Professional Documents
Culture Documents
reconsideration
which
failed
to
notify
the
opposing
party
of
the
time
and
place
of
trial
is
a
mere
scrap
of
paper
and
will
not
be
entertained
by
the
court.
He
has
only
himself
to
blame
and
he
is
the
reason
why
his
client
lost.
Almacen
was
suspended
indefinitely.
Teodoro
Chavez
vs
Atty.
Escolastico
Viola
196
SCRA
10
Legal
Ethics
A
lawyer
shall
do
no
falsehood
In
1966,
Atty.
Viola
assisted
Felicidad
Alvendia
et
al
in
filing
a
petition
against
Teodoro
Chavez
where
he
sought
to
have
the
Alvendias
be
declared
as
bona
fide
lessees
in
a
land
controversy.
Said
petition
was
dismissed
because
of
nonappearance
by
the
Alvendias.
In
1977,
Atty.
Viola
assisted
same
clients
in
applying
for
an
original
registration
of
title
over
the
same
land
in
controversy
in
1966.
In
said
application,
Atty.
Viola
insisted
that
his
clients
were
the
true
owners
of
said
land
because
they
acquired
it
by
sale
from
Teresita
Vistan
way
back
in
1929.
Chavez
then
filed
a
disbarment
case
against
Atty.
Viola.
Chavez
said
that
because
of
the
conflicting
claims
that
Viola
prepared
in
behalf
of
his
clients,
he
had
willingly
aided
in
and
consented
to
the
pursuit,
promotion
and
prosecution
of
a
false
and
unlawful
application
for
land
registration,
in
violation
of
his
oath
of
office
as
a
member
of
the
Bar.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Atty.
Viola
is
in
violation
of
the
Lawyers
Oath.
HELD:
Yes.
Viola
alleged
in
an
earlier
pleading
that
his
clients
were
merely
lessees
of
the
property
involved.
In
his
later
pleading,
he
stated
that
the
very
same
clients
were
owners
of
the
same
property.
One
of
these
pleadings
must
have
been
false;
it
matters
not
which
one.
Worse,
he
offered
no
explanation
as
regards
the
discrepancy.
A
lawyer
owes
honesty
and
candor
to
the
courts.
It
cannot
be
gainsaid
that
candidness,
especially
towards
the
courts,
is
essential
for
the
expeditious
administration
of
justice.
Courts
are
entitled
to
expect
only
complete
candor
and
honesty
from
the
lawyers
appearing
and
pleading
before
them.
Atty.
Viola
was
suspended
for
5
months.
Santa
Pangan
vs
Atty.
Dionisio
Ramos
93
SCRA
87
Legal
Ethics
Lack
of
Candor
by
a
Lawyer
Proper
name
to
be
used
by
a
lawyer
In
1979,
a
pending
administrative
case
filed
by
Santa
Pangan
against
Atty.
Dionisio
Ramos
was
delayed
because
Atty.
Ramos
allegedly
appeared
before
a
court
in
Manila.
When
the
records
of
the
said
case
was
checked
(one
which
Atty.
Ramos
appeared
in),
it
was
found
that
he
used
the
name
Atty.
Pedro
D.D.
Ramos.
In
his
defense,
Atty.
Ramos
said
he
has
the
right
to
use
such
name
because
in
his
birth
certificate,
his
name
listed
was
Pedro
Dionisio
Ramos.
D.D.
stands
for
Dionisio
Dayaw
with
Dayaw
being
his
mothers
surname.
However,
in
the
roll
of
attorneys,
his
name
listed
was
Dionisio
D.
Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
what
Atty.
Ramos
did
was
correct.
HELD:
No.
The
attorneys
roll
or
register
is
the
official
record
containing
the
names
and
signatures
of
those
who
are
authorized
to
practice
law.
A
lawyer
is
not
authorized
to
use
a
name
other
than
the
one
inscribed
in
the
Roll
of
Attorneys
in
his
practice
of
law.
The
official
oath
obliges
the
attorney
solemnly
to
swear
that
he
will
do
no
falsehood.
As
an
officer
in
the
temple
of
justice,
an
attorney
has
irrefragable
obligations
of
truthfulness,
candor
and
frankness.
In
representing
himself
to
the
court
as
Pedro
D.D.
Ramos
instead
of
Dionisio
D.
Ramos,
respondent
has
violated
his
solemn
oath
and
has
resorted
to
deception.
The
Supreme
Court
hence
severely
reprimanded
Atty.
Ramos
and
warned
that
a
similar
infraction
will
warrant
suspension
or
disbarment.
On
July
18,
1983,
a
decision
was
rendered
by
the
trial
court
approving
the
said
Compromise
Agreement
and
enjoining
the
parties
to
comply
with
the
terms
and
conditions
embodied
therein.
Partial
payments
were
made
under
the
compromise
judgment.
Upon
failure
of
private
respondent
to
make
the
other
payments,
petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
execution
of
judgment.
The
trial
court
granted
the
motion
on
December
16,
1983.
On
January
16,1984,
counsel
for
defendants
filed
a
pleading
entitled
"Clarification"
thereby
seeking
a
correction
of
the
compromise
judgment
on
the
ground
that
he
erroneously
filed
the
Compromise
Agreement
in
behalf
of
all
the
defendants
when
in
fact
he
was
the
counsel
for
MFC
only.
On
January
17,
1984,
said
counsel
filed
a
"Motion
To
Correct
Compromise
Agreement"
attaching
thereto
a
copy
of
the
resolution
of
the
Board
of
Directors
of
MFC
of
July
6,1983
showing
that
he
was
the
attorney-in-fact
of
MFC
only,
and
praying
for
the
correction
of
the
judgment,
accordingly.
The
motion
for
clarification
was
denied
on
January
20,1984.
On
January
24,
1984,
the
Syquia
Law
Offices,
in
behalf
of
private
respondents
Angelo
King,
Keng
Suy
Wat,
Quintin
Calderon
and
Jose
J.
Ferrer,
Jr.,
filed
a
motion
to
set
aside
the
decision
dated
July
18,1983,
the
Compromise
Agreement
and
the
writ
of
execution
dated
December
21,
1983
on
the
ground
that
there
was
no
service
of
summons
upon
each
of
them
as
the
corporate
address
of
the
corporation
was
not
their
address
as
they
were
no
longer
connected
therewith;
that
Atty.
Aragones
had
no
authority
to
represent
them
in
the
action
and
compromise
agreement;
that
they
were
not
served
copies
of
the
decision
of
the
court;
that
they
learned
about
the
same
only
when
it
was
being
executed;
and
that
they
did
not
participate
as
directors
or
officers
of
MFC
in
the
subject
transaction.
On
January
26,1984,
private
respondent
Domingo
F.
Li
filed
a
petition
for
relief
from
judgment
with
a
prayer
for
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
alleging
therein
that
there
was
no
service
of
summons
upon
him
and
that
Atty.
Aragones
was
not
authorized
to
represent
him
or
to
enter
into
the
Compromise
Agreement.
After
an
opposition
to
said
motion
was
filed
by
the
petitioner,
the
lower
court
denied
the
same
in
its
order
dated
April
6,
1984.
Separate
motions
for
reconsideration
filed
by
the
private
respondents
were
also
denied
on
May
4,1984.
Thus,
private
respondents
appealed
to
the
respondent
Court
of
Appeals,
reiterating
that
there
was
no
service
of
summons
upon
each
of
them
as
service
of
summons
was
made
at
the
address
of
the
firm
with
which
they
had
severed
connections;
that
the
counsel
of
record
of
MFC
has
no
authority
to
represent
them
in
the
case
and
in
the
Compromise
Agreement;
that
they
have
not
ratified
the
same
by
a
partial
payment
of
the
compromise
judgment;
and
that
they
were
no
longer
connected
with
MFC
at
the
time
they
were
sued.
In
due
time,
a
decision
was
rendered
by
the
appellate
court
on
January
27,
1987,
the
dispositive
part
of
which
reads
as
follows:
In
view
of
the
foregoing,
the
other
errors
assigned
by
the
appellants
need
not
be
resolved:
Wherefore:
(1)
the
decision
dated
July
18,
1983
approving
the
compromise
agreement
rendered
by
the
lower
court
as
well
as
the
writ
of
execution
issued
pursuant
thereto
as
against
appellants
Angelo
King,
Keng
Suy
Wat,
Quintin
Calderon,
Jose
Ferrer,
Jr.,
and
Domingo
Li
are
hereby
SET
ASIDE;
and
(2)
the
case
is
remanded
to
the
court
of
origin
which
is
hereby
ordered
to
direct
proper
service
of
summons
on
the
aforesaid
individual
appellants
at
their
respective
correct
addresses
and
thereafter
to
proceed
in
accordance
with
law.
SO
ORDERED.
7
A
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
said
decision
filed
by
petitioner
was
denied
by
the
appellate
court
on
April
22,
1987.
Hence,
the
instant
petition
predicated
on
the
following
grounds:
(A)
THAT
THE
CASE
AT
BAR
(a)
PERTAINS
TO
(AN)
APPEAL
FROM
ORDER
OF
TRIAL
COURT
DATED
APRIL
6,1984,
DENYING
(i)
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
DOMINGO
K
LI'S
'PETITION
FOR
RELIEF
FROM
JUDGMENT'
FILED
JANUARY
25,
1984,
AND
(ii)
MOTION
TO
SET
ASIDE
DECISION,
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
AND
QUASH
EXECUTION
FILED
JANUARY
14,1984
BY
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
ANGELO
KING,
KING
SUY
WAT,
QUINTIN
CALDERON
and
JOSE
FERRER,
JR.
and
(b)
DOES
NOT
INVOLVE
ANY
APPEAL
FROM
TRIAL
COURT'S
DECISION
DATED
JULY
19,1983
APPROVING
THE
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
WHICH
HAS
LONG
BECOME
FINAL
AND
EXECUTORY.
(B)
THAT
RESPONDENT
COURT
OF
APPEALS
COMPLETELY
IGNORED
THE
BASIC
QUESTION
OF
WHETHER
(a)
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
DOMINGO
K.
LI'S
'PETITION
FOR
RELIEF
FROM
JUDGMENT
FILED
JANUARY
25,1984,
and
(b)'THE
MOTION
TO
SET
ASIDE
DECISION,
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
AND
QUASH
EXECUTION'
FILED
JANUARY
14,1984
BY
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
ANGELO
KING,
KENG
SUY
WAT,
QUINTIN
CALDERON
AND
JOSE
FERRER,
JR.,
WERE
FILED
OUT
OF
TIME.
(C)
THAT
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
WHO
WERE
SUED
AS
DIRECTORS
AND
OFFICERS
OF
MFC
WERE
PROPERLY
SERVED
WITH
SUMMONS.
The
petition
is
devoid
of
merit.
Although
private
respondents
were
sued
in
their
capacity
as
directors
and
officers
of
MFC,
they
are,
nevertheless,
being
held
personally
liable
for
the
obligation
subject
of
the
litigation
under
the
complaint
filed
by
petitioner.
Hence,
the
rule
on
personal
service
of
summons
must
be
observed
in
that
summons
must
be
served
personally
on
private
respondents
or,
if
they
refuse
to
receive
the
same,
by
tendering
it
to
them.
longer
connected.
Such
substituted
service
is
not
valid.
There
was
no
compliance
with
the
requirements
of
the
rule
that
there
must
be
a
previous
personal
service
and
a
failure
to
effect
the
same
before
substituted
service
could
be
resorted
to.
As
the
private
respondents
have
not
been
duly
served
with
summons,
the
trial
court
never
acquired
jurisdiction
over
their
persons.
It
is
true
that
Atty.
Aragones,
who
entered
his
appearance
in
behalf
of
MFC
and
private
respondents,
sought
an
extension
of
time
to
file
an
answer
or
a
responsive
pleading,
and
a
suspension
of
the
proceedings
pending
a
possible
settlement
of
the
case;
that
thereafter,
he
signed
a
Compromise
Agreement
in
behalf
of
MFC
and
private
respondents
which
was
submitted
to
the
court
on
the
basis
of
which
a
compromise
judgment
was
rendered;
that
said
judgment
was
partially
complied
with
but
upon
default
in
the
payment
of
the
balance,
a
writ
of
execution
was
sought
from
and
granted
by
the
trial
court;
and
that
it
was
only
then
that
Atty.
Aragones
informed
the
court
that
he
committed
an
oversight
in
having
filed
the
Compromise
Agreement
in
behalf
of
private
respondents
when
it
was
only
MFC
which
hired
his
services.
If
Atty.
Aragones
was
duly
authorized
to
appear
in
behalf
of
the
defendants,
his
voluntary
appearance
in
their
behalf
by
the
filing
of
the
aforementioned
pleadings
and
the
Compromise
Agreement
would
constitute
a
waiver
of
the
defect
in
the
service
of
summons.
However,
the
lack
of
authority
of
Atty.
Aragones
was
revealed
when
he
produced
the
resolution
of
the
Board
of
Directors
of
MFC
to
the
effect
that
the
authority
of
said
counsel
was
in
behalf
of
said
corporation
only
and
not
in
behalf
of
the
private
respondents.
Since
the
Compromise
Agreement
was
signed
by
Atty.
Aragones
in
behalf
of
the
private
respon
dents
without
their
authority,
the
same
is
null
and
void
in
so
far
as
they
are
concerned.
By
the
same
token,
the
compromise
judgment
is
also
null
and
void
as
to
private
respondents.
The
ruling
of
the
lower
court
that
the
motion
to
set
aside
the
judgment
and
the
petition
for
relief
from
judgment
were
filed
beyond
the
reglementary
period
is
untenable.
An
action
to
declare
the
nullity
of
a
void
judgment
does
not
prescribe.
8
One
last
word,
Atty.
Aragones'
appears
to
be
remiss
in
his
duties
and
reckless
in
the
performance
of
his
responsibility
as
counsel
of
record
in
said
case.
He
represented
himself
to
be
the
counsel
for
the
defendants
including
the
private
respondents
not
only
in
the
motions
he
filed
but
also
in
the
Compromise
Agreement
he
submitted.
It
was
only
after
the
writ
of
execution
of
the
compromise
judgment
was
being
enforced
that
he
perked
up
by
saying
that
he
committed
an
oversight
and
that
he
was
not
authorized
by
the
private
respondents
to
represent
them
as
counsel,
much
less
in
the
Compromise
Agreement.
Candor
towards
the
courts
is
a
cardinal
requirement
of
the
practicing
lawyer.
To
say
one
thing
today
and
another
tomorrow
is
a
transgression
of
this
imperative.
Counsel
should
be
made
to
account
before
his
peers.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DENIED.
Let
a
copy
of
this
decision
be
furnished
the
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
for
an
appropriate
administrative
investigation,
report
and
recommendation
on
Atty.
Guillermo
E.
Aragones
who
holds
office
at
the
9th
Floor
of
the
Finasia
Building,
6774
Ayala
Avenue,
Makati,
Metro
Manila.
No
costs.
This
decision
is
immediately
executory.
SO
ORDERED.
(11)
that
he
spent
at
least
P10,000.00
in
his
efforts
to
protect
and
defend
his
hereditary
interests
in
the
estate
of
Rosina;
and
prays
for
judgment
(a)
declaring
the
deed
of
sale
over
the
aforementioned
lots
as
null
and
void,
(b)
directing
the
cancellation
of
the
transfer
certificates
of
titles
issued
in
the
name
of
Reliable
Realty
Corporation,
(c)
declaring
that
the
aforesaid
five
lots
as
his
distributive
share
in
the
estate
of
Rosina
as
well
as
directing
the
register
of
deeds
of
Manila
to
issue
in
his
name
new
transfer
certificates
of
title,
and
(d)
sentencing
private
respondents
jointly
and
severally
to
pay
him
P10,000.00
as
actual
damages,
P100,000.00
as
moral
damages,
P20,000.00
as
exemplary
damages,
and
P50,000.00
as
attorney's
fees
plus
legal
interests
on
all
said
values.
Private
respondents
Reliable
Realty
Corporation,
Uy
Kim,
Nemesio
Co,
Andres
Co,
Nicasio
Co
and
Manuel
Sosantong
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
(Appendix
"B",
pp.
44-50,
rec.)
appellant
Macias'
complaint
in
Branch
X
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance
on
the
grounds
that
the
court
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
nature
and
subject
matter
of
the
suit;
that
the
complaint
states
no
cause
of
action;
that
there
is
another
action
of
the
same
nature
pending
in
court;
that
plaintiff
has
no
legal
capacity
to
prosecute
the
present
suit;
and
alleging
specifically
that:
(1) Branch
X
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
case
since
the
subject
matter
involved
properly
belongs
exclusively
to
and
is
within
the
competence
of
Branch
VIII
and
Branch
IV
before
which
courts
Special
Proceedings
Nos.
63866
and
57405
are
pending
and
petitioner's
alleged
claim
of
beneficiary
interest
in
the
estate
of
Julian
and
Rosina
depends
on
a
recognition
thereof
by
the
probate
court
in
said
Special
Proceedings
Nos.
63866
and
57405;
(2) that
upon
the
face
of
the
complaint,
the
same
does
not
contain
a
cause
of
action;
because
Branch
X,
which
is
coordinate
with
Branch
VIII
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance,
under
the
existing
jurisprudence
has
no
authority
to
annul
the
questioned
orders
issued
by
Branch
VIII,
aside
from
the
fact
that
he
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court
from
the
order
of
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII
dismissing
Special
Proceedings
No.
67302
which
was
then
pending
before
Branch
IV
and
subsequently
transferred
to
Branch
VIII
(L-28054),
from
the
order
denying
Macias'
claim
of
beneficiary
interest
in
Rosina's
estate
and
appointing
respondent
Vito
Cruz
as
ancillary
administrator
of
the
estate
of
Rosina
in
the
same
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
(L-
29235;
Annex
"A",
pp.
51-60,
rec.)
as
well
as
from
the
order
of
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
IV
also
denying
Macias'
petition
for
relief
from
the
order
approving
the
partial
distribution
of
the
estate
of
Julian
and
denying
his
motion
for
the
removal
of
Vito
Cruz
as
administrator
and
appointment
of
herein
appellant
in
his
place
(L-28947;
Annex
"B",
pp.
61-65,
rec.);
(3) that
petitioner
Manuel
Macias
is
not
a
real
party
in
interest;
because
he
is
not
the
beneficiary,
nor
legatee
nor
creditor,
much
less
an
heir,
of
Rosina.
He
bases
his
alleged
interest
in
the
estate
of
Julian
who
died
intestate
on
June
15,
1964
solely
on
the
latter's
memorandum
to
his
sister
Rosina
wherein
he
hoped
that
his
sister
Rosina
will,
after
his
estate
is
settled,
give
at
her
convenience
to
petitioner
Manuel
Macias
the
sum
of
P500.00;
to
Faustino
A.
Reis
and
Severino
Baron
the
amount
of
P10
000.00
each;
and
to
Dominador
M.
Milan
and
Vicente
D.
Recto
P1,000.00
each.
The
said
memorandum
is
not
a
will.
Unfortunately,
Rosina
died
on
September
14,
1965
without
being
able
to
comply
with
the
memorandum
of
her
brother
Julian.
Since
petitioner
has
not
been
declared
an
heir
or
legatee
of
Julian
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
57405
nor
of
Rosina
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866,
he
has
no
legal
standing
to
file
the
present
action.
The
aforesaid
motion
to
dismiss
was
followed
by
supplement
alleging
that
since
the
buyer,
the
Reliable
Corporation,
has
a
distinct
personality
from
those
of
its
incorporators,
there
is
no
cause
of
action
against
private
respondent
Uy
Kim,
Nemesis
Co,
Andres
Co,
Nicasio
Co
and
Manuel
Sosantong,
its
incorporators.
Respondent
Ricardo
Vito
Cruz
filed
a
motion
for
intervention
in
said
Case
No.
76412
dated
June
4,
1969,
reiterating
the
ground
of
the
motion
to
dismiss
advanced
by
the
other
private
respondents
as
aforestated
and
emphasizing
that
this
petition
for
relief
from
judgment
seeks
the
nullified
classification
by
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
X
of
the
order
of
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
dated
April
15
and
April
24,
1969,
as
admmitted
by
petitioner's
motion
in
praying
that
this
Case
No.
76412
should
not
be
assigned
to
Branch
IV
or
Branch
VIII
as
his
petition
seeks
to
nullify
the
orders
of
Presiding
Judge
Manuel
Barcelona
of
Branch
VIII
in
said
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
(Annex
"B",
pp.
96-97,
rec.).
Petitioner-appellant
filed
his
opposition
dated
June
14,
1969
to
the
motion
to
dismiss
of
respondents
Reliable
Realty
Corporation
and
its
incorporators
as
well
as
to
the
motion
for
intervention
filed
by
respondent
Vito
Cruz.
In
an
order
dated
June
30,
1969,
Presiding
Judge
Jose
L.
Moya
of
Branch
X
sustained
the
motion
to
dismiss
and
forthwith
dismissed
plaintiff's
complaint
herein
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
but
denied
the
prayer
of
the
motion
to
dismiss
for
cancellation
of
the
notice
of
adverse
claim,
which
petitioner-appellant
caused
to
be
annotated
on
the
titles
issued
in
favor
of
Reliable
Realty
Corporation,
from
which
order
petitioner-appellant
Macias
interposed
his
appeal,
and
accordingly
filed
this
petition
for
review
on
certiorari.
respondent
Reliable
Realty
Corporation
respectively
dated
April
16
and
April
24,
1969
(Annex
"A"
pp.
94-95,
rec.),
which
appeal
is
now
pending
before
this
Court
in
L-30935
(pp.
87-97,
rec.;
pp.
4,
15,
appellant's
brief;
emphasis
supplied).
In
a
manifestation
dated
and
filed
on
December
19,
1969,
respondent
Vito
Cruz
adopted
in
toto
as
his
own
motion
to
dismiss
and/or
answer,
the
motion
to
dismiss
dated
December
12,
1969
filed
by
the
principal
respondents
(p.
102,
rec.).
Petitioner-appellant
filed
on
December
19,
1969
an
opposition
dated
December
18,
1969
to
the
motion
to
dismiss
(pp.
104-108,
rec.).
In
Our
resolution
dated
January
23,
1970,
the
motion
to
dismiss
petition
for
review
and
certiorari
was
denied
(p.
123,
rec.).
In
a
manifestation
dated
February
13,
1970,
private
respondents
Reliable
Realty
Corporation,
Uy
Kim,
Nemesio
Co,
Andres
Co,
Nicasio
Co
and
Manuel
Sosantong
adopted
as
their
answer
their
motion
to
dismiss
filed
on
December
12,
1969
(p.
133,
rec.).
The
appealed
order
of
respondent
Judge
Jose
L.
Moya,
dated
June
30,
1969,
reads:
It
appearing
from
the
complaint
that
there
is
presently
pending
in
Branch
VIII
of
this
Court
Special
Proceeding
No.
63866
for
the
settlement
of
the
inheritance
of
the
deceased
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson;
that
the
plaintiff
claims
to
be
a
beneficiary
by
hereditary
title
of
her
estate;
that
the
sale
of
the
lands
forming
part
thereof
which
the
plaintiff
desires
to
annul
was
approved
by
this
Court
in
Special
Proceeding
No.
63866;
that
aside
from
praying
for
the
annulment
of
the
sale,
the
plaintiff
also
seeks
a
declaration
that
the
lands
sold
constitutes
his
distributive
share
of
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson's
inheritance;
and
that
the
plaintiff
has
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court
from
the
order
approving
the
sale,
and
it
being
settled
that
the
jurisdiction
to
annul
a
judgment
or
order
of
a
branch
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
is
vested
exclusively
in
the
branch
which
rendered
the
judgment
or
issued
the
order
and
that
any
other
branch,
even
if
it
be
in
the
same
judicial
district,
which
attempts
to
do
so,
exceeds
its
jurisdiction
(Tuason
v.
Judge
Torres,
21
S.C.R.A.
1169,
L-24717,
December
4,
1967),
and
it
being
unquestionable
that
the
authority
to
distribute
the
inheritance
of
a
deceased
person
and
determine
the
persons
entitled
thereto
belongs
exclusively
to
the
court
or
branch
thereof
taking
cognizance
of
the
proceedings
for
its
settlement
(Branch
VIII)
in
this
case;
and
finally
the
Supreme
Court
having
already
acquired
jurisdiction
by
reason
of
the
plaintiff's
appeal,
no
subordinate
court
should
attempt
to
pass
upon
the
same
question
submitted
to
it,
the
motion
to
dismiss
filed
by
the
defendant
is
granted
and
the
complaint
is
dismissed.
The
prayer
in
the
motion
to
dismiss
for
the
cancellation
of
the
notice
of
adverse
claim
which
the
plaintiff
caused
to
be
annotated
on
the
titles
to
the
lands
on
account
of
the
present
action
is
denied
as
the
only
question
raised
by
a
motion
to
dismiss
is
the
sufficiency
of
the
complaint
filed
in
the
action.
(Appendix
"F",
p.
78,
rec.).
The
pretense
of
herein
petitioner-appellant
is
without
merit
and
the
foregoing
order
appealed
from
should
be
sustained.
Under
Section
1
of
Rule
73,
Rules
of
Court,
"the
court
first
taking
cognizance
of
the
settlement
of
the
estates
of
the
deceased,
shall
exercise
jurisdiction
to
the
exclusion
of
all
other
courts."
Pursuant
to
this
provision,
therefore
all
questions
concerning
the
settlement
of
the
estate
of
the
deceased
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson
should
be
filed
before
Branch
VIII
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance,
then
presided
over
by
former
Judge,
now
Justice
of
the
Court
of
Appeals,
Manuel
Barcelona,
where
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
for
the
settlement
of
the
testate
estate
of
the
deceased
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson
was
filed
and
is
still
pending.
This
Court
stated
the
rationale
of
said
Section
1
of
Rule
73,
thus:
...
The
reason
for
this
provision
of
the
law
is
obvious.
The
settlement
of
the
estate
of
a
deceased
person
in
court
constitutes
but
one
proceeding.
For
the
successful
administration
of
that
estate
it
is
necessary
that
there
should
be
but
one
responsible
entity,
one
court,
which
should
have
exclusive
control
of
every
part
of
such
administration.
To
intrust
it
to
two
or
more
courts,
each
independent
of
the
other,
would
result
in
confusion
and
delay.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The
provision
of
section
602,
giving
one
court
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
the
settlement
of
the
estate
of
a
deceased
person,
was
not
inserted
in
the
law
for
the
benefit
of
the
parties
litigant,
but
in
the
public
interest
for
the
better
1
administration
of
justice.
For
that
reason
the
parties
have
no
control
over
it.
On
the
other
hand,
and
for
such
effects
as
may
be
proper,
it
should
be
stated
herein
that
any
challenge
to
the
validity
of
a
will,
any
objection
to
the
authentication
thereof,
and
every
demand
or
claim
which
any
heir,
delegate
or
party
in
interest
in
a
testate
or
intestate
succession
may
make,
must
be
acted
upon
and
decided
within
the
same
special
proceedings,
not
in
a
separate
action,
and
the
same
judge
having
jurisdiction
in
the
administration
of
the
estate
shall
take
cognizance
of
the
question
raised,
inasmuch
as
when
the
day
comes
he
will
be
called
upon
to
make
distribution
2
and
adjudication
of
the
property
to
the
interested
parties,
...
.
3
It
is
not
disputed
that
the
orders
sought
to
be
annulled
and
set
aside
by
herein
petitioner-appellant
in
his
complaint
against
private
respondents
which
was
assigned
to
Branch
X
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance
presided
over
by
Judge
Jose
L.
Moya,
were
issued
by
Judge
Barcelona
presiding
over
Branch
VIII
of
the
same
court.
Even
in
other
cases,
it
is
also
a
general
principle
that
the
branch
of
the
court
of
first
instance
that
first
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
case
retains
such
jurisdiction
to
the
exclusion
of
all
other
branches
of
the
same
court
of
first
4
instance
or
judicial
district
and
all
other
coordinate
courts.
Thus,
in
the
1970
case
of
De
Leon
vs.
Salvador,
Mr.
Justice
Teehankee,
speaking
for
the
Court,
ruled:
The
various
branches
of
a
Court
of
First
Instance
of
a
province
or
city,
having
as
they
have
the
same
or
equal
authority
and
exercising
as
they
do
concurrent
and
coordinate
jurisdiction,
should
not,
cannot,
and
are
not
permitted
to
5
interfere
with
the
respective
cases,
much
less
with
their
orders
or
judgments,
by
means
of
injunction.
In
the
words
of
Mr.
Justice
Fernando,
also
in
behalf
of
the
Court,
"any
other
view
would
be
subversive
of
a
doctrine
that
has
been
steadfastly
adhered
to,
the
main
purpose
of
which
is
to
assure
stability
and
consistency
in
judicial
actuations
and
to
avoid
confusion
that
may
otherwise
ensue
if
courts
of
coordinate
jurisdiction
are
permitted
to
interfere
with
each
other's
lawful
orders.
...
This
is
to
preclude
an
undesirable
situation
from
arising
one,
which
if
permitted,
as
above
pointed
out,
would
be
fraught
with
undesirable
consequences,
as
already
indicated,
for
the
6
bench,
no
less
than
for
the
litigants.
To
such
an
eventuality,
this
Court
cannot
give
its
sanction.
Appellant
claims
that
his
action
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
before
Branch
X
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance,
is
not
for
the
annulment
of
any
judgment
or
order
of
Branch
VIII
of
said
Court
and
that
nowhere,
either
in
the
prayer
or
in
the
body
of
his
complaint,
does
he
seek
for
the
annulment
of
any
order
of
Branch
VIII
(p.
8,
appellant's
brief).
This
pretension
of
appellant
is
belied
by
paragraph
8
of
his
complaint
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
alleging
that
the
order
dated
April
15,
1969
directing
the
register
of
deeds
of
Manila
to
cancel
the
notice
of
lis
pendens
caused
to
be
annotated
by
the
appellant
on
the
titles
covering
the
five
(5)
lots
and
the
order
dated
April
24,
1969
approving
the
deed
of
sale
were
both
issued
by
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866,
without
due
notice
to
and
hearing
of
appellant;
and
further
belied
by
paragraph
9
of
the
same
complaint
alleging
that
the
acts
of
the
buyers
of
the
aforesaid
five
(5)
lots
in
causing
the
cancellation
of
appellant's
notice
of
lis
pendens
in
obtaining
the
registration
of
the
deed
of
sale,
in
procuring
the
cancellation
of
the
transfer
certificates
of
titles
over
the
five
(5)
lots
in
the
name
of
Rosina,
and
in
securing
new
transfer
certificates
of
title
in
the
name
of
defendant
Reliable
Realty
Corporation,
are
all
null
and
void
ab
initio,
because
(1)
of
the
pendency
of
his
appeal
in
G.R.
No.
L-29235
for
said
appeal
divested
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII
of
any
jurisdiction
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
to
sell
the
properties
in
question
notwithstanding
the
order
of
April
24,
1969
approving
the
deed
of
sale,
(2)
the
orders
dated
April
15,
1969
and
April
24,
1969
directing
the
cancellation
of
appellant's
notice
of
lis
pendens
and
approving
the
deed
of
sale
may
not
be
registered
as
they
have
not
become
final
and
will
not
become
final
by
reason
of
his
appeal
in
G.R.
No.
L-29235,
and
(3)
he
was
not
notified
of
the
petition
to
sell
any
portion
of
Rosina's
estate
(pars.
8
&
9,
Appendix
"A",
pp.
30-34,
rec.).
It
is
patent
that
by
the
aforesaid
paragraphs
8
and
9
of
his
complaint
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
before
Branch
X,
appellant
impugns
the
validity
of
the
aforementioned
orders
of
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866.
Furthermore,
in
his
motion
to
the
Honorable
Executive
Judge
of
May
5,
1969,
appellant
averred
that
he
filed
his
complaint
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
to
nullify
and
set
aside
certain
orders
of
Judge
Manuel
P.
Barcelona
of
Branch
VIII
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
over
the
testate
estate
of
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson
and
prayed
that
said
Case
No.
76412
should
not
be
assigned
to
either
Branch
VIII
or
Branch
IV
(Annex
"A",
pp.
21-22,
appellant's
brief).
Said
motion
could
not
refer
to
orders
of
Judge
Manuel
P.
Barcelona
other
than
the
aforecited
orders
of
April
15,
16,
and
24,
1969
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866.
This
appellant
impliedly
admits
on
pp.
3-4
of
his
reply
brief
which
is
further
emphasized
by
his
statement
that
the
only
purpose
of
his
motion
dated
May
5,
1969
was
"to
keep
the
action
away
from
possible
prejudgment
by
the
abovementioned
branches
of
the
court
below
(referring
to
Branch
IV
and
Branch
VIII
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance)."
But
even
without
considering
paragraphs
8
and
9
of
appellant's
complaint
and
his
motion
dated
May
5,
1969
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
before
Branch
X,
his
prayer
in
the
same
complaint
for
the
nullification
or
rescission
of
the
deed
of
sale
covering
the
five
lots
in
question
cannot
be
decreed
without
passing
upon
the
validity
of
the
orders
of
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
cancelling
his
notice
of
lis
pendens
authorizing
the
sale
and
approving
the
sale.
And,
as
heretofore
stated,
under
the
rules
and
controlling
jurisprudence,
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
X
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance
cannot
legally
interfere
with,
nor
pass
upon
the
validity
of
said
orders
of
the
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
VIII,
which
court,
as
the
probate
court,
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
the
estate
of
the
decedent,
including
the
validity
of
the
will,
the
declaration
of
heirs,
the
disposition
of
the
estate
for
the
payment
of
its
liabilities,
and
the
distribution
among
the
heirs
of
the
residue
thereof.
Appellant's
insistence
that
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412,
he
seeks
to
recover
his
distributive
share
of
the
estate
of
the
decedent
Rosina,
all
the
more
removes
the
said
case
from
the
jurisdiction
of
Branch
X;
for
as
heretofore
stated,
the
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866,
amply
covers
the
same
subject
matter
and
seeks
substantially
the
same
relief
as
his
complaint
in
Civil
Case
No.
76412
and
the
present
petition
(see
pars.
26,
28,
30-40,
and
the
prayer
in
this
petition,
pp.
13-34,
rec.
of
L-30935).
.
Appellant
himself
states
that
the
decision
in
the
three
cases
he
filed
with
this
Court
namely,
G.R.
Nos.
L-29235,
L-
28947
and
L-30935
will
answer
the
question
whether
he
has
legal
interest
in
the
estates
of
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson
and
Julian
A.
Wolfson
(pp.
21-22,
appellant's
brief).
The
cases
he
cited,
as
correctly
contended
by
appellees
(Lajom
vs.
Viola,
et
al.,
73
Phil.
563;
Ramirez
vs.
Gmur,
42
Phil.
855;
Rodriguez
vs.
Dela
Cruz,
8
Phil.
665;
and
Quion
vs.
Claridad,
L-48541,
January
30,
1943,
2
O.G.,
No.
6,
June,
1943,
p.
572,
74
Phil.
100),
are
not
applicable
to
and
therefore
do
not
govern
the
instant
case,
because
the
actions
therein
were
filed
by
the
preterited
heir
or
legatee
or
co-owner
long
after
the
intestate
or
testate
or
partition
proceedings
had
been
closed
or
terminated.
In
the
case
at
bar,
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866
is
still
pending
in
the
probate
court
Branch
VIII
of
the
Manila
Court
of
First
Instance
where
appellant
should
present,
as
he
has
in
fact
presented,
his
alleged
claim
of
legal
interest
in
the
estate
of
Rosina
Marguerite
Wolfson,
which
claim,
if
valid,
will
certainly
entitle
him
to
all
notices
of
all
petitions,
motions,
orders,
resolutions,
decisions
and
processes
issued
and/or
promulgated
by
said
probate
court.
There
is
no
order
by
the
said
probate
court
terminating
or
closing
Special
Proceedings
No.
63866.
7
However,
in
the
recent
case
of
Guilas
vs.
Judge
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Pampanga,
et
al.,
WE
reiterated
the
rule:
...
The
better
practice,
however,
for
the
heir
who
has
not
received
his
share,
is
to
demand
his
share
through
a
proper
motion
in
the
same
probate
or
administration
proceedings,
or
for
re-opening
of
the
probate
or
administrative
proceedings
if
it
had
already
been
closed,
and
not
through
an
independent
action,
which
would
be
tried
by
another
court
or
Judge
which
may
thus
reverse
a
decision
or
order
of
the
probate
or
intestate
court
already
final
and
executed
and
re-shuffle
properties
long
ago
distributed
and
disposed
of
(Ramos
vs.
Ortuzar,
89
Phil.
730,
741-742;
Timbol
vs.
Cano,
supra;
Jingco
vs.
Daluz,
L-5107,
April
24,
1953,
92
Phil.
1082;
Roman
Catholic
vs.
Agustines,
L-14710,
March
29,
1960,
107
Phil.
455,
460-61).
Even
in
the
case
of
Quion,
etc.
vs.
Claridad,
et
al.,
supra,
invoked
by
appellant,
WE
ruled
that
the
intestate
proceedings,
although
closed
and
terminated,
can
still
be
reopened
within
the
prescriptive
period
upon
petition
therefor
by
a
preterited
heir.
The
Court
cannot
ignore
the
proclivity
or
tendency
of
appellant
herein
to
file
several
actions
covering
the
same
subject
matter
or
seeking
substantially
identical
relief,
which
is
unduly
burdening
the
courts.
Coming
from
a
neophyte,
who
is
still
unsure
of
himself
in
the
practice
of
the
law,
the
same
may
be
regarded
with
some
understanding.
But
considering
appellant's
ability
and
long
experience
at
the
bar,
his
filing
identical
suits
for
the
same
remedy
is
reprehensible
and
should
merit
rebuke.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
dismissed
and
the
appealed
order
is
hereby
affirmed,
with
costs
against
petitioner-appellant.
Let
this
be
entered
in
his
personal
record.
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
Makalintal,
Zaldivar,
Teehankee,
Barredo
and
Antonio,
JJ.,
concur.
Castro
and
Fernando,
JJ.,
took
no
part.
Concepcion,
C.J.,
is
on
leave.
Garcia
v
Francisco
TOPIC:
Legal
Ethics,
CPR
FACTS:
Garcia,
et.
al
leased
a
parcel
of
land
to
Lee
for
a
period
of
25
years
beginning
May
1,
1964.
Despite
repeated
verbal
and
written
demands,
Lee
refused
to
vacate
after
the
expiration
of
the
lease.
Lee
was
represented
by
Atty.
Francisco.
On
March
29,
1989,
Lee,
through
Francisco,
filed
a
complaint
against
Garcia
and
the
other
lessors
for
specific
performance
and
reconveyance
with
damages
(docketed
as
Q-89-2188)
but
was
dismissed
by
the
trial
court.
On
May
29,
1989,
Garcia
and
the
other
lessors
filed
a
complaint
for
unlawful
detainer
against
Lee
but
Lee
answered
alleging
as
special
and
affirmative
defense
the
pendency
of
case
Q-89-2188.
This
allegation
was
rejected
by
Judge
Bautista.
On
October
24,
1989,
Atty.
Francisco
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction
against
Judge
Bautista
and
Garcia,
et.
al
(such
is
violative
of
the
Rule
on
Summary
Procedure
prohibiting
the
filing
of
petitions
for
certiorari,
mandamus
or
prohibition
against
any
interlocutory
order).
On
November
13,
1989,
Judge
Vera
issued
an
order
enjoining
Judge
Bautista
from
proceeding
with
the
trial
of
the
unlawful
detainer
case.
Upon
motion
of
the
complainant,
however,
the
injunction
was
set
aside
and
Civil
Case
No.
Q-89-3833
was
dismissed.
Lee
did
not
appeal.
On
April
6,
1990,
Lee
through
Francisco,
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition
with
prayer
for
preliminary
injunction
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
against
Judge
Vera,
Judge
Singzon,
Garcia
and
the
other
lessors.
Petition
was
denied.
On
June
14,
1990,
Judge
Singzon
decided
Civil
Case
no.
1455
in
favor
of
complainant
Garcia
and
the
other
lessors.
Lee
did
not
appeal.
Instead,
through
Francisco
again,
he
filed
a
petition
against
Judge
Singzon
and
the
other
lessors
for
certiorari
and
annulment
of
the
decision
in
the
unlawful
detainer
case
and
damages
with
prayer
for
issuance
of
preliminary
injunction.
On
July
2,
1990,
Garcias
group
filed
an
Omnibus
Motion
to
Dismiss
Civil
Case.
On
July
13,
1990,
Judge
Paralejo
issued
an
order
enjoining
Judge
Singzon
from
enforcing
the
decision
in
that
case.
Garcia
attacked
this
order
in
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition
with
prayer
for
preliminary
injunction
docketed
as
CA
Sp.
No.
22392.
The
petition
was
granted
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
Garcia
then
filed
a
motion
for
execution
in
the
unlawful
detainer
case.
Then,
Lee,
through
Francisco,
filed
with
the
Supreme
Court
a
petition
for
certiorari
with
preliminary
injunction
and
temporary
restraining
order
against
the
Court
of
Appeals,
Judge
Singzon,
Garcia
and
the
other
lessors
but
was
denied.
Finally,
Lee,
still
through
Francisco,
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
with
preliminary
injunction
against
Judge
Singzon,
Garcia
and
the
other
lessors
in
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Quezon
City
to
set
aside
and
declare
the
writs
of
execution
in
the
unlawful
detainer
case.
Such
dismissed
but
again
Lee,
through
Francisco,
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration.
According
to
Francisco,
he
was
relieved
as
counsel
while
this
motion
was
pending.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Atty.
Francisco
transgressed
with
the
Code
of
Professional
Conduct
HELD:
Yes.
The
Supreme
Court
held
that
Atty.
Franciscos
cause
was
without
merit.
Atty.
Francisco
abused
his
right
of
recourse
to
the
courts
for
the
purpose
of
arguing
a
cause
that
had
been
repeatedly
rebuffed,
he
was
disdaining
the
obligation
of
the
lawyer
to
maintain
only
such
actions
or
proceedings
as
appear
to
him
to
be
just
and
such
defense
only
as
he
believes
to
be
honestly
debatable
under
the
law.
By
violating
his
oath
not
to
delay
any
man
for
money
or
malice,
he
has
besmirched
the
name
of
an
honorable
profession
and
has
proved
himself
unworthy
of
trust
reposed
in
him
by
law
as
an
officer
of
the
Court.
Atty.
Crisanto
l.
Francisco
took
his
oath
as
a
lawyer
on
March
2,
1956.
Considering
his
age
and
experience
in
the
practice
of
the
laws,
he
should
have
known
better
than
to
trifle
with
it
and
to
use
it
as
an
instrument
for
harassment
of
the
complainant
and
the
misuse
of
judicial
processes.
SUSPENDED
for
1
year
Enrique
Zaldivar
vs
Raul
Gonzalez
166
SCRA
316
Legal
Ethics
Contemptuous
Language
Duty
of
a
Lawyer
Zaldivar
was
the
governor
of
Antique.
He
was
charged
before
the
Sandiganbayan
for
violations
of
the
Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act.
Gonzales
was
the
then
Tanodbayan
who
was
investigating
the
case.
Zaldivar
then
filed
with
the
Supreme
Court
a
petition
for
Certiorari,
Prohibition
and
Mandamus
assailing
the
authority
of
the
Tanodbayan
to
investigate
graft
cases
under
the
1987
Constitution.
The
Supreme
Court,
acting
on
the
petition
issued
a
Cease
and
Desist
Order
against
Gonzalez
directing
him
to
temporarily
restrain
from
investigating
and
filing
informations
against
Zaldivar.
Gonzales
however
proceeded
with
the
investigation
and
he
filed
criminal
informations
against
Zaldivar.
Gonzalez
even
had
a
newspaper
interview
where
he
proudly
claims
that
he
scored
one
on
the
Supreme
Court;
that
the
Supreme
Courts
issuance
of
the
TRO
is
a
manifestation
theta
the
rich
and
influential
persons
get
favorable
actions
from
the
Supreme
Court,
[while]
it
is
difficult
for
an
ordinary
litigant
to
get
his
petition
to
be
given
due
course.
Zaldivar
then
filed
a
Motion
for
Contempt
against
Gonzalez.
The
Supreme
Court
then
ordered
Gonzalez
to
explain
his
side.
Gonzalez
stated
that
the
statements
in
the
newspapers
were
true;
that
he
was
only
exercising
his
freedom
of
HELD:
Yes.
The
statements
made
by
respondent
Gonzalez
clearly
constitute
contempt
and
call
for
the
exercise
of
the
disciplinary
authority
of
the
Supreme
Court.
His
statements
necessarily
imply
that
the
justices
of
the
Supreme
Court
betrayed
their
oath
of
office.
Such
statements
constitute
the
grossest
kind
of
disrespect
for
the
Supreme
Court.
Such
statements
very
clearly
debase
and
degrade
the
Supreme
Court
and,
through
the
Court,
the
entire
system
of
administration
of
justice
in
the
country.
Gonzalez
is
entitled
to
the
constitutional
guarantee
of
free
speech.
What
Gonzalez
seems
unaware
of
is
that
freedom
of
speech
and
of
expression,
like
all
constitutional
freedoms,
is
not
absolute
and
that
freedom
of
expression
needs
on
occasion
to
be
adjusted
to
and
accommodated
with
the
requirements
of
equally
important
public
interests.
One
of
these
fundamental
public
interests
is
the
maintenance
of
the
integrity
and
orderly
functioning
of
the
administration
of
justice.
There
is
no
antinomy
between
free
expression
and
the
integrity
of
the
system
of
administering
justice.
Gonzalez,
apart
from
being
a
lawyer
and
an
officer
of
the
court,
is
also
a
Special
Prosecutor
who
owes
duties
of
fidelity
and
respect
to
the
Republic
and
to
the
Supreme
Court
as
the
embodiment
and
the
repository
of
the
judicial
power
in
the
government
of
the
Republic.
The
responsibility
of
Gonzalez
to
uphold
the
dignity
and
authority
of
the
Supreme
Court
and
not
to
promote
distrust
in
the
administration
of
justice
is
heavier
than
that
of
a
private
practicing
lawyer.
Gonzalez
is
also
entitled
to
criticize
the
rulings
of
the
court
but
his
criticisms
must
be
bona
fide.
In
the
case
at
bar,
his
statements,
particularly
the
one
where
he
alleged
that
members
of
the
Supreme
Court
approached
him,
are
of
no
relation
to
the
Zaldivar
case.
The
Supreme
Court
suspended
Gonzalez
indefinitely
from
the
practice
of
law.
Paragas
vs.
Cruz
Facts:
In
asking
for
reconsideration
of
the
Courts
dismissal
of
his
petition
for
certiorari
in
the
present
case,
counsel
for
the
petitioner,
Atty.
Jeremias
Sebastian,
used
derogatory
expressions
against
the
dignity
of
the
Court
in
the
language
of
his
motion
for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
Atty.
Sebastian
is
administratively
liable
for
his
actions/language.
Held:
The
expressions
contained
in
the
motion
for
reconsideration
penned
by
the
counsel
of
the
petitioner
are
plainly
contemptuous
and
disrespectful
and
he
is
hereby
guilty
of
direct
contempt
of
court.
As
remarked
in
People
vs.
Carillo:
Counsel
should
conduct
himself
towards
the
judges
who
try
his
cases
with
that
courtesy
all
have
a
right
to
expect.
As
an
officer
of
the
court,
it
is
his
sworn
and
moral
duty
to
help
build
and
not
destroy
unnecessarily
that
high
esteem
and
regard
towards
the
courts
so
essential
to
the
proper
administration
of
justice.
It
is
right
and
plausible
that
an
attorney,
in
defending
the
cause
and
rights
of
his
client,
should
do
so
with
all
the
fervor
and
energy
of
which
he
is
capable,
but
it
is
not,
and
never
will
be
so,
for
him
to
exercise
said
right
by
resorting
to
intimidation
or
proceeding
without
the
propriety
and
respect
which
the
dignity
of
the
courts
require.
GAVINA
MAGLUCOT-AW,
CATALINA
ORCULLO,
RICHARD
ESTANO,
NIDA
MAGLUCOT,
MELANIA
MAGLUCOT-
CATUBIG,
EMILIANO
CATUBIG,
LADISLAO
SALMA,
petitioners,
vs.
LEOPOLDO
MAGLUCOT,
SEVERO
MAGLUCOT,
WILFREDA
MAGLUCOT-ALEJO
and
CONSTANCIO
ALEJO,
respondents.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
KAPUNAN,
J.:
This
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
assails
the
Decision,
dated
11
November
1997,
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
48816
which
reversed
and
set
aside
the
Decision,
dated
13
December
1994,
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
30
of
Dumaguete
City,
Negros
Oriental
in
an
action
for
recovery
of
possession
and
damages.
The
core
issue
in
this
case
is
whether
a
partition
of
Lot
No.
1639
had
been
effected
in
1952.
Petitioners
contend
that
there
was
already
a
partition
of
said
lot;
hence,
they
are
entitled
to
exclusive
possession
and
ownership
of
Lot
No.
1639-D,
which
originally
formed
part
of
Lot
No.
1639
until
its
partition.
Private
respondents,
upon
the
other
hand,
claim
that
there
was
no
partition;
hence,
they
are
co-owners
of
Lot
No.
1639-D.
Notably,
this
case
presents
a
unique
situation
where
there
is
an
order
for
partition
but
there
is
no
showing
that
the
sketch/subdivision
plan
was
submitted
to
the
then
Court
of
First
Instance
for
its
approval
or
that
a
decree
or
order
was
registered
in
the
Register
of
Deeds.
The
antecedent
facts
of
the
case
are
as
follows:
Korte
Petitioners
filed
with
the
RTC
a
complaint
for
recovery
of
possession
and
damages
alleging,
inter
alia,
that
they
are
the
owners
of
Lot
No.
1639-D.
Said
lot
was
originally
part
of
Lot
No.
1639
which
was
covered
by
Original
Certificate
Title
No.
6775
issued
in
the
names
of
Hermogenes
Olis,
Bartolome
Maglucot,
Pascual
Olis,
Roberto
Maglucot,
[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Anselmo
Lara
and
Tomas
Maglucot
on
16
August
1927.
On
19
April
1952,
Tomas
Maglucot,
one
[if
of
the
registered
owners
and
respondents
predecessor-in-interest,
filed
a
petition
to
subdivide
Lot
No.
1639.
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Consequently,
on
13
May
1952,
then
CFI
of
Negros
Oriental
issued
an
order
directing
the
parties
to
subdivide
said
lot
into
six
portions
as
follows:
Rtcspped
a)
Hermogenes
Olis
-
lot
1639-A
b)
Pascual
Olis
-
lot
1639-B
c)
Bartolome
Maglucot
-
lot
1639-C
d)
Roberto
(Alberto)
-
lot
1639-D
Maglucot
e)
Anselmo
Lara
-
lot
1639-E
[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
f)
Tomas
Maglucot
-
lot
1639-F.
Sometime
in
1963,
Guillermo
Maglucot
rented
a
portion
of
Lot
No.
1639-D
(subject
lot).
Subsequently,
Leopoldo
and
Severo,
both
surnamed
Maglucot,
rented
portions
of
subject
lot
in
1964
and
1969,
respectively,
and
each
paying
rentals
therefor.
Said
respondents
built
houses
on
their
corresponding
leased
lots.
They
paid
the
rental
amount
of
P100.00
per
annum
to
Mrs.
Ruperta
Salma,
who
represented
the
heirs
of
Roberto
Maglucot,
petitioners
predecessor-
in-interest.
In
December
1992,
however,
said
respondents
stopped
paying
rentals
claiming
ownership
over
the
subject
lot.
Petitioners
thus
filed
the
complaint
a
quo.
Sdaadsc
After
trial,
the
lower
court
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
petitioners.
The
RTC
found
the
existence
of
tax
declarations
[if
in
the
names
of
Hermogenes
Olis
and
Pascual
Olis
(purported
owners
of
Lot
Nos.
1639-A
and
1639-B,
respectively)
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
as
indubitable
proof
that
there
was
a
subdivision
of
Lot
No.
1639.
It
likewise
found
that
Tomas
Maglucot,
respondents
predecessor-in-interest,
took
active
part
in
the
partition
as
it
was
he,
in
fact,
who
commenced
[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
the
action
for
partition.
The
court
a
quo
cited
Article
1431
of
the
Civil
Code
which
states
that
"[t]hrough
estoppel
an
admission
or
representation
is
rendered
conclusive
upon
the
person
making
it,
and
cannot
be
denied
or
disproved
as
against
the
person
relying
thereon."
Applying
said
provision
of
law,
it
held
that
while
there
was
no
court
order
showing
that
Lot
No.
1639
was
partitioned,
its
absence
could
not
be
used
by
Tomas
Maglucot,
or
respondents
as
his
successors-in-interest,
to
deny
the
existence
of
an
approved
partition
against
the
other
co-owners
[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
[if
who
claim
that
there
was
one.
Said
court,
likewise,
ruled
that
the
tax
declarations
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
over
the
houses
of
respondents,
expressly
stating
that
the
same
are
constructed
on
the
lots
of
[if
Roberto
Maglucot,
constitute
a
conclusive
admission
by
them
of
the
ownership
of
the
subject
lot
by
the
latter.
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The
dispositive
portion
of
the
lower
courts
decision
reads
as
follows:
Missdaa
WHEREFORE,
on
the
basis
of
the
foregoing
discussion,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
in
favor
of
the
plaintiffs
against
the
defendants
ordering
the
latter:
1.
To
demolish
their
houses
inside
lot
1639-D,
vacate
the
premises
thereof
and
deliver
the
possession
of
the
same
to
Plaintiffs;
Slxmis
2.
To
jointly
and
solidarily
pay
plaintiffs
the
sum
of
P15,000.00
for
attorneys
fees;
3.
To
each
pay
plaintiffs
the
sum
of
P100.00
every
year
from
1993
for
actual
damages
representing
the
amount
of
unpaid
rentals
up
to
the
time
they
actually
vacate
the
premises
in
question;
Sclaw
[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Petitioners
filed
this
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
alleging
that
the
CA
committed
the
following
reversible
errors:
I
IN
VIOLATING
THE
LAW
ON
ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION
PLAINTIFFS
HAVING
POSSESSED
LOT
1639-D
SINCE
1946;
II
IN
VIOLATING
THE
LAW
ON
ESTOPPEL;
THE
FACT
OF
PAYMENT
OF
RENTALS
AND
OFFER
TO
BUY
BY
THE
DEFENDANTS
IS
ADMISSION
THAT
THE
AREA
IN
LOT
1639-D,
HAD
LONG
BEEN
ADJUDICATED
TO
PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN
DECLARING
THAT
THERE
WAS
NO
PRIOR
PARTITION,
CONTRARY
TO
THE
FINDINGS
OF
THE
TRIAL
COURT,
AND
AGAINST
THE
EVIDENCE
ON
RECORD,
OF
WHICH
IF
PROPERLY
CONSIDERED
WOULD
CHANGE
THE
OUTCOME
OF
THE
CASE;
IV
IN
DECLARING
THAT
THERE
IS
NO
LAW
OR
JURISPRUDENCE
APPLICABLE
UNDER
THE
PREMISES;
THIS
WOULD
ONLY
SHOW
THAT
THE
RECORD
OF
THE
CASE
WAS
NOT
PROPERLY
SCRUTINIZED,
AND
THE
LAW
WAS
NOT
PROPERLY
STUDIED;
ESPECIALLY
IN
THE
CASE
AT
BENCH
THAT
THE
ORAL
AND
[if
MUTUAL
PARTITION
HAPPENED
DURING
THE
REGIME
OF
THE
OLD
RULES
OF
PROCEDURE;
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Petitioners
maintain
that
Lot
No.
1639
was
mutually
partitioned
and
physically
subdivided
among
the
co-owners
and
that
majority
of
them
participated
in
the
actual
execution
of
the
subdivision.
Further,
the
co-owners
accepted
their
[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
designated
shares
in
1946
as
averred
by
Tomas
Maglucot
in
his
petition
for
partition.
Petitioners
opine
that
in
1952,
Tomas
Maglucot
himself
initiated
a
court
proceeding
for
a
formal
subdivision
of
Lot
No.
1639.
In
[if
said
petition,
he
averred
that
only
Hermogenes
Olis
and
the
heirs
of
Pascual
Olis
were
not
agreeable
to
the
partition.
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Petitioners
further
contend
that
respondents
admitted
in
their
tax
declarations
covering
their
[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
respective
houses
that
they
are
"constructed
on
the
land
of
Roberto
Maglucot."
Simply
put,
petitioners
vigorously
assert
that
respondents
are
estopped
from
claiming
to
be
co-owners
of
the
subject
lot
in
view
of
the
mutual
agreement
in
1946,
judicial
confirmation
in
1952,
and
respondents
acquiescence
because
they
[if
themselves
exclusively
exercised
ownership
over
Lot
No.
1639-A
beginning
1952
up
to
the
present.
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
For
their
part,
respondents
posit
three
points
in
support
of
their
position.
First,
they
emphasize
that
petitioners
failed
to
show
that
the
interested
parties
were
apprised
or
notified
of
the
tentative
subdivision
contained
in
the
sketch
and
[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif]
that
the
CFI
subsequently
confirmed
the
same.
Second,
they
point
to
the
fact
that
petitioners
[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif]
were
unable
to
show
any
court
approval
of
any
partition.
Third,
they
maintain
that
Lot
No.
1639
remain
undivided
since
to
date,
OCT
No.
6275
is
still
an
existing
and
perfectly
valid
title,
containing
no
annotation
of
[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]
any
encumbrance
or
partition
whatsoever.
After
a
careful
consideration
of
the
pleadings
filed
by
the
parties
and
the
evidence
on
record,
we
find
that
the
petition
is
meritorious.
As
stated
earlier,
the
core
issue
in
this
case
is
whether
there
was
a
valid
partition
in
1952.
Scslx
Preliminarily,
this
Court
recognizes
that
"the
jurisdiction
of
this
Court
in
cases
brought
before
it
from
the
Court
of
Appeals
via
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court
is
limited
to
reviewing
errors
of
law.
Findings
of
fact
of
the
latter
are
conclusive,
except
in
the
following
instances:
(1)
when
the
findings
are
grounded
entirely
on
speculation,
surmises,
or
conjectures;
(2)
when
the
inference
made
is
manifestly
mistaken,
absurd,
or
impossible;
(3)
when
there
is
grave
abuse
of
discretion;
(4)
when
the
judgment
is
based
on
a
misapprehension
of
facts;
(5)
when
the
findings
of
fact
are
conflicting;
(6)
when
in
making
its
findings
the
Court
of
Appeals
went
beyond
the
issues
of
the
case,
or
its
findings
are
contrary
to
the
admissions
of
both
the
appellant
and
the
appellee;
(7)
when
the
findings
are
contrary
to
those
of
the
trial
court;
(8)
when
the
findings
are
conclusions
without
citation
of
specific
evidence
on
which
they
are
based;
(9)
when
the
facts
set
forth
in
the
petition
as
well
as
in
the
petitioners
main
and
reply
briefs
are
not
disputed
by
the
respondent;
and
(10)
when
the
findings
of
fact
are
premised
on
the
supposed
absence
of
evidence
and
contradicted
[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif]
by
the
evidence
on
record."
This
case
falls
under
exceptions
(7),
(8)
and
(10)
in
that
the
findings
of
facts
of
the
CA
are
in
conflict
with
that
of
the
RTC,
are
mere
conclusions
without
citation
of
specific
evidence
on
which
they
are
based
and
are
premised
on
absence
of
evidence
but
are
contradicted
by
the
evidence
on
record.
For
these
reasons,
we
shall
consider
the
evidence
on
record
to
determine
whether
indeed
there
was
partition.
Slx
In
this
jurisdiction,
an
action
for
partition
is
comprised
of
two
phases:
first,
an
order
for
partition
which
determines
whether
a
co-ownership
in
fact
exists,
and
whether
partition
is
proper;
and,
second,
a
decision
confirming
the
sketch
[if
or
subdivision
submitted
by
the
parties
or
the
commissioners
appointed
by
the
court,
as
the
case
may
be.
!supportFootnotes][21][endif]
The
first
phase
of
a
partition
and/or
accounting
suit
is
taken
up
with
the
determination
of
whether
or
not
a
co-ownership
in
fact
exists,
(i.e.,
not
otherwise
legally
proscribed)
and
may
be
made
by
voluntary
agreement
of
all
the
parties
interested
in
the
property.
This
phase
may
end
with
a
declaration
that
plaintiff
is
not
entitled
to
have
a
partition
either
because
a
co-ownership
does
not
exist,
or
partition
is
legally
prohibited.
It
may
end,
upon
the
other
hand,
with
an
adjudgment
that
a
co-ownership
does
in
truth
exist,
partition
is
proper
in
the
premises
and
an
accounting
of
rents
and
profits
received
by
the
defendant
from
the
real
estate
in
question
is
in
order.
In
the
latter
case,
the
parties
may,
if
they
are
able
to
agree,
make
partition
among
themselves
by
proper
instruments
of
conveyance,
and
the
court
shall
confirm
the
partition
so
agreed
upon.
In
either
case
i.e.,
either
the
action
is
[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
adversary
must
have
placed
reliance
on
the
action
and
acted
as
he
would
otherwise
not
have
done.
Some
authorities,
however,
hold
that
what
is
tantamount
to
estoppel
may
arise
without
this
reliance
on
the
part
of
the
adversary,
and
this
is
called,
ratification
or
election
by
acceptance
of
benefits,
which
arises
when
a
party,
knowing
that
he
is
not
bound
by
a
defective
proceeding,
and
is
free
to
repudiate
it
if
he
will,
upon
knowledge,
and
while
under
no
disability,
[if
!supportFootnotes][39][endif]
chooses
to
adopt
such
defective
proceeding
as
his
own.
Ratification
means
that
one
under
no
disability
voluntarily
adopts
and
gives
sanction
to
some
unauthorized
act
or
defective
proceeding,
which
without
his
sanction
would
not
be
binding
on
him.
It
is
this
voluntary
choice,
knowingly
made,
which
amounts
to
a
ratification
of
[if
what
was
theretofore
unauthorized,
and
becomes
the
authorized
act
of
the
party
so
making
the
ratification.
!supportFootnotes][40][endif]
The
records
show
that
respondents
were
paying
rent
for
the
use
of
a
portion
of
Lot
No.
1639-D.
Had
they
been
of
the
belief
that
they
were
co-owners
of
the
entire
Lot
No.
1639
they
would
not
have
paid
rent.
Respondents
attempted
to
counter
this
point
by
presenting
an
uncorroborated
testimony
of
their
sole
witness
to
the
effect
that
the
amount
so
paid
to
Roberto
Maglucot
and,
subsequently,
to
Ruperta
Salma
were
for
the
payment
of
real
property
taxes.
We
are
not
persuaded.
It
is
quite
improbable
that
the
parties
would
be
unaware
of
the
difference
in
their
treatment
of
their
transactions
for
so
long
a
time.
Moreover,
no
evidence
was
ever
presented
to
show
that
a
tax
declaration
for
the
entire
Lot
No.
1639
has
ever
been
made.
Replete
in
the
records
are
tax
declarations
for
specific
portions
of
Lot
1639.
It
is
inconceivable
that
respondents
would
not
be
aware
of
this.
With
due
diligence
on
their
part,
they
could
have
easily
verified
this
fact.
This
they
did
not
do
for
a
period
spanning
more
than
four
decades.
The
payment
of
rentals
by
respondents
reveal
that
they
are
mere
lessees.
As
such,
the
possession
of
respondents
over
Lot
No.
1639-D
is
that
of
a
holder
and
not
in
the
concept
of
an
owner.
One
who
possesses
as
a
mere
holder
[if
acknowledges
in
another
a
superior
right
which
he
believes
to
be
ownership,
whether
his
belief
be
right
or
wrong.
!supportFootnotes][41][endif]
Since
the
possession
of
respondents
were
found
to
be
that
of
lessors
of
petitioners,
it
goes
without
saying
that
the
latter
were
in
possession
of
Lot
No.
1639-D
in
the
concept
of
an
owner
from
1952
up
to
the
time
the
present
action
was
commenced.
Msesm
[if
!supportFootnotes][42][endif]
Partition
may
be
inferred
from
circumstances
sufficiently
strong
to
support
the
presumption.
[if
!supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Thus,
after
a
long
possession
in
severalty,
a
deed
of
partition
may
be
presumed.
It
has
been
held
that
recitals
in
deeds,
possession
and
occupation
of
land,
improvements
made
thereon
for
a
long
series
of
years,
and
acquiescence
for
60
years,
furnish
sufficient
evidence
that
there
was
an
actual
partition
of
land
either
by
deed
or
by
[if
!supportFootnotes][44][endif]
proceedings
in
the
probate
court,
which
had
been
lost
and
were
not
recorded.
And
where
a
tract
of
land
held
in
common
has
been
subdivided
into
lots,
and
one
of
the
lots
has
long
been
known
and
called
by
the
name
of
one
of
the
tenants
in
common,
and
there
is
no
evidence
of
any
subsequent
claim
of
a
tenancy
in
common,
it
[if
may
fairly
be
inferred
that
there
has
been
a
partition
and
that
such
lot
was
set
off
to
him
whose
name
it
bears.
!supportFootnotes][45][endif]
Respondents
insist
that
the
absence
of
any
annotation
in
the
certificate
of
title
showing
any
partition
of
Lot
No.
1639
and
that
OCT
No.
6725
has
not
been
canceled
clearly
indicate
that
no
partition
took
place.
The
logic
of
this
argument
is
that
unless
partition
is
shown
in
the
title
of
the
subject
property,
there
can
be
no
valid
partition
or
that
the
annotation
in
the
title
is
the
sole
evidence
of
partition.
Esmso
Again,
we
are
not
persuaded.
The
purpose
of
registration
is
to
notify
and
protect
the
interests
of
strangers
to
a
given
transaction,
who
may
be
ignorant
thereof,
but
the
non-registration
of
the
deed
evidencing
such
transaction
does
not
[if
!supportFootnotes][46][endif]
relieve
the
parties
thereto
of
their
obligations
thereunder.
As
originally
conceived,
registration
is
merely
a
species
of
notice.
The
act
of
registering
a
document
is
never
necessary
in
order
to
give
it
legal
effect
as
[if
!supportFootnotes][47][endif]
between
the
parties.
Requirements
for
the
recording
of
the
instruments
are
designed
to
prevent
frauds
and
to
permit
and
require
the
public
to
act
with
the
presumption
that
recorded
instruments
exist
and
[if
!supportFootnotes][48][endif]
are
genuine.
It
must
be
noted
that
there
was
a
prior
oral
partition
in
1946.
Although
the
oral
agreement
was
merely
tentative,
the
facts
subsequent
thereto
all
point
to
the
confirmation
of
said
oral
partition.
By
virtue
of
that
agreement,
the
parties
took
possession
of
specific
portions
of
the
subject
lot.
The
action
for
partition
was
instituted
because
some
of
the
co-
owners
refused
to
have
separate
titles
issued
in
lieu
of
the
original
title.
In
1952,
an
order
for
partition
was
issued
by
the
cadastral
court.
There
is
no
evidence
that
there
has
been
any
change
in
the
possession
of
the
parties.
The
only
significant
fact
subsequent
to
the
issuance
of
the
order
of
partition
in
1952
is
that
respondents
rented
portions
of
Lot
No.
1639-D.
It
would
be
safe
to
conclude,
therefore,
that
the
oral
partition
as
well
as
the
order
of
partition
in
1952
were
the
bases
for
the
finding
of
actual
partition
among
the
parties.
The
legal
consequences
of
the
order
of
partition
in
1952
having
been
discussed
separately,
we
now
deal
with
oral
partition
in
1946.
Given
that
the
oral
partition
was
initially
tentative,
the
actual
possession
of
specific
portions
of
Lot
No.
1639
in
accordance
with
the
oral
partition
and
the
continuation
of
such
possession
for
a
very
long
period
indicate
the
permanency
and
ratification
of
such
oral
[if
!supportFootnotes][49][endif]
partition.
The
validity
of
an
oral
partition
is
already
well-settled.
In
Espina
vs.
Abaya,
we
[if
!supportFootnotes][50][endif]
[if
declared
that
an
oral
partition
is
valid.
In
Hernandez
vs.
Andal,
reiterated
in
Tan
vs.
Lim,
!supportFootnotes][51][endif]
this
Court
has
ruled,
thus:
to
each,
recognize
and
enforce
such
parol
partition
and
the
rights
of
the
parties
thereunder.
Thus,
it
has
been
held
or
stated
in
a
number
of
cases
involving
an
oral
partition
under
which
the
parties
went
into
possession,
exercised
acts
of
ownership,
or
otherwise
partly
performed
the
partition
agreement,
that
equity
will
confirm
such
partition
and
in
a
proper
case
decree
title
in
accordance
with
the
possession
in
severalty.
In
numerous
cases
it
has
been
held
or
stated
that
parol
partition
may
be
sustained
on
the
ground
of
estoppel
of
the
parties
to
assert
the
rights
of
a
tenant
in
common
as
to
parts
of
land
divided
by
parol
partition
as
to
which
possession
in
severalty
was
taken
and
acts
of
individual
ownership
were
exercised.
And
a
court
of
equity
will
recognize
the
agreement
and
decree
it
to
be
valid
and
effectual
for
the
purpose
of
concluding
the
right
of
the
parties
as
between
each
other
to
hold
their
respective
parts
in
severalty.
A
parol
partition
may
also
be
sustained
on
the
ground
that
the
parties
thereto
have
acquiesced
in
and
ratified
the
partition
by
taking
possession
in
severalty,
exercising
acts
of
ownership
with
respect
thereto,
or
otherwise
recognizing
the
existence
of
the
partition.
A
number
of
cases
have
specifically
applied
the
doctrine
of
part
performance,
or
have
stated
that
a
part
performance
is
necessary,
to
take
a
parol
partition
out
of
the
operation
of
the
statute
of
frauds.
It
has
been
held
that
where
there
was
a
partition
in
fact
between
tenants
in
common,
and
a
part
performance,
a
court
of
equity
would
have
regard
to
enforce
such
partition
agreed
to
by
the
parties.
Esmsc
Two
more
points
have
constrained
this
Court
to
rule
against
respondents.
First,
respondents
Wilfreda
Maglucot-Alejo
and
Constancio
Alejo
offered
to
buy
the
share
of
Roberto
Maglucot.
Second,
the
tax
declarations
contain
statements
that
the
houses
of
respondents
were
built
on
the
land
owned
by
Roberto
Maglucot.
Esm
On
the
first
point,
petitioners
presented
Aida
Maglucot
who
testified
that
after
respondents
were
informed
that
petitioners
were
going
to
use
Lot
No.
1639-D
belonging
to
Roberto
Maglucot,
respondents
Wilfreda
Maglucot-Alejo
[if
and
Constancio
Alejo
went
to
the
house
of
said
witness
and
offered
to
buy
the
share
of
Roberto
Maglucot.
!supportFootnotes][52][endif]
Aida
Maglucot
further
testified
that
they
refused
the
offer
because
they
also
intend
to
use
the
lot
[if
!supportFootnotes][53][endif]
for
a
residential
purpose.
This
testimony
of
Aida
Maglucot
is
unrebutted
by
respondents,
and
the
CA
did
not
touch
upon
this
finding
of
fact.
Hence,
the
offer
to
buy
has
been
established
by
the
unrebutted
evidence
of
the
petitioners.
Why
would
they
give
such
offer
if
they
claim
to
be
at
least
a
co-owner
of
the
said
lot?
In
effect,
respondents
impliedly
admit
the
title
of
the
petitioners
and
that
they
are
not
co-owners,
much
less
the
sole
owners,
of
Lot
No.
1639-D.
Chief
On
the
second
point,
the
existence
of
Tax
Declaration
No.
04-557
in
the
names
of
Constancio
Alejo
and
Godofreda
[if
!supportFootnotes][54][endif]
[if
Maglucot,
Tax
Declaration
No.
04-87-13
in
the
names
of
Leopoldo
Maglucot
and
Regina
Barot,
!supportFootnotes][55][endif]
[if
Tax
Declaration
No.
04-593
in
the
names
of
Severo
Maglucot
and
Samni
Posida
!supportFootnotes][56][endif]
showing
that
the
houses
of
the
above-mentioned
persons
are
constructed
on
the
land
of
Roberto
[if
!supportFootnotes][57][endif]
Maglucot
constitute
incontrovertible
evidence
of
admission
by
the
same
persons
of
the
ownership
of
the
land
by
Roberto
Maglucot.
Tax
Declarations
are
public
documents.
Unless
their
veracity
is
directly
[if
!supportFootnotes][58][endif]
attacked,
the
contents
therein
are
presumed
to
be
true
and
accurate.
The
lone
testimony
of
Severo
Maglucot
that
Roberto
Maglucot
was
only
made
to
appear
as
owner
of
the
land
in
their
respective
declarations
because
he
was
the
administrator
of
Lot
No.
1639
is
uncorroborated
and
not
supported
by
any
other
evidence.
Jksm
No
injustice
is
dealt
upon
respondents
because
they
are
entitled
to
occupy
a
portion
of
Lot
No.
1639,
particularly
Lot
No.
1639-A,
in
their
capacity
as
heirs
of
Tomas
Maglucot,
one
of
the
original
co-owners
of
Lot
No.
1639
in
accordance
[if
!supportFootnotes][59][endif]
with
the
sketch
plan
of
said
lot
showing
the
partition
into
six
portions.
Finally,
this
Court
takes
notice
of
the
language
utilized
by
counsel
for
petitioners
in
their
petition
for
review
on
certiorari.
Thrice
in
the
petition,
counsel
for
petitioners
made
reference
to
the
researcher
of
the
CA.
First,
he
alluded
[if
!supportFootnotes][60][endif]
to
the
lack
of
scrutiny
of
the
records
and
lack
of
study
of
the
law
"by
the
researcher."
Second,
[if
!supportFootnotes][61][endif]
he
cited
the
researcher
of
the
CA
as
having
"sweepingly
stated
without
reference
to
the
record"
that
"[w]e
have
scanned
the
records
on
hand
and
found
no
evidence
of
any
partition."
Finally,
counsel
for
petitioners
assailed
the
CA
decision,
stating
that
"this
will
only
show
that
there
was
no
proper
study
of
the
case
by
the
[if
!supportFootnotes][62][endif]
researcher."
Any
court
when
it
renders
a
decision
does
so
as
an
arm
of
the
justice
system
and
as
an
institution
apart
from
the
persons
that
comprise
it.
Decisions
are
rendered
by
the
courts
and
not
the
persons
or
personnel
that
may
participate
therein
by
virtue
of
their
office.
It
is
highly
improper
and
unethical
for
counsel
for
petitioners
to
berate
the
researcher
in
his
appeal.
Counsel
for
petitioner
should
be
reminded
of
the
elementary
rules
of
the
legal
profession
regarding
respect
for
the
courts
by
the
use
of
proper
language
in
its
pleadings
and
admonished
for
his
improper
references
to
auction
sale
of
the
property
covered
by
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
T-3041
(a.f.).
The
Register
of
Deeds
of
Iligan
City
is
hereby
further
ordered
to
cancel
Entry
No.
451
on
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
T-3041
(a.f.)
on
file
with
his
office.
No
pronouncement
as
to
damages
or
attorney's
fees.
With
costs
against
the
defendants.
SO
ORDERED.
6
Petitioner
appealed
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
which
rendered
a
Resolution
on
August
28,1987,
forwarding
the
case
to
this
Court
for
resolution
reading
thus:
Considering
that
opposing
counsel
left
the
resolution
of
Atty.
Ramon
Gonzales'
motion
to
the
sound
discretion
of
this
Court
and
considering
the
unrefuted
allegation
of
the
said
motion
that
there
were
no
documentary
or
testimonial
evidence
which
were
the
basis
of
the
questioned
decision
but
mere
admissions
of
the
parties,
the
questions
raised
on
appeal
become
mere
questions
of
law,
over
which
the
Supreme
Court
has
exclusive
original
jurisdiction.
On
December
29,
1987,
petitioner
filed
this
present
petition
for
review
contending
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
modifying
its
earlier
decision;
in
declaring
that
he
has
no
right
to
foreclose
the
mortgaged
property;
in
declaring
the
temporary
restraining
order
into
a
permanent
preliminary
injunction
and
in
ordering
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Iligan
City
to
cancel
entry
No.
451
on
TCT
No.
3041.
We
gave
due
course
to
the
petition
and
required
the
contending
parties
to
submit
their
respective
Memoranda
on
August
31,
1988.
On
January
30,
1995,
respondents,
through
counsel
Ramon
A.
Gonzales,
filed
a
verified
Manifestation
informing
the
Court
that
the
subject
real
estate
mortgage
has
already
been
released
by
the
Traders
Royal
Bank
on
December
23,
7
1983
as
shown
in
the
certified
true
copy
of
the
Release
of
Real
Estate
Mortgage,
and
that
the
petitioner
was
killed
in
8
a
robbery
in
his
house.
Respondents
therefore
pray
for
the
dismissal
of
the
petition.
On
February
20,
1995,
this
Court
required
petitioner's
counsel
Atty.
Emilio
Abrogena
to
comment
on
the
said
Manifestation.
However,
the
copy
of
the
resolution
of
the
Court
addressed
to
Atty.
Abrogena
was
returned
unclaimed
9
after
three
notices,
with
the
postmaster's
remark
"moved."
In
view
of
this
development,
the
Court
considered
the
10
resolution
as
served.
Acting
on
the
Manifestation
of
the
respondents,
we
resolve
to
dismiss
the
petition
for
having
been
rendered
moot
and
academic.
The
resolution
of
the
basic
issue
of
whether
or
not
the
petitioner
has
the
right
to
extra-judicially
foreclose
the
mortgage
is
no
longer
necessary
in
view
of
the
release
of
the
mortgage
as
shown
in
the
certified
true
copy
thereof.
No
useful
purpose
would
be
served
by
passing
on
the
merits
of
the
petition.
Any
ruling
in
this
case
could
hardly
be
of
any
practical
or
useful
purpose
in
the
premises.
It
is
a
well-settled
rule
that
courts
will
not
determine
a
moot
question
or
11
abstract
proposition
nor
express
an
opinion
in
a
case
in
which
no
practical
relief
can
be
granted.
However,
we
take
notice
of
the
failure
of
petitioner's
lawyer,
Atty.
Emilio
Abrogena,
to
inform
the
trial
court
of
the
death
of
petitioner,
a
duty
mandated
by
Section
16,
Rule
3
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
which
provides
in
part,
to
wit:
Sec.
16.
Death
of
party;
duty
of
counsel.
Whenever
a
party
to
a
pending
action
dies,
and
the
claim
is
not
thereby
extinguished,
it
shall
be
the
duty
of
his
counsel
to
inform
the
court
within
thirty
(30)
days
after
such
death
of
the
fact
thereof,
and
to
give
the
name
and
address
of
his
legal
representative
or
representatives.
Failure
of
the
counsel
to
comply
with
this
duty
shall
be
a
ground
for
disciplinary
action.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Hence,
the
proper
substitution
of
the
deceased
in
accordance
with
the
aforequoted
provisions
of
Rule
3
could
not
be
effected.
We
likewise
note
Atty.
Abrogena's
failure
to
inform
this
Court
of
his
change
of
address
which
accounts
for
his
failure
to
comment
on
the
manifestation
of
respondents
relative
to
the
death
of
petitioner
and
the
release
of
the
subject
real
estate
mortgage.
Atty.
Abrogena
should
bear
in
mind
that
a
lawyer
is,
first
and
foremost,
an
officer
of
the
court.
His
duties
to
the
court
are
more
significant
than
those
which
he
owes
to
his
client.
His
first
duty
is
not
to
his
client
but
to
the
administration
of
justice;
to
that
end,
his
client's
success
is
wholly
subordinate;
and
his
conduct
ought
to
and
must
always
be
12
scrupulously
observant
of
the
law
and
ethics
of
the
profession.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
DISMISSED
for
being
moot
and
academic.
Atty.
Emilio
Abrogena,
counsel
for
petitioner,
is
hereby
REPRIMANDED
for
his
failure
to
inform
this
Court
of
the
death
of
petitioner
and
to
perform
his
duty
under
Section
16,
Rule
3
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.
He
is
further
warned
that
a
repetition
of
such
omission
in