Jose Burgos vs.

Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the
court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the
place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle
in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or
plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only
a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at
bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been
mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.
(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the
items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature
of the said items.

Today is Friday, March 06, 2015

search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,

petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court
of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed
to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,"
or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies
thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same
null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of
said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized
in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object
to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the

corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation
whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3
F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need
be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of
are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given

provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as
alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly
described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"
16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained,
17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against

the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in
the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability
to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring
his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the
same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in
Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,
without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and
so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment
was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as
we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment

included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
"stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon
which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the
Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or
federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine
an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the
incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit
it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis
ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit
of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure,
if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause
of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof
are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging
to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is

watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No.
304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John
J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and
other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal
belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the
federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but
in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In
other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to
said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant
application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do
not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from
the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct
conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly
declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared
illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the
opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the
such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures
made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately
preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the
nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the
illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view
even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court
from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases
and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were
therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal
standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places
other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the
searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal
standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity
of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings
submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the
suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from
places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial
construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or
return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and
seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects
gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive
of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where
the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed
solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting
three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the
petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or
General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named
three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in
the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared
to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants
directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to
return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal
and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United
States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to
the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States,
310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it
was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures,
a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a
man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is
protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his
filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers,
the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents
seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of
their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These
proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the
petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room
91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard;
1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing
cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the
corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return
and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and
extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the
then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out
Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between
"lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards.
See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched
must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and
suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several
corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully
moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870,
873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home
during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched
or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the
exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice
Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest
may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view
finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United
States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a
mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared
that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise
where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a
corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return
and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th
Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two
independent grounds: First he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and
second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at
bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the
corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership
or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the
invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir.
1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's
place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that
several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the

employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both
Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed
at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United
States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went
to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to
move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his
files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books
and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the
subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding
that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in
the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure
to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked
possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855,
861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said
person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F.
Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain
files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing
of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his
home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his
(Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and
business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records
were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by
the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records
were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties
seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S.,
supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having
violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having
been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by
the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was
captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored
with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See

also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States
did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the
case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were
seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were
"PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still
both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the
case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in
Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the
word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent
that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these
were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or
places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from
the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where
the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it
their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed
(actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn
applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of
which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of the
petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which
issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of
the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise
have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as
"President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically
mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition
were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal
searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not
criminal in origin or nature.
Footnotes

1Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro
D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G.
Reyes, City of Manila.
2Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman
Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio
Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian
Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation,
Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business
Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass
Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing
Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic
Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
6Inter alia.
7"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be
rendered in the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against
the use of the papers, documents and things from the following premises: (1) The office
of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932
Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts.,
Port Area, Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas
Development Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port
Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd
Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port
Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg., San
Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13)
American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen
Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port
Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila, South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse
Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd.,
Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey
Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24)
IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United Housing Corp.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis,
Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the
hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the
Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The preliminary injunction shall continue as to the
papers, documents and things found in the other premises namely: in those of the
residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2)

15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta
Village, Makati, Rizal."
8Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.
9Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
10In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 60 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287
F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.
11U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.
12On March 22, 1962.
13Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.
14Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16 People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
17Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.
18Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.
19Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis
supplied.
20Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead
vs. United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado,
338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L.
ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed. 2d.
1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.
21Even if remote.
22Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49: U.S. vs.
Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93: Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed.
2d 650.
CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:

*Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93516

August 12, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon
@ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka
Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz
(Records, p. 3). Such information was later amended to exclude all the aboveenumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The
amended information reads:
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Basilio DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody and control one (1)
M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live
ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of
Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
(Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered
its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed his objections to
the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay,
immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he,
thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN,
December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza
alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree
Number 1866, and considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles
and/or items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and
submitted in court as evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine Constabulary Command at
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
B.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTION.
C.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE
FIREARMS DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE
DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME
COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED
BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION
AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:

On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected
with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent
to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani,
Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina
Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the
group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a
radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance
the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they
earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba.
She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the
group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the house, the group found
that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give
the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the
place and requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group
again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw
Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of
the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the
group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the
Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a
computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and
Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to
look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for
subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial
beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation.
Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989). (p.
5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against
lawless elements in our society, We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this
end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case at bar, not only did We
find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining
evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against
him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole
violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that
the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14
rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The
prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:

Lieutenant Candito Quijardo

Fiscal
Q

How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?

A
He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned
the name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the same time
claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items. (TSN of October 31,
1989, p. 40)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K2," tell us if it has any connection to the house?
A

The same house, sir.

Q
Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan
Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did you
find out the identity?
A

I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.

Q
Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true identity
of Bernie Mendoza?
A

The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.

Can you name these officers?

A
55)

Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-

M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez

Q
That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that
house?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A
During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka
Bernie is the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on
matters not on their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues
that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the
failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.

It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as
evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are
admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically
declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence,
like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his
failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who
knew the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant
could have exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to crossexamine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any other
evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the
owner of the subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and
convict the appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights
useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house,
the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed
to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution
(Article III, Section 2). The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security
in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such
right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure
becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle;
and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July
31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered
the appellant's house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper
of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier
machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more subversive
items; that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown
the articles used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly conducted without
search warrant with the consent of the person searched in this case, appellant's helper
and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant's house; and
that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be
seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose
rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De

Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence
that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it
was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his
house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has
such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's
dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
(Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted
by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded
urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant.
But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the
appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go
inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the
meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they
should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion. (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant
is in the identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In
the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with
serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number thus:
FISCAL
Q

Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house?

Lt. Quijardo:
A
When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately
saw different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive orientation
and the M-14 rifle.
Q

In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?

In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.

If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same?

Yes, sir.

Q
I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes
of identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit "D."
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL:
Q
Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that
firearm to the firearm which according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?
A
This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house.
(TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its
correction or lack of it could spell the difference between freedom and incarceration of
the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden
to prove the existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the
firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the
trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the
substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not been
fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's
connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the
prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument
raised by the defense that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with the crime of
subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of
subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed
this case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et
al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very
essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag
(G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically distinguished
subversion from rebellion, and held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a
crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No.
1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein.
In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking of arms against the Government;
whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient and

the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government

is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289
(1981]), this Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security,
while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against
the Government is the very element of the crime on rebellion. On the other hand, R.A.
1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar
associations and its successors because their existence and activities constitute a clear,
present and grave danger to national security.
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion, and other illegal means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not
only constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private respondents), but
may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring
subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable.
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if
an accused is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the
doctrine of absorption of common crimes as applied in rebellion would have found
application therein. The respondents relied on the opinion of this Court when it said:
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of
the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the
charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the
dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering that the
legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of
firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up
of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical result of this may be harsh or
it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that obtain in the
present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to
enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April
22, 1992).
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the
charge of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection
with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the
accused on reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is
ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur, subject to my reservations in Baylosis v. Chavez, 202 SCRA 405.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur, subject to my reservations in Baylosis v. Chavez, 202 SCRA 405.
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81561

January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section
21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in
the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend
in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x
2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn,
pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore,
Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out
the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to

have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3,
October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated
address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested
assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming
his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER
CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION
OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1.
Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure
and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues
that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under

oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in
this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill
v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by
virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility
of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2],
Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with
the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37
SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon.
Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or
other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may

an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be

invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1.
This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under
the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of
his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court
there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and
as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the
search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892
(1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938
(1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there
said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,
informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted
in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both
instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that
NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp.
119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search
that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v.
State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the
property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and
where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and
seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in

his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed,
as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What
the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas ,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles
of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced
in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search
warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance
thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1,
1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure
is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill
of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through

private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental
as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2.
In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while
under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the
case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of
counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See.
5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there
being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is
that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified
by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here,
did you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of
his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p.
62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the
defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof
by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated.
What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is
there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial
investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second
assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3.
Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to
believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but
rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita,
Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship
the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German
national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as
incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated.
An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed
a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose
and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first
ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust
contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the

cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages
and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo,
p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials,
if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo,
171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of
the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in
the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug
abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland
(TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA
342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172
SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA
567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full
name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant
signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the
assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*

Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo.

**
It reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

***

Forged checks.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PP VS. BONGCARAWAN
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger
ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March
13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer,
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4)
other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as
the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and
was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but
no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this
back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase,
revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the
matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without
his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid
HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to
the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription

against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they
called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase
and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention,
and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the
owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses
were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person
named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does
exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and
support the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if,
as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories
can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this
Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent
to possess the same.
People vs. Cachola (January 21, 2004)
Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Thursday, March 15, 2012 Posted by
Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The mother, elder brother, uncle and cousin of 12-year old Jessie Barnachea
(Jessie) were killed. There were 4 separate informations charging Dominador Cachola
(Cachola) and Ernestos Amay (Amay) with murder.
At the trial before the RTC, the prosecution presented as witnesses Jessie, his brother,
neighbors and several police officers.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense counsels orally asked for leave of
court to file a demurrer to evidence. The trial court denied the motion outright and set the
schedule for the presentation of evidence for the defense.

However, instead of presenting evidence, the appellants filed a Demurrer to Evidence

even without leave of court.
RTC convicted Cachola and Amay sentencing them to suffer 4 counts of the supreme
penalty of death.
The case is on automatic review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not allowing Cachola and Amay to present
evidence after filing their demurrer to evidence without leave of court.
Held: NO. Section 15 (now Section 23), Rule 119 is clear on the matter: SEC. 15.
-Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving
the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. (Underscoring supplied).
The filing by Cachola and Amay of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave
of court was a clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their
claim that they had been denied due process because the evidence they belatedly
sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow them to wager on the
outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated
by convenience.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed
the hearings on the motion for demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied, and
then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the position of his coappellants. At no time other than in this automatic review was there any attempt that is
contrary to the waiver of the presentation of evidence.

109633; 20 JUL 1994]

Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of
firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or
shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and
seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an
entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the
shabu, its paraphernalias and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized
that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein.
The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

Home
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure
and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was
then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and
Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a
certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,
because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due
process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties
were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure
and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held,
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of

no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general
warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.

NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]

Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American
nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den
Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that
Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission
Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects
confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls
engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17
of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence,
another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to
face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted
against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative
Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45
and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board
of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988
but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20
April 1988.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners
pending determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the
declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and
social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule
126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not
an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental
to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In
view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending
their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation
charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when
confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in
accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69
of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested
and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for
deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is
that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of
the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the
people.

Today is Friday, March 06, 2015

search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69899

July 15, 1985

ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
XCV HON. REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY
FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT.
GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents,
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.
RELOVA, J.:
On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of
Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002
authorizing the search and seizure of
1.

Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2.

Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3.

Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4.

Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;

5.
Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines,
video machines and tapes
which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the
crime of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by PD 1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo)
On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:
2.
... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing
and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way,
inanimate or mute things as they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
3.
More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has
been rendered moot and academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a

military conspiracy was responsible for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino,
Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board which has
the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had
virtually affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed
Benigno Aquino, Jr.
4.
More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said
case against the accused on all documents pertinent and more so as we repeat,
rendered moot and academic by the recent Agrava Report. (p. 27, Rollo)
On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution,
pertinent portions of which state:
... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are
not under the control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these
circumstances, the proper forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should
be addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of
the Court. It is to be further noted that it is not even with this Branch of the Court that the
offense of inciting to sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary
injunction and restraining order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 98 from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q29243, praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge
Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and that a mandatory injunction be
issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin
Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately the
documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner and that final injunction be
issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st
Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in Criminal Case No.
29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt.
Godofredo Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine
Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their
comment. The plea for temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were
enjoined from introducing as evidence for the state the documents/properties seized
under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage No. Q-29243 (Sedition case
against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the
present action is premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable
cause exists justifying the issuance of a search warrant; (3) the articles seized were
adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was conducted in an orderly
manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's
wife; (6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the
search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by
laches.

There is merit in the petition.

Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order in question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the questions
raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in
and passed upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for reconsideration in said
court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is no longer a pre-requisite.
As held in Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring the filing
of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be
entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances.
The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due
process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity
but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905 and in
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when
questions are raised for the first time before the high court in a certiorari case that the
writ shall not issue, unless the lower court had first been given an opportunity to pass
upon the same." Further, in the case of Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We
held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration in the lower court has
often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this
rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent nullity
or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the
proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with nullity (Luzon
Surety Co. v. Marbella et al., L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances
warrant immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of this petition clearly disclose
that the issues herein raised have already been presented to and passed upon by the
court a quo.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3.
Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the
judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the
means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M.
Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an application for
search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials published or
intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel
Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will not suffice." A search warrant
should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The
evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those,
and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be
committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs, Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states
that in several issues of the Philippine Times:
... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the
government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized
by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835;
(p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite
distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted
authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant,
absent of the existence of probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search
warrant issued, the items confiscated from the premises of the office of the Philippine
Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the
following:
1.

One bundle of assorted negative;

2.

One bundle of assorted lay out;

3.
Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and
other paraphernalias;
4.
Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino
and a speech of one various artist;
5.

One bundle Dummies;

6.
Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates
(Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15):
7.

One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;

8.

OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;

9.

Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo)

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing
the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of
certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene

the explicit comment of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be
particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants. In
the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of
printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication,
newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language
used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of
petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable.
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of
which petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence
is, the printing and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs.
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure
is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the
political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."
Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29,
1983 and was executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one
(1) year, one (1) month and six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of
the warrant and the return of the documents/personal properties. Having failed to act
seasonably, respondents claim that petitioner is guilty of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).
In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after
the military operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited
by the Director-General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged
with the crime of inciting to sedition before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on
October 7, 1983, a preventive detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he
had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November 8, 1984 when this
Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,
releasing Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B. Basco,
Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce, In the same month, November 1984, petitioner
filed his motion to recall warrant and to return the seized documents. When respondent
judge denied the motion, he came to Us.
Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right
to the possession of the seized properties is incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on
September 29, 1983 is declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.

The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
GRANTED and all properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to
petitioner. Further, respondents Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M.
Ignacio are ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times
at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

This case, like the WE FORUM case, is another example of the military's gross
disregard of the Constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures
and freedom of the press, aided and abetted by judges who should know better. I give
my hearty concurrence.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
This case, like the WE FORUM case, is another example of the military's gross
disregard of the Constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures
and freedom of the press, aided and abetted by judges who should know better. I give
my hearty concurrence.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000]

MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA, petitioners, vs. HON. JAPAL M.
GUIANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
At bench is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest
issued by herein respondent Japal M. Guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, ordering the arrest of petitioners without bail in
Criminal Case No. 2376 for murder.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder, docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361, was filed before
the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against herein
petitioners and six (6) other persons[1] in connection with the death of a certain Abdul
Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.[2] The
complaint alleged that herein petitioners paid the six other respondents the total amount
of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul Dimalen.[3]
Acting on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in
a Resolution dated 22 August 1994[4], dismissed the charges of murder against herein
petitioners and five other respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for
murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an
information for murder against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant
to this Resolution, an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama
before the sala of respondent Judge.
In an Order dated 13 September 1994[5], respondent Judge ordered that the case, now
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2332, be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further
investigation. In this Order, respondent judge noted that although there were eight (8)
respondents in the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only one
(1) of the eight (8) respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary
resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how
the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the respondent judge
reasons, the trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama.
Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further
investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the
murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of
murder against herein petitioners and the other respondents in the murder complaint.
Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a refiling of the murder charge and
pursuant to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein.[6] On December 6,
1994, herein petitioners submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits.

After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28

December 1994,[7] found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners and
three (3) other respondents.[8] He thus recommended the filing of charges against
herein petitioners Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as principals by inducement, and
against the three (3) others, as principals by direct participation.
Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda,
who conducted the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a
notation stating that he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the
investigating prosecutor to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he
cited were that the case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the
father-in-law of his son.[9]
On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994[10] was filed
against the petitioner spouses and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of respondent
judge. This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A
notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which
explained the reason for his inhibition.[11]
The following day, or on 3 January 1995, the respondent judge issued a warrant[12] for
the arrest of petitioners. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, petitioners
filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion[13] for the setting aside of the
warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, petitioners argued that the
enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the
information was prematurely filed and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for
review with the Department of Justice.
A petition for review[14] was filed by the petitioners with the Department of Justice on 11
January 1995.[15] Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioners
pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition wherein petitioners pray for the
following:
"1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
implementation and execution of the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 and enjoining
the respondent judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 2376 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al. upon such bond as may be
required by the Honorable Court;
2. this petition be given due course and the respondent be required to answer;
3. after due hearing, the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 be set aside and declared
void ab initio and the respondent judge be disqualified from hearing Criminal Case No.
2376 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al."[16]
In a Resolution[17] dated 20 February 1995, this Court resolved to require respondent
judge to submit a comment to the petition. The Court further resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order[18] enjoining the respondent judge from implementing and

executing the Order of Arrest dated 3 January 1995 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 2376.
At the onset, it must be noted that petitions for certiorari and prohibition require that
there be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law available to the petitioner.[19] In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners
have no other remedy available to them as there is pending before the lower court an
Urgent Motion[20] praying for the lifting and setting aside of the warrant of arrest.
Ordinarily, we would have dismissed the petition on this ground and let the trial court
decide the pending motion. However, due to the length of time that the issues raised in
the petition have been pending before the courts, it behooves us to decide the case on
the merits in order to preclude any further delay in the resolution of the case.
Respondent Japal M. Guiani retired from the judiciary on 16 April 1996. For this reason,
respondent is no longer the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 14 of
Cotabato City; and the prayer of petitioner as to respondents disqualification from
hearing Criminal Case No. 2376 is now moot and academic. Thus, there remain two
issues left for the determination of the Court: first, the legality of the second information
for murder filed before respondents court; and second, the validity of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioners.
With respect to the first issue, petitioners aver that it is the respondent judge himself who
is orchestrating the filing of the alleged murder charge against them. In support,
petitioners cite five (5) instances wherein respondent judge allegedly issued illegal
orders in a mandamus case pending in respondents sala filed against petitioner Mayor
Bai Unggie Abdula. These allegedly illegal orders formed the basis for a criminal
complaint which they filed on 6 October 1994 against respondent and ten (10) others
before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.[21] In this complaint, herein
petitioners alleged that the respondent judge illegally ordered the release of the total
amount of P1,119,125.00 from the municipal funds of Kabuntalan, Mindanao to a certain
Bayoraiz Saripada, a purported niece of respondent judge. The Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao, in an Order[22] dated 12 December 1994, found "sufficient
basis to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case" and directed the
respondents therein to file their respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence.
From these facts, petitioners argue, it is clear that it is the respondent judge himself who
is orchestrating and manipulating the charges against the petitioner.
Petitioners further state that respondent judge exhibited extreme hostility towards them
after the filing of the said complaint before the Ombudsman. Petitioners claim that
immediately after the issuance of the Order of the Ombudsman requiring respondent
judge to file his counter-affidavit, respondent allegedly berated petitioner Bai Unggie
Abdula in open court when she appeared before him in another case Allegedly, in full
view of the lawyers and litigants, respondent judge uttered the following words in the
Maguindanaoan dialect:
"If I cannot put you in jail within your term, I will cut my neck. As long as I am a judge
here, what I want will be followed."[23]
Respondent judge, in compliance with the Order of this Court, filed a Comment dated 3
March 1995.[24] In this Comment, he argues that petitioners enumeration of
"incontrovertible facts" is actually a list of misleading facts which they are attempting to

weave into Criminal Case No. 2376 for the purpose of picturing respondent as a partial
judge who abused his discretion to favor petitioners accuser.[25] He claims that the antigraft charge filed by petitioners against him is a harassment suit concocted by them
when they failed to lay their hands on the amount of P1,119,125.00 of municipal funds
which respondent had previously ruled as rightfully belonging to the municipal councilors
of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Respondent vehemently denies having personally profited
from the release of the municipal funds. Moreover, respondent points out that the
allegations in the complaint seem to imply that the Vice Mayor of Kabuntalan, Bayoraiz
Sarupada, was a party to the mandamus case filed with respondents court when in
truth, there was no case filed by the vice mayor pending in his court. Finally, respondent
denies berating petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula and uttering the words attributed to him in
the petition. According to respondent, the last time petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula
appeared in his sala on December 28, 1994, in connection with the lifting of an order for
her apprehension in another case, he neither berated nor scolded her and in fact, he
even lifted the said order of arrest.
In its Comment with Urgent Motion for the Lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order
dated 5 June 1995,[26] the Office of the Solicitor-General states that petitioners
allegation that the respondent judge was biased and prejudiced was pure speculation as
no proof was presented that respondent assumed the role of prosecutor. Moreover, the
OSG argued that the fact that the respondent judge and petitioners had pending cases
against each other did not necessarily result in the respondents bias and prejudice.
An analysis of these arguments shows that these should have been properly raised in a
motion for the disqualification or inhibition of respondent judge. As previously stated
however, the issue as to whether respondent should be disqualified from proceeding
with the case has been rendered moot and academic as he is no longer hearing the
case against petitioners. As such, there is no need for a prolonged discussion on this
issue. It is sufficient to say that in order to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and
prejudice, petitioner must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence.[27] This is
a heavy burden which petitioners have failed to discharge. This Court has to be shown
acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.[28]
Petitioners next argue that the act of respondent in motu proprio ordering a
reinvestigation of the murder charge against them is another indication of the latters
bias and prejudice.[29] They claim that the filing of their complaint against respondent
motivated the latters Order of 13 September 1994 which ordered the return of the
records of the murder case to the provincial prosecutor. Furthermore, they posit that the
latter had no authority to order the reinvestigation considering that same had already
been dismissed as against them by the provincial prosecutor in his Resolution dated 22
August 1994.
A review of the pertinent dates in the petition however show that respondent could not
have been motivated by the Ombudsmans complaint when he issued the 13 September
1994 Order. Petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula filed the complaint before the Ombudsman of
Cotabato City on October 6, 1994[30] or about a month after the issuance of the 13
September 1994 Order. As such, when respondent issued the said Order, the same
could not have been a retaliatory act considering that at that time, there was as yet no
complaint against him.

With respect to the allegation that the respondent had no legal authority to order a
reinvestigation of the criminal charge considering that the said charge had been
previously dismissed as against them, we hold that respondent did not abuse his
discretion in doing so.[31]
It is true that under the circumstances, the respondent judge, upon seeing that there
were no records attached to the complaint, could have simply ordered the office of the
provincial prosecutor to forward the same. Upon receipt of these records, respondent
judge would then have sufficient basis to determine whether a warrant of arrest should
issue. However, from the bare terms of the questioned order alone, we fail to see any
illegal reason that could have motivated the judge in issuing the same. The order merely
stated that the records of the case should be returned to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for further investigation or reinvestigation. He did not unduly interfere with the
prosecutors duty to conduct a preliminary investigation by ordering the latter to file an
information against any of the respondents or by choosing the fiscal who should conduct
the reinvestigation which are acts certainly beyond the power of the court to do.[32] It
was still the prosecutor who had the final say as to whom to include in the information.
[33]
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioners only imputed bias
against the respondent judge and not against the investigating prosecutor.[34]
Consequently, this imputation is of no moment as the discretion to file an information is
under the exclusive control and supervision of the prosecutor and not of respondent
judge. Furthermore, petitioners cannot claim that they were denied due process in the
reinvestigation of the charges against them as they actively participated therein by
submitting their joint counter-affidavit.
Petitioners likewise allege that the information charging petitioners with murder is null
and void because it was filed without the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor. They
note that in the Resolution dated 28 December 1994 and in the corresponding
information, it clearly appears that the same were not approved by the Provincial
Prosecutor as it was signed only by the investigating prosecutor, Anok T. Dimaraw.
Petitioners contention is not well-taken.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on this matter state that "(n)o complaint or
information shall be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor
(underscoring ours)." In other words, a complaint or information can only be filed if it is
approved or authorized by the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
In the case at bench, while the Resolution and the Information were not approved by
Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, the filing of the same even without his approval
was authorized. Both the Resolution and information contain the following notation:*
"The herein Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting himself from this case and Investigating
Prosecutor Enok Dimaraw may dispose of the case without his approval on the following
ground:

That this case has been previously handled by him, and whose findings differ from the
findings of Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw; and the victim is a relative by affinity, he
being a father-in-law of his son.
(Signed) Salick U. Panda
Provincial Prosecutor
It must be stressed that the Rules of Court speak of authority or approval by the
provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor. The notation made by Prosecutor Panda clearly
shows that Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw was authorized to "dispose of the case
without his approval." In issuing the resolution and in filing the information, the
investigating prosecutor was acting well within the authority granted to him by the
provincial prosecutor. Thus, this resolution is sufficient compliance with the aforecited
provision of the Rules of Court.
Having thus ruled on the validity of the information filed against the respondents, we now
address the issue as to the legality of the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge
by virtue of the said information.
On this issue, petitioners, citing the case of Allado vs. Diokno[35] argue that the warrant
for his arrest should be recalled considering that the respondent judge "did not
personally examine the evidence nor did he call the complainant and his witnesses in
the face of their incredible accounts." As proof, he points to the fact that the information
was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January 2, 1995 and the order of arrest was
immediately issued the following day or on January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner argues,
respondent judge did not even issue an order stating that there is probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, a clear violation of the guidelines set forth in the Allado
case.
Respondent, in his Comment, denies any irregularity in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. He argues as follows:
"Written authority having been granted by the Provincial Prosecutor, as required by the
third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of (the) Rules on Criminal Procedure, and there
having been no reason for the respondent to doubt the validity of the certification made
by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that
probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the Information filed, and
recognizing the prosecutions legal authority to initiate and control criminal prosecution
(Rule 110, Section 5) and considering that the court cannot interfere in said
prosecutions authority (People vs. Moll, 68 Phil. 626), the respondent issued the warrant
for the arrest of the accused pursuant to paragraph (a), section 6, Rule 112;"[36]
The OSG, in defending the act of respondent judge, argues that the allegation that
respondent did not personally examine the evidence is not supported by current
jurisprudence. In support, the OSG invokes the pronouncement in Soliven vs.
Makasiar[37] that "(I)n satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses." Moreover, the
OSG points out that the judge enjoys a wide degree of latitude in the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest depending on the circumstances of
each case.[38]

The OSG further argues that the case of Allado vs. Diokno, relied upon by petitioners,
has no application in the case at bar considering that in the cited case, the documents
submitted before the court failed to establish any probable cause as they were
conflicting and contradictory. Significantly, the OSG continues, petitioners could not point
out a single flaw in the evidence presented by the prosecutor to negate the existence of
probable cause. Finally, the OSG points out that petitioners unfounded allegations
cannot prevail over the well-settled rule that official duty is presumed to be regularly
performed.[39]
After a careful analysis of these arguments, we find merit in the contention of petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
"Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized." (Undersoring supplied.)
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable
cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers
to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under
previous Constitutions.[40]
In Soliven vs. Makasiar, this Court pronounced:
"What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause."
Ho vs. People[41] summarizes existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows:
"Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more:
First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e.,
whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the

same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct

objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of
the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support his
own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him
for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order.
This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of
the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed
up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare
resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on
hand as to enable the His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on
whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend
to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as
the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript
of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the
very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys
the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he
relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer." (citations
omitted)
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there
was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant
Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was
found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an
admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the
fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued
the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence
of probable cause as his own.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
his official duties, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less
than the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally
mandated duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer.

To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the

respondents examination of the records should be.[42] The extent of the judges
examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before him two different
informations and resolutions charging two different sets of suspects. In the face of these
conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the certification of the investigating
prosecutor at face value. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond
the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents
supporting the prosecutors determination of probable cause. The inordinate haste that
attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest and respondents own admission are
circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the fulfillment of this duty.
Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity
of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the
Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 20 February 1995 in favor of
petitioners insofar as it enjoins the implementation and execution of the order of arrest
dated 3 January 1995 is made permanent. Criminal Case No. 2376 is REMANDED to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City for a proper determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued and for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1] The six other respondents in I.S. No. 94-1361 are Undong Dumamba Magelna,
Kongan Mabang, Badrudin Mamad, Guialal Kudarat, Kasan Mama and Cuenco Usman.
[2] Records, p. 57.
[3] Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[4] Annex "L Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60.
[5] Annex "M", Petition; Rollo, p. 61.
[6] Rollo. p. 62.
[7] Annex "N", Petition, Rollo, pp. 62-67.
[8] The three other respondents are Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama.
[9] Rollo, p. 67.
[10] Annex "O," Petition; Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[11] Rollo, p. 69.
[12] Annex "P", Petition; Rollo, p. 70.
[13] Annex "Q", Petition; Rollo, pp. 71-75.
[14] Annex "R", Petition; Rollo, pp. 76-88.
[15] The Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed by the Department of Justice
in a Resolution dated 6 June 1997.
[16] Rollo, pp. 22-28.
[17] Rollo, p. 81.
[18] Rollo, pp. 82-83.
[19] Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
[20] Annex "Q", Petition; Rollo, pp. 71-73.

[21] Annex "I", Petition; Rollo, pp. 42-52.

[22] Annex "J", Petition; Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[23] Rollo, p. 8.
[24] Rollo, pp. 95-101.
[25] Rollo, p. 3.
[26] Rollo, pp. 116-123.
[27] Webb vs. People, 276 SCRA 243.
[28] Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569.
[29] Rollo, p. 12.
[30] Rollo, p. 12.
[31] Placer vs. Villanueva, December 29, 1983.
[32] Abugotal vs. Tiro, 66 SCRA 196.
[33] Lim, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 279.
[34] Rollo, p. 119.
* Rollo, p. 67 and 69.
[35] 232 SCRA 192.
[36] Rollo, pp. 96-97.
[37] 167 SCRA 398.
[38] Lim vs. Felix, 187 SCRA 292.
[39] La Tondena Distillers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 544.
[40] Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 365.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Lim, Sr. vs. Felix, supra.

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Sunday, September 23, 2012
PEOPLE vs. INTING Case Digest
PEOPLE vs. INTING
187 SCRA 788
Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador
Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC
as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie
case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal
case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OICMayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested,
the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is
not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor

involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before
the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine
whether or not probable cause exists?
Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge
determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive
with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving
this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the
respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the
information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
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SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610. October 5, 2001]
ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE,
RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Atty. Edgar H. Talingdan, a private practitioner, charges respondent Judge Henedino P.
Eduarte, RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela, with improvidently issuing a warrant of arrest in
Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 for libel without the requisite preliminary investigation being
first conducted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor.
Specifically, complainant alleged in his Letter-Complaint dated 14 June 2000 that
sometime in April 2000 elements of the PNP Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya stormed into his
residence to arrest him and his client, Modesto Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of
Arrest dated 12 April 2000[1] issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br.
20-1373 entitled "People v. Edgar Talingdan and Modesto Luzano" of the RTC-Br. 20,
Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of libel. Surprised that such a case existed

against him and his client as they had not been previously charged, complainant filed a
Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutors
Office to Conduct Preliminary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking that the Warrant of
Arrest be set aside for being premature since they had not been previously notified of
the charge against them and no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the
public prosecutors office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was not
specified therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Respondent Judge
granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000
admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary
investigation had already been conducted and an information already filed in court.
Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case allegedly to help the Court in
purging the Judiciary of those who undermine its dignity and credibility as his faith
therein was almost eroded by the unfortunate incident.
In his Comments dated 28 August 2000[2] respondent Judge did not deny that he issued
the improvident warrant of arrest. He only alleged by way of explanation and
exculpation that on 24 March 2000 a complaint for libel was directly filed with the RTCBr. 19, Cauayan, Isabela, by Leoncio Dalin Sr. which was docketed as Crim. Case No.
2881. The case was assigned to his sala after raffle and was re-docketed as Crim. Case
No. Br. 20-1373. The records of the case then went to the Criminal Docket Clerk, Ms.
Imelda Severino who, under the Check List for Criminal Cases[3] that he had prepared
for her, was supposed to verify from the records first whether an information had already
been filed and if there was, to prepare the corresponding warrant of arrest if the accused
had not yet been arrested. Thus when he saw the Warrant of Arrest prepared by Ms.
Severino in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373, he signed the same honestly thinking that she
had faithfully complied first with her duty of going over the records of the case.
Respondent Judge assured the Court that the incident was a simple mistake on his part
and that he had not been actuated by malice, corrupt motive, or improper consideration
in its commission.
We referred this case on 17 January 2001 to the Presiding Justice, Court of Appeals, for
assignment who would conduct an investigation and thereafter submit a report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.[4]
In his Report and Recommendation[5] Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
recommended that respondent Judge be adjudged guilty as charged and fined Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the improvident issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in
Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373.
We find the recommendation to be well-taken and adopt the same.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized."[6] Interpreting the words
"personal determination" we said[7] that it does not thereby mean that judges are
obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses
themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary
examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is the

exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the
existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutors bare certification as to
the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision.
Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if
any, and other documents supporting the prosecutors certification. Although the extent
of the judges personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be
sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is
because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing
alone but because of the records which sustain it.[8] He should even call for the
complainant and the witnesses to answer the courts probing questions when the
circumstances warrant.[9]
In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the required procedure
but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not even a
prosecutor's certification to rely upon since no information had even been filed yet in
court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the
strength of a mere complaint filed by the private complainant Leoncio Dalin Sr. himself.
Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arrest against complainant
and the latters client simply because it was presented to him for signature by the
Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial
function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by
contending that the mistake was entirely attributable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who
failed to faithfully comply with her "duty" of going over the records of criminal cases and
ensuring first that an information had already been filed in court before preparing the
warrant of arrest. As we have already repeatedly said, a judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency of his court personnel for they are not guardians of his
responsibilities.[10] More importantly the responsibility delegated by respondent was
clearly unauthorized and unwarranted, as already explained above. He cannot without
abandoning his judicial obligation just instruct the Criminal Docket Clerk, through the
much vaunted Check List for Criminal Cases that he had prepared for her to follow, to
automatically prepare warrants of arrest simply because informations have been filed
against the accused. Although respondents purpose in preparing the Check List, i.e., to
help him comply with RA 8493 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998,[11]
may be considered laudable, we have already said that shortcuts in judicial processes
are to be avoided when they impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of
justice.[12] Much more when, as in the instant case, the shortcut amounted to a violation
of a constitutional provision.
A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of the
investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause[13] making him
administratively liable. We can do no less in the case of herein respondent who issued
the subject warrant of arrest without even such certification to rely upon, and worse,
merely at the instance of the Criminal Docket Clerk who mechanically typed the Warrant
of Arrest for his signature.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan,

Isabela, is FINED P10,000.00 for improvidently issuing the Warrant of Arrest dated 12
April 2000 in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 in violation of the constitutional requirement of
personal determination by the issuing judge as to the existence of probable cause. He is
WARNED that any repetition of the procedure he had heretofore observed in the
issuance of warrants of arrest will merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 7.
[2] With Annexes; Rollo, pp. 25-46.
[3] Annex 3, id, p. 37.
[4] Only respondent Judge appeared during the investigation thereafter conducted, it
appearing that complainant Atty. Talingdan died on 24 November 2000 of acute
myocardial infarction CRA; Investigators Report and Recommendation, p. 4.
[5] Undated.
[6] Sec. 2, Art. III, The 1987 Constitution.
[7] See Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1998, 167 SCRA 393, 398.
[8] Lim, Sr. v. Felix, G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 305.
[9] Id., p. 306.
[10] Lagatic v. Peas, Jr., A.M. RTJ-97-1383, 24 July 1997, 276 SCRA 46, 53-54; Belen
v. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-94-920, 20 January 1995, 240 SCRA 298, 301-302; Agcaoili v.
Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-92-6-251, 7 February 1994, 229 SCRA 705, 710.
[11] Respondent Judges Comments, p. 1; Rollo, p. 25.
[12] Paredes v. Manalo, A.M. No. MTJ-93-842, 10 May 1995, 244 SCRA 64, 70.
[13] Ho v. People, G.R. No. 106632, 9 October 1997, 280 SCRA 365, 381-382.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132389. November 19, 2002]
PEDRO CUPCUPIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the November 27, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 17334, which affirmed with
modification the November 18, 1994 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon,
Branch 170, wherein petitioner Pedro Cupcupin was found guilty of the crimes of
violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and of violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866,
otherwise known as the Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, in Criminal
Case No. 13374-MN and Criminal Case No.13375-MN. 5784, respectively.
The Informations filed against petitioner read:
In Criminal Case No. 13374-MN for violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended:
That on 05 March 1993 in Malabon and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess

approximately 38.2085 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as

shabu, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No. 13375-MN for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866,
otherwise known as the Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Ammunition:
That on 05 March 1993 in Malabon and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
custody, control and possession of:
one (1) M16 Baby Armalite rifle with defaced serial no. and fully loaded magazine
one (1) Browning pistol without serial no. with fully loaded magazine
two (2) empty magazine for Armalite
without lawful authority therefore.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment on August 5, 1993, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.[5]
The version of the prosecution can be synthesized as follows: Based on a confidential
information that petitioner, Pedro Cupcupin is engaged in selling methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), and in possession of firearms and ammunitions without the
necessary license, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano of the National Capital Region, conducted
a surveillance on the vicinity of petitioners residence at Int. David Santos, C. Arellano
Streets, Malabon, Metro Manila. After confirming said confidential information, Agent
Rejano applied for the issuance of search warrants before Judge Romeo J. Callejo,[6] of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49.[7]
On March 3, 1993, Judge Romeo J. Callejo issued the following search warrants:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Plaintiff,
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 56-93
- versus FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 16
PEDRO CUPCUPIN
ARTICLE III, of REPUBLIC
Int. David Santos, C. Arellano
ACT 6425, AS AMENDED
Street, Malabon, Metro
Manila
Accused.
x ------------------------------------- x
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
Upon sufficient showing of the existence of probable cause, after determination
personally by the Judge on examination under oath of the applicant and his witness by
means of searching questions and answers thereto, based on the facts personally
known to them that Respondent Pedro Cupcupin residing at said address, had been and
still is using the said premises, for the possession and/or use of regulated substance
known as methamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU) in violation of section 16 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Court commands you to conduct an immediate search, at any time of
the day or night, including Saturdays and Sundays, on the premises at the above
address, including the rooms located therein, and seize the following:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU)
and to bring the same before the Court for proper disposition in accordance with law.
You shall make a return of the warrant to the Court within ten (10) days from today.
SO ORDERED.[8]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Plaintiff,
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 57-93
- versus FOR: VIOLATION OF
PEDRO CUPCUPIN
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866
Int. David Santos, C. Arellano
(SECTION 1)
Street, Malabon, Metro
Manila
Accused.
x ------------------------------------- x
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
Upon sufficient showing of the existence of probable cause, after determination
personally by the Judge on examination under oath of the applicant and his witness by
means of searching questions, and answers thereto, based on the facts personally
known to them, that Accused Pedro Cupcupin residing at said address, had been and
still in possession of assorted firearms herein below listed, without the requisite license
therefore, in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
WHEREFORE, the Court commands you to conduct an immediate search, at any time of
the day and night, including Saturdays, on the premises at the above address including
the rooms located therein and seize the following:
a)
Two (2) .45 cal. pistols;
b)
One (1) .38 cal. revolver;
c)
One (1) .9 mm. pistol;
d)
Two (2) M-16 armalite rifles; and
e)
One (1) .22 cal. pistol
and bring the same before the Court for proper disposition in accordance with law.
You shall make a return of the warrant to the Court within ten (10) days from today.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On March 5, 1993, at about 7 a.m., the team composed of Supervising Agent Eduard
Villarta, NBI agents Timoteo Rejano, Ruel Lasala, Narciso Pea, Jr., Joel Consador,
Ceres Delapa-Cabrera, Ernesto Cabrera and Special Investigators Arthur Oliveros and
Ariel Nuez and SPO1 Olazo, raided the house of petitioner located at Int. David Santos
and C. Arellano Streets, Malabon, Metro Manila,[10] which consisted of a 2-storey house
made up of strong materials and a workshop room at the ground floor made up of light
materials.[11]
The NBI agents presented the search warrants and introduced themselves to the
petitioner and his wife, Adelfa Cupcupin. Upon their request, the NBI agents waited for
petitioners mother, Iluminada Cupcupin and in their presence, the team searched the
bedroom at the second floor and found a fully-loaded M16 armalite rifle underneath the
bed. They likewise found a semi-automatic browning pistol and two empty magazines of
armalite inside a drawer of a table found in the same bedroom. Agents Rejano and
Consador inscribed their respective initials and date on the handle of the rifle and the
pistol.[12] An Inventory of the items seized was thereafter signed by Adelfa Cupcupin,
Elumina Cupcupin, and the petitioner.[13]
Thereafter, the team searched the workshop room, again in the presence of petitioner,
his wife, and his mother.[14] Seized from petitioners workshop room were the following:
1) nine (9) plastic packs of white crystalline substance found inside a box [of]
ETERNITY; 2) one improvised water pipe; 3) one (1) improvised burner; 4) one (1)
weighing scale marked TAVITA; 5) three (3) small tooters; 6) one pack of plastic
pouches; 7) one electric resealer; 8) aluminum foils; 9) five (5) assorted magazines for
pistols; 10) one (1) rifle grenade; 11) assorted bullets for M16, .45 cal and 9 mm.[15] An

inventory of the items seized was prepared and thereafter signed and acknowledged by
Adelfa Cupcupin, Elumina Cupcupin, and the petitioner.[16]
Upon examination by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida R. Viloria-Magsipoc, the nine plastic
packs of white crystalline substance seized from the workshop room of petitioner, turned
out to be 38.0201 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
shabu.[17]
Petitioner, on the other hand, raised the defense of frame-up. He alleged that between
6:00 to 7:00 in the morning of March 5, 1993, while he was resting at the ground floor of
his house in the company of his wife, Adelfa Cupcupin and their two children, the team of
NBI agents arrived. They searched his house and detained him and his family at the
ground floor. He denied ownership and possession of the illegal items allegedly seized
from his house but admitted ownership of the automatic browning pistol found in his
bedroom. He produced a Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division
showing that said browning, cal. 9mm pistol with Serial No. 245PZ84617 is registered in
his name.[18] After the search and while in handcuffs, he was forced to sign some
documents which turned out to be an inventory receipt and a search warrant.[19]
Petitioner further declared that the charges against him are purely harassment because
in 1991 he had been previously charged, but was subsequently acquitted of illegal
possession of regulated drugs and firearms in Criminal Case Nos. 10108-MN and
10109- MN, respectively, before Branch 72, of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.[20]
On November 18, 1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court convicting petitioner,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 13374, finding accused Pedro Cucupin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425, as further
amended by Republic Act 7659 and considering the quantity of the Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride involved in this case, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty (20) Days as minimum, to Four (4)
Years, Two (2) Months and One (1) Day as maximum, & to pay the cost;
2.
In Criminal Case No. 13375, finding accused Pedro Cupcupin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, hereby sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day as minimum, to Eighteen (18) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day as
maximum, and to pay the cost of this suit.
The unlicensed M16 baby armalite, magazines, assorted ammunitions,
methamphetamine hydrochloride and the paraphernalia presented as evidence are all
forfeited in favor of the government, and the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn
over the same to the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office and Dangerous Drugs Board
for proper disposition.
The 9mm automatic pistol is hereby ordered returned to accused Pedro Cupcupin.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed, but modified as to the penalties, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of this appeal is AFFIRMED with modifications as to
the penalties imposed:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 13374-MN for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accused-appellant
is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Six (6) Months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision
correccional, as minimum.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 13375-MN for violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused-appellant
shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Six (6) Years of prision

correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[22]
Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors:
I
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
SEARCH WARRANTS WERE LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM, INVALID
AND VOID, THEY NOT HAVING COMPLIED WITH THE INDESPENSABLE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE THEREOF.
II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDENCE TO THE WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE WITNESSES, WHO WERE NBI AGENTS, WERE ACTUATED WITH
MALICE, IMPROPER MOTIVE AND COMMITTED IRREGULAR ACTS IN SECURING
AND IMPLEMENTING THE AFOREMENTIONED SEARCH WARRANTS.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND
PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE EARLIER JOINT DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENSES OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 15 OF
THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866, WHICH ARE THE
SAME OFFENSES NOW SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASES AND WHERIN THE
PETITIONER HAD BEEN CONVICTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND AFFIRMED BY
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED, THE SAME NOT HAVING
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]
Petitioner contends that the items allegedly seized from his residence are inadmissible
as evidence because the search warrants issued against him failed to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
Specifically, petitioner claims that said warrants were defective on the grounds that: (1)
NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance thereof had no personal
knowledge of the facts on which the warrants were based; and (2) subject warrants
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because there are two houses
located in the address stated in the said warrants.
The contentions are without merit.
Sections 2 and 3 (2), Article III, of the Constitution state:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are as follows:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (4a)
In determining probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, the oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or
doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.[24]
In the case at bar, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance of Search
Warrant Nos. 56-93 and 57-93, had personal knowledge of the circumstances on which
the warrants were based. Admittedly, Rejanos knowledge of petitioners illegal
possession of firearms and prohibited drugs came from a confidential informant, and
therefore, initially hearsay. Nevertheless, the surveillance and investigation he
conducted on the basis of said confidential information enabled him to gain personal
knowledge of the illegal activities of petitioner.[25] Hence, his testimony was sufficient
justification for the examining judge to conclude that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the records show that there is only one house located
in the address to be searched. The residence of petitioner consisted of a structure with
two floors, made up of strong materials and a workshop room at the ground floor made
up of light materials. The unrebutted testimony of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
inside the main house is an alley connected to the door of the workshop room. Pertinent
portion of the testimony of NBI Agent Consador, one of the members of the raiding team,
reads:
Court (witness)
Q Where is the house of the accused located?
A It is located at the corner of Arellano St., Your Honor.
Q Malabon?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is there a number in the house of the accused?
A I cannot recall, Your Honor.
Q How many structures are there in the premises of Pedro Cupcupin?
A As I remember, there are two structures but it looks like they are adjacent, one big
and the other one like nipa hut but they are adjacent, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean adjacent?
A The small structure is connected to the big structure, Your Honor.
Q When you say connected, will you tell the court what do you mean.
A When you enter the structure, there is a door that can be opened at the small
structure, Your Honor.
Q Without going outside of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do we understand from you that there is a connecting alley inside the bigger
structure going to the small structure?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q These two structures belong to Pedro Cupcupin?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxx
xxx
x x x.[26]
Likewise relevant is the testimony of Agent Rejano, thus:
xxx
xxx xxx
A We go back now to the two buildings which you said in your own opinion is only
one. I am showing to you the picture which was taken by your photographer, is this the
scenario of the place where [the] two buildings depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit
N? A two stor[e]y house is depicted at the left hand portion of Exhibit M that would be
the house you are alluding to as the house which you first entered the second floor
despite the fact that you will pass the ground floor that is the building you are alluding in
that statement of yours or testimony of yours a while ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about a structure depicted at the right hand portion in between the two
vehicles, is it part also of the residence of Cupcupin?
A It is part of the residence and while inside the edifice there is no divider, sir.
Q You will agree with me Mr. witness that despite the fact that there is no division, two
vehicles were parked in between the two structures, one jeep and a passenger jeep. My
question is, you will agree with me that despite the fact [that] there was no division, two
structures were clearly depicted in Exhibit N?
A As I have said in my observation, there is only one structure because in between
seemingly two structures, there is a corridor connecting the two structures. While inside
the said edifice, there is only one structure, sir.
xxx
xxx
x x x.[27]
It is clear from the foregoing that the workshop room where the packs of shabu were
found is actually an integral part of petitioners residence. Hence, it cannot be argued
that there are two houses in the address stated in the warrants and that the same failed
to particularly describe the place to be searched. The rule is that a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. Tested against the
foregoing rule, the Court finds that the residence of petitioner stated in the warrants as
Int. David Santos, C. Arellano Street, Malabon, Metro Manila, can with reasonable
effort be ascertained and identified by the NBI agents who were ordered to search the
above address, including the rooms located therein.[28]
It must be stressed that petitioner does not deny ownership, access to and more
importantly, immediate physical occupancy and control over said workshop room and his
entire residence. As a matter of law, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a
house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law,
and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict. Otherwise stated, the finding of
the drugs in the building owned by petitioner raised the presumption of knowledge and,
standing alone, was sufficient to convict.[29]
It may be argued that in the cases of illegal possession of regulated drugs and firearms
filed against petitioner in 1991, in Criminal Case Nos. 10108-MN and 10109- MN,
respectively, before Branch 72, of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, the trial court
found that the nipa hut near the house of petitioner is owned by a certain Benjamin
Santos.[30] But since it was not shown that said nipa hut is the same workshop room
referred to in the present case, and that the factual circumstances on which the finding
that subject nipa hut is not owned by petitioner, still holds true in the instant case, the
Court cannot rule that there are indeed two houses in the address stated in the search

warrants issued against petitioner. At any rate, it is not the ownership of the place where
the illegal items were seized that matters. What is decisive is that, it is the petitioner
who had access to and control over said workshop room being an integral part of his
house.
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the
prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his
person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession
or control of such article.[31] Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to
contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise
power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of
evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.[32]
In the instant case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to rebut the existence of
animus possidendi over the armalite rifle and the packs of shabu found in his residence.
The mere uncorroborated statement that he was not aware of the existence of said
illegal items in his house is insufficient.[33] Moreover, the defense of frame-up raised
by petitioner is a common and standard line of defense which is invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor, it being capable of easy concoction and difficult to prove.
Considering that no clear and convincing evidence was presented to prove that he was
really framed up, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well
as the principle that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect, must prevail over the petitioners imputation of ill-motive and harassment
on the part of the NBI Agents who conducted the search.[34]
For the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs, the Court of Appeals correctly
deleted the excess of 1 day in the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court, i.e., four
(4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional. In People v.
Medenilla,[35] the Court held that if the regulated drug weighs less than 66.67 grams,
then the penalty is prision correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than 133.33
grams, then the penalty is prision mayor, and if 133.33 grams or more, but less than 200
grams, then the penalty is reclusion temporal. Considering that 38.0201 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, or shabu is involved in the case at bar, the proper
penalty is prision correccional. There being no attendant modifying circumstance the
maximum period of the imposable penalty, cannot exceed two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, the medium period of prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the
imposable penalty shall be within the range of arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months), the penalty next lower in degree to prision correccional.
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of 10 grams or more but less than 50
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00). However, said law not being favorable to the accused, cannot be
given retroactive application in the instant case.
Under Republic Act 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms classified as high powered, like an M16 armalite rifle,[36] is prision mayor
minimum and a fine of P30,000.00. No modifying circumstance having been proven, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.[37] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum period of the imposable penalty cannot exceed the medium period of
prision mayor minimum, i.e., six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7)
years and four (4) months. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in fixing the maximum
period of the imposable penalty to eight (8) years of prision mayor. The minimum period
shall be within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2

months and 1 day to 6 years), the penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor
minimum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the November 27, 1997 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17334, finding petitioner Pedro Cupcupin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal possession of regulated drugs and illegal
possession of firearm is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, petitioner is
sentenced to suffer: (1) the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months, of prision
correccional, as maximum in Criminal Case No. 13374-MN, for illegal possession of
regulated drugs under Section 16, of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659; and
(2) the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 for illegal possession of firearm under
Section 1, of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, in Criminal Case No. 13375MN.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1] Eleventh Division, composed of Associate Justices: Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.
(Chairman and ponente); Ruben T. Reyes (member) and Hilarion L. Aquino (member).
[2] Penned by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
[3] Records of Criminal Case No. 13374-MN, p. 1.
[4] Records of Criminal Case No. 13375-MN, p. 1.
[5] Records, p. 81.
[6] Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[7] TSN, December 14, 1993, p. 32.
[8] Exhibit E, Records, p. 146.
[9] Exhibit E-1, Records, p. 147.
[10] TSN, December 14, 1993, p. 5.
[11] TSN, February 1, 1994, p. 13; January 6, 1994, pp. 14-15.
[12] TSN, December 14, 1993, pp. 7-11; February 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
[13] Exhibit K, Records, p. 149.
[14] TSN, December 14, 1993, p. 12.
[15] Exhibit J, Records, p. 148.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Exhibit C, Records, p. 145.
[18] Exhibits 6 and 7, Records, pp. 225-227.
[19] TSN, April 5, 1994, pp. 2-14.
[20] Exhibits 4, Records, p. 218.
[21] Records, p. 253.
[22] Rollo, p. 79.
[23] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[24] Uy, et al. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, et al., 344 SCRA 36, 55-56 [2000]; citing
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]; Quintero v. National
Bureau of Investigation, 162 SCRA 467 [1988].
[25] Yu, et al. v. Hondrado, et al., 99 SCRA 273, 278 [1980].
[26] TSN, February 1, 1994, p. 13.
[27] TSN, January 6, 1994, pp. 14-15.
[28] Exhibit E, p. 146; and Exhibit E-1, p. 147.
[29] United States v. Gan Lian Po, 34 Phil. 880, 882-883.
[30] Exhibit 4-B, Records, pp. 219-221.

[31] People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531, 550-551 [1997]; citing Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1987 Ed., Vol. II, p. 351; U.S. v. Ngan Ping, 34 Phil. 660 [1916]; People v. Libag,
184 SCRA 707 [1990]; People v. Aranda, 226 SCRA 562 [1993].
[32] People v. Burton, supra, citing Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p.
313; U.S. v. Lim Chingco, 15 Phil. 52 [1910].
[33] People v. Burton, supra.
[34] People v. Sotto, 275 SCRA 191, 204-205 [1997]; citing People v. Ponsica, 230
SCRA 87 [1994].
[35] 355 SCRA 172, 194 [2001].
[36] People v. Castillo, et al., 333 SCRA 506, 522 [2000].
[37] Revised Penal Code, Article 64.

Columbia Pictures v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993

DECISION
(3rd Division)
MELO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America,

Inc., NBI agents conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments,
among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for unauthorized sale, rental,
reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted motion
pictures Cleopatra (owned by 20th Century Fox) and The Ten Commandments
(owned by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI applied for and was
able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject Search Warrant No. 45 which
reads:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI
Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca
Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D.
No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of
Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons
to believe that FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric
Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in
control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner Connecticut, Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of MPAA member Company Titles) the
following properties to wit:
(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;

(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being
reproduced or retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of
accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or
otherwise used in the reproduction/retaping business of the defendants;
(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or
intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of
sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated
video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described,
which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day
between 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and
take possession of the above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties
to the undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs.
In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the
NBI agents found and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and
exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment,
television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters.
FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or
paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed video
reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which are not
illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used and intended to be used for reproduction
and not in the sale, lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.
Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances
and under special instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms and that,
therefore, its right to possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in serious
doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines
or paraphernalia to FGT.
II.

THE ISSUE

Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the
search warrant?
III. THE RULING
[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the respondent
Judge Flores.]

NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of
the search warrant.
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the
Court has previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search
warrant. In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the
lower court lifting the search warrant issued under circumstances similar to those
obtaining in the case at bar. A striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox
is the fact that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the
articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the warrant issued in
the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:
(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes
which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.
On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in 20th
Century Fox:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which
can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or
renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally
connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of
intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles
without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating an
Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in the
confiscation of all items found in any video store.
The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing
as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search
warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.
The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
ordering the immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely
correcting his own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be
gleaned from his statement that . . . the machines and equipment could have been used
or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion
pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the machines or
equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of
the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video
Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and
under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such, it has the right to
keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s) and
paraphernalia(s).
Posted by Atty. Ed at 5:57 PM

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124461. September 25, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; and
AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the
order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted
private respondent Aiden Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as
well as the order dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the earlier order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City, for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the
Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received
reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence
Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said
Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred
Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the
BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug products without license to
operate from BFAD is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or the Consumer Act).
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise
submitted herewith.
xxx

xxx

xxx. [1] (Emphasis supplied)

The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the
premises of another person at a different address:
3. This is executed to support affiants application for a search warrant on the premises
of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu.[2] (Emphasis supplied)

In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the
Regional Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for persons
distributing, selling or transferring drug products without license to operate from BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and
3. Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises, the
said person and place have in fact no license to operate.
4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from the residence
of Mrs. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to another
person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and purchased by the
affiant contained in two (2) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2
of 2.
This is executed in support of the affiants report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate
purpose this may serve. [3] (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch[4] of the location of
Aiden Lanuzas residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search Warrant
No. 958 (95), which reads in full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus -

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)

AIDEN LANUZA,
Defendant.
X---------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT
It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty. Lorna
Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of
the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness, Manuel P. Cabiles, member of
the Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,

Laguna, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of Article 40(k) in
relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer Act) has been committed or
about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Ms.
Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City has in her possession
and control at said address the following described properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among which are Bricanyl Tablet,
Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule, Persantin
Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule, Ventolin
Tablet, Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial, Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M
Ampoule, Norvasoc Tablet, Bactrim Forte Tablet, Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet, Librax
Tablet, Methergin Tablet and Tagamet Tablet
which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary license from the
Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the DAY or
NIGHT of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
undetermined amount of drugs and medicines subject of the offense and to bring the
same to this Court to be dealt with as the law directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten (10) days
from today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of June 1995 at
Quezon City.
(Sgd.)ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA
Second Vice Executive Judge[5]
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuzas
residence at the indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th
Criminal Investigation Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit,[6]
dated June 29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan,
both members of the search and seizure team. They stated in their affidavit that their
team, armed with the search warrant, conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN
LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City x x x; that the raid was
witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy.
Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City; that the service of the (search) warrant resulted in
the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines from the
possession and control of AIDEN LANUZA; and that the said items were brought to the
7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the
Legal Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD, Manila.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened
during the implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: At
the commencement of the search, the members of the team discovered that the

premises described as 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually
a five thousand (5,000) square meter compound containing at least fifteen (15)
structures which are either leased residences, offices, factories, workshops or
warehouse. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent
Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no drug products thereat, they proceeded
to search a nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and address
above stated. This search yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products which
were then inventoried in due course. x x x.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
In an order[9] dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the
seized drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of
the drugs analyzed and be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel
testing.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion[10] praying
that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared
inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk
Arts Export & Import Company located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City. The motion is based on the grounds that the
search warrant is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was applied to search the
premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued
to search the residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a non-existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna
Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (5)
the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it was
issued; and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different
or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person.[11]
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed[12] the motion to
quash the search warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.
After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral
arguments, the respondent Judge issued the assailed order[13] dated December 7,
1995, quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995
was revoked and all the articles seized were declared inadmissible in any and all
proceedings against private respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also, the BFAD was ordered to
return at its expense all the seized items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import & Export
Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order.[14]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an
order[15] dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that
the respondent Judge erred:
a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's application for a search warrant is so
"grave" in nature as to warrant quashal of the search warrant issued thereunder,
considering that such variance is actually a harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not authorized by the BFAD to apply for a search
warrant concerning the unlicensed distribution of drugs, considering that the grant of
BFAD authorization upon her to investigate fake, misbranded, adulterated or

unregistered drugs necessarily contemplates the authority to investigate the unlicensed

activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge the burden of proving probable
cause for issuance of a search warrant, by failing to present documentary proof
indicating that private respondent had no license to sell or distribute drug products,
considering that under the authority of Carillo v. People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only
had the burden of proving the negative ingredient of the offense charged on the basis of
the best evidence procurable under the circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in SW No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden Lanuza's residence at Lot No.
41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was not so conspicuously or
notoriously represented to the public as such by her as to contradict the investigating
and serving officers' perception of the outward appearance of her dwelling, which led
them to believe that the more general address of 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City referred to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.[16]
We granted the petitioners application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
in a resolution[17] dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the
assailed orders, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment[18] on the petition, but
petitioner's reply thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution[19] dated January
13, 1997, for failure by the Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of
thirty (30) days, that was granted, but with a warning that no further extension would be
given. Instead of filing his reply, the Solicitor General asked for two (2) more extensions
of time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"SEC. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS,
HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE
INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL
ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY
THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO
BE SEIZED." (Emphasis supplied)
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the
application for its issuance suffered from a grave defect, "which escaped (her)
attention," considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero
at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein
private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City.[20]
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.
The title of the questioned application, which reads:

"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,

- versus SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA,
For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la
40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo,
Article 41 of Republic
Cebu City,
Act No. 7394 (or the
Defendant.
Consumer Act).
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x"[21]
(Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received
reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence
Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said
Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred
Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the
BFAD;
xxx xxx
xxx
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise
submitted herewith.
xxx
xxx
x x x. [22] (Emphasis supplied)
unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private
respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
She has been the only one identified in the application, as well as in the aforequoted
affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was based, as having
allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting to P7,232.00 on May 29,
1995, without any license to do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394. It is
noteworthy that, as stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic
bags which contained the seized drugs and which were submitted together with the
application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These
markings with the name "Lanuza" obviously refer to no other than the herein private
respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued the search warrant, it was directed
solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same
day applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27,
1995, another application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero
at her residence at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from
the following examination conducted by respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas:
"(COURT)

Q. And who is your respondent?

A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other one is Belen Cabanero.
Q. Where are they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No. 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City.
Q. About the other?
A. New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu.
Q. Do you have any specific address at New Frontier Village?
A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel Cabiles.
Q. Will he be testifying?
A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is the vicinity of the New Frontier Village, Cebu
(witness presenting a sketch) (sic)
Q. How about this San Jose de la Montana. This is just in Cebu City?
A. At 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City."[23]
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen
Cabanero were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such
defect, as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the
search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she
was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of
the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged
with the specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the
Department of Health, which is in violation of Article 40 (k) of R. A. 7394, and penalized
under Article 41 thereof. The said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4
Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he made a "verification
in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should
have submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such
license. Although no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her
posture, we hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched."[24]
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence
that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is
necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient
of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the
present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant
who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the
time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the
examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards

before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a
person to the privacy of his home and personalties. As well stated by this Court through
former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Villanueva vs. Querubin:[25]
It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily ones home
but not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 [1966]).
What is sought to be guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to
his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the
choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him.
There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of
his life (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616, 630). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work, Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), could fitly characterize this constitutional right as
the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is
no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in
case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards
(Ibid, p. 47). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that
effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel could have easily procured such
certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or
entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured.
Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not
sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The presumption of
regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
[26] We apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al.:[27]
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated
films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the
effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is
not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity
of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence
of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must

be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the

existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at
Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different
person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.
[28] In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was
accompanied by a sketch[29]of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are
residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of
private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other
buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does
not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the
description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of
the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it
was correctly implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the house of private
respondent Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. However, the team did not find any of
the drug products which were the object of the search. Frustrated, and apparently
disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby warehouse of Folk Arts
Export & Import Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38 within the same
compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and seized which
were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2
Markbilly Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a statement that the
confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in the possession and control
of private respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by
the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law. In searching the
warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the
searching team went beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly
observed:
x x x. The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search at the house of
defendant-movant yielded negative result and the confiscated articles were taken from
another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts Import and Export Company owned
by another person. In the return of the search warrant, it is stated that Search Warrant
No. 958 (95) was served at the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City
and that during the search, drug products were found and seized therefrom which were

duly receipted. Accompanying said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2) members of the
searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan, both of
the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP, with station at Camp Sotero Cabahug,
Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose
dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted
medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendant-movant. However,
as indicated in the sketch attached to the application for search warrant, said Folk Arts
Import and Export Company is owned by one David Po, which is a concrete proof that
the searching team exceeded their authority by conducting a search not only in the
residence of defendant-movant Lanuza but also in another place which the applicant
itself has identified as belonging to another person, David Po. The foregoing are strong
reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an unreasonable search and
seizure which would warrant the quashal of the search warrant.[30]
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search
warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
in a resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, J., (Chairman) , Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1] Annex A, Petition; Rollo pp. 58-59. Atty. Cabanlas affidavit which is exactly the
same as Annex A is attached to the application as Annex B, Rollo, p.60.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Annex C. Petition; Rollo p. 61.
[4] Annex D, Petition; Rollo, p. 63.
[5] Annex E, Petition; Rollo, p.64.
[6] Annex F, Petition; Rollo, p. 65.
[7] Annex F, Petition; Rollo, p. 65.
[8] Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[9] Annex G, Petition; Rollo, pp. 66-70.
[10] Annex "H," Petition; Rollo, pp. 71-87.
[11] Rollo, pp. 71-72.
[12] Annex "M," Petition; Rollo, pp. 139-149.
[13] Annex "I," Petition; Rollo, pp. 88-91.
[14] Ibid., pp. 90-91.
[15] Annex "K," Petition; Rollo, p. 137.
[16] Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[17] Rollo, pp. 150-152.
[18] Rollo, pp. 161-191.
[19] Rollo, p. 224.
[20] Assailed order dated Dec. 7, 1995, rollo, pp. 88-89.
[21] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 58.
[22] Annex A, Petition; Rollo pp. 58-59. Atty. Cabanlas affidavit which is exactly the
same as Annex A is attached to the application as Annex B, Rollo, p.60.
[23] TSN, June 27, 1995, pp. 3-4, cited in the Petition, p. 15; Rollo, p. 20.
[24] Burgos, Sr., et. al. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, et. al., 133 SCRA 800, 813 [1984].
[25] 48 SCRA 345, 350, cited also in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 1 [1986].

[26] Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394 [1984]; Nolasco vs. Puno, 139 SCRA
155, 166.
[27] 164 SCRA 655, 663-664 [1988].
[28] People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 182 [1925].
[29] Annex "D," Petition; Rollo, p. 63.
[30] Rollo, pp. 89-90.
BACHE & CO (PHIL) and FREDERICK E. SSEGGERMAN vs HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ
BACHE & CO (PHIL) and FREDERICK E. SSEGGERMAN vs HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ
GR No. L-32409
FACTS:
Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed
to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of Search Warrant for
violation of Section 46 of National Internal Revenue Code and authorizing Revenue
examiner Rodolfo de Leon, to make and file the application for Search Warrant which
was attached to the letter. At that time Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means
of a note he instructed the Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents
de Leon and Logronio. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to
him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked responded
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz conducted a personal examination?
HELD:
No. The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus are granted. Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void.
RATIONALE:
Personal examination by the Judge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary
to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, the
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of
judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in
the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge
of the complainant and his witnesses.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of
her notes to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to
administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a
personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his
witness, it was one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court
Section 4 (Examination of the Applicant):

The Judge or Justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
on oath or affirmation the complaint and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attached them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.

PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of
Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises
allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and
that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate
charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of
marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach
warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence
makes the warrant void for vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional
requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is
primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the
properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2)
leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are
search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that
technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a
technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149462. March 29, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 28, finding appellant Priscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
drugs, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Pricilla (sic) Del
Norte (g)uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II,
R.A. 6425, and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion (P)erpetua
and a fine of P1,000,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The marijuana subject matter of this case is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn-over the subject marijuana to
the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal/destruction.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to transfer the accused Priscilla
del Norte to the Correccion (sic) Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City for the service
of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.[1]
A search warrant was served on a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa, on August 1, 1997, by
SPO1 Angel Lumabas, SPO3 Celso de Leon, Maj. Dionisio Borromeo, Capt. Jose,
SPO3 Malapitan, PO2 Buddy Perez and PO2 Eugene Perida.
As a result of the search, an information against appellant Priscilla del Norte was filed
with the trial court, viz:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PRISCILLA DEL NORTE Y DIWA
AND JANE DOE, true name, real identity and present whereabouts of the last accused
still unknown(,) of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II, R.A. (No.) 6425,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of August 1997(,) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping with (sic) one another, without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control(,)
MARIJUANA weighing 6748.37 gms. knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under
the provisions of the above-entitled law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked to serve a
search warrant[3] against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North
Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 6425. They were ordered to forthwith seize and take possession of an
undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves. They coordinated with the
barangay officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them by the local officials.
Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced
themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later identified
in court as the appellant.[4] They informed her they had a search warrant, but appellant
suddenly closed and locked the door. It was only after some prodding by the barangay
officials that she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted the search. They
found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed and inside the
room.[5] They asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and said she had
no means of livelihood.[6] Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further

investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the confiscated five
(5) bundles of marijuana[7] in court.
Mrs. Grace Eustaquio, a forensic chemist testified that pursuant to a letter request[8]
from the Chief of the Caloocan City Police, she conducted an examination on a
specimen consisting of five bundles of suspected marijuana. She found that each of the
bundles was positive for marijuana. This finding was reduced to a Laboratory Report.[9]
The report also contained a finding on the supposed weight of each bundle in grams,
i.e., (A) 973.45, (B) 1,840.31, (C) 472.99, (D) 1,678.8, and (E) 1,782.82.[10]
SPO2 Florencio Ramirez, a police officer in the Intelligence Branch of the Caloocan
Police Station, testified that on August 1, 1997, the appellant was brought before him by
SPO3 De Leon and SPO1 Lumabas. They also submitted two weighing scales, five
bricks of marijuana leaves, and two bunches of marijuana leaves wrapped in an old
newspaper.[11] He apprised appellant of her constitutional rights before investigating
her. After the laboratory test showed that the evidence yielded was marijuana, he sent a
referral slip[12] to Prosecutor Zaldy Quimpo for inquest.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She contended that
she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City,[13] and that on
August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service
Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to Marlyns house to
borrow money. Marlyn was out and she waited. While appellant was seated near the
door, several people introduced themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper
and entered the house. She heard them say we already got Ising, and was surprised
why they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising, her sister, at a house two steps away
from the house where she was arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the
policemen brought her to the police station.[14]
Appellants daughter, Christine also took the witness stand. She testified that she is one
of the eight children of the appellant. Since June 1997, she recalled that they had lived
at 376 Dama de Noche St., Caloocan City, as proved by the address stated in her school
identification card,[15] and a receipt evidencing payment for the rental of their house at
Dama de Noche St. from July 18 to August 18, 1997.[16]
The trial court convicted appellant. In this appeal, she raises the lone error that the
lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.[17]
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who owned the house where
the search was conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did not
automatically make her the owner of the marijuana found therein. She likewise argues
that the search warrant specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house
to be searched, and that since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in
admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against her.[18]
The Solicitor General contends that the totality of the evidence demonstrates
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[19] He cites the case of United States vs.
Gan Lian Po,[20] that when illegal drugs are found in the premises occupied by a certain
person, such person is presumed to be in possession of the prohibited articles. It then
becomes the accuseds burden to prove the absence of animus possidendi.[21]
We reverse the trial courts decision. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified
as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[22]

We first rule on the validity of the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(emphases supplied)
Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of the search is inadmissible due
to the irregularity of the search warrant which contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa
and not Priscilla del Norte. She alleges that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she
claimed she saw Ising nearby and pointed her to the authorities, but her efforts were
futile the authorities arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to
be searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that
mistakes in the name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the
warrant, provided the place to be searched is properly described. In People v. Tiu Won
Chua,[23] we upheld the validity of the search warrant despite the mistake in the name
of the persons to be searched. In the cited case, the authorities conducted surveillance
and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently
implementing it. They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the
place to be searched although they did not specifically know the names of the accused.
The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the irregularity of the search
warrant. The authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant.
It was only when they implemented the warrant that they coordinated with the barangay
officials. One of the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa
and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay official was not
presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge on pure hearsay.
On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutions witnesses failed to
establish appellants ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were
discovered. Except for their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented.
This is in contrast to appellants proof of her residence. The prosecution did not contest
the punong barangays certification,[24] Christinas school ID[25] and the rental receipt,
[26] all of which show that appellant and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche St.
There being no substantial contrary evidence offered, we conclude that appellant does
not own the house subject of the search.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that appellant was in actual possession of the
prohibited articles at the time of her arrest. This is shown by the testimony of the
prosecutions witness:
Fiscal Lomadilla to Witness
Q: What did you find in that house at No. 275?
A: We found marijuana.
Q: What is the quantity of the marijuana you found?
A: Five bunch (sic) or bricks of marijuana and two weighing scale(s), sir.
Q: Mr. Lumabas, you mentioned a search warrant issued by Judge Rivera. What was
the result of the execution of that search warrant?
A: We were able to find marijuana inside the house of Priscilla del Norte.

Q: What is the quantity?

A: More or less six kilos.
Q: Was it arranged? How was it placed?
A: It was wrapped inside the plastic tape and it looks (sic) like in bricks form.[27]
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: What part of the house did you discover these five bricks of marijuana?
A: Inside the room, sir, under the bed.
Q: You said you found the accused Priscilla del Norte, where was she when you found
her?
A: Inside the sala, sir.[28]
In fact, it seems that the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which were not in
plain view, viz:
Atty. Yap to witness
Q: You made mention about the bricks found?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said further that it was inside the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when you entered the room, was it locked?
A: No, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, there was no padlock of that room, is it correct?
A: I did not notice, sir, but it was open.
Q: And this alleged marijuana was protruding under the bed?
A: No, sir but it was under the bed, dulong-dulo.
Q: Was it also the same plastic bag?
A: No, sir.
Q: Was it also already wrapped in newspaper?
A: No, sir, only plastic tape. We were not able to notice that it was marijuana because
it is (sic) wrapped in a plastic tape.
Q: How long did you search?
A: Half an hour, sir.[29]
The prosecutions weak evidence likewise shows from the following testimony:
Atty. Yap to witness
Q: Were you able to search the personal effects?
A: Yung iba.
Q: Did you find any I.D. (of the persons) who occupy this room?
A: No, sir.
Q: In other words, your assumption is because Priscilla del Norte was around so (sic) it
follows that she was the possessor of that illegal drugs?
A: Yes, sir because it is their house.
Q: Was there a picture or photograph taken inside the room of that particular person?
A: None, sir.
Q: So a family lived thereat?
A: None, sir.
Q: Was there a separate picture of Ising Gutierrez?
A: I did not see any.
Q: There was no incriminating evidence except this (sic) drugs taken by Police Officer
de Leon and the barangay tanod, no other incriminating evidence?
A: None, sir. (emphases supplied)
In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.[30] In the case at bar, we hold that the
prosecutions evidence treads on shaky ground. We detest drug addiction in our society.

However, we have the duty to protect appellant where the evidence presented show
insufficient factual nexus of her participation in the commission of the offense charged.
[31] In People vs. Laxa,[32] we held:
The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it cannot
be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of constitutional rights. It is precisely
when the governments purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to
protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning without
understanding.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 25.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Records, p. 219.
[4] TSN, SPO1 Angel Lumabas, February 4, 1999, pp. 3-4; TSN, SPO3 Carlos De Leon,
September 3, 2000, p. 8.
[5] TSN, SPO3 Carlos De Leon, September 3, 2000, pp. 9-12.
[6] Id. at 14 & 17-18.
[7] Marked as Exhibits A to E.
[8] Exhibit J; Records, p. 220.
[9] Exhibit K; Id. at 221.
[10] TSN, Grace M. Eustaquio, July 15, 1999, pp. 3-7.
[11] SPO2 Ramirez identified Exhibits A to E as the bricks of marijuana turned over to
him by SPO3 De Leon and SPO1 Lumabas.
[12] Exhibit L Records, p. 222.
[13] Appellant presented a barangay certificate from the barangay chairman, Exhibit 1
Records, p. 243.
[14] TSN, Priscilla del Norte, February 13, 2001, pp. 2-22.
[15] Exhibit 4.
[16] Exhibit 5.
[17] Rollo, p. 43.
[18] Id. at 50-54.
[19] Id. at 6.
[20] 34 Phil. 880 (1976).
[21] Rollo, pp. 6-14.
[22] People v. Michael Sy, G.R. No. 147348, September 24, 2002.
[23] G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003.
[24] Exhibit 1.
[25] Exhibit 4.
[26] Exhibit 5.
[27] TSN, SPO1 Angel Lumabas, July 22, 1999, p. 4.
[28] Id., p. 6.
[29] Id. at 10-11.
[30] Article III, Section 14, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
[31] People v. Edelma Lagata y Manfoste, G.R. No. 135323, June 25, 2003.
[32] 361 SCRA 622 (2001).

Nolasco vs Pano
By maechmedina
Cynthia P. Nolasco vs Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano
FACTS: Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City On the same day, a searched
was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno; applied for search warrant from the
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, after a month of round the clock surveillance of the
premises as a suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA, particularly connected
to MV Karagatan / Pena Andrea cases. The searching party seized 428 documents and
written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. The City
Fiscal information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive
Documents
Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since
it does not sufficiently describe with particularly the things subject of the search and
seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for lack of searching
questions propounded to the applicants witness.
Disputed Search Warrant: Documents, papers and other records of the communist party
of the Philippines / New Peoples Army and or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Philippines..

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal?

HELD: The search warrant is of General, thus, it was hereby annulled by set aside.

RATIONALE: The Search Warrant does not specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what are the manuals not otherwise available to the public certain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully
seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter.
Mere generalization will not suffice and odes not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause upon which a warrant may issue.