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T H E CONCEPTUAL FOCUS OF SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

SYSTEMS 1)
by
EGON BRUNSWIK (Berkeley)
In the present paper the attempt is made to order systematically
some of the conceptual tools which have been used in dealing with
psychological topics. In the opinion of the author, a suitable starting
point for such a consideration is furnished by a scheme of the following kind (Fig. 1).
The drawing represents an organism within its surroundings
as described by an observing physicist in terms of measurement and
computation. This observer might be able to distinguish different
layers within the whole causal texture with reference to the organism. Some of these which became most outstanding in psychological discriminations might be designated by the terms (c) remote
past, (b) the realm of palpable bodies in the actual environment,
(a) stimulus events located on the retina or on other stimulus surfaces of the organism, (0) intraorganismic events, (A) muscular
reactions, or behavior in the narrower sense of the word, (B) effects of these reactions with regard to the relationship between
organism and surroundings, as e.g., the reaching of a goal, and
finally (C) the more remote consequences and final products of life
activities including stabilized mechanical or conceptual tools for
further use. For the purpose of further explanation, some of the
customary terms not used in this list are included in the chart.
The layers indicated are not supposed to designate singular sequences in time, but rather to furnish a general scheme for crosssectional classification and coordination of physical events, or
features of the physical world, with reference to their causal relationship to an organism. The scheme possesses a certain symmetry,
1) Paper sent in for the fourth International Congress for the Unity
of Science (Cambridge, England, 1938)"

The Conceptual Focus o/ some Psychological Systems

LAYERS:

37

(
M

-o- i ^ ^ ~

~-,

longitudinal
sequences
of events

!___~
(

-~

o
B

'=
~

=~
=~"

o=

Fig. 1. Scheme of the organism in its surroundings.


b

Fig.

2.

Fig.

Early Behaviorism

Fig. 6. Molar Behaviorism


r

Fig. 4. Gestalt Psychology

Fig. 5. Thing-constancy Research

Early Psychophysics

3.

1=,

Fig. 7. Introspectionism

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Egon Brunswik

with layers designated by corresponding letters (a and A, b and B,


c and C) conceptually related to each other.
Four main types of interest seem to be possible within this system:
(1) emphasis upon events belonging to a certain cross-sectional layer
and the internal relations of these events.among each other, (2) emphasis upon a certain type of causal chains, that is interest in longitudinal sequences, (3) emphasis upon the external relationships
of distant cross-sectional layers among each other, (4) emphasis
upon the interrelations of discrete longitudinal patterns among
each other.
Concepts and laws referring to (1) and (2), that is to single events
or to cross-sectional or longitudinal internal relationships, are
non-psychological. Roughly speaking, these internal relationships
constitute the core of the problems treated in physics proper as
far as the left part of the picture and particularly (b) is concerned.
They constitute the core of the biological sciences in the narrower
sense of the word as far as the middle of the picture is concerned,
and the "letters" or "Geisteswissenschaften" as far as the right
part is concerned. On this latter side those physical features of the
world are represented which still reveal the fact that their causal
ancestry is partially built up from causal patterns typical to life
activities. For example, a mechanical tool made by man would
be considered to belong to this group only by virtue of its particular
form in connection with a limited number of certain "relevant"
properties regardless of all the other traits.
We are now going to attempt to characterize some of the psychological disciplines, or systems, as they grew up historically,
in terms of our scheme. In every instance, not the programmatically
propounded general frame will be taken as the standard, but rather
the conceptual texture of the work actually performed in a sufficiently detailed fashion. This has to be done, since in an arm-chair
sense nearly any of the systems might justly consider itself allinclusive and able to be considerate in face of every objection without
doing violence to its own conceptual frame work. In short, we are
going to treat systems not in terms of what they could have included but what they did include.
Early experimental psychology still was characterized by the
ideology typical of the most paradigmatic non-psychological
sciences. In particular its interests were, as far as the very beginnings are concerned, chiefly longitudinal in the sense characterized

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems

39

above under (2). The first type of experimental research to win


importance in psychology was classical psychophysics. Its interest
centered around a rather limited fragment of a kind of longitudinal
chain, per se. The initial link was defined in terms of what Koffka
has named proximal stimulation, that is, stimulation in terms of the
causal chains as they just enter the sense organ. The guiding ideal
of the psychology of that time was expressed b y the wish to know
as much as possible about the functional mechanisms of the sense
organ and of nervous conduction, - - in short, about "mediation
problems" - - , and thus to be enabled to pursue the causal chains
as closely as possible, in a step-by-step fashion, so to speak. There
was, however, as we follow the development from the Johannes
Miiller to the Fechner era, a noticeable shift of emphasis toward
the relationship, per se, of the two end terms of the longitudinal
fragment concerned, namely the relationship between "stimulus"
and "sensation". At the same time the problems of the causal "mediations", as such, were losing ground. It is this becoming more
and more interested in a by-and-large causal correlation between
discrete layers regardless of the technicalities of their interconnection which brought psychology proper into existence as a discipline
distinguishable from physiology.
Fig. 2 gives a schematic picture of early psychophysics using the
scheme of Figure 1 as a frame of reference. The focus of conceptformation is located at the layers of proximal stimulation and of
internal response as well as at their gross interrelation as indicated
b y the arrow. The interest in mediation problems still vital is represented b y the slope covering the entire ground leading from the
one term to the other in longitudinal direction.
The categorical structure and the actual research interest of the
early "conditioned reflex" behaviorism as represented b y Pavlov
or b y Watson is similar, in principle, to that of early psychophysics.
The chief conceptual emphasis appears to be shifted, however,
from the implicit to the overt response in terms of bodily movements, as such. The interest in mediation problems is centered
around the motor rather than the sensory processes, as indicated
in Figure 3. - - In fact, of course, every psychophysics or introspective psychology had to utilize verbal, that is, a particular kind
of motor, responses. These responses were supposed to be, however, true representatives of inner states. The aimed-at-focus
of concept formation of these disciplines might therefore be considered to lie in the internal life of the individual.

40

Egon BrunsuJik

The further development of psychology as an exact science can


be characterized as a progressive extension of the range of consideration from the fragmentary or molecular viewpoint to larger units
of a "molar" nature. This goes with an increasing emphasis upon
gross by-and-large correlations between kinds of events schematically located at a distance from each other, on the one hand, and
with an - - on the whole - - more and more subordinate interest ill
mediation, per se.
A first important step was Gestalt psychology. Considering the
most characteristic core of problems actually treated by Gestalt
psychology in the field of perception, the chief difference as compared with traditional psychophysics lies in an extension of the
notion of the stimulus to that of a stimulus pattern. The response
is treated as a response to the sensory configuration as a whole
whereby the laws of dynamic interaction within each of the crosssectional layers of the sensorium are made the central issue. Gestalt
psychology, though totalitarian or molar, is, however, still fragmentary insofar as it is, in its most elaborate parts, a psychology
"from the retina inward", so to speak. There is, as in psychophysics, a great deal of interest in mediation problems, as can be seen
from the numerous attempts to explain physiologically the facts
found. All this is represented schematically in Figure 4.
A further extension of the psychology of perception is given b y
including into the scope of consideration the manipulable solid
bodies, located in the farther environment, and their recognition
as the specific determiners of the reaction. The beginnings of this
line of interest can be traced back to Helmholtz. This trend, however, did not become conscious of its own character until the last
few decades and after the earlier stages of Gestalt psychology already had been completed. In this discipline, the stimulus is not
any longer defined in proximal terms but in distal ones. The actual
research centers around the question to what extent the perceptual
system is able to liberate itself from the disturbing variability of
the proximal representation of similar distal stimuli and thus to
focus the response upon the latter and not upon the former as the
determining event. In other words, the question is how far the organism has established mechanisms which are able to extrapolate,
with a sufficiently large chance of success, the causal chains from
the retina backward and thus, figuratively speaking, to reach out
cognitively into the farther surroundings.

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems

41

A fairly univocal attachment of a class of reactions to bodily


properties, like extension or reflectivity to color, despite changes in
the mediating causal pattern is called "thing constancy". We might,
then, as well describe these reactions by means of the other term
of the external relation in question, or in short, in terms of their
"objects attained." The focus of concept formation is thus shifted
away from the organism itself into its farther surroundings, or,
more precisely, into a relationship of the organism with layer (b).
In other words, the organism is characterized by its ability to achieve
something with regard to its environment, not by the intrinsic
character of its reactions or by the nature of certain physiological
forms of mediation.
In the opinion of the author, there is scarcely another discipline
which would reveal as clearly as does constancy research the extent
to which the organism is able to render irrelevant the particularities
of mediation. Let us take a frequently quoted example. Among the
chief constituents of the system of cues which enable the organism
to extrapolate the sizes of the surrounding bodies from the retinal
stimulus pattern, are the so called "distance-cues", as, for instance,
binocular disparity or the perspective distortion of right angles.
There are numerous kinds of distance cues. Most of them differ
radically from each other as long as we consider intrinsic properties or the physiological mechanisms operated by them. They
have in common nothing but a higher or lesser probability of being
caused by a certain environmental depth-pattern. And yet they are
responded to by the central system of the organism in an identical
manner, or in short, they are "equipotential". It is this feature
of organismic reaction and achievement which forces psychology,
as it approaches its genuine molar and relational problems, more
and more into a focussing upon the end terms of far-reaching relationships. The particular "how" of the mediation processes,
on the other hand, necessarily will attract only subordinate interest.
In other words, we do not consider it a matter of choice, whether
psychology does focus its concepts on one or on another layer or
on a correlation of layers among each other. In looking without
preconceptions at nature populated by organisms, gross correlations of higher or lesser degree between kinds of events rather remote from each other in space or time will strike the observer. The
network of occurrences participating in such correlations might be

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Egon Brunswik

conceptually picked out and its constituents labeled as the given


foci of life patterns. Psychology has to focus its descriptions on
what the organisms have become focussed on, not on events
systematically located at the interstices between these loci. Ordo
idearum sit idem ac ordo return. There has to be a discipline to deal
with these foci and their gross correlations, per se. Otherwise there
would remain a white spot on the landmap of possible scientific
knowledge. By all of its history, it is psychology which is predestined to fill this gap.
In short, molar psychology of achievement is a deliberate "lump"treatment. This feature seems to be the chief obstacle which stands
in the way of its acceptance. Correlations between distant layers
never hold to an ideal degree. There are always "exceptions" due
to the lack of perfection of the cues and means establishing these
correlations. In every instance, there is only a higher or lesser degree
of probability for the reaching of the usual end. This feature becomes especially clear where we have to do with the so called instincts. Dealing with instruments of this kind in terms of their
achievement leads to an apparent lack of exactitude. It takes a
certain courage, a neglect of some of the attitudes sacred to scientific tradition, to give up the safety of molecular correlations,
cheap as they are, in favor of the equivocalities or "vaguenesses"
of molar correlations. But we have to prefer vagueness focussed
upon essentials to security and strict univocality focussed upon
non-essentials. This holds especially as long as we are lucky enough
to find everything prepared to become strictly physicalistic in our
"vaguenesses", quantifying them b y the means of correlation sta,
tistics and other related mathematical tools.
There always remains a certain self-restriction required in order
not to become too curious about the mechanisms causing the "exceptions" and dispersions mentioned, before the task of a birdseye-view-inventory of gross correlations had been completed.
Of course, there are various ramifications. Looking for exceptions
and their causes might, besides being a mere side track, become a
corrective measure which enables us to find still more superordinate
correlations. These superordinate correlations, however, should be
our ultimate aim. Furthermore, concepts and methods referring to
mediation problems will have to come back to psychology proper
as soon as the precise limitations of the complex achievements in
question are subject to closer examination. These problems are out

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems

43

of the scope of psychological consideration only so far as that first


phase of research is concerned in which far-reaching gross achievements become discovered and examined in first approximation.
On the whole, however, psychology should develop "from above",
not "from below". It might proceed to sub-foci of a more and more
particular kind and ultimately converge towards and merge with
its complementary sciences of a genuinely molecular type.
The schematic representation of constancy research (Fig. 5)
has to be drawn in the following way: an arrow from a certain type
of events in (b) to a certain type of events in (0), representing the
primary interest; a slope around the group of sub-foci which constitute the "family" of equipotential cue patterns and which
circumscribe the extent of variability of the mediational pattern
and thus the degree of safeguardedness of the achievement under
varying conditions of mediation; and finally a slope around the
whole unit of processes involved, including mediation processes.
The latter slope has been dotted in order to indicate the subordinate
nature of the mediation problems. A further dotted arrow is drawn
to connect the event in (0) with an overt response. This is done to
indicate that Psychology in Terms of Objects wishes to be, in principle, strictly behavioristic, i.e. refuses to extrapolate without particular controls from the measurable verbal utterances into the field
of their internal "meanings".
A picture symmetrical to that of constancy-research is yielded
by a chief part of the research done within the conceptual frame of
molar or purposive behaviorism, as represented by Tolman. (Figure
6). The difference is merely a material one, constancy research being
concerned with problems of reception and cognition, or the organismic achievement of a backward extrapolation of causal chains,
whereas molar behaviorism deals with problems of overt action
and its further environmental effects. In molar behaviorism, as
contrasted to molecular behaviorism, results are expressed in terms of
reaching a certain goal, not in terms of movements made. The
comparative irrelevancy of ways and means, that is their equipotentiality with regard to a certain end, is systematically recognized and attempts are made to prove it experimentally. As
it was done for the proximal stimulus cues in the extended psychophysics of perceptual thing constancy, molar behaviorism realizes
that the essentials of behavior will become lost in a description focussed on proximal determination. Thus both disciplines are essen-

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Egon Brunswik

tially environmentalistic, not mediationalistic or physiologistic.


In both constancy research and molar behaviorism a certain interrelation of longitudinal causal chains is made one of the central
issues, namely their equipotentiality within the larger instrument of
a well established farreaching causal couplings. Emphasis is withdrawn, to a certain extent, from a step-by-step determination of
these mediating chains of events. Such a restriction is not essential,
however, to a molar point of view, as is shown by the type of approach represented by Hull. His general frame of consideration
coincides in its most essential features with that of the disciplines
mentioned. A still stronger line of interest is focussed, however, on
tt~e "family" of mediational patterns, per se. These pattern's are
analyzed in an essentially associationistic or conditioned reflex
fashion, that is in a molecular longitudinal way. In the opinion of
the author, the chief objection to such an attitude is a merely
practical one, namely distraction from the gross "first-approximation" treatment of cognitive or behavioral achievement.
The idea of a pure achievement analysis is accomplished, more
thoroughly than in any of the other branches mentioned, in the
psychology of "tests". At first glance this might seem tobe a strictly
cross-sectional affair within events in layer (B), these events being
correlated among each other statistically. The correlational analysis
implies, however, the reference to organisms performing various
combinations of achievement. Mediation problems are usually
kept entirely outside of consideration.
It might even be said that correlation statistics as a general scientific instrument received a decisive impetus from test psychology
(Pearson, Spearman, Thurstone, and others). Starting from rather
complex achievements relatively detached from straight sensory
or muscular activities, test psychology had the chance to grow
up without meeting a resistance comparable to that met by Gestalt
psychology or the other molar disciplines mentioned above. The
methods developed in test statistics are, therefore, most likely to
become paradigmatic to all future molar psychology. As an illustration it might be mentioned that, according to a recent American
survey, the term correlation is among the two or three most frequently quoted terms to be found in the textbooks used in this
country.
In recent times statistical analysis led to a closer reference to a
small number of hypothetical "factors" or basic abilities indepen-

The Conceptual Focus o[ some Psychological Systems

45

dent of each other underlying the countless variety of actual performances. This is one of the instances where the stage is set for a
genuinely psychological physiological psychology, focussed not
on layer (0), as such, or on its interrelations with layers (a) or (A),
but on the farreaching interrelations between (0), on the one hand,
and (B) - - or (b) - - , on the other.
A few words only about disciplines like social psychology, genetic
psychology, psychoanalysis. T h e y all seem to be focussed primarily
on molar interrelations of the organism in its actuality with some
complex features of the remote environment, present or past. T h e y
fulfill the requirements of a molar psychology as long as t h e y
concentrate upon an attempt to segregate abstractively the focal
or relevant traits within the patterns they investigate from the
actually irrelevant ones.
A certain type of genetic attitude possesses, however, a close
resemblance to molecularism. Considering the systematic description of gross achievement or adjustment of the organism to the environment as the primary subject matter of psychology, inquiry
about the history of such mechanisms in some cases might easily
loose contact with the essential features of the achievemental pattern actuaUy in question. In such instances, asking "why" becomes
comparable to the "how" problems of the mediationalistic type.
For example, to be concerned primarily as to whether a certain organismic instrument is due to heredity or to learning, might occasionally become just another burden for the investigator of that
instrument, coordinate with the claim of the physiologically minded
criticist whose first concern is to know as much as possible about all
the single steps involved in the mechanism in question. Like molecularism, geneticism for its own sake involves the danger of diverting psychology into knowing more and more for the price of
knowing it about less and less, or about smaller and smaller fragments of the units which constitute the task of psychology.
In the common language of science, molecular as well as gerretic
descriptions have often been called "explanations". In contrast
to that, molar achievemental analysis is "descriptive" in the most
restricted sense of the word. As a deliberate "lump" treatment, it
refuses to aim at explanation for its own sake. It is a psychology
"in terms of .. ", a terminological affair, a way of registering
and conceptually looking at gross correlations in their straightforward actuality.

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Egon Brunswik

Up to this point of our considerations psychology has been treated


as if it were built up by means of strictly scientific methods, t h a t
is, in principle, as physics of a certain group of causal correlations.
For a large part of psychology this holds true, in principle at least.
The events involved are subject to measurement and the interrelations to quantitative treatment. Or, as Lewin would put it, "Aristotelian" concept formation in terms of absolute dichotomies between
qualitatively different "principles", as, e.g., the traditional antithesis of "insight" versus "learning", has already been largely
substituted by a "Galilean", that is by more "diagrammatic"
forms of thinking in terms of gradual discriminations.
We do not wish, however, to conclude this paper without glancing at some of the forms of psychology which do not or do not fully
subscribe to such a methodological ideal.
First of all, there is introspectionism. Common to all introspectionism is the tacit assumption of a strict one to one relationship
between verbal utterances and "inner events". Only by virtue of
such an attitude is it possible to consider, as is done by introspectionism, words or other events located in layer (A) as valid representatives or "symbols" for inner experiences (0). In all objective
psychology verbal utterances are taken not as symbols, but merely
as "symptoms" the meaning of which is supposed to be accessible
only by means of special correlational investigations. In Figure 7,
the substitution mentioned is represented by a parenthesis.
Another kind of substitution is, however, much more fundamental in introspectionism. As emphasized especially by the so-called
act-psychologists, e.g. Brentano, the essence of consciousness is
characterized by its pointing toward, or aiming at, an object. This
relationship has been called intentionality. Though it was said that
intentional objects should not be confused with the physical environment, it still can be made clear that introspectionism became
infiltrated with a conceptual structure taken to a large extent from
the layer of palpable bodies (b). Yet there was no chance of a quantitative treatment on a physicalistic basis, since the relation of (0)
to (b) - - or to something formally analogous to (b) - - had been
accepted as univocal without experimentation. Furthermore, this
relationship was regarded as a qualitative entity of its own kind
entirely incomparable with the causal relationship, to which it is also
supposed to be opposite in direction. This relationship was admitted
without further control, from a mere inspection of layer (0). This

The Conceptual Focus o] some Psychological Systems

47

is indicated in Figure 7 by a dashed arrow 0 ~ b which is also pointing in the opposite direction from the corresponding arrow b -+ 0
in Figure 5. In philosophy, the problems of "dualism" have to a
large extent arisen from confusion and uncritical mutual substitution of the two cross-sectional layers structurally similar to
each other. This substitution is comparable to that committed b y
introspectionism. The fallacies of an uncontrolled substitution of
layers by each other have recently been emphasized by Heider.
Introspectionism can be subdivided into two main branches. The
one is represented by men like Wundt or Titchener, and also b y
Mach. It is sometimes called "Structuralism". Its chief feature is
to look for basic elements out of which all the complex experiences
m a y "consist" (without questioning whether the grammar of the
word "consist" permits such an application). Structuralism coincides
in time with the early molecular sensory psychology characterized
b y its emphasis upon mediational features like proximal stimulation
and the structure of the sense receptors. It is obvious that in this
general attitude - - sometimes characterised as "glorification of the
skin" - - the mosaic-nature of the events at the sensory surface has
been directly carried over to the hypothetical structure of inner
events (cf. Fig. 7). Thus these came to be understood after the pattern of the sense organ. In structuralism, therefore, not only layers
(0) and (A) and layers (0) and (b), but also layers (0) and (a) appear
in uncontrolled confusion.
The second branch of introspectionism might be called phenomenalism. It is somewhat related to act psychology, and sometimes the
term phenomenology is applied, not quite unmistakably, to it.
It is the kind of introspection represented by Gestalt psychology
and the Wtirzburg school of psychology of thinking. There was sufficient sophistication within phenomenalism about the naive
entanglement of structuralism with sensory elementarism, with
mediationalism and with functional "explanation". Unbiased
"description" of the preanalytically given was aimed at. The structuralist's "consist of" was given up in favor of the phenomenalist's
"resembles". E v e r y d a y language and even slang was used deliberately. Characteristic examples are the description of the phenomenon
of the shadow by Hering as a tiny skin of darkness lying upon the
surface of the object, the true color of which shines through the
former, or the introduction of the term "Aha-Erlebnis" by Bfihler
in order to refer to the experience of sudden insight. In this way,

48

Egon Brunswik

phenomenalism grew into a kind of conceptualized and systematized


poetry, bringing, in principle, all the various concepts and terms of
the common qualitative language into one comprehensive system
of resemblances. Since all "qualities" might be regarded as gross
reactions of the organism to some features of the environment and
thus be systematically located in layer (0), phenomenalism is the
strictest expression in existence of an 0-internal system of psy=
chological concept formation.
As a system of mutual resemblances, phenomenalism can be represented by means of a spatial order. The best example for such
a quasi-spatial arrangement of qualities, though limited to a certain modality, is the three-dimensional Hering color pyramid.
It is built up on an entirely phenomenalistic basis regardless of
the physical relationships of colors among each other. Thus it deals
with reactions only, not with stimuli. It was the first attempt to
deal with psychological problems on a "topological" basis by assigning a certain place in a spatial order to each quality. These
qualities could then be determined in terms of basic "dimensions"
defined by certain outstanding qualities.
On a somewhat different basis, topological considerations have
been recently introduced into psychology by Lewin. In his Topological Psychology, the actual "life space" is represented by a spatial
scheme. As is true for phenomenalism, however, not the surroundings defined in terms of physics are taken as a frame of reference,
but rather the environment as it is cognitively or functionally
responded to by the organism in the particular instance. In a certain
way topological psychology is similar to the "Umweltforschung"
of UxktiU. It deals, deliberately, not with stimuli or stimulus relationships, but rather with a pattern of reactions to be schematically located in 0, and from 0 dynamically onward until a new equilibrium is reached. Its chief merit is that it furnished an adequate
conceptual tool for a description of this organized pattern of
"field" intervening between the stimulating surroundings (c, b, a)
on the one hand, and the acted-upon surroundings (A, B, C), on
the other. Though quasi-spatial and highly geueralized, topological
psychology is not quantitative and not physicalistic in the usual
sense. It enters the picture at a systematic locus symmetrical, or
complementary, to the psychology of perception. Psychology of
perception deals with the relationship of the world as it "is" for
the organism in question, and of the world as it "is" for the obser-

The Conceptual Focus o[ some Psychological Systems

49

ving discursified human being. Only the former is represented in


topological psychology.
In conclusion: psychological research today presents itself as a
pattern of fragments. These fragments tend to crystallize around the
program of a gross correlational analysis in terms of achievement,
converging "from above" with the disciplines dealing with molecular problems. Environmentalism seems to take the lead before
mediationalism and molecular geneticism (as, e.g., some of the questions of "explanation").

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