CIGR-351

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2014 CIGR Canada Conference

International Center
Toronto, Ontario, September 22-24, 2014

Intertie protection of Synchronous Distributed Generation

Using Intelligent Relays
Harmeet Cheema (*), Anthony J. Rodolakis (*), Geza Joos (*)
*McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

SUMMARY
The Distributed Generation (DG) Intertie Protection, also known as DG Fault interconnection
protection, merits particular attention when connecting DGs in distribution networks. Its main purpose
is to disconnect the DG as soon as possible upon the inception of an area-EPS fault. The relatively
large fault currents that may be contributed by the synchronous DGs, even under the sole influence of
its flux dynamics, constitute the objective of this investigation. These contributions may expose nearby distribution system fuses to danger and compromise host-feeder fuse-saving schemes. On the other
hand, detection of faults whose signature is low-magnitude fault currents is not trivial despite their
reduced shock impact on the system infrastructure. Low magnitude fault currents, typically caused by
elevated arc/ground fault resistances at rather remote fault locations near feeder extremities, present a
difficult to meet protection requirement and can be quite challenging to both area-EPS and DG Fault
Interconnection protection. This article describes a methodology for training and setting Intelligent
Relays that fulfills the fundamental DG Intertie protection requirements by detecting all types of shunt
fault types occurring anywhere within the geographical span of the distribution feeder the DG is
connected at. The fault types investigated in this article are Three Phase (LLL), Single Line to Ground
(SLG), Line to line (LL) and Line to line to ground (LLG) shunt faults with and without arc/ground
resistances, on solidly grounded distribution feeders. An equally fundamental requirement the
intelligent relay must, by design, meet is that it avoids DG nuisance trips under non-faulted system
conditions. The performance of the Intelligent Relays, based on indices quantified per the abovementioned considerations is compared against the performance of several variants of over-current
relays.

KEYWORDS
Synchronous Distributed Generation, DG Fault Interconnection Protection, Intertie Protection, Shunt
Faults, Intelligent Relay, Arcing impedance, Ground Impedance, Multivariate Analysis, Data Mining,
Dependability, Security, Data Mining, Decision Trees, Arc Resistance

1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

The issues that Distributed Generation forces protection engineers to address are diverse and pose
several rather non-trivial for both the area-EPS and the DG itself [1-5]. In the case of an area-EPS
fault, both the feeder protection and the DG Intertie protection are responsible for detecting it. The
fault detection sensitivity requirements, typically dictated by remote and/or high impedance faults, can
be quantified for grounded distribution systems that form the focus of this investigation, in terms of
phase/zero sequence current thresholds responsible for tripping phase/ground protective devices. The
alternative approach, to specify a reasonable upper limit for an effective value of the arc/ground fault
impedance that will limit the service frequency symmetrical RMS fault current, has been adopted here.
The same sensitivity requirements are normally imposed on both the feeder and the DG Intertie
protection but it is not unusual to demand higher sensitivity from the DG Intertie protection.
The issue of detecting high-resistance ground faults is not straightforward and has been approached by
analyzing the non-linearity of the arcing/ground resistance and/or the harmonic content of the resulting
fault current [6]. Since this article addresses the setting of Intelligent Relays using 1st cycle
symmetrical RMS fault currents, the only attribute of the high-resistance fault considered here is its
resistance. Last, but not least, immediate and unconditional DG disconnection upon fault occurrence
[1-5] is sought in this article, with no regard for possible Voltage Ride Through requirements.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the principle and the methodology used to
obtain the intelligent relay settings. Section 3 describes the benchmark distribution feeder and
illustrates two alternative approaches for setting intelligent relays to detect all 4 types of shunt faults in
the presence of one synchronous DG. The method is readily extended to identify the faulted phase(s).
Section 4 provides results on the performance characteristics of all considered protective devices and
proposes an implementation for the intelligent relay based on the results obtained. Section 5
encapsulates the conclusions of this investigation.
The performance of all the considered protective devices, including the intelligent relay, is quantified
in terms of their overall reliability by virtue of a Dependability index and a Security index. The
Dependability index (DI) earmarks the protective devices ability to reliably detect shunt system faults
of any type and severity. The Security index (SI) reflects the protective devices ability to avoid
nuisance trips for system events that may involve first-cycle conditions resembling faults.
2. METHODOLOGY FOR SETTING THE INTELLIGENT RELAY
The occurrence of an area-EPS fault is a fundamental frequency transient phenomenon particularly
under the influence of synchronous DG flux dynamics, rendering the signature of the incipient fault
time-dependent. The time-varying variables of interest, selected for studying the particular
phenomenon, are shown in Table I. Many different parameters can be considered e.g. voltage phase
and sequence measurements, active and reactive power at the interconnection etc. but for the sake of
keeping the intelligent relay settings as simple as possible only current variables are considered. For
any given time t, for any DG (subscripted i ), and for any system event (superscripted k ), a DG state
vector containing all the postulated DG variables can be stated as:

[ X ik (t )]T = [ xik1 (t ), xik2 (t )...xik6 (t )]

where xik1 (t ) to xik6 (t ) are the current measurements provided in the Table I. For N system events, the
set Si(t) defined for any DG can be written as:

Si (t ) = {[ X i1 (t )]T , [ X i2 (t )]T , [ X i3 (t )]T ,......[ X iN (t )]T }

that includes DG state vectors from both fault and non-fault events. The intelligent relay considers
only the first cycle so ignoring the time stamps, the set reduces to:

Si = {[ X i1 ]T , [ X i2 ]T , [ X i3 ]T ,......[ X iN ]T }

DG VARIABLES OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO INTERTIE PROTECTION

x1 = I A

x2 = I B

x3 = I C

Phase-A
Sym-RMS Current

Phase-B
Sym-RMS Current

Phase-C
Sym-RMS Current

x4 = I1

x5 = I 2

x6 = I 0

Positive Sequence RMS

Current

Negative Sequence RMS

Current

Zero Sequence RMS

Current

Table I: DG variables monitored for Intertie Protection Duty

Given the prior nature of system events, a classifier Ci can be constructed based on the information
contained in a training set Si that categorizes the first-cycle DG states as coming from an area-EPS
fault or not. The classifier itself can take the form of a Decision Tree (DT) obtained via data mining
methods [7-8]. DTs consist of consecutively-layered decision nodes, each featuring a decision making
procedure that relies on a numerical value of one and only one DG variable called the range, i.e. the
resulting DT is univariate. This approach suits well the task at hand because the DT structure
encapsulates the relay tripping logic. The relay protection handles/thresholds can be directly taken to
be the respective decision node variable/ranges. The future classification ability of the resulting DT is
quantified in terms of an independent testing set containing system events different from the ones
included in the training set, also used to calculate the relays performance indices.
In terms of constructing the DT classifiers, the pertinent machine learning techniques [7-8] rest on: a)
efficient node splitting criteria and b) Tree pruning methods. The end-goal is to arrive at a
reasonably sized DT without compromising its classifying ability. The node splitting criterion adopted
here is the well-established Gini criterion. Its general multi-class formulation, within the CART
algorithm used for this work as:
k
2
Gini(t)=1 p[(i|t)]
i=1
where: a) k is the number of classes envisaged to be created at node t, b) p(i|t) is the fraction of records
contained within class i, at node t. Physically, the Gini index indicates the cost of misclassifying DG
states, the objective being to have an index reduction for every new generation of nodes.
3. CAPTURING THE SIGNATURE OF AREA-EPS SHUNT FAULTS
The benchmark distribution feeder One Line Diagram and Data used is shown in Appendix I. The
feeder is balanced, exhibiting no negative sequence voltage content during steady state operation at the
DG interconnection point [3-5]. A 6th order model was used for the synchronous DG to capture the
sub-transient flux dynamics [1]. No excitation system reaction was modeled [1-5]. The presence or
absence of speed governors is immaterial for the time of interest [1]. The DG was assumed to operate,
prior to the fault inception, under a near unity constant power factor [1-5]. The intelligent relay was
trained for full-feeder load with the DG supplying 30% of it. The MATLAB simulation environment
has been used to generate the necessary results and to filter out the unidirectional (DC offset)
component of the fault current.
Two basic approaches were taken to produce DT classifiers for the considered fault types, namely the
multi-class and the combined two-class approach. The former constructs a five-class DT classifier
trained to recognize the solid or arcing shunt faults. A training set containing system events, consisting
of standard-trim shunt faults are shown in Table II. The resulting DT is shown in Figure 1.

I0 > 3.74
YES

NO

I1 > 126.43

I2 > 27.80
NO

YES

NO

LL Fault

NO

YES
LLL Fault

I2 > 11.90

No Fault

SLG Fault

SLG Fault

LL Fault

YES

NO
No Fault

YES
LLG Fault

I1 > 100.72
NO

YES

NO

I2 > 21.54

I2 > 24.20

I1 > 110.12
NO

YES

YES
LLG Fault

Figure 1 Multi-class Decision Tree for the various shunt fault types.
It is seen that the resultant DT, pretty much in compliance with current practice: a) has selected
sequence currents as the intelligent relay protection handles, b) has used zero sequence currents to
discriminate between ground and phase faults. The Dependability index (DI), of this DT was
determined to be .93 meaning that 93% of the faults within the testing set were recognized as such.
Similarly, its security index, SI, was determined to be 100%, meaning that no non-fault events were
misclassified classified as fault events. The testing set consisted of 23 non-fault events and 34 fault
events of all types, each with fault impedances assuming the discrete values of .001 (practically solid
faults), 2, 3, 8 and 15 . The fact that the Decision Tree classified any fault event as a fault and
tripped the intelligent relay was, by design, sufficient. The misclassified fault events were further
scrutinized and found to be electrically remote form the DG while involving high arc/ground
resistances. The classifier lack of sufficient detection sensitivity and its complex and rather nonintuitive structure, was the motivation to explore the below explained alternative approach.
In this second approach, dedicated two-class DTs were constructed aiming at detecting shunt faults
exclusively on a per type basis. The training events are provided in the Table II. All the events were
simulated at 100% system loading. The faults were introduced at 14 different locations in the feeder,
provided in the Appendix.

Non-faults
31 events
LLL (ABC)
28 events
LL (BC)
28 events
LLG (BCG)
28 events

TRAINING EVENTS
Normal steady state operation
Connection or disconnection of one or group loads
Circuit breakers inadvertent opening operation
LLL faults with Rarc = 0 and 3

LL faults with Rarc = 0 and 3

LLG faults with Rarc = 0 and with Rg = 0

LLG faults with Rarc = 3 and with Rg = 0

- SLG faults with Rg = 0 and 30

SLG (AG)
28 events
Table II: Training data for constructing two-class decision trees.

DTs were determined for each shunt fault type using non-fault and fault system events. The DTs were
trained, again, for current sequence variables. For example, the LLL DT was constructed using LLL
fault events and non-fault events, per Table II. The resultant DTs are shown in Figure 2.
I1 > 174.83

I2 > 21.20

YES

NO
NO FAULT

NO
NO FAULT

LLL

I2 > 34.34

YES

YES

NO
NO FAULT

LLG

I0 > 3.10

YES

NO
NO FAULT

LL

SLG

Figure 2 Dedicated Two-class Decision trees for all considered shunt fault types
It is readily seen that these DTs are much simpler with LLL, LL, LLG and SLG faults directly
identified by virtue of positive, negative and zero sequence currents exclusively. LLL faults are
symmetrical and the DT uses only positive sequence to detect these faults. LL and LLG faults are
unbalanced and are strongly characterized by negative sequence currents. Lastly, SLG faults DT are
identified by zero sequence currents, their value depending on system neutral grounding/ground
impedances.
A further improvement is, however, possible by producing DTs that feature faulted phase recognition
as well, for recording purposes. Figure 3 depicts these faulted-phase Augmented Decision Trees
(ADTs). They are, clearly, not applicable to LLL faults. The training set used to produce these trees
comprises the events shown in Table II augmented with LL, LLG, and SLG faults simulated on all
different possible phase combinations at 100% system loading. The phase faults had arc resistance of 0
and 2 and ground faults had ground resistance of 0 and 20 . Any differences in thresholds with
respect to the ones of Figure 2 are due to slightly different fault resistances.
I2 > 37.14

NO

I2 > 25.31

YES

NO FAULT

NO
NO FAULT

Ia > 118.2

NO

YES

LL-BC

LL-AC

a) ADT for LL faults

YES

LLG-BC

YES

NO FAULT

Ia > 181.13

YES

NO

LLG_AB

YES

LLG_AC

b) ADT for LLG faults

YES

SLG-A

Ib > 111.3

Ic > 164.6

NO

LL-AB

YES

NO

Ia > 157.78

NO

Ib > 118.7

NO

I0 > 3.48

NO
SLG-C

YES

SLG-B

c) ADT for SLG fault

Figure 3 Faulted Phase Detection Augmented Decision Trees for LL, LLG, SLG faults
4. PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETTINGS AND PERFORMANCE
The normal phase full load current at the PCC, i.e. at the high voltage side of the DG interconnection
transformer is approximately 80 A (74.74A). The phase over-current relay tripping threshold was
taken to be 1.5 times full-load current, i.e. 120A, the Ground over-current relay pick up threshold was
taken to be 0.75 times the full load current, i.e. 60A and the voltage restraint relay settings were
calculated as = 1.5 / where Ip is the pickup current, Is is the steady state current, Va is the
actual voltage and Vs is the nominal voltage.

The intelligent relay model implementation can be seen in the Figure 4. It has four decision trees for
each fault type. This model detects whether there is a fault or not and sends trip signal if one of the
four decision trees conditions are met.

I1
> 174.83 A

I2

LLL

LL
> 34.35 A

TRIP

I2
>>21.20
2.7 kVA

LLG
I0
> 3.10 A

SLG

Figure 4 Protective Device performance indices for high-resistance SLG faults

The intelligent relay provided in the Figure 4 and conventional protective elements were tested on an
exhaustive list of testing events provided in the Table III. These events were simulated for three
different loading conditions of 20%, 60%, and 100% . The faults were simulated on different phases,
with different arc resistances than what the decision trees were trained for.

Non-faults
69 events

TESTING EVENTS
Normal steady state operation
Connection or disconnection of one or group loads
Circuit breakers inadvertent opening operation
LLL faults with Rarc ranging from 0 to 3

LLL (ABC)
243 events
- LL faults with Rarcranging from 0 and 3
LL (AB,BC,AC)
270 events
- LLG faults with Rarc = 0 to 3 with Rg = 0
LLG (ABG,BCG,ACG)
225 events
- SLG faults with Rg from 0 to 30
SLG (AG,BG,CG)
270 events
Table III: Testing data for determining performance of DTs and conventional protection
Table IV illustrates the performance indices of DTs shown in Figure 2, along with the performance of
the other considered protective devices for all types of faults (whenever applicable). Given the
structure of the intelligent relay, these performance indices reflect the intelligent relay performance as
well. It is seen that in terms of dependability, the intelligent relay performs as well as the other devices
in detecting LLL, LL, and LLG faults, but slightly better for SLG faults. In terms of security the
intelligent relay is capable of correctly identifying the non-fault event of inadvertent CB1 breaker
opening that increases the DG phase current to 150A (its DT trip threshold being 174A) something the
other devices cannot do (interpreting it as a system fault due to the 120 A phase threshold), a fact that
reduces their security indices. The same holds true LL and LLG faults.

Shunt
Fault
Type

LLL
LLG
LL
LG

Intelligent Relay
Relay Indices, %

Phase-O/Current
Relay Indices, %

Voltage Restraint
Relay Indices, %

DI

DI

DI

SI

SI

SI

Ground-Over
Current
Relay Indices, %
DI
SI

100 100
100
97
100
97
N.A.
N.A.
100 100
100
97
100
97
92
100
100 100
100
97
100
97
N.A.
N.A.
100 97
86
97
92
97
88
100
Table IV. Performance indices of protective devices for DTs shown in Figure 2

Figure 5 illustrates the performance indices of all devices for wide varying ground resistance SLG
faults. In terms of the results portrayed in Figure 6, it is seen that the Intelligent Relay retains a
dependability advantage for high-ground resistance faults. No reduction in the tripping performance
indices was observed when testing the Augmented Decision Trees of Figure 3, with the sole exception
of having a single SLG fault event on phase C interpreted as a phase B fault.

Figure 5 Protective Device performance indices for high-resistance SLG faults

5. CONCLUSIONS
A methodology based on multivariate analysis and data mining methods was developed to set
Intelligent Relays for DG Intertie protection. The methodology was based on using sequence and
phase DG fault current contributions as protection handles. It proved capable of credibly capturing the
characteristics of the shunt fault inception phenomenon using a training process that involved standard
trim faults. The methodology provides a readily interpretable relay tripping logic, based on first-cycle
symmetrical RMS sequence fault currents resembling the tripping logic of currently used protective
devices. The capability of the intelligent relay to correctly trip for faults on other system phases has
also been demonstrated. The intelligent relay can also be trained to identify the system phase involved
in the various types of faults. The performance of the intelligent relay was found to be at par with the
remaining considered protective devices with a definite advantage for high-ground resistance faults.
7

APPENDIX I FEEDER DATA

The substation has a LLL short circuit level of 1000 MVA and a X/R ratio of 10. It feeds the 25
kV four wire multi-grounded distribution system through a 15 MVA, 114.3 kV/24.94 kV /Yg
transformer. The 25 kV distribution system has total demand of 11.064 MW and 2.345 MVAr. The
distribution main feeder X/R ratio ranges from 3.4 near substation down to 0.8 at the feeder end. The
laterals X/R ratio ranges from 3.4 to 0.6. A 1.2 MVAr capacitor is present near the feeder end.

Transformer 1
15 MVA
114.3 kV/24.94 kV
R = 0.2888 %
X = 7.464% B1

B2
CB-1

DL-01

B4

B3

B5

B9

B8

B7
DL-08

DL-06

DL-04

DL-03

DL-02

DL-09

B11

B10
CB-2

DL-15

DL-10

B12
DL-16

B13
DL-17

GY
L-02

L-03

L-05

L-04

L-09

L-10
DL-11

DL-07

DL-13

L-06

L-07

DL-12

L-01

DL-05

120 kV
SC Level =1000 MVA
X/R ratio = 10

A 5 MVA 4.16 kV synchronous generator supplies 30% of the system load in addition to auxiliary
load of 250 kW. The DG operates in power factor control mode and maintains 0.95 lagging power
factor at the PCC. It is connected to the distribution system through a 12 MVA, 25 kV/4.16 kV /Yg
transformer.

B6

L-12

L-15

L-16

L-17

L-13

L-11
DL-14

GY

C1
1.2 MVAR

L-08

Transformer 2
12 MVA
24.94 kV/4.16 kV
R = 0.8956 %
X = 8.956 %

B14
L-14

250 kW

Generator 1
5000 kVA/4.16 kV
Xd =3.12 pu
Xd = 0.592 pu
Xd = 0.354 pu

Figure 6 One line diagram of the distribution system

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