Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Selfunderstanding
and social cognitive
development
a
Clark University
Published online: 09 Jul 2006.
To cite this article: Daniel Hart & William Damon (1988) Selfunderstanding and
social cognitive development, Early Child Development and Care, 40:1, 5-23,
DOI: 10.1080/0300443880400102
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0300443880400102
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study
purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,
reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access
and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions
WILLIAM DAMON
Clark University
(Received 31 May 1988)
Self-understanding is described as a multi-faceted conceptual system.
Utilizing the distinctions among facets proposed by William James, a
new model of self-understanding development is presented. According
to the model, the various facets of self-understanding evolve through a
sequence of four developmental levels. The relationship between
development in self-understanding, as described by the model, and
interpersonal reasoning is considered in a study of children. The results
indicate that self-understanding develpment is related to, but
independent from, the development of interpersonal reasoning.
Theoretical and research implications of these findings are considered.
KEY WORDS: Self-understanding, Cognition, Childhood, Friendship,
Authority, Morality
The multi-faceted nature of self-understanding precludes a unidimensional model of development. Based upon our review of the
literature (Damon and Hart, 1982, 1988), and our cross-sectional
(Hart and Damon, 1986) longitudinal (Damon and Hart, 1986; Hart
and Damon, 1985; Hart, Maloney, and Damon, 1987), cross-cultural
(Hart, Lucca-Irizarry, and Damon, 1986) and clinical (Hart,
Schorin, and Damon, in press) studies, we have proposed and verified
the multi-faceted developmental model of self-understanding
depicted in Figure 1.
11
12
drawing relational analogies between self and others (as was the case
at level 2) to identifying one's manner of interacting with others.
Implicit or explicit comparative statements, therefore, assess the
quality of one's interactional capacities. Beyond comparisons, there is
also a concern at level 3 for the nature of any stable personality traits
that may define one's place and manner of operating in the social
network. At level 4 Systematic Beliefs and Plans categories of the self-asobject are organized through systematic beliefs and*life plans.
Characteristics of self draw their meaning for one's identity through
such beliefs and plans, which may include philosophical or moral
belief systems, ideological choices, or any variety of personal goals. It
is at this level, therefore, that a consciously systematic conception of
self is first achieved.
The side face of the model corresponds to the 'self-as-subject' or the
T in William James's description (1892/1961). Rather than attempt
to represent the actual development of the T component of the self,
which James believed would be impossible, the side face of the model
presents the developmental changes that occur in an understanding of
three of the four types of awareness that derive from the I (in our own
empirical work, we have found it difficult to elicit children's and
adolescents' understanding of self-reflection, and, for this reason,
have omitted this dimension from our model). The developmental
progressions for the T components of self-understanding are
described separately below. They are described separately because
our research indicates that there is not a general developmental
sequence applying to all three components of the T . Instead, each
component represents a distinctive type of self-understanding that
develops along its own trajectory, although there certainly are
commonalities among the three developmental paths, as well as
conceptual connections to the general sequence for the 'Me'
described above.
Within the agency component of self-understanding, at level 1, the
individual believes that biological or social forces determine the
existence and formation of self. At level 2, the individual asserts that it
is the self s own talents, abilities, efforts, or wishes, that shape the
direction of one's life. Level 3 agency understanding emphasizes the
influence of communication with others as a force directing the self s
life course. And finally, at level 4, the individual's own personal or
moral evaluations of life possibilities are believed to determine the
nature of the self.
13
14
think I inherited a good sense of humor too. I was raised with humor. My mother can
tell a joke and it changes me.
In the preceding section, we described the nature of selfunderstanding and its development. The purpose of this detailed
15
exposition is to highlight the unique developmental qualities of selfunderstanding, which have been frequently overlooked (Damon and
Hart, 1982). The absence of comprehensive descriptions of selfunderstanding development prior to the one presented in our work is
in marked contrast to the abundance of developmental descriptions
of other concepts such as logical reasoning (Piaget, 1929), moral
judgment (e.g. Damon, 1977; Kohlberg, 1983), social conventions
(e.g. Turiel, 1983), friendship (e.g. Youniss, 1979), social perspectives
(e.g. Selman, 1980), and person perception (Livesly and Bromley,
1973) to name but a few. Here, we shall consider the developmental
relationships that exist between self-understanding and these other,
more frequently studied concepts.
What type of developmental relationship should a researcher
expect to find between self-understanding and the various domains of
development? One common line of theorizing is that a single general
structure pervades all of a child's or adolescent's reasoning, and as
this general structure evolves into a qualitatively new one, reasoning
in different domains evidences parallel changes. Most usually,
researchers have assumed that the sequence of general structures is
best captured by Piaget's stages of logical reasoning. The research
strategy is to place individuals at different stages of development
based on performance in Piagetian tasks and then attempt to identify
reflections of that stage in the individual's reasoning in the domain of
interest. For instance, Noppe (1983) tested children and adolescents
on several different formal operational tasks, and also asked them to
write descriptions of themselves. Her hypothesis was that those
individuals who achieved formal operational thought and therefore
were capable of hypothetico-deductive reasoning would describe
themselves differently than those capable only of the reality-bound
cognitive processing characteristic of the concrete operational
thinker. The self-descriptions of formal operational adolescents might
be more oriented than those of concrete operational adolescents
towards psychological characteristics because of an ability to deduce
causes (motives, emotions), from results (behaviors). Within this sort
of theoretical paradigm, however, it is surprising that Noppe found
no significant differences in the self-description of the two groups of
adolescents.
A similar argument has also been made by some self theorists, who
have argued that developments in various domains are primarily a
reflection of the development of the self. This conception of the self is
inherent in much of the self-esteem literature, in which a single global
16
17
knowledge about the relationships between self and others within the
awareness that one's own actions can radically affect the nature and
direction of the ongoing social interaction. Knowledge acquisition
about the physical world is different; the child learns that the wind
blows and the sun shines without intentional coordination with the
child's actions or participation. One relatively molar distinction
between domains, then, is between social-cognitive and scientific
reasoning. The developmental connections between the two broad
domains are likely to be relatively weak, as a consequence of the
above mentioned fundamental difference (Damon, 1977). It is for this
reason that Noppe's failure to find meaningful relationships between
formal operational thinking and self-description in the study
described above seems to us predictable.
Although it is not surprising that there is little evidence for a direct
connection between the developmental trajectories of physical
cognition and self-understanding, we do expect self-understanding
development to be related to development in other social cognitive
concepts. This is because self-understanding is itself a social cognitive
concept. Like other concepts within the social domain, the process of
constructing knowledge about the self occurs within a network of
relationships in which different persons intentionally modify their
actions in reaction to the actions of others; this has become a point of
departure for virtually every major theorist (e.g. Baldwin, 1902;
Mead, 1934; Mahler et al 1975).
Even with the domain of social cognition, however, there are
important distinctions among the functions of different types of
knowledge. The most commonly studied social cognitive concepts
concern an understanding of interpersonal relationships and
regulations: friendship, authority, and justice, to name just a few.
Primarily, the child's understanding of these interpersonal
relationships and regulations functions to facilitate effective
participation in social interaction and in society (Damon, 1983).
Although self-understanding too serves this goal, it is distinct from
these interpersonal concepts in that it aids in the differentiation of the
individual from society. For this reason, self-understanding
development is unlikely to be identical with development of the
interpersonal concepts. Empirically, then, in contrast with Kegan,
we would predict that self-understanding developmental levels would
exhibit only a moderate degree of association with developmental
levels of interpersonal concepts.
18
A research example
19
Self-Understanding
Positive Justice
Authority
Positive Justice
Authority
Friendship
'49(38)**
"34(34)*
0-48(33)**
0-38(37)*
0-38(36)*
"5'(33)**
20
operates. Throughout this article, we have argued that selfunderstanding is a unique type of knowledge, serving both to aid the
individual's integration into, and differentiation from, the
surrounding social world. The dual functions and multi-faceted
nature of self-understanding demand that it receive its own
developmental investigation aimed at elucidating its specific
qualities. It is this descriptive task with which we, and others, have
been primarily concerned over the past ten years (see Damon and
Hart, 1988, for details).
The construction of preliminary descriptions of self-understanding
development, such as the one presented in our model, can permit selfunderstanding investigation to enter a new phase. From our
perspective, the most pressing need is for research that examines the
development of self-understanding in social context. We have argued
that self-understanding develops primarily within the medium of
intentional, social relationships, and for this reason selfunderstanding is one domain of social cognition. Although this
position is firmly entrenched in the self theories of Baldwin (1902),
Luria, (1976), Mahler et al. (1975), Mead (1934), and is consonant
x
with the speculations of Vygotsky as well (see Corsaro, 1985, or Hart,
Wertsch, and Kohlberg, 1987 for a review of many of these theories)
the unfortunate truth is that little developmental research has sought
to delineate the relationship, between the social context and an
understanding of self. As a consequence, little is known about how the
social environment affects the individual's construction of a sense of
self.
There appear to be several possible levels of analysis for
investigating social influence on self-understanding development. At
a molar level, it seems probable that culture has a major impact.
Anthropological research, while not directly exploring children's selfconcept development, has reported marked cultural differences in
how persons, and, by implication, selves, are conceived. This is not to
say that the notions of self and person are themselves ephemeral
cultural artifacts. In every culture people have some mode of
understanding these basic concepts (Levine and White, 1986).
Further, because these concepts serve essential human cognitive
functions, these modes of understanding no doubt have something in
common across cultures. Instead, culture is most likely to affect the
focus of self-understanding. In the reported anthropological data,
perhaps the most broad-based cultural differences in how persons are
21
22
Baldwin, J.M. (1902). Social and ethical interpretations in mental life. New York:
MacMillan
Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self-esteem. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Corsaro, W. (1985). Friendship and peer culture in the early years. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Damon, W. (1977). The social world of the child. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Damon, W. (1979). Why study social cognitive development? Human Development, 22,
1010-1017.
23
Hart, D., Kohlberg, L., and Wertsch, J. (1987). The developmental social selftheories of James Mark Baldwin, George Herbert Mead, and Lev
Semenovich Vygotsky. In L. Kohlberg, Child psychology and childhood education:
a cognitive-developmental view. New York: Longman.
Hart, D., Lucca-Irizarry, N., and Damon, W. (1986). The development of selfunderstanding in Puerto Rico and the United States. Journal of Early
Adolescence, 6, 293-304.
Hart, D., Schorin, M., and Damon, W. (in press). Self-understanding development
and adolescent adjustment. Maclean Hospital Journal.
Harter, S. (1983). The development of the self and the self-system. In M.
Hetherington (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology (Vol. 4, 285-385). 4th ed.
New York: Wiley.
James, W. (1961). Psychology: The briefer course. New York: Harper and Row Bros.
(Originally published 1892).
Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self: Problem and process in human development.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kegan, R. (1985). The loss of Pete's dragon. In R. Leahy (Ed.) The development of the
self. New York: Academic.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to
socialization. In D.A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Levine, R., and White, M. (1986). Human conditions: The cultural basis for educational
development. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Lewis, M., Brooks-Gunn, J., and Jaskir, D. (1985). Individual differences in visual
self-recognition as a function of infant-mother attachment relationship.
Developmental Psychology, 21, 1181-1187.
Luria, A. (1976). Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations (M. LopezMorillas and L. Solotaroff, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Mahler, M., Pine, F., and Bergman, A. (1975). The psychological birth of the human
infant. New York: Basic Books.
Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind Self and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Montemayor, R., and Eisen, M. (1977). The development of self-conceptions from
childhood to adolescence. Developmental Psychology, 13, 314-319.
Noppe, I. (1983). A cognitive developmental perspective on the adolescent selfconcept. Journal of Early Adolescence, 3, 275-286.
Piaget, J. (1929). The child's conception of the world. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams
and Co.
Rosenberg, M. (1985). Self-concept and psychological well-being in adolescence. In
R. Leahy (Ed.) The development of the self. New York: Academic.
Schorin, M., and Hart, D. (1988). Development of self-understanding in anorexic and nonanorexic adolescent females. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Schorin, M., and Hart, D. (in press). Psychotherapeutic implications of the
development of self-understanding. In S. Shirk (Ed.), Cognitive development and
child psychotherapy. New York: Plenum.
Selman. R. (1980). The growth of interpersonal understanding. New York: Academic
Press.
Turiel, E. (1983). Domains and categories in social cognitive development. In W.
Overton (Ed.), The relationship between social and cognitive development. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Youniss, J. (1979). Parents and peers in social development. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.