Nicomachean

Ethics,

I, 1096 b 26-29

W. W. FORTENBAUGH

6 of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues

the Platonic form of Goodness. At 1096b25 he thinks his
against
case won and concludes that the good is not a universal
correa
idea.
This
is
not
to
conclusion,
however,
single
wholly
sponding
so that Aristotle adds (1096b26-29) :
satisfactory
n

Chapter

The previous polemic against the Platonists

might suggest that the
different uses of the word "good" are fortuitously
equivocal. Aristotle
Two ways are suggested in
now moves to counter this impression.
are not
which different uses of "good", while remaining
equivocal,
The
second
that
of
Aristotfortuitously
equivocal.
suggestion,
analogy,
le explains by means of an example. The first suggestion, Tw
auvTeaEw is not elucidated by Aristotle.
elvi i npos 9V
It has been generally2 supposed that this first suggestion introduces
the focal analysis by which "being" and "one" are analyzed in the
central books of the Metaphysics.
to this supposition,
According
Aristotle suggests that "good" can be analyzed like "being". Different
senses of "good" can be shown to be conceptually
dependent upon some
if the other senses
primary sense which first must be comprehended
are in turn to be understood.
The logoi of the secondary senses will
include the logos of the primary sense but the primary sense can be
defined without reference to the dependent senses. (Cf. Met. 1004a25,
1028 a 34-36,

1077 b3-4)
this interpretation
has been incorporated
Recently
by Professor
G. E. L. Owen into arguments
Aristotle's
intellectual
concerning

185

In the early Eudemian

Ethics focal analysis is only
development.
in
Book
VII
where Aristotle applies the analysis to different
present
kinds of friendship.3 As yet Aristotle has not seen the extended application of the analysis to general expressions
like "one",
"being",
form of Goodness,
and "good" so that in his criticism of Plato's
Aristotle makes no use of focal analysis and refers (1217bl6-19)
to
as
of
the
dialectic
the appropriate
mode
inquiry concerning
good.4
In the later Nicomachean
Ethics the case is different.
Not only is
focal analysis employed to explain different kinds of friendship but its
to include the general term "good"
has been extended
application
a
is added (1096 b 30-31 ) to another
reference
Moreover,
(1096b27-28).
is
more
for inspecting
which
the different
appropriate
philosophy
senses of the word "good". This other philosophy is generafly5 underr. In keeping with this
stood to be the focal analysis of Metaphysics,
the
Greek
commentator
Alexander
in his remarks on
understanding
names
Book r of the MetaPhysics
"good" along with "being"
(242.5-6)
terms
used
in
several
not
but
senses,
among
equivocally
in the use of focal analysis, Owen finds a closer relationTherefore
the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics
than bebetween
ship
tween the Eudemian Ethics and the MetaPhysics.
Lines 1096 b 27-28 of
Ethics suggest focal analysis of the general term
the Nicomachean
"good" and mark an important
step forward in Aristotle's intellectual
development.
is attractive
but it leans
This picture of Aristotle's
development
of
the
common
lines
1096
b
27-28.
These
interpretation
heavily upon
I
have
never
and
so
have
been
lines,
believe,
adequately
explicated
been regularly misunderstood.
It is my purpose in this paper to consider afresh these cryptic lines and to offer a new and, I hope, correct
interpretation.
First I shall state briefly and without argumentation
my own undertwo
for
of
Aristotle's
the
avoidance
standing concerning
suggestions
I
Then
shall
to
underfortuitous
equivocation.
attempt
support my
standing by an analysis of the Greek terms used in 1096 b 27-28. Third

186

conforms with Aristotle's

point out that my interpretation
of
similar
in
the
Posterior
Aristotle's
problems
Analytics.
handling
of
shown
to
not
relate
will
be
"good"
primarily to
suggested analysis
Rather two modes of analysis
the central books of the Metaphysics.
familiar to readers of the Posterior A nalytics are suggested by Aristotle
for the avoidance of fortuitous equivocation.
Finally, I shall consider
the Eudemian Ethics' analysis of "good", showing that this analysis,
too, relates to the Posterior A nalytics and that it is wholly compatible
of the Nicomachean Ethics. The conclusion is
with my interpretation
that lines 1096b27-28 of the Nicomachean Ethics introduce no advance
in conceptual
analysis beyond the Posterior Analytics. These lines are
in Aristotle's intellectual history.
not evidence for a development
own
be
stated as follows. At 1096 b 7 Aristotle
understanding
may
My
a
start
in
his
criticism
of the Platonists by entertaining
a
fresh
makes
"Good" is predicated
of two kinds of subjects,
possible objection.
things desirable in their own right and things desirable only inasmuch
as they produce or protect things desirable in their own right. Although
"good" will not have the same sense when used to describe these two
different kinds of thing, it will, it is suggested, have only one sense
when used to describe things desirable in their own right. But is there
some way in which these desirable things are alike and so subjects
If a single predicate is applied to
of a single unequivocal
predication?
several subjects, like honor, pleasure, reason, these subjects must be
An
in some way the same or the predicate will be used equivocally.
analysis of things desirable in their own right reveals no common
Their logoi in respect to being
ground for the common predication.
differ
so
that
of these
must
be
"good"
good
predicated
equivocally
different subjects.
the predication
of "good"
Although
may involve equivocation,
Aristotle does not think that it involves fortuitous equivocation.
He,
indicates
two ways in which a single predicate
therefore,
might be
used without
fortuitous
the different
to characterize
equivocation
desirable
in
their
own
the
desirable
things
things may
right. First,
and it is this generic character
possess a common generic character
which is signified by the predicate
"good". In the different kinds of
desirable things the common character
so that their
is differentiated
of
kinds
different.
But
different
the
goodness appears
goodness are
still related generically so that all things desirable in their own right
may be labeled "good" without fortuitous equivocation.
The second suggestion is that of analogy. Whenever
two different
I shall

187

things are one by analogy,

they can be characterized
by a single
without
fortuitous
For example,
equivocation.
predicate
sight and
nous are not species of a single genus but each is similarly related to
something else: sight to body and nous to soul. They are analogous and
may be characterized
by a single predicate just as if they possessed a
nature.
Similarly, things desirable in their own right might be
single
because they are by analogy
characterized
by a single predicate,
members of a quasi-genus possessing a common nature.
The immediate
which this interpretation
must face is
question
Can
the
notion
of
affiliation
from the
be
drawn
philological.
generic
Ev
Greek phrase: &q/vo eivi i
avvTeaEw (1096b27-28)?
The answer to this question depends primarily upon a correct interpretation of auvreXeZv 7tp. Although these two words are often correcttoward",
they need not
by a phrase like "to contribute
ly translated
the
idea
of
motion
toward.
"to belong
mean
convey
They may simply
to". The phrase cruv't"Edvxp6q is like the phrase cruv't"Edvais. In Attic
Greek of the fourth century, the latter phrase can mean "to contribute
toward"
(Demosthenes
20.28), but it frequently means "to belong to"
Likewise in Aristotle's
this latter
treatises,
23.213).
(Demosthenes
mean
"to
't'&v
contribute
toward",
d 't"1vYevsaw avv<exo6vphrase may
but
it
lose
all
idea of motion toward.
't'6>V
(H.A. 509a29),
may
is
a
in
the
Parts
For example, there
of Animals 667 b 22 which
passage
is verbally very similar to the Nicomachean passage 1096 b 27-28, and
which seems to be incompatible,
with the idea of motion toward.
Aristotle asks why the aorta and great blood vessel begin from one
source. He begins his answer as follows : Tov
o5v Eis
auvrzThe cause of both vessels belonging to and stemming from one source
is that all animals possess in actuality one sensory soul. There seems
to be no notion of motion toward in this usage of the Greek phrase
av<exeiv
because according to Aristotle blood flows only away from
the heart.' The vessels run away from the heart and may be said to
o-uvrefocus upon or belong to a single source, the heart: Eis
xeiv.
Like auTe?ew elq, the phrase auvreXeZv
may suggest motion or
contribution
toward. For example, G.A. 715 a 12:
poptwv Toc7tpO
a
uvv<exo6v<
is
variation
on
H.A.
509a29 given
T7}v yevealv
simply
I
above. But uvv<exeiv 7rp'oq may also,
think, mean simply "to focus

188

upon" or "to belong to". The phrase may describe belonging to a

physical source as in the Parts o/ Animals
667b221 or it may indicate
source or common genus. In the Nicomachean Ethics
one conceptual
passage, 1096 b 27-28, the phrase means, I think, "to belong to" one
auvTe7tpoc:;IV
genus, so that the whole passage: cp'
xeiv means "all being from one genus or belonging to one genus."
to compare the list of equivocals given in the NicoIt is instructive
machean Ethics with a similar list found in Book VII of the Physics,
249a23-25.

or unconsciously
comments
consciously
Simplicius'
(1096.28-1097.2)
relate this passage from the Physics to the Nicomachean Ethics.8 For
7to &*Eyouaoct by means of the Nicomachean
he explains
phrase
and - what is more important he explains
EYYuSyvei
xon 7tp
Equivocals close in genus
by means of roc.
are things called from one thing or in relation to one thing. They are
things called by a common name because they stem from and belong
for example, are specifically
to one genus. Locomotion and alteration,
different but both are called change because they unite in a common
generic nature. Similarly, the different things desirable in their own
right might all be called good because they stem from and belong to a
single genus, because they possess a common generic character which
in the different kinds of desirable things.
is differentiated
It is, of course, possible that Simplicius knew both lists of equivocals
tried to interpret
the one in terms of the other. It is
and erroneously
that
the
ouvreNicomachean
possible
Tw
7tp 'CV&7t(Xv't'(x
7?Ewdoes not have the same significance as Yevecin the Physics and that
Simplicius' comment is misleading or wrong. But Simplicius' testimony
should not be quickly rejected. Book VII of the Physics is usually
the composition
of the
pre-dating
regarded as an early composition
his
Nicomachean
Ethics. Aristotle
well
recall
earlier
might
catalogue
of equivocals and introduce it into the Ethics with one omission (equivocals possessing some similarity,
249a24) and with several changes
in mode of expression. The likelihood of such a recall can be increased
and the omission can be explained by a study of two passages in the
Posterior Analytics.

189

Analytics, Book II, Chapter 14, reveals two ways in which

a single predicate can be applicable to several different subjects and
these two ways match, I believe, Aristotle's
concerning
suggestions
a
is
essential
attribute
First,
possessed by genus
possessed
any
"good".
by the different species, so that if, for example, it is proper to ascribe
to animals it is also proper to ascribe it to horses and men.
sensitivity
Aristotle is careful to point out that some genera may lack a simple
generic name and can only be picked out by description. These genera,
which are
like classes bearing a simple generic name, possess attributes
also possessed by the different species. Among genera picked out by
we can, I think, place the class of things desirable in their
description
And
if this class possesses the common attribute of goodness,
own right.
so do the different kinds of desirable things. If it is proper to ascribe
goodness to the generic class of desirable things, it is also proper to
ascribe it to the species without bald equivocation.
to
can be applicable
The second way in which a single predicate
Sometimes
when
different
involves
several different subjects
analogy.
they can
subjects cannot be unified under a single generic description,
still be one by analogy. For example, pounce, spine, and bone are not
they are related by analogy,
species of a common genus. Nevertheless,
so that just as if they enjoyed a single nature (lluxep
?cvoS rpluemq
cf.
98a22;
Topics 108 b 27-28) they possess common
1'1)
properties and can be described by the same predicates without simple
Therefore if things desirable in their own right cannot
equivocation.
be unified under a single genus, they might be unified by analogy and
so shown to possess the common property of goodness.
In Chapter 17 of the Posterior Analytics, Book II, Aristotle considers
can have a plurality
of causes. This plurality
whether one attribute
are
selected in which a single
of causes he denies. Three cases (99a6-16)
is predicate of several subjects so that a plurality of causes
attribute
In all three it is found that for each attribute
be
suspected.
might
there is one primary subject and one primary cause. The cases selected
are of especial interest because they match Aristotle's list of equivocals
First the attribute
at 1096b26-29.
may be equivocal so that there is
not one but several attributes
possessed by several different subjects.
when it is used of
is predicated
"similar"
For example,
equivocally
colors and figures. In respect to figures, it means "possessing proportional sides and equal angles." In respect to colors, it means "affecting
our senses in one way." There is no relation between these different
senses of "similar" so that the predicate "similar" is simply equivocal.
Posterior

190

The second case is that in which the several subjects and several
causes of a common attribute
are generically
related so that the atof the several subjects without fortuitous
tribute is predicated
equivocation. "Convertible"
is predicable of both "linear proportions"
and
"arithmetical
The
is
not
proportions".
predication
simply equivocal
because the two subjects are species of a single genus which is the
When the subjects are
primary subject of the predicate "convertible".
of the cause will vary, but when they
taken specifically the statement
are taken generically there is a single statement
of the cause.
The third case is, of course, that of analogy. When two different
things which cannot be properly placed within one genus are called by
one name, the predication
need not be simply equivocal.
For the
subjects may be related by analogy. And similarly if one states the
reasons why this attribute
the
belongs to these different
subjects,
stated reasons will be analogous. Analogous things belong to a quasiso that they can be described
genus (II .14.98 a 22, Topics 108b27-28)
a
without
fortuitous
by single predicate
equivocation.
in the Nicomachean
Aristotle's
Ethics should now be
suggestions
clear. He expresses himself with extreme brevity because he is simply
If things
recalling two stock ways for avoiding simple equivocation.
desirable in their own right can be unified generically or by analogy,
fortuitous equivocation
can be denied. If the different causes or reasons
which explain the possession of goodness by different
subjects are
related generically or by analogy, then the predications
are not simply
equivocal. Things desirable in their own right possess different logoi
in respect to their goodness. But these logoi need not be totally unrelated. They may enjoy a generic or analogous
affiliation
so that
"good" may be predicated of the different desirables without fortuitous
equivocation.
In the Nicomachean Ethics (1096 b26-29) Aristotle is operating with
of equivocals which is as old as the seventh book of the
a classification
249
a
23-25.
Physics,
Only in the Nicomachean list, Aristotle omits one
kind of equivocal noticed in the Physics, namely equivocals
which
possess a certain similarity;
e.g. a model and its image, or a live hand
and a clay hand. But for Aristotle this kind of equivocation
was always
a case of simple, unmitigated
so
that
it
is
omitted
in the
equivocation,
Nicomachean
which
is
to
passage
seeking
mitigate
equivocation.
Aristotle
wishes to avoid fortuitous
and toward this
equivocation
end he suggests two ways already noted in the earliest book of the
Physics and familiar to his audience from use in the Posterior Analytics.
191

some new focal

The first suggestion is not a murky hint concerning
a
familiar
of
mode
Rather
he
recalls
mitigating
equivocation.
analysis.
But this
His manner of expression is not clear and needs expansion.
is perhaps excusable when the point conveyed is somecrabbedness
thing already familiar to Aristotle's audience.
I think, what
The Eudemian Ethics' analysis of goodness supports,
has been argued. After showing that ethics is concerned neither with a
Form of goodness nor with universal
Platonic
goodness, Aristotle
that the subject of ethical inquiry is the practical
states (1218b9-18)
which is the cause of things under it.
good or goal (ou vex,
For
is
the
cause
is
made plain by teaching method.
That the goal
that each of the other
having defined the goal, teachers demonstrate
If
I
define the "good" as,
is
is
Aristotle's
point
simple.
good.
things
form for
and then substitute a paronymous
for example, "eudaimonia"
that other things which are conducive
the definition, I can demonstrate
a procedure identical
to eudaimonia are good. Aristotle is advocating
to that found in the Posterior Analytics, Book II, 94 b 1 1 -23 . If the goal
that
is health and is defined as "food not rising", I can demonstrate
whatever is conducive to food not rising, namely walking after dinner,
is that the major premise be
The only requirement
is healthful.
coordinate
or paronymous
transformed
by substituting
appropriate
The
the
and
its
definition.9
forms for both
major term "health"
goal
and the middle term "food not rising" is
is altered to "healthful"
of food not rising" (94 b 14-16). The minor term
altered to "productive
remains "walking after dinner". These terms form a syllogism1 whose
So long as the
conclusion is that walking after dinner is healthful.
not
clear how the
remain
unaltered
it
is
and
terms
middle
major
middle term applies to the minor. But when "food not rising" is
of the
of food not rising", the relationship
altered to "productive
middle term to the minor becomes more apparent. ill

192

The Eudemian passage, which also uses health as an example, should

If the goal is the good and is defined as
be similarly interpreted.
then
whatever
eudaimonia,
promotes eudaimonia, say virtuous action,
be
shown
to
be
can
is that if
good. The unexpressed
requirement
altered. The
possible the major and middle terms be appropriately
middle term may be altered to the paronymous
form eudaimonikon.
remains the same because it does not
The major term, however,
forms. "Good", unlike "health",
belong to a family of paronymous
not
assume
different
forms
which
does
signal a change in sense or usage.
There is only a single form. 12 "Good" applies to "eudaimonikon"
and
"eudaimonikon"
applies to "virtuous action" so that the conclusion is
reached: "virtuous action is good".
The analyses of the Posterior Analytics and the Eudemian
Ethics
make clear how several different things can be called "good". If the
good is defined as eudaimonia, whatever counts as eudaimonia,
say a
life of contemplation,
may be called the "good", because it is eudaiof eudaimonia,
monia. Whatever
is productive
like virtuous
action
it
be
is
eudaimonikon.
These
called
because
"good",
may
predications
of good are related because the logoi which explain and justify the
are related. The predications
are not baldly equivocal
predictions
or "white" (= "whitebut differ in logoi as "health"
and "healthful"
in
and
"white"
differ
their
logoi.
13
ness")
Aristotle's major problem is not showing how various uses of "good"
are related but how all uses of "good" are related. If the "good" is
a series of related uses can be easily derived.
defined as eudaimonia,
The problem is that the "good" seems to have several unrelated
definitions so that there are several independant
series of related uses
which lack a common focus.14 It is this lack of a common focus for
all uses of "good" which causes Aristotle to label the word "good"
I can define the goal and then demonstrate
how certain
equivocal.
other things are called "good", but not how all other things are called

193

has several competing

"good". The "good"
logoi so that there are
several series of related uses of "good". It is with this in mind that
Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics goes on to say (1218 b 25-27): in regard
to the good as goal for man and in regard to the best of the practicables
one must consider in how many ways the best of all is said. 15 In other
words one must ascertain the number of ways in which the "good"
as goal can be defined. If the collected definitions
cannot be shown
series of related uses
to relate then there will be several independent
of "good".
Similarly in the Nicomachean Ethics (1096 b 7-29) Aristotle is not primarily concerned to show how different things which produce or preserve some goal are called "good". Their goodness may be demonstrated
by the syllogistic analysis found in both the Eudemian Ethics and the
Posterior Analytics.
Aristotle's
concern is with the goals,
primary
with things desirable in their own right. For if these goals are called
reasons, then it is impossible to relate all pre"good" for unrelated
of "good". There will be several series of related uses of
dications
on how the goals
"good". Therefore Aristotle makes two suggestions
or
And
these
two ways inbe
related:
by analogy.
may
generically
in
troduce no new mode of analysis but simply recall
shorthand
form
two modes of analysis familiar to the readers of the Posterior A nalytics.

Douglas College, Rutgers University,

New Brunswick, New Jersey, U.S.A.

194