G.R. No.

200080

September 18, 2013

brought her to his sisters house in x x x where he raped her inside a bedroom.
Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was
brought to the barangay office where she was asked to execute a document stating
that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latters mother and sister-in-law
who brought her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of the
incidents only after her classmate Adriano informed her family of what happened in
school and of the rape incidents. AAA testified that she did not immediately tell her
family because she was still in a state of shock.5

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARVIN CAYANAN, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:

Adriano and the victims mother corroborated her testimony. A resident psychiatrist at
the National Center for Mental Health also testified that AAA was suffering from
mental depressive symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse.6

Accused-appellant Marvin Cayanan (Cayanan) seeks a review of the Decision1 dated

July 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 affirming
with modifications the Consolidated Decision2 dated June 16, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 77. The RTC decision convicted
Cayanan of the crimes of Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1) and
Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1498-M-200 I), and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime without
eligibility for parole.

Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however, did not give credit to
his defense, ruling that it is a weak defense and does not rule out the use of force
given the prosecutions evidence. He also failed to establish the genuineness and
authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA.7
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC.8

The CA, however, increased the award of damages originally awarded by the RTC:
(1) in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001, from P50,000.00 toP75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; and (2) in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001,fromP50,000.00 to P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and from P50,000.00 toP75,000.00 as moral damages. The CA also
awarded an additionalP75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M2001 andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases.3

A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any reversible error in
affirming Cayanans conviction. Record shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex
with him on February 1, 2001 and threatened her and her family with physical harm.
The testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAAs testimony that Cayanan
forcibly took her by the school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and thereafter
raped her.1wphi1 The defense failed to show any reason why the prosecutions
evidence should not be given weight or credit.

The prosecution established that Cayanan took advantage of 15-year old AAA4 on
February 1, 2001 while the victim was alone inside her house in x x x, Bulacan.
Cayanan is the victims brother-in-law, being married to her older sister, and the
couple lived in a nearby house. AAA was asleep when she felt someone caressing
her. It turned out to be Cayanan. He then started kissing her and told her to remove
her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly took it off and after the latter took off
his own under garment, he inserted his organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a
knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and informed anybody of the
incident.

Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission of the
crimes. For the Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it
must be proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof is required such as tokens,
mementos, and photographs.9 And while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly
written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these letters
were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative value.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape in
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape
if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim.10In this case, circumstances
show that the victims abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after
Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they
reached his sisters house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.11

On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend
Armina Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy
Manalastas. Cayanan then pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he
covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to
a dress shop in x x x, Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of
clothes as she was in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then

Finally, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in
awarding additional P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M2001 andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as these are
accord with prevailing jurisprudence.12

which sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms. Yee in the
Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual harassment.[1]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 04256 is MODIFIED in that accused appellant Marvin Cayanan is found
guilty of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. In all other respects, the
CA Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28
November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City
Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father and petitioner were childhood
friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then
filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able
to help her.

Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence,
trial proceeded.

Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid,
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.13

The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City
Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas,
U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around
nine oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of
petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning
project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the
job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at
one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner
suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford to be honest in
her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner
then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various
aspects of virginity. He hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or
friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her
the job where she would be the subject of a research program. She was requested
to be back after lunch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002]

DR.

RICO
S.
JACUTIN, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer
Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment, thusly:

Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the

nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so confused. When she got to the
office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether
there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her
a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a
physical examination would include hugging her but petitioner assured her that he
was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her
to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car
together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner
stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. After
dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.

That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the
accused, a public officer, being then the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City
with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his
position, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit,
request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and
fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the
office of the accused, namely: by demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose
her body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused,

While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she
said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired

whether she had varicose veins, and she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot
and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of
the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her
thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised,
she exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then
touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the
back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether
she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her
navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she
lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she
was through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had
just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider
her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.

Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political
harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05
November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr.
Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No.
7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO
JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and punished
under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the same Act, properly known as
the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is
further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and to pay the cost of suit.[2]

Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the
money he gave her but she did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her
for accepting the money and instructed her to return it. In the morning of 04
December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but she
was not able to see him until about one oclock in the afternoon. She tried to give
back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.

In the instant recourse, it is contended that I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the
inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.

A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995,
she attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her
mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some psychological problem, the
family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify
that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that
Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to
allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due
to post trauma stress.

II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law
and presumption of innocence on account of the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to sustain his conviction.[3]
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic
Act 7877 provides:

Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28

November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see him in his office, among
them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a boyhood friend. When it was
their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed
her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was no vacancy in
his office, adding that only the City Mayor really had the power to appoint city
personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident
happened, he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the
City Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to return
the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was scheduled to leave for Davao at
2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He
submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint
for sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu,

SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,

education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employee.

accused instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it
was not good for people to see them riding in a car together. She walked from the
office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as instructed. And after a while, a
white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was instructed by the
accused to come inside. Inside the car, he called her attention why she was in a
pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated side by side, the
accused held her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he would
go home for a while to put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back
inside the car and asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she was not
able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused
directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her
legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to
raise it higher, but she protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants
instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half of her legs. But then the accused
pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her
shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as
instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka! because he tried to insert his hand into
her panty. Accused then held her abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day!
(Visayan word of endearment), and let the back of his palm touch her forehead,
indicating the traditional way of making the young respect their elders. He again told
her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether
she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her breast. He then fondled
her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar while
silently asking God what was happening to her and asking the courage to resist
accuseds physical advances. After a short while, she asked him if there could be a
right place for physical examination where there would be many doctors. He just
exclaimed, so you like that there are many doctors! Then he asked her if she has
tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to kiss her, she answered that she has
lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated. Finally, she
informed him that she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted
that complainant was entertaining malice and reminded her of what she earlier
agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what happened. He then promised to
give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She was about to open
the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant
instantly parried his hand with her bag.[4]

Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held
when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire
to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a
boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her
about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all started from there;
the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would
be a part of a research, accused asked complainant if she would agree that her
private parts (bolts) would be seen. Accused assured her that with her cooperation in
the research, she would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked upon the
accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to
undergo the physical examination. At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the
interview and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon of the same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock
in the afternoon, but did not proceed immediately to the office of the accused, as she
dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a
loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, she
went back to the office of the accused. And once inside, accused called up a certain
Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept
a registered nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when
the latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call one more hospital. In her
presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that there was no
vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the
offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning Program
where there would be physical examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two
(2) secretaries to go out of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant,
accused asked her if she would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would
not agree because the research included hugging. He then assured her that he was
just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been subjected to
such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed
to the research, for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research
and would gain knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a
tomboy, she answered in the negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he
would first play bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical
examination). On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the
clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But

While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel,
it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the
appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good
weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and
actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner
would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not
been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The
findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu,
petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health

Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said
to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.

extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological
counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed
and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with
petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious
actions.[9]

The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner,

i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:
There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence
adduced by the defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards
Committee, as testified to by witness Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case

No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual
Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections
3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary
damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended
party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively,
moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs against petitioner.

First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna
Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. 3-A and 3-B) were signed by
Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting, Exh. 5, was signed by Myrna
Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. 3-A and 3-B certify
that the officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita
Rozabal.
Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how
was she able to personally bring the same in court when she testified on September
8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted during her testimony that she retired from the
government service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be
the custodian of the logbook when she testified.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. P-03-1697. October 1, 2003]

And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the attendance
of those who attended was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who
wrote and signed their names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their
names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr.
Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to
attending individuals inside the conference room.[5]

JOCELYN S. PAISTE, complainant, vs. APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR., Clerk of

Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tayug-San Nicolas,
Pangasinan,respondent.
[A.M. No. P-03-1699. October 1, 2003]

Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon,
the tribunal,[6] no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold
otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an
opportunity that is denied the appellate court.[7]

JOANNE S. GOLTIAO, complainant, vs. APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR., Clerk of

Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tayug-San Nicolas,
Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary

damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral
damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to enable an
injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on
account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the
result of passion or undue prejudice,[8] and it must always reasonably approximate the

These consolidated administrative cases arose from two different complaints

filed against respondent Aproniano V. Mamenta, Jr., Clerk of Court II, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Tayug-San Nicolas, Pangasinan. In an affidavit-complaint filed
with the Office of the Chief Justice,[1] dated August 10, 2001, complainant Joanne S.

Goltiao charged him with gambling and drinking liquor during office hours, sexual
harassment, arrogance and acts unbecoming of a government official. In another
affidavit-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator,[2] dated August 28,
2001, the other complainant Jocelyn C. Paiste charged him with conduct unbecoming
of a public officer and with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [3] for
his failure to issue official receipt.

jokingly put his hands on her forehead (agmanmano). She afterwards tried to free
her hands off his but he would no let her. Instead, he told her, Wait for a while, I
would just like to tell you something. I love you, is that okay? Tell me that you love
me too. No strings attached. She retorted, As if you are my father. Spurned, he
got mad. This kind of incident happened at least ten more times.
Furthermore, respondent sent her love notes. He wrote his love messages on
pieces of paper in front of her and handed them to her. [9] She knew that they were
intended for her as there was nobody else present when he gave the notes to
her. He would also call her at her mothers house. She did not respond affirmatively
to his display of affection as both of them are married. Finally, she explained that she
filed a complaint against him only on August 10, 2001 because of the August 7, 2001
incident, when she got fed up at the way he treated her.

After respondent denied the accusations against him in separate letters, [4] we
resolved[5] to refer both cases to Hon. Ulysses Butuyan, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan for investigation, report and
recommendation.[6] Separate investigations of the complaints were conducted.
In A.M. No. P-03-1699 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1202-P), evidence shows that
complainant Goltiao is a Stenographer I of the MCTC of Tayug-San Nicolas since
1997. She testified[7]that on August 7, 2000, at about 3:00 p.m., a representative from
the Plaridel Insurance Co. came to their office seeking clearance. She immediately
prepared the necessary form and, together with the representative, went to see
respondent in the courtroom to obtain his signature. When she asked him to sign the
document, respondent, who was at that time playingtong-its (a card game) at the
lawyers table with unnamed individuals, got angry and threw his cards. He shouted
at her: Why did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the
Supreme Court? She responded that such was not her intention and reminded him of
his requirement that he must first see the applicants before he sign their
clearance. He did not sign the clearance, sent then out and shouted Bullshit ka! at
her thrice. They all then went out of the courtroom and proceeded back to the staff
room. She went to her table and buried her face in her hands, crying. Respondent
followed her and continued uttering unsavory remarks: Bullshit ka! Vulva of your
mother! Why did you take the client there and even raised your voice? (Bullshit ka!
Okinnam nga babai! Apay ta innalam dagita kliyente idiay sanak to rinayawan!) She
replied that her parents taught them not to answer back at older people. He still
shouted: Vulva of your mother! I wish you will die now! Whom are you bragging of?
We will try each other. (Okinnam nga babai! Matay ka koma itattan! Apay sinno aya ti
paglaslastog mo? Sige, agpipinnadas tayo.) Thereafter, he asked the utility aide to
buy him four bottles of beer.

Marilyn de Leon, also a court stenographer of MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas,

corroborated the testimony of Goltiao.[10] She stated that she witnessed the incident
on August 7, 2001, when respondent became angry at Goltiao after the latter went to
ask for his signature while he was playing tong-its. She heard respondent shout foul
words at Goltiao. She added that respondent gets mad at everyone at the office on
trivial matter. She, too, received love notes from the respondent.
Court stenographer Glenda C. Ramirez also corroborated the testimony of
Goltiao.[11] She declared that she witnessed the incident on August 7, 2001 at their
office. She observed that respondent was fuming mad at Goltiao, when the latter
asked him to sign a clearance form. She heard respondent shout at Goltiao inside
the courtroom and at the staff room. Respondent got mad when Goltiao allowed the
representatives of the insurance company to enter the courtroom, where he was
playing tong-its. She related that she also received love notes from him. One time,
after respondent signed her travel order she noticed the following message written on
the order: 7:30 in the evening, Jollibee. She did not go out with him. She chose him
as a principal sponsor on her wedding in the hope that he would treat her like his own
child and that he would stop sending notes to her. This did not happen even as
respondent continued to easily get mad at her for simple lapses.
Renato Rombawa, a utility worker at the court, saw the incident on August 7,
2001, when respondent got mad at Goltiao inside the courtroom. [12] He did not know
why he became furious. At the time of the incident, respondent was playing tong-its.

Goltiao declared that her working relationship with the respondent is sometimes
good and sometimes bad because of his ill temper. [8] He easily gets mad at her even
for small, trivial mistakes. This situation started, according to her, when she told him
to stop courting and sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. She
related an incident which happened early one morning when he asked her to see him
inside the judges chamber. At that time, the designated judge was not around. Once
inside, she was told to sit in one of the chairs in front of the judges table. The
respondent, who was sitting at the judges chair, then extended his hand to her, as if
he wanted to shake her hands. She reciprocated by extending her hands and

Estifanio Acosta, Clerk III at the MCTC, stated that he likewise saw respondent
got mad when Goltiao tried to obtain his signature for a clearance form.
[13]
Respondent, he recalled, was at that time playing tong-its. He knew that
respondent gives love notes to Goltiao and Glenda Ramirez, as the two revealed this
secret to him.

Lastly, David Kagaoan testified that at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of
August 7, 2001, somebody came to get a clearance from the court. [14] The clearance
form was prepared by Goltiao who went to see the respondent at the courtroom. He
then heard shouts of vulva of your mother, get out of here! from the room. He
thought it came from the respondent, who was then playing tong-its. Rombawa, the
utility worker, went inside the courtroom and brought the sobbing Goltiao out. He
stated that complainant showed him some of the love notes respondent gave her. He
knows it came from respondent as he is familiar with his signature.

On April 20, 2001, Paiste, an officemate and a client again went to the MCTC in
Tayug-San Nicolas to post bail in connection with Criminal Case No. 7461. The
respondent instructed them to go to the house of Judge Pastor. They went there as
told but the judge rejected their papers. They returned the next day, a Saturday, after
completing their documents. They came from the court where they met respondent,
who accompanied them to the judges house. The judge approved the surety bond.
[19]
Later, they handed three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) to the respondent, two
thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) of which was for the JDF. They gave him
the remaining six hundred pesos (P600.00) after he asked them, Paano naman yung
sa akin? They understood that to mean that he was expecting some form of
compensation as he accompanied them outside the office on a non-working
day. They then demanded an official receipt for the two thousand four hundred pesos
(P2,400.00) they paid him corresponding to the amount of the JDF. He told them to
go to the court and get it the following Monday. That Monday, she sent one of her
staff to get the receipt, but the latter reported to her that he did not issue one. She
added that this is not the only time that he failed to issue her a receipt. In other
cases, he also neglected to do so even after she has paid the mandatory JDF fees.

Respondent denied the allegations against him.[15] He admitted shouting at

Goltiao because she, too, shouted at him. He declared that the complaint was
intended to harass him and put him into shame and to remove him from office. He
said that Goltiao and her witnesses resent his strictness and they want to continue
with their bad ways in the office. Goltiao, Ramirez and de Leon come to office late
but Goltiaos daily time record does not reflect her tardiness. She sells stenographic
notes without remitting a single centavo to the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF). Witness Rombawa does not work in the office from 2:00 to 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon. Witness Acosta is a habitual absentee, reports at 10:00 oclock and leaves
after only an hour. He then returns at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. He is hired by
one Bobby Go as a driver. Witness Kagaoan is a habitual latecomer as he attends to
his agricultural business first before going to the court. He adds that witnesses
Rombawa, Acosta and Kagaoan all play tong-its either at the session hall of the court
or the first floor of the building.

A staff member of the MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas, Estifanio Acosta, verified the
records of Criminal Case No. 7461 and stated that no official receipt appears on file
although the personal bail bonds issued by the JCP72 Insurance Agency, bearing the
date April 21, 2001, in favor of the several accused in the case were approved by the
acting presiding judge of the court.[20]

On rebuttal, complainant Goltiao revealed that respondent invited her several

times for a date at Jollibee, instructing her not to tell her husband about it.
[16]
Respondent countered that every time he invites her, it was with de Leon, Ramirez
and other court personnel.[17]

For his part, respondent merely denied the foregoing allegations in open court
and waived presentation of evidence.[21]
After investigation, the investigating judge rendered a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation[22] finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct and accordingly
proposed that he be sternly reprimanded and fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00),
thus:

In A.M. No. P-03-1697 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1196-P), complainant Paiste
is the owner of JCP72 Insurance Agency, and as its proprietor, has transactions with
the MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas.[18] She testified that on April 3, 2001 at about 2:00 p.m.
she went to the court, together with a client, to post bail. When they arrived, they
could not find the respondent. An employee named Marilyn accompanied then to one
of the rooms at the hall of justice where the respondent was holding game cards and
playing tong-its with some people. Marilyn called respondents attention telling him
that somebody wants to post bail. Respondent retorted, You just go ahead
upstairs. Why, could you not wait? They went ahead and respondent followed fifteen
minutes after. She noticed that he was mad. They told him they want to post bail and
he asked for the records of the case. After examining the records, he slammed it and
said, You go to Rosales! That is not our work! He also became angry when they
followed him.

Nonetheless, on the basis of the evidence adduced, barely refuted by the respondent,
the undersigned finds him guilty of serious misconduct in office, consisting of
abundantly substantiated offenses thus:
1.

Making undue advances through love notes to

female subordinates;

2.

Indulging in card games during office hours;

3.

Using abusive language in dealing with subordinates as

well as with third persons seeking his services as clerk of
court; and

4.

Receiving payments for court fees without promptly issuing

the corresponding receipts therefore.

Respondent failed to measure up to these standards. His use of offensive

language towards complainant Goltiao reflects his impoliteness and lack of
decorum. He shouted profanity at her, verbally abused her and even disrespected
her mother. He did this in the presence of so many employees and clients of the
court. Worse, there was no reason for him to unleash to her a fury of this kind. She
was merely asking him to sign a clearance form and to examine the applicant
pursuant to his specific instruction that he should first see the applicant for the
clearance before he sign the form. In fine, she was just doing her job. The truth is,
he got mad at her out of his fear that the client she brought along might report him to
this court when they caught him in flagrante delicto gambling.

WHEREFORE, all of the foregoing premises and circumstances considered, the

undersigned hereby respectfully recommends that respondent be sternly
reprimanded, and fined in the amount of P10,000.00, for serious misconduct.[23]
The report was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). After
evaluating the report and the records, the OCA proposed that a stiffer penalty must be
imposed on respondent. On the basis of Sections 52, 54 and 55 of Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999 of the Civil Service Commission, [24] it recommended
that the two complaints be consolidated and docketed as a regular administrative
case and that respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year having been
found Guilty of various offenses including the (sic) Grave Offenses and disgraceful
and immoral conduct.[25]

Similarly objectionable is respondents penchant for playing tong-its (a card

game) and gambling with other employees of the court. Gambling is illegal and is
absolutely forbidden at court premises during office hours. [29] It generates
unwholesome consequences on the gambler as it diverts his attention from the more
important responsibilities of his job.[30] Respondent himself was very much aware of
this prohibition and this is exactly the reason why he castigated the complainant for
approaching him while he was playing cards, thus: Why did you bring then with you?
Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court?[31]

A painstaking examination of the records of the cases convinces us that the

respondent is guilty of the offenses charged against him.
The evidence in A.M. No. P-03-1699 adequately establishes that he was guilty
of gambling, using abusive language and sexually harassing his female
subordinates. We find credible the categorical and straightforward testimonies of
complainant Goltiao and her witnesses. Their frank and candid testimonies,
unshaken by cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in
their material points, deserve our full faith and belief.[26]

Worse, respondent was playing cards and gambling during office hours at the
session hall of the courtroom, which is hardly the place for such undesirable
activities. A courtroom is generally looked upon by people with high respect and
regarded as a sacred place where witnesses testify under oath, where conflicts are
resolved, rights adjudicated, and justice solemnly dispensed. [32] Making it a game
room and a casino area diminishes its sanctity and dignity.[33]

In contrast, we are not persuaded by the denial put forward by the

respondent. The purported motive he imputes against complainant and her
witnesses for filing this case is not worthy of attention. He asserts that they just want
him removed so they can continue with their bad ways in the office. It strikes us
strange that he allowed these bad ways for a long time without taking any measures
or reporting them to the OCA.

The undue advances respondent made to complainant Goltiao betrays his

twisted sense of propriety. Many times, he declared his feelings for her and handed
her love notes. He would then beseech her to say the same things to him. He
proposed to have dinner dates with her at Jollibee. There were times that he
cornered her at the judges chamber and unnecessarily held her hand. While
professing ones amorous intention is not something that usually causes a hullabaloo,
it becomes indecent and improper in this case considering he is complainant Goltiaos
superior and both of them are married. His dissoluteness told itself when he went to
the extent of calling her at her mothers house and persuading her not to tell her
husband about these incidents.

Time and again, we have emphasized that court officers, circumscribed with
heavy responsibility, must be the paragon of propriety and good behavior.[27] This is
especially true for a clerk of court like the respondent. As a ranking officer of the
court, it is incumbent upon him to set an example to his co-employees as to how they
should conduct themselves in office; to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the civil service and the judiciary; and
to provide then with a healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each
other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end public interest will be
benefited.[28]

It appears too that the complainant was not the exclusive object of respondents
advances. Witnesses Marilyn de Leon and Glenda Ramirez testified that they also
received love notes and invitations for dinner from him. Like a hunter out on the
prowl, he victimized other female workers unabashedly professing his alleged feelings
for them in utter disregard of the fact that they were his subordinates, they were
married and they were young enough to be his daughters. Instead of he being in loco

parentis over his subordinate employees, he preyed on them as he took advantage of

his superior position.[34]

told them to go to the court at Rosales. He then got annoyed when they followed
him. To be sure, this is no way to treat court users.

Under the circumstances, we find respondent guilty of sexual harassment. His

severely outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, constitute sexual
harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive
working environment for his female subordinates.[35] He abused the power and
authority he exercises over them, which is the gravamen of the offense in sexual
harassment.[36] Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking
advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised
by a superior over his women subordinates.[37] That power emanates from the fact
that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances.[38]

High strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government, especially in

the judiciary, where the personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at
all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.[42] They are expected to
extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the people.[43] Such conduct is
exacted from them so that they will earn and keep societys high regard for and
confidence in the judicial service.[44] Conduct violative of this standard quickly and
surely corrodes respect for the courts. It is the imperative and sacred duty of
everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk,
to uphold the courts good name and standing as true temples of justice.[45]

There is likewise sufficient evidence in A.M. No. P-03-1697 to hold respondent

administratively liable for his failure to issue official receipt after receiving court fees
and for discourtesy. The testimony of complainant Paiste is worthy of belief. We find
her categorical and consistent declarations credible, especially when viewed in the
light of the fact that no ill-motive on her part was established. [39] Against her positive
testimony, supported by documentary evidence based on official court records, the
mere uncorroborated denial of the respondent deserves scant considerations.[40]

We do not agree with both the investigating judge and the OCA when they
imposed a single penalty on the respondent for two cases. Although consolidated,
the two cases are distinct and each one contains different charges. Respondent, as a
consequence, must be separately held liable and penalized for the charges in each
case.
This brings us to the individual penalties which must be imposed on the
respondent for each case. In A.M. No. P-03-1699, we hold that the
gross discourtesy, gambling and sexual harassment he committed constituted
serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service which
warrant his dismissal from office. He has been shown to lack the requisite
professional and moral qualifications to continue as an employee in the judiciary. In
A.M. No. P-03-1697, his failure to issue a receipt amounted to gross neglect of duty
while his grossly discourteous behavior is conduct unbecoming of a public officer. For
this reason, we impose on him a suspension of one (1) month.

The evidence shows that on April 21, 2001, complainant Paiste gave to the
respondent the amount of two thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) as bail bond
of the accused in Criminal Case No. 7461. When she asked for an official receipt, he
told her to get it the following Monday at the court. She sent an office representative
that Monday as told but respondent did not issue any receipt. Further verification
from the records of Criminal Case No. 7461 reveals that no copy of the official receipt
appears on file indicating that no receipt was ever issued to complainant Paiste.
Undoubtedly, respondent should have issued an official receipt when he
received the sum of money from complainant Paiste. His failure to do so is a violation
of the National Accounting and Auditing Manual which mandates that no payment of
any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an
official receipt, in acknowledgment thereof.[41] It bears emphasis that there is no valid
reason for his non-issuance of a receipt. Even if he argues that he could not issue an
official receipt to the complainant Paiste as the transaction transpired on a Saturday
and outside court premises, still, his failure to issue a receipt the following Monday is
totally unjustified.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, RESPONDENT Aproniano V. Mamenta, Jr. is found Guilty

of gross discourtesy, gambling, and sexual harassment in A.M. No. P-03-1699 and is
accordingly DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, agency, or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
He is likewise found Guilty of gross discourtesy and failure to issue an official
receipt in A.M. No. P-03-1697 and is meted the penalty of suspension for a period of
One (1) Month. Considering, however, that we already ordered his dismissal in A.M.
No. P-03-1699, his suspension is moot.

We also find the rude and boorish manner respondent treated complainant
Paiste and her client on April 3, 2001 uncalled for. His demeanor bordered on
arrogance. He made them wait for fifteen minutes before he attended to their
concern as they found him playing cards and gambling. He was very irritable the
whole time he was talking to them. After he examined the record, he slammed it an

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191566

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be

allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be
granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the
information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.12

July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondents Omnibus

Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information that there was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon constitute the
crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be
quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing
criminal liability. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an
Order15 dated February 20, 2009.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give
due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the
case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the
information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and
void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17

The facts of the case follow:

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC
of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondents petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003,
Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina.7She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby

GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and
receive evidence on the petitioners motion to quash and resolve the case with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that
there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the
evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one
essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court
further held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the
application of such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second
marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed
against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying respondents motion to quash the information, considering that the facts
alleged in the information do not charge an offense.22

On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed
as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which
second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10

10

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their
marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007,
respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision
became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed
an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING
RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED
MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
CONSIDERING THAT:

The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the
above cases. As in Antone and Montaez, respondent moved to quash the
information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and
that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of
nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for
certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.

I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY
ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an

accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an
Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.27 To
be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is
given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion
to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be
filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy.31

II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENTS FIRST
MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL
LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in
Montaez v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montaez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the
subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In
2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on
the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May
14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter,
however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal
complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio
prior to the filing of the bigamy case.

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the

sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained
all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;

In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of
their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006,
petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the
ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court
eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.

(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

11

(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.33

marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such

declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts
a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondents line of
defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier
marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.41

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3)
that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing the courts declaration that his marriage to Modina is
null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only
an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information
that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second
marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be
raised in a motion to quash.34It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the
very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller
examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the
proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented by
respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought
out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the
information on the hypothetical admission thereof.

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such
contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time
of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:

Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information
do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree
extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the
Courts pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused therein was acquitted
because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first
marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage
contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that
there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second
marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may
such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of
exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the
information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation
of evidence.43

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter.1wphi1 A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a
number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.

SO ORDERED.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 November 11, 2005

12

ROBERTO BRILLANTE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Brillantes petition nor in the instant motion, we advert to the well-established rule that
an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by the parties.1
In Mari v. Court of Appeals,2 petitioner therein was found guilty of slander by deed
penalized under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code (Penal Code) by either
imprisonment or fine. In view of the fact that the offense was done in the heat of
anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court opted to impose the
penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.

RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 25, 2004 filed by
Roberto Brillante (Brillante) assailing the Decision of this Court dated October 19,
2004 which affirmed his conviction for the crime of libel but reduced the amount of
moral damages he is liable to pay.

In this case, Brillante claims that on January 6, 1988, his friends house was bombed
resulting in the death of three people. This incident allegedly impelled him, out of
moral and social duty, to call a press conference on January 7, 1988 with the intention
of exposing what he believed were terrorist acts committed by private respondents
against the electorate of Makati City.

Brillante avers that his conviction, without the corresponding conviction of the writers,
editors and owners of the newspapers on which the libelous materials were
published, violates his right to equal protection. He also claims that he should have
been convicted only of one count of libel because private respondents were not
defamed separately as each publication was impelled by a single criminal intent.
Finally, he claims that there is a "semblance of truth" to the accusations he hurled at
private respondents citing several instances of alleged violent acts committed by the
latter against his person.

We find that the circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on which the
libelous publications were based similarly warrant the imposition of the penalty of fine
only, instead of both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art. 355 of the Penal
Code.3 The intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988
must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter.
Moreover, while petitioner failed to prove all the elements of qualified privileged
communication under par. 1, Art. 354 of the Penal Code, incomplete privilege should
be appreciated in his favor, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given
to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their
performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public
interest involving them.4

Private respondent Jejomar Binay (Binay) filed a Comment dated March 3, 2005,
maintaining that the equal protection clause does not apply because there are
substantial distinctions between Brillante and his co-accused warranting dissimilar
treatment. Moreover, contrary to Brillantes claim that he should have been convicted
only of one count of libel, Binay asserts that there can be as many convictions for libel
as there are persons defamed. Besides, this matter should have been raised at the
time the separate complaints were filed against him and not in this motion.

The foregoing circumstances, in our view, justify the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment and the retention of the meted fine only.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment dated April 4,
2005, stating that the issues raised in Brillantes motion have already been discussed
and passed upon by the Court. Hence, the motion should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 19, 2004 is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION consisting of the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed
upon petitioner.

Brillante filed a Consolidated Reply dated May 26, 2005 in reiteration of his
arguments.

SO ORDERED.
As correctly noted by the OSG, the basic issues raised in the instant motion have
already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon by the Court in its Decision. For
this reason, we shall no longer dwell on them.

DANTE O. TINGA

We believe, however, that the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Brillante

should be re-examined and reconsidered. Although this matter was neither raised in

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS,

JR. vs THE PEOPLE OF THE
PIERAZ

13

G.R. NO. 142509

PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis,

Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision [1] dated January 18, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him of the crime of
libel. Also assailed is the appellate courts Resolution [2] dated March 13,
2000 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these

matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz,
nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered
mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr.
dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty.
Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox
addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an
envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her husbands desk. On
that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its
content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila
August 18,
1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila
Subject:
Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening
letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client;
using carabao English.

Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr.,

particularly:
Satan,
senile,
stupid,
[E]nglish carabao,
Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant.
Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of
his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling
him: Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result
of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz frail health was likewise
affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr.
was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president
of
the
organization
Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga TagaManggahan
or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had
dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of privatecomplainant in the second week of August 1995.

May we remind you that any attempt on your part to

continue
harassing
the
person
of
Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No.
1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
Metro
Manila---undersigned much to his regrets shall be
constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for
disbarment against you.

Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall

whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even
addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had
made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to
Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he
filed before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office, however,Buatis, Jr.
could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that
indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter
dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.[3]

You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the
full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite
specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the
same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact,
the same shall be used by no other than the person of
Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you
and all persons behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to
face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can
prove who is who once and for all.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30,
1997[4] finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

14

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL
defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to
Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as
maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount
of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount
of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. [5]

his so called duty in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was
publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution
dated March 13, 2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising
the following issues:
A.
CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN
POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER
OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM
HER DWELLING PLACE?

The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer inutil, stupid and capable of using
only carabao English, is intended not only for the consumption of respondent but
similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the
letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing
as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was representing a
client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person represented by petitioner;
the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set
against the entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the
presumption of malice from the defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the
letter could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the intention of
petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but
instead petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by
satanic intention.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the
attention and notice of other persons other than the offended party, there was
publication; and that the element of identity was also established since the letter was
intended for respondent. It rejected petitioners stance that the libelous letter resulted
from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to
respondents letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioners association.

B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS
ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF
PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE
MADE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID
IS A CRIME?[6]
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of the People
and respondent filed his own Comment praying for the affirmance of the CA decision.
As required by us, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of the
crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling
in People v. Velasco[7] that if the act/matter charged as libelous is only an incident in
[an] act which has another objective, the crime is not libel; when he made his reply to
respondents letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to vacate the premises,
his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized
tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area
of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language, either
verbal or written of a lawyer under obligation to defend a clients cause is but a
privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged communication
which is lost only by proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual
proof of malice; the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence
that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was ill will or ill
feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory
imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to
the findings of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter which was
to defend the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of respondent to
eject Mrs. Quingco.

The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as

the immediate tendency of the defamatory imputation was to impair respondents
reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded
moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of the libelous
letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of
respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs decision to the CA which, in a
Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial
court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and
defamatory in character as they impeached the good reputation of respondent as a
lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioners claim that the letter is a
privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability since he failed to
come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and
downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged

Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply
would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for the use of those words, to wit:

15

lousy but inutile threatening letterusing carabao English was due to the fact that
the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as
respondents client has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file
the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco,
thus he is stupid; that the words Yours in Satan name is only a complementary
greeting used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but
not to the person being communicated and which is just the reverse of saying Yours
in Christ.
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.

In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel,

the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered
by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question
being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers,
and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in
reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing
the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.[13]
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter
dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words
such as lousy, inutile, carabao English, stupidity, and satan, the letter, as it
was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent
as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to
prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to
public
ridicule
as
even
his
own
family
have
told
him:
Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.[14]

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it

must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d)
the victim must be identifiable.[8]

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the
general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that
petitioners imputation is malicious (malice in law). [15] A reading of petitioners subject
letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a
demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed
petitioners good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to
overcome the legal inference of malice.

The last two elements have been duly established by the

prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written. [9] Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states that the same
was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his
secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it
to a third person.[10] Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open,
not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply
was addressed to respondent himself.

Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made
in the performance of his moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and
to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a
privileged communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354.
Requirement for publicity. Every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1.
A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2.
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the

imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are
to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[11]
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be
libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,[12] to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co.
(109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this
point: In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per
se,
two
rules
of
construction
are
conspicuously
applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give
to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain
and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand
what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous
must be construed as a whole.

Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory
imputation is a qualified privileged communication.

16

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified

privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a
legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to
protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;
and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without
malice.[16]

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings
or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a
fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may
be brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single
penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a
penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[23] where petitioners therein were convicted of
B.P. 22 which provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine
and imprisonment, we deleted the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and
instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of the
check. We held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino
entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.
Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith,
although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment
of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. It
would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty
within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed,
namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness
with due regard to the protection of the social order.[24]

While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social
duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent
as a reply to the latters demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the
subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation
concerning the status of Mrs.Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as
against the claim of respondents client. The letter merely contained insulting
words, i.e, lousy and inutile letter usingcarabao English, stupidity, and satan,
which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingcos right over the premises.
The words as written had only the effect of maligning respondents integrity as a
lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as
consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an
injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed
respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on
petitioners part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a
legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated
only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged,
and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the
statement.[17] A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the public.[18] In this case,
petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the
same and made a print out of the computer.[19] While petitioner addressed the replyletter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all
concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim
of privileged communication.[20] Such publication had already created upon the minds
of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondents
reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully
rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of
the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it
becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment,
whether assigned as an error or not. [21] We find that the award of P20,000.00 as
compensatory damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to
actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting
evidence of the actual amount thereof.[22] Respondent had not presented evidence in
support thereof.

In the subsequent case of Lim v. People,[25] we did the same and deleted the
penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding
that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.
On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to
lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the
imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioners case of libel. We
note that this is petitioners first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent
prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his
assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief
that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private
complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term
but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his
case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals
but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.
[26]
Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead
impose a fine of six thousand pesos.

17

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and
imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,[27] petitioner
was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a
petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty
imposed to a mere fine.

At muli, babanggitin lang namin ang

kanyang
mga
pahayag
tungkol
sa
pagkakasangkot niya sa buhay ni Miss S.
Inamin ni Philip na limang beses niyang
ginalaw si Miss S. Pero hindi ko pinasok ang
akin sa ano niya dahil siya rin ang may ayaw.
Ang sabi niya kasi sa akin, isa siyang
malinis na babae at hindi siya basta-basta
nagpapaganuon. So ang ginawa namin, ipit
method.
Yung ipitin niya iyong akin sa dalawa
niyang hita kunwari sa ano niya nakapasok
habang nagpa-pump ako.
Siya pa nga ang nagturo sa akin ng ibat
ibang posisyon, e yung helicopter at saka ang
galing niyang bumlow job. Sanay na sanay siya.
Kahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray Ravelo.
Nagalaw din siya ni Rey, pahayag ni Philip at
kami mismo ang nakarining ng mga linyang iyon
sa isa naming pag-uusap sa Jaloux Disco.
In which words and phrases, which were used by many
people, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact,
they meant and conveyed false and malicious imputations that the
said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert and possesses lascivious
and immoral habits, the accused well knowing that said
imputations are devoid of truth and without foundation in fact
whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive to the good name,
character, and reputation of the said Florinda Bagay.
Contrary to law.

WHEREFORE,
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the
penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00)
Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of
compensatory damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

OGIE DIAZ, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (Eleventh Division) dated March 15, 2002, in CAG.R. CR No. 22545.
On October 16, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila an Information for libel against Manny Pichel
and Ogie Diaz (Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner. The Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 92-1113377, reads:
That on or about December 28, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being then the Managing Editor and
writer, respectively of Bandera, a newspaper of general circulation,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity,
honor and reputation of one FLORINDA BAGAY, and with the
evident intent of exposing her to public interest, hatred, contempt,
and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
write and publish, or cause to be written and published in the
movie section of said newspaper an article which reads in part as
follows:
Ilang beses na nakaladkad ang pangalan
ng isang Miss S sa buhay ni Philip Henson ang
lalaking mahilig makipagsex sa asawa. Nasulat
na sa ibang tabloid na limang beses diumanong
ginalaw ni Philip ang babaing kine-claim
na nabuntis ako ni Philip.
Dahil sa pahayag na
yon
ay
nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng detalye si
Philip. Nagpa-interbyu siya sa ilang piling
reporters.

Upon being arraigned on June 8, 1993, petitioner Ogie Diaz and his coaccused Pichel, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial, the case
was heard on the merits.
Florinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she is a graduate of medical
secretarial course. She tried her luck in the movies under the guidance of her
godmother, Mila Parawan, a writer covering the entertainment industry. Florinda
adopted and used Patricia Santillan as her screen name.
During her brief stint in the movies, she met Philip Henson, an aspiring bit
player. A whirlwind romance between them followed and on June 16, 1988, they
started living together. On March 9, 1991, she gave birth to a girl she named Maria
Briana Bagay. By that time, her relationship with Philip Henson ended.
Florinda claimed she was the Miss S alluded to in petitioners column
Pakurot considering that her screen name is Patricia Santillan.
One Nonette Lim called her attention to the article and she felt
embarrassed. Mila Parawan showed her the item. Her family and neighbors also
read it. As a result, she was forced to stop her studies as a medical technology
student at the United Doctors Medical Center.

18

suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1)

DAY as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correcional in its Minimum and Medium Periods, as
maximum and to pay a fine of P3,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.

Florinda further testified that at the time the article came out, she and Philip
were no longer living together.
Mila Parawan also took the witness stand and corroborated Florindas
testimony. She further testified that after Philip and Florinda parted ways, her former
press relations officer, who used the nom de plume Isko Peta, wrote an item
entitled Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng inanakan ni Philip Henson which appeared in
the December 2, 1991 issue of Artista Magazine. Philip believed that Florinda
released their story to the press. He then caused the publication of the libelous article
against her.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, sustained the conviction of

petitioner but acquitted Pichel.
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated August 29, 2003.

Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well respected family in
their community. Thus, she could not have done the acts being imputed to her.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the subject article is libelous.

On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was certain the Miss S

referred to in the article is Florinda because petitioner and Pichel, her good friends,
told her that Miss S is her alaga (ward).

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Pichel testified that he had been a journalist covering show business for the
past 21 years. He denied having met or known the complaining witness. He also
denied being the editor of Bandera. He was only its lay-out artist, a part time job.
Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the column Pakurot
where the alleged libelous statements appeared, however, he did not know the
complaining witness or Miss S. The source of his article was Philip Henson.

This provision should be read in relation with Article 355 of the same Code
which states:
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means.
A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.

The defense also presented as witness two movie journalists Ernie Pecho
and Mario Bautista. Both had more than 50 years covering the entertainment
industry.
Pecho testified that he has never heard the screen name Patricia
Santillan; that reading the article in question would not give the reader any idea that
Miss S is Patricia Santillan; and that in the movie world, the letter S refers to
shabu, not to a person.

Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be

present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given
publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. [2] Absent one of these elements, a
case for libel will not prosper.

Bautista, for his part, stated that he has never heard of any actress or
starlet named Patricia Santillan. After reading the article, it never came to his mind
that Miss S is one Patricia Santillan.
Douglas Quijano, a long-time line producer and talent manager, testified
that in his many years of managing movie and TV stars, he could not recall an
actress named Miss S. He has never heard of Patricia Santillan.

We find the first element present. In determining whether a statement is

defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken
in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense.[3] In the instant case, the article in question details the sexual
activities of a certain Miss S and one Philip Henson who had a romantic
liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character,
integrity, and reputation of Miss S. The words convey that Miss S is a sexual
libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours,
where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to
Miss S by the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation.

On May 12, 1998, the trial court rendered its judgment convicting petitioner
and Pichel of the crime charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above discussion and
findings, the Court finds both accused Manny Pichel and Ogie
Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel, defined
in Article 353 and penalized under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to

19

CORONA, J.:
As to the element of malice, we find that since on its face the article is
defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354
of the same Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if
it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is
malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who
claims to have been defamed.[4] We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was
neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except to
embarrass Miss S and injure her reputation.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 from a decision2 and resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA).
In 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints against
petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family, hereafter the Alcantaras, including one
for estafa against petitioner in the Makati Prosecutors Office docketed as I.S. No. 9739547. In essence, respondent Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of
3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement Corporation.

On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article

appeared in the December 28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.

It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa that
respondent Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit,4 submitted to the
investigating prosecutor a newsletter5 purporting to be a belated annex to the
affidavit. It was prefaced with the quotation "For every extraordinary fortune there is a
great crime" and the text:

The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the
contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is
enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains
matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others
reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by
extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did
understand that he was the person referred to.[5] Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and
Lyons[6] laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person
recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article.

An example is Marcos. We need not discuss this.

Second example is the Alcantaras.

The libelous article, while referring to Miss S, does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify Miss S. In short, the article fails to
show that Miss S and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.

a) Overshipment of log; b) Land grabbing;

c) Corruption of public office; d) Corporate grabbing.

Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda Bagay could not have
been the person defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen,[7] we held that
where the requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not been complied
with, the case for libel must be dismissed.

The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 which, in the surrejoinder affidavit, respondent Ponce described as being the forefather of all the
cases he had filed against the Alcantaras. In SEC Case No. 2507 which the
Securities and Exchange Commission en banc decided against him, Ponce accused
the Alcantaras of defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22545 is REVERSED. Petitioner Ogie Diaz
isACQUITTED of the crime of libel. The bail on appeal posted for his temporary
liberty is ordered CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156183

On December 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondent Ponce
with the Makati Prosecutors Office6 in connection with the aforesaid newsletter. He
claimed that: (1) the statements therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had
circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors Office and (3) the newsletter could not be
considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to
the said affidavit but had given it thereafter.

February 28, 2007

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, Petitioner

vs.
VICENTE C. PONCE and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor Imelda P.

Saulog.1awphi1.net On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a
resolution7 finding probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of an
information8 in court. Thereafter, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63.

DECISION

20

However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice,
who reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution dated February 28, 2000.9 This
reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged
communication, having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R.
Bautista as an intended annex to respondents sur-rejoinder. The Secretary of Justice
thus directed the withdrawal of the information.

(3) malice;
(4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a
dead person and
(5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration10 but it was denied.11

The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is whether or not the
controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication, which would exempt it
from libel.

Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61543. In a decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA
found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the
latters resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case.12 After
unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in the Department of Justice, respondent
Ponce attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105. However, we
denied respondent Ponces motion for extension for time to file his petition13 as well
as his subsequent motions for reconsideration.

According to the Special Fifth Division of the CA:

It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of
the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same
are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. The
lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of
relevancy.

In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was decided, the Office of
the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of the Justice Secretary,
filed a motion to withdraw information, which the trial court granted on September 28,
2001.14 The trial court ruled that the absence of the essential element of publicity
precluded the commission of the crime of libel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the withdrawal but the trial court denied the motion in an order dated March 21,
2002.15

In this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, contrary to petitioners

submission, instantly shows that there was sufficient reference to the "newsletter"
which justified the Justice Secretary and respondent Judge in holding that private
respondent actually intended the said article to be included as an annex attached to
said pleading and that the same was merely omitted and belatedly submitted to
Prosecutor Bautista during the preliminary investigation. Such "sufficient reference" is
shown by the fact that the newsletter is about SEC Case No. 2507 the very same
case being discussed by private respondent in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder
Affidavit and hence, petitioners claim that Annex "F" mentioned together with Annex
"E", both articles showing the "devious maneuvering" of petitioner in the said case,
refers to another article. And even if the supposed Exhibit "F" could refer also to that
article "So The Public May Know," such circumstance will not exclude the subject
"newsletter" as an intended annex to the said pleading as in fact private respondent
explicitly mentioned "articles" without stating that there were only two (2) particular
articles being referred or which of those articles caused to be published by his
counsel.

On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 71189. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed decision.
The principal question for our consideration is whether or not the CA, in its decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71189, gravely erred in finding that Judge Salvador had not
committed grave abuse of discretion for granting the withdrawal of the information for
libel against respondent Ponce.
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,16 has the
following elements:
(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance;

As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent Judge adopted,
the "newsletter" containing the defamatory statement is relevant and pertinent to the
criminal complaint for estafa then under preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa
involves deceit, dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in the SurRejoinder Affidavit of the "newsletter" discussing the alleged "corporate grabbing" by
petitioner will tend to support private respondents case of estafa against petitioner

(2) publicity or publication;

21

insofar as such alleged "corporate grabbing" will highlight or manifest petitioners

propensity for dishonest dealing or fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no
doubt that the subject "newsletter" is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint
for estafa, and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely
privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or
damages.

Petitioners feeble argument that Prosecutor Bautista remains a third person because
the subject "newsletter" was never included or formally offered as evidence, hardly
convinces Us to hold that there was actual publication for purpose of finding a prima
facie case for libel against the private respondent. He must be reminded that the case
for estafa was still at the preliminary investigation stage and there is no requirement
of a "formal offer" of such documentary evidence or supporting documents to
establish probable cause (citations omitted).17

In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings,

courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy.
Thus, in People vs. Aquino, our Supreme Court has emphasized that "it is the rule
that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally construed to favor the writer, and
the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. The doctrine of
privileged communication has a practical purpose.

Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation, it was vested
with a privileged character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether
the doctrine of absolute privilege extends to statements made in preliminary
investigations or other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case
of Borg v. Boas18 makes a categorical declaration of the existence of such protection:

xxx xxx xxx

It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far
as the actual participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to
judicial action of an official nature have been given absolute privilege. Of
particular interest are proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted
prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor
or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded. Furthermore,
the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a
prosecution is protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a
basis for an action for defamation. (Emphasis ours)

Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. There is
publication if the material is communicated to a third person. What is material is that a
third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a mans reputation is the
estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself." Our
Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer, in the discharge of
his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of
officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication, such communication does not amount to publication. Applying this
rule by analogy to the present case, private respondents submission of the
"newsletter" intended as an annex to his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547
to Prosecutor Bautista who was then conducting the preliminary investigation in said
case, does not amount to publication for the reason that the sending of such material
was made specifically for the purpose of including the same as evidence in the
preliminary investigation. That such submission was belatedly made does not take
out the material from the absolutely privileged communication rule. Prosecutor
Bautista had a legal duty to perform with respect to the subject communication, which
is to consider the same along with the other evidence submitted by private
respondent as complainant in I.S. no. 97-39547, in determining the existence of
probable cause for the commission of the crime of estafa and that petitioner as
accused-defendant therein should be tried for such offense.Under the circumstances
and in the lawful exercise of private respondents right to present evidence in support
of his accusations against petitioner in the criminal complaint for estafa, We fail to see
how such submission of documentary evidence omitted from the annexes to the SurRejoinder Affidavit, could amount to publication that would give rise to private
respondents liability for a libel charge especially when there is no proof of the alleged
circulation of copies of the subject "newsletter" except to the City Prosecutors Office
of Makati wherein I.S. No. 97-39547 was then in the preliminary investigation stage.

The ruling in Borg is persuasive in this jurisdiction. We see no reason why we should
not adopt it.
Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as "a communication made bona fide upon any
subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest . . . made to a person
having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained [in]criminatory matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."19
While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse can
lead to great hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this account will give
rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks to
the free and unfettered administration of justice.20 It is as a rule applied liberally.21
The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged communication must
hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course of the
proceedings need not be in every case material to the issues presented but should be
legitimately related to the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may
become the subject of inquiry in the course of trial.22

22

Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint
against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were
disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the
privileged communication doctrine, these statements were still relevant to the
complaint under investigation because, like the averments therein, they also involved
petitioners alleged rapacity and deceitfulness.

IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI

ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG
ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA
NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING
SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG
KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES
DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA,
NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN
SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA
MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG
TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG
SINTENSIYA SA KANYA

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the September 13, 2002
decision and November 21, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71189 AFFIRMED.

when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same
are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other
purpose than to expose said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to
humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a fugitive from
justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and
contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and
prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN, vs PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES,

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Before us is a petition[1] for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, of the Decision[2] dated September 3, 2002 and the Resolution[3] dated March
24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20890 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas.

Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas (Tugas) both

pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint
Decision[8] dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. The
dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads

On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie)

Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel[4] were filed against Cristinelli[5] S.
Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 218. Except for the name of the complainant, [6] the informations uniformly
read

WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of

the accused, judgment is hereby rendered finding CRISTENELLI S.
FERMIN and BOGS C. TUGAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
of libel, punishable under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months
and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each case.

That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR
FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of
Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St.,
Roxas District, Quezon City, and circulated in Quezon City and
other parts of Metro Manila and the whole country, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other,
publicly and acting with malice, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously print and circulate in the headline and
lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 the
following material, to wit:

Likewise, accused Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs Tugas are

sentenced to pay jointly and solidarily:
a)

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO

NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE

23

moral damages of:

1.

P500,000.00 to Annabelle Rama in

Criminal Case No. Q-95-62823; and

2.

P500,000.00 to Eddie Gutierrez in

Criminal Case No. Q-95-62824;

b)

attorneys fees of P50,000.00.

DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION WHICH MAY BE REBUTTED BY

CONTRARY EVIDENCE.

SO ORDERED.[9]
III.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its
Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted
Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous
article. The fallo of the Decision reads

THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS NOT LIBELOUS.

IV.
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS PROTECTED BY THE MANTLE
OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND IS WITHIN THE REALM
OF FAIR AND HONEST COMMENT.[11]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1.

2.

The appealed decision as against the accusedappellant BOGS C. TUGAS is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another is entered ACQUITTING him of
the crime charged and ABSOLVING him from any civil
liability; and

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and the second issues jointly, then
the third and the fourth issues together.
Petitioner posits that, to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or
consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. This principle is,
allegedly, based on our ruling in U.S. v. Taylor,[12] People v. Topacio and Santiago,
[13]
U.S. v.Madrigal,[14] U.S. v. Abad Santos,[15] and U.S. v. Ocampo,[16] as purportedly
clarified in People v. Beltran and Soliven. [17] She submits that these cases were
applied by the CA in acquitting her co-accused Tugas, and being similarly situated
with him, she is also entitled to an acquittal. She claims that she had adduced ample
evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the
offending article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles
published in Gossip Tabloid.

The same appealed decision as against accusedappellant CRISTENELLI S. FERMIN is AFFIRMED,

with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is REDUCED toP300,000.00 for EACH
offended party, and the award of attorneys fees is
DELETED.

Costs against the appellant FERMIN.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The arguments are too simplistic and the cited jurisprudence are either
misplaced or, in fact, damning.

The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition, raising the following
arguments:

Foremost, U.S. v. Madrigal and U.S. v. Abad Santos are not applicable to the
present case. U.S. v. Madrigal pertains to a criminal prosecution under Section 30 of
Act No. 1519 for fraudulently representing the weight or measure of anything to be
greater or less than it is, whereas U.S. v. Abad Santos refers to criminal responsibility
under the Internal Revenue Law (Act. No. 2339).

I.
THE RULING IN U.S. VS. TAYLOR, PEOPLE VS. TOPACIO
AND SANTIAGO, U.S. VS.
MADRIGAL
AND U.S. VS. SANTOS AND
THE
HOLDING
IN U.S. VS.
OCAMPO AS CLARIFIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
PEOPLE
VS.
BELTRAN
AND
SOLIVEN
REQUIRING
KNOWLEDGE, PARTICIPATION AND COMPLICITY BY THE
PUBLISHER IN THE PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF THE
LIBELOUS ARTICLE TO SUSTAIN THE LATTERS CONVICTION
FOR LIBEL ARE APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.

The other cases are more in point, but they serve to reinforce the conviction of,
rather than absolve, petitioner.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277
which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or
serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part
of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author
of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was
the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he
was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained
in the said libelous article.[18]

II.
ART. 360 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH MAKES A
PUBLISHER LIABLE FOR LIBEL TO THE SAME EXTENT AS IF
HE WERE THE AUTHOR THEREOF MERELY CREATES A

24

In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it
was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the
libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it.

We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article

was published in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent
of its proprietor or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution
against such proprietor or manager.

Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the

publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically
identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as
petitioner and Tugas are in this case.

In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197),

this same question was considered and the court held that in the
criminal prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in which a libel
appears, he is prima facie presumed to have published the libel,
and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to prove that he
never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it was
pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were
afterwards published in the same paper, gave him no ground for
exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the
court, said:

The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code[19] was enunciated in U.S. v. Ocampo,[20] to wit:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the
United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter
is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith
and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a
publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but
also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any
connection with its publication are liable as publishers.

It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may

be used for the publication of improper communications, to use
reasonable caution in the conduct of his business that no libels be
published. (Whartons Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishops
Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill., 195;
Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)

xxxx
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg.,
273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the responsibility of the
manager or proprietor of a newspaper was discussed. The court
said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):

The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the

English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord
Kenyon said that he was clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of
a newspaper was answerable criminally as well as civilly for the
acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the management of
the paper.

The question then recurs as to whether the manager or

proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely
on the ground that the libelous article was published without his
knowledge or consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper,
such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the
manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.

This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell,
and Mr. Justice Foster.
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander,
said:

The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think

ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his
paper; and it should be no defense that the publication was made
without his knowledge or consent, x x x

An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a

paper, although he did not know of its being put into the paper and
stopped the sale as soon as he discovered it.

One who furnishes the means for carrying on the

publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said
to cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held
responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned in the
publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an
agent or servant in the course of his employment necessarily
implies some degree of guilt or delinquency on the part of the
publisher; x x x.

In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held
that
A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent
of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally,
and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in
publishing it.
It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the publisher, as shown by the
editorial box of Gossip Tabloid,[21] but also its president and chairperson as she

25

herself admitted on the witness stand. [22] She also testified that she handled the
business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take charge of everything.
[23]
Obviously, petitioner had full control over the publication of articles in the said
tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of
the libelous article fails to persuade. Following our ruling in Ocampo, petitioners
criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had actual knowledge and
participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article
purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were
employees under her control and supervision.

the physical lay-outing, indication and allocation

of type-size of the body of the article, before the
same was printed and published in GOSSIP
Tabloid.
Q:

You do not deny the statements in this publication

as executed by you in the counter-affidavit and
sworn in before the City Prosecutor, is this
correct?
Yes, that is correct.

Petitioner argues that Ocampo has been clarified by the CA in People v.

Beltran and Soliven such that Maximo V. Soliven, as publisher of The Philippine Star,
was acquitted by the appellate court in view of the lack of evidence that he knew and
approved the article written by Luis D. Beltran about then President Corazon C.
Aquino in the newspapers October 12, 1987 issue. Petitioner submits that People v.
Beltran and Soliven serves as a guide to this Court regarding the criminal liability of
the publisher of the newspaper where a libelous article is published. Put differently, it
appears that petitioner wants this Court to follow the CA decision and adopt it as
judicial precedent under the principle of stare decisis.

A:

COURT:

Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as you

were, you will not allow the said publication of
this same article or same stories?

The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8[24] of the Civil Code, is
enunciated, thus:

A:

If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will

because if you can see the article, your Honor, it
is according to our source, it is not a direct
comment.

COURT:

So whether you are there or not, [the] same article

leading to them (sic) will still find its way to come
out?

A:

Yes, your honor.[27]

ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
That is all for the witness, your Honor.

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial

precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.[25] (Emphasis supplied)

Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and
publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was
written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was
confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view
of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not
prevent him from performing his work, thus

Unfortunately, the Beltran decision attained finality at the level of the CA.
Thus, if the CA seemingly made a new pronouncement regarding the criminal liability
of a publisher under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, that ruling cannot bind
this Court unless we purposely adopt the same. Be that as it may, we find no
compelling reason to revisit U.S. v. Ocampo; to modify it would amount to judicial
legislation. Article 360 is clear and unambiguous, and to apply People v. Beltran and
Soliven, which requires specific knowledge, participation, and approval on the part of
the publisher to be liable for the publication of a libelous article, would be reading into
the law an additional requirement that was not intended by it.

Q:
A:

In the same vein, we note that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. Tugas
cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was
evident from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit,[26] and as gleaned from his
testimony before the trial court, to wit:
WITNESS:

Q:
A:

As editor-in-chief, I have no participation in the

writing of the questioned article and my only
participation in the publication is the handling of

Q:
A:

26

How would you describe the condition of the patient on June

13, 1995?
He is in stable condition.
You said he was in severe pain, from your opinion, was that
condition sufficient to enable him to work?
Yes, in my opinion.[28]
You said your impression of the patient was urethral colic
and this was caused by spasm?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

When you say spasm, it is not sustained, it comes every

now and then and [intermittently], it is not sustained?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

Now you said he was in stable condition?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

That means that his ailment is not life-threatening?

Correct.

Q:
A:

In fact, visitors were allowed to see him?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

He can also write?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

He was allowed to [receive] friends?

Yes, sir.

Q:

According to you, he was able to work also, he is not totally

incapacitated in performing certain chores in the hospital
room?
No, sir.

A:

I do not know about it.

Q:
A:

How did you know that he is working on his paper works

in Quezon City? Did you see him do that?
I only know he goes to Manila everyday.

Q:
A:

In your boarding house, you saw him read and write?

Probably yes.[29]

But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting
Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Anent the third and fourth issues, petitioner argues that the subject article in
the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of
press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. We
disagree.
The banner headlines of the offending article read:

A:
Q:
A:

How long before 7:10 were you able to see him?

That is about 2 hours.

Q:
A:

About 5:00 oclock in the morning?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

Who was his companion when you saw him?

He was boarding in my place.

Q:
A:

So, you brought him to the hospital?

Both of us went to the hospital.

Q:

Which
boarding
house
[to]? In Angeles City?
Yes, sir.

Q:

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES,

MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI ANNABELLE!

Now, prior to 7:10 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1995,

you did not see Mr. Bogs Tugas?
I saw him, he was admitted at 7:00 oclock but I saw him
before.

Q:
A:

A:

KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA,

IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!

are

you

On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold
letters, are:
HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAMI
RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAGABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA
NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG
TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA
MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA NOON SA
AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, MILYON-MILYON ANG
INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA
PILIPINAS NOON!

referring

A:

Do you know that Mr. Bogs Tugas works here in Quezon

City as editor-in-chief of a newspaper tabloid?
Yes, sir.

Q:

And some of his work is done in your boarding house?

The rest of the article, which continued to the entire second page of the tabloid,
follows
Mainit na pinag-uusapan ngayon ang ibat ibang posibilidad
na maaaring gawin ni Annabelle Rama Gutierrez para lang hindi
matuloy ang pag-aresto at pagkukulong sa kanya ng mga

27

awtoridad kaugnay ng sintensiyang ipinapataw sa kanya ni ManilaRTC Judge Rodolfo Palattao.

Isa si Bert Leroy, Jr. sa mga Pilipinong nagkaroon ng

malaking problema kina Eddie at Annabelle, alam ba nyo yun?

Mula noong June 8, nabatid ng Gossip Tabloid, ay wala

pang sinumang nakapagtuturo kung saan talaga naroon ang ina ni
Ruffa Gutierrez na hindi pinayagang makapagpiyansa ng Branch
33 para sa pansamantala niyang kalayaan.

Ang ganda-ganda ng samahan nila nung una sa Amerika,

yumaman sila nang dahil sa mga mamahaling kaldero na
ibinebenta nila, kaso, sumabit sina Eddie at Annabelle dun sa
mismong company na pinagkukunan nila ng produkto!

May mga nagpapalagay na sa pamamagitan ng tinatawag

na back-door exit, ang pag-alis ng bansa sa paraang hindi na
kailangan pang dumaan sa NAIA, ay nakaalis na si
Annabellenoon pang nakaraang Biyernes, June 9, patungong
Amerika.

Bukod sa napakarami na nilang isinabit na Pinoy sa

Amerika dahil sa mga kalderong yun, e sumabit pa sila nang
malaking halaga sa mismong manufacturer nung mga ibinebenta
nilang mamahaling kaldero!
Yun ang dahilan kung bakit bigla-biglang umuwi sa
Pilipinas ang pamilya ni Eddie!

Pero isang mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip

Tabloid ang nagsabing napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika nagtungo si
Annabelle dahil doon man ay may mga nakahanda nang awtoridad
na handang magkulong kay Annabelle, sakaling mapatunayang
naroon nga siya.

Ang ikinakatwiran nilang mag-asawa noon, e gusto raw

kasi nilang lumaking Pilipinong-Pilipino ang kanilang mga anak,
pero ang totoo, e, napakalaki ng problemang iniwan nila sa
Amerika! mahabang simula ng source ng Gossip Tabloid.

Hindi siya makapupunta sa Amerika dahil napakarami rin

niyang asuntong iniwan doon noon pa!

Masamang-masama diumano ang loob ng mga Pilipinong

kinatalo roon nina Eddie at Annabelle, lalo na si Annabelle, na
bukod sa mataray na ay may kayabangan pa.

Nag-abroad man siya, e pihadong hindi siya sa Amerika

nagtuloy dahil nakaabang na rin ang sangkatutak niyang maniningil
dun ngayon!

Dati nang ganyan si Annabelle! Mataray siya na wala sa

lugar. Nung nasa Amerika pa silang mag-anak, e, yun din ang
madalas nilang pag-awayan dun ni Eddie!

Sa Amerika pa kaya siya magtatago, samantalang ilang

taon na rin siyang inaabangan dun ng mga kababayan nating
niloko niya, in one way or another? simula ng source ng Gossip
Tabloid.

Madalas silang magkagalit, kaya si Eddie, para lang

makapagpalipas ng mga sama niya ng loob, e, dun nag-i-stay sa
bahay ng mga kaibigan niyang Pinoy!

Niliwanag ng naturang source na ang dahilan ng biglaang

pag-uwi ng pamilya Gutierrez sa bansa ilang taon na ang
nakararaan ay may kinalaman sa malaking halagang hindi
nabayaran nina Eddie at Annabelle sa ilang kababayan natin sa
Amerika.
Naaalala
pa
ba
ninyo
yung
mga
ibinebenta noon nina Eddie at Annabelle sa States?

Grabe ang naging problema nila dun, kaya wala silang

choice that time kung di ang umuwi na lang sa Pilipinas!
Ang halagang involved sa pagbebenta nila ng kaldero, e,
hindi basta-basta, milyunan yon!

kalderong
Kaso yung pinagbebentahan nila, yung halagang dapat
sana, e, ibigay nila sa kompanya dahil porsiyentuhan lang naman
sila dun, nagastos nila!

Mga mamahaling kaldero yun, hindi basta-basta kaldero

ang ibinebenta nila dun, kaya talagang ang ganda-ganda
na sana ng buhay nilang mag-anak dun hanggang sa dumating
yung point na sinisingil na sila nung mismong kompanya ng
kaldero!

Nawala ang pera, at ang balita nga sa States, e, si

Annabelle ang dahilan kung bakit nalubog sila noon sa utang sa
States!

Malaki ang halagang involved, milyon-milyon, kaya nung

kinasuhan na sila, e kinailangan nilang umalis sa Amerika para
bumalik na dito.

Nag-casino pala si Annabelle! Grabe raw kung magpatalo

siya, kaya pati yung kinita nila sa pagbebenta ng mamahaling
kaldero, e, natunaw! sabi uli ng source ng Gossip Tabloid.

28

Maraming Pilipino ang sinabitan doon ng mag-asawa, ayon

pa sa source ng Gossip Tabloid, kaya ngayong may asunto naman
si Annabelle dito sa Pilipinas ay napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika pa
rin siya tatakbo.

To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones
sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of
the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal use the
money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing
high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (that
complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in
America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings
from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was
made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloidhad a nationwide circulation. The
victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice,
as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.

Paano siya magpupunta dun para tuluyan nang

manirahan, e, ang dami-dami ring Pinoy na naghihintay sa kanya
dun para maningil sa kanya?
Alam nyo ba, bukod sa galit na galit na sa kanila ang mga
Pinoy na nandun, e, may mga nakaabang na ring asunto para kay
Annabelle.
So, malabong sa Amerika pa siya tumuloy ngayong
napapabalitang nasa abroad siya dahil sa mga naghihintay na kaso
sa kanya dun.

Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because, allegedly,
the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before then
Judge Palattaos court. She even cited as proof of her lack of malice the purported
absence of any ill will against complainants, as shown by the article she wrote about
complainants daughter Sharmaine Ruffa Gutierrez in the June 15, 1995 issue of the
same tabloid where she expressed her sympathy and admiration for the latter.

Ang alam namin, e, sa Europe nagbabalak pumunta ang

pamilya ni Eddie.
Di bat ilang beses nang nagpapabalik-balik dun sina
Ruffa. Noon pa, e, pinag-aralan na nina Eddie at Annabelle ang
posibilidad ng mga gagawin nila!

Notably, however, the complainants successfully refuted the imputations

during the trial. Complainants proved that they could return anytime to the United
States of America after the publication of the article,[33] and that they remained on
good terms with the manufacturing company of the cookware. [34] To the contrary, both
petitioner and Tugas failed to adduce evidence to show the truth of the allegations in
the article despite the opportunity to do so.

Alam nila na hindi sila puwedeng mag-stay sa States dahil

kalat din ang asunto nila dun, bukod pa sa napakaraming Pinoy na
huma-hunting sa kanila!
Kaya kung totoong nakalusot na nga si Annabelle ngayon
para makatakas siya sa pagkakulong, imposibleng sa States siya
nagpunta!

Further worthy of mention is the admission of petitioner before the trial court
that she had very close association with then Congressman Golez and mayoralty
candidate Joey Marquez, and that she would use her skills as a writer to campaign for
them. Complainant Eddie Gutierrez ran against then incumbent Golez for the
congressional seat inParaaque City. Petitioner testified in this wise

Mas malaking problema ang kailangan niyang harapin sa

States dahil sa perang nadispalko nila, bukod pa sa asuntong
iniwan nilang nakatiwangwang dun!

Q:

Naghahanap ng sakit ng katawan si Annabelle kung sa

States nga niya maisipang pumunta ngayon para lang malusutan si
Ligaya Santos at ang sintensiya sa kanya ni Judge Palattao!
madiin pang pahayag ng mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip
Tabloid.[30]
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person,
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. [31] In determining whether a statement
is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be
taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense.[32]

29

A:

When you acted as writer during the campaign, as you said,

for Joey Marquez and Golez, of course you did not give
your services for free to these candidates, were you paid?
I was not paid, Sir.

Q:
A:

You just wanted to help them, am I correct?

Yes, because they are my friends, Sir.

Q:
A:

And you wanted them to win the election, thru your being a
writer, is that correct?
Yes, Sir.

Q:
A:

You were campaigning hard for Golez and Marquez, right?

Right, Sir.

Q:

When you say hard, you wanted your candidates to win, is it

not?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:
A:

Who was the opponent of Joey Marquez at that time?

The former Mayor Olivares, Sir.

Q:
A:

How about the opponent of Congressman Golez?

One of them is Eddie Gutierrez, Sir.

Q:

And the tandem of Marquez and Golez versus the tandem

of Olivares and Eddie Gutierrez, am I correct?
Actually, that was the situation at that time, Sir.

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Of course, the tandem of Joey Marquez was working hard

to win over their opponent, is it not?
Whatever their problems were, I am out.
As a hard campaigner, you wanted your team to win over
the other, is this correct?
Yes, Sir.

A:

Of course you understand what PRO work is, it includes

propaganda, is that correct?
I am sorry I dont accept PR work, Sir.

Q:
A:

Do you understand PRO work?

Yes, Sir, I know.

Q:

In propaganda, for your side, you promote it as against the

other, right?
Yes, Sir.[35]

A:

We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind

media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and
demanded by their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled
irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that is, in
utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the
cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual selfdestruction of the right and the regression of human society into a
veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and
brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute
unrestraint in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of
freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine
freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of others. If
there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be
freedom from the press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as
distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, [W]ithout x x x a lively sense of
responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful
instrument of injustice.
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict
that space in which expression freely flourishes and operates. For
we have always strongly maintained, as we do now, that freedom of
expression is mans birthright constitutionally protected and
guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to
act as its defensor fidei in a democratic society such as
ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the
servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does
not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the
ordinary citizen.[38]

It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make
defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply
making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not
only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also
malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral
campaign.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel should
be upheld.
With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that
on January 25, 2008, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of
Penalties in Libel Cases. The Circular expresses a preference for the imposition of a
fine rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances attendant in the cases [39] cited
therein in which only a fine was imposed by this Court on those convicted of libel. It
also states that, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to
pay the same, the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should
apply.

Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of

speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made
against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public
figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within
the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious
or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of
public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil
liability.[36] While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in
the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and
commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their
honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments,
whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.[37]

However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound
discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of
a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.

30

while backing up.[3] Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of
Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three
of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital,
[4]
where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic
injuries.[5]

In the case at bench, the Court considers the publics speculations as to the
whereabouts of Annabelle Rama Gutierrez with the issuance of the warrant of arrest
after her initial conviction for estafa. Petitioner fueled these speculations through her
article. However, her article went overboard and exceeded the bounds of fair
comment. This warrants her conviction. Nonetheless, in light of the relatively wide
latitude given to utterances against public figures such as private complainants, and
consonant with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the Court deems it proper to
modify the penalty of imprisonment to a fine in the amount of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each case. But the award of moral
damages for each of the private complainants in the amount of P500,000.00, as
ordered by the trial court, should be restored on account of the serious anxiety and
the wounded feelings suffered by complainants from the libelous article, particularly
taking into account the fact that petitioner and the private complainants were on
relatively good terms with each other, and complainants gave no cause or offense
which could have provoked the malicious publication.

The defense presented a different version of the incident.

The petitioner narrated that at around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he
was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street when his car ramped on
an island at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but
failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its two rear wheels had
been elevated.[6] He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that
many people were approaching his car.[7] He again alighted from his vehicle and saw
a person lying on the road.[8] He looked at his left side and saw a car that was
running fast like a wind pass by. He approached the person lying on the road, and
noticed that she was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez car
backing up; he carried the victim towards that car.[9] Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo
brought the victim to the UST Hospital.[10]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 3, 2002 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR No. 20890 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in lieu of
imprisonment, petitioner Cristinelli S. Fermin is sentenced to pay a fine in the amount
of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each case. The
award of moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 each in favor of complainants
Annabelle
Rama
Gutierrez
and
Eduardo
Gutierrez,
is
increased
to P500,000.00. Costs against petitioner.

Mendez, for his part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January
21, 1993, he left his girlfriends house in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As he was
driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street on his way home, he saw a
vehicle that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another vehicle overtook his
car from the right and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like
object fall from the car that overtook him,[11] and stopped when he realized that what
had fallen was a persons body. When he moved his car backwards to help this
person, many people approached his car. He alighted from his car and inquired from
them what had happened. The people replied that someone was run over; some of
them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over the victim when they
tried to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez car.
Thereafter, the two of them brought the victim to the UST Hospital.[12]

SO ORDERED.
EDWIN TABAO - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Edwin Tabao (petitioner) seeks reconsideration of our Resolution, dated

June 8, 2009, denying his petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any
reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision to warrant the exercise of
this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual
issues.

The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and thereafter
charged the petitioner and Mendez with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Manila.[13] The RTC, in its
decision[14] dated September 15, 2003, found that it was very clear that both accused
are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete,[15] and convicted the two (2)
accused of the crime charged. It found that the petitioners car first hit the victim,
causing her to be thrown into the road on her back, and that Mendez car ran over her
as she was lying down. It held that the two failed to observe the necessary precaution
and due care in operating their respective vehicles, to wit: the petitioner was not
attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island divider and bumped
Rochelle; Mendez was driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to
avoid running over her as her body lay prone on the street. The RTC sentenced them
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four months and one day ofarresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, 10 months and 20 days of prision correccional, as maximum.
It also ordered them to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts:
(a) P478,434.12 as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
(c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.[16]

The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts:

At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his
Toyota Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G.
Tuazon Streettowards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider,
bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact,
Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back.[1] Thereafter, Leonardo
Mendez speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over
Rochelles body. Bystanders armed with stones and wooden clubs followed
Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover.[2] Francisco Cielo, a
newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went
inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license, and ordered him to move
the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice

31

The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No.
28401. The CA, in its decision[17] dated July 27, 2007, agreed with the factual findings
of the RTC, and affirmed its decision with the modification that the petitioner be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional,
as maximum.

Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily,

but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place. Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a
failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen.
[21]
Thus, in order for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material
damage suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the accused, and
the direct link between material damage and failure in precaution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally convinced that all three were established in
this case in accordance with the required level of evidence in criminal cases.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion
in its resolution[18] of March 17, 2009.
The petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging
that the courts a quo erred in convicting him of the crime charged. As earlier stated,
we denied this petition for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed CA
decision to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for
raising substantially factual issues.

The petitioner was positively

identified by an eyewitness

The petitioner now comes to us via the present motion for reconsideration,
raising the following arguments:
I.

The fact of Rochelle Lanetes death was stipulated during pre-trial, as well as
duly established during trial.[22] What remain to be proven beyond reasonable doubt
are the inexcusable lack in precaution on the part of the petitioner and the direct link
of his negligence to the victims death.

THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF BOTH THE COURT

OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ARE
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN AND
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE [ON RECORD;]

II.

[THE] COURT OF APPEALS [ERRED IN UPHOLDING

HIS] CONVICTION [ON THE BASIS OF THE]
INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF x x x
VICTOR SORIANO[; and]

III.

THE [SUPREME] COURT DISREGARDED [HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL] PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.[19]

An eyewitness account established that the petitioners vehicle actually hit

Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases,
decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution.[23] One of the prosecution
witnesses, Victor Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioners cause, saw the incident in
its entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime.[24] In his September 1, 1994 testimony, Victor positively
identified the petitioner as the person who drove the car that ramped on an island
divider along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street, and hit Rochelle. To directly
quote from the records:
ATTY. ALICIA SERRANO:

In its Comment, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, prays that the motion be denied for being pro forma; the petitioner
merely advanced the same arguments which he raised in his appellants brief and
motion for reconsideration before the CA.

Q:

Mr. Soriano, do you remember where were you on or about

10:00 oclock (sic) of January 21, 1993?

VICTOR SORIANO:
After due consideration, we resolve to DENY the motion.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court; we will not normally disturb
these factual findings unless they are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. [20] After a
careful review of the records, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts factual
findings that found the petitioner guilty of the crime charged.

A:

Yes, maam.

Q:
A:

Where were you?

I was at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon.

Q:

What were you doing at the corner of Governor Forbes and

G. Tuazon at that time?
My sidecar was parked there because I was waiting for my
wife, maam.

A:

32

Q:
A:

And when you were there at the corner of G. Tuazon and

Governor Forbes at the said time and place, was there
any unusual incident that happened?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

And what was that unusual incident?

I saw an accident involving a speeding car which
ramped over the island and bumped a woman who
was crossing the street.

Q:

When you saw that the car ramped over the island and
hit and bumped a woman, what happened to the
woman that was hit and bumped by the car which you
said ramped over the island?
The woman was thrown at the middle of the road on her
back, maam.

A:
Q:

A:

pre-trial admitting that the accused Tabao is the driver of

the car which ramped at the divider.
INTERPRETER:
Witness approaching a man seated inside the
courtroom and who stood up and identified as Edwin
Tabao, the accused in this case.[25] [emphases ours]
On cross-examination, Victor further elaborated on what he saw of the incident:
ATTY. ESTEBAN NANCHO:
Q:

When you saw this woman after being hit and bumped
by the car that ramped over the island and was thrown
at the middle of the road, what else happened?

VICTOR SORIANO:

xxxx

A:

Yes, sir, that is true.

The woman was no longer moving at that time when I saw

another car coming.

Q:

And can you tell us how the woman was hit, was bumped by
the car that ramped over the island?
The woman was crossing the street and when she saw the
on-coming car, she tried to avoid that but the car [which]
ramped over the island bumped the woman.

A:
xxxx
Q:
A:

What else happened when you saw the car coming very fast?
The woman sprawled at the middle of the road was ran over
by the speeding car and that car stopped while going up to
the flyover.

Q:

xxxx
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Mr. Soriano, you said that the first car ramped over the
island and bumped a woman, and as a result of that, the
woman was thrown at the middle of Forbes Street. Do you
confirm that?

You said you saw a car that ramped over the island and
that the car that ramped over the island was the car
that hit and bumped the victim that was thrown at the
middle of the street. Now, will you be able to identify
before this court the driver of that car that ramped
over the island and hit and bumped the victim?
Yes, maam.

A:

In other words, the car first ramped over the island before it
hit the woman?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

What part of the car bumped the woman?

The bumper of the car, the left side of the bumper.

Q:
A:

What part of the body of the victim was hit by the car?
Her left side of the body.

Q:

Are you saying that the victim was facing the car when the
car bumped her.
Yes, sir, she was facing the car. She was about to avoid that
car.

A:

If that driver of the car that hit and bumped the victim is
inside the courtroom, would you be able to point to
him before this Honorable Court?
Yes, maam, he is here.
Will you kindly point before this courtroom who is that driver
of the car that hit and bumped the victim? Although, Your
Honor, there was already a stipulation at the start of the

Q:
A:

How was the woman thrown at the middle of Forbes Street?

She was thrown backwards.

Q:

And what part of the body of the victim first hit the
pavement?
The back of her head.

A:

33

xxxx
Q:
A:

declared in both that he saw the petitioners car ramp on the island divider and bump
Rochelle. As to whether the car ramped on the center island before or after it bumped
the victim does not detract from the fundamental fact that Victor saw and identified
the petitioner as the driver of the car that ramped on the island divider and hit
Rochelle. As earlier discussed, Victor sufficiently explained this inconsistency during
the trial.

And you said after the woman was thrown at the middle of
the street[,] another speeding car ran over the body of the
woman?
Yes, sir.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Victor, who stood only seven meters from the incident, clearly and in a
straightforward manner described how the petitioners car had bumped the victim. We
thus see no reason to overturn the lower courts finding regarding Victors credibility,
more so since the petitioner did not impute any ill motive that could have induced
Victor to testify falsely. The fundamental and settled rule is that the trial court's
assessment regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, especially when the assessment is
affirmed by the CA.

Now, from the time the body of the victim was thrown at the
middle of the street, how much time had lapsed when the
second car ran over the body of the victim?
Not more than one minute. When I saw the car, it was a little
bit far then I saw the car running very fast. It did not take
more than a minute.
xxxx

Q:
A:

The positive identification in this case, coupled with the failure of the defense
to impute any ill-motive on the eyewitness, to our mind, works to dispel reasonable
doubt on the fact that the petitioners car had in fact hit Rochelle. The eyewitness
account provides the necessary link between the petitioners failure to exercise
precaution in operating his vehicle and Rochelle Lanetes death.

Now, did you point at any person gathered at the scene of

the accident that it were (sic) the 2 accused who were
responsible for the accident?
I told Cielo about that and I told him that whoever brought the
victim to the hospital is the one who ran over the victim.[26]

The petitioner failed to exercise

precaution in operating his vehicle

The petitioner nonetheless claims that Victor is not a credible witness due to
inconsistencies between his affidavit and court testimony. He harps on the fact that
Victor declared in his affidavit that the petitioners car first hit Rochelle before it
ramped on an island divider; while he testified in court that the petitioners vehicle
ramped on the island divider before hitting the victim.

The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to
other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. [30] He is bound to anticipate the
presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his own.
[31]
Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property, it is
nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and
caution under the circumstances for the safety of others as well as for his own.[32]

We find these arguments unmeritorious.

Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness affidavit and
testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and
are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer.[27] At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently explain the
discrepancies between his affidavit and court statements. Victor reasoned out that the
secretary who typed his affidavit made a mistake; and explained that he signed the
affidavit despite the inaccuracies in paragraph 2 because the secretary told him, kasi
ho magugulo ang naimakinilya na.[28] Accordingly, when Victor informed his lawyer
during the first day of the hearing about the inaccuracy, the latter told him to state the
truth regardless of what was written in his affidavit.

The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way
home from work on January 21, 1993, he did not notice the island divider at the
foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a result, his car ramped on the island so that both its
rear wheels became elevated from the road and he could no longer maneuver the
vehicle.[33] The petitioner even testified that his car had to be towed.[34] Later, during
cross-examination, he admitted that all four wheels of his car, not just the two rear
wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony, lost contact with the ground.
[35]
The entire vehicle, therefore, ended up on top of the island divider. He puts the
blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure to notice the island on the darkness
of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island.[36]

The general rule that contradictions and discrepancies between the

testimony of a witness and his statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit
him is not without exception, as when the omission in the affidavit refers to a very
important detail of the incident that one relating the incident as an eyewitness would
not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement
substantially contradicts the testimony in court.[29] In the present case, we see no
substantial contradiction in Victors affidavit and in his court statements as he

To our mind, the fact that the petitioners entire vehicle ended up ramped on the
island divider strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate
incident. The vehicle could not have ended up in that condition had the petitioner
been driving at a reasonable speed. We are not persuaded by the petitioners rather
simplistic account that mere darkness, coupled with the traffic islands alleged
newness, caused his car to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor Forbes

34

Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic island intended to channel vehicular
traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover.

The petitioner insists that his car could not have bumped the victim because
his car was coming from the right side (i.e., from Espaa), while the victim was hit on
the left side of her body. He argues that if the victim was on her way to her house on
Mabini Street coming from the corner of Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon
Street (where she alighted), then the responsible vehicle could only have come from
the left (i.e., from Nagtahan) as only those vehicles coming from this direction could
hit the victim on the left side of her body. He further claims that his car had no dents
or scratches.

A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate

of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered,[37] to enable him to keep
the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full
stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.[38] It has not escaped our notice that
the intersectionof Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street is adjacent to the
vicinity of the incident. A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty,
among others, to keep and maintain his vehicle under control so he can, if needed,
stop at the shortest possible notice.[39] Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of
a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is
necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway.[40]

The petitioners arguments are misleading.

Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., the attending physician, testified that the victim suffered
multiple injuries compatible and consistent with a vehicular accident.[43] He did not
state that the injuries suffered by the victim were only on her left side. In fact, a
perusal of Dr. Altezas initial medical report shows that the victim suffered
injuries both on the left and right sides of her body. In addition, Dr. Floresto
Arizala, Jr., the National Bureau of Investigation medico-legal officer who conducted
an autopsy on Rochelles body, confirmed that the victim suffered injuries on various
parts of her lower right and left extremities as a result of the initial or primary impact.

The fact that the petitioner was driving near the Governor Forbes Street and G.
Tuazon Street intersection gives rise to the expectation that he would drive at a speed
that anticipated or would have anticipated that other persons are on the road,
whether as pedestrians or as motorists. The facts show, however, that the petitioner
was driving his car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an intersection.
Otherwise, he should have been able to put his vehicle to a complete stop or, at the
very least, at a speed that would have prevented his car from climbing entirely on top
of the island divider. That the petitioners entire vehicle landed on top of the traffic
island body, chassis, four wheels and all sufficiently indicates his speed at that
time. The force that propels an entire car off the street and on top of a traffic island
could only have been inordinate speed, or at least speed beyond that of a motorist
coming from or going to an intersection. In short, the ramping of his vehicle
demonstrably indicates to us that the petitioner failed to observe the duty to maintain
a reasonable speed. We therefore believe Victors testimony that the petitioner was
speeding when he bumped the victim.[41]

The petitioner relies heavily on Dr. Altezas statement allegedly declaring

that the victims injuries on her lower left leg and left thigh were the primary impact
injuries. However, this statement was not based on the actual incident but on Dr.
Altezas presumptions. For clarity, we reproduce Dr. Altezas testimony:
ATTY. SERRANO:
Q:

We are likewise not persuaded by the petitioners claim that darkness and the
traffic islands alleged newness justify his failure to notice the island. The petitioners
admission that he did not notice the traffic island is in itself an indication of his failure
to observe the vigilance demanded by the circumstances. Ultimately, it shows the
criminal recklessness for which he has been convicted. The record shows that
pedestrians were present in the vicinity at the time of the incident. The CA even
pointed out that the vicinity is near residential areas, while we pointed out its proximity
to an intersection. The darkness and these circumstances should have caused the
petitioner to be more alert and more vigilant, to say nothing of slowing his car down.
Newly constructed or not, the island divider should have received the petitioners due
attention. His bare allegation that the island lacked markers or reflectorized marks is
likewise not persuasive. As the trial court correctly observed, many other vehicles
passed the same road that night but only the petitioner failed to notice the island
divider.[42] We thus find the trial court to be correct when it held that the
petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of the
incident.

Now doctor, you said that these injuries you found x x x on

the body of the victim are compatible and consistent with a
vehicular accident. Would you tell this court how these
injuries were sustained?
xxxx
Doctor, what would be the possible situation when you
use compatible and consistent vehicular accident?

DR. ALTEZA:

The location of the victims injuries vis--vis

the position of the petitioners vehicle

35

A:

If I would be allowed to make some presumptions, if the

patient was standing up at that time he was hit by a
vehicle, I would presume that the primary impact
injuries, injuries hit first by the vehicle are the injuries
of the lower leg and the left thigh considering that the
height of the injuries are approximately the height of the
bumper as well as the hood of the car.

Q:
A:

There are several kinds of vehicles, doctor?

Yes, Your Honor, I was thinking of a car. Now, after being hit
by [a] car, under normal condition, the victim is normally
thrown at the surface of the street.[44] [emphases ours]

weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his

opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies,
the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study
and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any
other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The
opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in
the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert
opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony
is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is
not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.[46]

From this exchange, we find it clear that Dr. Alteza was merely making a
hypothetical statement that a person who is presumed to be standing when hit by a
vehicle would suffer primary impact injuries on his lower leg and left thigh. He never
declared that Rochelle suffered primary impact injuries on her lower left extremities. At
any rate, it was not improbable for the victim to have been hit on the left side of her body
as Victor testified that she (victim) tried to avoid the petitioners car, and was in fact
facing the car when she was hit.
We likewise do not believe the petitioners claim that his vehicle was not
involved in the incident due to the absence of dents or scratches. As the petitioner
himself admitted, his vehicle was not subjected to any investigation after the incident.
Moreover, the pictures of the car, presented by the petitioner in court, were taken long
after the incident and after a repair had already been done to the vehicle. There was
therefore no way of verifying petitioners claim that his car did not have any dent or
scratch after the incident. At any rate, the absence of a dent or a scratch on the
petitioners car, assuming it to be true, does not conclusively prove his nonparticipation in the incident. The absence of any dent or scratch is influenced by
several factors: the type of paint, the speed of the car, the points of impact, and the
material used on the cars exteriors.

We emphasize that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the

incident; his testimony was merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by
SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in
P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not
have been involved in the incident. For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of
P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony:
ATTY. SERRANO:

Weight of expert testimony

Q:
The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness
Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio who testified that the petitioners car could not
have bumped the victim because the latters body was not thrown in line with the car,
but on its side. The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the
field of traffic accident investigation, and as such, his statements are backed-up by
[the] principles of applied physics, engineering, and mathematics.[45]

When you said in line with the motor vehicle that bumped
the victim, is it that when a victim is bumped by the motor
vehicle, the victim would be thrown in line with the
vehicle?

P/SR. INSP. CORNELIO:

The petitioners arguments fail to convince us.

Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of
a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the word may
signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory
on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are
bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness
must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the
parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the
court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and
the applicable law. It has been held of expert testimonies:

A:

Yes, Maam. Usually, that is the outcome of the incident.

Q:
A:

He cannot be thrown sideward?

Maybe if another vehicle would hit the pedestrian because
that also happened. When a pedestrian is hit by a vehicle
and another vehicle hit the pedestrian, it will be thrown
somewhere else.

Q:

Mr. Witness, you are testifying as far as the vehicle of

Tabao is concerned. You said that the line of vehicle that
bumped the victim would be in line. Are you telling us that
it is not possible that when the vehicle of Tabao hit the
victim, the victim would be thrown sidewards?
Yes, Maam.

A:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert

testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may choose
upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the

36

Q:
A:

What do you mean, yes, Maam?

He can be thrown either in front of the vehicle that hit the
victim or slightly offset with the car of Tabao. It [may be]
but not far from the side.

Q:

But he would be thrown sidewise[,] not frontal?

A:

Slightly to the side but not considerable length of distance

away from the car. It is sidewards.

Q:

Q:

In your Mathematics, do you consider that if a vehicle is

speeding fast, he could have thrown anything that is
bumped by that vehicle far away from the vehicle?
Yes, Maam, possible.

A:

A:

Now, failure of the investigator to indicate the distance,

would that show that it was not Tabao who bumped the
victim?
I cannot say categorically that the car of Tabao indeed, hit
the victim. Because the distance is very significant in this
sketch for proper evaluation.
xxxx

Q:

A:

Q:
A:

So, that probability is also possible aside from the

probability that you said the victim is thrown in line or
in front. So, you are now saying it could be said that
the victim can be thrown sidewise?
It [may be] thrown sidewise. As I said [a while] ago, it
might be slightly offset with the vehicle that hit the
pedestrian but not too far from the side of the bumping
vehicle.

Q:
A:

So, it cannot be said that when an object is bumped by

a vehicle, it will be thrown forward. It will all depend
on which portion of the bumper hit by object bumped?
Yes, Maam.[47]

From the foregoing, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not discount the
possibility that the victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted
that the location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would also depend on
the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.

So, it could depend on the speed of the vehicle that bumped

the object bumped?
Yes, Maam.

The defense of denial

Q:
A:

Whether it is forward or sidewise, the distance of the

object thrown would depend on the speed of the
vehicle that bumped?
Yes, Maam.

Q:
A:

So, if it is speeding, it could be thrown farther?

Yes, Maam.

Q:
A:

Sidewise or frontal?
It should be frontal.

Q:

You said it could be thrown sidewise do I take it

correct[ly,] it can be thrown sidewise also?
Maybe. As I have said [a while] ago, it [may be] slightly
offset with the line of the vehicle.

A:

The petitioner denied that his car had bumped the victim, and insists that he
just saw the victims body sprawled on the road after his car had already ramped on
the island divider.
The petitioners defense of denial must crumble in light of Victors positive and
specific testimony. We reiterate that the petitioner, aside from merely alleging the
inconsistency between Victors affidavit and court testimony, did not impute any ill
motive on Victors part to falsely testify against him. The petitioner, in fact, admitted
that he and Victor did not know each other prior to the incident. We have consistently
held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent, and
without anyshowing of ill-motive on the part of the testifying eyewitness, should prevail
over the denial of the accused whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.[48] A denial is negative evidence. To be believed, it must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, the denial is purely selfserving and has no evidentiary value.[49]

xxxx
Q:
A:

We significantly note that the petitioner claimed for the first time in his
present petition that he saw a rug-like thing[50] being thrown out of a passing car as
he was about to alight from his car after turning off its engine; he later discovered that
the thing thrown was a persons body. He reiterated this claim in his motion for
reconsideration before this Court. This assertion was a clear rip-off from his coaccused Mendez version who likewise claimed to have seen the same thing. To our
mind, the modification of the petitioners story was a belated attempt to cover up his
failure to convincingly explain the presence of the victims slumped body on the road
near his car and a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself. Nowhere in his affidavit or
earlier court testimonies, or even in his previous pleadings with the lower courts, did
he ever state that a passing car had thrown a rug-like thing [51] on the street. The
petitioners sudden change of story at this stage of the proceedings casts doubt on
the veracity of his claim.

So, do we take it from you that your basis only of telling the
court that Tabao is not in [any way] responsible is the
distance of the victim from the car that bumped?
I am not saying categorically that the car of Tabao is not
responsible. But as I can see in the sketch presented
today in this Honorable Court, the position of the victim is
too far from the vehicle of Mr. Tabao. If I were the
investigator in this particular case, I should indicate the
measurement of the victim from the car and this sketch
[does] not indicate the distance.

37

All told, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts findings of fact and
conclusions of law finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.

In addition, we are baffled by the petitioners act of frequenting the hospital

after the incident. Amanda Ycong, the victims aunt, testified that she saw the
petitioner several times at the hospital when the victim was confined there; but
would immediately leave whenever he saw members of the victims family. We find it
highly unusual for a person who allegedly had no participation in the incident to be
overly concerned with the victims well-being. What puzzles us even more is why the
petitioner would evade members of the victims family whenever he was seen by
them at the hospital.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to DENY the

motion with FINALITY, no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the
reconsideration sought. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

38