Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2: 153-170
Abstract
Democratic government is not the same as innovation in government.
Government is an important component of democratic theory in the ways in
which it relates to the polity as a whole and implements demands made by the
people. However, government in classical democratic theory is not seen for
its capacity to innovate. In this essay, the issue of innovation is approached
through the idea of interfaces between the government and civil society. The
author analyzes participatory budgeting, councils, and national conferences in
Brazil from the perspective of innovations which have create new interfaces
between civil society and the government.
Keywords: Democratic innovation, civil society, participatory budgeting,
national conferences.
Democratic
rules were the main components of government, which fostered the possibility
that rational individuals could achieve their aims. Thus, bureaucracy and
government for Weber were understood in terms of their capacity to produce
precision, constancy, stringency and reliability of its operations... .3 To be
sure, Weber also knew that bureaucracy and government were in tension with
political will. However, he thought that nothing could be done in modernity to
alleviate this tension, which was a result of modernity itself.4 Thus, for Weber,
innovation was not among the desirable characteristics of government.5
The new institutionalism tradition also has dealt with the problem of
innovation in government. New institutionalism emerged with the aim
of stressing symbolic and normative systems which affect and constrain
organizational choices.6 Cultural and normative systems were addressed by
new institutionalism as determining, facilitating, or constraining choices made
by individuals within political institutions. The result of these constraints was
seen in a similar way as Weber saw political institutions, namely as stable
patterns for sequences of activities that were routinely enacted.7 Again, we see
within political science a tendency either to oppose or to ignore institutional
innovation, due to the fact that rules are needed to generate predictability or
constancy, a central element in the concept of institutionalization. However,
not all new institutionalists adopt the same conception of the relation between
rules and predictability. Hall and Taylor describe three different conceptions of
rule behavior within new institutionalism, and they show, particularly within
historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, that changes
in actors and actor behavior also produce changes at the institutional level:
Organizations often adopt new institutional practices, not because it advances
means-ends efficiency of the organization but because it enhances the social
legitimacy of the organization and its participants.8 Thus, we have a twopronged understanding of institutional life: one, according to which the role
of institutions is to give predictability to social actors. This is the conception
3 Wolfgang
J. Mommsen, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press, 1989).
4 Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Webers Developmental History
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
5 It should be noted that Weber proposed a solution to this problem through the charismatic leader.
See Weber, Economy and Society.
6 Walter Powell, The New Institutionalism: The International Encyclopedia of Organization
Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007).
7 Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects and Institutionalism, in The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Walter W. Walter and Paul J. DiMaggio
(Berkeley, CA: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 144-145.
8 Peter A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,
Political Studies 44, no.5 (1996): 936-957.
9 Adam
Fung, I point out that transparency has three elements: disclosure, information,
and enforcement mechanisms. Disclosure is the process through which the
government reveals information and/or decision-making procedures to the
public. The nature and the role of information in the relationship between
civil society and the state is the second important step in the construction
of transparency. And third, government in an adequate transparency policy
should have targets or mechanisms through which it reveals information to the
public. Transparency is not an interface through which civil society mandates
decisions.15 Rather, it is a mechanism for disclosure. However, innovation may
take place through the mechanism for providing information to the public or
through the enforcement procedures introduced. Innovation in government
through specific transparency procedures is analyzed below.
The last interface discussed by Hevia and Isunza is what they call interfaz
de co-gestion, which I call co-deliberation interface. Co-deliberation
interface is the most recent but also the most discussed interface between
government and civil society. Usually, state and civil society actors share a
public procedure for deliberation, particularly in the area of public policy. Codeliberation interfaces are bottom-up in the way they structure co-deliberation.
They involve the organization of assemblies or councils at the local level which
interact with the state, and decisions are made through some joint mechanism,
such as the councils, participatory budgeting, or national conferences in Brazil,
and are later implemented by the state.
Thus, we have three different degrees of innovation within the state: the first
format, which I call mandatory, is typical of early twentieth-century debates on
the limits of representation. It involves mechanisms of direct democracy that
proliferated in the American West during the early twentieth century.16
The second innovation in government is transparency. Innovations
linked to transparency are related to the fact that government cannot become
completely independent from civil society. Different from referendum and
recall, transparency is not a category that originated in the political system.17
Transparency migrated from the market to the system of government. However,
today, it is very much practiced within government.
15 Archon
Fung and David Weil, Open Government and Open Society, in Open Government:
Collaboration, Transparency, and Participation in Practice, ed. Daniel Latroph and Laurel
Ruma (Cambridge, MA: O'Reilly Media, 2010), 105-113.
16 Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, Michigan Law and Policy Review 2
(1997): 11, 16-18.
17 Archon Fung, Full Disclosure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Fung
showed the marked origins of transparency at the market level. The stock was the first place
where transparency was introduced in the United States during the 1930s. For the authors,
transparency has been imported from market to state relations.
The third innovation, which is the only one with which I will deal in this
essay, is co-deliberation, a bottom-up interface between civil society and the
state. Different from the two previous interfaces that originated in separate
political crises in the early twentieth century and the 1930s, co-deliberation
interfaces have their origins in the processes of democratic deepening of late
democracies, such as Brazil and India. I will analyze participatory budgeting,
councils, and national conferences in Brazil from this perspective.
18 Ibid.
(and therefore present need). A table for classifying priorities assigns grades
in inverse relation to previous access to a particular public good. According to
the 1999 criteria, previous access to a public good of up to 80 percent leads
to grade 1; up to 60 percent previous access, grade 2, and up to 20 percent,
grade 5. The second criterion is the population of the region, and the third, the
communitys own ranking of its priorities, again on a scale of 1 to 5. At the end
of this process, a region can amass up to fifteen points if it previously had less
than 20 percent access to a public good, chooses this good as a top priority, and
has more than 120,000 inhabitants.
In the second round of regional assemblies, the region elects delegates to
the PB council. This process, which takes place in June, leads to the formation
of a council composed as follows: two councilors from each of the sixteen
regions (thirty-two councilors), two from each of the five thematic assemblies
(ten councilors), one councilor from the UAMPA-the umbrella organization
of neighborhood communities-and one from the public service trade union.
The PB council thus has forty-four members.
Thematic Meetings
The second Workers Party administration (1993-1996) introduced thematic
oriented meetings. They grew out of a process called constituent city,
which aimed to incorporate into the PB social sectors that still stood outside
of the process. The result was the introduction of five thematic assemblies
on the following issues: city organization and development; health and social
assistance; economic development and tax systems; transport, circulation, and
education; and culture and leisure. The cycle of the thematic meetings parallels
that of regional meetings, and participants are entitled to elect ten delegates to
the PB council.
The PB Council
The PB council is inaugurated each July. It creates a budget proposal based on
the rankings and decisions which took place in the intermediary meetings. The
PB council then revises the final budget proposal elaborated by the Gaplan (the
planning agency, detailed below) and mayors cabinet. In September, a final
budget proposal is in place. The council also monitors the implementation of
its decisions by the citys administrative agencies during the year.
The PB in Belo Horizonte
The PB has been in practice in Belo Horizonte since 1993. It involves three
rounds of regional assemblies (to be reduced to two rounds) which lead to a
regional forum of priorities. The first round of regional assemblies is similar
to its counterpart in Porto Alegre, although it is more argumentative and less
deliberative. The administration opens each assembly with a statement of what
was decided in the previous year and an accounting of the current state of the
implementation of previous decisions.
December 2013 | 159
20 Since outcome is proportional to population and inversely proportional to income of the locality,
25 It
is beyond the aims of this work to analyze the formation and evolution of the Workers
Party. For an analysis of the movements which claimed labor autonomy in Brazil during the
democratization process, see Leonardo Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin
America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002). For an analysis of the formation of
the Workers Party, see Margaret Keck, PT a logica da Diferena [Workers Party: The logic of
difference] (So Paulo: Atica, 1992).
26 Rebecca N. Abers, From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy,
and Civic Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Politics and Society 26 (December 1998): 511537.
27 Nsia Lima et al., Sade e Democracia: Histria e Perspectivas do SUS [Health and democracy:
History and perspectives] (Rio de Janeiro: Editiora Fiocruz, 2005).
Local
Administration
Original Proposal
Local assemblies
and control of the
population on budget
decisions
Workers councils
and a mechanism for
the election of city
councils
Form of Deliberation
Based on direct
deliberation at the
local level
Based on delegates
electing new
delegates
Final Design
Neighborhood
associations
proposal prevailed at
the local level
Workers Party
proposal prevailed
at the intermediary
level (municipal
budget council)
Administration
proposal kept the
connection between
participation and
the operation of
administrative
institutions (Gaplan,
CRC, CROP)
neighborhood.30 As the people arrived, water supply was irregular and there
was no sewage or paved roads. In the first year of the Belo Horizonte PB, a
few community leaders demanded sewage and pavement. They did not know
how to proceed and thus failed to convince other participants of the priority
of their claims. A change in the neighborhood association and the selection
of new leadership led them to much better organized participation in the next
year, and their claims were included in the city PB plan for 1995. The examples
in both Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte show how institutions designed
for public deliberation can have a positive effect in situations of previously
existing deliberative inequalities: in Porto Alegre, inequality stemmed from
the existence of clientelism in the neighborhood; in Belo Horizonte, it was the
result of poor organizational skills. In both cases, a participatory design led the
population to move from a situation of deliberative inequality to one in which
they became equal members of a deliberative process. The PB thus helped
to overcome two traditional mechanisms: hierarchical relations derived from
the favor culture, and the practice of claiming goods through mediators, both
replaced by associational interaction and free expression
was the strengthening and increase of the number of national councils. Brazil
had had sixteen national councils, and Lulas government created fifteen
new councils during his two administrations, almost doubling the number of
national councils in Brazil. The third contribution to participatory policies was
at the level of the national conferences, where one can see the focus of the
participatory policies during Lulas two mandates.
Lula governed Brazil for two consecutive mandates (2003-2006; 20072010) and established a new pattern of participation at the national level in
Brazil. Among the 115 national conferences that have taken place in Brazil
since 1941, seventy-four took place during Lulas administration. Lulas
government standardized national conferences: they were all called by one of
the ministries through an administrative act (portaria); they all involved debates
at the three levels of government, city, state, and national;33 all conferences
engaged in deliberations and made recommendations to the government; and
all conference decisions became laws signed by the president.34 In many cases,
conference decisions also became law projects or legal initiatives under the
federal government.35
There are two characteristics of the national conferences: (1) their pattern
of participation, that is to say, how one can compare who participates and
the nature of that participation at the local and national levels, and (2) the
conferences deliberative impact on the decision-making process at the federal
level. Participation in the national conferences in Brazil has been very high.
Table 2. Have you participated in a national conference, and at what level?
Regional
Municipal
State
National
Total
75.5
143
94
65.7
39
27.3
108
19
13.3
143
143
143
33 There
have been conferences that took place only at the national level; for the purposes of
this work, we have not included them in the number above. They are: conferences of the
A. P. L.; science and technology; professional learning; Brazilians abroad; and two human rights
conferences (the eighth and the tenth).
34 Lula signed into decree most of the decisions of the national conferences, which does not mean
that all these decisions became law. Most of the decisions in the area of public policies required
law projects, and, in many cases, decisions contradicted existing laws. Abortion could be the
best example: it was approved in the national conference on human rights in 2010 but it was
rejected in the national conference on health. In both cases, it was signed by Lula.
35 Thamy Progrebinschi, Conferncias nacionais, participao social e processo legislativo
[National conferences:Social participation and legislative process] (IESP/Ministrio da Justia,
2010).
Average Income of
the Participants
Average Education
of the Participants
Gender
Up to 8 years of
education (46.1%)
51.4% of the
participants were
women
National
Conferences (2010)
Average income
is 2 to 5 Brazilian
minimum wages
(around 300 U.S.
dollars) (34.4%)
Average income
is 1 to 4 minimum
wages (52.2%)
Up to 8 years of
education (38.1%)
51.2% of the
participants were
women
Participatory
Budgeting in Porto
Alegre (1998)
sample involved 2,200 respondents and also was representative for all regions of Brazil.
The sample was a cota sample which reflected income, education, and gender for Brazil as a
whole.
37 Emir Sader, Quando novos personagens entram em cena [When new actors join the political
scene] (So Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988).
38 Leonardo Avritzer, Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil (Washington, DC: Wilson
Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
Social assitance
Culture
Education
Sports
Public safety
Youth policies
Mental health
Communication
Urban policy
Food security
Health
Other
NR
64
44.8
52
36.4
17
11.9
18.9
17
11.9
6.3
56
42
27
23
18
16
16
16
39.2
29.4
16.1
12.6
11.2
11.2
11.2
12
11
4
1
2
3.5
8.4
7.7
2.8
0.7
1.4
15
10.5
12
8.4
21
14.7
0.0
28
19.6
5
0
0
143
3.5
0.0
-
3.5
2
7
143
1.4
1.4
4.9
100
5.6
15
10.5
28
19.6
26
18.2
13
9.1
NR
53
37.1
Total
143
100.0
are:
Thus, we can see that national conferences have started to influence the national
government in two important ways: in the way it organizes its relationship with
civil society actors, and in the way it changes the operation of government
and its relationship with Congress. Lulas government had two very clear and
distinct phases. The first was the phase in which it did not engage participation
and instead tried to pursue its agenda through Congress. This phase ended
with the disaster of the vote-buying mensalo scandal, which threatened to
bring down the Lulu government in 2005. In the second phase, the government
pursued its agenda in Congress with the help of civil society and through the
major national conferences. This was one of the keys to Lulas success in his
second mandate.
1979).
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,