U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and the South China Sea Carlyle A. Thayer January 30, 2010 [client name deleted] Question: The Pentagon has just announced its plan to proceed with the sale of arms to Taiwan that has been postponed since the Bush administration. Taiwan seems to play a specific role in the bilateral relationship between China and the United States especially in Southeast and the Asia Pacific, which includes the South China Sea. In fact, the United States has always promoted relations with Taiwan with the aim of deterring China's influence to the South. However, China and Taiwan share a common policy towards the South China Sea. For example, China has not intervened in the case of Taiwan's occupation of Itu Aba island. What is your assessment of this issue? Are improved U.S. relations with Taiwan related to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea? ANSWER: The essential point, in answer to your question, is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed by the U.S. Congress after the U.S. Administration switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China. The TRA is law and it requires the President and the Pentagon to provide defensive military equipment to Taiwan to enable it to defend itself from an attack by China. The TRA also requires that the U.S. Pacific Command develop the capability to come to Taiwan’s assistance if attacked by China and to prevail in that conflict. It is in the national interest of the United States to maintain a balance across the Taiwan Straits. In the 1950s, the US 7th Fleet was there as much to prevent Taiwan from attacking China as it was to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It is in the interest of the United States to build up the defensive capabilities of Taiwan to deter China. A weak Taiwan, in the US view, only invites China to miscalculate. After all, China has over 600 ballistic missiles along the coast aimed at Taiwan. Late in the second term of the Bush Administration, the US sold weapons to Taiwan. China predictably curtailed and downgraded military‐to‐military contacts with the U.S. These were restored following last October strategic and economic dialogue between senior leaders. The current arms sales represent the outcome of complex domestic politics in both countries (Taiwan and the U.S.) and strategic considerations. It is my estimation that the U.S. government has limited its support for Taiwan to its relations with mainland China and is not promoting Taiwan’s interests or influence further south. This would wreck bilateral relations between Washington and Beijing. Taiwan has occupied Itu Aba since 1956. This is the only real island in the South China Sea. The U.S. would want to deter China from occupying Itu Aba lest this embolden China to be more aggressive in seeking reunification with Taiwan. Also, there is no state in Southeast Asia that is sympathetic towards Taiwan. So I doubt the U.S. is attempting to promote Taiwan’s 2
interests further south. Southeast Asian nations have all agreed to the “one China policy.”
The only partial exception is Singapore which trains its troops on Taiwan because it lacks the space on its own territory. Singapore also adheres to the “one China policy.” China and Taiwan base their claims to the South China Sea on the same historical basis. China’s U‐shaped map was originally issued by Taiwan (as 11 dotted lines, reduced to 9 dotted lines by Chou En‐lai after two lines in the Gulf of Tonkin were removed). I do not see the current arms sale as representing a new thrust in U.S. policy. The U.S. seeks to promote Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself and the U.S. seeks to deter China from using force. The real issue in the South China Sea is China’s naval base at Sanya and the buildup of naval forces there. China is primarily seeking to deter the US from acting the way it did in 1995‐96 when China fired ballistic missiles into the Taiwan Straits to intimidate the voters on Taiwan during an election. The U.S. responded by deploying two carrier task forces. Ever since China has been seeking to develop the capacity to deter the U.S. in a future contingency. But the buildup at Sanya also means China will have the capacity to deploy in the South China Sea without much advance warning.