Phronesis Volume 18 Issue 3 1973 (Doi 10.2307/4181920) Michael Lapidge - Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα- A Problem in Stoic Cosmology

and : A Problem in Stoic Cosmology
Author(s): Michael Lapidge

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1973), pp. 240-278
Published by: BRILL
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&pxot and croLxZec:
A Problemin StoicCosmology
MICHAEL
LAPIDGE
recent years accurate and penetrating studies of Stoic logic,

epistemology, psychology and physics have been published. By
contrast, no critical attention has been given to Stoic cosmology.
The reasons for this neglect are not far to seek. In the first place,
Stoics themselves after Posidonius had expressed virtually no interest
in cosmology. Stoic doctrine of cosmology became codified and petrified by the doxographers, and when errors were inevitably incorporated
into this doxography, there was neither sufficient expertise nor concern to correct them. The doxographical testimonies which survive
are confused and charged with contradiction. In general, modern
scholarship has made little advance on the ancient doxographers
towards the understanding of this aspect of Stoicism. Further, because
there was no Stoic well enough versed in cosmology to reply to the
attacks of (say) Plutarch or Plotinus, modern scholarship has been
obliged to give these adverse accounts more emphasis than they would
be given if a Stoic refutation had been made and had survived.
But after the first century B. C. there was no Stoic who could have
performed such a task, and we are left with an inconsistent jumble of
fragments. Some of the inconsistency is to be attributed to the early
Stoics themselves, no doubt. But we should not allow ourselves to
forget that these early Stoics - and Chrysippus in particular - were
accomplished logicians, and that they would scarcely have tolerated the silly contradictions with which they are charged by the
comparatively simpleminded Christian apologists of a later period
(I think particularly of Tertullian and Lactantius). Before any
sound evaluation of Stoic cosmology can be made, the inconsistencies in the fragments will have to be exposed to see which inconsistencies are of Stoic provenance and which spring from inattentive and unsympathetic doxography. The bulk of this formidable
task awaits future investigation. My concern here is to isolate one
small problem among many: the Stoic notions of 'principle' and 'element'.
To begin at the apx7: perhaps the most frequently repeated statement of Stoic doxography is that, for Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus,
Tn
240

there were two &pXo, one of which was passive (7=caZov)and was called
U'j, the other of which was active (7roLo5v)and was called br6s.1
This is a deceptively simple statement. Before any consideration may
be given as to why the Stoics posited two 'principles' (&pxxL)
instead
of one or many, and what they signified by the term apXn, it is necessary to ascertain as nearly as possible what each of the 'principles'
was and how it functioned in the Stoics' universe.
The first-mentioned attributes of the Mcpacd
are that one is 'active'
or
the other 'passive' (7rkaXov), better perhaps, 'undergoes
(MtoLo5v),
action'. The conception of 'acting' and 'undergoing action' to account
for movement and change is not original with Stoicism. Plato had
first articulated the distinction,2 and Aristotle had seen that it might
be used to account for a variety of physical phenomena.3 Although
no extensive discussion of how the Stoics applied these conceptions
in their physical theory survives, it is reasonable to suppose that
Aristotle's discussion of the role of 'action' and 'undergoing action'
in genesis influenced the Stoic conception of cosmic genesis. For both
Aristotle and the Stoics the two concepts were inseparable aspects of
the one process; Aristotle observes that 7MLeZV and 1T&aeXv
are the same
in the sense that the road from Thebes to Athens is the same as that
from Athens to Thebes.4 Sextus Empiricus, in a passage that is very
I
SVF I.85 (DL 7.134 and Aetius I.3.25), 493; II.300, 301, 302, 303, 312, etc.
In the following discussion I shall wherever possible attempt to identify the
Stoics responsible for a particular term or theory. Identification is very often
rendered impossible by the doxographical tendency to report o' TDrxoL rather
than a particular Stoic's name as the source of an opinion. The problem already
perplexed Seneca - 'iam puta nos uelle singulares sententias ex turba separare:
cui illas adsignabimus? Zenoni an Cleanthi an Chrysippo an Panaetio an Posidonio?' (ep. 33.4) - and it remains acute today.
2 Theaetetus 156 a; Sophist 247 d; Phaedrus 270 d; Timaeus 57 a.
3 e.g. de gen. et corr. 1.7.323 b 1 sqq.; Phys. III.3.202 a 22 sqq.; de gen. anim.
1.18.724 b 5 sqq. See discussion by F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical
World (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), pp. 37-8, 353-67.
4 Phys. II1.3.202 b 11-14. In what follows I have assumed that certain Stoic
theories were arrived at through contact with Aristotle's physical thought, in
whatever form. I realize that this assumption presents some difficulty. The
majority of Aristotle's writings do not seem to have been known in their present
form much before the first century B.C. It is improbable that they would have
been known outside the Lyceum in 300 B.C., and it may be somewhat hazardous
to argue for Stoic contact with Aristotelian thought on the basis of terminological
resemblances. And yet there are so many terms which seem to be of Aristotelian
provenance in the Stoic sources that some contact between Aristotle's thought
and the early Stoics - even if only oral - seems likely. This supposition seems
241

faithful to Stoic nominalism, states that 'acting and undergoing action

they are nominally distinct
are one in conception but two in name'5
but essentially one.6 The inseparability of 'action' and 'undergoing
action' is crucial in the understanding of the Stoics' conception of
'matter' (U`kq).
Much of the difficulty in understanding the Stoic conception of
U{n may be alleviated by assuming (tentatively and subject to demonstration) that the term has three distinct meanings in Stoic
sources:
-
?1 the one pre-existing substance or 'matter' out of which the universe

is created;
?2 the passive aspect of this substance only;
?3 the 'matter' of particular created and ephiemeral objects.
The distinction between ? 1 and ? 3 will be self-evident; that between

? 1 and ? 2 is elusive and requires demonstration.7 First, my definition
? 1. Aristotle had met the problem that the universe could not come
to be out of nothing by positing that it was eternal. By contrast, the
notion that the universe is created and destructible is fundamental
to Stoic cosmology. The Stoics were consequently obliged to assume a
substance out of which (recalling Aristotle's ?e ov) the universe would
come to be, and which would at the same time 'underlie' change in
preferable to maintaining that all Aristotelian terminology in Stoic sources has
been foisted on the Stoics by Aristotelian-minded doxographers (althouglh this
is often the case with Diogenes Laertius). See also n. 44 below.
5 adv. math. 9.240 (not in SVF); cf. SVF II.302 (Philo).
6 The oneness of 'action' and 'undergoing action' brings withi it a train of difficulty. For example, in order for 'action' to take place, the agent anld thing acte(d
upon must be distinct but not dissimilar in kind. Clearly one thing could not
act upon itself. Aristotle met this problem by supposing that agent and patient
must be alike in 'kind' (yive) but distinct in 'form' (e8et) and consequently
must have the same substrate (de gen. et corr. 1.6. 322 b 13-21; 1.7.323 b 30ivitl
324 a 9). There is no evidence that the Stoics ever posed this problem
regard to their one otOLx and its two aspects (TroLo5v, raoaxov).
but, excepting
7Origen (SVF II.318) gives a far longer list of meanings of U`X?j,
only his first two definitions (my ?1 and ?3, presumably), none of his othier
definitions can be confirmed elsewhere in surviving Stoic testimonies. Origen's
list smacks strongly of doxography's omniunmgatherum technique, and it is
likely that he was using this technique as well as an earlier nion-Stoic source
(Numenius?) rather than the Stoic texts themselves; cf. J. IM.C. van Winden,
Calcidius on Matter (Leiden, 1959), p. 96.
242

The latter supposition

the universe during those periods of &Cx6aov,uaLq.8
depends on Aristotle's demonstration that change requires an enduring
or npc,rn
substrate.9 This substance is consistently called either ouaLtoc
is
of
a fixed
Oioz: or 7spurn i{X in Stoic sources;1O it is eternal and
bulk or mass (that is, it neither increases nor decreases)." Universes
are created from it and resolve themselves into it. Although this
conception of substance is indebted to Aristotle, and is described
in terminology which is unmistakeably Aristotelian,12 the grave
differences between the Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions need to
be stressed. Aristotle did not use the term 'first' or 'prior' to denote a
body or substance which existed before the universe in time. His
eternal universe has no need of such a conception and he explicitly
denies that the elements are generated from such a first body.'3
It seems likely that the Stoics (originally at least) attempted to
distinguish between the one 'first substance' and its passive aspect.
Calcidius states that Zeno and Chrysippus distinguished between
the 'first substance' is frequently called
7rp n'j {1; its passive aspect is called simply 'Wn and is never (to my
knowledge) called 7rp&rn'jv` in a surviving testimony. This may
indicate that a distinction between U`X-and ppT U` was intended.
essentia
and silua.14 Further,
In any case the 'first substance' or 'first matter' has two aspects, one
of which is U`k, one kz6. Although the two aspects are nominally
separate, they are in fact inseparable; they are like the vay from
Athens to Thebes seen from two different viewpoints. The inseparabili8
Arius Didymus,
VOt4 U9?PcTVXLt
as,
fr. 37 (DDG, p. 469) -SVF

7trz?pXULLV &MCvotahaLa
'
II.599:
LSaoCRa)'q
ou'axv
7iamq,
-r
xo'
y&xp-rotl yLvotlTb 8-ttoupy'aov
9 Phys.
1.9.192 a 29-34.
?0SVF 1.85; II.309, 316, 317, 318, 323, 374.
Arius Didymus, fr. 20 (DDG, p. 457) = SVF 1.87: oi'alxv 8i elVOL Trv
6v'rw)v 7roCVT&)V
7rp6)TVqV U`kv, TW'iT?V 8& 7caGov M48LOV xOCL OUTr 7TXeLG) YLYVOQLevnV
Tiv
ou-re
The term npWn U(-, for example, is often used by Aristotle: Phys. 11.1.
193 a 29; Metaph. A. 1014 b 32, 1015 a 7-10, H. 4. 1044 a 18-23, Or.1049 a 24-7;
de gen. anim. I. 729 a 32. See C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der
griechischen Philosophie (Miunster, 1890), p. 241, and H. Happ, Hyle: Studien
(Berlin, 1971), pp. 307-9, for attempts to
zum aristotelischen Materie-Begriff
ascertain its elusive meaning in Aristotle; also WV.Charlton's appendix to his
Aristotle's Physics I, II (Oxford, 1970), pp. 129-30.
13 de caelo III. 6. 305 a 22-4:
&XX&SLA'v
o','XX a4t)ouT6; TLVO4 eYXZwPeZyLvea5oL rT
y&p
4UO
oaCO
7po6rpOV
EIVuL T6)V a-ToL;?L()v.
aTQ)LX?aU[CETOU
14 in Tim., c. 290 Waszink
(SVF I. 86).
12
243

ty of bc6e and (UX-is a feature of Stoic cosmology which cannot be

too strongly emphasized: it is asserted by Alexander of Aphrodisias,15
Origen,16 Proclus17 and Syrianus.18Calcidius too emphasizes this feature of Stoic monism at length: 'ergo corpus universum iuxta Stoicos
determinatum est et unum et totum et essentia... unum autem, quia
inseparabileseius partes sunt et inuicem sibi cohaerent'.19So insistently
is the inseparability of &e6q and U`Xy)maintained in these (reliable)
sources that one must be preparedto dismiss as mistaken any attempt
to separate the two.20
Against the Stoic doctrine that Oxe64
and u`XYn
were in fact inseparable
the problem which most vexed ancient commentators is to be considered: the Stoics' statement that 'matter' was 'without quality'
or 'quality-less' (&IoLoq). If indeed {UXIwere never to be found separate
from is64 one might well wonder how i'Xncould conceivably be described as 1MoLoq:would not the continual presence of 4s6g 'qualify'
the u I?21 Aristotle did not himself use the term Mrotog
although
UX-n,
the notion of 'matter' being 'without qualification' may be deduced
from several passages.22 Nevertheless Aristotle's 'first matter' was
inseparable, incorporeal and knowable only by analogy.23What then
16 SVF II. 306. The term &X'ptroq in this context is Aristotelian, as is the
notion of 'Un being inseparable (de gent.et corr. II. 1. 329 a 24-6: iiLuti 8i pOCxLkv
'r(ov al7)'qCov, a&XX&
to(u'))nv OU XOPLa 'v ... and
IL&v elvm( 'Lvo D>
ThV@av .T)V
'v iXc0pLatOv. Also II.
ibid., 30: &py,v tL.v xac trpc)-rTqv
oLo%4EvoL' ?lvmt T?v US,v
5. 332 a 35). One must always reckon with the possibility of Alexander foisting
onto the Stoics an Aristotelian notion to which they did not subscribe. Here
the balance of evidence weighs against the possibility.
16 SVF II.318, 1054.
17 Proclus, in Tim. 81e (SVF 11.307), 126 b (not in SVF), 297 (SVF 11.1042),
299 c (SVF 11.307); in Parm., IV (col. 921.13 Cousin, not in SVF).
18
SVF II.308.
19in Tim., c. 293 Waszink (not in SVF); cf. c. 294.

For example, the statement of Tertullian (SVF 1.155): 'ecce enim Zeno quoque materiam mundialem a deo separat... itaque materia et deus duo vocabula,
duae res'. Many ancient accounts of Stoic cosmology are vitiated by this tendency to dualism; cf. SVF II.302.
21 Plotinus, in fact, contemptuously derides the Stoics for speaking of god as
'qualified matter' (SVF II.314 [U-) Tr; IXouvao],II.320). See J. M. Rist, Stoic
Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), p. 259.
22 e.g. de gen et corr. II. 1. 329 a 30; Metaphy. Z. 3. 1029 a 20. See Solmsen's
discussion, Aristotle's System of the Physical World, p. 119, n. 6.
23 Aristotle's conception of UXi has been the subject of many detailed studies.
On UfXvn
as incorporeal see Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie, pp. 236-8; L.
Cencillo, Hyle: Origen, conceptoy funciones de la materia en el Corpus Aristotelicum
20
244

led the Stoics to posit an apparently separable &noto4 {vXA?

There is no
simple answer to this question. Assuredly they did speak of an &-otos
U'?; Plutarch tells us this specifically.24 The difficulties might perhaps
have been removed by an appeal to the Stoics' rigorous nominalism.
Thus, although they spoke of an (toLos v`y (for whatever reason),
they must have considered that its 'quality-less-ness' was a mental
construct only (what they would have called a ?rxt6v),25 and that,
although 'matter without quality' was mentally conceivable it never
in fact existed as such. One might arrive at a notion of &atoLoq Uonly by abstraction. This is how the problem appeared to Calcidius,
who, when summing up the views of the Stoa (as well as of Plato and
Aristotle) on matter stated that U`f or silua was 'sine qualitate...
ac sine figura ac sine specie, non quo sine his umquam esse possit,
sed quod haec (scil. silua) ex propria natura non habeat nec possideat
potius quam comitetur species et qualitates. denique si mentis consideratione uolumus ei haec adimere sine quibus non est, possumus ei
non effectu sed possibilitate horum omnium possessionem dare'.226
Matter is without quality, not because it could ever exist as such,
but because 'of its own nature' it was without quality. The crucial
point in understanding this confusing doctrine is the restrictive phrase
'of its own nature' - ex propria natura. Some such restrictive phrase
usually accompanies Stoic discussions of matter, which is said to be
'unqualified' either x ut'or-djvor xK'ot
v ?0yov.27
evovv or xacixvro"
(Madrid, 1958), pp. 44-50; and the exhaustive treatment by H. Happ, Hyle,
pp. 778 sqq. On U-1 as knowable xao'&vocoXoyEmv
see J. Owens, 'The Aristotelian
Argument for the Material Principle of Bodies', in Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles
und Theophrast, ed. 1. During (Heidelberg, 1969), pp. 196-201.
24 SVF 11.380:
v y&p SXv &7rotovovopackouat. Plutarch justly argues that the
Stoics, in speaking of &7rotoq5q, present only half the problem ('Or 8& i[LLa
&oto.
PA17r0oua): they nowhere speak of the correlative rot6L6neTq4
25See the excellent discussion of Xex-r&
by A. A. Long in Problems in Stoicism,
ed. A. A. Long (London, 1971), pp. 75-90.
26 in Tim., c. 310 (not in SVF). Similarity between this passage and a passage
in Origen (SVF II. 318) has led scholars to assume a common source for the two
accounts. Waszink (Calcidii Coinmentarium in Timaeum (Leiden, 1962), pp.
lxxviii-lxxx) proposed Porphyry, and van Winden (Calcidius on Matter, pp.
95-6), Numenius. On Calcidius and the Stoic conception of UiXVn
in general see van
Winden, pp. 93-103.
27 e.g. SVF II. 313, 318, 1047. The Stoics seem to have distinguished things
known 'by conception' and 'by experience' (xarr' &7rdvouxv
and xocz'xnepETr'roamv);
see Sextus Empiricus, adv. math. 8.58 (SVF II. 88). A similar distinction is
attributed to Posidonius - that between zorT'&tdvOLmV and xau'YU6aroaLv (DL
245

Failure to appreciate what was intended by the restrictive phrase

misled some of the most trenchant criticism of Stoic theory in antiquity - that of Plutarch and Plotinus.
Plutarch notes in de communibus notiiiiS28 that for the Stoics the
&e64 which is found in uX- is neither 'unmixed' nor 'simple' but
composed 'of another' and 'through another'. It is impossible to tell
whether Plutarch is quoting Stoic terminology, but he seems to be
thinking of WZosand u`X- as two components of the one compound
ouCaoc.But u(XY by itself is said to be irrational and withouit form:
-ena un x,'ocx'iv xoyoq xY &7toLo4.By contrast, the 4eos is not said
to be 1'aw4to4 or `i?os (the half-argument again). So, Plutarch
charges, if rational 1s64 anid uSt are indeed one, the Stoics are in-
consistent in calling u`n 'irrational' ( 'L

o
6oyog, oix
trv
siu Tr
uv
eV XCXL&auT6vI
yap ?v
I`Xoyov &tro38Wdxoatv).
One
wonders
UIY xMal
how
the
Stoics might have answered this charge. In the first place, Plutarch's
treatment is slightly tendentious in considering U`n and 41r6 as components of a mixture rather than as nominally distinct aspects of one
substance. And in neglecting the Stoics' nominalism Plutarch has
probably overlooked the force of their qualifying phrase YoaocU'r-iJrv:
is by itself 'irrational' and 'without quality'. If by a process of
UX-n
mental abstraction (`Xyjcould be conceived on its own, it would be
found to be 'without quality'. But it is never in fact found in such a
state. Consequently, the Stoics would lhave been obliged to defend
the positioni that UXn,in so far as it is an eternal aspect of the one
substance, is in effect 'rational'. Plutarch found this position completely untenable, as any Platonist vould have done.
The criticism of Plotinus is less careful than that of Plutarch
in its attempt to discover what the Stoics' doctrine was; in many
ways he misrepresents this doctrine. Plotinus' criticism of the Stoic
theory of matter is found principally in Enn. VI.1.25-7.29 He proceeds
7. 135 =-- fr. 16 in L. Edelstein
and I. G. Kidd, Posidonius
I: The Fragnments
(Cambridge, 1972)).
28 1085 b (SVF 11. 313). On Plutitarch's criticism of Stoicism in general see
M. Pohlenz, 'Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker', Hermes 74 (1939), pp. 1-12;
F. H. Sandbachi, 'Plutarclh on the Stoics', CQ 35 (1941), pp. 20-5; and recently
D. Babut, Plutarque et le stoicisnie (Paris, 1969), esp. pp. 24-46.
Not all of Plotinus' discussion is printed in SVZF.Plotinus' theory of matter

has been discussed by J. M. Rist, Phronesis 6 (1961), pp. 154-66; on Plotinus
and Stoicism in general see W. Theiler, 'Plotin zwischen Platon und Stoa',
29
Entretiens Fondation Hardt 5 (1960) pp. 63-86, and recently A. Graeser, Plotinus
and the Stoics (Leiden, 1971).
246

to discuss the theory from his Platonic point of view, a point of view
which is de facto intolerant of the Stoics' thoroughgoing materialism.
Thus he charges that the Stoics did not reserve the place of honour
in their cosmology for the 'principle of all things', but (regrettably)
substituted that which was devoid of life, unintelligent, shadowy
and indeterminate.30 The Stoics' failing here is easily apprehended:
their system is not Plotinian, and Plotinus is ill-disposed from the
beginning to understand their theory of matter. Likewise Plotinus
asks of them, 'how does it come about that matter sometimes becomes
body, other times its soul'?3' Here he simply refuses to countenance
the widely-known Stoic doctrine that iuZn was corporeal32 and persists
in reading Iu, in a Platonic sense. Given these (wilful) misunderstandings of Stoic theory, it is not surprising that Plotinus' criticism
of the Stoic "X-1is in many ways deficient. He argues as follows: 3
to the Stoics the &ek is a 'second something' to matter and is corporeal. Corporeality is said (by Plotinus and purportedly by the
Stoics) to consist in both 'matter' and 'form'. Whence, then, given
that &e64is corporeal, does it get its form? For if it existed without
U-1, it would be incorporeal. Further, if corporeality consists in matter
and form, how could u'X-possibly be a 'principle' (apx()? For, if `XYn
is corporeal, it must be composite (i.e. it must consist in matter and
form), and therefore matter and form must be prior to it (hence it is
no &px). Plotinus' argument is challenging but wrong. In the first
place it is misleading to stress that Oe is a 'second something'
to u`X-: the 1e64 and u"X-are inseparably one and may be separated
in name only. It is unlikely that the Stoics defined 'body' (a7tux)
as consisting in 'matter' and 'form' or 'quality'. Those Stoic definitions which survive define 'body' as that which has length, breadth
and height ;34 one is inclined to suspect that the definition was formulated in those terms to avoid the very criticism which Plotinus makes.
In any case the Stoics considered that 'quality' was corporeal,35 so
that a composite of 'quality' and 'matter' would nonetheless be body.
It is clear that the Stoics must have defended their description
31 Ibid.
Enn. VI.1.27 (SVF 11.314).
e.g. SVF 1.136, 137, 138; 11.773, 774, 775, 780, 785, etc.
83 Enn. VI.1.26 (SVF 11.315)
3 DL 7.135, 150; SVF 11.382. cf. the comment of Alexander of Aphrodisias,
{'X-4 lvcLt (SVF 11.394), where no mention is made of
that 7r&va<5X0M; 1i?)iv ii
'quality'.
35 SVF 11.323 (Galen), 11.383 (Simplicius).
80
32
247

of the passive aspect of the one substance (definition ? 2) as &notooi'X1

by resort to a rigid nominalism, however tenuous this defense might
now seem. At the same time Stoic texts speak of an &7oto ou'aL.36
To see what the word &notoc might mean when applied to the one
substance or npcv-~-U
v) (definition ? 1 above) is more problematic
As I understand the Stoic terminology, ouaLxis used to describe
still.37
the one first substance which consists in two aspects. Although by a
process of abstraction one might arrive at a conception of one aspect
separate from the other (&atoLoqv` or &uXoq
45e6), no such abstraction
would be pertinent to the first substance. By definition the qualifying
aspect (5e64) of the first substance is eternally present in it. At
the very least this eternal presence of ?0ek would seem to account for
the spherical shape of the first substance during those periods when
ovalm is in the shape of a cosmos.38 Clearly a different explanation
would be required to account for the 'quality-less-ness' of the first
substance than to account for the application of the term dsotoL to
its passive aspect alone. That is why one is inclined to credit the
testimony of Plutarch when he gives a radically different explanation
of &itOLoq oUCLa. Towards the end of de communibus notitiis Plutarch
discusses the confusion in Stoic terminology of U`kq, o'ua' and a&4,.
He notes that certain Stoics proposed the following notion: that oaLX
was said to be abotoq not (as one would expect) because it was devoid
of all quality, but rather because it contained all qualitics: ov 86 'LVEq
YvG)v spopoa?XXovrouk6yov, 1
&4rOLov
'vrV ou'aOv &VO[LOCaOVreq
OuX 6TL
oc a
o
.39 Although
this statement was incomprehensible to Plutarch, it may be seen to
square with the Stoic system: while the cosmos was formed the 'first
substance' would include - would be - all qualified things, and even
after z7wiat the substance would contain spermatically the qualities
7r&rY1,step?aL
7TOLOW7TO
L 7rM&a
OCXX6'6
SVF I.85; II.318, 380.

Mrt pvaouaLv
&7rOomvr,v
This problem already puzzled Galen who asks,
7rpwrIvousa(v; (SVF II.382). cf. Galen's discussion at SVF II.323 a.
88 The testimony of ps.-Philo (SVF 11.621) adds more confusion: MQxouaoc&XPL
'Tf &x vUpcoaeo4oUiacz rtL
8tX LXOaL,uuV-n i &8Lmx6a[L
ro;. What is the force of
ax pt r-; kx7up6aew;? Presumably o'ata persists eternally, whether in the shape
of a cosmos or not. This problem does not seem to have been fully worked out.
We know for example that the universe is spherical (SVF II. 547). But what
shape (if any) does the oU'Ci have when it is not formed into a cosmos? No
surviving Stoic source poses this question.
39 de comm. not. 1086 a (SVF II.380).
36
87
248

of things of the succeeding &vOoCGL .40 There is therefore some

considerable justification for treating &=oqoL (Ij and &7rotoq ou'ac
as distinct conceptions. But even if such a distinction be granted
as wholly Stoic, the choice of the one word 7rotogto connote these
different conceptions was surely unfortunate. At least part of the
confusion in Stoic texts seems to be due to the unhappy choice of
terminology by the Stoics themselves.
There is one further meaning of i`kv (definition ? 3 above) which
is well attested in Stoic sources. Diogenes Laertius reports41 that
the ouata of all things is the 7rpcx'ri{`XSn,and that 'AvA
or ouata is used in
two senses: that of the whole (the universe) which neither increases
nor decreases and that of parts (&v ed ti
,pou4) which both increases
and decreases. Diogenes' statement is confirmed by Calcidius, who
notes that the partes of the one substance are changed but not destroyed,42 where presumably the mass of the whole remains constant and
if a part of it were destroyed (i.e. were reduced to nothing) the mass
would be diminished. Thus partes may be 'destroyed' in so far as they
are partes but in respect of the whole there is no destruction. The
Stoics apparently regarded the destruction of parts qua parts as
'change'. A quantity of earth becomes water; it ceases to be earth
(or is destroyed as earth) but in becoming water the mass of the whole
remains constant and is in this way a substrate to the change. Something approaching this modern conception of mass is what must be
intended by Plotinus' statement, that one U-XT'underlies' (ij7roff3Xim5or) the elements.43 At the same time the 'particular' ( r&v '7r'
1?pouq) vXn of (say) the earth changes when it becomes water. The
notion of a constant corporeal mass underlying change would have
been unthinkable to Aristotle. Nevertheless the Stoics would seem to
be indebted here as elsewhere to Aristotle's thought regarding genesis.44
40
Alternatively, the o'afo might be &Trotog

in the sense that Plato's 'oAo0X
was said to be &~iopyo4and cVc8eXkq (Timaeus 51 a), ready to receive any shape.
But the abundant Stoic testimonies that the substance contained a7ep'xrtxol
?6yot would weigh against this.

DL 7.150 (SVF I.87; II.316).
42 in Tim., c. 292 Waszink (SVF 1.88). cf. Arius
Didymus, fr. 20 (DDG, pp.
457-8 = SVF I.87): rc 8&,6p-nq
-Toux &el t &ocru86xpvcEv &XX 8LaLpC!a&L
xol
p
41
GuYXCzalftu.
43
SVF 11.320; cf. II.408 (Galen):
I5J'i 'rLt CatLV
1 (MCMLV
U7OPC5>0&iVn
'rOt aTOL-
4" W. Wiersma (Mnemosyne 3rd ser. 11 (1943), p. 195, n. 3) has argued, following
Bignone (L'Aristotele perduto I, pp. 33, 42, 68 sqq.) that, since only Aristotle's
249

That change from one thinig to its opposite required a common subis a fundamental doctrine of Aristotle,4s
strate (6CMXCL0svov or UXrB)
and it clearly influenced the Stoic doctrine that all things come to be
froin S .16 The Stoics, however, made a clear distinction between
U{n and U'7roxe4vov. For them U"Xwas the corporeal substance which
underlay all change. By contrast 67oxecurvov was a categorical term
used to describe one aspect of the state of an object; it was something
said about an object (X-t6v) and hence was incorporeal. This difference may be seeni in Dexippus' comment47 - that for the Stoics
the u'oxe,.'voV was two-fold and included both the {`X- of an object
and its ntowv - where {U' cannot be simply equivalent to VWOxzLEvov.
Once again Aristotelian terminology has been borrowed by the Stoics,
but the Stoic conception is distinct.
Now the Stoic conception of apXirpmay be reconsidered. One of
the most difficult problems in the interpretation of Stoic cosmology
is that of reconciling the fact that, on the one hand, they posited a
single primal substance out of which the cosmos arose and, on the
other hand, they posited two &ppc', not one.48 Though it is virtually
impossible at this remove to reconstruct the deliberation which led
some conjecture is worthwhile. One must
Zeno to posit two ipXOCL,
assume, as Zeller long ago remarked,49 that the Stoic system was
exoteric writings and dialogues were known outside the Lyceumn in Zeno's time,
Zeno could not hiave had access to those Aristotelian works (de gen. et coyy.,
Physica, Metaphysica) wliclh discuss the concept of U7A. Wiersina consequently
denies that Zeno taught a '),7 and proposes that attributions of this doctrine to
Zeno must be an error of later doxography (he compares tlle false attribution
of U)j to Plato in Aetius 1.3.21). Wiersma was conducting a polemic againist the
extreme view of Siebeck (Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen (Freiburg,
1888), pp. 181-252) that all principal Stoic physical doctrines derive fronm Aristotle. If u(- were an isolated instance, Wiersma's remarks would be salutary.
But the balance of evidence weighs against llim: he must account for 7ot6ouv/
7riacov, cpJuLt as creative (eyxwtx6v), irpc'ur UX, the 67roxe[tvvov, the natural
elemental tendencies
upwards and downwar(ds, and perhaps the circularmoving otd&p, by recourse to non-Aristotelian physics.
'5 The most detailed discussion is in Phys. I.7.190 a 35 sq(l.
G'
46 DL 7.150 (SVF II.316):
TL&TOTO5VyLVErLat. l)iogenes intends
U(X)86 ?CTLV e
this as a general definition to embrace the variety of wavs in wlhiclh the Stoics
used the term.
discussion is influenced bv Plotinus, Enn. VI 1.25
47 SVF 11.374. Dexippus'
(partly printed in SVF 11.373).
48 This question
was put trenchantly by A. Bonh6ffer in his appendix ('Der
stoische Pantheismus') to Die Ethik des Stoikeys Epictet, pp. 244-5.
4' Phil. d. Griech. 111.14, p. 126.
250

erected on certain underlying assumptions which Zeno had not acquired from the criticism of Platonic or Aristotelian positions. In
general terms, Zeno's a priori assumptions might be described as
materialism, monism and nominalism.50 If the universe as it exists
is not eternal, it must have been created. If created, it could not
have been created out of nothing. There must have existed some precosmic substance out of which the universe came to be. This is essentially the position of the Presocratic cosmologists; this pre-existing
something from which the universe began - whether water, air,
fire or something less determinate - was generally called the apX.51
Why then did the Stoics not call their 'first matter' or 'first substance'
the Oipxy?The Stoics maintained that all things arose from this one
-
v6r-
nT&vrox yLveat&ax,as
Cleanthes said52- so it would not have
been surprising if they had designated this one substance as the &'pyj
of their cosmology. It must have appeared as such to Sextus Empiricus,
for at one point he calls the Stoics' one substance the Op':
a&otoLU
p
p;V oi"v xcdL &V& acI0awoo
Ipx.yIp
'W)v ov
OxV
a67 CV-Taoo y6Veawa.V
O'l
T'-qV 6?,ov
soi
sarLV T &7t0!.04 {\ 53 But such
Xvx'
a theory
could no longer satisfactorily answer questions which were raised in

Zeno's time, particularly by Aristotle's treatment of genesis. The
Stoics were obliged to explain how the cosmos arose from this one
substance. In so far as they were materialists, they would have argued
that all causation must be corporeal, that only matter can act upon
matter.54 Creation must have been caused either by a material force
outside the one substance (a notion which would have been repugnant
to their monism) or else by such a force within the one substance
itself.55 Using Aristotelian terminology they designated one aspect
5 These fundamental assumptions are discussed by J. R. Mattingly, 'Early
Stoicism and the Problem of its Systematic Form', Philosophical Review 48
(1939), esp. pp. 274-6.
51 See A. Lumpe, 'Der Terminus Prinzip (&pX) von den Vorsokratikern bis auf
Aristoteles', ABG 1 (1955), pp. 104-7. Because the term 4pXy is found largely
in the testimonies and not in direct quotations, it is more probable that the
attribution of the term springs from post-Aristotelian doxography than from
the Presocratics themselves.
52 Arius Didymus, fr. 38 (DDG, p. 470) = SVF 1.497.
53 adv. math. 10.312 (SVF 11.309).
54 SVF I.90; II.340, 341, 363, 387.
55 Sextus Empiricus (adv. math. 9.75 = SVF 11.311) reproduces an almost
identical
OVTrc
in setting out the Stoic cosmology:
train of argument
OUGL.x...
aXLV)T0Q
OiUacX
xtve5La,L. (2) 'r xtvo3v...
EK X9T;
86 oix
XL
1X7LTLCT04
&,Xo rt 7tL*v6v ka-wL
U67O
eIVXL
(1) n -TOLVUV
tjV
dtTi
O'C6pDX
% 8UVOCLEV tLVM 8
TLVO4
251

of this substance 'active' (noLoi5v).56But that which acted could not

exist without something to act upon (naZov). Aristotle had suggested
that an &py-could not exist by itself but must exist in something,and also
that genesis could only take place from opposites.57 Hence more than
one aPX-nwould be needed to account for cosmic generation58(even
though Aristotle did not himself consider such an event). The Stoics
existed in something else
settled on two &pXcx[:
each of these &pXxa
and their functions were distinct enough that they might be considered
opposites. It would have been quite appropriate to designate the
active apy'jas 196e. And at one point Aristotle had himself suggested
was characteristically passive ;$9 the Stoics adopted this
that {"Xv1
suggestion. They were consequently left with a cosmological paradox:
while attempting to remain faithful to their monism in positing
to account for cosmic
one substance, they required at least two &'ppai
genesis. Calcidius puts the paradox concisely: 'duo totius rei sumunt
initia..una quidem essentia'.60 It needs scarcely to be added that
this paradoxical position was vigorously attacked in antiquity.6"
It would seem reasonable to assume that the Stoics arrived at their
conception of two aCpaocE
through some confrontation with Aristotle's
theory of genesis and change.62Once again the vast differencebetween
cxUr`q nreomnpxulxtv. (3) oa'-r o&Svm glvoc
cf. SVF II.599.
i'oL
axT
&XT)a
ATlV
iu7b
xtveCZT(L8uvCX4e.
cf. F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System ol the Physical World, p. 89.

I.2.185 a 4 (* yap &px4'TLVO4 % 'tvCov); cf. discussion by W. Wieland,
Die aristotelische Physik, 2nd edn. (G6ttingen, 1970), pp. 55-7; also Metaph.
A. 10. 1075 a 27 sqq. (on 'principles').
58 The necessity of more than one &pXlarises from the discussion at Metaph.
K. 2. 1060 a 13_b 30. See discussion of this passage by A. Ehrliardt, The Beginning (Manchester, 1968), pp. 122-3, who infers from Aristotle that one &pxi
must be active, one passive. Although Aristotle in theory maintained that three
elgoq, a-tp-aLm),as at Phys. 1.
&pXatwere needed to account for change (UBX1,
7. 191 a 15-17, in fact these three reduced themselves to two: form and matter
is not inconsistent
(cf. Happ, Hyle, p. 295). That the Stoics posited two &pXotr
with Aristotle.
56
57 Phys.
59 de gen. et corr. I. 7. 324 b 18 (4 8'UAX- f bX-1 rXTrmitx6v); II. 9. 335 b 29-30

cf. Baeumker, Das Problem
T'6 t&aXCLV &'TL xOClT6bXL'VC&L).
(Tq5 LV y&p %j5
der Materie, p. 265, and Happ, Hyle, pp. 762-3.

60in Tim., c. 289 Waszink (not in SVF).
61 Notably by Plutarch (SVF II.525), Plotinus (SVF 11.314, 373) and Lactantius
(SVF II.1041).
62 See however the recent discussion by H. J. Kramer, Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie (Berlin, 1971), pp. 133 sqq., who sees the Stoic &pyxain
the context of Academic discussion.
252

the Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions should be stressed. Aristotle's

were more or less methodological principles, conceptions used
&pxoct
to account for the process of change.63Aristotle's universe was eternal,
and he had no concern with describing cosmic genesis. The Stoic
as corporeal entities which exist before the uniconception of 'PXocl
verse is created, and out of which it comes to be, would have been
intolerable to Aristotle.
It is virtually impossible to form a satisfying and accurate idea of
the Stoic conception of {)j. In many ways we are better informed
the 4es6'. The 641s is almost invariably
concerning the other ?&pXn,
described as fiery. Aetius reports that Zeno considered the &s6'
to be the 'fiery mind of the cosmos'.4 Plutarch testifies that the Stoics'
Zeus (-
5e6q) was 'one mighty and continuous fire',65 and Eusebius,
that the 'fiery and hot substance of the cosmos was god, which was
corporeal and was the creative force itself, and was none other than
the energy of fire'.66 Clearly fire as creative force occupied a central
position in Stoic cosmology. For Cleanthes, that which had heat and
was fiery was able to move of its own accord - 'omne, quod est calidum
et igneum, cietur et agitur motu suo', in Cicero'swords.67That 'heat'
or 'fire' (the Stoics did not distinguish between the two terms) is the
principle of growtli and self-movement is perhaps best witnessed in
is a 'creative fire (7i5p
the well-known statement of Zeno that cpy'aL
-teXvtxOv)going methodically about the business of creation'.68 Zeno's
6f3 This
point has been argued by Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, p. 104:

'Die aristotelischen Prinzipien stehen mit Wasser und Luft, den Elementen
und Atomen gar nicht auf derselben Stufe. Sie sind Gesichtspunkte, unter denen
man u.a. auch alle von den Vorgangern angenommenen Prinzipien ordnen kann'.
Wieland's viewpoint has been vigorously disputed by Happ, Hyle, pp. 798-9;
see also G. Morel, 'De la notion de principe chez Aristote', Archives de philosophie
23 (1960), pp. 487-511; 24 (1961), pp. 497-516.
64 Aetius I.7.23 (DDG, p. 303) = SVF 1.157; cf. Servius on Aen. 6.727 (SVF
I1.1031).
65 de facie in orbelunae 926 c (SVF I1.1045).
66 SVF 11.1032: 'rv Trupi - xcx
ouatov... elvoct
xO6aou xclt r6v f6v
?ppv
el?vcL a7N.u, xaot tv
8-tto.upy6v ociuP6v, oux'8tepov
Trq roi
rp6
ao4te
ND 2.23 (SVF I.513). Solmsen has observed that 'cietur motu suo' would
seem to be a translation of Greek &pX; (Meded.A kad. van Wet. 24.9 (1961), p. 272;
cf. idem, JHS 77 (1957), p. 122). But Solmsen would seem to have in mind the
Aristotelian notion of 4pxi (as for example that at Metaph. A. 8. 1073 a 23-25),
and there is no evidence that the Stoics defined &pyyin this way.
68 SVF I.171; II.1133, 1134. That the definition is by Zeno himself see Pohlenz,
Die Stoa II, pp. 38-9.
67
253

definition incorporates some Aristotelian terminology,69 but the

conception of fire as material creative force could not be found in
Aristotle. Zeno's system was strongly monistic, and it would have
been equally correct to describe this creative force as cu'at or 49,6
or even 'fate' or 'providence'. Thus it would have been consistent
with Zeno's system to describe &6q the &pxnas sup reXvtx6v,although
the only fragment to make such a statement is late and is not explicitly
attributed to Zeno: ox Zraxot voepowv56V Otoyalvovctl, wup TXvLo'v
r3d
aaov e ye:vevJ 70
O6a
We must now ask if Zeno described his t?0k or sup eXVoV as
at bnp.There is abundant evidence that he did. But simple affirmation
here is slightly misleading. By the time of Zeno virtually every ancient
cosmological system assigned some role to xo1p,7' and it would have
been surprising if Zeno had omitted it. The question should rather
reflect
be put: does Zeno's use of the term adhp to describe his &h6k
the theorizing of a particular cosmological system and, specifically,
does it reflect the impressive conception of a spherically-moving
od$p which Aristotle had formulated? Further, does the Stoics'
O,jp occupy a position additional to the four commonly known
'elements' or 'first bodies' - is it conceived of as a quinta essentia
or merely as the uppermost of the four elements? Cicero in several
places notes that the summus deus of the Stoics was said to be aether,
and Minucius Felix says that the Stoics maintained 'aethera interdiu
omruum esse principium',73 where jrincipium possibly translates the
Stoic term CpX. Further, as we know from Zeno's definition of oupcv6q
(preserved by Achilles Tatius), the atrJp is the 'outermost' or 'uppermost' part (-rob
gaprov) of the universe and includes all things except
69 The notion of yau'at as eXvLx66vis evidently Aristotelian (e.g. Phys. II.8.199 a
9 sqq., b 29-30), as Siebeck ('Die Umbildung der peripatetisclhen Naturphilosophie in die der Stoiker', Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, p. 222)
p. 115, n. 91) haveobserved.
and Solmsen (Aristotle's System of thePhysical WVorld,
One might add that the conception of nature working methodically is also
Aristotelian: 9lL 8'q yu9L 0
yo%fv-qi y6vaLv o6&6 &Lv eE 9UvaLv(Phys. 11.1.
193 b 12-13).
70 Aetius I.7.33
(DDG, p. 306) = SVF II.1027, where &e6q has replaced cp6aL

of the frequently quoted definition. The statement of Athenagoras, Legatio pro
Christianis, c. 6, is derived from Aetius.
71 There are two well-documented studies of achLYp:
that by J. H. Waszink,
Reallexikon fur A ntike und Christentum, s.v. 'aether', and by P. Moraux, RE
XXIV, col. 1171-1263, s.v. 'quinta essentia'.
72 ND 1.36, 39; Acad.pr. 2.126 (SVF 1.154).
73 Oct. 19.10 (SVF I.154).
254

itself.74 Cleanthes (reported by Cicero) gave a more extensive definition of aether: 'tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum
et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether
nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat'.15 To this point there is little
that is original in the Stoic cxthp. To inquire more closely: Aristotle
in de caelo had explained the cosmic ordering of elements by reference
to the two simple motions - the rectilinear (sU?Zo) and the circular
(7rcpecpepq). Rectilinear motion may be away from or towards a point;
circular motion is around it. The simple bodies or elements have
simple motions: air and fire tend naturally upwards, earth and water
naturally downwards in rectilinear movement. By contrast the first
body or alodp encloses the four elements and has a characteristic
circular motion.7fi If we recall that, to Cicero at least,77 the Stoic
and Peripatetic systems were so similar that the two separate names
were scarcely justifiable, it is worthwhile asking if any trace of Aristotle's distinctive occwmp
theory may be discovered in the Stoic cosmolNo certain answer can be given. On the one hand, Arius
ogy.78
Didymus79 preserves an account, purportedly by Chrysippus, that
there were two basic tendencies in the cosmos: the stationary centre
and that which revolved about it (7repLyep6pevov 7sp' TO

,tecaov). Of these, the oahnp is the nepLpep6pO'Uvov,
earth, air and water
(07ntopvov)
the vsop.'vov. Against this account, Achilles Tatius80 reports the Stoic
74SVF
1.15.
ND 1.37 (SVF I.530). cf. SVF I.532, 534, 580 (DL 7.137).
76 The principal argument is found in de caelo 1.1 and 2; 111.2; IV.3 and 4.See
commentary by Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World, pp. 254 sqq.,
and G. A. Seeck, (Jber die Elemente in der Kosmologie des Aristoteles. Zetemata
34 (Munich, 1964), pp. 91-119.
77 de fin. 4.12-13: 'ergo in hac ratione tota de maximis fere rebus Stoici illos
(scil. Peripateticos) secuti sunt, ut et deos esse et quattuor ex rebus omnia
constare dicerent.. . ergo adhuc, quantum equidem intellego, causa non uidetur
fuisse mutandi nominis; non enim, si omnia non sequebatur, idcirco non erat
ortus illinc'.
78 Moraux (RE XXIV, col. 1233) has remarked certain similarities between the
Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions of ato8p; he does not concern himself, however, with the theory of natural movements. Note that Alexander of Aphrodisias
(de mixt., p. 223.6 Bruns) accuses the Stoics of distorting Aristotle's conception
of the a&4tp.
79 fr. 31 (DDG, p. 465) = SVF 1I.527. The attribution to Chrysippus is extremely insecure: Diogenes Laertius (7.138) gives the identical definition of oupxvvo
verbatim and states that he is quoting it from Posidonius' work Merexpo?oyLx'
TOtCOaL4(fr. 14 Edelstein/Kidd).
80SVF II.554.
7
255

doctrine that all cosmic parts
'elements') tend towards the

,uzaov, where the fire
mentioned is the odthnp.8'This account would seem to square with the
more elaborate testimony by Arius Didymus attributed to Zeno,
that all parts of the cosmos have a natural movement towards its
centre: yi, {8&p, &ap, sdup,a
centre:
(t6p?p=
tcwva vetesUt emc 'r
6~t.aov
it&vToc o'r ptep- TroV5xO6a1.ou En
rOV x6%tou
'V
cpop&v
Some parts however have more weight than others; air and
gXCLV.82
fire are comparatively weightless (Poc?p), which is not to say that
they are 'light' or tend upwards. The cosmos is maintained because
of the balance
or tension
less heavy parts. No

of circular motion of
by another statement
fire and air are light,
around'
as well:
between
(-reveat*,L)
the very heavy
epaa()p&ov o'v 6v'reV atozL(L)V,
obv ocPOC,XoGUYt,oraa
and
mention is made in either of these statements

the macSp.
But this picture is further confused
of Achilles Tatius that, of the four elements,
have a natural inclination upwards, and 'whirl
Ov,
M 'Er7v 0vC
Yop&v
L-V
Xcd
3tr3pXE tr 7trp
60p[rLv xOlx nepct-
Achilles would seem to have combined (or confused) the

notion of rectilinear upward motion with the circular motion of the
10Hp;it is surely a mistake, however, that both air and fire are 'whirled around'. In any case it would seem that some Stoics at least taught
two rectilinear motions (upwards and downwards). Simplicius states
unequivocally that, for the Stoics, there are two motionis whiclh differ
naturally (cpiaeL yap 8au&popcx
ToWCMTa): the one 'from the centre to the
extremities', the other 'from the extremities to the centre'.84 Though
Simplicius is never beyond suspicion of 'Aristotelizing' Stoic doctrine,
his account may well be corroborated by that found in Aetius. Of the
veLzaXo.83
air and fire are light,
four elements,
eartlh and water
D=XPX?tgVat 0 V?UeL WC6T058 1totUpkaoU,

7rpLyLOV
cIp7
XoC'C tU?xV,
TrO 8
noted that the first statement
pu
83 TO'
LEpLOV 7rpLLYpzp7
(XO
eO vOve-!
Vt
-oi
TrO'
lheavy:
xO6yov
yap
EGoav. XoiL TOlev

xvLvezrcu.85 It -will be
aou) flatly con-
tradicts the earlier statement of Achilles Tatius (76vToc V?euL etL TO

,u6aov).If this testimony of Aetius may be accepted as uncontaminated
Stoicism, the influence of Aristotle's dth.5pdoctrine is indisputable.
As may be seen from SVF II.555 (also Achilles Tatius).
Arius Didymus, fr. 23 (DDG, p. 459) = SVF 1.99.
88 SVF 11.555.
84 SVF II.556.
85 Aetius 1.12.4 (DDG, p. 311) = SVF II.571. The accounts of natural movement
and cosmic order by Philo which are included in STVF(II.561, 568) are ulnmistakeably Aristotelian and are of no use in reconstructing Stoic doctrine.
8i
82
256

But is Aetius himself free of 'Aristotelizing'? We are left with several

conflicting Stoic theories: (1) that earth, air and water tended towards
the centre and fire revolved around them, (2) that all four elements
tended towards the centre (no revolution of fire in this case, presumably), (3) that earth and water tended to the centre, fire and air to the
extremities where they whirled around, (4) that earth and water
tended towards the centre, air and fire to the extremities, whence
'terrestrial light' moved in a straight line but 'aethereal light' moved
in a circle, peripherally. Given the present state of fragments, no
resolution of the conflict seems possible. It would seem that the
Stoics themselves did not agree on any one doctrine. They were apparently trying to solve two cosmological problems at once: first,
how does the cosmos cohere - what prevents it from flying off into
space? and second, how may the existing stratification of the four
elements be accounted for? It may well be that Zeno answered the
first question by positing the tendency of all four elements to the
one centre,86 thereby eliminating any tendency away from the cosmos
and towards the void. This problem of course was brilliantly solved
by the invention of the cohesive powers of the all-penetrating nv4uxa.
But whether the two-tendency theory represents a post-Zenonian
development or not is impossible to say.
The balance of evidence indicates that the Stoics taught that there
were four and not five cosmic layers, the uppermost of which was the
and which (in as much as it was 4eo') consisted in
4h6q or the adth'Mp
7tip trvexo6v. The four-layer stratification is confirmed on two separate
occasions by Cicero, who explicitly denies that the Stoics taught any
fifth element.87 Cicero's confirmation may perhaps contradict the
above-quoted statement by Aetius which posited a distinction between rectilinear and peripheral movement of light, and which would
thus imply an Aristotelian omNdjp
in addition to the four prime substances. However the movement of the oduinpwas conceived, its function in Stoic cosmology is clear: by the agency of the aethereal fire
the cosmos comes to be (ro' MLpLov &8 'xeZvo sup, ip' ou... O'v XO6[OV
86 cf. SVF I.101: Z'vcov 9exaxe L6 NVp xa'Cu?lRav

Zeno also seems to
Xtvela&xt.
have conceived of an &yxuxX(osvop&o
(SVF I.118), though what role it played in
his cosmology (if any) is indeterminable.
87 A cad. post. 1.39; de finibus 4.12. On Stoicism, Aristotle and the fifth substance
see A. Jannone, 'Aristote et la physique stoicienne', Actes du Vlle Congres de
l'Assoc.G. Budd (1963), pp. 284-5.
257

yeyOVeVau)88 and
is ultimately
consumed.89
What
role the aetherial
fire as teo6 (and hence as &pX) has in Stoic cosmogony will be considered shortly.
A further problem was raised by the Stoics' conception of acxIp
It was stressed earlier that the two Stoic 'principles',
as so.
t&e6 and (ikv], were inseparable the one from the other. Yet &E0
would seem to exist on its own as ocxchp.90Certainly no surviving
testimony tells us that the cdrp consisted in passive Ui1 as well as
in fiery ?0o,
although the theory of inseparability would logically
seem to require such a statement. To meet this difficulty the Stoics
drew on their conception of matter as having mass. In addition to
being prescribed by length, breadth and height, body (aCqm)must also
have been seen as having weight or mass. And the mass of a given
body would presumably vary both in proportion to its size and with
respect to the concentration of its matter. Bodies might be less or
more pure, depending on how much matter they contained (or depending on the relationship between the 5e60 and the U`?). During his
discussion of the Stoic U`n, Calcidius makes reference to just such a
theory in a passage which has not previously been noted and which is
inexplicably omitted from von Arnim's collection of fragments.
Certain substances are said by the Stoics to be more or less 'material',
others to have more mass: 'esse enim quasdam magis, alias minus
siluestres materias, aliasque aliis corpulentiores, quarum tamen
exordium fore unam quandam antiquiorem communem omnium siluam'.9Y This conception is the theoretical basis for the frequent
statements that the 'principle' 4s64 is the 'purest of bodies':
ve'V4V
TCOV7rxiv-t)V,alp
xa Ov-rL
x
pc&c-oov,
as Hippolytus
observ-
in the
words of Philo.93 Similarly, Arius Didymus at one point reports the
ed,92
88
or
-0
[ev 8pCX'r'pLoV4o-V
6X;V VOi4 ev
pVrtiV rCXLxpLVE
SVF II.327 (Galen); cf. 11.1067.
89 Dio of Prusa (SVF II. 601) mentions that conflagration is caused by the
&1LXp&qaCL; MEUpo0.
90 If one accepts the
possibility of 4e6s existing on its own, one must be prepared

to accept the possibility of a separate quantity of matter (though where it wollld
be found is not readily apparent). The possibility of such a 'store of matter' is
defended by H. K. Hunt, 'Some Problems in the Interpretation of Stoicisnl',
A UMLA 27 (1967), pp. 165-77, esp. p. 168.
91 in Tim., c. 289 Waszink (not in SVF).
SVF 11.1029.
9a Philosophoumena, 21 (DDG, p. 571) =
*9 de opif.mundi, 8 (SPF 11.302).
258

opinion of Chrysippus (?), that ocx&4pis apaw'oeaToo SXLX>XPVLaTOCO4;94

this agrees well with his statement elsewhere that Xpuat`ntn (scil.
ai rOv O pa TOv X(XpcOc'OOV
80re)
XcXL CXCXpLv6aTOV
T(V
&- 7r
?XLJt6rOT
V
6X
xac~'nv ov t3X7aLou
7RPL&yOVTA
Oc
pop&v.95To
some Stoics - Antipater,Y for example - the xclnp was the ruling part
of the cosmos; for Chrysippus the nyYeLOcVLXOv
was the
(~yeovtxov)
'purest part of the aether' (so %&apW'trpoeV ToU oCtpo)).7
In terms
of the Stoic theory as reported by Calcidius, ocL-p would seem to be
more 4ek, less DX. It is interesting that we nowhere learn of the
obverse possibility - of substance that is more material, less 46q.
Here as elsewhere the Stoics presented only half the argument: 6
as Plutarch says of them in another context.
uLLGU rXSloUa,
Before leaving the o&pXomL
one final difficulty must be mentioned.
This difficulty arises from the fact that Zeno is said to have designated
the pre-cosmic x&oqas water. We know that one aspect of the precosmic ouatocwas fiery (the oe), but no surviving fragment describes
the other aspect (u{;X)as watery, and it is not easy to see what a
reference to X?&o4
as water might mean within the context of Zeno's
cosmology. Perhaps the best-known reference to Xo'o in antiquity
was that in Hesiod's Theogony 116 (7p-rLa'L x&o4). Cicero98 tells
us that Zeno 'interpreted' Hesiod's Theogony, though whether or
not Zeno wrote a full commentary on the work is not now ascertainable.
It seems likely that a written work (of whatever length) is in question,
for the several reports in scholiasts on Hesiod derive evidently from
such a work.99 Thus Valerius Probus makes reference to Theogony
116 and adds 'nam Zenon Citieus sic interpretatur, aquam yoc
appellatum &o9 TOu XEa&OL'L.100
In all likelihood Cornutus followed
Zeno in remarking that X?C?s'is the water which exists before &xaxo-
94fr. 31 (DDG, p. 466) = SVF II.527; see note 79 above.

95fr. 29 (DDG, p. 465) = SVF II. 642. cf. 11.413 (the sun as 7r5p?t>6XLpLVk).
96 DL 7.139.
97 DL 7.139 (SVF 11.644).
98 ND 1.36 (SVF I.167).
99cf. SVF 1.103, 105; II.564, 565.

100SVF 1.103 (on Vergil, ecl. 6.31). cf. SUF 11.564: oL 8F eEpia,ot ?m
Xos
7r7p&t6O X6L5&O, 6 6aG' Xka,aOL. The Stoics may possibly have been anticipated in
this conception of x&o4and its etymological derivation from Xao&OL by Phere-
cydes, who is said by Achilles Tatius (Isag. 3 = DK 7 Bla) to have proposed

water as the beginning of all thilngs, which he called Xoq. Achilles' statement
may well be contaminated by Stoicism.
259

,unatqand derives its name from moisture'.101 In a similar observation
preserved by a scholiast on Apollonius of Rhodes, Zeno stated that

xacoqwas water and that the cosmos was formed by water sinking
down, forming slime, and then the slime solidifying to produce earth
(xacL Z \vwv 8'
TO
'HaLt6o, ya&oq"8wp
irop'
'U?vyLvea,YOct, 1yvuevLuV,
yY
aVL
cp7)aLtv, o'u avtLaV0VOq
1 And in still another
aT;pqLVL0tVTL.102
scholion on the Theogony derived from Zeno, the earth is said to be

produced from water.103It is thus indisputable that Zeno conceived
of a pre-cosmic water which took part in cosmogony. To put the
question again: how may this pre-cosmic water be reconciledwith the
widely attested notion that the cosmos was produced from the primal
substance, one aspect of which was the fiery 4eo'6,the other the passive
It was a widely accepted notion in antiquity that both fire and
water were instrumental in creation. Plutarch states that fire without
moisture is unnutritious and dry, whereas water without heat is
unfruitful and sterile.104 For Varro, fire and water are the causa
nascendi duplex.105 Theophrastus, who was contemporary with Zeno,
stated that 'everywhere nature generates life by mixing heat with

101
Comp. Theol., c. 17 Lang. cf. ps. -Philo (SVF II.437): X&o; o p.iv 'Aptaloro-nq
TD6 68wp, 7aop(mO
'r6nov Oferoct elvou. . . Tov 8i E-rwX(oV 9VLOL
T),V XUC5LVTo0VQoLM 77roLTn-
1*XCL
VoAO~L~vrzq.
12
SVF 1.104. In the Quaestiones Honiericae of Heraclitus
inogony
is found
which begins from a moist substance
(Allegoricus) a cos(uypx 9U'aL5);part of
this becomes rarefied into air, and the finest part of the air is kindled to become xdap. The water, however, is condensed and, changing into slime, becomes
et EXuvobroyoco5v'r= (Quaest.
earth: auvt4xvov T- T6 U68p xax [cxXaXA6[cvov
Hom. 22.3 Buffi6re). Heraclitus goes on to note that this is why Thales chose
water as the cTotLelov of all things. But the terminology (and the cosinogony) is
unmistakeably from Zeno.
103 SFF 1.105: Z,vov 8i 6 1TuX6q ex TO6 6ypo5 -tjv 7oaCrX9LV y7v yeyeV<aat
9maLv. The comparatively rare plhrase is repeated by Diogenes Laertius (7.137:
8? 7rv-rcov yi,v), which may indicate that Diogenes is quoting directly
uTO'CaXU
from Zeno's text.
104
quaest. Roni., 263 e:
bU'p &vcu fp~t6&Troq

106
ling. lat. 5.61.
-T
&yovov
nVp xZplq U'yp6Tno
&-rpocov ea'rt xcd tnp6v,
-r 8i
xat iyp6v.
cf. Ovid,
Met. 1.430-1:
'quippe
ubi temperiem
sumpsere
umorque calorque/concipiunt, et ab his oriuntur cuncta duobus'. Lactantius

(Inst. div. 2.9) quotes these lines and adds: 'alterum enim quasi masculinumn
elementum est, alterum quasi foemininum, alterum activum, alterum patibile.
ideoque a veteribus institutum est, ut sacramento ignis et aquae nuptiarum
foedera sanciantur; quod foetus animantium calore et humore corporentuir,
atque animentur ad vitam'.
260

moisture in a certain way, the moisture acting as matter ("X-n)for

the heat.106 In fact this notion is attested in Zeno in the context
of his discussion of human procreation. Sperm, according to Zeno,
consisted in nveiua and moisture;107 and for Zeno 7tvEu-~.xwas equivThe male contributes sperm which
alent to heat (4$p[LcxaCcc).108
is of heat and moisture; the female produces a moist substance
There is every reason to believe that Zeno applied this notion
(U(X-1).109
of generative heat and moisture to the cosmos as well. That is what is
meant by Arius Didymus' report that god moved through matter
T
rT
ppa.'10 Here of course is the origin of Zeno's
ot06v7Ep
xocL?V
yoeV
astsp-ri.xoX6yoL. Further, we have the explicit testimony of Diogenes
Laertius that, just as seed in the sperm, so the ?064 being the spermatic
reason of the cosmos remains as such in the water during cosmic
generation:
(scil.
EOv)
Wa=ep
?zV T
a7spptLOCxOv
yOVXoyov
X0
a7p~i.U
6vTC To6
7rEpLCS7TSCX,
xOaou
OUT&XOZXL
'7oL0v8e U'o7rcC[a,c
TOUTOV
e"v
-rF iUypp.111The fiery 649, that is, subsisting in pre-cosmic moisture,

brings about creation. And this is what Zeno must have intended by
referring to pre-cosmic ZXoqas moisture.
It is apparent that Zeno thought of his two inseparable &pxoax
in
many different ways: as the active (7roLo5v)and passive (7taxaov),
as the ke6k and UX-, as fire (n7p -exvtx6v) and pre-cosmic moisture
(Xxo4), as the hot male sperm and the female moisture. Zeno was
himself much given to allegorizing, and it is not surprising that he
should have represented his two fundamental 'principles' so variously.
Later Stoics followed this inclination of Zeno. Thus Servius observes
that, although the Stoics posited the one god, they applied different
names to it depending on its function; in fact its,divinity was said
to be of either sex, male if it were active, female if passive: 'unde
etiam duplicis sexus numina esse dicuntur, ut cum in actu sunt mares
sint, feminae cum patiendi habent naturam'. 12 This is to say that lo
7rnoLivis conceived of as masculine, no 7t&aXov as feminine. Origen
106
de causis plant. 111.23.3 Wimmer:
=0CVtovCX0Uyxp -)
5OL4
,&o0yo0Vt FLLuLkVIn
cf. de igne,
10 and 65 Wimmer.
107 SVF 1.128. The idea is Aristotelian:
[dv OZV -r6 mdpL YxOLV6vnvCU o0CTxcxt
6dt
V8mTroq(degen. anim. I1.2.735 b 37).
108 SVF I.127:
pLoaocv 8A xaL wveutuo Zi1jvwv T6oaro EN=oL
9YoLv.
109 SVF 1.129.
10 Arius Didymus fr. 20 (DDG, p.
458) = SVF 1.87.
"I DL 7.136 (STVF 1.102; 1I.580).
7CW4
112
-r6
TX Vyp6'TI ?pLhP6V
X%ciNEp UnV 05iaCV-v 1yp6-ro
TX
fp,).
SVF 11.1070.
261

preserves a statement of Chrysippusto this effect: Hera is said to be

the U(-, Zeus the %e46.113Finally, Dio of Prusa very evidently draws
on this tradition of Zeno in describing the marriageof Hera and Zeus

as the combination of (female) moisture (uyp&v
ou'acv) with the 'cosmic
sperm' (o7rp,cx toi5 ntovT64), the sperm residing in the moisture just as
creative nv?Ui4 in the seed.114The designation of these various parallel
forces emphasizes unwittingly the dualism of Stoic cosmology.

Strictly speaking, of course, all these forces are to be considered
merely as aspects of one substance. But it requires considerable
strength of will to consider (say) fire and water as one, and we are
obliged to forgive those ancient commentators who could not credit
the Stoics' monism.
the Stoics also posited four aTocZeLa.
In addition to the two &pXyaL
One of the most difficult questions of Stoic cosmology is to ask how
were related to the atroXea, or, to put the question otherwise,
the &pXvt
why the Stoics should have wished to make such a distinction at all.'15
Cosmology before Zeno had made no such distinction."6 Plato,
speaking of fire and the prime substances in the Timaeus (48b) says
that they are called either &pyoLor crroLXeZoto5 nocvrt6 (by the Preso-
cratics, presumably). Aristotle too uses the terms almost synonymously.117 Corporeal'elements' are defined by Aristotle as those parts into
which bodies are ultimately reducible and which may not be further
divided without a change of form."8 It follows that complex bodies
SVF 11.1074.
Or. 36.55 (SVF II.622).
115 cf. G. Verbeke, L'Ivolution de la doctrinedu pneuma (Louvain, 1945), pp. 39-40:
'quel [est] le rapport qui existe entre les principes et les 616ments? 11 n'est pas
certain que Zenon ait dejk pos6 ce probleme; il requiert cependant une solution'.
Verbeke himself proposes no solution. It will be seen from the following discussion that Zeno had indeed raised the question and had worked out the relationship intricately.
116 On the notion of CJroLzetovsee H. Diels, Elementum (Leipzig, 1899); 0.
Lagercrantz, Ele,nentum (Uppsala, 1911); W. Vollgraff, 'Elementum', Mnemo"I"
114
syne 4 ser. 2 (1942), pp. 89-115;
W. Burkert,
'oarot?etov' Philologus
102 (1959),
pp. 167-97 and A. Lumpe, 'Der Begriff 'Element' in Altertum', ABG 7 (1962),
pp. 285-93.
117 Metaph. A. 3. 983 b 11; Meteor. I. 2. 339 a 11 sqq.; de gen. et corr.
1. 2.
329 a 5 etc.
118 Metaph. A. 3. 1014 a 31-34: 64Lolwg 8& xoct Tra 'rov acq0'Cur0valTOLX?tN XyOUaLV
O XkyOVT'C Et at
8&&lpELtZc Ta 4aw1Tm1 gaX0(oX, &XOlvoc8& ?kxi'&Xe o et8ht 8a0q4povroc.
262

consist in combinations of these 'elements' and that the bodies are

themselves reducible to their 'elements'. One might ask whether here
as elsewhere the Stoics were influenced by Aristotle's conception of
alOLXCLOV.
Diogenes Laertius preserves a Stoic definition of 'croX?eLov
with exactly this meaning: 9tc- 3 atowXjLov ? Oi 7CpWrOU YEVeroV T&
&ava6rac.119But we have already seen abunyLVo6zva xxl ?L 8 e'aZovTov
dant evidence that, for the Stoics, the 'pyoct were the material
e o6 of the cosmos; such a conception of a'oLyZEov would obviate
as it was articulated. In this case we are able
the conception of &pxnto watch Diogenes at work. Into his discussion of Stoic cosmology
C
he has inserted Aristotle's definition of ipyx or aTocxeov:

c oi yap ea'nV
Mv%7t( s 6vrmxxc EK OU yEYvtrL 7WpcOU xaC 'LkO YsLper.L 'rXeutkoV.120
In short, Diogenes' definition of arotX?iov is not pertinent to Stoic

theory.
Diogenes Laertius elsewhere reports explicitly that the Stoics
between &pcxLand aroLx-c4. Unfortunately
this report
distinguished
is vexed with textual problems, and must be quoted in full:
&OC(Pipetv 8
[Liv yap 7CIaL

goatV
xoal a-oLXeloV
ts
o&yCVnOU
<xa>
&px)
'a 8a aoLqemx xmt& rv kxTr6pcoatvpk[p,,pcfatL. &cx&xao iacrtous
elvtv t&4&spXMO xoaL&u6pqpou4, d 8 .LILp9(saL.121
&ap-ou,
The bone of contention here is the statement
that the &pxpZx

are
; &a&sTrOU;is an emendation based on a statement in the Suda. Stoic scholarship has ranged itself into two opposing camps: Hirzel122 and von
whereas Baeumker,124 Mattingly125 and
Arnim123 prefer &'Caoa&ouq,
It
is
fair to ask what 0&a'twIouq might have
Pohlenz'26 prefer a4mcra.
The Stoics considered that only the corpomeant as applied to &pXmjx
Mawtoua.
119
In fact the consensus
of manuscripts
reads ac
DL 7.136.
Metaph. A. 3. 983 b 8-9.

DL 7.134 (SVF II.299).
122 Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften
(Leipzig, 1882), p. 756, n.
120
121
1.
SVF II.299 and the notes ad loc. More recently, C. H. Kahn ('Stoic Logic
and Stoic LOGOS', AGP 51 (1969), pp. 158-72) inclines to prefer &awLtmouq
on the basis of similarities between the universal Logos and the incorporeal
is printed by H. S. Long
);ex&a(pp. 168-9 and n. 21). The reading &a cimaoouq
in his recent Oxford (OCT) edition of Diogenes Laertius, and by Edelstein and
Kidd, Posidonius I: The Fragments, fr. 5.
124 Das Problem der Materie, p. 332, n. 3.
125 Philosophical Review 48 (1939), p. 281.
126Die Stoa II, p. 38.
123
263

real could be said to 'exist',"27 and considered only four classes of

'non-existent' or 'incorporeal' (Xaex,uov): rxro-v, xEvOv, ON'ov and
xpovov.128 In so far as the a'aci.orov did not really exist it was said to
be a ,exro'6v:it existed in name but not in fact. Would it have been
conceivable to describe the Stoic kh6s as existing in name alone?
The os6eis active, the vtN passive, and only that which is corporeal
may undergo activity: '6 Ca4ctOCTov
xax' oUTg oUrT 7tOLELV
'nt 7EPUXEV
Further, according to Cleanthes at least, nothing
Or 7rcxaxV.129
incorporeal may act on something corporeal: oUv86a oCX,rov0pVaIo a8' a,Wt
I
ta &Xk&a ,a
64Lo LCt.130
The two &pXoc(
which by acting on each other produce the cosmos must therefore be

corporeal. Abundant documentary evidence confirms this statement.
Aristocles states of the &pa'Lthat &`upo

7oLQ5V xCx
Stoac
aW~LOCT-r
fP7aLv JvouL, xoc TO
ro 7r
wta&ov,131 and Origen expressly states that roUq&O't rr
I
o , eivau -
sa&~L'rLXa?Nyo
1pXaq.132I
have no doubt, then,
that the correct reading should be

as the manuscripts affirm,
u
although even that is somewhat misleading. The two &pXaLare not
separate bodies but aspects of one substance. Perhaps the reading
a6tLa would be more faithful to Stoic theory. One wonders if Diogenes'
statement has any value after all. It is founded on Aristotelian distinctions'33 and the insistence on 'form' (pr,pCoaaL) is something
which cannot be confirmed by any other Stoic statement concerning
the mroLexa.134 Nevertheless
127
the basic distinction
which it proclaims
SVF 11.320 (Plotinus): a4tmx'ac ti6vov x'r6vrx elvLL, and SVF 11.525 (Plutarch):
6v'rmyap A6vuTX'aw'mr
x)ovLv.
Sext. Emp. adv. math. 10.218 (SVF I1.331); cf. the discussion of this Stoic
notion by E. Br6hier, 'La theorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoicisme', AGP
22 (1909), pp. 114-25.
129 Sext. Emp. adz. math. 8.263 (SVF II.363).
180 SIVF I.518 (Nemesius); cf. Aristotle, de anima III.4.429 a 13 sqq.
181 SVF 1.98. cf. SVF I.153 (that the l6q is
acs.p) and DDG, p. 608: xx' 6 6v
128
HX&O'Vvft6v &a6toLmrov,Z'vov 8&

adux,.
SVF II.1051.
182
cf. de caelo I.11.280 b 1 sqq. et passimn.

e.g. &yevrouq/&OpAxpprouq:
The distinction between 'formed' and 'unformed' would seem to have little
validity in Stoic cosmology because of its conception of two cosmic states:
that of the created cosmos (8tox6anvsmL)and that before or after. The &pXao
183
134
could well be 'unformed'
before sloX6a0i5a4,
but when the cosmos
is created
and they are transformed into elements, do they cease to be &pXm(

qua paXxO?
must always exist (Phys. I.6.189 a 18-20) and
Aristotle had slhown that M&pXotE
were eternal (SVF 1.85 etc.). To meet the difficulty
for the Stoics too the M&pXmo
the Stoics argued that &pXatpreceded a-rotxetxboth temporally and essentially.
264

- that between &p;ocL

and aerotxZoc
- is abundantly attested elsewhere.138
Given, then, that the Stoics distinguished between &pXaLand
how were these concepts related? The simplest statement
=roLXqeZ,
concerning this relationship is again given by Diogenes Laertius:
the =rotx?ta together constitute the 5XI (oc I 're-Mopaaroqe?a dIvat
o0 T,v {7oLv oiT-av -rv ?yv).136 This simple equation makes nonseilse
'of parts'
of well-attested Stoic doctrine concerning both the iMXn
p4pouq) and the distinction between precosmic and cosmic
was said to 'underlie' (Unof3?Xfasubstance. Plotinus137 states that {'XYn
Ix) the elements, and this statement squares with that of Galen3,38
6cid
(rav
that there is a u'-noPXn,ev7I

'US to all the elements. And the fact that
this u'n 'underlies' the elements surely precludes all possibility of any
direct equation. An even more considerable objection to Diogenes'
equation is that statement by Sextus Empiricus, that first matter
'changes, and by changing itself brings about the four elements':
O
r] a7tOcO U'X)... rXoa,
0?6CapX *jc
'toI%M.139
'? 'OC4
yLyvrTOa
That is, i)Xnprecedes the elements in time; since the elements arise
from U`n they clearly cannot be identical to it.
How do the ar'oLXJeo
arise from the &pxx? The cosmogoniesattributed
to the Stoics are riddled with inconsistency and require detailed
examination. For once, fortunately, we have accounits attributed to
each of the three major thinkers of the early Stoa, and we are often in a
position to see where one thinker rethought the doctrine of his pre-
decessor. We may begin with the three accounts attributed to Zeno,140

two of which are found in Diogenes Laertius, one in Anus Didymus:
(? 1) aLox6a[LnaL;must occur periodically from the oiatoc, when from fire a
change into water through air will come about. One part (-r6 piv 'tL) will
take its place underneath and will constitute earth, and of the remainder
some will remain as water, some will through vaporization produce air,
and from part of this air fire will be kindled.
[Arius Didymus, fr. 38 (DDG, pp. 469-70)]
35SVF 1.85 (Aetius, Achilles Tatius, Philo). Galen (SVF II.408) observes that
crotXeox must be homogeneous in so far as they are elements and concludes:
&V TOUTUpyap 87 XOX8L)VyXe
YeVCL4
?EIVOL
CtOLXeLOV&pXP4,
'rOL4g7rp&ydCaLvCT)V
&kVt-,)
u7rDppxoutaLv apXaO, 'aO
q
O(Xq Oxp)a,
8i
~&V&yx7)q
OuX
ctrOL)(CEX
7rV-r
0?.LO-
6[LOyeV7.
Perhaps the latter notion derives from Aristotle's observation that the first
bodies are otOOLsp7) (MVeteor.IV.1.389 b 26-28).
136 DL 7.137 (SVF II.580).
137
138
139
140
SVF II.320.
SVF II.408.
adv.math. 10.312 (SVF II.309).
All three are printed in SVF I.102.
265

(? 2) in the beginning (xmr'&pXo'),being by himself, god transformed substance ('r?vTr&axv

ouaLav)through air into water; and as in the sperm the
'Jyp4),
seed is found, so god remains in the moisture (UrnhOtXEtETrC
4v
IV -Cij0
rvtAiV)
for subsequent productions.
adapting matter (c6cpy6v m-rc 7otoUVTMTV
Thence he creates first of all the four 0-rOLX6M.

[DL 7.136]
(?3)
the cosmos is created when from fire the substance changes through
air into moisture
L&kpo5
(&x irupoq n oicrxaCTpOMr 8C
etq uyp6'rja.);
then the
coarser part (TO 7aXu,ucpi) of the moisture condenses into earth, the lighter
part ('r XemroLpkq)turns into air and this rarefaction goes on to produce
fire.
[DL 7.142]
Though there are minor discrepancies, these three accounts are evidently derived from the one Zenonian cosmogony. It will be seen
that Zeno conceived of a two-stage cosmogonical process: first, the
primal substance (or god or fire: the termnsare equivalent) transforms
part of itself into water or moisture; second, the action of the fire
or os6. on this moisture in turn produces the four elements by means
of vaporization or condensation. These accounts correspond exactly
to that Zenonian conception we considered earlier with regard to
Xo?o?:that 7r5p 'rXeXo'v and pre-cosmic moisture were responsible for
cosmic generation.141 For Zeno, cosmic generation follows the same
pattern as human generation.
The cosmogonies of subsequent Stoics are to be seen against that
of Zeno. Arius Didymus has preserved an extensive account of
Cleanthes' cosmogony: 'with the world enflamed, the middle of it
settles down first, then the nearby parts are extinguished all tlhrough,
and with the world turned to moisture, the extremity of the fire,
when the middle has reacted against it (or: bounced off it), makes it
turn back again to its opposite (viz. fire); then, he claims, with this
upward transformation, it grows and begins to order the whole':
&X(OylPYfVT0q
T05
'rM37C?rv
auVEcM
Tr6 0?kOV
MX'rO73 7p
tOV,
etlX
<XO'x>
'X
= Vr6q k UypCVkVroq,
'no lay(xMov 'oi3
<TOi
7rX'LV<7rOL?lV> eEs 'roUvavr(ov,
irup6q, MV'truTqCaaXVTO4 UT(- TOU l.LkaOU,Tpk7E&Ct
tv 'r
<&VoAkv>
el?4oUm 'T
8vLxoall
TpE7CO[VOU
(P7)tLV XutCa~&L xall &pXCa4l
kX6[ievm &TOaCOsVVUaf&OL8t
ko'u,
6)O,V.142
sinking down and solidification of earth mentioned by the scholiast on

Apollonius of Rhodes (above, p. 260) corresponds exactly witlh the second stage
of Zeno's cosmogony: after the fire has inseminated the water, the earth ('r6
7axu4epiq) condenses out.
,2 Arius Didymus, fr. 38 (DDG, p. 470) = SVF 1497. I have given the text
141 The
266

Arius is very probably reproducing Cleanthes' own text here - the

word kXzpoyELc is nowhere else attested and would seem to be a
coinage of Cleanthes. But if Cleanthes did coin a new terminology

to describe cosmogony,'43his conception is largely traditional. Precosmic fire, acting on water, for Cleanthes as for Zeno, is said to begin
(&pXea8xt) the process of
&Lox6apaL,
by which the creation of the
four elements and their subsequent orderingis to be understood.

A cosmogony similar in outline to that of Zeno and Cleanthes is
ascribed by Plutarch to Chrysippus: 'the fire changes through air
into water. From the water earth condenses and air evaporates. By
becoming rarefied the air produces aether, which embraces the cosmos
and moves in a circular direction'.'44This account is brief, but may
be seen to reproduce nearly verbatimthe cosmogony attributed to
Zeno by Arius Didymus. The only addition is the explicit statement
that the fire produced by rarefaction of air is the OClnp.In short,
it would appearthat Zeno, Cleanthesand Chrysippustaught essentially
the same cosmogony:145 that the 'principle' fire (su5prexvLx6v, that is)
co-operates with a pre-cosmic moisture to generate in turn the four
elements by the processes of rarefactionand condensation.146
But the fact that the four m?tXe?' were generated from the two
presented the Stoics with a nearly insuperable problem, and
MpXxc
one which continued (and continues) to confuse commentators of
is described as 7i5p 'sxvLX6V or
Stoicism. It is this: one of the o&pxocL
more generally as fire; but through the agency of this fire the four
of von Arnim; the words in brackets are his (necessary) additions. Von Arnim
discusses this passage in detail in RE XI.1, col. 563, s.v. 'Kleanthes'.
143Note however that 'sinking down' (cruvtzLv) is the term used by Zeno to
describe the condensation of earth from water in his commentary on Hesiod's
Theogony (SVF 1.104, above, p. 260).
144 de Stoic. repugn. 1053 a (SVF II.579). cf. also ibid., 1053 b (SVF II.605):
xOcl I?V
8TCXV kX7pC0art
yVYnTOXL, &6Xou
4iv
Xcd
43ov
?lVaL cpvnao<r6v x6aLov>,
7pineabM.
arwvv4Levov8 aGc, xl =xUV6prvov, Ct1 586rp xot yiv xMI Tz6CWTOetaq
145 A similar cosmogony is attributed to 'a certain Stoic' by ps. -Philo (SVF
II.619): after &poan and the extinguishing of the fire, the fire changes into
air, the air into water and the water sinks down into earth. The principal roles
of pre-cosmic fire and water have been obscured here. The account attributed
by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. V. 14. 104 = DK 22. B. 31) to Heraclitus in
which fire changes through air into water which then acts as sperm of creation
and from which the elements are born, is unmistakeably Stoic. So too is that of
Dio of Prusa, Or. 36.55 (SVF II.622).
146Those cosmogonical accounts which do not proceed from the two 'principles'
(?n5p'repxx6v and pre-cosmic moisture) are probably to be dismissed as non-
267

elements are generated, one of which is fire. How are these two
sorts of fire to be distinguished? Zeno and Cleanthes strove to make
such a distinction; there is no evidence that Chrysippus ever did.
The distinction they made was a simple one: the fire which is god is
creative, but that fire which we experience daily is destructive.
Thus a statement by Zeno preservedby Arius Didymus:
Zeno said that the sun, moon and each of the other stars were intelligent
and fiery, consisting in np trevtx6v. For there are two sorts of fire: the one
and changing its nutriture into itself, the other creative
destructive (&rXXvov)
(reXvtx6v), productive and preservative, such as is found in plants and
animals and which is PUaL and 4uXi. The substance of the stars consists in
this 7ip XcVLx6V..147
It is fairly certain that the distinction TExvLXOvI/6rsxvov

was Zeno's
own (as was the conception of su5preXv6x6v
itself).1448Cleanthes made
a similar distinction although he did not use Zeno's terminology.
Cicero preserves Cleanthes' distinction:
atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor
omnium idemque, quocumque invasit, cuncta disturbat ac dissipat, contra
ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet
sensuque adficit. negat ergo esse dubium, horum ignium sol utri similis sit,
cum is quoque efficiat, ut omnia floreant et in suo quacque genere pubescant. quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit, qui sunt in corporibus
animantium, solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua
astra, quae oriantur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur.14'
Stoic. Thus the brief statement in Aetius (11.6.1 = SVF 11.582): 'the genesis
of the cosmos is said to begin from the earth, that is from the centre. For the
&xpyof a sphere is its centre'. Similarly that preserved by Hermias and attributed to Cleanthes (SVF 1.495), that genesis begins with earth changing into
water, water into air, air into fire, the fire being then borne aloft. But genesis
cannot begin with earth; after IX=upeaCl the succeeding cosmic generation must
begin with fire. More confusing still is that account in Arius Didymus (fr. 21
[DDG, p. 458] = SVF II.413): fire changes into air, air into water, water into
earth and then again earth changes into water, water into air, and so on back to
fire. I suspect that this account is not intended to describe the genesis of the
elements but rather their mutual interaction once created. It is a well known
Stoic doctrine that the elements could be transformed into each other (SVF
1.102; II.405, etc.).
147 fr. 33 (DDG, p. 467) = S VF 1.120.
148 A similar distinction is reported by Diogenes Laertius (or is it Diocles?),
that some 'presentations'
some &rreyvot.This distiniction

(yavrocaoct) are -rEXvLxcLx,
is probably Zeno's as well.

149 ND 2.41 (SVF 1.504).
268

There is every reason to believe that this distinction was consistently

maintained by the early Stoics themselves. Achilles Tatius testifies
that the Stoics said the stars consisted in fire, 'a fire divine and
eternal and unlike the fire we know which is destructive'.'50 The
distinction made by Philo between ignis corruptibilis and ignis salutaris undoubtedly springs from Stoicism: the ignis salutaris is said
to be that 'per quem omnia artificiose facta sunt. quare, ut mihi
videtur, etiam nonnulli philosophorum ignem artificialem asseruere
in viam cadere ad semina in generationem producenda'.'51 Philo's
last sentence translates Zeno's definition of cUplFLq. In many ways
the distinction between the terrestrial and heavenly fires was an
easy one to make. Indeed the Stoics were not the first to make it.
Plato had remarked various sorts of fire (Timaeus 58c) and Aristotle
had been obliged to distinguish between terrestrial fire and his 'first
body' (ocThnp);he had done so by stating that what we conventionally
call (heavenly) fire is not fire at all, but rather an excess of heat
ep,uoi xoai otov Ecrq ta-L -0 7r5p).152 Theophrastus too
(07ep3oXI yap
had noted that terrestrial fire continually seeks nourishment and cannot
exist without nutriment, but against this there exists the pure and
unmixed warmth of the first sphere (ev icn TN 7pCh'T apouLpa 'rouvirl
xod xhpckv).'53 But if fire is to be
C95L4
&pO6pn
Oacr &L LXT0V ?ivaz
understood as pure and unmixed, this must mean that it does not burn
anything; but that is against the nature of fire. Consequently Theox0Cl 1X'm0q,
phrastus posits two kinds of fire: 4 [euv 7pWrr xochzpo&
a
acpop
.154 Theoye
xoL
xor&
aeL
yEVo
LtWpi
trv
pny?Vi
tr,
I
phrastus goes on to explore the relationship between the two fires,
and ends by distinguishing between warmth which for him is creative
and is an &pXJ,and fire which is destructive.'55 Clearly, then, Zeno
was not alone in distinguishing two sorts of fire. I would suggest,
however, that hiis distinction was cardinal to Stoic cosmology in a way
far more important than the similar distinctions of Aristotle and TheoSVF II.682.
SVF II.422.
152 Meteor. 1.3.340 a 19 sqq.; cf. de
gen. et corr. I1.3.330 b 25, 29. Aristotle demonstrates in de caelo 11.7.289 a 11-35 that the stars consist in heat but not in
fire. Boyance (Hermes 90 (1962), p. 63, n. 4) suggested that the Stoics' two-fire
distinction could be traced to Meteor. 1.3.
1I" de igne, 4 Wimmer. See commentary on de igne by P. Steinmetz, Die Physik
des Theophrastos von Eresos (Berlin, 1964), pp. 111-47.
154 Ibid.
165 Ibid., 6.
160
151
269

phrastus. The difference between Stoic &pXml

and arOLXa hinges in
effect on the distinction between the two fires. For, although no surviving fragment says so explicitly, it is clear that rup reXvLx6vthe &e6s
is an &py4whereas 7r5p1,rxvovis one of the four ar?Xe? created by the
7t5p
'rXVLXOV.
Failure to make this apparently simple distinction reduces Stoic

cosmology to confusion and nonsense. Yet the distinction was easily
overlooked. In the second book of Cicero's de natura deorum, for
example, Balbus had explained Cleanthes' two-fire distinction at
length.156But when Cotta replies to Balbus in the third book he
has already forgotten the distinction. He asks: if fire is not fed it
will perish; how then can it be eternal?157Cotta's argument is irrelevant: Balbus had clearly explained that the fire in which aether
consisted was vitalis and salutaris and that it preserved, nourished
and increased all things. If Cotta could have made this mistake in the
very presence of Balbus, it is not surpnsing that later commentators
should have followed his example. Aristocles (as quoted by Eusebius)
whose o&pZoct
states that, for Zeno, fire is the aroLXetov
are &ek and
Aristocles has imputed to Zeno a non-Stoic definition of
v?.158
aToLeX0ov (as did Diogenes Laertius), has failed to realize that the
?e6k is in fact the fire which creates, and has ignored the fact this
fire is an apxy. He is partly aware of its significance - he calls it 'r
np&r)ov nip
but his failure to apply Zeno's distinction entirely
vitiates his statement. The same might be said of a frequently-quoted

statement of Arius Didymus, that fire is the aTolqemOV
par excellence,
because out of it the remaining elements are produced and into it

they ultimately resolve.159Within the context of Zeno's system this
- which
statement cannot be correct. The fire - namely 7ripr'Zvtxx6v
in any sense but an apx. There
generates all things is not a a'roLZxeov
are complicating factors here, however. The fragment is attributed to
Chrysippus. From the same fragment we learn that Chrysippus defined
G'oLXeZov
in three ways: first, to designate the primordial fire
which produced the cosmos and second, to designate earth, air, fire
.ND 2.41, quote(I above, p. 268.
ND 3.37: 'quod interire possit id aeternum non esse natura; ignem autem
interiturum esse nisi alatur; non esse igitur natura ignem sempiternum'.
158 SVF I.98.
156
157
159 fr. 21 (DDG, p. 458) = SVF lI.413: r6 gi t*p xxl xo.r'&koXyvcT'rotXctoVXkycaxLt

'axrTov
xc -rEt Xoc3oxtv xc t k
T6
Nrpr.Trou TrMXoLCaur&
TxCaL
8tc'r61j OcF'roi3
u.
niv'roc xto6lcvocBX6c
270

The third definition is missing

and water (that is, Zeno's four aroLxZZcx).
from the transmitted text.'60 To say the very least Chrysippus' terminology is confusing: fire the aroLxxzovproduces four atoLZeZa,one
of which is fire. The confusion is not eliminated by the addition of
xzo-' Koy?v to describe the one a-oLxrov which genlerates a different
four. What is clear is that Chrysippus for some reason or other abanand GtroLxoV.161This is affirmed
doned Zeno's distinction between OCpXf
by a further statement made by Arius: from the a-rotzev fire comes
the ?PXn, which is Xoyoqor eternal energy.'62 What led Chrysippus to
abandon Zeno's distinction is not immediately clear; I shall consider
one possibility shortly.
Other ancient commentators misunderstood Zeno's distinction
in other ways. Porphyry seems to be completely unaware that the
Stoics distinguished between a creative and a destructive fire. 'The
Stoics do not shrink', he says, 'from calling fire noetic and eternal...
as if this fire were just like that which we know from daily life. Thus
they contradict Aristotle, who denied that the aether consisted in
fire as we know it'.163Again, the Stoics - like Aristotle to some degree and the fire we know
-csyvt%Gv)
distinguished between the aether (sru5p
it is only surprising that the learned Porphyry
from daily life (&`rz7vov);
should have ignored it. Justin, for example, states that 'the Stoics
said that even god himself dissolved into fire'.'64 Justin was simply
unaware that 1zo6 was nup reXvmxv. Similarly, Augustine states that
the Stoics said that 'fire, one of the four elements... was thought to
be god'.'65 He too was unaware that god was the &cpZ'or sup 7zsvtx%6v
160 In spite of the fact that Arius explicitly says rpLtXC &' xeyo,ue.vou xoclr
Diels (Elementun, pp. 38-9) claimed to discover six
Xp6aLMVov TOi5 TOLe?Lo%-,
separate meanings of aroqetov in the passage in question. Diels' argument is

over-ingenious and totally unconvincing. On Chrysippus' use of aroLx&ovsee
also J. B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Leiden, 1970), pp. 119-20.
161What are we to malie of Diogenes Laertius' report, that towards the end of
his Physica Chrysippus posited two 4p(oci,just as had Zeno and Cleanthes (DL
7.134)? Chrysippus' threefold definition of sTOLX1Lovas well as his conception of
7ve5[ocx(see below) obviate the possibility that he taught the traditional Stoic
distinction. Have we to reckon with the further possibility, that
&pX/atOLXyLov
Physica is a work written before he had worked out his conception of cve5tio?
162 fr. 21 (DDG, p. 458) = SVF II.413: yeyovevo 81'?97)aexocito &OCU&oC036a
CUXrVY
XO
0> ?Oyo4xi -r
C5 EaTL TOTZ
ALouTO
&TOTOV
7repi a-COXELOU,
PX <XOCL
163SVF II.1050.
164
SITF 11.614.
165 SVF
1.423.
271

which created in turn the four atotyea, one of which was everyday
fire. This confusion persists in modern scholarship.166
The blame for this confusion does not rest entirely on the inattention
of the doxographers. Even leaving the confusion introduced by
Chrysippus momentarily to one side, there are abundant contradictions
in the teaching concerning the two fires. The fire of the sun is said to
be creative and hence in need of no nourishment. What, then, are
we to make of the frequent testimonies that the Stoics taught an
&vocaupcatq, that is, that the sun and the other stars were 'nourished'
or 'fed' by the sea?'67 It seems likely that the Stoics adopted the conception of iV&u$dLMatL from Aristotle'68 but did not fully integrate it
with their conception of 7r-Up'CxVLXov.On the other hand, the avaup.(oat is perhaps to be considered as another case of generation from the
on water, or perhaps simply as an example of
action of 7rip reXvyLx0v
interchange between elements (even though the sun does not technically consist in 'elemental' fire). In any case no surviving Stoic account of x'c&uV[catL4 takes the two-fires distinction into consideration.
A more serious problem is posed by the Stoics' conception of exiznpwatc.
As the cosmos is generated from 7r5p'reXvxo6v,presumably (and logically) it would dissolve into su5pteXvtx6v, although no Stoic fragment
says just that. But 7d5p'rexvLxovis a creative and sustaining force:
how can it be responsible for the destruction of the cosmos? The
dilemma is revealed clearly in Balbus' account of Stoic cosmology.
At one point he expounds Cleanthes' teaching about the destructive
fire which consumes ('confector est et consumptor omnium') and the
creative fire which sustains and is the substance of the sun.'69 Shortly
as occurring because the sun and
thereafter he explains eXpwaL4
the other stars 'consume' the earth and water: 'quod astrorum ignis
et aetheris flamma consumit. ex quo eventurum nostri putant - ut
ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum umore consumpto neque
terra ali posset nec remearet aer'.'70 If the sun indeed consists in
Even Pohlenz (Die Stoa 1,73) writes, 'Dieses schopferisches Feuer ist das
Element...'. Among modern scholars Rist alone consistently distinguishes between the two fires; see Stoic Philosophy, pp. 185sqq.
8 T&T 9[L7rUPO T3TO xZOt 'v &X?x &Gapa,
167 DL 7.145 (SVF 11.650): Tpl9CaX&L
4x&-G. cf. also SVF II. 652, 655, 656, 658, 659, 661,
-rv dv \XLOV &x -t?yai;
663, 677 and 690.
168 esp. Meteor. 1.4.341 b 7-342 a 29; also I.7.344 a 10 sqq.; II.3.357 b 24-358 a
34; II.4.359 b 34-360 a 16, etc.
166
168
ND 2.41 (SVF 1.504).
170
ND 2.118 (SVF II.593).
272

7rcp
rZXvLX6v,how can it be said to 'consume' the other elements?
Zeno seems to have proposed no solution to this glaring contradiction. To resolve (or at least to obscure) the problem, Cleanthes and
Chrysippus worked out a complicated nomenclature to explain what
happened at
?XIt)pGtaL.
Cleanthes argued that the world dissolved
into ypXo',Chrysippus that it dissolved into ocyi.171 It is impossible

to ascertain what was meant by these terms. Philo defines axY-p
as a 'sacred fire, a cp?a6 &sa'ro 1'A72 Alexander of Aphrodisias notes
that light is an 'emanation (&7opor) of fire, which the Stoics call
yq .113 Cleanthes' choice of 9p6o rather than 'uymis bizarre; for
ocvyn is customarily the light of the sun and, since for Cleanthes the
sun was the 7yZLOVLXOv of the universe, it would seem reasonable that
the universe would resolve itself into the sun's fire or light. 'A certain
Stoic' quoted by Philo distinguished three kinds of fire: CvtYpoc, rpo?6
and ocuy.174 This agrees in part with a statement of Galen175 - which
is not necessarily a Stoic statement - that air igniting produces
cpkR, earth igniting produces (vApoca and water igniting produces
Galen does not mention ay, however. And if these terms
&pcxo.
in themselves are not confusing enough, we are also told that the Stoics
considered the sun to be
JvoaaX
Voep6V.176
Small wonder that later
commentators become confused when reporting the Stoic conception

of fire.
However great these confusions might seem, they were manifoldly
increased by one factor: the inception into the Stoic cosmology
as a cosmic force. It will be seen at once that the adoption
of nve53Lcx
of nvzi3x as central agent in the Stoic cosmology would cause the
distinctions we have been considering - that between &pyn and C'roryeZov, and that between sup TXvtxov and stup Teyxvov- to be abandoned. As had been shown earlier, for Zeno 4eoe as sup 'rewXvOv
172
SVF 1.511; 11.611.

SVF II.664.
173
SVF 11.432.
171
SVF II.612.
SVF II.427.
176 SVF II.650, 655, 656. cf. II.652. The attribution of the concept of the sun
as &vm[ui. vospopvto any Stoic is not without difficulty. It is attributed to Stoicism
at large in DL 7.145. A passage in the Etym. Gud. (which is thoroughly corrupt)
attributes the identical terminology to Zeno alone (SVF 1.121). Aetius II.20.16
(DDG, p. 351 = DK.22. A. 12) attributes the phrase to Heraclitus and Hecataeus! Has the doxography been influenced by Stoic terminology? Or Stoic
terminology by Heraclitus?
174
175
273

was the creative cosmic agent. I am firmly of the opinion that it was
Chrysippus who first made the far-reaching application of the conception of a bodily xve5uoc (which all Stoics taught) to the cosmos;
that is, it was Chrysippus who 'discovered' cosmic nveuoc. The
evidence for this assertion is of two sorts: first, there is not one dependable ascription to Zeno of any conception of a cosmic nveupoc,
and its manifold
and second, virtually every account of cosmic nvse5Fao
operations - notably its role in establishing cosmic tension ('rovoq)- is
ascribed to Chrysippus.
Although there is no considerable evidence that Zeno taught a
cosmic 7rvpxoc, this evidence however flimsy needs to be assembled
once for all. On the one hand there is sound and dependable evidence
which functioned much in the way
that Zeno taught a bodily rnsvz5Vc
or
'inborn heat' functioned.'77 The
that Aristotle's bodily 7rvep4oc
question here is whether or not Zeno himself saw by analogy a 7ve5?a
operating in the cosmos as =vsupi operates in the human body.
It is extremely doubtful that he did. One would be obliged to point
to Philo's statement 'Zeno Mnaseae filius aerem deum materiam et
elementa quatuor','78 where aerem would have to be seen as translating
7rve5pia in its pre-Stoic sense of 'air' or 'wind'. This in itself would
suggest that he attached no sense of cohesion, pervasion or vitality
to it. From Cicero's time onwards nvei4tocis translated as spiritus,
not aer.179 The fact that Zeno elsewhere used nve54toc to designate
'wind' - Diogenes Laertius quotes a passage from his de universo
where lightning is seen to be caused by clouds torn apart by wind
(pyVuP.e"voV u'O 7rvsi4tocTo0)'80- would seem to indicate that he did
not at the same time use nve5aocto denote an all-pervading, cohesive
and life-giving cosmic force. A statement in Calcidius (purportedly
by Zeno) says that spiritus was found in matter from eternity.181
This statement is extremely unreliable evidence for Zeno's theory:
177 SVF I.127: 1veuio as identical to bodily heat; I.128: human sperm consists
in 7ve53to and moisture; I.135 (DL 7.157): the human soul consists in nvuc5o
gvf?p0ov (cf. I.137 and 138); 1.140 (Galen): the substance of the human soul is
7rve5?Va;I.145 (Themistius): the soul is nve5p.a; I.146 (Epiphanius): the soul is
7cOXUXPOVLOV
7tVep.u.
de provid. 1.22 (SVF I.85). Philo's sentence is probably to be emended and

punctuated to read 'ae<the>re<u>m deum, materiam, et elementa quatuor';
the sentence is thus a statement of Zeno's two &pyoct
and four a'oLtyloc.
179 ND 2.117; also 2.134, 136 and 138.
180 DL 7.153 (SVF I.117).
181 in Tim., c. 292 Waszink (SVF I.88).
178
274

though the paragraph begins with Zeno as subject it concludes with

adpellant, suggesting that Calcidius had Stoici and not Zeno in mind.
And this passage was not drawn directly from Zeno's works in any
case; Calcidius was here following either Numenius or Porphyry.182
In short, given the absence of any other statement whatsoever concerning Zeno and cosmic 7vMU40, neither the testimony of Philo nor
of Calcidius is dependable in establishing that Zeno taught a cosmic
nve5Lvci
. Further, there is no mention in any statement attributed to
Zeno of the behaviour of cosmic nve4[m:no mention, that is, that it

interpenetrates and animates the cosmos, that it creates a 'pneumatic
tension' (nveu,uasxostovoq),that it unifies the cosmos. And if he had,
how could he possibly have squared its functions with those of his 7sup
'?XvLx6v?
Although some scholars'83have attributed the conception of cosmic

to Cleanthes, I can see no compelling evidence for this attribution. The huge balance of evidence suggests that the full versatility
of nve5ua.as cosmic force was first realized by Chrysippus. Even if
Cleanthes had first conceived the analogical application of bodily
to the cosmos, it was Chrysippuswho worked out in astounding
nVDX,La
nveup.
detail the behaviour of this nv4iU,u. The cosmic ntvsi3pa was able to
explain an infinite variety of phenomena: the stability of the cosmos

(a problem which earlier Stoics had been unable to solve decisively),184
the interrelationshipof all cosmic parts to one another (as, for example,
lunar movement to tides), seeing and hearing, earthquakes and other
terrestrial phenomena, the principle of growth in plants and animals,
the cause of shape in all objects, to name only the most arresting
features of the theory.'85On the analogy of bodily nve5iuM
it became the
source of cosmic life. In so far as it bound and vitalized the cosmos,
it was considered as 6ok;in so far as it was hot and fiery, it usurped
the functions of 7ti3ptsevLx6v.Zeno's earlier conception of puaLsas
was expanded (or rather revised) to include the new
7r5p rexvL%6v
conception of cosmic 7vMi3[a.Thus Diogenes Laertius, after quoting
Zeno's definition, adds that 7up -eyvLx6vis to be understood as sTve4ua
7UpOet8?k X VLLe;V0CG;.188 At some point Zeno's.definition was thor182
See van Winden's discussion, Calcidius on Matter, pp. 98-9, and n. 26 above.
Notably Verbeke, L'dvolution de la doctrine du pneuma, p. 55.
184 See above, pp. 255-7.
185 Excellent discussion by S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959),
pp. 21-48; also Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, 73-5.
188 DL 7.156. Elsewhere (DDG, p. 306) 7rv4o is simply accommodated to the
definition by the connective xocl.
183
275

oughly revised to exclude sugprexvtx6v and to give nveu4t its proper

due. Galen preserves just such a definition, and there can be no doubt
that the tLves in question are late Stoics: (pu'aLv
TLVCg slVouL)CyOUaL
nveU5Ltx`v'rxvov Qo7o0 L xv,187 where 0'807roGntLxOv
has replaced 48e
3AL ov of Zeno, and nve5pc evreyvov Zeno's sup 'rxvr.xG.
Chrysippus' discovery of the wide application of the concept of
cosmic me53o is an exciting moment in the history of thought. So
quickly and widely was the nvi.oa used to explain cosmic phenomena that there was little time to revise the traditional cosmology.188
Many of Zeno's distinctions became obsolete. The nveuuat, as the
conception was inherited by the Stoics from medical thought, consisted in both air (the traditional meaning of the term nvsu,a.) and
heat;189 the Stoics consequently defined nve-uatm
as consisting in fire
and air, that is, in two elements.190 But on the other hand nve4icx, in so
far as it is the creative agent in the cosmos, takes over the position
of Zeno's 1t6e.19' An obvious problem arises: the nv4uiux functions
as an apXJ but is itself constituted of two a-MLZeZcx.
This problem
In
a
did not escape ancient commentators.
moment of penetrating
analysis Alexander of Aphrodisias exposes the Stoics' dilemma.
Alexander argues: (1) the Stoics posit two &PyxL,`X{ and b64, one
187
Hist. phil., 20 (DDG, p. 611, not in SVF).

I incline to think that Boethus of Sidon's (the Stoic) views are to be seen
as a conservative reaction to the far-ranging application which Chrysippus was
making of 7rveu5o. Boethus seems to have posited a bodily nvEv4za, for Macrobius
says 'Boethus (scil. animam dixit) ex aere et igne' (Comnm.in Somn. Scip. I. 14. 20).
But he denied that the cosmos was a living thing (rZ ov; DL 7.143); this must
mean that he denied that a vital breath or rve[ihoxpenetrated the cosmos.
And in fact Boethus locates the &64 outside the cosmos, in the sphere of the
fixed stars (DL 7.148). Boethus' cosmology is thus a return to Zeno's simpler
scheme, and may well be seen as a reaction to the contemporary teaching of
Chrysippus.
"89 See Solmsen,
MlusHelv 18 (1961), p. 180; idem, Meded. Nederi. Akad. van
Wet. 24.9 (1961), p. 282.
190 SVF 11.310: xat yap 'cpoq xazl 7rup6q pLu'roL
-v ojaL9v yXrLV'C6 nrv4ut;
II.442: -r nv?a
OCrTav Xyov-re
Opoq; 11.786: ?UX
yeyov6q &x Trup6q -re xocXL
EIVOL cuyxe(t.?vov
7rq gx -t 7up6q xcxiL&po4. Against this one must perhaps weigh
the statement in Arius Didymus, fr. 28 (DDG, p. 463 = SVF II.471) that, for
Chrysippus, ivsi3a consisted in air. Could this mean that fire was not a constituent of nve5,uo?
191SVF II.310: &e6q xcr u'ro6 aCo,
'iv voep6v -r xcdt &tLov; 11.1009:
nv5
xxC 7wp(o8?e;
g8
Toi
-r,V
0eO5 ou'aXv oL ETWYxcA OUTW- '
u 3l.LU voepov
6P[oVTOCL
& OXOU TOU
11.1027: oL EmTwxol voep6v &6v a' 7roocvov-rac .. . Me5t
&LWXOV
[LV
x6ap?ou.
188
276

active and one passive; (2) they say that 649 is corporeal in so far
as it is eternal and noetic 7tVse5:Lx; (3) but 7uprvs?xis itself composed
of something of the four simple bodies which the Stoics call a-rotZea.
And Alexander poses the following paradox: either nve-u~i4 may be a
compound of elements, or else it must be some sort of 'fifth body'.192
No satisfactory solution to this paradox seems to have been found.
The Stoics were forced to abandon Zeno's distinction between &poxac
and aroqeZoc, and between creative and destructive fire. Because
nve5i3mis at once creative agent and is composed of elements, the
constituent elements themselves assume the characteristics of 'activity' and 'passivity' which Zeno had assigned to the &pxot alone.
Thus Nemesius attests that, for the Stoics, two elements are acxa
(fire and air, i.e. the constituents of nveu,ua) and two are 7ocDXx
(earth and water).193 This division creates further difficulties in turn;
for if fire and air are said to be active, and together are seen to discharge the role of ?45s in Zeno's scheme, by analogy earth and water,
in so far as they are passive ( couhyLx&)are incongruously assigned the
role of Zeno's U?A. Some such reasoning must lie behind Galen's
otherwise confusing testimony, that fire and air are 'pneumatic'
substance whereas earth and water are 'hylic': 'tFVv
TVEUMTCLXIV
yC&Xp
pp.,v x 7t
e XCi u(wp auVSvaeL.94 However unconvincing
the attempt, it is nonetheless clear that the Stoics whom Galen is
quoting here were attempting to harmonize the doctrine of ni4ut
within the traditional cosmological framework of Zeno. Other Stoics
made different (and equally unconvincing) attempts at assimilation.
Alexander had suggested that the Stoics' 7cVe5pa had either to be
considered as elemental stuff or else as a fifth substance (V'a'xt s'o
4Mov OC&rOZqaCOica 7rZ'nVT7 'tq ouaGX);
certain Stoics proposed just such a
solution. At one point Galen remarks that, in addition to the elemental
qualities (two 7toLqLx&, two 7to*Tnx&) certain Stoics added a fifth
body: xac it&uTOV 7rUpetaMyeL xCTO TOUq Zaxok
TO 8LY&XOV86X 7tXVTGV
To these Stoics at least, 7vci5ia had become emancipated
sTv4*.x.'95
from its origin as elemental fire and air in mixture and had become an
ouatxv
aL)VEXEw
t6
auvzov,
rv
X
uALxIv
To auvr6xo?rvov* o
ypmaL,ynv
192
SVF II.310. A similar criticism is made by Simplicius (SVF II.389) which

possibly derives from Alexander.
193 SVF II.418. Aristotle had
applied this distinction to the basic 'qualities',
not the elements; cf. de gen. et corr. 11.2.329 b 25 sqq.; Meteor. IV.1.378 b 12.
194 SVF II.439.
195SVF
II.416.
277

autonomous cosmic agent; it consequently assumed a role additional

to the four elements.196By this point Zeno's distinction between
had been long forgotten.
&pxatand a'roLXeZa
Soon afterwards not only Zeno's distinction was forgotten but
virtually the entirety of Stoic cosmological thought as well. Today
we are left with the merest remnants of a once vital cosmology. Yet
it is only by applying distinctions such as that between &pXotand
amoLXeU to these apparently confusing remnants that the Stoic cos-
mology as a coherenitand compelling conception begins to emerge.'97

ClareHall, Cambridge
19OThe doctrine concerning elements reported by Diodorus Siculus (1.11.16), in

which nvi4ua is listed in addition to the traditional four, clearly reflects Stoic
influence, as Spoerri rightly conjectures (Spdthellenistische Berichie uiber Welt,
Kultur und Golter (Basel, 1959), p. 188).
197 I should like to acknowledge the kindness of F. H. Sandbach and J. M. Rist
who read and criticized this article in typescript and who made many helpful
suggestions.
278


Phronesis Volume 18 Issue 3 1973 (Doi 10.2307/4181920) Michael Lapidge - Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα- A Problem in Stoic Cosmology

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Phronesis Volume 18 Issue 3 1973 (Doi 10.2307/4181920) Michael Lapidge - Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα- A Problem in Stoic Cosmology

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and : A Problem in Stoic Cosmology

Author(s): Michael Lapidge

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&pxot and croLxZec:

recent years accurate and penetrating studies of Stoic logic,

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This content downloaded from 150.216.68.200 on Thu, 22 Aug 2013 21:06:37 PM

faithful to Stoic nominalism, states that 'acting and undergoing action

?1 the one pre-existing substance or 'matter' out of which the universe

The distinction between ? 1 and ? 3 will be self-evident; that between

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The latter supposition

and silua.14 Further,

fr. 37 (DDG, p. 469) -SVF

y&xp-rotl yLvotlTb 8-ttoupy'aov

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ty of bc6e and (UX-is a feature of Stoic cosmology which cannot be

19in Tim., c. 293 Waszink (not in SVF); cf. c. 294.

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led the Stoics to posit an apparently separable &noto4 {vXA?

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Failure to appreciate what was intended by the restrictive phrase

consistent in calling u`n 'irrational' ( 'L

and I. G. Kidd, Posidonius

Not all of Plotinus' discussion is printed in SVZF.Plotinus' theory of matter

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of the passive aspect of the one substance (definition ? 2) as &notooi'X1

SVF I.85; II.318, 380.

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of things of the succeeding &vOoCGL .40 There is therefore some

Alternatively, the o'afo might be &Trotog

?6yot would weigh against this.

SVF 11.320; cf. II.408 (Galen):

I5J'i 'rLt CatLV

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Cleanthes said52- so it would not have

could no longer satisfactorily answer questions which were raised in

in setting out the Stoic cosmology:

xtve5La,L. (2) 'r xtvo3v...

&,Xo rt 7tL*v6v ka-wL

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of this substance 'active' (noLoi5v).56But that which acted could not

cf. F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System ol the Physical World, p. 89.

59 de gen. et corr. I. 7. 324 b 18 (4 8'UAX- f bX-1 rXTrmitx6v); II. 9. 335 b 29-30

der Materie, p. 265, and Happ, Hyle, pp. 762-3.

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the Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions should be stressed. Aristotle's

5e6q) was 'one mighty and continuous fire',65 and Eusebius,

point has been argued by Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, p. 104:

8-tto.upy6v ociuP6v, oux'8tepov

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definition incorporates some Aristotelian terminology,69 but the

(DDG, p. 306) = SVF II.1027, where &e6q has replaced cp6aL

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and that which revolved about it (7repLyep6pevov 7sp' TO

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doctrine that all cosmic parts

'elements') tend towards the

centre: yi, {8&p, &ap, sdup,a

tcwva vetesUt emc 'r

it&vToc o'r ptep- TroV5xO6a1.ou En