PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES' UNION, INC, respondent.
G.R. No. 46739

September 23, 1939

Facts :
The Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the
respondent, Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be
dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary
qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company,
against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Industrial Relations has the right to direct the petitioner to recruit
employees against its discretion
Held:
The order appealed is reversed with costs against the respondent Pambusco Employees
Union, Inc.
The

court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an
essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to
such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses.
The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employee to
work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is
oppression." (Mills vs. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div., 605; 91 N.Y.S., 185, 189-192.).

G.R. No. L-6846

July 20, 1955

GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES UNION, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:
The Agricultural Division of the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., took the alternative of retrenchment to reduce the overcapitalization. All these plans
required a reduction in the volume of business necessitating likewise a reduction of personnel and caused the laying off of 17
employees. These employees were given one month separation pay.
Issue:
Whether the retrenchment is justified in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses.
Held:
The petition is denied.
The laying off of the 17 employees was due to the retrenchment policy which the Company had to adopt in order to reduce the
overcapitalization and minimize expenses. The volume of business was considerably reduced.
It should be noted that the retrenchment policy was adopted before even the organization of the petitioning union. It was not, therefore,
aimed at the Union or any of its members for union or labor activities. It was not an unfair labor practice.

G.R. No. L-2028

April 28, 1949

PHILIPPINE SHEET METAL WORKERS' UNION (CLO), petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY, and LIBERAL LABOR UNION,respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the respondent company due to their union activities. As a matter
of fact, of the 11 workers laid off, there are included officers and members of the petitioning union, namely, the president, Pablo Sicat; the
vice-president, Generoso Villanueva; and the secretary, Marcos Eugenio. The respondent company proved that the laying off of these eleven
workers was due to lack of materials. With regard to this contention, the examining division of this Court was ordered to investigate the
availability of materials used in connection with the work performed by these eleven laborers, the volume of business and the work
performed by these workers during Sundays, legal holidays, and night shift. The court then find no sufficient reason to lay off these workers
and ordered the company to pay these workers corresponding wages from the date of their lay-off to the date of their temporary read-mission
in the company.
Subsequently, nine days before the decision came down, filed a motion in the case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15
workers in its can department on the ground that the installation and operation of nine new labor-saving machines in said department had
rendered the services of the said workers unnecessary. The Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) opposed the motion, alleging that
there was more than sufficient work in the company to keep all its workers busy, and, on the further allegation that the company had hired
without the authority of the courts some ten new laborers pending resolution of the principal case, it in turn asked that the company be
declared guilty of contempt of court. The Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) opposed the motion, alleging that there was more
than sufficient work in the company to keep all its workers busy, and, on the further allegation that the company had hired without the
authority of the courts some ten new laborers pending resolution of the principal case, it in turn asked that the company be declared guilty of
contempt of court.

Issue:
Whether the company abused their right to reduce personnel
Held:
The petition was denied without costs against the petitioner.
The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account of their
union activities. But neither should it be denied when it is shows that they are not discharging their duties in a manner consistent with good
discipline and the efficient operation of an industrial enterprise.

G.R. No. L-3587

December 21, 1951

TIONG KING, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and THE NATIONAL TAILOR'S ASSOCIATION, respondents.

Facts:
Tiong King took over the ownership of a tailor shop from Gaw Pun So. Subsequently, Tiong King filed a petition in the Court of
Industrial Relations Case No. 117-V-3, alleging that since he operated his shop in February, 1948, he had continually suffered losses; that as
there remained only very little of the capital originally invested, Tiong King thought it advisable to close the business to avoid further
irreparable losses; and that he was definitely closing the shop on May 30, 1948. Tiong King accordingly prayed that he be allowed to close
his tailor shop and business from six o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1948. On the same date, April 27, 1948, Tiong King gave out a
notice of the projected closing of the Army Shirt Factory, with the announcement that his personnel would be paid their salaries and wages
on May 29, 1948, at six o'clock in the afternoon. On May 29, 1948, Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan of the Court of Industrial Relations
issued an order enjoining Tiong King not to close his factory and not to dismiss, suspend or lay off any laborer or employee without previous
authority of said court.

After hearing, Presiding Judge Roldan rendered a decision dated January 13, 1949, dismissing the petition of Tiong King and ordering him to
pay his personnel from the last week of May, 1948, up to the date of the decision, at the rates specified therein.
Upon petitioner for reconsideration filed by counsel for Tiong King, the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated a resolution date May 27,
1949, allowing Tiong King to close his business and shop, subject to the condition that, upon reopening the same, his former personnel
would be taken back.
Issue:
Whether Tiong King, as owner of the tailor shop, has the right to close the business which will result to termination of its
employees
Held:
The decision of Court of Industrial Relations is affirmed.
There being no question that Tiong King's capital invested in the Army Shirt Factory was almost exhausted at the time of the filing
of his petition to close it, said petition must necessity be granted. It is admitted by all the Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations that an
employer may close his business, provided the same is done in good faith and is due beyond his control. To rule otherwise, would be
oppressive and inhuman.
G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly,
he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor
Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same
had been filed out of time.

Issue:
Whether petitioners claim that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality
Held:
The petition is dismissed.
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"

Issue:
Whether the assailed order constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power.
Held:
The petition was dismissed
It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof. Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection
to labor,"26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
G.R. No. L-49582 January 7, 1986
CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JACOBO C. CLAVE, Presidential Executive Assistant, and COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union (Union for short) lodged a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV,
Department of Labor, against private respondent bank (Comtrust) for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Article 95 of
the Labor Code in relation to Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.
Subsequently, the arbitrator ruled that:
All the monthly-paid employees of the Bank herein represented by the Union and as governed by their Collective Bargaining Agreement, are
entitled to the holiday pay benefits as provided for in Article 94 of the labor Code and as implemented by Rule IV, Book III, of the
corresponding implementing Rules, except for any day or any longer period designated by lawor holding a general election or referendum;
The next day, on April 23, 1976, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. 9, hereinbelow quoted:
The Rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the
benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he
was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him
or not.
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of
monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to
the benefit.
Under the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of
monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P
240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed
to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account
of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.

Issue:
Whether guided by Policy Instructions No. 9 on the holiday issue can apply the same retrospectively.
Held:
The questioned decisions of the respondent Presidential Executive Assistant and the Acting Secretary of labor are hereby set aside, and the
award of the Arbitrator reinstated.

The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group,
namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly
paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid.
An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra
vires.
G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)

Facts: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE
but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned
corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn
appealed to the SC

ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter,
covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every
government owned and controlled corporation.
The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at
the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences
of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel
of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements.
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does
not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or
similar proceedings.

xxx
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps.
whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service
Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may
be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are
not covered by the Civil Service.

xxx
The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of
Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular
ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a
willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These
subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be
privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec.
and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.
Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special
charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including
such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly,
such a situation cannot be allowed
National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include
Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of
GOCC under the general corporation law.
Facts: Eugenia Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she
was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC
has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by
virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank
which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are
governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco
ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the
Civil Service Law.
HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases
that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to
Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constitution prior to
the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over
disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO. In
the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Constitution starkly differs
from the 1973 constitution where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by
clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries
of GOCC under the general corporation law.
REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No.
87676
Date:
December 20, 1989
Petitioner:

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Parks Development Committee

Respndents:
The Hon. Court of Appeals and the national Parks Development Supervisory Association
&their Members
Ponente:
Grio-Aquino, J
.

FACTS:
The NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the
ExecutiveCommittee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other
national parks, and laterrenamed as the National Parks Development Committee under
Executive Order No. 68, on September21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The
National Parks Development Committee, Inc."However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was
ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificateof Registration should not be suspended
for. The NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SECthat his Office had no objection to
the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate ofRegistration of NPDC.By
virtue of Executive Order No. 120, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later
Department)of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the
Commission on Audit andpursuant to Executive Order No. 120, all appointments and other
personnel actions shall be submitted through the Civil Service Commission
Commission.Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of
employees holdingsupervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized
and it affiliated with the TradeUnion of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) under
Certificate No. 1206. Two collectivebargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC
and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967)and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No.
1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.On March 20, 1988, these unions
staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, andPook ni Mariang Makiling at
Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in
the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaintagainst the union to declare the
strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, beinggovernment employees,
have no right to strike although they may form a union. The Regional Trial Courtof Manila,
Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 8844048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to
restrain thesame. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence,
this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
governmentagency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its
employees to strike.

HELD:
NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and
regulations(Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees
(Sec. 14, ExecutiveOrder No. 180).While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987
Constitution to organize and join unions oftheir choice,
there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between
theemployees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1,
1987 provides thatthe Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of
Labor and Employment, shall hearthe dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower
court erred in holding that the labor disputebetween the NPDC and the members of the
NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment. The petition for review is
granted. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public SectorLaborManagement Council as provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, ET AL.G.R.
No. 120319October 6, 1995Petitioner:
Luzon Development Bank
Respondent:
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees and Atty. Ester S. Garcia in hercapacity
as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
Ponente:
J. Romero
Facts:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Associationof
Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the
following issue:whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision and theMemorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion. At
a conference, the parties agreed on thesubmission of their respective Position Papers on
December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia,in hercapacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received
ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on theother hand, failed to submit its
Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator remindingthem to do so. As of
May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, withoutLDB's
Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as
follows:WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the
CollectiveBargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on
promotion.Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision
of theVoluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
Issue:
Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasijudicialentities

Held:
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court
ofAppeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions,including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated tohim under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation ofthe term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
The fact that his functions and powersare provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is aquasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated thereinA fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators should likewise beappealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative CircularNo. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.This would be in furtherance of, and
consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 toprovide a uniform procedure for
the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities notexpressly excepted from
the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute.In the same
vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as
theArbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in
the contract orsubmission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or
city in which one of theparties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is
held, shall have jurisdiction. A party tothe controversy may, at any time within one (1)
month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming
the award and the court must grant such order unless the award isvacated, modified or
corrected.In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of
the regional trialcourt. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision,
ACCORDINGLY, the Courtresolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

CASE TITLE
: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS. CA
GR NO.
: 85279
DATE

: JULY 28,1989
PETITIONER
: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIONT.
BAYLON,RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DEALDAY,SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN AND VIRGILIO MAGPAYO
RESPONDENT
: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.PARALEJO,RTC,
BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
PONENTE
: CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
On June 11,1987, the SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for awrit of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 09 ,1987,
the officers and membersof SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building; that the strike wasreported to the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.It appears that the SSSEA went
to strike after the SSS failed to act on the union demands on certain jobrelated issues and
unfair labor practices. The court a quo, on June 11,1987, issued a temporaryrestraining order
pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the meantime,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
The SSS filed an opposition, on July 22,1987, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss
and convertedthe restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding
the strike illegal. Aspetitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also
denied on August 14,1988,petitioners filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the SC, the SCreferred the case to COA.Upon motion of the SSS
on Feb.06,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining thepetitioners from
staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the DOLE
onJan.25,1989 and to maintain the status quo.The COA dismiss the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by thepetitioners and held that since the strikers
are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, andmay be enjoined by the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over the SSS complaint for damages, from continuingwith their strike.
Issue:
Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike and the RTC have jurisdiction?
HELD:
SSS is one of such GOCC with original charter, having been created under R.A No. 1161, its
employeesare part of the civil service and covered by a memorandum prohibiting strikes.

This being the case, thestrike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.No reversible
error having been committed by the COA, the petition is hereby denied.