Carlos Palacio

3-29-2015
Dr. Denis Gainty
Thought Paper 3
During the early years of the twentieth century, following the death of the Meiji Emperor,
Japanese society and government underwent certain changes in political and ideological dynamics
which ultimately resulted in the ultra-nationalist militaristic state that thrust East Asia and the Pacific
into a bloody conflict in the 1930's and 40's. These changes, though by no means inevitable results of
the processes which began with the Meiji Restoration of the century before, were certainly facilitated
by them, as well as by social forces which developed out of the period known as the Taisho
Democracy. Two articles written on the subject, Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese
Militarism by Kato Shuichi, and Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism by Maruyama Masao,
explore these forces and how the Japanese people were persuaded to accept the militaristic government
and the atrocities which it committed during the war years. The first article looks at the political
situation surrounding this phenomenon, and how the liberalism of the Taisho era not only failed to
bring about its intended results, but actually facilitated the ascension of the military element of the
government. The second article, on the other hand, looks at the psychological aspect of Japanese
nationalism, and how the Tennosei ideology created the predisposition in the Japanese national psyche
to accept, if not actively participate in, the ultra-nationalism of the 30's and 40's. By examining both of
these complimentary articles I will deconstruct the idea of Japanese radical nationalism and examine
how various, pervasive forces within post-Reformation Japanese society and government, such as the
Tennosei ideology, the failure of liberalism and the resultant resignation of the urban middle class, and
the structure of the Imperial government itself, manifested themselves in the imperialist aggression of
the early 20th century.

Kato begins his analysis with a description of the trend towards liberalization in post-World War
I Japan. According to him, large-scale postwar unemployment led to labor movements, strikes and riots
(Kato pg. 219). At the same time, however, Japan was already forming its foreign policy of aggression
towards the Asian continent, especially China, which was nonetheless mediated by the signing of
disarmament agreements with Western powers which caused the government to disband several of its
naval divisions, acts which were largely supported by the liberals but which left a bitter taste in the
tongues of the military leaders. The liberals in question, though staunch supporters of anti-militarism,
people's rights and greater levels of democratization in the government, were reluctant to fully oppose
the government, as they perceived that doing so would be far too radical to be a practical position. This
contradictory position, in which supporters of a democratic and liberal system of government hesitated
to oppose a government structure which in many ways made such goals impossible, led, Kato argues,
to the ultimate failure of the liberal movement in Japan (Kato pp. 223, 227, 230). Their timidity in the
face of the Imperial government also left the fight for liberal government to the Marxists, who had
come to prominence following the October Revolution in Russia. However, the Marxists were never a
very popular force outside of the intellectual urban class, and this, coupled with the extensive
persecution which the endured at the hands of an Imperial government reacting to the situation in
Russia, led to their ultimate failure as a potential force for liberalization in Japan. Another factor in this,
as Kato points out, was the fact that the largest contingent of the Japanese labor force, the non-urban
farmers and migrant workers, were largely supportive of the Imperial government and especially of the
armed forces, as many villagers saw the armed forces as an excellent means of advancing their own lots
(Kato pg. 228). Thus, while the influence of the Army continued to grow, helped largely by the fact that
it was beholden to no authority except the Emperor under the Meiji Constitution, as well as its
successful, though unauthorized by the government, adventures in China, which were widely
recognized as profitable to the country, the voice of the urban mass of the people grew increasingly
insignificant. This, Kato argues, was due to the lack of any real political organization or leadership

among them (labor unions and political parties, though present, were not widely supported and thus
ineffectual) and the continued reluctance to change the government structure which gave the military
its direct access to the ultimate authority, the Emperor, going over the heads of all other government
bodies. In addition the Army had a certain leverage over the government, as it could withdraw the War
Minister, thus intercepting any attempts to form a government. It could also threaten the government
with the possibility of terrorist attacks by frustrated young soldiers, several of which had already
happened and had proven to be a real danger. Thus, given little other choice, the Japanese people
resigned themselves to being an apolitical mass while the Army used its influence to decide the
affairs of the country.
Aside from these political and economic trends which led to the militarism of 20th century
Japan, Maruyama Masao also points out certain psychological and ideological factors which facilitated
this process. The central phenomenon which accounts for these factors, Maruyama argues, is the initial
failure during the Meiji Restoration to separate the internal aspects of the lives of the citizens, such as
morality and virtues, from the external state structure. Thus, in post-Reformation Japan, the two went
hand-in-hand; the State embodied within itself a moral code, the ultimate moral code, and to oppose the
State was to commit the gravest act of immorality. As Maruyama makes clear, the State here is
inseparable from the person of the Emperor, the apex of this political-moral structure known as the
Kokutai, or national body (the author translates it as national polity). Thus, all acts of the
government, are derived ultimately from this fountain of goodness and virtue, and are thus beyond
reproach. In a similar vein, all private acts of the citizens of the state are not seen as neutral, but rather
are judged on a rather arbitrary scale of adherence or non-adherence to the Kokutai. These moral
norms, the author points out, are not created by the Emperor, but rather are perceived to be simply
embodied by the Emperor, as the scion of a long and uninterrupted line of Emperors going back to the
mythical first Emperor of Japan. It is this lineage, rather than the individual person of the Emperor,
which determines the Kokutai. Thus, as the office of the Emperor is inextricably tied to the ideal of

virtue and morality, it follows that those closest to the Emperor in the system of command which
constitutes the government, should be superior to those below them, not merely in the official sense of
seniority of rank, but in a higher sense, comparable to the way in which the perceived proximity of the
pope to God conferred on the papacy a sense of superiority and infallibility in the medieval church.
Maruyama ties this closely to the structure of the army, which, as a body with direct access to the
Emperor, portrayed itself as superior to all other government bodies, the essence of the nation
(Maruyama pg. 14). Within the army, though, this hierarchy continued to reproduce itself, as the unit
was inspired with a sense of superiority towards other units, the company towards other companies,
the administrative squad towards other similar squads, [etc...]. This hierarchy, however, was felt no
less in the mass of Japanese society, as those highest on the social ladder (closest to the Emperor) were
perceived as superior, and those below them were expected to defer to them, not merely as a question
of respect to their title or position, but rather as a symbolic recognition of the superiority of the
Kokutai. On the other hand, though, the author points out that this hierarchy, while empowering certain
of its members, at the same time disempowers them, as there is always someone above them to which
they must show the same deference which they expect from those below. In this case, not even the
Emperor is an exception, as he must defer to the tradition of Emperors of which he is merely a
representative. Thus, the author argues, this leads to a condition in which the leaders of the country felt
themselves completely free of responsibility for their actions, perceiving that they had only done what
the structure of government and society obliged them to do in the name of the Kokutai ideal. In
addition, the author argues this structure led to a phenomenon which he calls transfer of oppression,
by which each rung of the ladder attempts to alleviate the oppression under which it perceives itself by
transferring it to the next one. The author argues that this phenomenon contributed to the atrocities
which Japanese soldiers committed in China and the Pacific, as many of them were so low on this
ladder that they could not transfer their own oppression to any lower rank. Thus, when given the
opportunity, they were all to glad to take it.

These two articles, though focusing on different aspects of a complex social and historical
question, ultimately converge on the same point: what was it that allowed or persuaded the people of
Japan to not only support, but actively take part in the lamentable acts of the country's imperialist
period? Upon looking at the arguments made in the articles, the factors which most stand out are a
reluctance to change the structure of the Meiji government, the disempowerment of the masses of the
people which allowed the military to abuse that structure, and the promulgation of an ideology which
made it difficult to oppose the actions of whatever faction managed to exert control over the
government. Essentially, it was the Meiji period which, despite its role in the rapid progress of the
country towards greater liberalization, ultimately laid the groundwork for the victory of the far-right
over the more liberal forces, and led Japan to a period of bloody, aggressive imperialism.

References:
Kato Shuichi
1974 Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese Militarism. In Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho
Democracy. Bernard S. Silberman and H.D. Harootonian, eds. Pp. 217-236. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press

Maruyama Masao
1963 Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism. In Though and Behaviour in Modern Japanese
Politics. Pp. 1-23. London; Oxford University Press