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MADHYAMAKA

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-THE
GREAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF

HUMOR?

JGnagarbhas Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two

Truths. An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy.

Malcolm David Eckel. - State University of New York Press. 1987.

- pp. 220.
Recalling how vital a comprehension of the distinction between two
truths/realities (satya) is for a proper understanding of Madhyamaka
religious philosophy as a whole, already Nagarjuna had pointed
this out in his magnum opus (MK XXIV.9): ye nayor na vzjtinanti
vibhtiga? satyayor dvayo$/ te tattvav na vu&anti gambhire (read
thus!) buddha&sane //, it may strike us as strange that in the huge
body of extant Indian Madhyamaka literature it is not until the eighth
that we
century, with Jrianagarbhas Satyadvayavibhtiga/vibhafiga-vytti,
finally find a treatise, or more properly an essay, having this distinction as its main topic.
It is true that a distinction between two truths, a satyadvayavibhtiga,
runs as an undercurrent through all Madhyamaka texts before Jiianagarbha, and it is true that it occasionally comes to the surface or even
tends to become the focus of debate (in the case of Bhavya and
Srigupta, Jrianagarbhas immediate predecessors), but in all these cases
it still retains a somewhat subordinate role within a broader context. It
is not until JZnagarbhas work, of which David Eckel has now given
us an admirably translated and annotated edition, that it becomes
unquestionably the main focus of attention and even finds its way into
the title of the text.
What the historical background for this state of affairs may be, is
partly suggested by Jfianagarbha himself (p. 70):
The Lord knew what would benefit others, and he distinguished the two truths in
various ways to help those of lesser intelligence. Others, including NFigFijuna, have
explained them further. But great Buddhists have misunderstood, to say nothing of the
others who follow them.
Journal of Indian Philosophy 18: 249-260,
1990.
0 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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So it is the fact that great Buddhists, in the verse Jiianagarbha,

somewhat sarcastically speaks of my great predecessors, have
misunderstood that prompts him to bring an old issue on the agenda
anew. But there is another factor, more positive, about which Jtianagarbha himself is silent but about which the very words of his essay
speak most eloquently: The enormous influence that Dharmakirti
exerted as far as style, terminology and philosophical thought are
concerned.
There are thus three major factors that account for the appearance
of JrGnagarbhas essay and enable us to place him in a proper historical context. On the one hand, Jfianagarbha sees himself as vindicating
Madhyamaka tradition formerly represented by Nagarjuna, Bhavya,
and others. Then there is the challenge from Yoga&a with its fierce
criticism of the Madhyamaka interpretation of such concepts as
emptiness, and two truths. In this debate JriGnagarbha takes sides with
Bhavya, who all his life had participated in a debate with Dharmapala
and Sthiramati and their predecessors Asariga, Vasubandhu, and
Dignaga, and others. Third, there is the deep and overwhelming
impact of Dharmakirti. The innovations from his hand could not
be rejected or neglected in the eighth century; they could only be
adopted, and Jrianagarbha, to the best of our knowledge, is the first
Madhyamaka author to do so. If Dharmakirti was untouchable, at
least his student, Devendrabuddhi, was not. Since Dharmakirti, in my
opinion (see my paper in Wiener Zeitschrifr fiir die Kunde Siidasiens
28 (1984), 149-175) should be seen as a Yoga&-a of the Sakaravada
branch, this also means that Jiianagarbhas work to some extent can be
seen as an attempt to diminish the differences created between the two
schools of Mahayana philosophy, above all after the appearance of
Bhavyas MadhyamakahydayalTarkajwib.
In his Preface (p. 1) Prof. Eckel says that: Jiianagrabhas work on
the two truths records his struggle to adapt Madhyamaka thought to
the philosophical innovations of his contemporaries without losing
what is distinctive in his own past. And in his Introduction (p. 5) he
observes, more specifically, that:
Jiianagarbha stood at a point in the history of Madhyamaka when Madhyamaka
authors were asked to respond to YogSira critics while making a subtle accommodation to the style of the Buddhist logicians. And all this had to be done in a form
consistent with the convictions of the Madhyamaka tradition itself.

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Before going into details let me try to give a survey of what Eckels
fine book has to offer its readers: the first part (pp. 15-65) entitled
Jfianagarbha and the Growth of the Madhyamaka Tradition, discusses
Jiianagarbhas Madhyamaka background, the works ascribed to him,
the structure of the argument in the SDV, and, finally, his debt to
Dharmakirti. The second part gives us Eckels translation of the
Tibetan text, which is given as part four, after selections from
Santaraksitas Putijikti with explanatory notes. Finally the blockprints
of the Derge edition, a bibliography and indexes covering Sanskrit
terms and phrases as well as proper names are given.
Speaking of the principles that govern his translation Eckel (p. 9)
with approval quotes Dryden: I have endeavord to make Vergil
speak such English as he would himself have spoken, if he had been
born in England, and in this present age. Eckel is perfectly aware of
the difficult problems posed by condensed and technical Sanskrit
prose that has to be rendered into a modern and easy language. The
reader will find his translation clear, reliable and extremely readable. I
have not been able to detect any of the serious sort of misunderstandings that disfigure an alarmingly high percentage of recent
American translations of Madhyarnaka texts from the Tibetan and
Sanskrit.
The edition of the Tibetan text on the basis of Derge and Cone,
there being no Narthang or Peking ed. available, is very accurately
done. The SDV consists of a vGti in prose and 120 stanzas (46 basic
ones, 74 additional ones). A pity that the editor did not add numbers of lines which would have facilitated reference to the text. In the
Tibetan text I have noted the following misprints: p. 156, 1.3: for lhag
ma1 read lhag mao; p. 157, 1.10: after phyir add rollde nyid kyi phyir
mdo sde las ga yang mthong ba med pa ni de kho na mthong ba zhes
gsungs so, and delete ngo bo . . . gsungs so; p. 157, 1.23: for gno read
ngo; p. 158, 1.26: for synad read snyad; p. 159, 1.24: for ma ma read
ma; p. 162, 11. 15, 18 & 20: for bi read bl; p. 169, 1.6: for sa read
xi; p. 171, 1.16: for rnams read rnams las; p. 182, 1.21: for sha read
shti; p. 188, 1.21: for kun du read kun tu; p. 189, 1.9: for kun du
read kun tu.

As far as Eckels translation and annotations are concerned I would

like to make the following remarks:
p. 70: great predecessors, shing rta the dug. As the commentary

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shows this is a synonym of rang gi sde pa, S. svanikaya, svaytithya.

Siintaraksita also uses the term shing rta then po in his work
Madhyamakalamkarav~ti,
p. 56 (ed. Ichigo). Here it also refers to
masters of Mahay5na. Note, in this connection, the expression tshul
gnyis shing rta, the vehicle of two principles. In MadhyamaktilamkrIravrtti, p. 302 it refers to Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Santaraksita
seems to have borrowed the image from Madhyamakaratnapradipa
V.
Here, however, it refers to the two kinds of truth.
p. 71: I am not sure that cowherds and women (gopalangana) is
a stock phrase in Madhyamaka literature. Bhavya ad MHK III, 26
has Sahara and mtitariga, in MRP I sabara and gopala in the same
context. For Candrakirti, see Eckel, p. 111.
p. 72: In a note on Jiianagarbhas somewhat obscure position on the
idea of svasamvedana IchigO, op. cit., pp. brxx-lxxx& rightly argues
that JGinagarbha accepts self-cognition of knowledge to the extent that
he is forced to when he refutes Sakkara-and Nirakkarajfianavada, but
rejects the Yoga&a claim that it can be employed to prove pratytitmagatijr&ina as cognizing the absence of parikalpitasvabhava
(i.e. in
paratantrasvabhava). Jiianagarbhas position becomes much clearer
when seen in the light of Candrakirtis refutation of self-cognition as a
means to prove the existence of paratantrasvabhtiva, the vastumatra.
See Madhyamaktivatara, pp. 165-173. The other important source
for this before Jrianagarbha is MRP IV/2 (see my Bhavyas critique
of Yoga&a in Madhyamakaratnapradipa, in Buddhist Logic and
Epistemology, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 239-263.)
p. 74: For the passagefrom the Akqayamatinirdesa, see my Nagarjuniana, p. 149. There are allusions to this passagein all the works of
Bhavya and Candrakirti.
p. 75: According to Jrianagarbha tathyasamv$(-satya) is a vastumatra which is not confused with anything that is imagined and arises
dependently. Moreover, such a mere thing is arthakriyasamartha,
and it corresponds to appearances (yathadarsanam). Again Ichigo,
op. cit., pp. lxvi-lxix, provides a good summary of Jtianagarbhas view
of samvrtisatya and its influence on SGrtaraksita. His own definition
shows the impact of Bhavya, Candrakirti, Dharmakirti and Srigupta. In
Mahayana the term vastumatra first plays an important role in the
Tattvartha-patala of the Bodhisattvabhumi, pp. 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37

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(ed. N. Dutt). Here it is the ultimately real that cannot be denied,

cannot be spoken of, but at the same time is a fact providing the
foundation of prujfiupti. The early Yogacara teachers identified it with
the paratantrasvabhava, and to the Buddhist logicians, even prior to
Dharmakirti (see PV I, 190, etc.), as is proved by Bhavyas TJ ad
MHK III, 285 (Peking ed., 138b2: rtog pa dung bcas pa ni rjes su dpag
pa? shes pa stel rtog pa dung rjes su dran pa? rnam pai rnam par rtog
pa yod pa i phyir roll rnam par rtog pa med pa ni mngon sum gyi shes
pa stel dngos po tsam la dmigs pa? phyir ro/l), it is virtually the same
as svalaksana (see e.g. Nyayabindu: svalaksana is paramarthasat,
arthakriyastimarthyalaksanatvad
vastunah), or at least the cognitive
aspect of vastumatra. Jrianagarbha is here as careful as Bhavya and
Candrakirti; he does not identify the vastumatra with svalaksana, nor
does he make it solely an object of pratyaksa. He is more open
when speaking of two sorts of experience, darsana, viz. savikalpa and
nirvikalpa. Hence &intaraksita is reading too much of himself and
Dharmakirti into Jrianagarbha when he says: dngos po tsam dung
mthun par byed pai ngang can gyi sems ni rang gi mtshan nyid kyi yul
can gyi shes pa la byuo (Peking ed., lOb8). When using the deliberately vague term yathadarsanam Jiianagarbha is, as Eckel points out
(pp. 56-57) borrowing from Dharmakirti, whose yathanudurSanam,

according to Eckel, treads a narrow line between the hypothetical

term yathaprutyaksam (consistent with perception) and yathabhasam
(consistent with appearance). I do not, however, think that Eckel has
understood Dharmakirtis position properly. When he translates the
celebrated PV II, 2: arthakriyasamartham yat tad atra paramarthasatl
anyat samvrtisat proktum by Here [the object] that is capable of
effective action is called ultimately real and the other is relatively real
(p. 54), he is, like others before him, overlooking the significance of
atra. Here, as PVin II, 55 (arthakriyasamartham yat tad atra paramarthaw), the atra is actually interchangeable with yuthanudarSanam. As
I have pointed out (WZKS 28 (1984) 156) Dharmakirti acknowledges
Had he not, as a
a samvyavahtinka- and a paramarthika-pram&a.
Yoga&a, had his reasons for wanting to avoid Madhyamaka terminology, he could easily have used samvrtjxi for yathanudarSanam. So
when Dharmakirti speaks of samvrtisat and paramarthasat both terms
refer to what a Madhyamika would consider samvrtisatya. See Siddhi,

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pp. 549-550 for the various sorts of satyu current in Yoga&a in the
time of Dharmakirti and his predecessors. JSnagarbha, in other
words, follows Dharmakirti closely, and Dharmakirti cannot be said to
be deliberately vague once we recognize the context properly.
p. 76: Jfianagarbhas verse: ni!edhytibhtivatah spa$ap na ni!edho
sti tattvatah, is almost an echo of Vaidalya, see my Nagarjuniana, p.
93.
p. 77: Eckel suggests(notes, p. 127) that Jfianagarbhas term
tuttvtirtha is similar to the term Stinyattirtha in Nagarjunas MK XXIV,
7, and renders it reality as object. It is said to refer to the expressible ultimate. (Note, to be sure, that only &intaraksita, not JGnagarbha
himself, employs the two technical terms saparytiya and apatytiyu (or
nihparytiya). What Nagarjuna actually means by Gyat&tha
is not
immediately clear. He seems to have taken it over from LarikGvuttirustitra II, 145 which would, of course, settle the question of interpretation. If, however, we are to believe Candrakirti, p. 491, we should
understand the term in the light of XXIV, 18 so that the meaning (of
the word) Gnyatti is the same as that of pratityasamutptida. Or should
we rather say that the three concepts in XXIV, 18 correspond to the
three concepts in XXIV, 7? In any case, Ratmivali I, 98 has the term
tattwirthanir~ya,
and in V, 37 praj% is defined as satytirthani&aya.
The additional artha may well suggest that tattva as artha is consciously distinguished from tattva as such. For tattvajfitina, etc.,
without artha, see Nagarjuniuna, p. 270. Assuming that Nagarjuna did
make a deliberate distinction between two approaches to tattva, which
is, after all, very natural, we could more easily understand MK XVIII,
8-11, q.v.
p. 77: The antarailoka is clearly an allusion to the same Prajfilfptiram&i passageas the one alluded to by Nagigarjuna,MK XXII, 11. It is
quoted in MadhytintavibhrigabhG~ya, p. 18 (ed. Nagao): sarvam idaq
na Stinya~ ntipi cG2zyam. It seems that Eckels addition in brackets
should be deleted as it refers to the aparytiyaparamttrtha being ni;prapafica, cf. MK XVIII, 9.
p. 78: To understand the first antaraSloka it must be recalled that
the VimalakirtinirdeSastitra introduces the term abhiitaparikalpa
(Lamotte, p. 270) perhaps from the Bodhisattvapitaka (see Peking ed.,
vol. XXII, 294b) and that this term was later interpreted as a synonym

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of paratantrasvabhava by Yoga&a masters, beginning with Maitreya.

Had Vimalakirti been prepared to accept an interpretation such as the
one given in Madhyantavibhaga I, 1, to which JiGnagarbha here
alludes, he could and would not have remained silent. Just as Dignaga
and others speak of svalaksana, though by definition it cannot be
described, so Vimalakirti should have been able to speak of the
paratantrasvabhava if this were what was referred to when the stitra
mentions abhtitaparikalpa. So, according to JiGnagarbha, it is an
anachronism to interpret abhtitaparikalpa in the stitra as paratantrasvabhava.

p. 79: What distinguishes correct relative truth from incorrect is

that it possessesthe ability of arthakriya. This distinction, and causality
in general, is only valid according to experience (yathadarsanam), not
in the light of paramarthasatya, or nyaya. (For nyaya, Tib. rigs pa, cf.
Nagarjunas usage of yukti, Tib. also rigs pa, in Yuktisastika,
etc.
. ..
Nagarjunas usage comes very close to that of the Larikavatara, and,
indeed, JiGnagarbha may not be as innovating as suggested by Eckel.)
For yathadarsanam Jrianagarbha sometimes uses terms such as
yathaprasiddha, yathapratiti, Tib. ji ltar grags pa (kho na) bshin. This
terminology can be traced back to Bhavya and Candrakirti, but mainly
Dharmakirti, as in the case of yathadarsanam yathanudarsanam.
p. 83: The introduction of the idea of atisaya, a causal surplus,
again shows the influence of Dharmakirti.
p. 85: The term vastugraha is inspired by Nagarjuna, in whose
Acintyastava we find bhavagrahagrahavesa (v. 16) bhavagrahagrhita
(v. 52) and vastugraha (v. 54).
p. 85: Whereas authors such as Kambala and Candrakirti prefer to
define samvrti in terms of avidya, later authors such as Santadeva
(sic!) and Jiianagarbha define it in terms of buddhi (locus or instrument), a usage of buddhi fairly remote from that of early Madhyamaka
(intellect, intelligence). Again one feels the influence of Dharmakirti
with whom it is a favourite term.
p. 86: On the Prajriaparamita passagedealing with viparyasa, see
Conze, Large Sutra . . . p. 633. There is also an allusion to this
canonical passagein MRP III.
p. 88: Jfianagarbhas remark that The inference (anumana) and the
thing to be inferred (anumeya) are made up of a subject (dharmin),

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a property (dharma), and an example (d@infu) that appears to the

minds of both parties to the discussion. Otherwise there is no inference . . ., is clearly reminiscent of Dignagas celebrated sentence:

_ _
sarva evayam anurruin~numeyavyavah~ro
buddhyaru(thena dharmadharmibhedena na bahih sadasattvam apekate. See E. Frauwallner,
Kleine Schrifen, p. 840. - In the Tib. text p. 173, 1. 23 di tha snyad
kyi should probably be emended to tha snyud di ni. - Note that
ktiriktis 18- 19 are quoted in the Tib. doxographical work Blo gsul
grub mtha, pp. 178-180 (ed. Mimaki). Furthermore, the same text
quotes ktiriktis 17ab (p. 144) 3 (p. 148), 36 (p. 152), 12 (p. 154) 8

(p. 156) 21 (p. 170) 28 (p. 200) 18-19 (p. 208) 29-30 (pp. 21021 2) and 9cd-1 Oab (p. 226). On p. 126 ktirikti 9ab is quoted.
Mimaki claims that it differs considerably from the canonical version.
This is a mistake. The third line is actually part of the Vrtti! It is true
that we in Tib. doxographical works often find quotations from
Jnanagarbhas SDV. Though minor variants occur, they are always, to
the best of my experience, only orthographic, or due to lapsus
memoriae. There is, on this ground, no reason to assume the existence
of some paracanonical version of Jiianagarbhas SDV.
p. 88: The canonical quotation is not from the ,&yadharmadhtitupruk~tyasumbhedanirdeSa where the interlocutors are Maiijusri and
Sariputra. The PrujCiptirumitti passagehere referred to has been
quoted by R. Hikata, Suvikrtintavikrtimi-paripycchti
. . . p. lxix, q.v.
p. 88: The verse attributed to Nagarjuna by Santaraksita could
either hail from his Lokaparik+, or, more likely, Vyavahtirusiddhi. See
my Nagarjuniana, pp. 14 and 96.
p. 89: Coming to the third part of the definition of correct relative
truth, not subject to analysis, Eckel (p. 138, note 104) remarks that
The three elements of the formula could not have been brought
together before the time of Dharmakirti, since he introduced the term
artha-kriyti into the vocabulary of Buddhist logic. But elements of. the
formula occur separately in earlier works. I need not here speak of
hetujtita and arthakriytisamartha. The relevant passagesin Candrakirti
have been mentioned by Eckel. Candrakirti uses terms such as
avictiraprasiddha and itthat+c&Gprasiddhi.
In the same sense
Dharmakirti has avikalpya, ma brtags par. Even earlier we have
Alokamtflti 44, q.v. I still prefer to regard the verse in MRP I: . . . ma

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brtags nyams dgai mtshan nyid can/ rgyu las skyes dang don byed nusll
tshu rol mthong bai kun rdzob yin// as the source of all later authors,
beginning with Srigupta. See JIP 9 (1981) 196. It is not unlikely that
Bhavya adopted arthakriyasamartha from Dharmakirti (whom he

quotes later in the MRP), though, of course, the idea is at least as old
as the Vrtti to Vigrahavyavartanl 2, q.v. (karyakriyasamartha). The
source of the compound avicaramanohara (or avicararamaniya) is still
not clear. With regard to arvagdarsana Bhavyas source is probably
the Vrtti to Vakyapadiya I, 15 1, q.v. it is also used by Dharmakirti, in
his Pramanaviniscaya, at least twice. There are, to be sure, several
other references to Bhartrhari in the MRP.
p. 90: Emend abhinivesa to samklesa, Tib. has kun nas nyon
mongs.

p. 90: For the idea that samvrti, previously defined as buddhi by

Jtianagarbha, has no Graya, see already Alokamaki 3 1.
p. 92: Here, in ten antaraslokas, Jrianagarbha refutes an opponent,
notorious for his bad arguments, who claims that if something does
not arise in a real sense (tattvatah), it does not arise in a relative sense
(samvrtya), like the son of a barren woman and so forth , . . The
name of the opponent is not mentioned. More or less following Ruegg,
Eckel refers to Candrakirtis Madhyamakavatara VI, 36-38. See,
however, also VI, 12 and, above all, the references to Bhavya in
Prasannapada, that come even closer to Jtianagarbha. All this seems
to indicate that Jrianagarbha may have had Candrakirti in mind here.
The arguments against Candrakirti are in fact already to be found in
the extant works of Bhavya. In any case we here have a Svatantrika
refuting a Prasangika. Some of the verses are rather obscure. In the
two final couplets Jnanagarbha is referring to the ineffable absolute
(aparyayaparamartha) in relation to which arguments and causality
make no sense. The final words run di nyid kyis ni thal bar yang/ dogs
pa rnam par bzlog pa yin/. Eckel translates: From this it follows that
the objection is refuted. But somehow Jiianagarbha wants to conclude
his refutation of Candrakirti by saying that even his prasarigaarguments are impossible unless samvrtisatya is somehow accepted.
p. 94: With regard to the numbering of the verses I would prefer to
count brtags pai og tu khas blang gi as 27a, and mngon sum la sags
gal zhe na as 27b, thus dropping what Eckel prints as 27b on p. 180.

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p. 97: Here Jiianagarbha speaks of a gradual teaching of aggregates

(skandha), realms (dhtitu), sense media (tiyutuna), mind-only (cittum&a), and the selflessnessof dharmas, adjusted to the mental
capacities [of his listeners]. This brings us back to a major issue
discussed by Eckel in his introduction to the translation. I do not
think that Eckel (p. 55) is justified in claiming that We do not see in
Jiianagarbha the same understanding of mind-only that is found in
Santaraksita. Indeed, Santaraksitas stand-point on cittumtitru can be
traced back to Jiianagarbha, and his position has not been well
defined or properly recognized by Tibetan sources. See Ichigo, op.
cit., p. lxxxv. Furthermore, Jrianagarbhas passageis almost an echo of
the oft-quoted Bodhicittuvivurunu 25, q.v., Nugurjuniunu, p. 192. The
idea is at least as old as the celebrated Luriktivuttiru verses quoted by
Eckel, p. 60. But what about Bhavyas attitude to the doctrine of
cittumatru? Does Jnanagarbha depend on Bhavya in this regard?
According to Eckel (pp. 17-18, with note 14 on p. 60) Bhavya does
not treat it as a necessary step in the ascent to a higher level of
understanding, etc., it is rather, on the basis of MHK/TJ V, 54 like
mud that has to be washed away. However, what Bhavya is criticizing
in this passageis not at all cittumtitru as a spiritual krumu, but, on the
contrary, the manner in which the opponent uses this doctrine in an
argument. If external objects do not exist in the first place why then
argue that they are parts of cittu. It is silly and superfluous to get in
touch with mud only in order to wash it away again. Also from MHK/
TJ IV it is clear that Bhavya certainly accepts the idea of cittumtitru,
which is, after all, canonical, but he does not accept the Yogacara
interpretation aiming at negating the existence of external objects. The
problem is really, as Eckel also suggests,that cittumtitru may occur in
a theoretical as well as in a practical context. In Madhyamaka texts
these two sides are always kept clearly apart. So whether Bhavya also
accepted citumtitru as a spiritual kramu depends on whether we
accept the authenticity of the MRP or not. In any case, there can be
no doubt that cittumtitru was accepted also as a spiritual practice
already at the time of Luriktivuttiru and Bodhicittuvivurunu, that is,
long before the time of Bhavya.
p. 97: Verse 33ab is an echo of Mudhytintuvibhtigu I, 8ab: ubhzitupurikufpus cu CittacuittEs tridhGtuk&.

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p. 99: The first anturaSloka is an echo of Dharmakirtis PVin III,

2ab or PV IV 54ab: riktasya jantor jtitasya gunado;am apaiyatah.
The title of our text - is it Satyadvayavibhatigu or Satyudvayavibh&u? Eckel (pp. 61-62) is aware of the problem and prefers
-vibhatiga with the Tibetan colophons. Since, however, the Sanskrit
in Tib. colophons is often merely a reconstruction based solely on Tib.
this argument is in itself not of much weight. Tib. rnam par byed pa,
or rnam par dbye ba can, to be sure, render vibhtiga as well as
vibhariga, so it is of no help in deciding the question. No doubt the
title contains an allusion to Nagarjunas celebrated verse: ye nayor na
vijtinanti vibhtigam satyayor dvayoh . . . In similar contexts vibhtiga is
always used, never vibhatiga, but this in itself is not sufficient to say
that -vibhtiga would be more proper in the title of a text (or chapter)
than -vibhariga. In Pali (we need not go outside Buddhist tradition) we
have, of course, the Vibhatigu. In (Buddhist) Sanskrit we find titles
such as Karmavibhauiga, Vinayavibhariga, etc., where - vibhariga would
mean classification of a large number of topics. On the other hand
-vibhciga is well attested in the Sanskrit mss. pertaining to early
philosophical works such as Madhytintavibhtiga, Ratnagotravibhciga
and Dharmadh&uvibhcIga. See Gokhales Yogacara Works Annotated
by Vairocanaraksita, in ABORI: Diamond Jubilee Volume, Poona
1977-78, pp. 635-639. Also, correct Takasaki, A Study on the
Ratnugotravibhtiga (Uttaratuntra), Rome 1966, p. 14 1, n. I accordingly. Here the term -vibhtiga signifies a distinction made between two
or more opposite concepts. I cannot agree with Eckel when he says
that (p. 62) vibhafiga in the sense of distinction is acceptable
Buddhist usage as long as we are dealing with the usage in philosophical Mahayana texts. It is, therefore, almost certain that the title of
Jiianagarbhas text is SatyadvayavibhcSga.
Eckel (pp. 35-49) makes a very interesting point about paradoxes
in Madhyamaka literature and philosophy, and he speaks about the
sense of balance and the dynamic character of Madhyamaka. First,
as Eckel points out, the philosopher assumes a certain distinction (esp.
that of two truths), then he denies the distinction just made, and finally
the philosopher reappropriates these distinctions. See also, most
recently, Eckels Bhavavivekas Vision of Reality in JAAR LV/l
(1987), 39-54, for a development of the same idea. He concludes that

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REVIEW

ARTICLE

Perhaps the best category to describe Jfianagarbhas mode of argument is not dialectic
or paradox, but irony. No one would make the mistake of claiming that Jiiinagarbha
is one of the worlds great comic writers, but there is much in his argument that
reminds a reader of the deep sense of playfulness that in Indian civilization characterizes the freedom of the enlightened mind.

Eckel has certainly made an important point here. There are elements,
moments, that go beyond dry logic, &qkaturka, surely. And apart from
the sense of balance, playfulness and irony, there is a sense of the
beauty of a condensed and polished style, the beauty of the religious
imagery, etc. There is a tendency to be cryptic, elusive, and sarcastic,
and what if it turned out that Jfi&agarbha, like %ntaraksita, behind
the academic faqade, was an ardent adherent of Vajraytia? Very
ironic, indeed!
Personally, at the risk of being taken too seriously, I find that
Madhyamaka presents itself as a system of great humor. Humor has
to do with an awareness of opposites. Here it is more than just an
occasional attitude; it is rather a deep sentiment, a Lebensgefihl. A
Madhyamika has, to begin with, a belief in (or experience of) some
absolute values, but like all of us, he is also confronted with the
everyday world of plurality and relativity. One can very well say that it
is his sense of great humor that enables him to overcome the
opposites and incompatibilities of life, or, as he himself would say, to
follow a middle path between extremes. Great humor, when having
to express itself in communication, is sensitive to the inexpressibility of
the absolute, and finds a certain satisfaction in expressing itself in
paradoxes and negations. It achieves a certain dynamics, or agility,
which is the very soul of a spiritual attitude adverse to any sort of
dogmatic, clinging mode of behaviour. Madhyamaka texts are full of
sarcasm and sophistry, but it should not be forgotten that they are
always the outcome of great humor that has its deepest basis in a
belief in absolute values.
CHRISTIAN

LINDTNER

Institut for Orientalsk Filologi

KBbenhavns Universitet
Njalsgade 80
2300 Kabenhavn. Denmark