OBJECTIVES

(i) To study the key developments in the recent politics of India.

(ii) To outline a theoretical framework within which coalition politics is examine.
(iii) To identify the issue areas specially the challenges that the experiment with coalition
government throws up.
(iv)To critically examine the efficacy and desirability of coalition politics for.

INTRODUCTION

Coalition Politics is a time tested thing in Modern Democracy. The concept of Coalition Politics
in my opinion draws its roots from the times when warring states sometimes used to ally with
each other in order to defeat of a common enemy; one example being The Battle of The Red
Cliffs (208/9 CE).
First instance of a Coalition Government was found to be the Delian League which existed
around 431 B.C.1
India got a taste of Coalition Politics at the state level when the Left front comprising of
Communist Party of India (CPI), CPI (Marxist) and others formed the first ever Coalition
Government in India at West Bengal with Mr. Jyoti Basu as the Chief Minister (succeeded by Mr.
Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee) which till date hasnt been defeated. At the national level the first ever
coalition government was formed under the Prime Ministership of Late Shri Morarji Desai Ji
which existed from 24th March 1977 to 15th July 1979 headed by now an insignificantJanata
Party (who reputation has now been acquired by its breakaway section which formed
the Bharatiya Janata Party).
Since 1996 Indian Politics has been dominated with Coalition Governments which by far have
been stable after a shaky start.The incumbent Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh is
heading a coalition Government of 15 parties called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) with
Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, widow of Late Shri Rajiv Gandhi Ji being its Chairperson which was elected
for a second term in Office.

COALITION GOVERNMENTS
1 (Courtesy: Yahoo! Answers)

The term 'coalition' is derived from the Latin word 'coalition" which is the several substantive of
coalescere which means to grow together. However, as actually used, it some what belies it
nominal meaning, 'for the units or the elements brought into combination by a coalition very
seldom grow together in any lateral sense. A coalition government is a cabinet of
a parliamentary government in which several political parties cooperate, reducing the dominance
of any one party within that coalition. The usual reason given for this arrangement is that no
party on its own can achieve a majority in theparliament. A coalition government might also be
created in a time of national difficulty or crisis, for example during wartime, or economic crisis,
to give a government the high degree of perceived political legitimacy, or collective identity it
desires while also playing a role in diminishing internal political strife. In such times, parties
have formed all-party coalitions (national unity governments, grand coalitions). If a coalition
collapses, a confidence vote is held or a motion of no confidence is taken.
Coalition cabinets are common in countries in which a parliament is proportionally
representative, with several organized political parties represented. It usually does not appear in
countries in which the cabinet is chosen by the executive rather than by a lower house, such as in
the United States (however, coalition cabinets are common inBrazil). In semi-presidential
systems such as France, where the president formally appoints a prime minister but the
government itself must still maintain the confidence of parliament, coalition governments occur
quite regularly.

INDIA EXPERIENCE WITH COALITION POLITICS

Unlike general perception, coalition in polltics is not a new concept for lndian politics.
Coalitionism as a form of government is common and widely practiced in Europe, India, too, has
accmlulated non considerable amount of equivalence in the form of governing arrangement.
Undivided India got its first experience of coalition government in 1937, when the Government
of India Act, 1935 became operatwe. At that time Jinnah asked for a coalition consisting of
Congress and Muslim League in U.P. but Congress, the party holding majority did not entertain'
this demand. Mohm Ali Jinnah at that time argued that in India, coalition was the only
respectable device to give to the Muslims a fair share in governance, In other states like NWFP
and Punjab Congress formed coalitions with other regional parties.
The pulls and pressures of Indian politics today can only be understood by tracing their roots to
the post-1967 changes. Ousting Congress was easier than forging another political instrument of
rule. In most of north India, the break up of the united Opposition governments came about due
to difference of interest and ideology between the Jana Sangh and the socialists. The former had
a stronger urban profile and the latter, a rural base, the former were stronger among the upper
strata and the latter among the worse off sections and the middle peasantry. The collapse of the
Morarji Desai (1977-79) ministry was due to similar rifts. A second significant feature was the
ouster of the Congress from certain states as the party of power. This first took place in Tamil
Nadu where a regional party came to power and then in West Bengal in 1977 where a Marxistled coalition won office. Over time, a process of the steady displacement of Congress from the
place of the natural party of government was at work. The internal fissures among opposition
parties led them to give up attempts to merge after the 1979 collapse.
The second phase, again of broad-front anti-Congressism, was that of the Janata Party, which
unified ideologically disparate non-Congress parties so as to have one-on-one contests
aggregating votes at the constituency level so as to win, reflected the imperative of aggregation
to win regardless of ideology. This also consisted of intra-state alliances of disparate parties
within the overall umbrella of unification of those parties at the national level.
The National Front coalition, 1989-90, led by the Janata Dal and with four regional parties,
supported from the outside by the BJP and the Left Front, was a new departure in three senses.
First, that learning from the Janata experience, it did not try to unify very different parties but put
together a coalition of distinct parties based on a common manifesto. Second, it brought in the

explicitly regional parties like the DMK, TDP and AGP, and the Left parties (Tables 3-4 for party
acronyms), unlike the late 1960s/1970s experiments. Third, it also marked the beginning of interstate alliances of parties or spatially compatible alliances where parties do not compete on each
others turf.
In 1996, the nine-party United Front (UF) minority coalition government of Prime Minister Deve
Gowda, with another three (Left) parties formally part of the UF coalition but opting to support it
from outside, and also supported by the Congress, was formed. The UF was a territorial coalition
but had a certain secular ideological mooring, ranged as it was against a Hindu nationalist, antisystem BJP. The Congress withdrew support in April 1997, forcing a change of prime minister,
and then once again withdrew support in November 1997, precipitating early elections in
February 1998.
In March 1998, a eleven-party BJP-led minority coalition government based on a coalition
consisting of thirteen pre-electoral (including three Independents) and one post-electoral
members of the government, and ten post-electoral supporters and three pre-electoral allies who
opted out of the government, assumed power for a year.
In October 1999, the twelve-party BJP-led NDA won a decisive victory and formed a minority
coalition along with post-electoral allies, despite some NDA constituents opting to support from
the outside (the legislative coalition, pre- and post-electoral including those who opted to stay
out of the government, including independents, consisted of twenty parties).
India finally harnesses the coalition horse:
After 4 failed Coalition Governments and 2 mid-term elections, on October 13, 1999, Shri Atal
Bihari Vajpayee Ji took oath as Prime Minister of India for the third time. The BJP-led NDA had
won 303 seats in the 543 seat Lok Sabha, thereby securing a comfortable, stable majority. The
Coalition Government that was formed lasted its full term of 5 years the only non-Congress
government to do so.
The National Democratic Alliance was widely expected to retain power after the 2004 general
election. The parliament had been dissolved before the completion of term in order to capitalize
on the economic boom and improved security and cultural atmosphere. However, the coalition
sidestepped controversial and ideological questions in favour of bread-and-butter economic
issues during the campaign and subsequently lost almost half its seats, with several prominent
cabinet ministers being defeated.

India now looks forward to a stable future of Coalition Governments as single-party majority
seem to be a thing of the past now.

In May 2004, the nine-party Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) drawn from a preand post-election alliance consisting of seventeen parties including eight new allies and minus
two old allies, formed a minority coalition government with the external support of the four Left
parties and two others, plus external support of two pre-electoral allies who opted to stay out.
The major difference between 2004 and earlier elections was that the Congress, for the first time,
became coalitionable in a large number of significant states under the logic of the enemy of my
enemy is a friendFollowing this logic, the Congress could be an attractive coalition partner to
first and second parties in states (for example, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, potentially Uttar Pradesh) in
which it was a third or fourth party or coalitionable where it faced a direct contest with the
BJP/NDA and there was a third or fourth minor party present. This does not mean that if these
conditions obtain such coalitions will necessarily be formed. And likewise for the BJP under
similar conditions where it is a first or second party facing the Congress with an available third
party, or where it is third or fourth party. These conditions should be viewed as merely necessary
and not sufficient for the formation of state-level coalitions. One or other of the situations
mentioned above came about in seven significant states Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Jharkhand, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu (in the last two of
which the same situation existed earlier).
All the coalitions since 1996 have been inter-state territorial coalitions. The period since 1991
has also seen the growth and sustenance of intra-state alliances based on ideology (like the BJPShiv Sena) and based on territorial compatibility of two kinds. First, intra-state alliances in which
the regional party allies with the state unit of the national party with the regional party getting the
lions share of both Lok Sabha and assembly seats.23 Second, the reverse of this pattern, viz., an
alliance between a minor state party and a national party in which the latter gets the lions share
of both Lok Sabha and assembly seats, the key being territorial compatibility in which the
national party does not contest in the smaller regional partys intra-state strongholds.24 The clear
emphasis of alliances since the nineties has been on territorial compatibility at the expense of
ideological compatibility, particularly the BJPs alliances of 1998, 1999 and 2004, and the
Congress alliances of 2004, but even the UF coalition. However, the most important point to be
noted in this history of coalitions is that, with the exception of the Left Front limited to three
states, coalitions have been driven by the imperative to aggregate votes to win and not by

ideological or programmatic cleavages except for differences between the Congress and the BJP
on secularism.
The Indian National Congress, led by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi became the single largest party and,
along with many minor parties, formed the United Progressive Alliance. With the conditional
support of the leftist parties from the outside, the UPA formed a government under Dr
Manmohan Singh. The alliance completed a full term and remained in power after the 15th
General Elections in May 2009. Although the left now longer supports the UPA but with new
allies it has been able to extend its lead in the Lok Sabha.

FRAGMAENTATION OF NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEM

An indicator of the fragmentation of the national party system is the Laakso-Taagepera index (N)
(of the effective number of parties). The values of N by votes/seats were 4.80/4.35, 5.10/3.70,
7.11/5.83, 6.91/5.28, 6.74/5.87 and 7.6/6.5 in 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004
respectively whereas in 8 general elections between 1952 and 1984 the effective number of
parties by seats exceeded three only once (3.16 in 1967) and the effective number of parties by
votes exceeded five only once (5.19 in 1967).

No

Name

Date of
swearing
in

Date of
Demittin
g Office

Number
of Parties
in the
Governm

Type of
Governm
ent

Number
of Days

Party

Jawaharla
l Nehru

15/08/47

13/05/52

ent
1

SPM

1733

Jawaharla
l Nehru

13/05/52

17/04/57

SPM

1800

Jawaharla
l Nehru

17/04/57

1/04/62

SPM

1810

Jawaharla
l Nehru

1/04/62

27/05/64

SPM

787

Gulzari
Lal Nanda

27/05/64

9/06/64

SPM

13

Lal
Bahadur
Shastri
Gulzari
Lal Nanda

9/06/64

11/01/66

SPM

581

11/01/66

24/01/66

SPM

13

7
8

Indira
Gandhi

24/01/66

13/03/67

SPM

413

Indira
Gandhi

13/03/67

18/03/71

SPM

1466

10

Indira
Gandhi

18/03/71

24/03/77

SPM

2198

11

Morarji
Desai
Ch.
Charan
Singh
Indira
Gandhi

24/03/77

28/07/79

OC

856

28/07/79

14/01/198
0

MC

170

14/01/198
0

31/10/198
4

SPM

1752

31/10/198
4
31/12/198
4
2/12/89

31/12/198
4
2/12/1989

SPM

61

SPM

1797

10/11/90

MC

343

12
13
14
15
16

Rajiv
Gandhi
Rajiv
Gandhi
Vishwanat
h Pratap

India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
India
Nation
Congre
Janat
Party
Janat
Party
Secula
India
Nation
Congre
Congre
I
Congre
I
Nation
Front l

Singh

by Jana
Dal
Samajw
i Jana
Party
Congre
I

17

Chandra
Shekhar

10/11/90

21/06/91

SPMG

223

18

P.V.
Narasimh
a Rao
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
H.D.
Deve
Gowda
Inder
Kumar
Gujral
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
Atal

21/06/199
1

16/05/199
6

SPMG

1791

16/05/96

1/06/96

MC

16

MC led
BJP

1/06/96

21/04/97

MC

109

MC led
Janata D

21/04/97

19/03/98

10

MC

332

MC led
Janata D

19/03/98

20/04/98^
^

11

MC

32

MC led
BJP

20/04/98

14/04/99
%

10

MC

359

MC led
BJP

14/04/99

13/10/99

MC

182

MC led
BJP

13/10/99

5/02/01*

12

MC

479

MC led
BJP

5/02/01

15/03/01*
*

11

MC

38

MC led
BJP

15/03/01

22/07/01*
**

10

MC

129

MC led
BJP

22/07/01

1/07/02**
**

11

MC

344

MC led
BJP

1/07/02

23/12/02*
****

11

MC

175

MC led
BJP

23/12/02

23/05/03*
*****

10

MC

151

MC led
BJP

23/05/03

8/9/03#

MC

108

MC led

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Behari
Vajpayee

Notes:
^^ Buta Singh forced by A.B. Vajpayee to resign from the cabinet
% AIADMK ministers resigned from the Union Council of Ministers
*PMK quits NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
** Trinamool Congress quits NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
*** Rashtriya Lok Dal joins the NDA, Ajit Singh sworn in as the cabinet minister
**** PMK joins the Union Council of Ministers, Maneka Gandhi (Ind) dropped from the Union Council of
Ministers. She continues to support the government.
***** NC quits the Union Council of Ministers
****** RLD quits the NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
# Trinamool Congress joins the NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
## DMK quits the NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
### MDMK quits the NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
#### PMK quits the NDA and the Union Council of Ministers
~ Shibu Soren resigns from the cabinet following the arrest warrant issued against him JMM continues to support
the government.
@ TRS leaves the Union Council of Ministers and the UPA
We follow the cross-national definition (and West European) of Muller and Strom (2003) and the Parliamentary
Democracy Data Archive (www.pol.umu.se/ccpd), and Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1998) and count a new
cabinet only when (a) the party composition of the executive coalition changes (b) the prime minister changes (c)
there is a general election. We further count independents as separate members of a coalition. We exclude parties
which have a minister only from the Upper House. Due to the above reasons we do not classify the 1969 split in the
Congress and formation of Congress(R) as leading to a separate government .This is so because there is no change
of prime minister, no change of party composition and there is no general election .We do not count the addition of
individual MPs to the ruling party as the change of government For this reason P.V. Narasimha Raos 1991
government is treated as an SPMG , even though theirs was a change of status and the government attained a
majority in 1993.This was due to the independent MPs joining the Congress. We calculate the total duration of the
government by including the date of swearing in and ignoring the date of demitting the office. We further follow
Woldendorp et al (1993, 1998) on duration defined as date of swearing in to date of next government swearing in,
i.e. demitting office.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF COALITION POLITICS

BJP

Acceptance of coalition politics as an important political phenomenon today, makes it imperative

to study their advantages and disadvantages .Bryce once remarked "administration formed by
coalition of parties is usually weak, not merely because the combination is unstable but because
men whose professed principles differ are likely to be entangled in inconsistencies or driveh to
unsatisfactory compromises."
Coalition politics in a democratic polity is a reflex of a living and continuous interaction between
a pasty's natural & hence ultimate quest to come to power by itself and the expedient perhaps
transitory inter-party collaboration to capture the reins of government. Thus by its very nature
coalition politics is Subject to contradictory pulls and pressures. It is therefore not surprising if
parties tend to use the coalition expedients fulfill the ultimate objectives, it IS equally
understandable if parties avoid and even prefer to opt out of a coalition if the former goal tends
to cost the latter. Thus stability is a major casualty in a coalition government that which is an
essential requirement for carrying out any long-range programme of economic and social
development and providing administration.
The leadership of the real executive (PMICM) is one of the accepted principles of parliamentary
This principle hardly appears to be empirically tenable in the context of coalition politics in
India. The following reasons may be discussed;
Firstly, a person does not owe his position as PM/CM to his election as leader of a particular
party or to his pre-eminence within a party but to interparty acceptance which is usually the
result of hard bargaining. There are claims and counter claims which results in the creation of the
post of a Dy. Leadership which tends to be more contractual than a cultivated one and as such he
is PM or CM more by courtesy than by right, though there are always exceptions.
Secondly, the PM/CM doesnt always enjoy even elbowroom freedom in the distribution of
portfolios. This distribution is in fact part & parcel of the agreement governing the coalition.
Thirdly, the PWCM is always fighting the battle of political survival-sometimes placating the
prospective defectors with more minister ship, at others being at the beck call of co-ordination
committees ,and at still other maneuvering for an alternative set of political alignments. Although
he is following Carlyle literally 'I am their leader, therefore I must follow them'.

The principles of collective responsibility so critical to parliamentary democracy, are also

seriously threatened by coalition politics. There are numerous examples of responsibility being
more individual than collective especially in state governments-an extreme case being that of
Ajoy Mukherjee, the CM of West Bengal who would resort to hunger strikes a d mass
satyagrahas against Jyoti Basu, Home Minister in his own Cabinet. The cabinet, which consists
of representatives from different parties, speaks in many voices. The sense of direction and unity
of purpose gets lost.
Political homogeneity is another characteristics of a parliamentary government. This in turn is
rooted in programmatic unity..Though coalitiongovernments do make efforts to provide for
progrmmatic unity through minimum programmes, they are very poor substitutes - ill-conceived
compromises of contradictory programmatic pullgand pressures. The parties in the coalition also
have different support structure, which further militate against minimum programmes being
treated as an integrated programmatic unit, and more importantly against its implementatibn.
Thus minimum programmes are many a time and evil however necessary- dysfunctional to
political homogeneity, they are more a source of weakness than strength.
Another dysfunctionality is that it affects the morale of the rank and file of the parties. With
frequent elections at all levels, .the problem that arises is that of alignment Continued partnership
at one level may come in contlict with possibility of competition an another levels. The rank and
file doesn't alivays appreciate the competition of national level politics. They are further
alienated if they don't get adequate share of ofices and patrongage. There are no assurances for
them that the policy of their party will get properly implemented.
Neutrality of the civil servants under a coalition government some- times. suffers. The
contradictory pulls and pressures of the coalition model may either cripple independence on the
part of the civil servants that may become too strong and just ignore the miGsteria1btdding.
Neither attitude is conductive to nation building.
Many critics of the coalition experiment raise the question of its negatively affecting relations
between the Center and the States. Obviously in terms of its relation with the Central government
a state government will be at an advantage if formed by a party which suppotts the Central
government. On the other hand, a state government formed by parties, which are in the
opposition in the parliament, will have a difficult passage. However, this is not only true of

coalition governments. Even with single party majority governments such problems do arise and
these have more to do with working out an effective federal structure-that allows smooth Center
State relation than with coalition politics per se.
Then comes the question of growth of fissiparous tendencies and factionalism based on region,
caste, community etc. getting stronger due to coalition politics. However, the reverse is also true.
Diversity in society gets political representation more clearly through coalition rather than single
party dominance. Thus,in explaining $e success or failure of coalitions, political culture is an
important factor. Cultures which accord a central place to accepting and negotiating differences
are considered conducive to the consolidation and stability of federal coalitions. Recent
experiment India with the instability of minority and coalition governments has undeniably
generated misgivings, but it need not necessarily be so.
The diversity and plurality in India's fabric can be best represented through coalition politics
when even small groups regional groups, etc.have say in politics. This is not possible in single
party dominance .Even only when that party had within it various shades of opinions and
espoused a multiplicity of cause. In a vast countly with diversity as ours, coalitions may be thus a
necessary stage in the evolution of democracy. Also, a coalition government need not necessarily
lead to instability or discontinuity in policies, nor can they be called ineffective or less purposive.
The coalition government in Kerela had many achievements to its credit, the most important
being land reforms. The coalition, in West Bengal was equally successful- though its success
may not be spectablar- in dealing with communal labour Issues. In this connection an examine
cited by Prof. Jennings is pertinent. He observes "curiously knough, the coalition which saved
civilization between 1940 and 1945 seems to ,have been at least as united as the ordinary party
governments."
With respect to collective responsibility-and the powers of PM, it can be said that while there is
undeniably a difference in this respect because of the absence of party discipline mechanisms,
the contrast is not as sharp as it is made out to be. It is widely recognized that head of
government don't have absolute to choose and remove colleagues. Some impose themselves by
virtue of thier political weight, while others can't be removed with impunity. Regional, caste and
minority representation has always played a role in cabinet formation. All these factor of only
become accentuated in coalition government situations.

Democratic accountabiliiy is just achieved in plural societies through coalition politics. Those
who bemoan the cost of coalition governance ignore similar deals cloaked in the secrecy of
dominant party discipline. The multiplicity of partners and sub-agendas obviously brings about
greater transparency, but the policy outcomes are not necessarily or inferior to those emerging
from single party dispensations. As a result of the pressure experienced by the various partners
within the coalition the policies, which finally emerge, are in the nature of a consensus, avoiding
extreme positions. For example the BJP had to drop mandir plans in order to successfully forge a
coalition and form the government.

One might now consider the argument that only a bi-party system will' lead to efficiency and
stability. Studies have shown that coalitions are more a common feature of the political systems
of a majority of countries and the USA, UK, Australia, Canada are really not perfect models of
bi-party system. These two or three parties are only what are called "the main pillars of the
political system". The Americal Government may be cited as the foremost instance of a two party
system However, it must be remembered that the American parties are themselves coalitions of
various forces and groups.
In India the Congress6has gone on record against the principle of coalition government, calling
them dishonest alliances. This ignores the possibilities of 'honiest' alliances and draws sustenante
from a typically British aversion, which could be and unreliable guide to governance alternatives
for a federal party.
Thus, though the Indian experience with coalition hasn't been very encouraging - it would be
foolish to dismiss them altogether.

Challenges and Suggestions :-

The main challenge regarding coalition polities is that since in India, it is inevitable, the focus
should be on how to ensure that basic issue of good governance, clean politics and administration
are not neglected. It is a fact that coalition politics has come to stay in the I n d m scenario. One
party majority system or that of two single party system is passe. The dominant political scenario
would be the two coalition gourp.' Thus rather than return to a political centralization that was
the economic ruin of India, our major national parties need to focus on social and cultural
ecosystems, linking them,togetheracross regions and communities".
Electroral dynamics are also ensuring that no single party will be in a position to dominate the
political scenario. Politics of consensus is sought to be achieved, which unfortunately often
becomes polities of onemanship and bargaining. In this context, however a contrasting and
different view may be taken of two former home secretaries of India, Mr. N.N. Vohra and Mr. K.
Padmanabhiah .Mr. Vohra has an optimistic viewpoint that since meetings are so often and there
is so much consideration, decision,taken may be slow, but they are more lasting. Mr. Vohra who
was also principa1secretary to Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, there have been few governments
where the Cabinet & Cabinet Committees have met. Mr. Padmanabhiah also agrees and says that
in a multiparty government, the state satraps who are rewarded with cabinet portfolios do not
resist development related decisions.
However, an alternative and differing viewpoint have been given by former Cabinet Secretary
T.S.R. Secretary T.S.R. Subhramaniumwho says that simply bringing about a meeting between
two ministers of different parties be comes a herculean task, more a process of appeasement.
This is one of the most important challenges for not only the ministers but also the bureaucrates.
They have to rise above parochial and narrow considerkims and think in terms of the
national interest.
The question therefore arises as to how this can be ensured that at the time of formation of (he
coalition the number game should not be followed. Capabilities and merit of the
legislators/parliamentarians 'concerned should be taken into account. The choice of the leader of
the coalition also should be taken with utmost care. The obvious choice of leader will be the
leader of the largest party of the coalition of parties. Ideally this person should be one with a
vision, with a capacity to shoulder responsibilities and pressures and an ability to strike a chord
among different constituents of coalition. Need for a basic common program which may guide

the future course of action is necessary. This would ensure that at least basic administrationand
governance would not come to a stand still.
Often, coalitions are formed after the electoral process is over. This sometimes leads to politics
of horse-trading, especially if two groups of parties have roughly the same strength. Therefore, it
is desirable that pre-poll alliances are formed whch would mean that atleast the voters are clear
of their choices and later on after election results, the people's mandate is respected. It is so
important that majority should be tested on the floor of the house and a specific time period be
given before the floor test. Often this time period varies, and unnecessarily this leads to
allegation of bias against the President or Governor as the case may be.
In coalition politics, it is understandable that the parties to the coalition will try to expand their
support basis. This cannot be avoided altogether, but this should not be the immediate-and
exclusive objective of the partners, which should also owe loyalty to the coalition and the
common minimum program. The coalition of parties should endure consultation-and cooperation between the organizational and ministerial wings through devices such such as coordination consultation committees. Constitutional functionaries such as the President, the Prime
minister, the Governor, the Chief Ministers as well as the Civil Servants should not transgress or
be denied their normal simply because the Government happened tobe a coalition.
A closer look also needs to be taken at whether the first past the post system is serving the its
purpose in a coalition politics system or whether a system if say proportional representation
would be more suitable. In the latter the final result would more closely reflect the wishes of the
people, However smaller parties would be sidelined and marginalised which in itself may not be
desirable.
Since coalition politics has come to stay and all parties have come to realise the inevi, .rbilib ofcoalition and pofitical alliances their tactics will also accordingly change.They will aim at
compatibility which would reduce and even remove in-coalition stressesand c~nflicts. This
would necessary lead to prior formulation of ideological and policy commitment oriented to
solving issues than merely gaining power. Coalition will probably work better if there are two or
three major parties which might act as the anchor or pillars of the system. The other parties can
co-operate with them in an endeavour to provide a stable government.
-

In the context of the emergence of a competitive multi-party system and the inevitability of
coalition politics, minor 'reforms need to be initiated in the scheme of parliamentary governance
to expand the democratic space and increase the effectiveness of government. The suggestion
that the Prime Minister should be elected by the Lok Sabha and the Council of Ministers can be
removed by a vote of no-confidence by the Lok Sabha only after the House had selected a leader
also needs to be widely debated, if there is consensus among parties on this issue.
India has now moved much ahead from where it was fifty years ago.
Material progress can be realised faster immoral flanksare guarded. That is the weakness today.
The foundations of the new politics cannot be built without an ethical base for political and
administrative for the kind of growth that strengthens the roots of the new politics. The new
politics must reverse this slide. India needs a new class of politics, less arrogant more aware of
the limitations, open to alternative points of view and prepared to compromise. The struggle for
dominance has destroyed the politics of dialogue and discourse .A new drive towards the politics
of service will provide moral authority to enforce discipline on manpower. Politics can and must
control. That control cannot be through coercive machinery of the state than persuasive powers
of the people. What is required is nothing short of empowering the people in the true' sense of
the term.

Recent future of Indian Coalition Politics

As per the Times Now-CVoter survey, the BJP-led NDA is projected to get 186 and the UPA
led by Congress is expected to win around 117 seats, which would mean 240 crucial seats
with go to others.The survey also predicts that Mamata Banerjee-led Trinamool Congress,
the Left Front, Mulayam Singh Yadav's Samajwadi Party and Mayawati's BSP will emerge
as the most important players after the 2014 polls.
The outcome of the 2014 elections will make government formation an extremely
complicated exercise, giving the regional satraps more bargaining power.
The survey found that reaching the majority mark of 272 in the 543-member Lok Sabha will
be a far cry for any pre-election formation.Among the "others", the Left Front is projected to
get the largest number, 32 seats, followed by BSP with 31 and AIADMK with 28 seats. The
SP and Mamata Banerjee-led Trinamool Congress are expected to bag 25 and 23 seats
respectively.
The survey predicts a hung Parliament in 2014 with nobody really in a clear position to form
a government if current voter pattern continues ill the actual voting.
The poll indicates Congress suffering the worst setback in Andhra Pradesh, going from 33
seats to just seven, while Jagan Reddy's YSR Congress and Telangana Rashtra Samithi
(TRS) are predicted to get 13 seats each. Among other states where Congress is expected
to suffer losses are Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Kerala.
In Rajasthan, the survey showed Congress winning just five seats, a loss of 15 seats, all of
them picked up by the BJP. Similarly, in UP too, the Congress' tally will come down from 21
as it will lose 16 seats and the same would be bagged by Samajwadi Party (SP) and
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
The survey also indicated that Delhi would go to the BJP which would bag six of the seven
seats. In Maharashtra, the survey showed the Congress losing six from its 2009 tally of 17
seats and NCP losing two, while BJP and the Shiv Sena are expected to pick up four and

three seats each over their 2009 tally, bringing their tally to 13 and 14 seats respectively of
the state's 48 seats.

In West Bengal, Trinamool will gain four seats in 2014 taking its tally to 23 and the Left will
just pick up one more totalling 16 seats. The Congress would be a major loser here, losing
three of its six seats in West Bengal.

In Tamil Nadu, the DMK's tally is expected to come down to just five seats from 18 in 2009,
while AIADMK's will go up from nine to 28 seats.

The above stats clearly explains the present scenario of Indian Coalition politics and how
the coalitions are influenced by regional parties as well as national issues.

Future of Indian Coalition Politics:

Both Experts and Political Parties agree that the era of Coalition Politics has just begun and its
here to stay. At the time when regional political parties are assuming significance and the days
of single party rule are over, there is no escape from coalition politics." says Mr. Sharad
Pawar, Union Agriculture Minister and President of the Nationalist Congress Party.
Experts say that Coalition Politics is result of rise of Regional Parties on agendas of National
Importance. One of the reasons for the growing importance of Regional Parties has been their
success in articulating the interests of the assertive backward castes and Dalits or untouchables.
These parties remain regional in terms of geographic location, but are national in terms of
issues relevant to the country as a whole. Their role within the national coalition is also
indicative of a more competitive and polarised party system.

CONCLUSION
From the explanations above, we can conclude that the apparently counter-intuitive patterns in
India, that do not seem to fit theory or comparative experience, actually do fit the rational choice
expectations of behaviour if one takes into account the institutional features of the Indian
political and electoral system such as the SMSP electoral system, multiple cross-cutting
cleavages, federalism, and the existence of strong regional parties.
The prevalence of minority governments, both minority coalitions and single-party minority
governments, can be explained by the pattern of fragmentation of the national party system due
to the operation of Duvergers law under federalism into a territorially compatible, multi-party
system with numerous small regional parties with strong incentives for pre-electoral coalitions.
This, when combined with ideological differences between parties on key issues like secularism
and economic liberalisation, and expectations of instability, tends to give rise to minority
coalitions since 1996 rather than to minimal winning or surplus majority coalitions. On the
longevity of the NDA, what was a formal minority coalition was in effect a secure surplus
majority coalition due to the mutual electoral interdependence between the BJP and its external
supporters as well as principal coalition partners, and the impossibility of an alternative coalition.
Hence, the Indian case of coalition behaviour is actually rational choice theory-confirming if
adjusted for institutional features, particularly federalism, the electoral system and social
heterogeneity with multiple cross-cutting cleavages.
Lastly, I argue that my alternative criteria are meaningful in a political-behavioural sense, not
only because the Woldendorp et al (1993) definition distorts duration by magnifying the duration
of coalitions by extending them to the next governments swearing in, but also because the
former better capture the behavioural dynamics of leading, lesser and external supporting parties

in coalitions. The focus shifts to how a prime minister and leading party maintain a coalition
despite actual and threatened exits by coalition partners and/or external supporters, including as
in the case of the NDA, behave in a manner that resembles a secure surplus majority coalition
more than a minority coalition.
The continuity of coalition governments (first under the NDA and later UPA) confirms not
merely the decline of one party rule and rise of regional and smaller parties, but a crisis of
majoritarian political culture, based on the dominance of a single party led by a charismatic
leader over a cluster of smaller parties.
Both the Coalitions have faced the problem of internal disputes due to clustering of parties
having differing manifestos. For the sustenance of a stable future of Coalition Politics, the parties
must keep their Common Minimum Program ahead of their own ideologies.

References
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chakrabarty, Bidyut (2005). Forging Power: Coalition Politics in India. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press. 260-70.

Chhibber, Pradeep and Murali, Geetha (2007). Duvergerian Dynamics in Indian States,
Party Politics 12(1), 5-34.

Arora, Balveer (2000). Negotiating Differences: Federal Coalitions and National

Cohesion, in Francine Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava and Balveer Arora (eds),
Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 176-206.

WEBLIOGRAPHY

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