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As the title of this paper perhaps already indicates,I want to confront two further
elaborations
of Searle'stheory of speechacts.One, by Searlehimself,presentsitself as
an attemptat foundingspeechact theory in the wider framework of a theory of mind,
and what I have in mind is of course Searle'sbook Intentionality(1953). The other
development
of speechact theory will be representedby two philosophers,who are
treatedin the contextof analyticphilosophyand linguisticpragmaticsas rather suspect
thinkers:JiirgenHabermasand Karl Otto Apel. The researchprogrammeof 'universal
pragmatics'(Habermas' term) which is closely related to Apel's 'transcendental
pragmatics'
obtained its final touch as part of Habermas' Theoryof Communicative
Actiort and relies very much on speech act theory. It is never easy to confront
philosophers
with very different backgroundsand sucha confrontationoften resultsin
somethinglike a steale mate situation,where each party accusesthe other one of
misrepresenting
its own viewsor perhapsevenpervertingthem. The discussionbetween
Searleon one side and Apel/Flabermason the other is an exampleof this.
The discussion
betweenthe 'Frankfurt-pragmatists'and
Searleis from the outset
burdenendwith a very fundamental disagreement,not about details, but about the
wholeframeworkin which the problemsare discussed.
This disagreementamountsto
the followingsituation:Searle - without any doubt - seesin his book Intentionalitya
continuationand further elaboration of his earlier book SpeechActs. Apel and
Habermason the other hand have the impression that Intentionatity is a rather
fundamental
revisionof Searle'searlier philosophyof languageand that the theory of
speech
acts cannotcoherentlybe incorporatedinto Searle'sintentionalisticphilosophy
of mind.They think that with Searle's'intentionalisticturn' the very spirit of the theory
of speechactsis lost and that it is better preservedin their own thought.
Apel's and Habermas'impression,that the theory of speechacts cannot be
appropriately
treated in the framework of Searle'sintentionalisticphilosophyof mind
is foundedon an interpretationof Searle'sviewswhich Searlehimself does not share.
Butthemisunderstandings
which Searlebelieveshe can discoverin the representation
of hisviewsby Apel and Habermasare very much supportedby his own formulations.
Therefore- in the first part of this paper - I will try to show how Searlehimself caused
'misunderstandings'
the
about which he showshimself so much amazed.In a second
partI turn to what could be called the 'Frankfurt interpretation'of speechact theory.
156
Joachint Leitich
The third part tries to show what is the main complaintagainstSearleand finally I
want to reflect upon Searle'sdefenseagainstHabermas'and Apel's criticism.
I51
Hegelif my promiseis sincere.And if you ask someoneto read Hegel,you must want
him or hear to read l-Iegel.So we discoversomethinglike a parallelismbetween
illocutionaryroles and psychologicalmodes, a parallelismwhich is such that the
psychological
modesare the sincerityconditionsof the speechacts.
A fourth and last point of the comparisonleads into the center of Searle's
theoryof intentionality,becauseit statesan essentialconnectionbetweenthe concept
of intentionality
and the conceptof representation.
This point dealswith conditionsof
success
or conditionsof satisfaction,
and this notion is a kind of generalizationof the
notionof truth conditionsfor all typesof speechacts.The conditionsof successof an
orderare fulfilled,if the order is carriedout. The conditionsof successof a promise
consist
in carryingout the promisedaction,and the conditionsof success
or satisfaction
of an assertionare fulfilled if reality conformsto what the speakerasserted.In exactly
the samesenseintentionalstatescan be characterized
by conditionsof successtoo.
The conditionsof successof a wish are realized if what is wished happens, the
conditions
of satisfaction
of the intentionto do somethingare fultllled if one does it
anda belief'sconditionsof satisfaction
are fultilled if what you believeis the case.
Thesestructuralanalogies,which are only with a didacticpurposederived from
the theoryof speechacts,permit Searleto state what an intentionalstate is. Each
intentionalstate
contentin a psychological
hasa representative
mode.Intentionalstates
represent
in the samesenseas speechactsrepresent.My statementthat it is raining
is a representation
of a stateof affairs,and my belief that it is raining representsthe
samestateof afthirs.My order to someoneto leave the room representsa certain
actionof a certainpersonand so doesmy wish that a certainpersonleavethe rclom.
The notionof representation
needsperhapssome explication.To saythat a belief or
a wish,a statementor an ilrder is a representationis simply to say that it has a
propositionalcontent and a psychologicalmode, that its propositional content
determines
conditionsof satisfaction
and its psychological
mode determinesa direction
of fit. The term 'representation'is nothing more than an abbreviation of this
constellation
(cf. Searle19i13:12). If the propositionalcontent is specified,then the
conditions
of satistzrction
are alsoalreadyspecified.If you believe,that it is raining,it
is givenwith your belief,which conditionsmust obtain if your belief is to be satisfied.
If you wish that the cat lies on the mat, it is specifiedby the content of your wish
whichstatemustbe the casein order for your wish to be satisfied.So we could simply
saythat an intentionalstatewith a directionof fit is a representationof its conditions
of satisfaction.
Now that we are equippedwith Searle'skey terms,we can look at how Searle
proposes
to integratehis speechact theoryinto his theoryof intentionality.As already
indicated
in my brief exposition,
Searlewantsto defendthe thesisthat intentionalstates
aremorefundamentalthan speechactsand that there is a logicaldependencyin the
sensethat there can be intentionalstateswithout speechacts, but no speechacts
withoutintentionalstates.
Let us seehow Searlearguesfor this.
The productionof speechzrctsis connectedwith the production of physical
158
Joachint Leitich
159
retrcatcd,and by prearrangcment I signal this by raising my arm. How does it work'l" (19ft3:
167)
A partof thisstoryis surelythis:The raisingof the arm has in this context conditions
of success
with a mind-to-worlddirectionof fit. The conditionsof successare that the
enemyhasretreated.In the contextof this exampleSearleposesagain the question
how somethingwhich is not intrinsicallyintentional(here a body movement) can
represent,
and the answerfollowsthe line alreadysketchedThe conditionsof success
of thebeliefthat the enemyhasretreated,are intentionallyimposedupon the physical
symbol,here the movementof the arm. The raisingof the arm can only count as a
representation
of the stateof affairsthat the enemyhasretreated,becausethis action
wasperformedwith the intentionthat the conditionsof successof the raisingof the
arm shouldbe the sameas the conditionsof success
of the belief that the enemy has
retreated.
The essenceof Searle'sview therefore lies in the assertionthat we find
something
like a transferof conditionsof successfrom an intentionalmental state
(which has such conditions of succesintrinsically)to an physical entity (body
movements,
marks on paper or sounds)which do not have conditionsof success
intrinsically
(and theretorecould not representanythingif there was no mind). But as
an illustrationof the theclryof transf'erringconditionsof satisfactiontrom mental states
ontolinguistic
signs,the examplechosenby Searleseemsabsurd."ls not the real basic
question
of the constitutionof linguistricmeaningthrough the intentionalityof mind
simplydisplacedhere, since agreementas to the meaning of the signal already
presupposes
the existenceof linguisticmeaningconventions?"(Apel 199I: 33). A
charitable
readershouldhaverecognized
that Searledid not want to illustratethis point
withhisexample.Searle'sexampleillustratesof coursehow somethinglike a transfer
of conditions
of satisfaction
from one symbolto anothersymbolis possible.But what
it surelycannotdemonstrateis the priorityof mentalstateswith regardt<lspeechacts,
because
in thisexample,as Apel pointedout the, conditionsof success
are transterred
fromsomething
whichalreadyhasa conventional
linguisticmeaningto somethingwhich
doesnot yet havea meaning.
Searle,of course,is consciousof the shortcomings
of his examplewith regard
to thethesisof the logicaldependence
of speechactson mentalintentionalstates.How
with the words: "So
couldanyoneoverlookthis'l He explicitlyresumeshis discussion
farwe havedescribed
the structureof meaningintentionsfor peoplewho alreadyhave
(19fi3:176),and he grantsthat thisleavesopen the questionof the relation
a language"
between
the institutionof languageand prelinguistictorms of intentionality.But even
in conceding
this,Searlestronglysuggests
that he wantsto statethat the institutionof
language
canbe derivedfrom or analyzedin termsof prelinguisticintentionality.Along
thisline he asks,if there were beingswho were capableof havingintentionalstates
suchasbelief,desircand intentionsbut who did not have language,what more they
wouldrequirein order to be able to perform linguisticacts.(cf. 1983: 177).Searle's
answeris that thosebeings,in order to pertbrm illocutionaryacts,would need "some
means
fbr externalizing,
of
fbr maikingpubliclyrecognizable
to others,the expressions
th e i rInt ent ional
s t at e s (1
" 9 8 3 :1 7 8 ).
160
Joachim Leilich
Though one might now expect a further elaboration of Searle's thesis (an
explanation of the passagefrom the prelinguisticto the linguistic carrying the
theoreticalburden),we are alreadyat the end of his chapteron meaning.What follows
is only a very sketchyexpositionwhich comprisesthe following steps:
"first the deliberateexpression
of Intentionalstatesfor the purposeof lettingothcrsknow that
one hasthem;second,the performance
of theseactsfor the achievement
of the extra-linguistic
aims which illocutionaryacts standardlyserve;and, third, the introductionof conventional
procedureswhich conventionalize
the illocutionarypoints that correspondto thc various
perlocutionary
aims"(1983:179).
16l
f62
Joachint Leilich
163
164
Joachim Leitich
165
separates
meaningfrom communication.If Searlewanted to answerthis question,he
would have two possiblestrategies,but both would bring him in an uncomfortable
position.Either he could say:meaningonly has to do with propositionalcontent. But
thenHabermasis right in sayingthat Searle'snew way of thinking no longer contains
thetrue spiritof speechact theory,which revolvesaroundillocutionaryforce. Or Searle
couuldsay:my explicationof meaningalsowantsto coverillocutionaryforces.But then
it remains mysterioushow Searle wants to separate meaning intentions from
intentions,becauseillocutionaryforce is preciselythe expressionof
communication
communication
intentions.Not the communicationintention about which Searle is
speaking- the intention to communicate a propositional content - but the
intentionin the senseof Habermas'double structure,where on the
communication
levelof intersubjectivity
communicativemodes are constitutedthrough the choice of
illocutionaryforces.Searlecould of coursesay that he takes illocutionary force into
consideration.
But the only theoreticalinstrumentshis analysispermits are directions
of fit. And directionsof fit are, as Searle himself admits (1991: 97), far too weak to
explicatethe differencesbetweendifferent illocutionaryforces.
Searledoes not only offer Habermas a division of labor - something like a
fruitful and peacefulcoexistence- between a theory of representation(Searle'sjob)
whichis presupposed
by a theoryof conversation(Habermas'job), but he finally makes
a counterattackaccusing Habermas of entertaining deeply t-lawed views. This
counterattack
is centeredaround the unhappy George Bush examplewhich I already
It runsas follows:"Habermasthinksthat the existenceof validityclaimsis
mentioned.
nota consequence
of the analysisof certain sorts of speechacts,rather he thinks that
thevalidityclaimsareconstitutiveof all speechacts"(Searle1991:91). This is a correct
and we should rather ask why Searlecannot agree with this. Searle
characterization
at all that there are validityclaimsinvolvedin the speechact.But he
doesnot disagree
triesto formulatethe relation betweenvalidity claimsand speechactsin a rather queer
of
way."Thatthereare validityclaims",Searlesays,"seemsto me a strict consequence
my analysis.However, what I do claim is that it is philosophically back to front to
that the validiryclrtimsprovide a basisfor tlrc uttderstandingof the phenomena
suppose
of speechacts,ratherit is the theoryof speechactstlnt has to explainthe validiryclaims".
(Searle1991:93t). It seemsto me an unfruitful approachto state the problem in terms
of the questionas to whether validity claims are a consequencederived from speech
actsor somethingwhich is constitutiveof speechacts.And I think Searle could agree
with this,becausehe unintentionallyrefuteshis own attack in explainingwhat validity
of speechacts
claimsreallyare.In an etfort to explainvalidityclaimsas a consequence
the following example.In a
(ratherthan constitutiveof speechacts),Searlediscusses
in the contextof the budgetof an Universitydepartmentsomeonestates:
discussion
"TheUniversitybudgetwill not permit us to expandthe library in the next year."Searle
admitsthat in this statementthere are severalvalidityclaimswhich can be revealedby
the followingchallenges:
1
2
t66
JoachimLeilich
motive to deceiveus.
You do not really have enough evidenceto say that. The figures about next
year's budget are not yet available.
Searle correctly notices that "the relevanceof such complaintsis already determined
by the internal featuresof the speechact in question.And the three validity claims in
question are those of truth, sincerity and legitimacy,in this case having sufficient
evidencefor one'sclaims."(1991:93).Without any doubt,Habermaswould agreewith
this picture,which is intendedto showwhere there is agreementbetweenHabermas
and Searle. Searle remarks that Habermas'validityclaims derive exactlyfrom his
Acts, namelythe typesof rules which
conditionson illocutionaryactsas statedin Speech
specifya certain speechact (1991:93). Habermas,to be sure,never tried to conceal
that his validity claimswere derivedfrom Searlesanalysisof different types of rules for
illocutionary forces. When Searle himself statessuch conditionson speech acts, for
example the essentialcondition,the sinceritycondition and the preparatorycondition,
he is not statingsomethingfrom which in a later phaseof analysisvalidity claimscould
be derived,but he is statingthe very validity claimsthemselves.There is no difference
(exceptfor a terminologicalone) betweenSearle'sconstitutiverules in SpeechActs and
by Habermasand Apel are
Habermas'validityclaims."The validityclaimsdiscussed
just thesevariousconditionsgeneralized",
Searleadmitshimself(1991:98). But these
rules are, as Searlehimself would not doubt, constitutive.But how then can Searle
complaint that Habermas falselythinks that validity claims are constitutiveof speech
acts,if validity claims are nothing more than a generalizationof types of constitutive
by the
rules? The illocutionarytorce of a speechact can completelybe characterized
validity claimswhich someonemakesin performingit. Searleis confusedin thinking
that validity claimsare somethingwhich shouldcome into the debatelater, after speech
acts are constituted by sets of constitutive rules. Nevertheless,Searle's attack is
understandable.Habermas'terminologyexplicitlyfocuseson the socialcommunicative
dimension which is embodied in illocutionary force. Recognizing this essential
communication-constituting
forceof the illocutionarycomponentwouldmake it difticult
for Searle to maintain his rather sharp distinctionbetween communicationand
meaning.Therefore he must in someway try to dissociateHabermas'intentionsfrom
his own. But the result will be inevitably that the character of illocutionary force
remainsvery much underexposed,to the extentthat we can very well understand that
the Frankfurt pragmatistshave the impressionthat Searle - though unintentionallysaid goodbyeto his earlier ideas.
Searle defends his thesis of the priority of representation-intentionsover
communication-intentions
on the level of propositionalcontent. And on this level
Searle'sproposalis clear and plausible.But by way of illustratinghis view on the level
of
of propositionalcontent,he manifeststhat he did not even recognizethe essentials
Habermas'criticism.Habermasdealswith the communicative
functionof illocutionary
forces (which he explicatesin terms of validityclaims),but in his responseto Habermas
Searlekept silent about illocutionaryforces.How is it possiblethat someonewho wants
to ground speechact theory in a theory of mind only speaksabout representationalor
propositionalcontentsbut never givesan explicitanalysisof illocutionaryforces?
167
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Joachint Leilich
769
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