Off

1nc K
Reject the affirmatives solution as grounded in a parsimonious
model of IR predictions that drives Newtonian rationality and serial
policy failure key to complexify the discipline
Kavalski, PhD, 12
(Emilian, professor of IR University of Western Sydney, PhD international politics Loughborough University, Waking IR Up
from its Deep Newtonian Slumber Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41(1) 137 150 )

Is the discipline of International Relations (IR) a science? Its scientific credentials have long concerned proponents and
detractors. As Ronald Rogowskis claim in the epigraph suggests, the hankering after an elegant science of
international politics has virtually become a dream to which his and subsequent generations of IR
scholars have succumbed. Belying this dreaming is a question whether IRs social-scientific inquiry
can ever approximate that of the natural sciences. Perceiving the natural sciences to be an exact
science, cohorts of IR students have been developing powerful and parsimonious models for the
explanation and understanding of international politics. Take the balance of power, for instance. Its aim
is to ascertain the existence of a particular regularity in world affairs parity between adversaries.
Borrowing the notion of equilibrium from the natural sciences, the balance of power explains international
order as a regulating mechanism motivated by the natural desire of states for survival. In this way, IR has
tended to propound explanations premised on assumptions of predictability rooted in the
conviction that international life is a closed system, changing in a gradual manner and
following linear trajectories, which can be elicited through discrete assessments of
dependent and independent variables. What IR intends to produce in this way is a nearly
mechanistic model of international politics that is perceived to be as rigorous and robust as the one of the
natural sciences. In recent years, the simplification and reductionism underpinning this dream of a
scientific IR have come under severe criticism from different quarters. In fact, some such as John G. Ruggie have
made the point that the discipline needs to wake up from this deep Newtonian slumber, if it is to
have any bearing on the real world of international politics. The three books under review actively contribute to
this decentring project by advancing the complexification of IR. The notion of complexification entails different things for different
authors, but what all of them share is some form of engagement with the complexity paradigm of the philosophy of science.3
Originating in the natural sciences, the

complexity paradigm challenges the Newtonian view of an orderly

world and suggests that global interactions occur in a non-linear fashion . Consequently, the outcomes
of such interactions are difficult to infer, let alone to predict. In this respect, the proponents of the
complexification of IR have noted that while the hard sciences have become increasingly soft as
a result of their acceptance of the uncertainty and randomness of reality, IR has hardened as a
result of its suppression of ambiguity, disregard for surprises and over-investment
in its capacity to forecast international developments. Richard Ned Lebow explains this search
for (and commitment to) a predictable worldview of regularities as a need for psychological closure ,
reflecting a desire for definitive conclusions in support of preferred theoretical
assumptions.4 It is in this context that Damian Popolo asks the pertinent question whether scientific IR is
not premised on fundamentally misleading notions about science.5 In other words, the
question that emerges is whether things appear perplexing because the ken of the mainstream is askew. In its response to this query,
the complexity paradigm reveals that Newtonian

IR tends to operate on very little information (usually a

few variables); yet, this does not prevent it from jumping to conclusions as if it had
knowledge about the whole picture. Such lack of sensitivity to what IR does not know then
underpins a model of the world that is rarely stumped. As a result, when the accepted
framework for explanation and understanding fails that is, it faces a question that it cannot answer
(for instance, Why IR failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War?) IR comes up with a question that it

can answer (for instance, Why the Cold War ended?, answer: Because the Soviet Union could no longer maintain the
balance of power and, therefore, without such capability it could no longer survive in the international system and had to implode).
The complexified IR suggests that by

answering the wrong questions, Newtonian IR enacts a theatre

of validity to generate explanations far more coherent than reality . Therefore, the
incredible rate of failure of the very frameworks asserting the law-like regularities of
international politics to anticipate any of the major events of the past 25 years should not be
surprising.6 The irony of this situation is not lost on Lebow, who notes that it is the commitment to science and
scientific methods by international relations scholars that provides a major impediment
to their practice of science.7 Thus, this review article assesses the three books under review in the context of the
current state of the art in the emerging complexity paradigm of IR. Since this paradigm intends a complete
rethinking of the discipline, the article will focus on the complexification of the ontology, epistemology, methodology and
ethics of IR. It has to be stressed at the outset that while IR students will find all three books under review of immense interest, their
authors reach out to much wider and interdisciplinary audiences thus, the collection edited by Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight
will be of immense relevance to any of the subfields of political science, especially international political economy; Lebows work has
historians, literary theorists and psychologists in mind; while Popolos book addresses political theorists and philosophers. (137-9)

1NC Wolf DA
Prostitution reform is a lightning rod
Heiges 9 (Moira, J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004, Yale
University, From the Inside Out: Reforming State and Local Prostitution Enforcement to
Combat Sex Trafficking in the United States and Abroad 94 Minn. L. Rev. 428)
The topic of prostitution

is fraught with moral, ideological, and therefore political

controversy . n233 Domestically, as well as internationally, a small but outspoken minority perceives
prostitution as a freely chosen profession that should be protected as a legitimate form of work. n234
Meanwhile, an opposing though equally powerful lobby sees it as an inherently violent form of
sexual exploitation that is particularly harmful to women. n235 Yet in spite of the inherent political pitfalls, leaders at
all levels of government have a vested interest in addressing both voluntary and coercive forms of prostitution in their jurisdictions.

Wolfs PC passes Pennsylvania tax reform and oversight key to

Marcellus shale development, education, and drilling regs
Stephanie Ritenbaugh 3-24-2015; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Pennsylvania lawmakers dig in on natural gas severance
tax http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/03/24/Pennsylvania-lawmakers-dig-in-onMarcellus-Shale-severance-tax/stories/201503240019
Pennsylvania Republican lawmakers are maintaining a hardline stance against Gov. Tom Wolfs Marcellus Shale severance tax

with Mr.
Wolfs proposal to use a severance tax to reinvest in education being a campaign cornerstone, the stage is
set for legislative horse trading this spring. Voters elected him, and Pennsylvania understands this
issue, said John Hanger, Mr. Wolfs director of planning and policy. We are interested in good faith
negotiation and conversation about the details. But we need a drilling tax . Drew Crompton, chief of staff
proposal, saying they wont discuss a tax until bills dealing with pensions and liquor privatization are settled. And

for state Sen. Joe Scarnati, R-Jefferson, the Senate president pro tempore said pensions must be dealt with first. Were going to pick
up the pension bill in April, Mr. Crompton said. Then we would be willing to talk about the need for new revenue. The problem
with the budget proposal isnt just the severance tax, but all the tax increases the governor is proposing, Mr. Crompton said.

Republicans make up the majority in both the state Senate and House of Representatives. The
severance tax proposal calls for a 5 percent tax on the value of the natural gas extracted from
wells, 4.7 cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) on the volume of the natural gas, and a 5 percent tax on the value of
natural gas liquids produced. Mr. Wolf has said the proposal will raise $1 billion in its first full year, the lions share of which would
be dedicated to education. Drawing the ire of the natural gas industry is another feature of the governors plan a $2.97/Mcf
minimum value for shale gas produced in Pennsylvania, regardless of the actual sale price. Drillers wouldnt be able to pass any extra
cost on to landowners, according to the proposal. In the Marcellus Shale region, natural gas prices have been depressed as pipeline
capacity has not kept pace with surging production. On March 20, natural gas traded at $2/Mcf at Dominion South Point, while
natural gas at the Henry Hub the national benchmark in Louisiana sold for $2.80, according to Bloomberg data. Meanwhile,
operators selling gas at the Leidy Hub in north-central Pennsylvania traded at $1.49. The severance tax is not much different than a
sales tax it should be based on what youre actually paying, Mr. Crompton said. You cant negotiate when one side is asking for
too much, he said. Steve Miskin, a spokesman for the House Republican majority, said the proposal is out of step with todays
market. When natural gas prices are low, his tax hits its height, Mr. Miskin said. They arrived at $1 billion and they want to spend
higher and higher to meet that goal. Were not advocating for new taxes, Mr. Miskin said. If revenue is necessary, we believe its
through liquor privatization and dealing with cost drivers. Kevin Sunday, spokesman for the Harrisburg-based Pennsylvania
Chamber of Business and Industry, compared the inclusion of the $2.97 floor price as making someone making $40,000 a year pay
income tax on $100,000. This proposal is much higher than the advertised 5 percent tax, Mr. Sunday said. Mr. Hanger said the
proposed severance tax would take effect in 2016, so the first day is still more than nine months away, and natural gas prices are at
rock bottom levels. Theres only one place for it to go and thats up. Current levels arent sustainable. For the first year of the tax, the
proposal assumes gas prices will average $3.25, which wouldnt trigger the floor price, Mr. Hanger said. Theres precedence for
pricing a floor for commodity that provide public improvement, he said, noting that Act 89, which funds bridge and road repairs,

the severance
tax proposal is important to the regional development of the Marcellus Shale
formation , which spans several states, said Michael Wood, research director. Pennsylvania is the only
major oil and gas producing state without a formal severance tax . Mr. Wolfs proposal is modeled after West
includes a floor price for gasoline at $2.49. The left-leaning Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center believes

Virginias tax, but adds the $2.97/Mcf minimum. Mr. Wood also said natural

gas prices wont stay low forever as

demand increases and as companies prepare to enter new markets. The first exports of liquefied
natural gas are expected to begin this year. The worry about low prices now is just an excuse to
not pass this tax, Mr. Wood said. For the last seven or eight years, people have found excuses to not have the tax that other
states levy. Its past time to have this in place. The longer we wait, the more it harms Pennsylvania. Environmental advocacy group
PennFuture also supports the

proposal as it stands, which includes greater funding for regulatory

and enforcement agencies . Robert Altenburg, director of the energy center for PennFuture, notes that staffing levels

have fallen at the state Department of Environmental Protection. I dont know if this will completely reverse that trend, but its
headed in the right direction, Mr. Altenburg said. While

the $2.97 minimum built into the proposal will make

it difficult for drillers to plan their tax burden and will eat into profit margins, its not likely to
drive drillers away from one of the most economical shale plays in North America, said Bill Holland
senior reporter for SNL Energy, a trade publication. Its shallow, its rich and its undeniably huge , Mr.
Holland said. Pennsylvanias unconventional gas producers pulled more than 2 trillion cubic feet of gas out of the ground during the
second half of 2014 alone, according to data released by the state Department of Environmental Protection. When

the
governor comes in, its part politics, part horse trading. Hes starting with a high
hand , Mr. Holland said. But the governor will likely get the tax. Its just too large to
ignore . A severance tax is going to narrow the margins and make Pennsylvania less attractive, but where else are you going to
go in this low price environment? Overall, the shale tax is popular with voters. According to a Franklin & Marshall poll
in June 2012, 55 percent of Pennsylvania voters supported it, with another 18 percent somewhat favoring such a measure. About
20 percent were opposed. Among independent polls, you might get different percentages depending on how the question is
phrased, but youre not seeing anything showing its unpopular, said G. Terry Madonna, a political scientist and pollster at Franklin

But the
budget debates this spring are shaping up to be challenging. With a Republican
majority in both state houses, it will be difficult to deal with a severance tax unless they reach
some accommodation on pensions and liquor privatization, Mr. Madonna said.
& Marshall in Lancaster. For most people, its not a tax that they have to pay directly not like an income tax.

Key to manufacturing base

John Yudichak, MSC, et al 11-13-2013; Marcellus Shale Coalition Founded in 2008, the Marcellus Shale Coalition
(MSC) works with exploration and production, midstream and supply chain partners in the Appalachian Basin and across the
country to address issues regarding the production of clean, job-creating, American natural gas from the Marcellus and Utica Shale
plays. Yudichak, Pa. state Senator John Yudichak (Dem.-Plymouth); Marcellus Shale: A Transformational Economic Opportunity
For All http://marcelluscoalition.org/2013/11/marcellus-shale-a-transformational-economic-opportunity-for-all/

The overwhelmingly positive impact of the Marcellus Shale continued to make its way
throughout Pennsylvania this week. At an economic seminar, Pa. state Senator John Yudichak (Dem.-Plymouth)
touted safe and tightly - regulated shale development as a transformational economic
opportunity. These homegrown jobs are renewing small towns, driving down once-skyrocketing unemployment
rates and reigniting our manufacturing sector. At the same time, as Bloomberg News reports this week,
The shale boom has moved the U.S. closer to energy independence, added jobs,
helped revive manufacturing, and lowered gas bills. Heres what theyre saying about the clear benefits of
shale which are Powering An American Renaissance: Economic Benefits of Marcellus Shale Are Many: Public and private officials
said Thursday that the economic benefits of the Marcellus Shale are many. When [KDKAs Jon] Delano asked
what they considered to be the single most important contribution to the region, panelists had a difficult time limiting their answer
to one item. To [MSCs Dave] Spigelmyer, the

explosion of natural shale gas production has put the

country on a path to energy security and created more than 200,000 jobs across the commonwealth, while

setting a market price for power in just a few short years. Speaking for the airport authority, which in February received a $50
million signing bonus from Consol Energy to extract natural gas from beneath Pittsburgh International Airport that officials say
could bring as much as $450 million in royalties, Penrod listed the financial gain, as well as strong regional economic growth. Some
of that growth is directly impacting the airports bottom line, he said. Weve had a 4.5 percent increase in seats sold at the airport
from a year ago, Penrod said. Noble said her township is benefitting from the impact fees generated from Act 13, noting that it has

received $1.1 million in fees over the last two years. (Washington Observer-Reporter, 11/14/13) Sen. John Yudichak: Marcellus Shale
Presents Transformational Economic Opportunity: State Sen. John Yudichak Thursday said the Marcellus shale industry will lift
Northeastern Pennsylvania out of the cloud of economic hardship and will continue to do so for generations to come. We
are all here for one reason and singular goal to learn how NEPA can

leverage the transformational economic

opportunity presented by Marcellus shale into the creation of new jobs, new businesses and
sustainable economic growth. John Augustine, community outreach manager for the Marcellus Shale Coalition, gave a
detailed presentation on the state of the industry, its economic impact and the anticipated growth over the next 40 to 50 years.
Augustine said the Marcellus shale region produces 12 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day and will soon surpass 13 billion cubic
feet per day. Augustine said the industry employs about 232,000 people with an average salary of $83,000 per year. Between
2010 and 2012, Augustine said there were 4,500 wells drilled, representing a $31.5 billion investment. He said the industry has
generated $1.8 billion in tax revenue since 2006. Webber said the gas industry has dramatically grown jobs for members of his
union. Since 2006, the union man hours have grown from 200,000 to 3.6 million in 2012. Yudichak said the natural gas
industry will power modern manufacturing plants, fuel more efficient vehicles and light the way for new technologies that push the
boundaries of health, science and commerce. (Times-Leader, 11/15/13)

Global war
Barry D Watts 2008; Senior Fellow, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, The US Defense Industrial Base,
Past, Present and Future, CBA,
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In.pdf
Since the 1950s, the

US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the United States,
the bombers and missiles on which
nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-

just as it was during World War II. American defense companies provided

area surveillance and targeting sensors, and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers. They also
contributed to the development of modern digital computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on
the moon in less than a decade, and played a pivotal role in developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President
Eisenhowers warning in his farewell television address that the nation needed to guard against the acquisition of undue influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. Usually forgotten or ignored has been an earlier, equally
important, passage in Eisenhowers January 1961 speech: A vital element in keeping the peace is our

military establishment.
Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be
tempted to risk his own destruction. Eisenhowers warning about undue influence, rather than the need to maintain
American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the percentage of
US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of defense
programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon performance. In fairness, the federal
government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of these programmatic
difficulties as US defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition
shortcomings. The main focus of this report is on a larger question. How

prepared is the US defense industrial base to

meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has largely ebbed, but new
challenges have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist
terrorist groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure in Iraq; the longer-term
challenge of authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and, not least,
the worsening problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex and
varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry. From a competitive perspective,
therefore, the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much a source of long-term advantage in the
decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s.

CP 1
Plan: The United States courts should rule that prostitution is legal
and should require states to:
-classify sex workers as employees and create regulations for sex work that ensure a safe and
healthy workplace, not including mandatory health screenings or licenses for individual
workers;
-require licensing for third-party operators, exempting single-operator owned entities with four
sex workers or less;
-prohibit employers from forcing a worker to engage in a sex act;
-provide recourse to workers whose employer violates these employment regulations

CP 2
The Congress of the United States should require that prostitution is
legal based on international human rights law, citing the Supreme
Court of Canadas citing the Supreme Court of Canadas decision in
Bedford v. Canada, and should require states to:
-classify sex workers as employees and create regulations for sex work that ensure a safe and
healthy workplace, not including mandatory health screenings or licenses for individual
workers;
-require licensing for third-party operators, exempting single-operator owned entities with four
sex workers or less;
-prohibit employers from forcing a worker to engage in a sex act;
-provide recourse to workers whose employer violates these employment regulations

CP 3
The United States Congresses should require that prostitution is legal
based on international human rights law, citing the Supreme Court of
Canadas citing the Supreme Court of Canadas decision in Bedford v.
Canada, and should require states to:
-classify sex workers as employees and create regulations for sex work that ensure a safe and
healthy workplace, not including mandatory health screenings or licenses for individual
workers;
-require licensing for third-party operators, exempting single-operator owned entities with four
sex workers or less;
-prohibit employers from forcing a worker to engage in a sex act;
-provide recourse to workers whose employer violates these employment regulations

1nc treaty power

Federal treaty power is strong now the plan shatters it
Corn & Brenner-Beck 15 (Geoffrey S. Corn, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law;
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals Corps, formerly the Armys
senior law of war advisor, supervisory defense counsel for the Western United States, Chief of
International Law for U.S. Army Europe, and served as a tactical intelligence officer in Panama;
and Dru Brenner-Beck, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals
Corps, formerly served as Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Armys Office of the Inspector General and
Chief, Military and Civil Law, U.S. Army Europe, former law clerk to the Honorable Carlos F.
Lucero, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and legal consultant on international law
matters, President of the National Institute of Military Justice; Exploring U.S. Treaty Practice
Through a Military Lens, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 38(2), forthcoming 2015,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399917)
VII. THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUILIBRIUM, TILTED TOWARD OUR AMERICAN VALUES Perhaps the only normative conclusions that can be
drawn from examining LOAC

treaty practice is that this area of treaty practice involves a continual search for
equilibrium between the nations sovereign prerogative to act in defense of its vital national
interests and the advancement of those interests through commitment to international legal
constraints. The search for this equilibrium in large measure parallels an analogous search embedded in the law itselfthe equilibrium between
the necessities of war and humanitarian constraint. U.S. LOAC treaty practice reveals the vital and at times competing roles
of the three branches of the federal government, and the inherent limitations of federalism, in
achieving this equilibrium. This search for equilibrium is similar to that conducted by James Madison himself. Considered a political
pragmatist, Madisons constitutional interpretations did not follow an evolutionary development. Instead, they pragmatically changed with
circumstances in order to maintain political equilibrium . . . equilibrium between national departments, the federal center, and the state periphery.268
This Article posits that similar shifts can be seen among the various branches, and between state and federal power in the maintenance of equilibrium
in the treaty power, with a small tilt toward an equilibrium that preserves American values. The Senate, in the early 1950s, consented to an
unprecedented expansion of binding international obligations through the treaty power.269 Accepting both the NATO Treaty itself, and the NATO
SOFA, as well as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Senate understood both the necessity of mutual defense arrangements and the concomitant
restriction on U.S. unilateral action.270 Because of the shared worldview between the President and the Senate that arose in the aftermath of World
War II and the advent of the Cold War, the

Senate understood and accepted the necessity of binding

international ties in the U.S. policy of active diplomacy, even when those agreements affected
both the rights of U.S. soldiers overseas and the jurisdiction of domestic U.S. state courts . These important treaties were
concluded at the same time as Senator Brickers failed attempts to amend the U.S. Constitution to overrule
Missouri v. Holland and limit the treaty powers domestic effects to those areas already strictly
within Congresss Article I powers. The rejection of the Bricker Amendment and the acceptance of these binding
international treaty obligations reflects an acceptance by the Senate of the necessity of a
robust treaty power at the federal level . Significant to the Senates acceptance of these limits on autonomy is the
perception that they reflected both American values and practice.271 By the 1990s, however, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, and the omnipresent
threat that had motivated the imperative of maximizing congressional and presidential consensus on foreign policy dissipated. No longer was foreign
policy conceived of as an area immune from partisanship and this change in national security perspective produced increased friction between the
Senate and the President in relation to treaty obligations. As a result, even seemingly uncontroversial treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons
Convention, were subject to divisive battles in the Senate during its consideration of their ratification. Similar opposition can be seen in the Senates
decades-long and still extant delay in considering Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, and in its passage of the 2006 Military
Commissions Act provision that prohibited the invoking of the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in habeas or civil proceedings in any U.S.
court. During this same period the courtsand most notably the Supreme Courtseemed to indicate a greater inclination to impose limitations on
national power through the treaty interpretation process. In Yamashita and Eisentrager, the Supreme Court in the late 1940s and early 1950s narrowly
construed treaty provisions to permit the military commission trials of General Yamashita and 28 German prisoners, even though this interpretation
was arguably a contravention of the humanitarian object and purpose of the 1929 Geneva Conventions. Yet, even at this time, vociferous dissents by
Justices Murphy and Rutledge advocated interpretations that reflected an inconsistency between a narrow and permissively oriented interpretation of
the Geneva Conventions and fundamental American values. 272 In 2006, however, the Supreme Court interpreted Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions to provide a floor of humanitarian protection to Salim Hamdan, invalidating his military commission trial conducted solely under
executive authority. Although subject to debate, the Courts decision to interpret Common Article 3 to apply to the non-international armed conflict
against al-Qaeda was an effort to fulfil the humanitarian purposes of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.273 Finally, the defeat of the Bricker Amendments
during the 1950s sustained the holdings of Missouri v. Holland and ensured that federalism would pose no real constraints on the treaty power.

Nevertheless, the

resurgence of federalism in the Courts commerce clause jurisprudence in the 1990s may
have predicted a similar return of federalism challenges to the treaty power. In its Bond decisions,
the Court recognized both that federalism protects the liberty of individual citizens, and that
treaties will not be interpreted to intrude on traditional areas of state responsibilities absent a
clear Congressional statement of their intent to do so. In its 2014 decision, the Court also cast doubt on Hollands
shorthand holding that a valid treaty equals valid implementing legislation, creating possibilities of attack against future
treaty implementing legislation. The three concurrences in that case would have gone even
further in restricting the scope of the federal treaty power, even in this core LOAC treaty, with
Justice Scalias eliminating it as an independent power altogether.274 This resurgence of
federalism concerns , particularly where the underlying treaty lies at the core of the treaty
power, may reflect an underlying new susceptibility to a treaty impacting a states
traditional role , something also seen in the 2008 Medelln decision. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, although sanctioning federalism challenges to treaty-based legislation, did not address the key treaty
power questions raised, preserving the broad ruling of Missouri v. Holland , at least for
the near future . VIII. CONCLUSION As in any political system, voluntary international obligations assumed by a nation reflect the values
and history of the nation acting on the international stage, both of which can change over time. In the U.S., the policy objectives,
views of the proper U.S. role in the world, and perception of U.S. values influence all three
branches of government as they fulfill their constitutional roles in the formation,
implementation, and interpretation of treaties. Although limited in number, because they implicate the core functions of the
national governmentforeign policy and national defenseLOAC treaties and the cases implicating them provide important insights into U.S. treaty
practice. The

role of treaties and international law influence all three branches search for the
equilibrium between national and international imperatives. Done against the background of their reverence for, and
commitment to, the law of nations,275 the Framers designed the Constitution to involve all three branches of the U.S. Government in formulating and
enforcing its international obligations. Although cases interpreting LOAC treaties are sparse, they do exist, and they do provide evidence of the
significant influence the judiciary has and will continue to have on the rules that regulate the use of U.S. military power. Perhaps the nation has entered
an era of a greater willingness by the judiciary to prioritize the object and purpose of relevant LOAC treaties over Executive interpretation. Such an
interpretive perspective would certainly help explain decisions like Hamdan and Noriega. Whether this perception is justified or exaggerated, it is
interesting that in the wake of the Hamdan decision, Congress sought to foreclose reliance on the Geneva Conventions as a basis for judicial relief. This
provision of the Military Commission Act of 2006 was, ironically, challenged by none other than General Noriega when he sought to block his postincarceration extradition to France based on Frances inability or unwillingness to ensure respect for his rights as a POW. The district court rejected his
challenge based on this statutory ban on asserting the Geneva Conventions as a source of right in U.S. courts, a holding upheld by the Eleventh Circuit.
None other than Justice Thomas questioned the validity of such a statute when he dissented in the subsequent denial of Noriegas petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court.276 Even more important, in the 2009 MCA, Congress significantly limited this bar. Ultimately,

this merely
reflects the ongoing ebbs and flows of influence asserted by each branch of our government on
the treaty creation, implementation, and interpretation process as each seeks the appropriate
equilibrium. It is also possible that the nation is experiencing an era in which Congress is taking a more
narrow view of international law as a mechanism to restrict U.S. national power; a narrowing
that can be seen through its role in LOAC formation, advice and consent, and statutory treaty
implementation. In its approval of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Senate embraced the imposition of binding international standards
governing armed conflict in large measure because it saw those standards as embodying the values and practices of the United States in the face of the
emerging Cold War threat from the eastern bloc. In other cases, the Senate, and Congress more generally, resisted treaties they believed limited U.S.
freedom of action in foreign affairs and war powers. Most notably, the

Senate has leveraged the advice and consent

process to compel Executive commitment to implement treaty obligations consistent with
Senate will, and at times to even assert pressure on the President in relation to matters in no way connected to the treaty. The ratification struggle
over the CWC illustrates both of these Senate practices, resulting in presidential concessions that were arguably inconsistent with the object and
purpose of the treaty. Limitations

imposed by the U.S. federalist system of government are also now

impacting the nations implementation of LOAC treaty obligations. The Bond case demonstrates
that individual citizens will have standing to contest the validity of implementing legislation or
perhaps self-executing treaties in circumscribing their behavior in areas traditionally reserved to
the states. Regardless, although not resolving Justice Holmes invisible radiations from the Tenth Amendment, Bond establishes that
implementing legislation will not be interpreted to interfere with the traditional division of law enforcement authority between federal and state
governments absent a clear statement from Congress of that intent. Given

the central concern of the Framers during the

drafting of the Constitution over the states interference with the fulfillment of national treaty
obligations, it is ironic that federalism may still have an impact on such an important function of
the federal government in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, while it is true that war is a challenge to law,277 it
remains an open question whether it is the law, or war itself, that must adjust. Leveraging the
nations military power to advance vital national security interests while advancing the
regulation of hostilities through the treaty power will, as it has in the past, impose
pressures on the three branches of the U.S. government and on our federal system itself.
Their actions in response will provide a lens into how treaties and i nternational law
itself will operate in U.S. practice in the future.

The plan shifts to a constitutional model that favors federalism

concerns over the treaty power
Powell 1 (Catherine Powell, Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School,
Executive Director, Human Rights Institute, J.D., Yale Law School, M.P.A., Woodrow Wilson
School in Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, B.A., Yale University, Dialogic
Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United
States, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, November 2001, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245-295
(2001), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3254&context=penn_law_review)
While the U.S. Constitution assigns the power to make and adopt treaties to the federal
government, several state and local governments have "adopted" human rights treaties and other
international norms, often in response to constituent pressures that are more effectively mobilized at the subnational level . For example,
in the absence of federal ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), San Francisco has incorporated "principles of CEDAW" into binding local law . In the death
penalty context, where the federal government has not yet opted to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR) , aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, a handful of cities have urged their states, and in
some cases the federal government, to support a moratorium, relying on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights' call for such a moratorium.
What are the

constitutional implications of this and other moves to bypass the federal government
in incorporating and enforcing international human rights ? Discussions about the allocation of
authority between federal and subfederal systems in the implementation of international human rights law typically proceed by staking out one of two
initial positions At

one end of the spectrum, a traditional constitutional theory takes a restrictive

view of state and local authority, envisioning hierarchical imposition of federally
implemented international law norms through the federal treaty power " and
determination of customary international law ' 9 by federal courts.'0 At the other end of the spectrum, a
revisionist theory assumes greater fragmentation and authority reserved to the states based on
federalism and separation of powers limits on federal authority ." "These divergent images capture different
moments of political promise and despair, at times focused on the immense power of the national project, and other times appreciating the vitality and

Under both models,

one system -either federal or sub-federal has a predominant voice in deciding when and
how international human rights law is implemented . Such either/or approaches seek to avoid the
conflict and indeterminacy created when the distribution of constitutional authority is
uncertain.13 At the traditional/hierarchical end of the spectrum, the conflict is interference with
the ability of the nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs , 4 posed by "divergent and
perhaps parochial state interpretations" of international law. ' 5 At the revisionist/fragmentation
end, the conflict, at its core, is interference with states' rights by federal courts (without authorization to do so by the federal
durability of forms of governance that, without . . . great resources, continue to have social and political force."12

political branches) and by

the political branches (particularly Congress, when it exercises the treaty

power to legislate in areas beyond those specifically conferred in the U.S. Constitution , Article 1,
Section 8).' While the two paradigms described here are idealized and oversimplify the subtlety and hybridity within these paradigms, in fact much
of the scholarship on federalism and human rights law in the United States loosely tracks one or the
other of these two models, if not always in its purest form.

Specifically, expanding state court jurisdiction to interpret and apply

treaties results in Status-of-Forces Agreement breaches and collapses
NATO cohesion and LOAC compliance
Brenner-Beck 14 (Dru Brenner-Beck, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge
Advocate Generals Corps, formerly served as Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Armys Office of the
Inspector General and Chief, Military and Civil Law, U.S. Army Europe, former law clerk to the
Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and legal consultant on
international law matters, President of the National Institute of Military Justice, Federalism
and the Treaty Power: Breaking the Bond(S) Between Nations: The Treaty Power and Status of
Forces Agreements, American University National Security Law Brief, 5(1), 9-4-2014,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2491979 *bracket edited for gendered
language)
B. Visiting Forces, Status Agreements, and the Usurpation of State Criminal Jurisdiction? The Bond case raises potentially significant federalism
concerns in relation to treaties regulating the means of warfare. However, a much more direct and potentially disruptive effect on the balance between
federal and state authorities in our Constitutional structure is produced by a different category of treaty related to military affairs: status of forces
agreements (SOFAs). Because the numbers of foreign soldiers present in the United States are relatively few in comparison to the numbers of U.S.
soldiers overseas, the effect of these agreements on the federal-state division of power has been infrequent Nonetheless, SOFAs offer an important
illustration of the intersection of treaty power and federalism concerns, and how Bonds clear statement rule could genuinely frustrate the nations
ability to advance its national security interests by reciprocally protecting allied forces from assertions of a states criminal power. The United States
hosts over 7000 military students from over 136 nations at 150 schools or installations nationwide under its International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program.144 Additionally, at least two German units are permanently stationed in the United States at Fort Bliss in Texas and at
Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.145 Thus, there are significant numbers of foreign NATO forces and family members as well as significant
numbers of non-NATO military personnel engaged in international exchanges present in the United States present at any given time. Although
relatively small in number compared with the number of U.S. forces and associated personnel residing overseas, these foreign forces and their families

With a far-flung military

presence in dozens of foreign nations, the United States currently has over 100 international SOFA
type agreements that address the status of military forces.147 These agreements can be bi-lateral, multi-lateral,
are involved in the same proportion of crimes and accidents as any other inhabitant of the United States.146

reciprocal or non-reciprocal. With the exception of the multi-lateral North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA- the only SOFA that is a
treaty148- most

SOFAs take the form of executive agreements, some of which are concluded on the
basis of authority contained in a treaty, while others are based on other congressional authority,
and still others, more loosely associated with other defense agreements or based on exclusive
executive authority.149 Because the domestic legal effect of the alternatives to formal Article II, section 2 treaties is far from settled, the form
of the SOFA can be critical is assessing its federalism impact. Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of the land under the Constitutions
Supremacy Clause, the effect of a SOFA concluded by executive agreement would not necessarily have the same domestic force and effect. Accordingly,

any interference with a state criminal prosecution arising from operation of a SOFA, particularly the
typical executive agreement type SOFA, could very easily trigger federalism concerns and state
initiated challenge to the effect of the agreement. Because the NATO SOFA jurisdictional
framework is considered a benchmark and model for all other SOFA type agreements,
examination of its criminal jurisdiction provisions is critical to understanding the potential
impact of SOFAs on federalism.150 Article VII of the NATO SOFA151 grants exclusive criminal jurisdiction where only the laws of one
state are broken;152 in all other cases the NATO SOFA grants concurrent jurisdiction to both the sending and receiving state. In other words, if a
service-member covered by the SOFA commits an act that violates the law of only one state, that state has exclusive jurisdiction. But in the much more
common situation where the conduct violates the laws of both the sending and receiving state, jurisdiction is concurrent. Within this category of
concurrent jurisdiction, the SOFA allocates the primary right to exercise jurisdiction to the sending state for acts or omissions arising from the
performance of official duties or for inter se cases where both the accused and the victim are members of the sending state.153 The receiving state is
granted primary jurisdiction in all other cases. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, either state may cede their right of primary jurisdiction to the other.

This jurisdictional

allocation creates the potential for interference with U.S. state criminal
proceedings in the two situations of concurrent jurisdiction: - cases arising from official duty and inter se cases.154 In both these situations, the
foreign sending State would have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, a right granted by an international agreement with the United States. This
means the

United States would be obligated to allow the sending state to assert jurisdiction and would
preclude the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction absent a waiver by the sending state. But what exactly is U.S. jurisdiction in such a
context? Does such a SOFA foreclose the assertion of jurisdiction by only the federal government? Or does the agreement prohibit the state from
asserting jurisdiction for a crime that occurs in its territory whenever the sending state chooses to assert its primacy under the SOFA? Considering that
most criminal law in the United States is administered primarily by the states, this is a profoundly significant question, and for the NATO SOFA treaty
was one explicitly considered by the Senate. Examples

of cases where the sending state has the primary right of

jurisdiction highlight the tensions that can emerge between state and federal authorities when
compliance with an international treaty or international agreement is at stake . Two hypothetical examples
involving the German forces stationed in Texas and New Mexico illustrate the potential for federalism concerns produced by the NATO SOFA.155 First,
recall that the SOFA grants the sending state primary jurisdiction for official duty offenses. If an on-duty German military member kills an American
citizen as the result of an automobile accident while driving an official German military vehicle offpost,156 the State of New Mexico or Texas would
ordinarily have jurisdiction to charge the German driver with vehicular homicide or other applicable criminal offense. However, because the alleged
criminal act occurred while the soldier was in an official-duty status, the German government (as the sending State) would have a treaty-based right to
assert primary jurisdiction for this offense.157 In the second type of case, a foreign military member might commit spouse or child abuse in the familys
off-post residence. Assuming both the victim and the accused in this hypothetical are German citizens present in the United States under the provisions
of the SOFA, this is an inter se case, and again, under Article VII Germany would have primary jurisdiction.158 It is easy to comprehend the
sensitivities of local prosecutors and courts in cases involving these and other types of criminal misconduct committed in their jurisdictions.159
Nevertheless, a local court would be expected to analyze the provisions of the SOFA to determine the treatyimposed limitations on the exercise of its

If,
local court refused to defer to the German assertion of primary jurisdiction - the outcome
mandated by Article VII of the NATO SOFA - the state through the decision of the local prosecutor or state judge, would
effectively force the U nited S tates to breach its international obligations . Interestingly, the Senate
own jurisdiction, and in these cases, forego prosecution or dismiss160 charges absent a German waiver of the right to exercise primary jurisdiction.
however, the

appears to have contemplated these type of conflicts when it considered the NATO SOFA during ratification hearings. In order to illustrate the potential
interference with states rights, the Senate explicitly discussed the impact of the

NATO SOFA jurisdictional sharing

provisions on a hypothetical foreign soldier in the United States involved in an automobile accident while on official duty resulting in injury or
fatality to a U.S. citizen. The Senate fully understood that if ratified, Article VII161 would alter state criminal law under the
Supremacy Clause, and further, it would regularly fall to the state courts to implement NATO
SOFA obligations. Thus, the Senate envisioned a local court determining its own jurisdiction under the SOFA and the Supremacy Clause
and dismissing any case in which the SOFA granted the primary right of prosecution to the foreign sending state. It is therefore clear the Senate
understood the seriousness of this potential

interference with U.S. state criminal jurisdiction. However, it also

understood that permitting this interference was necessary to protect U.S. forces abroad from the plenary
territorial sovereignty of allied receiving states, a trade-off certainly influenced by the expectation that U.S. forces would be affected by the SOFA far
more frequently than allied forces in the United States.162 In its hearings on the NATO SOFA the

Senate expressed the

understanding that state courts would comply with the Constitutions Supremacy Clause and
properly limit their own jurisdiction to try the foreign military member in accordance with the
SOFAs provisions. Furthermore, because the Senate considered the provisions of the NATO SOFA to be self-executing, Congress never
passed explicit implementing laws that would allow the federal government to compel dismissal of the state criminal proceeding if it believed the state
court did not properly interpret the SOFA provisions.163 Indeed, in its hearings the

Senate recognized that there was no

real federal remedy if the local state criminal court improperly determined that it
had jurisdiction over a visiting force member when the foreign sending state disagreed. Instead,
such disparate interpretations of the SOFAs concurrent jurisdiction provision would be left to the realm of international negotiation.164 Such an
unresolved breach could easily lead to retaliatory action by our NATO allies , affecting U.S.
military members and their families overseas, but also the integrity of the defense alliance itself . This is
especially true in our modern era, when unlike the height of the Cold War, foreign hosts of U.S.
forces often perceive the U.S. military presence to be of less interest to their own security than to
that of the U.S. Accordingly, enforcement of the NATO SOFA, and other analogous status
agreements, is functionally dependent on a state court recognition and application of the
SOFAs allocation of concurrent jurisdiction- recognition ostensibly mandated by the
Supremacy Clause for treaties , and from the federal government perspective, hopefully for executive

agreements as well. This enforcement is well within a state courts capabilities. However, should
a court prove obdurate or a local prosecutor unconvinced of the importance of these SOFA
provisions when weighed against local sovereignty and the interests of the local community, it
would prove difficult to enforce compliance with these treaty provisions . Ironically, this was a problem the
Founders certainly appreciated, as compliance with Treaty obligations was a driving reason for the failure of the Confederation.165 Nonetheless,

because they remove state criminal jurisdiction where the sending state has primary
jurisdiction, SOFAs affect a traditional and core area of state sovereignty in the most
fundamental way. Still, given that the Senate consented to the NATO SOFA Treaty as it was rejecting Senator Brickers proposed
constitutional amendment to overturn Missouri v. Holland, which explicitly permitted interference with traditional state prerogatives under the treaty
power, any state failure to comply with the NATO SOFAs jurisdictional provisions would be particularly ironic. Bond, as resolved by the Supreme
Court, only defers resolution of the extent of the invisible radiations arising from the Tenth Amendment on treaty-implementing legislation, and does
not address what limitations, if any, exist when, as directly contemplated by the Founders, the treaty is self-executing.166 other soFas: executive &

the United States is currently party

to over 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs.167 These agreements can be bi-lateral,
multi-lateral, reciprocal or non-reciprocal, and most SOFAs take the form of executive
agreements.168 The form of the SOFA agreement can arguably impact its domestic legal consequences. If the President is authorized by
congressional-executive agreements While the NATO SOFA is the sole SOFA concluded as a treaty,

Congress to negotiate and conclude international agreements on particular subjects, or if the agreement is approved by a joint resolution of Congress,

these Congressional-Executive agreements have been considered the equivalent of a treaty .169
Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of the land under the Constitutions Supremacy Clause, the domestic effect of a
SOFA concluded by congressional-executive agreement could arguably be subject to Bonds clear indication rule before
it could affect the traditional division of law enforcement authority between federal and state
governments. Although most SOFA agreements have been entered into as part of an overall mutual or bi-lateral defense or security
agreements, only the NATO SOFA and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA are reciprocal, posing federalism concerns in
their enforcement. As part of post-Cold War diplomacy, the PfP Agreement authorized the establishment of bilateral agreements between
NATO and individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries, usually former Warsaw pact countries, to encourage their democratization and integration with
Europe and NATO.170 The PfP applies most of the provisions of the NATO SOFA bilaterally between signatory states of the PfP and NATO member
nations.171 In 1994, Congress authorized the President to apply the provisions of the reciprocal NATO SOFA to PfP nations by entering into executive
agreements to that effect.172 As of 2012, an additional 24 counties are subject to the NATO SOFA through implementation of the PfP Agreement

Between
the NATO SOFA and the PfP SOFA, the U.S. has common reciprocal SOFA arrangements with
approximately 58 countries, amounting to over half the SOFA arrangements currently in
place.173 Just as the Supreme Court did not discuss the effects of its requirement for a clear indication that Congress sought to change the
through executive agreement, with the NATO SOFA implemented by a treaty, and the PfP SOFA by a congressional-executive agreement.

traditional balance of criminal authority, it also did not discuss whether and how such a clear indication would be shown when the source of the change
was a congressional-executive agreement, such as the PfP SOFA agreements. The

Senate in considering the NATO SOFA did

understand, and accept, the effect of the SOFAs criminal jurisdiction provisions on traditional
state criminal jurisdiction. While Congress clearly authorized the President to enter into these reciprocal PfP SOFA arrangements, and
because the underlying PfP agreement requires direct application of the NATO SOFA provisions to these new countries,174 they should have equal
domestic effect. Nevertheless, just as the effect of the Bond decision on self-executing treaties is unknown, so too will be its effect on a reciprocal SOFA
entered into as a congressional-executive agreement. Here, it is clear that reciprocity

was authorized by Congress in the

context of extending the NATO SOFA protections to PfP nations. Presumably, Congress in
extending these provisions did so with the knowledge that the NATO SOFA itself was a selfexecuting treaty, and applied directly to affect state criminal jurisdiction. Such common sense evaluation of
the statutory effect, however, may not be the sort of clear indication mandated by the Supreme Court in Bond. Conclusion Limitations
imposed on federal power pursuant to the U.S. federalist system of government are central to
our democracy. However the exercise of the national treaty power , and the implementation of
these agreements, have historically been immune from these limitations . This may no
longer be the case as federalism concerns are now impacting the nations implementation of
core LOAC treaty obligations . The Bond case demonstrates that individual citizens will have standing to
contest the validity of implementing legislation or perhaps self-executing treaties in
circumscribing their behavior in areas traditionally reserved to the states . Although not resolving Justice
Holmes invisible radiations from the Tenth Amendment, Bond establishes that implementing legislation will not be interpreted to interfere with the
traditional division of law enforcement authority between Federal and State governments absent a clear indication from Congress of that intent.

Lurking in the background are SOFA treaties, treaties that reflect fundamental foreign
policy , war powers , and national security decisions of the nation, but that similarly
implicate the core of traditional states areas of responsibility in our federal system. Given
the central concern of the Founders during the drafting of the Constitution over the States interference with the fulfillment of national treaty
obligations, it is particularly ironic that federalism may still have an impact on such an important function of the federal government in the 21st
Century. Awareness of the periodic ebbs and flows of the relationship between the nations treaty powers and federalism, against the backdrop of our
nations history, indicate that Congress and the President should directly address the federalism concerns extant in relation to adoption of treaties and
other international agreements. The current position of the Supreme Court reflects these historic divides. Just as our Founders wrestled with the

the Court should carefully

consider rulings, which in the name of federalism , emasculate [ weaken ] the nation as a
responsible international actor and compromise its vital national security
interests . In spite of Justice Holmes resolution of questions related to the scope of the treaty power framed by the outcome of the Civil War, and
creation of unified nation capable of acting on the world stage as a legitimate member of the family of nations,

President Eisenhower by the rejection of Senator Brickers proposed constitutional amendments, Bond seems to have only exacerbated federalism
uncertainty. The

political branches must take up the mantle and provide much clearer statements of their expectation that
treaties and international agreements, especially those related to status of visiting forces, trump
states rights.

Extinction
Farmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir
Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of
British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the
National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war, Business
Insider, 2-20-2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-couldescalate-to-war-2015-2)
Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict , posing an existential threat to our
whole being, Britains top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander
of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and
seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating
violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael
Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic
states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments absolutely
unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze
Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond.
Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia , which
is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact . He said the "resulting
ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more
difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former
director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use
conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown
last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its
borders. There was a danger these could be used not only for intimidation and coercion but
potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to
prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of
course a classic Soviet technique. He went on to say that the threat from Russia, together with the risk it
brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict , however unlikely we see it as

being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being. Nato has agreed to set up a
rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in
Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the
force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for
Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared
to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself
"sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by
European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr

Fallon said the Russian president might try to test

Natos resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine . A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack
such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic
tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel
Russian aggression whatever form it takes, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were warming up.
His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused
Mr Fallon of going beyond diplomatic ethics . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation
remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most
serious challenges his country was facing. "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."

1nc judicial budgets

Courts are effectively lobbying state governments now for budgetary
relief inter-branch relations are key
Hartley & English 14 (Roger E. Hartley, professor and director of the masters of public
affairs program in the Department of Political Science and Public Affairs at Western Carolina
University, and Melissa L. English, assistant professor of business law at Western Carolina
University, former civil litigator, J.D. University of Arizona, The State of State Courts: Efforts to
Improve Interbranch Relations in the Wake of Perceptions of Crisis, The Council of State
Governments, The Book of the States 2014, 10-15-2014,
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/state-state-courts-efforts-improve-interbranchrelations-wake-perceptions-crisis)
Efforts to Improve Intergovernmental Relations In the past five years, a

renewed focus has been placed on improving

the judiciarys intergovernmental relationships and crafting strategies that will help
courts negotiate the rough-and-tumble of the political process . Court officials at the
highest levels, public legal organizations such as the National Center for State Courts and the
American Bar Association, political scientists and legal scholars have shared this focus. The
result has been the identification of important opportunities for the judiciary to improve
intergovernmental relationships , and the development of innovative programs to develop
the opportunities and capacity for courts to advocate within the political process . One opportunity that
has been identified is for court leaders to build collegial relationships with the other branches so the
members of those branches understand the role of courts, their importance to the legal system
and their needs. In 2009, the American Bar Associations Presidential Commission on Fair and Impartial State Courts and the National Center
for State Courts sponsored a national summit in Charlotte, N.C., entitled Justice is the Business of Government: The Critical Role of Fair and Impartial
State Courts.23 The summit included 300 attendees and delegations for each branch of government from 37 states. It focused on the need to improve
relations among the branches and concluded that court leadership needed to become more assertive about the needs of courts. Among the conclusions
of the summit was for each delegation to create local plans for regularized communication with the other branches of government with specific
attention to legislation with an impact on courts.24 The 2013 annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court
Administrators in Burlington, Vermont, had a similar focus: Collaborative Justice: Interbranch Relations in the New Century. This meeting was
notable for including representatives from the National Governors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures. The Justices and
court administrators spent significant time discussing how to improve lobbying efforts with other branches. Among the findings were that judicial
leaders needed to create and maintain personal relationships with legislative and executive leaders.25 The attendees established a framework for an
institutionalized meeting structure where regular interbranch communication can occur and committed to build national partnerships with the
National Governors Association and National Conference of State Legislatures to work on policy agendas and research of interest to all three
branches.26 Courts

also recognize the necessity of internal and external reforms to increase the
courts capacity to lobby while also closing avenues for reprisal . In the context of
budget politics , external reforms include constitutional amendments to allow direct
submission of the budget to state legislators, legislative efforts to free courts of restrictive budget
line items and institutional changes inside courts that would build better strategic lobbying
efforts.27 Internally, courts can improve capacity for political engagement by devoting more resources to intergovernmental relations staff and
building internal lobbying processes that persist across budget cycles.28 Unfortunately, no research examining the amount of money and staff courts
devote to their intergovernmental relations work has been conducted. Other scholars have noted the importance of improving tactics and effective
messaging. For example, Jeremy Buchman, Associate Professor of Political Science at Long Island University, has documented how the U.S. Supreme
Court successfully lobbied for the Judiciary Act of 1925. The Act sought to reduce the U.S. Supreme Courts caseload by expanding the Courts
discretionary jurisdiction and forcing more parties to seek review by writ of certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court used improvement of court efficiency as
a means to persuade lawmakers.29 Research also documents strategy and successful efforts where federal court officials worked with the other
branches to build judicial institutions over time and the lobbying work of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.30 For example, court
officials at the federal level successfully lobbied for the Judiciary Act of 1891 that created the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and in 1939
Congress created the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. In

states, a host of reforms have been created in

partnership with state legislatures and governors like court unification of administration efforts,
changes to judicial selection methods, and support of specialized courts .31 Judicial leadership and tenure also

have been identified as being important to improving interbranch relationships. Effective

leadership is important to build

better relations with the other branches and to form partnerships . Rather arbitrary selection methods, limits on
the tenure of court leadersin Alabama, for example, presiding circuit judges are limited to three-year termsor mandatory rotation of judicial
positions and benches may fracture important networks once they are formed. For example, chief judges of the circuit and district courts are the most
senior judge in the federal court system. They may serve a seven year term or until the age of 70.32 An alternative to short rotations of judicial leaders is
longer terms with attention to judges with court leadership skills, providing mentoring and grooming them for succession into leadership, and giving
them the opportunity to serve longer or multiple terms. Courts also might create partnerships with outside organizations to help advance causes of
importance to courts. Courts in Tennessee, for example, have created partnerships with executive branch agencies that are participants in the court
system, including the prosecution and public defense bars.33 Partnerships

like these allow courts to have allies

that might raise the salience of court issues and needs that would otherwise be ignored
when the branch goes into the political process alone. In Washington state, the courts helped organize the Justice in
Jeopardy Commission, which included representatives from business, the bar, the legislature and others to lobby on behalf of court funding
increases.34 Conclusion Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard wrote the following about the need for effective court leadership on societal problems
and interbranch relations: A member of the judicial family is called upon to play roles that are not strictly a part of the classic adjudicative function,
but reflect instead the exercise of leadership in other ways, like lending a part of the credibility the judicial branch acquires over time to a very
important undertaking that society needs.35 The

crisis in court funding and efforts to alter the powers of

courts call attention to importance of the courts intergovernmental relationships and
how, without effective and competitive advocacy, court needs get lost in the rough
and tumble of the political process . While courts and allied organizations have a renewed focus on the importance of
intergovernmental relations, the effectiveness of emerging strategies and best practices still need evaluation. In addition, more scholarly research is
needed to continue to identify effective strategies for courts to improve their capacity and ability to lobby other branches, their tactics and how these
strategies compare to those of the executive agencies with whom courts compete.

The plan sours state inter-branch relations generates massive

controversy

Controversial rulings sour inter-branch relations and trade off with

efforts to secure funding
Amestoy 14 (Jeff Amestoy, former Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court, former
Attorney General of Vermont, Fellow at the Center for Public Leadership, Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, The Politics of Restraint: State Judicial Leadership in the 21 st
Century, Perspectiives on State Court Leadership Series, 4-30-2014,
http://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Experts/Court-leadership/Harvard-ExecutiveSession/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/Harvard%20Executive
%20Session/Politics-of-Restraint.ashx)
In an age of political excess, restraint is little valued as a source of political authority. By training, temperament, and judicial
function, state court leaders rightly conceive restraint as a virtue essential to the branchs
legitimacy . But restraint can provide state judicial leaders the standing to exercise the
necessary political dimension of their leadership . The restrained and prudent use of judicial branch authority
maximizes the capacity of state judicial leaders to exercise their broader responsibility as leaders of a
democratic society. The affirmative rights that typify many state constitutions (e.g., the right to privacy, the right to adequate education) often compel
judicial decisions that prompt public, legislative, and executive branch responses.4 The structure of state constitutional law provides legitimate roles for
the public, legislature, and executive in responding to judicial opinions.5 State constitutional amendments prompted by citizen initiative petitions or a
states legislative process are often a part of the constitutional discourse. Effective state judicial leadership recognizes that judicial authority is not
ultimate authority. The

politics of restraint cautions judicial leaders to be equally alert to nuances of

political engagement in judicial advocacy of programs and appropriations . Every state judicial leader engaged
in the challenges confronted by American society understands the inherent tension between the judicial responsibility to decide cases and the desire to
alter the social conditions that give rise to those cases. Problem

solving courts, of which drug courts, mental

health courts, and fathering courts are but three examples, represent responses of state
judicial leaders to the understandable desire to confront the fierce urgency of now. 6 Yet such
initiativeswhich require interaction with legislators and other stakeholdersmust be accompanied by a nuanced
calculation of both the cost of that political engagement and the risk of compromising
the distinct status of the judiciary as impartial adjudicators .7 Restraint provides a value for
state judicial leaders who are compelled to navigate the currents of interbranch relations . If
judicial independence is to be found in the freedom to design the architecture of ones own
restraint, state judicial leaders must be particularly attuned to how they expend political
capital in building the architecture. For example, a state judicial leadership initiative that seeks to
marshal legislative support for judicial appropriations by enlisting the lobbying power of the business
community could raise questions of its potential effect on the judiciarys reputation for decisional
independence. A judicial independence, historically rooted in the capacity to produce case decisions free from influence,
cautions restraint in utilizing a state judicial leaders political capital for protecting
funding when it may be needed to preserve decisional independence .8

Failure to mitigate court budget crisis slows economic growth and

collapses rule of law reverse causal prefer quantitative studies
Magnuson, et al 14 (Eric J. Magnuson, Partner at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.,
Vice Chair of DRIs Judicial Task Force, former Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court,
has more than 35 years of experience practicing law; Steven M. Puiszis, Partner and Deputy
General Counsel of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Secretary Treasurer of DRI, a member of its
Board of Directors and former Chair of DRIs Judicial Task Force, former President of the
Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel; Lisa M. Agrimonti, Shareholder at Briggs and
Morgan, Professional Association, currently pursuing Doctorate of Business Administration;
and Nicole S. Frank, Associate at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.; The Economics of
Justice, DRI, 2014, http://www.dri.org/DRI/webdocs/news/2014%20Economics%20of
%20Justice.pdf *bracket edited for ablest language)
Executive Summary In 1776, Thomas Jefferson decried that the king has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries. For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury. (Declaration of Independence, 1776).1
While Jefferson and the other Framers provided for an independent federal judiciary in the Constitution, no effective way has been found to address
the occasional choke hold that the executive and legislative branches exert on the federal and state judiciaries through control of the purse strings.

The reality is that the third and co-equal branch has been reduced to a supplicant in search of
funding from the two other branches of government. It does not bode well for democracy when access to the
justice system can be held hostage to political debate and often loses out to the competing
policies of the moment. While much has been made of the political/philosophical ramifications of this regrettable reality and its effect on
the timely administration of justice, little debate has turned on a more practical reality. That is, the economic effects of a woefully underfunded
judiciary on local economies or inversely the economic benefits of a fully funded judiciary on those local economies. That exploration is the purpose of
this paper. Citizens turn to our state courts when their lives are in crisis. But after

years of underfunding, many state courts

are unable to timely deliver the justice our citizens seek, and to which they are entitled. The business community
also relies on a functioning court system to efficiently resolve their disputes . Budget cuts in many
states, however, have required court systems to lay off staff, reduce court hours, close or consolidate
courts in some instances, and give priority to criminal cases that require speedy trial rules. This has resulted in significant
delays in resolving civil cases in jurisdictions where court funding has been cut. Delayed resolution through lack of
judicial funding inflicts widespread economic harm. Because of uncertainty in the outcome of a pending trial
or even a trial date, for that matter, businesses are reluctant to add employees, expand product lines, or
invest in capital equipment all of which affects the vitality of the local economy . From an economic

analysis, underfunded

courts have a profound negative impact on the state economies they serve.
Multiple economic studies independently demonstrate that the savings achieved through
funding reductions to a state-court system are exceeded by lost tax revenues and other harmful
economic impacts to a states economy. State court systems take up a minute percentage of a states overall budget, typically from
less than one percent to three percent. Thus, the overall savings resulting from cuts to a states judicial branch are relatively small. Because of the
courts structural composition, however, the vast majority of a state courts budget, sometimes as high as 96 percent,2 is consumed by the salaries of
judges, clerks, court staff, and probation officers. Cuts to the judicial branch often result in disproportionate job losses, diminished tax revenues, and
increased unemployment benefits. The relatively small savings achieved by cuts to a states judicial branch are outweighed by direct loss of revenues.
Moreover, these

budget cuts indirectly create additional social and economic problems for the state
and local governments. At a time when scarce resources need to be carefully managed, the relatively small investment
needed to ensure adequate funding of our state courtsa fraction of a penny for each tax dollarcan be made
with no significant impact on the other needs of state and federal government . In short,
adequate court funding is a smart use of the publics resources. Today however, this issue flies under the radar of the
public, and in many instances is ignored by the leaders of other branches of state government . A
2013 national poll conducted by the DRI Center for Law and Public Policy on our civil justice system revealed that only 40 percent of those polled felt
that our state courts were underfunded. (DRI National Poll on the Civil Justice System, 2013). A similar percentage expressed the view that state courts
were adequately funded, while another 20 percent of those polled had no opinion on the issue. (Id.) The

sad reality facing America is

that many of our state court systems are so poorly funded that they are at a tipping point
of dysfunction . We hope that this whitepaper will help to educate both the public and leaders of state and local governments that many
of our state-court systems are woefully underfunded to the extent that justice may end up being
rationed. Our state courts impact the lives of virtually every citizen in America . They are not
simply another governmental agency with projects that can be pushed into the next fiscal year. As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his 2013 Year-End
Report: The

impact of the sequester was more significant on the courts than elsewhere in the
government, because virtually all of their core functions are constitutionally and statutorily
required. Unlike Executive Branch agencies, the courts do not have discretionary programs they can
eliminate or postpone in response to budget cuts. The courts must resolve all criminal, civil, and bankruptcy cases that fall
within their jurisdiction, often under tight time constraints. (Roberts, 2013). It is not an understatement to say that
American democracy is built on our court systems. To protect our democracy and contribute to
the well-being of local economies, it is critical that our courts remain independent and
adequately funded. Thus, this whitepaper will document the evidence that our court systems are woefully underfunded; explore the impact of
underfunded courts on American society; and explain the urgent need for both the public and governmental leaders to recognize the value of a fully

No
matter how fair a law may be, if it cannot be enforced, it becomes meaningless. Our state courts
are constitutionally charged with upholding the rule of law and providing citizens with equal
access to justice . The fairness of our laws is rendered meaningless if our courts lack the
necessary resources to enforce them. The essence of American democracy is premised on a clear separation of powers between the
funded justice system, and restore adequate funding to the judicial branch. The First Purpose of Government: Upholding the Rule of Law

judicial, executive and legislative branches of government. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers No. 78 observed, there is no liberty, if
the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive branches. As the Supreme Court has observed: The Framers of our
Government knew that the most precious of liberties could remain secure only if they created a structure of Government based on a permanent
separation of powers. Indeed, the Framers devoted almost the whole of their attention at the Constitutional Convention to the creation of a secure and
enduring structure for the new Government. It remains one of the most vital functions of this Court to police with care the separation of the governing
powers. Pub. Citizen v. United States Dept of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (internal citations omitted). A courts mission, as part of an
independent branch of government, is to administer justice equally to all and protect the rights and liberties guaranteed by the state or federal
Constitution and laws. Enforcing

the rule of law requires resources, generally in the form of human

capital, which requires adequate funding. However, by constitutional design, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch of
government because it has been granted no influence over either the sword or the purse. (The Federalist No. 78). Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor
state constitutions address the level of funding the judicial branch should receive, nor how the adequacy of that funding should be determined. Rather,
funding is left in each instance to the executive and legislative branches of state government. Thus, state

courts are at the mercy

of other branches of government when it comes to funding . (Interview Lippman, 2013). While our courts are an
independent branch of government by constitutional design, [they] are also, in so many ways, interdependent, including with respect to [their]
budget[s].(Id.). Fully Funded vs. Underfunded: A Penny or Less Our

state court systemseven when fully fundeddo

not consume much of a states overall budget. In fact many states fund their courts at less than 1 percent and not
a single state in America spends more than 4 percent of its annual budget on its judiciary. (Gildea & Tews, 2012, p. 10 (quoting Edwin Meese III &
Robinson III, William T., 2012)). As a result: The proportion of state and local budgets represented by even a fully funded court system is quite small

in the range of 1 to 2 percent. (ABA Task Force on Preservation of the Justice System Rep. (ABA Task Force), 2011; see also DRI, WFOF in 2011
(Despite the broad services provided by our state court systems, they typically receive only one to three percent of a states budget.)). At the federal
level, for each citizens tax dollar, only two-tenths of one penny go toward funding the entire third branch of government. (Roberts, 2012; see also
Hogan, 2010 (same)). Nonetheless, state

court systems around the country are experiencing an underfunding

crisis as budget cuts continue. Because the judicial branch comprises such a small portion of a
state governments overall budget, cuts to the judicial branch result in little savings for state
governments, but trigger significant governmental, social, and economic costs . Notably, underfunding
state justice systems also raises serious constitutional issues as underfunded courts struggle to perform their constitutional duties. Citizens are
denied access to the courts and access to justice . In some cases, criminal defendants are denied their
right to a speedy trial, resulting in the dismissal of charges . (Gildea & Tews, 2012 (citing State v. Colbert, No. A10-55,
2011 WL 67785, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011) (reversing conviction for speedy trial violation)). More fundamentally, however, the failure
of the executive and legislative branches to adequately fund a state court system poses a
significant constitutional threat to the very structure of American government. To adequately
fund our state court systems requires only a little additional funding, but that modest investment will deliver
manifold benefits. National Trend to Underfund State Courts State courts are the cornerstone to justice in America.
Funding cuts to state courts have a particularly negative impact on our nations legal system
because they handle the vast majority of legal business more than 95 percent of all civil
and criminal litigation. (DRI, WFOF in 2011 p. 611 ; see also Interview Lippman, 2013). Despite the important role that state courts play,
the trend in judicial funding since 2008, or in some cases, over the last decade, has been flat or declining
nationally. (See Greenberg & McGovern, 2012). For instance, a 2013 Report by the Illinois State Bar Associations Special Committee on Fair and
Impartial Courts illustrates that appropriations to Illinois state courts have declined in inflation-adjusted (2002) dollars by 22 percent.2 (ISBA, 2013).
The budget allocation for the judicial branch in Illinois as an overall percentage is now barely one-half of one percent. (ISBA, 2013 at 1). Similarly in
Georgia, the judicial branch comprises a mere 0.89 percent of the states overall budget. (ABA Task Force, 2011, at 3). Professor Irwin Chemerinksy, of
the University of California Irvine School of Law, noted that in 2011, 42 states had cut judicial funding (Chemerinsky, 2011, citing NCSC). He cautioned
that the

decline in judicial funding will slowly erode services over time as staff are laid off, or not
replaced. The most visible impact of budget cuts is the reduction of court services. Reduced court services results in delayed
or denied justice which leads to a growing loss of public confidence and trust in our courts.
The Sacramento Bee recently reported that the Los Angeles County Court closed eight court houses and eliminated 511 jobs to address an $85 million
deficit. Overall, one in five court jobs was eliminated due to funding shortages (The Associated Press, Budget cuts lead, 2013).3 The California Trial
Courts Presiding Judges Advisory Committee undertook a comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of those cuts throughout the state through a survey
of 1,560 judges and 260 commissioners in 48 counties. (Goode, 2013). Contra Costa County Superior Court Presiding Judge Barry Goode described
cuts in court services ranging from closed court houses to reduced service hours and staff. As a result of reduced service capacity, the survey also found
significant delays and backlogs in processing times for various services including court closures and trial delays. (Id.). Indeed, in recent years,
California has closed 114 courtrooms, 22 courthouses, reduced hours of operation at 30 courts, and had furloughs as long as 58 days. (Robert, 2013). In
June 2013, the Los Angeles Superior Court announced its plan to eliminate 511 more positions resulting in 177 people losing their jobs, 139 getting
demoted, and an additional 223 people getting reassigned. (Robert, 2013). As the largest justice system in the nation, the impact of budget shortfalls is
quickly identified in California. But smaller states are suffering as well and beginning to document the adverse impacts. For example, states like Illinois
are reporting the impact of cuts over the last dozen years, which the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts reports has resulted in: delayed or
unfilled long-term, non-judicial vacancies; graded positions filled at the minimum salary; imposed moratorium on merit and performance pay
increases; encouraged use of videoconferencing to reduce travel expenses; and delayed technology purchases and upgrades. (ISBA, 2013). Alabama
courts are now closed on Fridays to save costs; Michigan cut as many as 49 judgeships through retirement and attrition; the Chief Judge of the
Supreme Court of Kansas announced a potential need to close all courts for as long as seven weeks; and courts in Iowa operate with staff levels at 12
percent below the staffing standard. (Voice America Radio Show, 2013). The chart below depicts the debilitating impact of budget shortfalls on state
courts nationwide. (Id.) [GRAPH OMITTED State Court Actions 20092012] As may be expected, these

ongoing cuts will

ultimately lead to the significant loss of public confidence in the judiciary as courts do less
justice less well in a less timely fashion. Impacts of an Underfunded Justice System Why Cuts Quickly Injure the Courts Much has
been written on the cost of the American criminal justice system, but the broader economic impacts of funding cuts to the
judicial branch have been overlooked or inadequately documented, making a precise cost-benefit analysis difficult. In todays age
of sequestration, budget cuts, and falling government revenue, no one seriously questions that both federal and state court systems are facing
significant economic challenges. (Rutledge & Brandenberg, 2013). The unique demands and restraints that are placed on our state courts make
trimming their budgets difficult. Chief Justice John Roberts noted this challenge in his 2013 Year-End Report when he explained that courts are
constitutionally mandated to resolve civil disputes that citizens bring to court as well as the criminal cases filed by prosecutors, and that prolonged

Courts have heavy

responsibilities to those they serve and little ability to trim their budgets in a manner that does
not affect capacity to provide those constitutionally mandated services, all during a time when
case filings, especially bankruptcies and foreclosures, are increasing . (Gibbons, 2011 at 3 Overall, the [federal]
Judiciarys workload is at or near record levels in most filing categories.). Courts across the country have responded to the
shortfalls in judicial funding will result in the delay or denial of justice for the people the courts serve. (Roberts 2013).

diminished resources with a remarkable effort to streamline, modernize, and digitize the judicial
process. (ABA Task Force, 2011, at 1213) (discussing the many forms that enhanced use of technology, which courts have taken in recent years to
reengineer to process for increased efficiency)). However, at the end of the day, justice is a human process . Cases
need to be decided by judges, and litigants, whether civil or criminal, deserve to see justice first-hand. Simply put, our system of justice
and our courts depend on public trust and confidence to function effectively, and when justice
becomes remote or unavailable, that trust and confidence suffers greatly . Just how little room the judiciary
has in its budget is underscored by the overwhelming portion of funds that go to human resources. Personnel expenses constitute the lions share of a
states judicial branchs budgetas much as 95 percent in Iowa. (Iowa Judicial Branch, 2010). Because the judicial branch requires predominantly
human resources to function,1 there are limited alternatives to dealing with budget cuts other than reducing staff or salary. It is understandable why
state courts have resorted to closing courthouses on certain days of the week, suspending jury trials, and enduring layoffs, furloughs, and hiring freezes
in the face of budget shortfalls. (Gildea & Tews, 2012). However, each of these actions reduces efficiency of our court systems and increases the time it
takes to resolve disputes. The justice system is more significantly affected by budget cuts when compared to other branches of state government. For
instance, in the 2010 Iowa study, there were at least twenty state agencies that weathered budget cuts without any layoffs. (Iowa Judicial Branch, 2010).
However, the Iowa Judicial Branch laid off more employees, cut more jobs, and required more unpaid leave than most state offices and departments,
including the regents. (Id. (quoting Chief Justice Marsha Ternus of the Iowa Supreme Court). While the judicial branch in Iowa employed only four
percent of the entire states government workforce, Iowas across the board budget cuts resulted in the judicial branch losing nearly half49 percent
of all the state government positions that were trimmed due to that budget cut. (ABA Task Force, 2011, at 5)). Delayed Justice Is Denied Justice: The
Human Impact of Underfunded Courts Courts deliver justice to the citizens of our statestaxpayers and voters. People turn to courts when they are
facing some of the most important and challenging times of their liveswhen they are facing divorce, bankruptcy, seeking protective orders, suing a
business partner, enduring home foreclosures, or even defending their own liberty. But when

the judicial branch is

underfunded, courts resources shrink and delays increase . As Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye noted regarding
Californias court system, [w]e face astonishing and harmful delays in urgent family matters, in business contracts, wrongful termination,
discrimination cases, personal injury cases across the board. (Koseff). Delays due to underfunded courts impact the people courts serve in a variety of
ways. Naturally, reduced funding restricts the courts ability to dispose of civil matters in a timely manner. Indeed, not long ago in Sacramento, Judge
Steve White told the New York Times: people are bringing lawn chairs to the court because of the long wait for civil services. (Robinson III, 2011). In
Utah, the average age of pending cases is up 84 days over the past two years. (Micronomics, 2012). Imagine waiting months for a court to finalize an
uncontested divorce or resolve a parenting dispute. In addition to causing delays in civil cases, underfunding the judicial branch triggers other
economic and societal issues in the criminal context. Probation is a low-cost alternative to incarceration, but in many states, the salaries of probation
officers are a part of judicial branchs budget. Funding cuts place the jobs of probation officers on the chopping block, and thereby increase the risk to
public safety when fewer officers are available to work with those placed on supervised release. Additionally, individuals who are ultimately found guilty
of a crime, but who can afford bail, remain out of custody for a longer period of time while awaiting trial as a result of the underfunding of our court
systems. By contrast, those

who are innocent, but cannot afford bail are held in custody longer. These
scenarios of delayed justice due to underfunded courts expose social costs and places public
safety at greater risk, in addition to wasted taxpayer dollars reflected in larger jail populations. Court delays are even affecting lawyers civil
litigation strategies. Judges in Los Angeles are discouraging parties from filing demurrers because those motions further delay an action. (Coe, 2013).
In addition, there are other, hidden costs resulting from delayed justice that impair a governments treasury. Because cuts to the judicial branch
inevitably result in layoffs, there is an immediate harm to the local and state economy in the form of lost tax dollars from those workers, and a loss of
other economic activity they would produce. (ABA Task Force, 2011, at 56) ([T]he reduction in state expenditures for properly functioning courts
even harms the state treasury itself because directly lost salaries and indirectly lost business opportunitiesresult in corresponding tax losses).
Moreover, delays in civil case dispositions create additional economic losses because litigants cannot invest or otherwise use their resources as they
might if the dispute were resolved. (Id.) In exchange for all these costs, taxpayers do not receive any benefit, but instead face other adverse economic
and societal impacts. Adverse Economic Impacts and Induced Effects of Underfunded Courts The

irony in cutting the funding to

our state-court justice systems is that those attempts to save money during economic downturns
are not only ineffective, but also handicap [depress] the states economy. A 2012 survey conducted by the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform documents that adverse impact. In that survey, 1,125 general counsel or senior litigators were asked: How likely
would you say it is that the litigation environment in a state could affect an important business decision at your company such as where to locate or do
business? Would you say very likely, somewhat likely, or very unlikely? (U.S. Chamber Institute, 2012, at 6). In response, 70 percent said that a states
litigation environment was either very likely or somewhat likely to affect an important business decision. (Id.) The delays

and other
service-related repercussions from the underfunding crisis translate not only to lower
performing economies stemming from increased litigation costs to existing local business, but
also result in the cost of lost opportunities for further economic development as businesses turn
away from states with underfunded justice systems. Four Studies Quantify Adverse Economic Impact Several
studies have independently quantified the impact of reduced judicial funding on the
state and local economy. While taking different approaches in their economic models, these studies each quantified losses
in the hundreds of millions annually to the state economies resulting from the underfunding of
the states court systems. Three studies found significant adverse economic impacts involving
direct, indirect, and induced effects that resulted from reductions in court funding, which in
turn led to longer case processing times. The fourth study focused primarily on a lost investment
model and similarly found significant adverse economic impacts . Two of these studies were authored by the
Washington Economics Group, Inc. (WEG)the first for the Florida Bar in 2009, and the second was for the Georgia State Bar two years later in 2011.

Micronomics, Inc. authored the third study, which evaluated funding cutbacks of the Los Angeles Superior Court in Los Angeles County as well as a
fourth evaluation of the Los Angeles County court system relying in part on information obtained from a survey of 42 states by the National Center for
State Courts (Micronomics, 2009). WEGs Studies in Florida and Georgia The WEG studies examined the total economic impact of reduced funding by
examining 1) direct effects on production resulting from increased demand; 2) indirect effects of the production changes for backward-linked industries
caused by the increased demand in the directly impacted industry; and 3) induced effects representing changes in regional household spending caused
by household income generated from the direct and indirect effects (WEG 2009; WEG 2011). In the 2009 Florida Study, WEG noted that funding for
Floridas state courts had declined annually since FY 20042005 in terms of inflation adjusted dollars, at the same time real property/mortgage
foreclosures and the states population were on the rise. WEG concluded that the backlog of real property/mortgage foreclosure cases caused by the
underfunding of the Florida court system resulted in a $9.9 billion loss annually to the states economy in direct costs, and an additional $7.2 billion in
indirect and induced costs to the states economy. WEG offered a best practice recommendation that funding be adequate for constitutional
responsibilities, stable, and equitable through the court system (WEG, 2009). In a 2011 Georgia study, WEG reached similar conclusions, but on a
smaller scale, basing its economic analysis on three years of declines in funding and a review of civil and domestic relations cases (WEG, 2011). Between
2003 and 2008, there was an 8 percent increase in Superior Court judges and a 24 percent climb in caseload. WEG concluded: The inadequate
funding levels of the States Court System have had adverse impacts not only to the statewide economy, but have also resulted in unquantifiable adverse
effects on business and professional activities throughout the Statethereby negatively impacting the business climate of Georgia (WEG, 2011). WEG
opined that funding reductions resulted in direct, indirect and induced economic impacts on the state of between $337 million and $802 million
annually. (WEG, 2011; Fulton County Sup. Ct., 2012). [CHART OMITTED Comprehensive Economic Development Impacts of Investing in the State
of Georgia Court System] The authors concluded an adequately funded and efficient court system increases the States ability to attract and expand
industries, improves access to legal services for residents, reduces costs to the State from inefficiency, and also improves the quality of Georgia
communities (WEG, 2009). Micronomics Group Studies Estimate Losses in the Billions WEGs studies do not stand alone. In 2009 and 2012, the
Micronomics Group prepared additional studies to evaluate the impact of court funding cuts . The 2009 study
focused on the County of Los Angeles (Micronomics, 2009). The Los Angeles Superior Court budget was set to accommodate deficits between $79
million and $140 million through 2012 to 2013. Weinstein & Porter determined that the cutbacks would prompt courtroom closures, operating capacity
reductions and lost court days, which Micronomics in turn concluded

would cause the following economic impacts:

$13 billion in lost business activity due to reduced use of legal services; $15 billion in economic
losses caused by litigation uncertainty; $30 billion in lost revenue to the county and state and
150,000 in job losses; and $1.6 billion in lost local and state taxes . (Micronomics, 2009). Micronomics
undertook a follow-up study in 2012, building on its Los Angeles County work and focusing on the direct impact of
judicial budget cuts based on the National Center for State Courts survey of 42 states (Micronomics,
2012). Using a proxy it developed for calculating the economic loss associated with delays in civil case processing, Micronomics concluded that
proposed funding cuts would cause estimated losses of $52.2 billion from increased
uncertainty on the part of litigants, excluding the direct losses from job cuts in firms and the
courts and related economic output. (Micronomics, 2012). A 2012 RAND assessment similarly noted the financial crisis and
subsequent erosion in state budgets has placed stress on court mechanisms at the same time that particular kinds of litigation, such as disputes over

Other studies
have also concluded that the difference between a high-performing economy and a lowerperforming economy is rooted in a functional judicial system . Richard E. Messick, international
foreclosure, seem to have increased (Greenberg, 2012). Economic Theory: Judiciary as Catalyst to Economic Development

consultant formerly with the World Bank, examined the economic impact of a fully funded justice system. (Messick, 1999). In particular, he reviewed
how Oliver Williamson, a World Bank Economist, distinguished economies based on the societys ability to enforce contractual obligations through its
judiciary. A

high-performance economy is one that is characterized by a significant number of

long-term contractsjust the type of business relationship that is unlikely to thrive in the
absence of a well-functioning judicial system. When the judiciary is unable to enforce contract
obligations, a disproportionately large number of transactions take place in the spot market,
where there is less opportunity for breaching contracts. Or, alternatively, firms circumvent the
judicial system altogether by vertical and conglomerate integration, turning arms-length
transactions into intrafirm ones. In either case, argues Williamson, the results are higher transaction
costs and a low-performance economy. (Messick, 1999 (Williamson 1995)). In his 1999 article, Judicial Reform and Economic
Development: A Survey of the Issues, Messick noted the widely held belief that judicial reform for developing countries will result in enhanced
economic performance (Messick, 1999 (citing Sherwood, 1995)). Among Messicks identified hypotheses is the judiciarys effect on enabling exchanges
between private parties, or enforcing contracts. (Messick, 1999). In a 1997 World Bank survey of 3,600 firms in 69 countries, unpredictability of the

Enforcement of
contracts is essential for economic growth (Messick, 2005). When entrepreneurs have confidence
contractual obligations will be met, specialization and the resulting increase in growth and
productivity can occur. (Messick, 2005). The most important public means of contract enforcement
is the court system, [n]ot only because they are an avenue of last resort in the event of a breach but because the threat of a lawsuit can
deter breach. (Messick, 2005). Messick also referenced the 2005 Word Development Report that affirmed the importance of
well performing courts for a better investment climate Better courts reduce the risks firms
judiciary presented a significant problem in their business operations (Messick, 1999 (citing World Bank, 1997).

face, and so increase the willingness to invest more in their enterprises . (Messick, 2005). The U.S. Chamber
Institute 2012 study supports these economic conclusions as it found that a states litigation environment affects important business decisions. (U.S.
Chamber Institute, 2012, p. 6) (only 10 percent of survey responses indicated that the litigation environment was very unlikely to affect an important
business decision)). With so much documented support that a fully funded state-court system improves economic development and underfunded
justice systems contribute to a low-performing economy, our attention must turn to change. All

stakeholders in our state-courts

system must grow the constituency of supporters of adequately funded state court systems . Actions
Already Taken to Address the Underfunding Crisis Various bar associations and the National Center for States Courts (NCSC) have sounded the alarm,
expressing the concern that further

reductions in funding threatens the ability of the courts to perform

their constitutional functions. The American Bar Association (ABA), DRI, and the American Association for Justice have similarly
expressed grave concern in the context of the 2013 sequestration noting that state courts have endured years of withering cuts despite overwhelming
caseloads (DRI, 2013). They jointly warned budget cuts through sequestration will impinge access to justice at the state and federal levels and put
court petitioners, staff and judges in harms way (DRI, 2013). The ABA has spoken out about the threats that cuts to the judicial system pose to our
democratic government and even formed the ABA Task Force on Preservation of the Justice System. The efforts have not ended there. In 2011,
Californians were encouraged to participate in hearings on the civil justice crisis held in major cities across the state. (Selbin & Steinbach, 2011). These
hearings were modeled after a similar effort in New York. (Id.). But these efforts have not resulted in much progress. (See State Bar of Calif. et al.
Findings & Recommendations, 2012). Legislators

have the ability to restore funding to the states justice

systems by appropriating funds at a level that not only allows courts to meet their constitutional
obligations, but also enables economic growth. The time for this investment in our states justice
systems is now . Legislative and Executive Branches Must Choose to Invest in the Justice System By neglecting to fund their
state justice systems, the legislative and executive branches will continue to harm and eventually
disable the third and co-equal branch of state government. We have to understand that underfunding our court system has
long-term, negative consequences and could wind up costing us much more than we would ever save financially in the short term. (Cooper, 2013). By
the same token, in

deciding to fund the justice system properly, the legislative and executive branches
have the ability to restore the judicial branch to its optimal state, improve efficiency, shorten
length of time to disposition, save significant annual economic losses to their states, and pave
the way for economic growth . The judicial branch cannot force this change of heart in its two partner branches of government on
its ownrest assured it has tried. In the spring of 2008, Chief Justice Judith S. Kaye filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York against New York
state legislators and the governor on behalf of New Yorks state judiciary, claiming that the nine-year freeze on judicial pay violated New Yorks
constitution. Kaye v. Silver, et al., No. 400763/08 (Sup. Ct., NY County, 2008); see also Larabee v. Governor of the State of New York, 65 A.D.3d 74, 77
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept 2009); Maron v. Silver, 58 A.D.3d 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept 2008). The theory was that by failing to adequately
compensate the state supreme court judges and other judges, Governor David A. Paterson and the legislature violated separation of powers and
independence of the judiciary. But while [t]he intersection of the separation of powers and judicial compensation has a lengthy history, the
legislature, in truth, makes decisions about appropriating funds for judicial compensation and the judicial branch in general. (See Larabee, 65 A.D.3d at
99). The decision rests with the other branches. Committees may make recommendations to the legislature but the legislators must agree and decide to
adequately fund the judicial branch. Conclusion The

role of the judicial branch cannot go overlooked or

undervalued. The cost is simply too great. Federal and state governments are premised upon the framework of three fully
functioning branches of government. An adequately funded judiciary would only require a penny more per dollar, or in some cases, a fraction of a
penny per dollar, from tax dollars. Any savings to a state government from cuts to the justice system are insignificant compared to a governments
overall financial set-backs and create other, hidden costsboth social and economic. By contrast, the

impact of funding cuts on the

judicial branch is drastic and undermines a courts ability to fulfill its constitutional duties. The judicial branch has a
massive impact on the success of government, social cohesion, and economic stability . A
fully funded justice system offers business consumers a better investment climate, deterred
breach of contract, and enforcement of private contracts, and an efficient disposition of matters.
The case is overwhelming that the first priority of government in times of shortage should be a strong,
effective, and adequately funded justice system .

Extinction
Richard N. Haass 13, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/30/13, The World
Without America, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-ofamerican-power-by-richard-n--haass
The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising
China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the
biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system,
Let me posit a radical idea:

and slow economic growth in short, the domestic foundations of American power . Readers in other countries may be
tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in Americas difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been
guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between Americas practices and its principles understandably
provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at Americas imperfections and struggles
ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for.

Americas failure to deal with its internal challenges would

come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the worlds stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for
about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, Americas capacity to consume other countries goods
and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and
Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery . The
US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the worlds citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More
recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other
societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a

the US has long been a leading example of what market economies

and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely
to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding . Finally, the world faces many
serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of w eapons of m ass d estruction, fight climate
change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to
significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally,

regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts .
These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out . While Adam Smiths invisible hand may
ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics . Order requires the visible hand of
leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges. Dont get me wrong: None of this is
meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the worlds problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems

multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and

implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the
necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in
order economically , physically, socially, and politically if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the
world . Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia,
Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all . Such a world would almost certainly be
characterized by chronic crisis and conflict . That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet s
suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But

inhabitants.

AND, rule of law stops pandemics

Greco 5 (Michael, president of the American Bar Association, Miami Daily Business Review,
12/5, lexis)
the rule of law is so
central to everything the legal community stands for, both in the U nited S tates and around
the worl d. And second, because we increasingly find that our nation's top international priorities-defeating
terrorism, corruption and even the spread of deadly diseases-are being undone at the ground level by
What makes the rule of law so important that it attracted such a distinguished community? First, because

poor governance and lawlessness. As Rice eloquently told the gathering, "In a world where threats pass even through the most fortified boundaries,

weak and poorly governed states enable disease to spread undetected , and corruption to
multiply unchecked, and hateful ideologies to grow more violent and more vengeful." The only real antidote to these global
threats is governments, in all corners of the world, that operate with just, transparent and consistent
legal systems that are enforced b y fair and independent judiciaries . These issues are not just the
province of distant foreign governments. Building the rule of law must begin at home . Recent revelations in our own countrythat the CIA has maintained secret prisons for foreign detainees-underscore the urgent need for an independent, nonpartisan commission to
investigate our treatment of such prisoners.

Extinction
Casadevall 12 (Arturo Casadevall, Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology
and Immunology, Professor in the Division of Infectious Diseases, and Director of the Center for
Immunological Sciences, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, The future of biological warfare,
Microbial Biotechnology, 5(5), September 2012, p.584-585,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/abstract)
In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this
writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing
asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats
the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid
impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent

decades have provided

unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although
infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was
responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously,
the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that
many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was
naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from
the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of
hostmicrobe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to
itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential
threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number
somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a
consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

1nc backlash
Plan causes overwhelming federal backlash turns case
Posner 8 (Eric Posner, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, Medellin and
America's ability to comply with international law, Slate, 3-25-2008,
http://www.slate.com/content/slate/blogs/convictions/2008/03/25/medellin_and_america_s
_ability_to_comply_with_international_law.html)
academic theory that holds that the type of litigation (sometimes called " transnational
legal process ") exemplified by the Medellin case would eventually bring the United States into greater and greater
compliance with i nternational law . But with the benefit of hindsight, we see that the opposite has been
the case . The U.S. government reacted to this litigation by withdrawing from the protocol
that gave the ICJ jurisdiction over these cases, and the U.S. Supreme Court has reacted to this
litigation by weakening the domestic effect of treaties , expressing discomfort with
international adjudication and making clear that the president lacks the power to compel the states to comply with treaties. The
United States will violate or withdraw from i nternational law when its national government
wants to, and sometimes it will do so even when its national government does not want to.
There is an

Crushes diplomacy and turns cred

Wilkinson 4 (J. Harvie Wilkinson, Circuit Judge for the 4th Circuit, Debate: The Use of
International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 423, 2004)
So of course international law should play a part in American judicial reasoning. It would be odd if it did not. In
some areas, foreign and international law is made relevant by our Constitution, by statute or treaty, by the well-developed principles of common law, by
overwhelming considerations of comity, or simply by private commercial agreement of the parties. But

when judges, on their own

motion and without any direction by Congress or the Constitution decide to make such
precedents relevant, we are dealing with an entirely different question. So judges must not wade,
sua sponte, into i nternational law 's deep blue sea. Rather, we ought to ask: How does American law make foreign or
international standards relevant? Why should we ask this threshold question? Because it is important that the United States speak
with one, not multiple, voices in foreign affairs . The Constitution is explicit on this: Article I, Section 10 says
that "no State shall enter into any Treaty [or] Alliance" with a foreign power. 9 The Constitution leaves the conduct of foreign
and military affairs largely to the political branches -- not the courts. The diplomatic
credibility of the United States would plummet if the actions and pronouncements of the
executive and legislative branches in foreign and military matters were later repudiated and
contradicted by judicial decree. Where courts go too far, in my view, is where they rely upon
international (and mostly European) precedents when resolving important and contentious social issues. This
"internationalization" of the Constitution on domestic social issues raises three types of problems.

Effective diplomacy prevents nuclear war

Douglas Ross, professor of political science, 1999; professor of political science at Simon
Fraser University, Canadas functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass
destruction, International Journal, p. lexis
Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been
willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all

for, a
proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international
conflict and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not police
the world alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United
States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the U nited S tates and other leading powers
in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the
world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD .
worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes

Adv 2

WMD TerrorismNo Impact

No nuke terrorthis card is unbeatable
Weiss 2/13visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at
Stanford
(Leonard, On fear and nuclear terrorism, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2015 vol. 71 no. 2 75-87, dml)

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives
of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful
world. Although

there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he
was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no
doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously
toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is
virtually nonexistent . This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not
hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder : In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington,
DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the
entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out
shopping.
Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional
weapons to ply their trade.

If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or

commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even
more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by
terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time ,
planning , resources , and expertise , with no guarantees that an acquired device would
work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a groups more immediate activities and
goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished . While absence
of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search
for Saddams nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic
consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:
Nuclear terrorismturns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban
legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies,
allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only
the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26)
The three ways terrorists might get a nuke
To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, consider

the three possibilities for

terrorists to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state;
manufacture one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring .
Stealing nukes. Nothing

is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves,

which have multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and
surveillance, electronic locks (including so-called permissive action links that prevent detonation unless a code is
entered into the lock), gated and locked storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders
if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have such protections, and
there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since
no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own
weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning
a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry

them off in the face of such layers of protection is

thief is an insider.

extremely low but it isnt impossible, especially in the case where the

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were loose nukes in the USSR,
based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 suitcase nukes that had
been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it
is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the
device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.
Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan

is frequently suggested as
a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders
sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists inherit nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has
devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons
in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra
base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes,
not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan

is
not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international
assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in
somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear
security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012).
However, the

weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree
of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more
vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were
subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles,
but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.)
Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by
a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United
States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but its also not a reason to conclude that
Pakistans nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility
of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources
tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistans nuclear arsenal
does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back
burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al
Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who
supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistans nuclear activities.

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which
terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear
weapon. There

are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses
control of a weapon, it cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended.
Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before
or after the fact of its detonation (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately
result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful
deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.
Although these first two ways in which terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon have very small probabilities of occurring (there is
no available data suggesting that terrorist groups have produced plans for stealing a weapon, nor has there been any public
information suggesting that any nuclear weapon state has seriously considered providing a nuclear weapon to a sub-national group),
the probabilities cannot be said to be zero as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an
appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon
manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactorgrade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive

target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon
states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.
But terrorist

use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an
implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult
technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade
plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available
through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present
themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment
could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the
high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods
would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation
suggests an extremely low probability of technical success . More likely, according to one wellknown weapon designer,4 would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device.
There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could
conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards
system. But this scenario would

require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on

which safeguards in that state are based and adds another layer of complexity to an operation
with low probability of success.
The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium , which presents fewer technical
challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a gun type design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has
sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a
subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The
probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More
likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of
radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear fizzle that could be quite damaging
locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension.

stealing that
much highly enriched material (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) is a
major problem for any thief and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts
of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two
decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the
material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for
still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for
HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the
In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms,

feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would
likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the
needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no
argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first
raised it in the early 1970s5 and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard
dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978).
Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are
acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.
Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain
such material by terrorist groups, there is only one known case of a major theft of HEU . It involves a US
government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s at a time when security and materials
accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government with the probable
involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, not a sub-national terrorist group intent on making its own weapons
(Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The

circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and

there was significant information about the contractors relationship to Israel that should have
rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft

underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for
making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though
low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there

has been a significant effort to increase

protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental
organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials6 and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the
Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the
materials as secure as the weapons themselves.
Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons?
A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for

there is
little to no evidence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to
obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for
fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment,

nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant.
There

is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the
Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a
variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum
Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the

nuclear weapon effort stalled and was

abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the
Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing
close surveillance.
What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to
enable them to operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly
dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new
caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized
government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack ? Building a new
Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has
become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and
use of nuclear weapons by IS.

Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time , money , and
infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery
that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives
and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its
operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful
prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further
the probability of a successful effort.

Adv 1

AT: State Courts

State courts accomplish nothingaff just adds another layer of
confusion to an issue devoid of consensus
Posner 12/4/2014 professor of law at the University of Chicago (Eric, The Guardian, The
case against human rights, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-againsthuman-rights)

The reason these kinds of problems arise on the international but not on the national
level is that within countries, the task of interpreting and defining vaguely worded rights, and
making trade-offs between different rights, is delegated to trusted institutions. It was the US
supreme court , for example, that decided that freedom of speech did not encompass fraudulent, defamatory, and obscene
statements. The American public accepted these judgments because they coincided with their moral views and because the court
enjoys a high degree of trust. In principle, international institutions could perform this same function. But the international
institutions that have been established for this purpose are very weak.

there is a drastic lack of

consensus between nations. To avoid being compelled by international institutions to
recognise rights that they reject, countries give them little power. The multiple institutions lack
a common hierarchical superior unlike national courts and thus provide conflicting
interpretations of human rights, and cannot compel nations to pay attention to them. That is why, for
instance, western countries have been able to disregard the human rights councils endorsement of
defamation of religion, the idea that criticism of Islam and other religions violates the human rights of those who practice
In truly international human rights institutions, such as the UN human rights council,

those religions.

Torts
Particularly causes a surge of extra-territorial torts theyre terrible
turns case
Parrish 13 (Austen L. Parrish, Professor of Law and Interim Dean, Southwestern Law
School, former Professor of Law, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, State Court
International Human Rights Litigation: A Concerning Trend? Faculty Publications, Paper 882,
2013, http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/882)
A new, but somewhat predictable, phenomenon is beginning to emerge in the human rights field.
Reluctant to re-embrace more traditional international lawmaking and faced with higher hurdles to successfully
asserting Alien Tort Statute claims in U.S. courts, advocates have begun to experiment with alternative strategies
for redressing human rights violations. One strategy involves state court litigation.' State courts are emerging
as the next battleground in efforts to incorporate international human rights norms
into American law and to advance respect for human rights generally.2 Some predict that
state courts, applying state constitutional, statutory, or common law, may prove a particularly promising venue for
the recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights.3 This strategy, while just now emerging in the human rights
context,4 is not unfamiliar. Human rights activists draw on and imitate the strategies of others .5 In the
1970s, the state constitutional rights movement sought out state courts when federal courts grew less receptive to recognizing certain kinds of civil
liberties.6 More recently, international environmental rights activists have asserted state claims as a way to address global climate change and other
transboundary harms when opponents have stymied international lawmaking efforts.7 In both contexts, the

retreat to state courts on

some level represented defensive maneuvers: attempts to eke out marginal gain when other avenues for
progress were blocked . Both movements hearkened back to an earlier time, when the bench and bar were more preoccupied with
application of state, rather than federal, law.8 This Article explores the parallels between the recent willingness to consider state court litigation to
remedy human rights violations occurring abroad and earlier attempts to use similar strategies to advance other causes, particularly those implicating
environmental rights. The exploration is made in three steps. First, I sketch the emerging phenomenon where advocates

and scholars
have urged greater use of state law remedies to advance human rights. Second, I describe how a
parallel strategy was recently employed in the international environmental law context and how that strategy also traces back to the state rights
movement from the 1970s. Finally, I end on a note of caution. Asserting

state claims in state courts, unconnected to

treaty regimes and as a way to advance international human rights for human rights
violations occurring abroad (i.e., Alien Tort Statute-ty pe litigation), has its drawbacks. State court litigation is at
best a short-term palliative . Over the longer haul, it potentially places human rights on a
weaker , defensive footing. State court litigation-similar to its federal analogue is likely to prove a poor
substitute for more traditional, multilateral, and collaborative international lawmaking .

IHRL Fails
IHRL fails prefer quantitative empirical analysis
Landman 5 (Todd Landman, senior lecturer in the department of government and member
of the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, Protecting Human Rights: A
Comparative Study, October 2005, http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/protectinghuman-rights)
In Protecting Human Rights, Todd Landman provides a

unique quantitative analysis of the marked gap

between the principle and practice of human rights. Applying theories and methods from the fields of international law,
international relations, and comparative politics, Landman examines data from 193 countries over 25 years (19762000) to assess the growth of the international human rights regime, the effect of law on actual
protection, and global variation in human rights norms. Landman contends that human rights foreign
policy remains based more on geo-strategic interest than moral internationalism . He argues
that the influence human rights ideals have begun to have on states cannot be separated from
the broader impact of socioeconomic changes that swept the globe in the late twentieth
century. Landman concludes that i nternational law alone will not suffice to fully protect human
rightsit must be accompanied by democratic government, effective conflict resolution, and just
economic systems.

AT: HR Cred/Treaties
Rights are doomed in the US and globally
Posner 12/4/2014 professor of law at the University of Chicago (Eric, The Guardian, The
case against human rights, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-againsthuman-rights)

We live in an age in which most of the major human rights treaties there

are nine core treaties have been ratified

by the vast majority of countries. Yet it seems that the human rights agenda has fallen on hard times. In
much of the Islamic world, women lack equality, religious dissenters are persecuted and political
freedoms are curtailed. The Chinese model of development, which combines political repression and economic liberalism,
has attracted numerous admirers in the developing world. Political authoritarianism has gained ground in Russia,
Turkey, Hungary and Venezuela. Backlashes against LGBT rights have taken place in countries as
diverse as Russia and Nigeria. The traditional champions of human rights Europe and the United States
have floundered. Europe has turned inward as it has struggled with a sovereign debt crisis, xenophobia towards its Muslim
communities and disillusionment with Brussels. The United States, which used torture in the years after 9/11 and
continues to kill civilians with drone strikes , has lost much of its moral authority. Even age-old
scourges such as slavery continue to exist. A recent report estimates that nearly 30 million people are forced against their will to
work. It wasnt supposed to be like this.

Human rights through i-law failsimpact is academic junk

Posner 12/4/2014 professor of law at the University of Chicago (Eric, The Guardian, The
case against human rights, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-againsthuman-rights)

At a time when human rights violations remain widespread, the discourse of human rights continues to flourish.
The use of human rights in English-language books has increased 200-fold since 1940, and is used today 100 times more often
than terms such as constitutional rights and natural rights. Although

people have always criticised

governments, it is only in recent decades that they have begun to do so in the distinctive idiom of
human rights. The United States and Europe have recently condemned human rights violations in
Syria, Russia, China and Iran. Western countries often make foreign aid conditional on human rights and have even
launched military interventions based on human rights violations. Many people argue that the incorporation of the idea of human
rights into international law is one of the great moral achievements of human history. Because human rights law gives rights to all
people regardless of nationality, it deprives governments of their traditional riposte when foreigners criticise them for abusing their
citizens namely sovereignty (which is law-speak for none of your business). Thus, international human rights law provides
people with invaluable protections against the power of the state.

Why, for example, do

more than 150 countries (out of 193 countries that belong to the UN) engage in torture? Why has the number of
authoritarian countries increased in the last several years? Why do women remain a subordinate class in nearly
all countries of the world? Why do children continue to work in mines and factories in so many countries?
And yet it is hard to avoid the conclusion that governments continue to violate human rights with impunity.

The truth is that human rights law has failed to accomplish its objectives. There is little
evidence that human rights treaties , on the whole, have improved the wellbeing of people. The
reason is that human rights were never as universal as people hoped, and the belief that they could be forced upon
countries as a matter of international law was shot through with misguided assumptions from the very

beginning. The human rights movement

shares something in common with the hubris of development

economics , which in previous decades tried (and failed) to alleviate poverty by imposing top-down solutions on developing
countries. But where development economists have reformed their approach, the human rights movement has yet to acknowledge its
failures. It is time for a reckoning.

Multilat Fails
Multilat fails
Langenhove, 11 Luk Van, Director of the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Institute
of the United Nations University (Multilateralism 2.0: The transformation of international
relations, UN University, 5/31/11, http://unu.edu/publications/articles/multilateralism-2-0the-transformation-of-international-relations.html)Red

Two major developments are currently transforming the multilateral system. The first is the trend towards multi-polarity as expressed by the rising
number of states that act as key players. There have been times when only a few or even one player dominated the geopolitical game. But today it seems
that several states are becoming dominant players as global or regional actors. The (voting) behavior of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa) in the UN and their presence in the G20 illustrates this trend. The second development, meanwhile, is that

new types of

actors are changing the nature of the playing multilateral field. Regions with statehood properties are increasingly
present in the area of international relations. Since 1974, the European Union (EU) for instance has been an observer in the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA). But on 3 May 2011, UNGA upgraded the EUs status by giving it speaking rights. And that same resolution opens the door for other
regional organizations to request the same speaking rights. Undoubtedly, this is what is what will happen in the near future. But as stated by some UN
members in discussions on this resolution, this could unbalance the one state, one vote rule within the UN. On the other hand, this opening towards
regional organizations brings with it new opportunities. Together these two developments illustrate that multilateralism

is no longer
only a play between states: various regions as well as other actors are present and are
profoundly changing the multilateral game. But thinking about multilateralism is still very much
based upon the centrality of states: they are regarded as the constitutive elements of the multilateral
system and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. This implies
that international politics is regarded as a closed system in at least two ways: firstly, it spans the whole world; and,
secondly, there are huge barriers to enter the system. Many authors have pointed to all kinds of dys-functions such as the complexity
of the UN system with its decentralized and overlapping array of councils and agencies, or to the divides between developed and developing countries.

The emergence of truly global problems such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and many others
have indeed led to an increasing paradox of governance. As Thakur and Van Langenhove put it in Global Governance (2006,
12:3) [t]he policy authority for tackling global problems still belong to the states, while the sources
of the problems and potential solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level. As
such the building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be less and less capable of
dealing with the challenges of globalization. But because the multilateral world order is so dependent
on the input of states, multilateralism itself is not functioning well. From an open to a closed system One way to
capture the above-mentioned developments is to use the metaphor of multilateralism 2.0 in order to stress how the playing field and the players in
multilateralism are changing. The essence of the Web 2.0 metaphor is that it stresses the emergence of network thinking and practices in international
relations, as well as the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to an open system. In multilateralism 1.0 the principle actors in the inter-state
space of international relations are states. National governments are the star players. Intergovernmental organizations are only dependent agents
whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the states allow them to go. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations. In
contrast, in multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion of
sovereignty. Regions are one such type of actor. Conceived by states, other

players can have statehood properties and as

such aim to be actors in the multilateral system. Regional organizations especially are willing
and able to play such a role. But sub-national regions as well increasingly have multilateral
ambitions as demonstrated by their efforts towards para-diplomacy. As a result international relations is
becoming much more than just inter-state relations. Regions are claiming their place as well. This has major consequences for how international
relations develop and become institutionalized, as well as for how international relations ought to be studied. What was once an exclusive playing
ground for states has now become a space that states have to share with others. It is a fascinating phenomenon: both supra- and sub-national
governance entities are largely built by states and can therefore be regarded as dependent agencies of those states. However, once created, these
entities start to have a life of their own and are not always totally controllable by their founding fathers. These new sub- and supra-entities are knocking
on the door of the multilateral system because the have a tendency to behave as if they were states. This actorness gives them, at least in principle, the
possibility to position themselves against other actors, including their founding fathers! All

of this has weakened the

Westphalian relation between state and sovereignty. One state, one vote Organizing multilateralism in a state-centric
would only be possible if all states are treated as equal. This means that irrespective of the differences in territorial size, population size, military power
or economic strength, all states have the same legal personality. Or in other words, the Westphalian principle of sovereign equality means working with
the principle of one state, one vote, although it is universally acknowledged that this principle does not correspond to the reality. In multilateralism
2.0 this could be balanced through a more flexible system that compares actors in terms of certain dimensions (such as economic power) regardless of
the type of actors they are. In other words, one can for instance compare big states with regions or small states with sub-national regions. This allows
not only a more flexible form of multilateralism. It could perhaps also lead to a more just system with a more equal balance of power and

representation. Within the present multilateral system, the UN occupies a major position. But, in order to adapt to the emerging mode 2.0 of
multilateralism, it needs to open up to regions. This is a problem, as the UN is a global organization with sovereign states as members. Indeed, the way
the UN is organized, only sovereign states, the star players, can be full members (see Article four of the UN Charter). Even though the EU was granted
speaking rights, it was not granted voting rights. Chapter VIII of the Charter also mentions the possibility of cooperation with regional organizations
and right

from its conception there have been attempts to go beyond a state-centric approach.
However, for many years now, the UN has struggled with the question of what place supranational regional organizations should and could take in achieving UN goals. On one end of the spectrum is
the position that regionalism blocks the necessary global and universal approach needed to solve the problems of today. At the other end there is the
position that regionalism can serve the overall goals of the UN. Obviously, the question is not only a philosophical one. Rather, it is also about power of
institutions. Are regional organizations weakening the UN or can they be considered as allies of the UN in dealing with supra-national problems?
Further recognition required The key issue in relation to any institutional reform aimed at reinforcing multilateralism is how to create a balance of
power among UN members and a balance of responsibilities and representation for the people of our planet. Such

a complex set of
balances cannot be found if reform propositions continue to be based upon states as the sole
building blocks of multilateralism. A radical rethinking is needed, which recognizes that, next to states, world
regions based upon integration processes between states have to play a role in establishing an effective multilateralism. Todays reality is that, next to
states, world regions are becoming increasingly important tools of global governance. There needs to be, however, a lot of creative and innovative
thinking based upon careful analysis of the regional dimensions of ongoing conflicts and of existing cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations. The upgrading of the EUs status in the UN is an important step forward. But it is not enough. Other regional organizations such as the
African Union, ASEAN or the League of Arab States should follow. And next to speaking rights, collaboration between the UN and regional
organizations needs to be further developed. This is the only way to increase regional ownership of what the UN and its Security Council decide. As a
matter of fact, this recently happened with the UNSC resolution 1973 regarding Libya: explicit reference is made to the African Union, the League of
Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Moreover, the League of Arab States members are requested to act in the spirit of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter in implementing the resolution. Reviving Chapter VIII seems to be a promising way to combine global concerns with local (regional)
legitimacy and capacity to act. The challenge is that in line with the complexity of the emerging new world order, any proposal to rethink
multilateralism in such a way that it incorporates regionalism needs to be flexible. A

simplistic system of regional

representations that replace the national representations will not work. And not only the UN,
but also the regional organizations themselves need to adjust to the reality of multilateralism 2.0. In this respect it
remains to be seen to what extent the EU Member States will allow the EU to speak with one vision. And above all, in order to become
politically feasible, the idea of a multi-regional world order needs to be supported and promoted
by civil society. As long as this is not the case, old habits and organizational structures will not
change, and the world will not become a more secure place to live in.

Thumpers
Treaty spillover empirically denied
Koplow, 13 [Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States
Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?, David A. Koplow is Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel
for Arms Control to the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from
2009 to 2011.]

The United States justifiably prides itself on its devotion to the rule of law. We take legal instruments
seriously; when we assume a binding legal obligation at home, we mean it, and we expect all parties to the agreement to demonstrate
comparable fealty. !is commitment to the law also extends to international agreements. Treaties

are the coin of the

international realm, and the United States leads the world both in making treaties and in publicly
and pointedly holding others accountable when they fall short of full compliance. 1 What
happens, then, when the United States contravenes a binding international legal obligation in
a manner so obvious and unarguable that it can offer no defense to the charge of
breach? It happens more often than one might think and to more important treaties
than one would hope, including treaties for which the United States continues to depend upon fastidious performance by
other countries. Here, I present three illustrative cases studies of blatant U.S. violations of binding
international legal obligations : the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and the obligation to pay annual dues under the Charter of
the United Nations. I explain the causes of these breaches and examine their adverse consequences for
the United States and for the international rule of law .

Surveillance Thumps
Greenwald, 10/15/14 [UN Report Finds Mass Surveillance Violates International
Treaties and Privacy Rights, Glenn, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/15/uninvestigator-report-condemns-mass-surveillance/]

The United Nations top official for counter-terrorism and human rights (known as the Special Rapporteur)
issued a formal report to the U.N. General Assembly today that condemns mass electronic surveillance as a clear
violation of core privacy rights guaranteed by multiple treaties and conventions. The hard truth is that the use of
mass surveillance technology effectively does away with the right to privacy of communications on the Internet altogether, the report concluded.
Central to the Rapporteurs findings is the distinction between targeted surveillance which depend[s] upon the existence of prior suspicion of the
targeted individual or organization and mass surveillance, whereby states with high levels of Internet penetration can [] gain access to the
telephone and e-mail content of an effectively unlimited number of users and maintain an overview of Internet activity associated with particular
websites. In a system of mass surveillance, the report explained, all of this is possible without any prior suspicion related to a specific individual or
organization. The communications of literally every Internet user are potentially open for inspection by intelligence and law enforcement agencies in
the States concerned. Mass surveillance thus amounts to a systematic interference with the right to respect for the privacy of communications, it
declared. As a result, it is incompatible with existing concepts of privacy for States to collect all communications or metadata all the time
indiscriminately. In concluding that mass surveillance impinges core privacy rights, the

report was primarily focused on the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a treaty enacted by the General Assembly in
1966, to which all of the members of the Five Eyes alliance are signatories. The U.S. ratified the treaty in 1992 , albeit
with various reservations that allowed for the continuation of the death penalty and which rendered its domestic law supreme. With the exception of
the U.S.s Persian Gulf allies (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar), virtually

every major country has signed the

treaty. Article 17 of the Covenant guarantees the right of privacy, the defining protection of which, the report explained, is that individuals have

the right to share information and ideas with one another without interference by the State, secure in the knowledge that their communication will
reach and be read by the intended recipients alone. The reports key conclusion is that this core right is impinged by mass surveillance programs: Bulk
access technology is indiscriminately corrosive of online privacy and impinges on the very essence of the right guaranteed by article 17. In the absence
of a formal derogation from States obligations under the Covenant, these

programs pose a direct and ongoing

challenge to an established norm of international law. The report recognized that protecting citizens

from terrorism attacks is a vital duty of every state, and that the right of privacy is not absolute, as it can be compromised when doing so is necessary
to serve compelling purposes. It noted: There may be a compelling counter-terrorism justification for the radical re-evaluation of Internet privacy
rights that these practices necessitate. But the report was adamant that no such justifications have ever been demonstrated by any member state using
mass surveillance: The States engaging in mass surveillance have so far failed to provide a detailed and evidence-based public justification for its
necessity, and almost no States have enacted explicit domestic legislation to authorize its use. Instead, explained the Rapporteur, states have relied on
vague claims whose validity cannot be assessed because of the secrecy behind which these programs are hidden: The arguments in favor of a complete
abrogation of the right to privacy on the Internet have not been made publicly by the States concerned or subjected to informed scrutiny and debate.
About the ongoing secrecy surrounding the programs, the report explained that states deploying this technology retain a monopoly of information
about its impact, which is a form of conceptual censorship that precludes informed debate. A June report from the High Commissioner for Human
Rights similarly noted the disturbing lack of governmental transparency associated with surveillance policies, laws and practices, which hinders any
effort to assess their coherence with international human rights law and to ensure accountability. The rejection of the terrorism justification for mass
surveillance as devoid of evidence echoes virtually every other formal investigation into these programs. A federal judge last December found that the
U.S. Government was unable to cite a single case in which analysis of the NSAs bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent terrorist
attack. Later that month, President Obamas own Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies concluded that mass surveillance
was not essential to preventing attacks and information used to detect plots could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional
[court] orders. Three Democratic Senators on the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote in The New York Times that the usefulness of the bulk
collection program has been greatly exaggerated and we have yet to see any proof that it provides real, unique value in protecting national security. A
study by the centrist New America Foundation found that mass metadata collection has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of terrorism
and, where plots were disrupted, traditional law enforcement and investigative methods provided the tip or evidence to initiate the case. It labeled the
NSAs claims to the contrary as overblown and even misleading. While worthless in counter-terrorism policies, the UN report warned that allowing
mass surveillance to persist with no transparency creates an ever present danger of purpose creep, by which measures justified on counter-terrorism
grounds are made available for use by public authorities for much less weighty public interest purposes. Citing the UK as one example, the report
warned that, already, a wide range of public bodies have access to communications data, for a wide variety of purposes, often without judicial
authorization or meaningful independent oversight. The report was most scathing in its rejection of a key argument often made by American defenders
of the NSA: that mass surveillance is justified because Americans are given special protections (the requirement of a FISA court order for targeted
surveillance) which non-Americans (95% of the world) do not enjoy. Not only does this scheme fail to render mass surveillance legal, but it itself
constitutes a separate violation of international treaties (emphasis added): The Special Rapporteur concurs with the High Commissioner for Human
Rights that where States penetrate infrastructure located outside their territorial jurisdiction, they remain bound by their obligations under the
Covenant. Moreover, article 26 of the Covenant prohibits discrimination on grounds of, inter alia, nationality and citizenship. The Special Rapporteur
thus considers that States are legally obliged to afford the same privacy protection for nationals and non-nationals and for those within and outside
their jurisdiction. Asymmetrical privacy protection regimes are a clear violation of the requirements of the Covenant. That principle that the right of
internet privacy belongs to all individuals, not just Americans was invoked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden when he explained in a June,
2013 interview at The Guardian why he disclosed documents showing global surveillance rather than just the surveillance of Americans: More
fundamentally, the US Persons protection in general is a distraction from the power and danger of this system. Suspicionless surveillance does not
become okay simply because its only victimizing 95% of the world instead of 100%. The U.N. Rapporteur was clear that these systematic privacy
violations are the result of a union between governments and tech corporations: States increasingly rely on the private sector to facilitate digital
surveillance. This is not confined to the enactment of mandatory data retention legislation. Corporates [sic] have also been directly complicit in

The latest
finding adds to the growing number of international formal rulings that the mass surveillance
programs of the U.S. and its partners are illegal . In January, the European parliaments civil liberties committee
operationalizing bulk access technology through the design of communications infrastructure that facilitates mass surveillance.

condemned such programs in the strongest possible terms. In April, the European Court of Justice ruled that European legislation on data retention
contravened EU privacy rights. A top secret memo from the GCHQ, published last year by The Guardian, explicitly stated that one key reason for
concealing these programs was fear of a damaging public debate and specifically legal challenges against the current regime.

OverpopNo Impact
No impact to overpopulation
Albert 04 (Michael, founder and current member of the staff of Z Magazine, Humanitys Future, p. 151, dbm)
Overpopulation Is Not the Problem Of course population

can reach a point where, for a given level of

technical know-how, and with a given social structure, more people means more
environmental degradation and a lower standard of living for most. But there is no evidence
that we are near such a population level. And there is no evidence that current poverty,
hunger, and tenacity degradation etc. owe their origins or tenacity in any significant degree to
a population problem, but, instead, the evidence is abundant that these particular crimes
against humanity are rooted in oppressive institutional structures and the abhorrent
misallocations of labor and energy and maldistribution of product that they foster.

Population will stabilize

Population and Development Program 2006 (10 Reasons to Rethink Overpopulation,
Fall 2006, http://popdev.hampshire.edu/projects/dt/dt40.php

World population is still growing and is expected to reach 9 billion by the year 2050. However,
demographers agree that the era of rapid growth is over. Population growth rates peaked in the
1960s due to dramatic reductions in death rates and increased life expectancy. Since then, with
increasing education, urbanization, and womens work outside the home, birth rates have fallen
in almost every part of the world. The average is now 2.7 births per woman. A number of
countries, especially in Europe, are now concerned about declining population growth as many
women have only one child. The UN projects that world population will eventually stabilize ,
falling to 8.3 billion in 2175.