Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Ex Nihilo Nihil, In Nihilum Nil: A Reply to Mourelatos

Author(s): David Gallop
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 11, Seventy-Eighth Annual Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Nov., 1981), pp. 666-667
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026577
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666

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

EX NIHILO

NIHIL, IN NIHILUM NIL: A REPLY

TO MOURELATOS*

OURELATOS argues persuasivelyfor at least two distinct sources for ex nihilo nihil (ENN) in pre-Socratic
philosophy:
to what-is-not;
(1) Parmenides'injunctionagainstmakingreference
and
in thePrincipleof
latercrystallized
(2) The demandforintelligibility,
Reason(PSR).
Sufficient

The second idea certainlyremainedprominentin the Epicurean

tradition,which shows no trace of the first.Whetherthe second
need be supposed to have pre-datedthe Eleatics,as a "rationale" for
ENN, appears more doubtful.
Parmenides' denial that "what-is" could have come fromwhatis-not (or nothing) contains two ambiguities that affectseveral of
the issues Mourelatos raises:
(i) Does 'whatis' standfor"the(one and only)thingthatis," i.e.,for
Or is ita pure
conceivedas a uniquereferent?
thewholeuniverse,
(there)is', standingforanysubjectwhatever?
variable,'whatever
from
"fromnothing"meancomingintoexistence
(ii) Does generation
generated
being
mean
it
does
Or
nonexistence?
of
state
a previous
fromnothingconceivedas a causeor source?
A "pure variable" interpretationof the subject suits the firstof
Parmenides' two argumentsagainst the generationof what-isfrom
what-is-not,and enables it to be taken as a rationale for ENN. It
does not, however, suit the second argument,which Mourelatos
connectswith the PSR. This remains a difficultyforthe "variable
subject" interpretationof the first ar-gument,whether or not
Parmenidesis concerned,as Mourelatosclaims,withrationalintelligibilityas opposed to causal explanation.
Mourelatos entertainsa spatial versionof theargumentusing the
PSR, but thinksthatit would contradictthe supposition of generation ex nihilo. This seems questionable. It is not clear thateithera
spatial or a temporalversionof the argumentneed contradictthat
supposition;nor is it moreobvious thatthespatial one would do so.
on AncientPhiloin an APA symposium
*Abstract of a paper to be presented
"Pre-Soon AlexanderP. D. Mourelatos,
sophy,December30, 1981,commenting
craticOriginsof thePrinciplethatThereAreNo OriginsfromNothing";see this
JOURNAL,thisissue,649-665.
0022-362X/81/7811/0666$00.50

Inc.
? 1981The Journalof Philosophy,

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667

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

With referenceto the universeas a whole, a spatial versionof the

argumentwould appear prima facie to be as tenableas the temporal
one, just as both versionsalike would be untenable fora variable
subject. However, a distinctiveweakness in the spatial version is
worth considering: the temporal argument assumes, plausibly
enough, that generationcould not occur at more than one time,
whereas a counterpartassumption with regard to space may be
more debatable.
For the so-called "annihilation complement" of ENN, in nihilum nil (INN), much depends,once again, upon whetherthesubthe whole universe,or a variable. For the
ject is a unique referent,
whole universe,a parallel argument against its perishing, using
the PSR, would seem as cogent as the one against its generation.
Mourelatos' view that INN "carries a heavier burden of proof"
than ENN seems mistaken,since his distinctionbetween "plain
perishing" and annihilation by an all-powerfuldestroyerappears
to restupon a doubtfuldichotomy.Perishing throughany sortof
disintegrationwould be precluded by the subject's being a unified,
continuous,indivisiblewhole.
Mourelatos' contrast between Parmenides and Melissus seems
somewhat overdrawn. In particular, Melissus' argument against
change findsa reasonablyclose parallel in Parmenides' proof that
his subject is changeless;and Melissus' denial of thevoid may,pace
Mourelatos, be read as making use of the Parmenidean interdict
against referenceto what-is-not.
Mourelatos' interpretationof certain versesof Empedocles, importinga similar appeal to the PSR in orderto disproveperishing,
is suggestive,and mightbe applicable also to a puzzling remarkof
Melissus.Finally,his suggestionthatENN is rootedin Empedoclean
yearningfor personal immortalityhas some notable implications
forPlato's defenseof immortalityand the Epicurean attackupon it.
DAVID GALLOP

Trent University

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