Justin, Gale - Identification and Definition in The Lysis - AGPH, 87, 1 - 2005!75!104

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Identification and Definition in the Lysis
by Gale Justin (Sacramento)
Abstract: In this paper, I make a case for interpreting the Lysis as a dialogue of definition, designed to answer the question of What is a friend? The main innovation
of my interpretation is the contention and this is argued for in the paper that Socrates hints towards a definition of being a friend that applies equally to mutual
friendship and one-way attraction the two kinds of friend relation very clearly identified by Socrates in the dialogue. The key to understanding how the two different
kinds of friendship can have a common definition is to appreciate that the property
of being a friend has a relational character.
What is the main question asked by Socrates in the Lysis? Some scholars have urged
that what Socrates means to ask is what feature intrinsic to persons who desire and
what features possessed by the objects of their desire explain the attraction between
the entities. Other scholars say that the question under consideration is, What is
friendship? understood only as a reciprocal relationship between human beings.
Still others suggest that Socrates is primarily interested in the question of What is a
friend? both in the case in which friendship is construed as a necessarily mutual relationship and in the case in which it is not.1 I subscribe to the third view, but I part
company with its proponents on a central point. They believe that Socrates does not
offer any explanation of what is common to the two relations that he speaks of as
friends; whereas, I believe that he alludes in the Lysis to a single account of being a
friend that applies equally to mutual friendship and to the one-way attraction relation.2 It is, therefore, my concern to argue that (1) the question Socrates raises is the
The attraction theory is defended by Glidden 1981, 46; Mackenzie 1988, 26; Irwin 1995, 54f.; Reshotko 1997, 4; Versenyi 1975, 187. The friendship view is
maintained by Annas 1977, 532; Adams 1992, 4; Bolotin 1979, 66; Gonzalez
1995, 69f.; Guthrie 1977, 144f.; Pangle 2001, 305; Roth 1995, 2f.; Tessitore 1990,
117; Vlastos 1969, 6f. The question of What is a friend? is taken to be the main
question by Levin 1972, 239f.; Robinson 1986, 65f.; Santas 1977, 81f.
Consider Robinson 1986, 79: Plato has not, in his [favorite] suggestion that
the good is
friend to the intermediate made any provision which
would allow this one-way attraction to become an element in a mutual friend-
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definitional question of what is a friend; (2) he identifies, in the course of pursuing an

answer to that question, two kinds of friend relation; and (3) he provides the basis for
a definition which can explain both kinds of relation.3
1. Main Question of the Lysis

I begin with remarks on how the dramatic dimension of the dialogue lays the groundwork for raising the definitional question. The general context is Socrates display
undertaken to advise the love-struck Hippothales on how a lover ought to go about
endearing himself to his beloved. Socrates starts off his interrogation of Hippothales
by asking the youth to describe his tactics of amorous pursuit. After hearing that
Hippothales composes encomiums in honor of Lysis, Socrates points out that the bestowal of praise is likely to make the favorite harder to catch. Hippothales concedes
this and asks Socrates to advise him on what sort of seduction strategy he should use
to win Lysis affection. Hence, the entire subsequent discussion is oriented towards
answering the question that Hippothales request for assistance brings into the dialogue, namely, How does a person become friendly to, , (206c2) another
person?
This exact question emerges explicitly when Socrates begins his first exchange with
Menexenus. Socrates asks Menexenus, who is already Lysis friend, how a person becomes the friend of another (212a68). Moreover, it is evident from the text at
216c1217a2 where Socrates uses interchangeably the phrases to become a friend,

, and to be a friend,
, that the lead question, How does
one become a friend? is a variant of the definitional question, What is a friend?
Socrates switches from one formulation to the other because both can be answered in
terms of exactly the same condition: whatever accounts for what it is to be a friend
also settles how one becomes a friend.4 Thus, the dramatic and the philosophic dimensions of the dialogue make reasonably clear that the main question of the dialogue is (some version of) the definitional question, What is a friend?
My understanding of the main question may be contrasted with the approach according to which the question under investigation is, What is friendship? The term
friendship,
, appears only ten times in the dialogue; and, it never occurs in the
context of a question. Moreover, on the friendship approach Socrates examples of
one-sided attraction are hard to accommodate, since friendship is normally understood to involve mutuality. But the examples of one-sided attraction qualify as friend
relations on the hypothesis (the neither good nor bad is friend to the good) that is So-
ship. Robinson reaffirms this view in his overall interpretation of the Lysis for
Project Archelogos: http://www.archelogos.phil.ed.ac.uk.
Nothing that I say hinges on a judgment about either for whom the Socrates-character speaks or what place the Lysis occupies in the chronological order of Platos dialogues.
Santas 1979, 155, notes the close connection between these questions.

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crates first candidate definition of the relation to be defined. So the specification of

that relation should not be an obstacle to including one-sided attraction within its
scope.5 These considerations count against taking the question, What is friendship? to be at the heart of the Lysis.
The converse interpretative procedure which weights the examples of one-sided attraction more heavily than those of mutual friendship recommends treating the Lysis
as developing a theory of desire, pursuit, or ultimate value. There is, I think, one major drawback to this procedure. Socrates typically seeks to clarify a value concept
with interlocutors who might be thought to know or have beliefs about the concept in
question. For example, he discusses courage with the distinguished general Laches,
piety with Euthyphro who is about to charge his own father with impiety, and the fine
with the considerably accomplished Hippias. But nothing about Lysis or Menexenus
uniquely qualifies them to discuss desire, pursuit, or ultimate value. So if the topic of
central concern in the Lysis is to have special relevance to the traits (especially the beliefs) of the interlocutors, as it typically does, it is not likely to be the nature of desire,
pursuit, or ultimate value. The drawbacks to the just now mentioned interpretative
procedures give us, therefore, good reason to try for an interpretation of the Lysis in
terms of the question, What is a friend?
2. Identification of Two Kinds of Friends

As the opening step of such an interpretation, I want to consider how Socrates approach to the poets views on friends reveals that the friend relation has two subkinds. Having suitably chastened Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates turns their attention to traditional poetic teachings on the subject of friends (214a34).6 He takes up
Homers view that god draws like to like and Hesiods contrary opinion that most opposite things are friends.
In following out the implications of Homers verse, Socrates claims to find in it the
hidden meaning that the good are friends. He then exclaims: We are now able to say
who are friends.7 The fact that Socrates discovers in Homers teaching (214d56)
6
7
Roth 1995, 11f., dismisses Socrates examples of an attraction of a person to his

opposite precisely because the relation cannot, he says, be mutual. But this is a
problem only if we assume at the outset, as Roth does, that the relation to be defined is reciprocal friendship.
I discuss below the interrogations of Lysis and Menexenus.
Lysis, 214e1. I use throughout (sometimes slightly modified) the translation of
W. R. M. Lamb, Plato (Cambridge, Mass. 1925), vol. 3, 7f. Sedley 1989 proposes
that Socrates exclamation contains the main question of the dialogue. It is, he
says, the identification question of who or what is a friend to whom or what? Socrates exclamation may, however, contain the particular question as to who
exemplifies the friend relation rather than the general question concerning the
nature of the relation itself. To support his view of the exclamation as containing
the general, i.e., the main question of the dialogue, Sedley argues that the identi-

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the case of friendship between good people, when this certainly is not explicitly there,
suggests that he himself believes it to be, in a qualified form at least, a genuine example
of the relation to be defined. Furthermore, it is made plain that this kind of friendship
is a mutual relation, for the consideration that counts against it is the fact that the
friends who are similar (or self-sufficient) cannot benefit each other. Setting aside the
fact that this friendship cannot supply a definition of being a friend, I would point out
that Socrates needs at the beginning some agreed-on examples of the relation which the
interlocutors are attempting to define.8 I submit that the case of friendship between
good people serves this purpose. In a qualified form, it is a bona fide example of one
kind of friend relation. I discuss below additional evidence that Socrates accepts as one
kind of friend relation the mutual friendship of people who possess good qualities, after I consider an example of a second kind of friend relation that Socrates accepts. This
is an example that Socrates extracts from Hesiods teaching.
In the course of investigating Hesiods proposal that a person is attracted to his/her
opposite, Socrates mentions the attraction of an uninstructed person to a person
with a special expertise (215d78). He shows approval of this particular association
when he maintains that only a person who recognizes his own ignorance can love
knowledge (218a7b3). The knowledge he has in mind is clearly not limited to the
knowledge that is attainable by individual inquiry, but encompasses knowledge that
can be acquired by associating with an expert. This supposition is supported by the
prominent use Socrates makes of the example of the sick person who is friendly to the
doctor. The sick person is attracted to medical knowledge in the doctor.9
Furthermore, it is important to note that two moves by logic choppers (216a9)
pave the way for Socrates dismissal of the relationship of attraction between opposites. The logic choppers (a) treat the relation as if it were necessarily reciprocal, and
8
9
fication question also occurs at 218b78. But taking 218b78 to contain the identification question requires an emendation in that line of text. 218b78 should be,
Sedley says, emended from
to
. This is
because he translates 218b78 as what the friendly and the unfriendly are, and,
as he points out, not would be the proper negation for the substantive the
friendly,
. So Sedley emends the omicron-upsilon from a negation to a
relative pronoun. As I understand the disputed line of text, the expression being
negated is not the substantive the friendly,
, but the verb of the indirect
question what is a friend?,
. Thus, I think the line reads: what is
a friend and what is not [a friend]. This is a suitable translation in the context;
and, it is acceptable Greek, since is the proper negation for most finite verbs
(Smyth 1920, 601 and 604f.). Yet without his (elegant) emendation, there is no
clear-cut occurrence of the identification question as the main question of the
dialogue. I am grateful to Ruby Blundell for discussing with me the grammatical
points of Sedleys proposal.
I am indebted on this point to Burnyeat 1977.
Roth 1995, 11, thinks that Socrates use of the patient-doctor relation is insincere,
for there is, Roth maintains, no way in which the doctor can be construed as opposite to the sick. But the doctor has health in the sense of having medical skill.
In this sense, what the doctor has is the opposite of the sick.

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(b) substitute moral terms for non-moral terms. They can, thereby, offer as an instance of the relation the case of a good person who is attracted to a bad person. But
this association violates the interlocutors agreement that a bad person cannot be a
friend (214c8d4). So Socrates concludes that mutual attraction of opposites cannot
provide an adequate analysis of being a friend. Nothing that the logic choppers have
said, however, impugns as an example of being a friend the one-way attraction of an
uninstructed person to an expert. And the fact that Socrates builds a substantial
amount of theory on the patient to doctor relation is a good reason to believe that he
accepts one-way attraction to an expert as a genuine example of the relation under
discussion (218e3220b5).
3. In Support of Two Sub-Kinds

I want now to offer additional considerations in support of my contention that Socrates accepts that being a friend has two sub-kinds, each of which has one of the aforementioned examples as a particular instance. The first consideration is linguistic.
There is in Socrates discussion of the poets verses a division of labor imposed on
two Greek constructions. Socrates uses to be friends,
, and its variants to
designate the mutual relationship between good persons. For example, on the basis
of the alike proposal, he claims: We now can tell who are friends. For the argument
discloses that they are the good, 5
!
" # $
%&
' ( ) *
(214e12). By contrast, he uses is friendly to/
friend of ,
+/,, to designate the attraction relation between a person
and his/her opposite. For example, he says: The sick person is the friend of the doctor, # -. [] , ,
(218e34). It could be mere coincidence that Socrates regularly employs the
construction to refer to the mutual relationship between good people and to the mutual friendship of Lysis and Menexenus
(207c7); whereas, he uses
with dative or genitive for designating one-way attraction to an expert. But the fact that these phrases serve consistently to denote instances of two distinct kinds of relationship strongly suggests that Socrates intends to
mark off by their means two varieties of the friend relation: a mutual friendship between people who are good in some sense, and a one-way attraction relation between
a person who lacks some good and a person who possesses that good.
A second consideration supporting the same idea is based on features displayed by
the initial cross-examinations of Lysis and Menexenus. Each exchange gives prominence to a different one of these two varieties of the friend relation. Consider first Socrates examination of Lysis. The episode portrays Socrates engaged in behavior
which can achieve, according to the earlier agreement with Hippothales, a return of
affection. Since Socrates actually does get from Lysis an affectionate response
(211a35), the exchange is likely to provide some insight into the nature of a mutual
friendship.
To begin, Socrates asks Lysis whether he believes that his parents want him to be
happy. When Lysis answers that he does, Socrates inquires whether Lysis believes a
person is happy if he is a slave and does nothing that he wants. Lysis says, No. At

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this point, Socrates ventures the conclusion that Lysis parents do not restrict him
from doing what he wants. But Lysis affirms that they restrict him a great deal. Now
Socrates probes Lysis on his attitude towards the restrictions in order to determine
whether it is incompatible with his combined beliefs that freedom is necessary for
happiness, and that his parents want his happiness. Socrates pursues the topic of incompatibility by introducing examples of things that Lysis wants, but is not allowed,
to do. In this way, Socrates hopes (a) to present the restrictions in unfavorable terms,
and (b) to lay the groundwork for the judgment that Lysis parents do not desire his
happiness. From the negatively colored examples, Socrates infers the conclusion that
Lysis seems to achieve no benefit from his considerable assets (208e8209a1). And if
we assume the additional premiss that happiness requires the beneficial use of whatever assets one happens to have, then he insinuates the judgment that Lysis parents
prevent Lysis from being happy.
Lysis does not, however, concede Socrates claim that he gets no benefit from his
possessions. This suggests that he does not have a wholly negative view of the constraints. He tells Socrates that they are in place because he is not yet of age (209a56).
His response connects the restrictions to the goal of insuring his future happiness.
This is how Lysis parents would explain the constraints. And given Lysis untroubled attitude towards the restrictions, he apparently shares his parents point of view.
Thus, his reply makes clear that the freedom he requires for happiness is compatible
with the imposition of some reasonable constraints.10
In the next phase of the cross-examination, Socrates leads Lysis to the realization
that the restrictions are not due to his age, but to his level of skill. Socrates does this
by pointing out that his parents entrust to him things that he knows how to use. For it
is these things that he will use well. So Lysis now explains the difference between the
assets that he can control and those that he cannot in terms of his having and his not
having knowledge. Thus, Lysis becomes at least dimly aware that the restrictions correspond to limits he himself would impose if he had knowledge. In this way, the freedom that Lysis associates with happiness is nearly identified by him with self-rule.
With this much accomplished, Socrates goes on to insure that Lysis will give
knowledge pride of place among his values. To this end, he employs a story about the
King of Persia. The Great King, says Socrates, would allow Lysis to season soup with
fistfuls of salt or use ashes to medicate the royal heirs eyes if he considered Lysis to
be skilled at cookery or medicine. Since these imagined measures go well beyond
standard cooking and medical procedures, and since it is unlikely that the Persian
King makes competency the sole determining factor in his choices, Socrates claims
10
Bolotin 1979, 86, thinks that throughout the exchange Lysis understands freedom to be doing whatever one wants. So, according to Bolotin, Socrates uses the
examples of parental restrictions to challenge Lysis contentment with his parents (88). Gonzalez 1995, 73, also thinks that Socrates intends the examples to
make Lysis feel that his parents hinder his freedom. As I understand the negative
light in which Socrates casts the restriction, it is not intended to drive a wedge
between Lysis and his parents but is a ploy used by Socrates for the purpose of ascertaining Lysis candid opinion of the restrictions.

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regarding Lysis prospects are surely exaggerated. Nevertheless, Socrates seems to be

willing to embellish a hypothetical case as a means of enticing Lysis to pursue
knowledge. Thus, generalizing from the fanciful examples, Socrates concludes:
With regard to matters in which we become intelligent, every one will entrust us
with them [] and in such matters we shall do as we wish []. Nay, not only shall
we ourselves be free and rule over others in these things, but these things will be
ours. For we shall derive benefit from them. (210a9b7)
Socrates is telling Lysis what it means for a person to acquire expertise in something.
A person who acquires expertise in a thing (eyes, mules, government) can extract benefit or advantage from the thing. Since he would be able to make possessions useful,
other people entrust to him their possessions; and, he would, in turn, be free to do
with the things entrusted to him whatever he wants (cf. 208a2b1). The legal owner
of the thing would be ruled by the experts opinion. It is, however, the legal owner
who receives the benefit that the expert produces by his skilled use of the things entrusted to him.11
Lysis may not grasp this last feature of the expert, which is to produce benefit for
others. But clearly the prospect of being in a leadership position, especially in the political realm, may have sufficient appeal to motivate Lysis to put knowledge at the
head of his list of values. In any event, Socrates has surely enhanced Lysis desire for
knowledge; and, he has simultaneously educated him on the essential ingredient of a
happy life (assuming that freedom in the sense of rational rule is necessary for happiness, as Lysis is likely to assume).
It now needs to be recalled that this exchange was intended to show Hippothales
how to win the return of affection from a beloved. Lysis does, as I mentioned, respond to Socrates educative talk with affection and admiration. So it is fair to say
that were Hippothales capable of emulating Socrates philosophic discourse with Lysis, Lysis would be disposed to feel affection towards him. Moreover, Lysis is clearly
intellectually curious and reasonably self-restrained. Since these qualities in Lysis are
apparently attractive to Hippothales, a friendship formed between them would be
based on the good qualities that each of them has.
What scholars may find troublesome in this view of Hippothales as attracted to
Lysis in virtue of Lysis good qualities is Ctesippus complaint that Hippothales poems and love songs dwell on Lysis noble birth and his familys wealth.12 But Socrates
ignores Ctesippus complaint about the compositions when he chastises Hippothales. He says that the greater the praise that Hippothales lavishes on Lysis, the greater
will be the blessings that he will seem to have lost, if he fails to win the youths affection (205e58). Socrates reproach implies that Hippothales is attracted to Lysis
many good qualities, not the least of which is his bodily beauty. So there is reason to
11
12
In this paragraph I am indebted to remarks made in conversation with Roslyn

Weiss.
See, for example, Glidden 1981, 49, Tessitore 1990, 116, and Gonzalez 1995, 85.
Contrast Bolotin 1979, 78: Hippothales most pressing wish is to capture for
himself the beautiful and good Lysis.

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think that were Hippothales able to engage in co-inquiry, he and Lysis could form a
mutual friendship based on the good qualities of body and soul that are possessed by
each of the youths. The Lysis exchange, then, gives us a glimpse of what a mutual
friendship between Hippothales and Lysis might be like.13
I turn next to Socrates more adversarial approach to Menexenus. Dramatic details
of the exchange suggest that Socrates is operating in this elenchus as an expert friend.
The cross-examination is carried on in the presence of Ctesippus in his role of Menexenus teacher, not cousin (211c3d1). And Socrates line of questioning is reminiscent of Euthydemus clever talk to Cleinias (Eud. 275d3277b1). Thus, Socrates,
functioning as instructor of moral inquiry, mimics the rhetorical style of sophistic
educators. Attention to Socrates instruction shows, however, (1) that Menexenus,
not Socrates, confounds two kinds of friends,14 and (2) that Socrates works hard to
highlight, not obscure, the difference between one-sided attraction and mutual
friendship. In order to obtain confirmation of these two claims, it is necessary to consider how Socrates commences the cross-examination. He does so by offering Menexenus three options for identifying who becomes friend to whom, if one person likes
another. These options are (a) the person who likes, (b) the person who is liked, and
(c) There is no difference, (212a9b2). Option (c) can be taken in more than one
way. One way is to interpret (c) as follows: (c) The person who likes and the person
who is liked in return do not differ in respect of being a friend. This way of completing (c) admits the possibility that the person who likes is not a friend of the same kind
as the person who is liked. It is (c) along with the possibility of friends of different
kinds that seems to be, as we shall see, the option that Socrates would choose.
Option (c) is actually chosen by Menexenus. Menexenus seems to understand (c)
however, as an elliptical way of asserting something of this sort: (c): It makes no
difference, if one says A is a friend of B or B is a friend of A, each is a friend period. As Menexenus sees it, friend A and friend B are on a par, since he seems not
to realize that liking and being liked are different conditions. Menexenus subscribes
to this unsophisticated view of a friend probably because he has acquired the affection of his friend Lysis by doing no more than liking Lysis (212a15).15
13
14
15
The Lysis elenchus can also be seen as simulating the type of exchange engaged in
by a philosophic lover and his beloved, each of whom possess an affinity of character but play asymmetric roles in the relationship. See Phaedrus 253a16 and
253c26.
Annas 1977, 532f., Levin 1972, 242f., Robinson 1986, 65f., and Santas 1977, 83,
contend that Socrates equivocates in this exchange on friend,
. Glidden
1980, 276f., argues against this contention.
Glidden 1980, 282, suggests that syntactic considerations underlie Menexenus
choice of (c). As a student of Greek language, Menexenus might well assume
that the use of that verb [to like / to be liked, & / &] explains the
use of the corresponding adjective. But the Menexenus elenchus unlike Socrates argument using because in the Euthyphro (9d211a8) to which Glidden
compares the elenchus makes no mention of grammatical orderings. So there
does not seem to be a textual basis for ascribing to Menexenus such an educated
choice.

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In an effort to clarify what Menexenus is thinking when he selects option (c), Socrates inquires:
What are you saying? Do both become friends to each other (.
), if only one likes the other? (212b35)

The most natural way of reading Socrates second question is to take him as asking
whether two people become mutual friends, if only one likes the other. This reading
of the question is in harmony with Socrates use of the phrase to be friends,
, to denote mutual friends, given that he has a tendency in this dialogue, as we

have seen, to switch back and forth between to be and to become (213c610,
216c1217a2). If this is a correct construal of Socrates second question, then it is fair
to say that Socrates would not answer that question in the affirmative. Socrates opening question, What are you saying? shows, I think, that he is surprised by the view
that he conjectures is implicit in Menexenus commitment to (3), namely, the view
that a person becomes a mutual friend by doing nothing more than liking another
person. The surprised reaction shows that Socrates does not think one-way attraction and mutual friendship are indistinguishable relationships. And although he does
not here call friend either party to the one-way attraction relation, he later uses a
friend expression to characterize both parties to the relation (212d5213a6). Presumably, then, it is option (c), understood in terms of (c) with the possibility of subkinds of friends, that Socrates would choose.
Menexenus readily assents, however, to Socrates second question because he has
not given much thought to what is involved in being a friend. It is not until Socrates
goes on to point out (and Menexenus agrees) that a person who likes may not be liked
in return that Menexenus realizes that liking and being liked are different conditions.
Since he now also realizes that friendship for him involves twoway liking, Menexenus concludes that neither is a friend, if only one person likes the other (212c8d1).
He thereby contradicts his assent to the second question posed earlier by Socrates.
Socrates next takes up separately the parties to the one way attraction relation. But
the interlocutors agree that neither party individually can become a friend, since one
party may hate the other; and, hatred makes enemies, not friends, of people. The
cross-examination concludes once Menexenus openly admits that he is at a loss to say
who becomes a friend to whom, if only one person likes the other. The negative outcome of the elenchus is, then, traceable not only to Menexenus reasonable belief that
a person cannot be a friend to an enemy, but also to his inability to conceive of the
one-way attraction relation. When faced with the possibility that the friendly person
might not be liked in return, he surrenders his belief that the two are friends because
it does not occur to him that a person whose affection is not returned is a different
kind of friend.
It seems clear, however, that Socrates wants to highlight, not unacceptably obliterate, the distinction between one-sided attraction and mutual friendship. For he
keeps consistently to the case of one-sided attraction; and, he shows that there is a
basis for distinguishing it from mutual friendship, namely, the fact that one-sided liking can arise in contexts that preclude its being characterized as reciprocated affection. Thus, Socrates does not, as a sophist might do, move on a purely verbal basis

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from consideration of a pair of persons who reciprocate affection to consideration of

a pair of persons, only one of whom likes. Rather, he works to reveal exactly what it is
about one-sided attraction that makes it a distinct kind of friend relation. The Menexenus exchange emphasizes, then, the one-sided attraction relation; whereas, the Lysis exchange reveals some salient features of a mutual friendship. The fact that the
two exchanges give prominence to a different kind of friend relation is further evidence for my claim that Socrates accepts that the friend relation has two sub-kinds.
One final consideration in support of this contention is the fact that Lysis is depicted as being capable of having relations of both kinds. He and Menexenus claim to
be mutual friends (207c78). He is also the object of Hippothales one-way attraction. And Socrates intimates that Lysis could be involved in a one-way attraction
relation with his fellow Athenians. Socrates remarks to Lysis concerning managing
the Athenians affairs suggest that Lysis could acquire an administrative expertise in
virtue of which his fellow Athenians would be friendly to him (209c5d4). Furthermore, there is no indication that Lysis would be attracted in turn to something in
those whom his expertise serves. Thus, even if Socrates thinks it only a possibility
that Lysis fellow Athenians could be friendly to an administrative skill in Lysis, the
mere mention of it shows that Socrates regards the one-way attraction relation as
being a bona fide kind of friend relation.16
The details in this section strongly suggest that Socrates accepts mutual friendship
and one-way attraction as genuine sub-kinds of the friend relation. Socrates terminology, the philosophic content of the exchanges, and significant features of the dramatic framework make reasonably clear that he divides friend relations into these
two kinds. I now want to show that Socrates hints towards a definition of being a
friend that can explain both of the sub-kinds.
16
On the basis of Socrates subsequent positing of desire as a cause of being a

friend, Gonzalez 1995, 78 n. 21 and 83 n. 30, maintains that only a good lacked
by human beings can be the good in virtue of which people are friends. If Gonzalez is correct, then Socrates could not hold that a person is a party to a friend
relation in virtue of possessing administrative expertise. But Gonzalezs requirement that all parties to a friend relation lack the good in virtue of which they are
friends results from his assumption that friend applies to entities one at a time.
As a consequence of this assumption, he thinks friend shifts its meaning from
what is possessed the meaning he attributes to it in the first exchange with
Lysis to lacking what belongs the meaning he thinks it takes on once Socrates
identifies desire of good with the motivating cause of being a friend (82f.). The
fact is, however, that being a friend is a relational property. A person is a friend to
or of someone. Therefore, attribution of the property involves more than one person. I explain how this works on Socrates view in section 9. My point here is that
Socrates can without any shift in meaning maintain that the friend relation obtains between a person who possesses a good and a person who lacks/desires that
good, since the property of being a friend applies to someone in relation to someone else. So Lysis can be a party to a friendly relation in virtue of having an expertise that his fellow-citizens lack.

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4. Socrates Analysis of Being a Friend

A number of commentators see 216c1222d9 as offering Socrates own view of what
it is to be a friend.17 And most commentators would agree, I think, that Socrates exposition divides, roughly, into four stages. Stage I (216c1218c3) introduces Socrates
favored hypothesis that the neither good nor bad is friend to the good because of
the presence of bad. Stage II (218c4220b5) makes plain that the first friend of the
neither good nor bad is some good.18 Stage III (220b6222b3) removes presence of
bad and posits desire of the akin as what in our psychic make-up motivates us to
acquire friends. And Stage IV (222b4222d9) takes up the question of whether the
akin relation could be the basis for the friend relation. I agree with this collective
view of Socrates overall strategy. My question is whether Socrates works his way
through these various stages to an account of being a friend that can simultaneously
17
18
Versenyi 1975, 188f., Glidden 1981, 50f., Mackenzie 1988, 27f., Santas 1977,
81 f., Gonzalez 1995, 78f., and Kahn 1996, 285f. For a different view see Vlastos
1969, 6f., Annas 1977, 537f., and Roth 1995, 1f.
Bolotin 1979, 169, Mackenzie 1988, 29f., Santas 1977, 86, Gonzalez 1995, 83 n.
30, Kahn 1996, 285f. Gliddens view is different. He takes Socrates concern to be
why does an individual (Hippothales, Menexenus) love or become a friend to
someone in particular (Glidden 1981, 50). Thus, he construes the first friend,
/
, not as a kind of entity, but as a functional (formal) principle. It
exemplifies, he thinks, whatever it is that is served by the agents loving what he
does (56). Glidden is, I think, mistaken in his belief that Socrates wants to explain why particular individuals become friends and, as a consequence, value the
things they do. Glidden draws one line of support for this interpretation from
reading Socrates question How does one become a friend? as requesting an
account of how it is that Lysis and Menexenus became friends (50). But Socrates question does not ask for a biographical account of the role that friends play
in a persons life. It is, as I have argued, a variant of the definitional question;
and, it asks for the explanatory factors of being a friend.
Furthermore, Glidden contends that Socrates investigation focuses on unconscious motivational factors that result from an agents condition (48f.). To support this view, Glidden discusses the fanciful examples that Socrates uses to encourage Lysis to become wise. Glidden points out that these examples provide a
wholly unrealistic picture of conscious motivation (48). So Socrates, Glidden
concludes, cannot be striving to explain conscious motivations and attitudes.
Rather, he wants to find psychological elements in the personality which might
remain unknown to the agent himself that explain the function love plays
in our lives (49 and 56). Glidden is, I think, misled by his belief that Socrates
is always intending to convey a truth, even when what he says is patently false, if
taken literary. The unrealistic character of Socrates examples relative to the
choices that people actually make seems wholly explicable in terms of Socrates
aim of converting a thirteen-year-old to intellectual pursuits. In my view, then,
the conversation with Lysis is intended, not to reveal unconscious affective attitudes, but to encourage Lysis to form new ones.

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explain mutual friendship and one-way attraction. I hope to show that the answer to
this question is yes.
To better understand the drawback of attributing to Socrates an analysis of being a
friend that cannot account for both kinds of relation consider a version of this view.
Gonzalez says that Socrates results can be summarized as follows: we who are neither bad nor good desire that ultimately loved good of which we are in want19. If the
elements that explain the friend relation are, as Gonzalez proposes, a neither good
nor bad subject who desires an abstract good and the abstract good that is desired,
then there can be no uniform account of reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations between friends. For the primary analysis is in terms of a subject and an abstract object.
Gonzalez attempts to extend his proposal as follows:
Socrates and the boys can establish a reciprocal friendship by seeking together
that good that belongs to all of them but of which all are deprived.20
But this extension introduces an explanation of being mutual friends that differs
from the primary analysis of the friend relation. So Socrates would have to admit,
contrary to the implication of his definitional question, that there is no uniform account of the property of being a friend. The text gives us, however, no reason to think
that Socrates doubts that being a friend has a common nature. So I want to suggest
that Socrates four-stage analysis leads to an account of being a friend according to
which desire for good and a certain particular good possessed by another person are
the explanatory elements in virtue of which the property is applied. I will come back
to the question of how this account can explain both reciprocal and non-reciprocal
friendships after I have discussed the stages of Socrates exposition.
5. Stage I
In Stage I, as others have noted, Socrates identifies the good as one component of the
friend relation.21 What has not, perhaps, been noticed is that at this stage of his analysis, Socrates anticipates his shift in Stage III to desire as the motivating cause of
being a friend and, thereby, lays the groundwork for an analysis of being friend in
terms of desire for good.
Socrates anticipates his shift to desire as the motivating cause of being a friend
when he compares the effects of being bad and having bad present on the relation
between desire for good and being a friend. Since being bad and having bad present
have opposite effects on the joint occurrence of desire for good and being a friend
having bad present engenders it, being bad precludes it the comparison implies that
the connection between desire for good and being a friend is causal. Moreover, the
19
20
21
Gonzalez 1995, 82.

Gonzalez 1995, 86.
This is noted by Mackenzie 1988, 29, Santas 1977, 84f., Gonzalez 1995, 78, Kahn
1996, 28, and Rowe 2000, 209.

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relative order in which the properties are introduced points to desire for good as the
causal antecedent (motivating cause) of being a friend (217e5218a2).
Socrates lays the groundwork for analyzing being a friend in terms of desire for
good by emphasizing the link between desire for good and being a friend. For this
emphasis makes most sense if one of these notions can be used to explain the other.
And this can be done because desire for good can account for the aspect of being a
friend that Socrates clearly appreciates, namely, its relational aspect (218d67).
In order to strengthen my claim that desire for good can explain the relational
aspect of being a friend, I wish to compare desire for good with the relational interpretation of being hungry. If being hungry is interpreted as yearning for food rather
than as rumbles in the stomach, then being hungry applies to a person in virtue of the
persons yearning/desire and in relation to the abstract entity food. If we assume,
however, that the person is hungry for the steak on the barbecue, then being hungry
applies to the person in virtue of the persons yearning/desire and in relation to that
particular instance of food. Analogous points hold for the property of desire for
good. Attribution of the property may be in reference to a relation between the psychological state and an abstract entity or in reference to a relation between the state
and a natural entity, depending on the specification of the object of desire that is
given. The fact that desire for good itself has a relational nature makes it suitable to
explain the relational aspect of being a friend, and in consequence, qualifies it to
serve as one of the explanatory elements of the friend relation. Hence, it is plausible
to regard Socrates attention here to desire for good as paving the way for his treatment of it as an explanatory factor of being a friend.22
6. Stage II
Socrates begins by asking:
Whoever is a friend, is he a friend to someone or not?
[] for the sake of something and because of something? (218d610)
The first question gives prominence to the relational nature of being a friend. The
second question pursues investigation of being a friend by asking about the causes of
the relation. Scholars agree that Socrates takes up in this section the question con22
Glidden 1980 thinks that Socrates treats being a friend as a non-relational property. He contends this approach reflects Platos bizarre theory of relations
(282). In Gliddens view, then, a person can be a friend without being a friend to
or of anyone (287). Mackenzie 1988, 26, also regards being a friend as a non-relational property. This prevents her, I think, from seeing that Socrates analysis
makes genuine progress. For she assumes that being a friend must be explained in
terms of either the desired element or the desiring element; and, since neither one
by itself can provide an adequate account of the value property, the dialogue ends
in an impasse (30f.). In my view, the attribution of being a friend depends on the
presence of both elements.

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cerning the aim of a friend relation, and that he investigates in the next section the topic of motivation.
Socrates discussion of the aim of a friend relation is connected to his claim in
Stage I that the good is a component of the friend relation. In both cases, Socrates
concern is with the range of entities that can be chosen as friends. When Socrates
identifies the good as one component of the relation, he is characterizing the
befriended party in a formal way. Whoever is chosen as a friend, that person is chosen as the source of some good. When Socrates takes up the question of aim, he is
talking about the material side of the same choice, the specific good for example,
medical knowledge in virtue of which the possessor of the good is befriended. Moreover, by drawing Menexenus attention to the aim of a friend relation, Socrates can
present for Menexenus consideration the general idea that some attachments are directed towards procuring and sustaining others. To elucidate this point, Socrates
asks Menexenus whether a person cherishes health, a good (218e67), for the sake of
acquiring a further friend. When Menexenus responds affirmatively, Socrates suggests that the series of means-end attachments must eventually reach the first friend,
/
(219c7d1). It is, Socrates says, this entity that is the genuine friend,
whereas the friends that are used as means to the association with the first friend are
friends in name only (220a6b3).
Several scholars see in Socrates use of the phrase first friend an implicit reference to the ultimate human good. On one version of this sort of interpretation, the
first friend is happiness. According to a second version, it is the Good itself.23 Support for this general approach may be found in the neuter phrase, /
, that Socrates uses to designate the terminus of the series of means-end attachments. The expression shows that for Socrates an inanimate entity, not a person
as such, is the overall goal of the friendly persons choice of friends. But a narrow
reading of the neuter phrase is not the only option. The phrase can be understood to
denote a property that is involved in the terminal friendship, not on its own, but in
virtue of its being possessed by the befriended party to the final friendship. Notice
Socrates willingness to apply the neuter adjective (or possibly noun)
,
friend, to the feminine %
,
health (219a56) and the feminine % , medicine (219c12). Clearly, the application of the neuter term to entities
whose names belong to the feminine gender is intended to indicate that the entities
are included within the class of friends. But since here the application of
can
be understood to be in reference to the bodily health and the medical knowledge possessed respectively by the healthy person and the doctor, it is arguable that the referrent of /
should be understood in a parallel way. On this alternative, broad reading of /
, the phrase denotes a good possessed by
the befriended party to the terminal friendship.
The broad reading of the phrase coheres well with the general idea that Socrates
wants to promote by bringing in the reference to the first friend. A person does take
23
Proponents of the happiness version of the interpretation include Vlastos 1969,

7, Versenyi 1975, 195f., Irwin 1995, 54, and Adams 1992, 276. Kahn 1996, 288,
and Bolotin 1979, 206f., endorse the Good itself version.

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an interest in a doctor, for instance, because a doctor possesses a good medical

knowledge that is, in normal circumstances, valued by the person merely as a means
to procuring and protecting other, more intimate attachments. So the broad reading
of first friend can secure Socrates point about the means-end structure of personal
attachments. Furthermore, the broad reading allows for relationships between persons the agreed upon topic throughout the dialogue to be genuine friend relations. For on the broad reading, a persons attachment to another person is a condition of his/her acquisition of the first friend. On the narrow reading, by contrast,
personal relationships are demoted to the status of friends in name only, since the
persons ultimate attachment is to the first friend on its own.24 Thus, the broad reading is, I think, the more plausible reading of /
. It can secure Socrates point about the means-end structure of personal relationships; and, it serves
well the associations that are the central topic of the conversation. On the interpretation that I recommend the first friend is, then, whatever good is involved in the terminal friendship.25 I offer support for the claim that the first friend is a good, not a
specific kind of good, after I ask what entitles Socrates to terminate the progression
and posit a first friend.
Irwin contends that a commitment to a psychological thesis about human motivation lies behind Socrates insistence that there is a first friend. According to Irwin,
Socrates does not say it would be foolish to pursue one thing for the sake of another
without limit; he implies (in we must refuse) that it is impossible.26 Irwins interpretation is difficult for two reasons. First, it is implausible to suppose that it is on
the basis of a motivational theory implied by Socrates remark we must refuse,
- & (219c7), that Menexenus endorses Socrates supposition of a first
friend. In the earlier exchanges, Socrates uses common sense views, not philosophical
doctrines, to gain the boys acquiescence in his proofs and disproofs. So Irwins interpretation either leaves obscure on what grounds Socrates gains the concession
24
25
26
Kahn 1996, 290, indirectly defends the thesis that the first friend is the Good itself by maintaining that the reciprocity of friendship ceases to be a central topic
of the discussion towards the end of the dialogue. Socrates last words (223b39)
suggest, however, that the topic of mutual friendship is central from the beginning of the discussion to its end. Scholars who affirm the thesis that the first
friend is happiness, the ultimate goal of any rational action, cannot accommodate Socrates requirement that a friend benefit whoever has one (207c9,
222b10c1). For it is difficult to understand how a goal, insofar as it is a goal and
only a goal, can be a thing that benefits a person. So proponents of the happiness
as a goal approach must either ignore the benefit requirement or insist that Socrates does not seriously endorse it.
More exactly, the first friend is a good that is possessed by the befriended party to
the terminal friendship. Since the more exact characterization will receive additional textual support in section 7 (see n. 34), it is enough for now to limit myself
to the more neutral claim that the first friend is involved in the terminal relationship.
Irwin 1995, 54.

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from Menexenus, or it proposes grounds that are not in the least like those Socrates
has used to achieve earlier agreements.
Second, Socrates gives the reader no hint when he claims at 219c78 we must refuse and arrive at some beginning that our psychological make-up explains our resistance. The fact that the series of means-end attachments has an end could be explained along psychological lines; but nothing else that Socrates says here supports
Irwins psychological explanation. So I would like to propose an interpretation that
fits better, I think, with the text than Irwins interpretation does.
On the interpretation that I favor, Socrates and Menexenus have different reasons
for supposing that the series must end at a first friend. Menexenus endorses the idea
of a first friend because his friendship with Lysis supports it. He believes that he is
Lysis first friend (206d56). Socrates himself concludes that there is a first friend
only after he gives the father-son and coinage examples (219d5220a6). Both of these
examples are intended to show that people give priority to one among the various
goods that they include in their lives. Having given these two examples, Socrates
claims that the very same principle embodied in the examples governs the case of
friends (220a67). Just as people give priority to one among the various goods that
they include in their lives, so too people regard one friendship among the associations that they have as being more important than any of the others. If this is correct,
then Socrates we must refuse is a matter of hypothetical necessity. When Socrates
initially raises the question of whether the series of attachments must terminate in the
acquisition of a final friend, he assumes that there must be a first friend, if the case of
being friends is like other cases of valuing. His question to the boys takes into account by anticipation the fact that they will agree that the case of being friends resembles cases of ordinary valuing. Thus, from Socrates perspective Menexenus concession jumps the gun. For Menexenus affirms a proposition whose truth is for
Socrates conditional upon the truth of the soon to be established proposition that relations between friends resemble cases of ordinary valuing.
I now turn to the dispute regarding the nature of the first friend. In connection
with this controversy, I shall address the two following questions. (1) Does Socrates
think that he has successfully argued for a unique first friend? And, if not, (2) what
view of the first friend can be ascribed to Socrates? I shall simply state and, then,
briefly defend my answers to these questions. I do not think that Socrates believes
himself to have proven that there is only one first friend.27 As I understand Socrates
analogical argument, he cites two relevantly different cases as examples of people
who prioritize their values. Whereas it is natural to read Socrates father-son case as
an example of a person for whom one good in his life occupies a unique position
(219d67), the coinage example cannot plausibly be read in this way. Peoples economic priorities vary depending upon their financial circumstances. Furthermore,
Socrates seems to appreciate the difference between the two cases when he amplifies
the phrase, used in stating the coinage case, what is valued above everything else,
27
Versenyi 1975, 192f., Mackenzie 1988, 34f., and Irwin 1995, 54, maintain that
Socrates series of attachments allows for multiple final friends relative to the different ways people prioritize their values. Glidden 1981, 56 n. 145, disagrees.

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with the remark whatever it happens to be (220a4). If Socrates amplification is intended by him to indicate that one and the same good does not invariably predominate in everyones life, then he has not proven, and does not think that he has proven,
that the series of attachments terminates in a relationship that involves a unique first
friend. The idea of a first friend in this sense is not contained in both of the examples
that serve as a foundation for the analogy.
If Socrates has not proven and does not think that he has proven that there is a unique first friend, what view of the first friend can be ascribed to him? Socrates appears
committed to the following theses concerning the first friend. The first friend is a
good that partly explains why a person enters into friendships that are useful relative
to his achievement of a terminal friendship that involves that good. Genuine goods
are first friends.
The first thesis is a consequence of the argument for a first friend. According to
that argument, a first friend is analogous to the good that is the object of a complete
series of desires. Just as people desire some goods for the sake of a terminal good, so
also people form subordinate friendships for the sake of some terminal friend relation. The good that grounds the terminal friendship is the good for the sake of which
the person forms the subordinate friendships. It is the first friend. However, as I explained earlier, the analogues used by Socrates to establish this point do not settle the
question of whether there can be more than one first friend.
The second thesis that genuine goods are first friends allows for a plurality of first
friends. The second thesis, in turn, has in its favor the fact that Socrates commitment
to it helps to explain his puzzling use of 2, for the sake of , at 220e5. The puzzling
use of 2 occurs in a premiss of an argument for the claim that (1) the first friend appears to be completely opposite in nature to subordinate friends (220e34). In particular, the premiss is (2) the first/terminal friend is a friend for the sake of an enemy, 3, 2 (220e5). (2) is co-ordinate with (3) subordinate friends are friends for the sake
of a friend (220e3). (1) follows from (2) and (3). (3) is established by the argument for a
first friend. But it is less clear what supports (2) and what (2) asserts. The agreement at
218d89, namely, (2a) that a friend is for the sake of something, and the conclusion
reached at 220b45, namely, (2b) that the first friend is not for the sake of some further
friend provide a slight inductive basis for (2). But neither (2a) nor (2b) help to clarify
the meaning of (2). Moreover, if (2a) and (2b) are the only claims within its interpretative context that bear on (2), then there intervenes between the evidence for (2) and the
argument of which (2) is a part a stretch of text 220c1d9 concerning the use-value
of the good that has no real connection to the argument. Thus, I want to suggest that
the intervening chunk of text fits into the larger discussion concerning the necessity of
a first friend and the difference between it and subordinate friends. This proposal has
in its favor the fact that it can help to explicate (2). Accordingly, in my view Socrates
carries on the discussion, switching between the language of the first friend and the
language of good things. If this is correct, then any good thing is a candidate for the
status of first friend. To defend this suggestion, let me show how the intervening chunk
of text fits into the main discussion concerning the first friend.
Our stretch of text 220c1d9 deals with the use-value of the good in the absence
of the bad. The expression , the good, employed here must designate

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good things in general rather than a certain kind of good. For it is clear that Socrates
hypothesizes the absence of bad things in general (220c36). And there is no reason
to suppose that the hypothetical situation would have an effect on only one kind of
good thing. Hence, Socrates is here talking about any kind of good thing. Furthermore, this bit of text and the discussion of the first friend connect in the following
ways. First, the stretch of text allows us to add to (2a) and (2b) Menexenus affirmation (2c) that good things are not intrinsically useful (220d78). With the addition of
(2c), (2) becomes a more plausible candidate for the use-value of the first friend, since
all the other obvious alternatives have now been ruled out. Second, our text provides
a clue to the meaning of (2). For interpreting (2) in light of this stretch of text allows
us to read (2) as asserting the Hippias Minor point that good things/first friends are
useful for doing bad deeds/are for the sake of an enemy. This is a sensible claim. It
also upholds the distinction that Socrates draws between for the sake of , 2, and
because of , (218d89).28 Third, our texts introductory question about the usevalue of the good in the absence of the bad can now be seen to have its final answer in
the last step of the argument concerning the difference between subordinate and first
friends. The last step maintains that the absence of bad things/enemies leaves us with
no friends presumably because there would be no use for friends under the imagined
circumstances. The implication of the last step for good things is that they would be
useless, if bad things did not exist.
Thus, we can make sense of (2), find further support for (2), and answer the question
about the use-value of the good in the absence of bad, if we read our stretch of text as
carrying on in the language of good things the larger discussion concerning the first
friend. But this reading presupposes that Socrates equates good things and first
friends and, thereby, acknowledges a possible plurality of first friends. This characterization of the discussion also raises the question of what Socrates gains by switching
terminology. The first shift at 220c1 enables Socrates to return to the remedial view of
the good and, thereby, to temporarily settle the question of whether the good has, in
28
Shorey 1930, 380f., maintains that for the sake of replaces the more appropriate because of to emphasize the difference between subordinate and terminal friends. If Shorey is correct, then it is hard to see how (2) can provide a reason
for (1), the claim that subordinate and terminal friends are opposite. Yet (2) is a
because, -, clause, so it ought to give a reason for (1). Bolotin 1979, 174f.,
suggests that for the sake of an enemy identifies a persons defective self as the
ultimate aim of her friendships. But a persons defective self is, on Bolotins view,
what motivates a person to acquire the first friend. Thus, there is, on Bolotins
view, no real distinction between the because factor and the for the sake of
factor, despite the fact that Socrates distinguishes them (218d89). Mackenzie
1988, 30, claims that the terminology for the sake of the bad is intended to explain the nature (?. , 220d5) of the final good (emphasis in original).
But her support for this construal of the phrase is misleading to the extent that
she quotes only the portion of the line which fits her overall view of the dialogue
as dealing with the metaphysical question of what explains intrinsic value. The
remaining bit 220d78 tends rather to suggest that Socrates is concerned with
the plain-mans question of what makes the good useful to us.

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addition to its instrumental value, an intrinsic value. Because Menexenus well understands the instrumental value of the good he is inclined to agree, without thorough discussion of intrinsic value, that instrumental value is the only use-value of the good.
Thus, bringing back the familiar medical metaphor for the purpose of setting aside for
now the option of intrinsic value necessitates a shift to the language of the good. The
second shift at 220d9 signals Socrates return to the topic of friends. If this is correct,
then Socrates attention to the means-end structure of our engagement in friendships
has enabled him to identify one explanatory component of the friend relation. This
component is whatever good is involved in the relation that terminates a complete series of attachments. The discussion of first friend closes, however, without providing a
satisfactory account of the use-value of this friend. Socrates implies a plausible usevalue for the first friend when he identifies what is, I think, the second explanatory
component of the relation. He takes up the latter task in Stage III, to which I now turn.
7. Stage III
In Stage III Socrates investigates the because of (motivating) factor. There is little
doubt that Socrates identifies desire as the motivating factor (221d34).29 What is
less clear is why Socrates next proceeds to argue that any attitude that involves desire
for/pull towards an entity is by its very nature of the akin, ,
(221e4).
Most scholars suppose that Socrates is primarily interested in establishing something
new about the entity that a person desires. But taking this perspective on the role
played by the akin in Socrates analysis compels commentators either to put aside entirely the earlier specification of the good as one component of the friend relation or
to show that the akin designates the good. Mackenzie thinks that the akin supplants the good as a specification of that on the basis of which a person is befriended.
But why should we interpret one stage in the development of Socrates hypothesis so
as to assume that he drops a key conclusion that he reaches in a previous stage? Gonzalez maintains that akin and good are interchangeable designations of the befriended entity. But there are, as he realizes, occurrences of akin for which good
cannot be substituted. For example, akin has to have a sense other than good
when it denotes the property in virtue of which the interlocutors are, on Gonzalezs
view, friends because the interlocutors are not fully good. Gonzalez gives it the sense
of lacking what belongs. But were akin in the sense of lacking what belongs to
denote the property in virtue of which the interlocutors are friends, then they would
be friends in virtue of a similarity. And, as Gonzalez recognizes, Socrates maintains
that being akin can explain being a friend only if being akin is not applied in reference to the relation of similarity (222b510).30
29
30
Bolotin 1979, 182f., Glidden 1981, 54, Mackenzie 1988, 30, Santas 1977, 84f.,
Gonzalez 1995, 81, Kahn 1996, 289, and Rowe 2000, 209, agree.
Mackenzie 1988, 29f., treats akin as supplanting good. Gonzalez 1995, 86f., appears to give akin a secondary sense that would imply that the akin are similar.

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In my view, Socrates has already specified the good as one element that explains
the friend relation. In Stage III, he wants primarily, but not exclusively, to establish
something about the subject who befriends a person who possesses a good of some
sort. Taking this perspective on Stage III puts us in a position to see that the akin argument (221d8e5) reaches the conclusion that desiring attitudes themselves can be
characterized as being of the akin, since they arise out of a loss experienced by the
subject. The conclusion of the argument does, however, pertain to the desired entity,
since these attitudes settle on whatever it is that the subject has lost. By using the
phrase of the akin, ,
, at 221e4 in the conclusion of his argument, Socrates can simultaneously characterize the desiring attitude and the desired entity, since
the genitive construction is here legitimately ambiguous between subjective and objective genitive.31
Because this approach to Socrates treatment of the akin is not the standard one, I
wish to mention two other features of the Stage III discussion that support my view
of it as pertaining particularly, but not exclusively, to the desiring subject. First, Socrates begins the discussion by talking about appetites. By beginning in this way, Socrates encourages the reader to understand desiring attitudes in general on analogy
with appetites. Appetites are urges that normally arise, not as a result of encountering an entity that in the subjects estimation will satisfy the desire, but from physiological conditions in the subject. So by starting off in this way, Socrates sets the stage
for an account of desire on which at least ultimate desires turn out to have their
source in the nature of the subject. The second feature of the discussion that suggests
Socrates wants to emphasize the idea that a persons most basic desires are outgrowths of his/her natural constitution is the connotation of the word akin. Its primary meaning is of the same household or family32. Given that the word conveys
the idea of belonging based on birth or origin, it makes sense to suppose that Socrates uses it to bring out the fact that some desires originate in the physiological and
psychic make-up of the subject. Thus, there are good reasons to read Socrates argument concerning the akin as making foremost a point about desiring attitudes and,
derivatively, a point about the entities that attract.33
31
32
33
See Smyth 1920, 318f. Also see Rep. 437d28 for the use of a similar construction.
See Kerferd 1972/73, 177f., and Pembroke 1971, 114f.
The lacks/losses that prompt desire of the akin are thought by some commentators to have in Socrates eyes a negative value (Vlastos 1969, 8 n. 20; Versenyi
1975, 196; Bolotin 1979, 172f.). These commentators contend that for Socrates
motivating impulses always serve to eliminate some bad, although they admit
that Socrates expressly says that there will be some desires even if bad ceases to
exist (221b57). Versenyi and Bolotin defend their contention by claiming that
Socrates central teaching on desire is contained in his medical equation of good
with a drug for the bad (220d34). However, this analogy occurs in a question to
Menexenus. So its centrality to Socrates own position needs support. Versenyi
and Bolotin appear to offer in support only their own belief that it is psychologically impossible to need or want something unless there is some negative stimulus towards the thing. Thus, Bolotin: No one would need it [the good] were it

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Upon completion of the akin argument, Socrates returns to the topic of being a
friend. He says:
(1) It has been shown to be necessary for us to befriend the akin by nature [].
(2) Then the true lover, and not the feigning one, 8, must be befriended
by the favorite. (222a6b1)
(1) is partly a consequence of the akin argument for the case of friends. From the fact
that all desires are of the akin, that is all desires are directed towards complementary
properties possessed by other entities (221d8e2), and given that the friendly attitude
is a kind of desire (221d35), a person naturally befriends/desires someone who possesses a property that is akin to/complements her make-up in some respect. Further,
(1) represents the akin relation as obtaining between the friendly pair rather than as
holding between a desire and the desired object. So (1) departs in a relevant respect
from Socrates initial characterization of the components of the akin relation. But it
is also clear from what I will call the responsibility assigning passage (221e8222a5)
that it is because the attracted person desires something possessed by the attractive
person that the pair themselves are akin. So Socrates is willing to attribute the akin
relation both to the friends and to features of the friends that explain the standing of
the friends in the akin relation. And, as we shall see, Socrates allows one other characterization of the parties to the akin relation.
Two additional points are worth noting about (1) in light of the responsibility assigning passage. First, the causal structure of the friend relation is now clear. Desire
is the motivating cause, since it pulls one party towards a property possessed by the
other member of the pair. And the property possessed by the other party is the aim of
the relation in the sense that it is what the attracted person lacks and, therefore, seeks
to acquire.34 Finally, (1) contains the qualifier by nature added to the expression
34
not for the presence, or threatened presence of evils (172f.). Socrates simply disagrees. He apparently thinks that the well-functioning human body can experience motivating impulses for food and drink in the absence of anything negative
or bad (217a25). Hence, some of a persons lacks are neutral in the sense that
they are part of the structure of a normal member of the species. This point bears
on the alleged selfishness of Socrates conception of the friend relation. If lacks
are not confined to defects, then their elimination need not consist simply in
bringing a person back to normal. A lack may motivate a person to extend the
range of his capabilities by pursuing, for instance, a relationship with someone who arouses his concern. For an interesting discussion of this possibility see
Pangle 2001, 315f.
We have here, as promised, additional support for the point that the ultimate aim
of the series of means-end attachments is a good possessed by the befriended
party to the terminal friendship. For the responsibility assigning passage indicates that a property possessed by the befriended person serves as the aim of the
friendship of the akin. If, as I go on to argue, the property is in the case of the
akin by nature a genuine good, then a friendship of the akin by nature could terminate a series of means-end attachments, since it has the appropriate metaphysical structure to be the final friendship. Its defining purpose is a genuine good.

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akin. By adding the qualifier, Socrates may want to indicate that desire of the akin
by nature is desire of a good that is akin to a persons nature. I return to this point
after I address (2).
(2) states that the attractive party cannot help but reciprocate the affectionate attitude of the genuine lover/friend. It is, I think, significant that Socrates uses the expression genuine, (222a89) a word etymologically related to family,
descendent, to refer to the lover who inspires the return of affection. The expression implies that there is in the lover something that complements the beloveds
nature and, thereby, inevitably leads to the beloveds affectionate response. That Socrates characterizes the lover in such a way as to account for the return of affection
suggests that the akin relation is not symmetrical.35 Were standing in the akin relationship sufficient for mutual affection, Socrates could have expressed (2) in such a
way as to imply that it is the akin nature of the pair that insures the mutuality. Since
he chooses instead to further specify the nature of the lover, it would seem that more
than being akin is required for mutual affection. Consideration of one-way attraction provides additional evidence for this claim. The parties to the one-way attraction relation could not be akin, if it were part of the essential nature of the akin relation that its members reciprocate affection. Yet one-way attraction is grounded on
desire; and, desire is of the akin. So one way attraction has to be a kind of akin relation. Moreover, even if we suppose that the akin by nature relation differs from the
plain akin relation, we cannot look to the qualified relation to provide an example of
a symmetrical relation. For the responsibility assigning passage specifies desire and
the object desired as wholly explanatory of that relation. It is difficult to maintain
that mutual affection is an effect of that explanatory structure. Hence, it is safer, I
think, to conclude that the reciprocity expressed in (2) derives from the genuine nature of the lover. His nature guarantees a return of affection from the beloved. If this
is correct, then (2) reports not one but two instances of the akin relation.
I now return to the point mentioned in the discussion of (1), namely, the fact that
the qualification added to akin provides some grounds for supposing that desire of
the akin by nature is fundamentally desire for a genuine good. What I wish to suggest
is that desire of the akin has sub-kinds. Hence, to say that a person desires the akin is
to identify the general character of the desire, not necessarily its specific kind. A specific kind of desire of the akin is, I suggest, introduced by means of the qualifier by
nature. And that specific kind of desire of the akin is desire for good. The main advantage of this proposal is that it allows us to read the four stages of Socrates investigation as promoting a single conception of being a friend as opposed to setting
forth a series of unrelated and deficient conceptions of the relational property. Here
are some of the ways the proposal contributes to a unified reading of these stages.
First, construing desire of the akin by nature as desire for a good akin to the desirer
would fit with the implication in Stage I that desire for good is a cause of being a
friend (217e5218a1). As I mentioned, Socrates focus on how the presence of bad af-
35
Bolotin 1979, 186, claims that one cannot be akin to another without the other
being akin to oneself .

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fects desire for good would make most sense, if desire for good were the relational
property upon which being a friend depended. Consequently, if we understand desire
of the akin by nature as desire for good, then the motivating factor hinted at earlier is
affirmed in different phraseology in the responsibility assigning passage that belongs
to the Stage III discussion of the akin conception. Second, on the supposition that
Socrates equates desire of the akin by nature with desire for good there is an obvious
connection between Stage II and Stage III of the investigation. For Stage II introduces genuine goods as the aim of the friend relation. If my proposal is adopted, then
Stage III introduces a motivating cause of the friend relation, namely, desire of the
akin by nature, that can be interpreted in such a way that it is the correlate of the aim
of the relation. Third, the proposal allows us to resolve an apparent incompatibility
between the unrefuted option, option (a), offered in Stage IV and Socrates claim in
Stage III that people can desire neutral things (221b57). Option (a) emerges in Stage
IVs examination of the hypothesis that the akin relation explains the friend relation.
Option (a) asserts that the good is the akin for everyone (222c45). Consequently, if
option (a) were selected to elucidate the akin relation that underlies the friend relation, the good would be one component of the friend relation and desire for good
would be the other component. For the explanatorily more fundamental characterization of the akin relation is in terms of desire and the object desired (221e45). And
on option (a), the akin/the object of desire is the good. Selecting (a) would mean,
however, that only good things are desired. And, as I said, this conflicts with Socrates Stage III claim that there can be neutral desires.
It is worth considering whether option (a) can be made consistent with the broader
view of desire because (a) carries over into Stage IV what seems to be the prime candidates for explaining the friend relation: desire for good and the good desired. Thus,
if the option can be made consistent with the Stage III claim, then its unrefuted status enhances the thesis that the four stages of Socrates investigation are promoting
essentially the same conception of being a friend. Option (a) can be made consistent
with the broader view of desire, if akin in option (a) has the sense akin by nature.
The option would, then, express the point that the good is the akin for everyone
whose desire of the akin is of the specific kind, desire of the akin by nature. This construal of (a) would render it consistent with the claim at 221b57, since (a) would be
asserting that goods are desired by everyone without implying that they are the only
objects of desire because desire directed towards good things is only one of the subkinds of desire of the akin. So the proposal that desire of the akin has sub-kinds, one
of which is desire of the akin by nature directed towards good things, allows us to interpret the unrefuted option of Stage IV in such a way that it does not conflict with
the broader view of desire taken by Socrates in Stage III. The proposal, thereby, frees
us to retain desire for good and the good desired as the prime candidates for what explains the friend relation because these are the explanatory components of the relation presented by the unrefuted option in Stage IV. There are, then, several ways in
which the proposal that desire of the akin has sub-kinds enables us to give a unified
reading of the stages of Socrates investigation, and thereby, reinforces the view that
Socrates develops in these stages a single conception of being a friend. These considerations are not entirely decisive but they make it reasonable to claim that desire for

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good introduced under a different name in the responsibility assigning passage is

the second explanatory component of the friend relation. I now turn to Stage IV
where Socrates has the resources to argue that people who desire good are friends
only to the good. Thus, Stage IV can be read as promoting the explanatory components of the friend relation already introduced in the earlier stages of the investigation, namely, desire for good and the good desired.
8. Stage IV
Socrates begins Stage IV by insisting that a successful account of the friend relation
can be given only if it is possible to distinguish the akin from the similar (222b410).
The salient difference is this. The akin relation holds in consequence of the fact that
one person lacks and, therefore, desires a property possessed by the other party to
the relation. The similarity relation obtains between entities in virtue of what each
entity has on its own. Thus, were the akin relation conflated with the similarity relation, it would be difficult to explain the attraction to the friend and also difficult to
meet the requirement that a friend benefit whoever has one.
The aporetic conclusion of the Lysis is partly due, I think, to the fact that boys
equate the akin relation with the similarity relation. This mistake is revealed to the
reader when Socrates begins the Stage IV argument. He does so by posing a dilemma. He asks whether (a) good is the akin for everyone or (b) it is the case that bad
people are akin to bad, good people are akin to good, and neither good nor bad
people akin to neither good nor bad (222c48). The boys affirm (b). But this option
equates the akin relation with the similarity relation, since the pairs on this option
exemplify the akin relation presumably because the paired entities belong to the same
ontological kind. So the basis of the akin relation on this option is a similarity between the akin entities. Even when Socrates points out that (b), in conjuntion with
the hypothesis that the akin is friend to the akin, implies that bad people can be
friends, a proposition that was rejected earlier, the boys bypass (a) and endorse instead a more restricted version of (b). But their second choice good is akin to good
leads to a problem already mentioned by Socrates, namely, that the good are self-sufficient and, therefore, seem to have no need or desire for friends (215a7b2). Unsurprisingly, then, Socrates evinces puzzlement over the closing conclusion that the
good are friends to the good only. We thought, 6 (222d8), he says, that we had
excluded this hypothesis. The fact that Socrates hedges when he casts suspicion on
this conclusion suggests that the conclusion might be satisfactory were there a different line of argument from which it could be drawn.36 To argue satisfactorily for the
36
Further support for my suggestion that Socrates here invites presumably the reader to find some solution to the final aporia is given at 222e14 where Socrates
calls for a re-examination of the entire discussion. Socrates request would make
most sense, if he thought that a review of the arguments would reveal that something went wrong, thus making possible a way out of the impasse. See also the

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closing conclusion requires, I think, that we preserve the distinction between the akin
and the similar. This means that the akin relation is fundamentally a relation between
a desire and the entity that is desired. Socrates formulation of options (a) and (b) indicate, however, that he introduces, as I said he would, a third characterization of the
relata of the akin relation. For the options represent the relation as obtaining between a person and an entity. Consequently, if we wish to incorporate into the reformulation of the closing argument one of the aforementioned options, we need to
adopt the third characterization of the relation. But we are justified in slightly modifying the characterization in order to accommodate the explanatorily more fundamental characterization of the relation as obtaining between a desire and an object of
desire. Hence, we ought to represent the relation as follows:
P1
People who desire the akin are akin to the akin object(s) of desire.
Furthermore, preserving the distinction between the akin and the similar means that
the elements that comprise the akin relation can belong to different ontological
kinds. This consideration would, in light of the earlier stages of the investigation,
counsel adopting option (a) as a premiss in the argument.
P2
The good is the akin object of desire for everyone.
To P1 and P2 we should add the hypothesis under examination:

P3
The akin is friend to the akin.
Given these premisses, we can infer:

P4
People who desire the akin are friends to the akin object(s) of desire. (P1, P3)
and,
P5
People who desire the good are friends to the good. (P2, P4)
Concern about P5 as involving a substitution in an intentional context should be allayed by the observation that the argument proceeds from an outsiders point of view.
So the akin occurs purely referentially in P4 rather than within the attudinists ontology and is, therefore, subject to substitutivity of identify.37 Now on the basis of Socrates conjecture at 222d56, namely, if we say that the good and the akin are the
same, we can add:
P6
37
The good and people who desire the akin are qualitatively the same.
so far, ., at 223b7. Thus, three of Socrates comments suggest that further

reflection on all of the earlier exchanges can produce a positive result. Yet in a
sense the dialogue does end inconclusively. Although Socrates seems to be committed to the view that philosophic activity, health, and different kinds of
knowledge are genuine goods, he does not make clear what else constitutes a genuine good in a friend. In this sense, then, the Lysis is aporetic like the other
elenctic dialogues.
For a defense of the substitution see Bonomi 1995, 164f., and Quine 1995, 356f.

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and infer:
P7
The good and people who desire the good are qualitatively the same. (P2, P6)
The next move is perhaps the most contentious.38

P9
The good are people who desire the good. (P7)
We can now infer the conclusion:

C10
The good is friend only to the good.39 (P5, P9)
The conclusion of this argument evades the difficulty encountered by the conclusion
of the closing argument. For good person is construed here as person who desires
the good, i.e., good things. Thus, a good person would likely care for and want
friends who possess goods that complement the good persons desire for good. This
fact is also relevant to answering the question of what makes the good intrinsically
useful to a person, i.e., useful in the absence of bad. The answer seems to be that the
good benefits, at least partly, by satisfying a persons desire for good.
There still remains a problem. My reconstruction of the closing argument relies on
the assumption that a good person is a person who desires good things. Thus, some
comment is due on this move. A starting point is the textual evidence for the stronger
conception according to which a good person is a person who is self-sufficient in the
sense of having no needs or wants the sense that would block my move. The
textual evidence does not plainly support ascribing to Socrates the stronger conception of a good person. Consider 215a7c2 where Socrates takes up the issue of
whether good people can be friends. Socrates first inquires whether a good person is
self-sufficient, i.e., has no needs in the specific ways in which he is good. Lysis assents. Socrates next question concerns the person who needs nothing. He asks Lysis
whether this person will cherish anything (215b12). Lysis responds, Presumably
not. From this agreement, Socrates argues that the person who needs nothing cannot be a friend. But it is important to notice that Socrates never presents for Lysis
consideration the question of whether a good person has no needs. Consequently,
when Socrates finally raises the question of how a good person can care for and befriend another person (215b49), he would be asking an improper question, if he is
interpreted as asking whether a good persons lack of needs precludes him from having friends. For by assenting to the qualified self-sufficiency of a good person, Lysis
does not imply that a good person has no needs. Even if Lysis is unaware that his assent does not have this implication, it is difficult to believe that Socrates does not recognize what follows from Lysis admissions. So rather than attribute to Socrates an
improper question, it is more charitable to interpret him as asking how a friend relation between good people can be explained other than by means of a similarity qualified self-sufficiency that makes the relation implausible in light of the previous
38
39
See below for a defense of this move.

To justify only in C10 we would need to add to the argument the assumption
that there are three kinds of things, good, bad and neither good nor bad
(216d68), and steps that bear on the exclusion of option (b).

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101
conclusion that having friends depends upon having needs. But reading Socrates
question in this way suggests that he does not regard good people as having no needs
or desires, since this reading takes him to be asking how the friendship of good
people can be made compatible with the dependency of having friends on needs conclusion. So Socrates reservation concerning the friendship of good people does not
conclusively establish his commitment to the stronger conception of a good person.
Furthermore, two other passages of the Lysis text strongly suggest that for Socrates a good person has needs and desires. One passage is Lysis 221a9b7 where Socrates speaks of people (not just those without merit) as having desires. Since nothing in
what Socrates says here indicates that he has in mind only people whose behavior displays none of the virtues, the passage suggests Socrates acceptance of the view that
people who are moderate and orderly, i.e., have some measure of virtue, have needs
and desires, including desires for genuine goods.40
A second passage that supports the same idea contains Socrates declaration that
he would wish,
, to have a good friend more than the wealth of Darius
(211d8e6). Now Socrates clearly regards himself as a good person. For he says in the
Apology that death cannot bring harm to a good person (41d13) and that what has
happened to him (i.e., his impending death) is a good thing (40b89). Since it is difficult to believe that Socrates would not realize what is implied by his declaration
combined with his belief that he is a good man, the inference must be that he thinks a
good person can want good things. The textual evidence, then, tends not to favor ascribing to Socrates the stronger conception of a good person, but rather tends to suggest that he holds the weaker conception. Hence, my revised version of the argument
relies on a conception of a good person that appears to be acceptable to Socrates. The
reformulation also retains the view of being a friend that is promoted in the previous
40
As the reader probably realizes, by arguing that for Socrates good people desire
genuine goods, I implicitly attribute to Socrates the recognition of non-rational
desires. For a corollary of my argument that Socrates holds that a good person
a person who is moderate and orderly (see 214c6d4, 216b46) desires this or
that good thing, is that in Socrates view not every desire that a person experiences is an instance of desire for good. Socrates holds, I believe, a broader view of
desire, according to which a person can in some cases desire things that the person herself judges not to conduce to her overall good. By favoring this understanding of Socrates on desire, I am following scholars who have argued that the Socratic position in many elenctic dialogues allows for non-rational desires. See on
this Devereux 1995, 381f., and Brickhouse / Smith 2000, 180f. Furthermore,
there is evidence in the Lysis that favors attribution to Socrates of this broader
view of desire. At 207e7209a6, Lysis expresses desires to drive his fathers chariot and to play with his mothers wool-spinner, despite his belief that these activities are unsuitable sources of enjoyment for him, given his age. Socrates would
seem, then, to be aware that there are other objects besides genuine goods for
which the restrained and the unrestrained person can have a desire. Hence, this
corollary of understanding Socrates view of a good person in the terms I have
suggested fits with the Lysis text and with recent work on Socrates moral psychology.

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stages of Socrates investigation. So Stage IV, like the earlier stages, hints towards the
conclusion that desire for good and the good desired are the explanatory components of the friend relation.
9. Strategy of Accommodation
I now wish to give the promised explanation of how this understanding of the friend
relation can accommodate both mutual friendship and the relation of one-way attraction. The strategy for accommodation conforms to the idea that an individual
possesses a relational property in a qualified way.41 The strategy also assumes that
the friend relation holds between two persons in virtue of one persons desire for a genuine good and the other persons possession of that good. Furthermore, it takes the
use by Socrates of different phrases for designating the two kinds of friend relation to
reflect a difference in the way the property of being a friend applies to each member
of the pair. When two people are mutual friends, each member of the pair has the
property in relation to the other person. When one person is attracted to another person, only one party to the relation has the property of being a friend in relation to the
other party.
Consider first mutual friends. Recall that Socrates describes these friends by a
phrase of the form a and b are friends. Using Lysis and Hippothales as the pair,
their (future) friendship can be analyzed thus:
(1)
Lysis has the property of being a friend in virtue of his desire for good and in
reference to Hippothales in virtue of his (Hippothales) capacity to engage
in philosophic inquiry.
and
41
My strategy of accommodation is indebted to Matthen 1982. According to Matthen, Plato explains a persons possession of a relational property by introducing
in the Phaedo 102b102c the notion of qualified participation/predication. A relational property such as being tall, to use Matthens example, applies to a person
in virtue of some characteristic of that person (i.e., his specific size) and in relation to some other person in virtue of a characteristic of that other person (i.e.,
her specific size). Matthens analysis has been challenged by McPherran 1983.
McPherran objects that Plato is not analyzing in these Phaedo passages relational predications but relations that involve the joint instantiation of Forms. This is
a complicated issue that I cannot pursue here. But it may be useful to say in Matthens defense that Plato does explicitly draw from the discussion a conclusion
about the predications of tall and short to Simmias (Phaedo 102c8d3). It
may also be, as McPherran argues, that for Plato the predication of a relational
property implies or can be expanded into a statement about the entity to which
the subject of the predication is related by means of the relation that corresponds
to the relational property. For an excellent discussion of how this might work see
Mignucci 1986.

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(2)
103
Hippothales has the property of being a friend in virtue of his desire for
good and in reference to Lysis in virtue of his (Lysis) beauty and self-restraint.
So the youths are on this analysis mutual friends. Both have the property of being a
friend in reference to the other and in virtue of some good possessed by the other.
Turning now to one-way attraction, the strategy works like this. Given that Socrates uses language of the form a is friendly to (friend of) b to denote one-way attraction, the sick persons relation to the doctor can be analyzed as follows:
(3)
The sick person has the property of being a friend in virtue of his desire for
health and in reference to the doctor in virtue of the doctors medical
knowledge.
In (3) being a friend applies in virtue of ones person desire for a good and in reference to a good in another person. But the relation is not necessarily mutual.
This is, then, how Socrates analysis of being a friend can explain the two kinds of
relation that are, I have argued, regarded by him as genuine examples of the friend relation. Those commentators who charge Socrates with trading on ambiguity, as well
as those who find in the Lysis no positive teaching, fail to see that Socrates has a
scheme that provides for mutual and one-sided friend relations. Sometimes being a
friend applies in a qualified way to a pair (or more); and, sometimes it characterizes
only one person in reference to another person. But the fundamental basis of the ascription of the property is the same in both cases: desire for good and the desired
good possessed by the other person. So I would conclude that a fruitful interpretation of the Lysis is possible on the assumption that its main question is, What is a
friend?42
Adams, D. 1992. The Lysis Puzzles. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9: 317.

Annas, J. 1977. Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism. Mind 86:
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Quine, eds. Paolo Leonardi and Mario Santambrogio. Cambridge: 164185.
Brickhouse, T. and Smith, N. D. 2000. The Philosophy of Socrates. Boulder.
Burnyeat, M. F. 1977. Examples in Epistemology. Philosophy 52: 381398.
Devereux, D. 1995. Socrates Kantian Conception of Virtue. Journal of the History
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42
Mohan Matthen and Roslyn Weiss provided careful and helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to both of them. I benefited also from the
suggestions made to me by the editor of this journal, Don Garrett, and by two
anonymous reviewers. I thank all three of these readers for helping me to better
explain my views.

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Zur Diskussion

Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie 87. Bd., S. 75 104

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definitional question of what is a friend; (2) he identifies, in the course of pursuing an

1. Main Question of the Lysis

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crates first candidate definition of the relation to be defined. So the specification of

2. Identification of Two Kinds of Friends

Roth 1995, 11f., dismisses Socrates examples of an attraction of a person to his

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3. In Support of Two Sub-Kinds

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regarding Lysis prospects are surely exaggerated. Nevertheless, Socrates seems to be

In this paragraph I am indebted to remarks made in conversation with Roslyn

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), if only one likes the other? (212b35)

, to denote mutual friends, given that he has a tendency in this dialogue, as we

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from consideration of a pair of persons who reciprocate affection to consideration of

On the basis of Socrates subsequent positing of desire as a cause of being a

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4. Socrates Analysis of Being a Friend

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Gonzalez 1995, 82.

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Proponents of the happiness version of the interpretation include Vlastos 1969,

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an interest in a doctor, for instance, because a doctor possesses a good medical

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good introduced under a different name in the responsibility assigning passage is

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The good is the akin object of desire for everyone.

To P1 and P2 we should add the hypothesis under examination:

The akin is friend to the akin.

Given these premisses, we can infer:

so far, ., at 223b7. Thus, three of Socrates comments suggest that further

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The next move is perhaps the most contentious.38

The good are people who desire the good. (P7)

We can now infer the conclusion:

The good is friend only to the good.39 (P5, P9)

See below for a defense of this move.

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Adams, D. 1992. The Lysis Puzzles. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9: 317.

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Glidden, D. 1980. The Language of Love. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:

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