Reforming Bengalurus Governance:

Political Devolution and Democratic Accountability

Submission to the Expert Committee on BBMP Restructuring1

February, 2015
Contents
1.

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 2

2.

Devolution of Political and Administrative Powers ........................................................................ 5

2.1

Devolution of Powers to Wards ..................................................................................................... 6

2.1.1 Ward Committee ............................................................................................................................ 7

2.1.2 Area Sabha ........................................................................................................................................ 7
2.1.3 Improving Quality of Life through Ward-based Governance ........................................ 8

3.

4.

2.2

Devolution of Powers to Zones ...................................................................................................... 9

2.3

Devolution of Powers to BBMP ................................................................................................... 10

Fixing Democratic Accountability ....................................................................................................... 12

3.1

Executive Power of Local Government .................................................................................... 13

3.2

Role of Parastatal Agencies........................................................................................................... 14

Governance of Metropolitan Bengaluru ........................................................................................... 17

4.1

Metropolitan Area........................................................................................................................... 18

4.2

Metropolitan Planning Committee ........................................................................................... 18

5.

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 21

6.

Summary of Recommendations........................................................................................................... 23

Authored by Sudhir Krishnaswamy and Mathew Idiculla with inputs from Harini
Nagendra and Manu Mathai. An earlier version of the draft was discussed among other
faculty members at Azim Premji University and suggestions by Chiranjib Sen, Gladwin
Joseph and Narayana A have been incorporated.
1

P a g e 1 | 24

1. Introduction
Bengaluru, until Indias Independence, existed as two cities Bengaluru, the Indian part of
the town governed by the Bangalore City Municipality and Bangalore, the cantonment
established by the British and governed by the Civil and Military Station Municipality. After
Indias independence, a single municipal body called the City of Bangalore Municipal
Corporation was set up in 1949 by amalgamating the two municipalities.2 Since then, the
spatial boundaries of the city corporation have expanded by more than 10 times. With the
formation of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) in 2007 by merging seven City
Municipal Councils, one Town Municipal Council and 110 Village Panchayats into the city,
the total area of the Corporation increased from the 226 sq. km. to 716 sq. km.
Expanding Boundaries of Bengalurus Municipal Corporation
Year

Name of Corporation

Size of Corporation

1949

Bangalore City Corporation

69 sq. km

1995

Bangalore Mahanagara Palike

226 sq. km

2007

Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike

716 sq. km

The Government Notification which increased the area of Bengalurus Corporation in 2007
proposed that the expanded boundaries would help coordinate and improve infrastructure
development and service delivery and strengthen administrative capacity across the region.
However the legal framework within which the Corporation operates has remained the
same The Karnataka Municipal Corporation (KMC) Act, 1976. Notably, the integration of the
peripheral areas into the BBMP was carried out without consulting the municipalities and
village panchayats which were subsumed into this larger body.3 Eight years later, the
decision to amalgamate these areas is seen by the State government to be a failure. The areas

Nair, Janaki. The promise of the metropolis: Bangalore's twentieth century. New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2005.
3
Idiculla, Mathew Prasad, Who decides where your city ends? India Together, November 29, 2014. Available at
http://indiatogether.org/city-metropolitan-region-municipal-corporations-governance-government

P a g e 2 | 24

that were added, especially the 110 villages, continues to languish in terms of basic
infrastructure and service delivery.4
A three member Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. B.S. Patil (IAS (R)), and
with Mr. Siddaiah (IAS (R)) and Mr. V. Ravichandar as members, was constituted by the
government in September 22, 2014 to recommend the best way to divide BBMP to improve
the ease of administration and provide basic amenities and facilities to the people.5 An
addendum note on November 19, 2014 clarified that the committees mandate was to
restructure BBMP to improve the quality of life through suitable government system and
infrastructure for Bengaluru.6
The public debate on this issue has been framed as a choice between having multiple
corporations and having administrative decentralization within BBMP. A Committee headed
by BL Shankar, constituted by the Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC) for giving
suggestions on the division of BBMP, suggested trifurcating the BBMP into three municipal
corporations - Bengaluru Central, consisting of the core Bengaluru region which was part of
the old Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP), Bengaluru South and Bengaluru North.7
Dividing BBMP into multiple corporations would mean that each unit would work as an
independent urban government with separate city councils. The alternative is to not split
BBMP into various independent corporations but to have more decentralized modes of
administration through zonal and regional offices.
The key question before the Committee is how BBMP must be restructured to ensure better
quality of life for the citizens of Bengaluru. We argue that division or administrative
decentralisation of BBMP is not to be taken by itself as a solution for Bengalurus governance
problems. The problem with governance in Bengaluru is not primarily in its size but rather
in the manner in which power is organised. In this submission, we propose a new governance
framework that is based on the constitutional principles of political devolution and
democratic accountability. These principles may be consistent with a divided or a
decentralised BBMP. In this submission we have laid out a framework for restructuring
BBMP that does not include its division. Irrespective of whether BBMP is split, unless these
constitutional principles are respected, no restructuring will achieve their objectives.

BBMP Restructuring: Expert Committee Preliminary Report, Dec 2014

Government order no. NaAaE484 MNY 2013 dated Sept 22, 2014. Available on
http://www.bbmprestructuring.org/wp/government-order/
6
Addendum Notice 19.11.2014 Available on http://www.bbmprestructuring.org/wp/government-order/
7
Shankar Committee for BBMP Trifurcation, The New Indian Express, 18th November 2014
5

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A mere division of BBMP without altering the manner in which power is organised and
distributed will not achieve any positive change. If the division of BBMP is carried out by
issuing a Notification under the KMC Act, 1976, it will only result in the replication of the
same structure of governance over smaller geographical units. Division without reform will
not resolve the core defects of our current structure of BBMP governance. Similarly, a purely
administrative decentralization of BBMP will also not be effective. Administrative
decentralization, carried along the lines of the eight zones that presently constitute BBMP,
will not be able to address the basic issues faced by the citizens since these units will
continue to lack substantive political accountability.
An alternative to both pure administrative decentralization and a routine division of BBMP
is a restructuring of BBMP based on the constitutional principles of political devolution and
democratic accountability. The 74th Constitutional Amendment, passed in 1992, created an
independent third tier of government in urban areas. However, the statutory framework for
urban local bodies in the State have not substantially changed and has failed to realize the
promise of the constitutional amendment. For political devolution that respects the principle
of local self-governance in the Constitution, we must begin by recognizing that the unit of
city government closest to the people- the Ward- must be vested with as much power as
possible. At the next level, the Zones must be vested with the powers to address issues that
affect multiple wards and the Municipal Corporation must only be made responsible for citywide policy making.
Once devolution of powers has been carried out, the next step is align political and executive
powers to ensure that administrative authority is politically accountable on a daily basis.
This alignment must be achieved at all levels- Ward, Zone and Municipal Corporation. A
politically empowered mayor and legally and politically accountable parastatal agencies are
key elements of such reform. In this submission we explain how by fixing democratic
accountability and devolving political and administrative powers, the governance crisis of
Bengaluru can be addressed. We aim to show that only by restructuring Bengalurus
governance along these constitutional principles is there any hope for a division of BBMP to
usher in meaningful reform.

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2. Devolution of Political and Administrative Powers

The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 sought to achieve the empowerment of local
democracy through the devolution of functions, funds and functionaries to elected municipal
bodies. It also provides for the formation of Ward Committees below the municipality to
ensure that responsibilities within the ward are effectively carried out by a body closer to
the people. The constitutional entrenchment of local governments was required to ensure
that State endow the local government with powers necessary to enable them to function
as institutions of self-government.8 Despite these provisions, Municipal Corporations and
Ward Committees in India continue to find themselves beholden to the state government.
We argue that for effective local governance, the devolution of powers from large, centralized
governmental bodies to smaller, decentralized units are necessary. Devolution includes both
political and administrative decentralization whereby decision-making powers are handed
over from higher levels of the government to lower levels.9 In this section we explain how
the constitutional principle of devolution can be achieved by endowing the wards, zones and
city governments with necessary powers to solve local problems. At the ward level, the Ward
Committee can be made responsible for the municipal functions within the ward and at the
zonal level, a Zonal Council can be made politically accountable for the tasks of BBMP within
the zone. We argue that the Ward must be made the basic unit of governance and only those
matters that cannot be decided at the ward level should be taken up to the zone and city
level. The underlying principle behind this governance framework is the idea of subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity is the principle of governance which says that power should be located as close
to people as possible in the smallest units that are feasible.10 Essentially, it states that
government action should be taken at the lowest level at which that problem can be
addressed.11 Subsidiarity, a term used more in the context of European Union, is closely
associated with localism, a term used in United States, which argues that local autonomy
should be protected and enhanced. The normative justifications for localism is dominated by
two theories which emphasize different fundamental values. One normative basis for
8

Article 243W, Constitution of India

Rondinelli, Dennis. What Is Decentralization? in Litvack, Jennie, and Jessica Seddon, eds. Decentralization
briefing notes. Washington DC: World Bank Institute, 1999.
10
Daly, Herman E. For the common good: Redirecting the economy toward community, the environment, and a
sustainable future. No. 73. Beacon Press, 1994.
11
Blank, Yishai. "Federalism, subsidiarity, and the role of local governments in an age of global multilevel
governance." Fordham Urban Law Journal 37 (2010): 509; Bermann, George A. "Taking subsidiarity seriously:
federalism in the European Community and the United States." Columbia Law Review (1994): 331-456
9

P a g e 5 | 24

localism is that it promotes participation in public life while the other is that it provides for
more efficient provision of public sector goods and services.12
A public sphere that facilitates maximum public participation and debate has been
characterized as the most authentic and radical form of democracy.13 Since individual
participation can effectively take place only in small units, transfer of power to local level is
said to be essential.14 Local government hence promotes public freedom, which is the
ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life.15
Devolution of powers to local level can also ensure that services are provided as per the
particular needs of the locality. Hence, going by the principle of subsidiarity, the Ward must
be empowered to take necessary action to solve any issue faced by a locality. If the subject
matter concerns more than one ward, the Zone would be made responsible and if it concerns
more than one zone, the Municipal Corporation would be made responsible.
2.1 Devolution of Powers to Wards
Many of the daily problems confronted by citizens are local and can be solved at the lowest
level of government if they are sufficiently empowered to do the same. If the Corporator of
the Ward is given more decision-making powers for municipal functions within his/her
Ward, local problems can be addressed more effectively. Governance at the local level, since
its the one closest to the people, is also the ideal domain at which citizen participation can
be promoted. Area Sabhas, like the Gram Sabha in the villages, can serve as a forum for the
discussion and articulation of the needs of the citizens. Elected representatives can be held
accountable to the people through forums like Ward Committees and Areas Sabhas. Hence,
ward level governance has the potential to promote participation, ensure accountability and
solve basic civic issues faced by the people of Bengaluru.
Making the Ward the basic unit of governance would involve more than the formation of
Ward Committees and Area Sabhas. It would also involve strengthening the ward level
administration. Each Ward office must be structured in such a way that each of the key
functions of BBMP has its specific ward level unit. Hence, whether it is public health,
sanitation, solid waste management, parks and lakes management, or land use, the Ward
must have officers appointed to deal with these functions. To ensure that each Ward has the
12

Briffault, Richard. "Our Localism: Part II--Localism and Legal Theory." Columbia Law Review (1990): 346-454.
Habermas, Jrgen. The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois
society. MIT press, 1991.
14
Frug, Gerald E. "The City as a Legal Concept." Harvard Law Review (1980): 1057-1154.
15
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. London 1990 (1963) quoted in Frug, Gerald E. "The City as a Legal Concept."
13

P a g e 6 | 24

necessary financial capacity to administer these functions, we suggest that a percentage of

the property tax collected from the ward to be remitted directly to Ward administration. All
cesses and fees collected at the Ward level may also be retained by the ward. If the ward
level bureaucracy is also strengthened in this manner, the ward can become a powerful
administrative and political unit.
2.1.1 Ward Committee: The 74th Constitutional Amendment mandates the
formation of Ward Committees, consisting of one or more wards, for every municipality with
a population of more than three lakh.16 The Karnataka State Legislature on January 13, 2011
passed the Karnataka Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 2011 providing for Ward
Committees and Area Sabhas modeled on the Community Participation Law or Nagara Raj
Bill which was one of the mandatory reforms to be implemented by the states receiving funds
under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).17

Despite

constitutional provisions and state legislations, Ward Committees were not functional for
most periods of time in the last two decades. Ward Committees were formed in Bengaluru
in 2013 after the Karnataka High Court directed the constitution of such bodies.
Ward Committees must be provided with greater capacity and entrusted with more
responsibilities. The law enacted by the State requires every ward to have a Ward Committee
which consists of the councilor from the ward as its Chairperson and a maximum of ten
persons.18 However the 10 members representing the civil society are to be nominated by
the municipality on the recommendation of the councilor and not elected. Further, the
Councilor is given veto powers over ward committee decisions. To ensure that Ward
Committees becoming meaningful decision making institutions, we recommend that
decisions in Ward Committee be taken consensually as far as possible.
2.1.2 Area Sabha: As per Karnataka Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 2011,
every Ward shall be further divided into areas' comprising all persons registered as voters
in one or more than one contiguous polling booths.19 Area Sabhas are required to meet at
least once in three months. Despite these provisions, even efforts to make Area Sabhas active
have not begun. The creation of Area Sabhas as a third-tier of local governance, below the
Ward Committee, can deliver on the promise of participatory democracy that is close and
accessible to the people. Hence there should not be further delay in the institutionalization
16

Article 243-S, Constitution of India

See Chapter IIIA, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976
18
Section 13H, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976
19
Section 13C, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976
17

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of Area Sabhas. To ensure that Area Sabhas are institutionalized, it can be provided, by a legal
provision, that the devolution of revenue to the Wards be subject to the condition that all
Area Sabhas are made functional in that Ward.
The Model Nagar Raj Bill circulated by the central government under JNNURM requires the
Area Sabha Representative (ASR) for each area to be elected but Karnataka's law requires
the ASR to be nominated by the municipality on the recommendation of the Corporator.20
Under the Karnataka law, the Ward Committee members do not include the ASRs coming
within the wards. Hence currently, there is complete disconnect between the Areas Sabha
and Ward Committee. We recommend that at least 2/3rd members of the Ward Committee
be constituted of the Area Sabha Representatives to ensure that there is more synergy
between the two bodies. We also recommend that the Area Sabha Representative be directly
elected from voters in a particular area.
2.1.3 Improving Quality of Life through Ward-based Governance: Making the
Ward the basic unit of governance can also improve the quality of life for the citizens of
Bengaluru since it will be more responsive to local needs. While centralized service agencies
have a very important role to perform in the city, they are not always responsive to the
specific local needs of an area. For a service like transport, issues of last-mile connectivity
can be better addressed if the Ward is empowered to take actions to solve the issue.
Similarly, the management of urban commons is best dealt by the locality than by centralized
city or state agencies. Centralized modes of waste disposal has failed miserably in Bengaluru
and hence ward-based garbage management can deal with the concern more effectively.
Every Ward office can also be provided with a grievance redress cell which deals with
citizens concerns regarding various municipal services within the ward. We provide two
examples of how making the ward the basic unit of governance can improve the quality of
life of the citizens of Bengaluru.
Governance of urban commons: Decentralized modes of monitoring and governance
of urban environment, lakes and commons is far more effective than a system of centralized
administration. Urban commons such as parks and lakes provide important services to
urban residents, by cleaning polluted air and water, mitigating urban heat islands, providing
livelihoods for the urban poor and recreational benefits for city residents living in stressed
environments. Ward Committees and Area Sabhas should be provided with the necessary
capacity to protect, maintain and manage these commons. In several parts of Bangalore,
20

Model Nagara Raj Bill, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India

P a g e 8 | 24

citizen groups and RWAs have effectively protected, restored and are managing local parks
and lakes in collaboration with the BBMP and BDA, such as the Kaikondrahalli lake in
Bellandur and the Puttenahalli lake in J.P. Nagar. Yet there are many more groups who have
taken the initiative to protect their commons, but are unable to do so because of the lack of
recognition and empowerment. To prevent the elite capture of these commons, it should be
mandatory for such groups to disallow the exclusion of any groups of local residents. It is
also important to have reliable, updated information on environmental and ecological
quality to monitor the effectiveness of such management. Decentralised environmental
monitoring of important indicators such as air and water quality by the Area Sabhas and
Ward Committees is therefore essential, along with the transparent and immediate updation
of such information. Interconnectivity between lakes for rainwater storage and flood
management, and as biodiversity and recreational corridors should be planned at the zonal
and city level, but governance should be at the ward level.
Urban mobility: Recognizing the ward as a critical foundational level for governing
mobility in Bengaluru is important. As is easily evident and widely documented, an
important lacuna in the physical infrastructure of Bengaluru is the provision of safe, dignified
and effective last-mile connectivity to main (trunk line) public transport options, i.e.
connectivity from the main road public transport point of service to places of residence,
work, commerce and social life. The poor quality of infrastructure to walk and cycle at the
neighbourhood and ward level greatly restricts the use of non-motorised transport options.
In turn, this contributes to the rapidly growing dependence on private, motorized vehicles
that adds significantly to gridlock on main trunk routes across the city. In addition to wasted
time, fuel and other ecological and health impacts, gridlock on the main trunk routes also
contributes to undermining the ability of BMTC to provide timely and efficient service.
Decentralization of urban governance offers a means to break this negative cycle and
perpetuation of gridlock. Devolution of governance to Ward Committees and Area Sabhas
with rights and responsibilities to manage and maintain local level infrastructure offers an
effective means to break this cycle of poor service, higher volumes of private vehicle and
gridlock.
2.2 Devolution of Powers to Zones
Presently the administrative body responsible for dealing with the governance of an area as
big as 741 sq. km is the BBMP. The intermediate level of local governance- between the Ward
and the Municipal Corporation- is the Zone. Political Devolution to the level of the Zone can
P a g e 9 | 24

ensure that for an issue faced by a locality spread across multiple wards, a zonal level body
instead of the BBMP can address the same. Presently, BBMP is divided into 8 zones: South
Zone, East Zone, West Zone, Mahadevapura, Dasarahalli, Yelahanka, Bommanahalli and
Rajarajeshwarinagar. Each zone is headed by a Joint Commissioner, who is answerable to the
Municipal Commissioner of BBMP. One of the preliminary questions to consider is whether
the present zonal classification is logical or if it needs to be redrawn. Since there is much
variance in the size and demography of each zone, it would be useful to redraw the
boundaries of all the zones taking into consideration the economic, ecological, social and
demographic geographies of the place.
However, presently, the Zone is only an administrative unit and not a political one. We
suggest that along with the bureaucratic machinery headed by the Joint Commissioner, there
should be a Zonal Council consisting of all the councilors elected from the wards coming
within the zone. A similar system of committees constitutive of the Councillors of a
geographic region within the Municipal Corporation exists in Kolkata through its Borough
Committees.21 Unlike a Ward Committee, the members of the Zonal Council would also be
members of the BBMP and can be entrusted with specific functions of the BBMP within the
Zone. Issues that cannot be addressed at the ward-level can be taken at the zonal-level. For
example, while the Ward Committee can be made responsible for waste-collection, the Zonal
Council might be more appropriate to deal with waste-disposal.
The Zonal Council should be empowered to pass resolutions and take decisions regarding
the municipal functions of BBMP coming within the zone. The Zonal Council can be headed
by a Zonal Chairperson, elected by the members of the Zonal Council among themselves. The
zonal boundaries of parastatal agencies like BWSSB also need to be made congruous with
the zones of BBMP to ensure effective governance. Zonal Councils can provide the necessary
political accountability to ensure that the Zone does not remain a purely administrative unit
but becomes a political unit as well.
2.3 Devolution of Powers to BBMP
Considering the principle of subsidiarity, the BBMP must be made directly responsible for
only those issues that cannot be solved at the ward or zonal level. Despite the passing of the
74th Amendment, city governments like BBMP continue to be under the extensive control of
the state government. Hence, the BBMP is often constrained in its ability to solve various
21

Pinto, Marina. Metropolitan city governance in India. Sage Publications, 2000. Ch. 7 Calcuttas Mayor-inCouncil, pp. 161-189

P a g e 10 | 24

issues faced by the city. The manner in which State government exercises control over the
city government may be through finances, parastatal bodies and the involvement of state
level political representatives in local decision-making.
Presently, city governments like BBMP have very limited taxation powers and other sources
of revenue. Hence they continue to rely on funding from the state and central governments.
We propose that significant revenue generating powers be devolved from the state to the
local government level. Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), despite being state level
representatives, are also members of local city governments like BBMP.22 Adding to this, is
the expectation of MLAs to perform an executive role in their constituency like providing
basic facilities like water and sanitation. We propose that sufficient measures be taken to
ensure that state level leaders like MLAs are ring-fenced out of the decisions of the local
bodies.
The Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution was added by the 74th Amendment to guide State
Governments in the assignment of various functional responsibilities to the Municipalities.23
However, most of the functions listed under the 12th Schedule are being carried out by
various parastatal agencies which are under the control of departments of the state
government and not the local body. We propose that BBMP be made responsible for the
municipal functions instead of the state-controlled parastatals. We would be dealing with
the role of the parastatals in more detail in the next section.

22
23

Section 7, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976

Twelfth Schedule (read with Article 243-W) Constitution of India

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3. Fixing Democratic Accountability

Democracy, beyond its instrumental values, provides the necessary basis for the political
legitimacy of the state. Democratic institutions are based on the principle of the moral
equality of citizens. Further, actions that are the product of democratic decision-making
provides the citizens a reason to be obligated to the state. Hence, democracy is necessary if
the exercise of political power is to be morally justifiable.24 Beyond the intrinsic moral value
of its procedure, democracys normative appeal also lies in the fact that democratic
procedures are more likely than other procedures at arriving at correct decisions.25 If the
exercise of the states executive power is not based on democracy, it cannot be said to be
politically legitimate. Hence, for the local government of Bengaluru to exercise legitimate
political authority, it needs to be under legitimate democratic control. An examination of how
power is organized in Bengalurus current local governance system reveals that executive
powers are exercised by actors that do not have the necessary democratic and political
mandate at the appropriate level of government.
Discussions regarding the restructuring of local governance in Bengaluru has primarily
focused on the question of territorial restructuring. Sufficient attention has not been paid to
the powers of existing bodies within the local governance structure. One of the key issues in
city governance in Bengaluru is the absence of alignment of the political and administrative
responsibilities of specific units of government. This is manifested in two different ways. On
the one hand Bengaluru has bureaucratic agencies with no political accountability at the
appropriate level and on the other hand we have political bodies with no executive authority.
Currently, while the mayor is the political head of the city, he/she does not have enough
executive powers. And though urban planning, regulation of land use and water services are
municipal functions, these are carried out by parastatals that are not accountable to the local
government.
Since the state government-controlled parastatal agencies perform municipal functions and
the state government-appointed Municipal Commissioner is the chief executive of
Corporation, the democratically elected local government of Bengaluru has limited executive
powers. Bengaluru has also witnessed state government-appointed Task Forces like
Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) and Agenda for Bangalores Infrastructural

24
25

Buchanan, Allen. Political Legitimacy and Democracy, Ethics (2002), 112(4): 689719
Estlund, David M. Democratic authority: a philosophical framework. Princeton University Press, 2009.

P a g e 12 | 24

Development (ABIDe) play a key role in the development of the city in the past.26 To ensure
democratic accountability of the local government, the elected arm of the Municipal
Corporation must be sufficiently strengthened. Hence beyond the question of territorial
restructuring, it is important to reorganise governmental structure in a manner in which
power is vested with the appropriate level of democratic government.
3.1 Executive Power of Local Government
Under the present system, though the mayor is the political head of Bengaluru, he/she is
largely a ceremonial head without adequate executive powers. As per the Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, the Municipal Commissioner is vested with the executive
powers of the Corporation.27 The Commissioner is a non-elected member appointed by the
State Government in consultation with the Mayor of the Corporation. Presently, the election
of the Mayor is indirect since he/she is elected by the elected councillors among themselves
for a period of one year.28 Hence, we currently have a system where the Mayor has limited
influence in the way the city is governed.
One of the options for reform is that of having a directly elected mayor with a fixed term of
5 years.29 In this framework, the Mayor would be vested with executive powers and will
appoint a committee for discharging his/her duties. The mayor can be elected at the level of
the city or for the larger region. However, a powerful directly elected mayor for the whole of
Bengaluru might centralize power and undermine the powers of the councilors representing
various wards. Having a directly elected mayor who can appoint a mayoral committee can
also pose problems if he/she is not from the political party which is in majority in the council.
This can result in a situation where the mayoral committee takes undemocratic decisions
since it does not need the support of the majority in the council. Also, Indias Parliamentary
democracy does not have a system of directly elected political executives either in the state
or central government unlike Presidential systems. Hence, we are not in favour of a directly
elected Mayor.
An alternative to a directly elected Mayor is to adopt a Mayor-in-Council system, similar to
the cabinet system of government followed in central and state governments in India. The
26

Chamaraj, Kathyayini, Parastatals and task forces - the new decision-makers, India Together, 22 February,
2009. Available at http://indiatogether.org/parastate-government
27
Section 64, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976
28
Section 10, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976
29
This is a reform suggested by the Kasturirangan Committee on BBMP, Agenda for Bangalores Infrastructural
Development (ABIDe), Bangalore Political Action Committee (B.PAC) among others

P a g e 13 | 24

executive power of the corporation can be shifted from the Municipal Commissioner to the
Mayor-in-Council. In a Mayor-in-Council system, as followed in Kolkata, both the Mayor and
the Mayor-in-Council forms the executive and they would typically belong to the political
party or coalition that wins the majority of Wards in the Corporation.30 In the Kolkata
Model, the Mayor-in-Council consists of a Mayor, Deputy Mayor and a ten-member cabinet
chosen among the councilors with each cabinet member dealing with different portfolios.
We feel that the Mayor-in-Council system is the best way to ensure a stable, powerful and
democratically representative executive responsible for governance in Bengaluru. The
Mayor-in-Council shall be collectively responsible to the BBMP council consisting of all the
corporators. Even with the Mayor-in-Council, the present subject-wise Standing Committees
would be retained but they would perform a policymaking and deliberative role and not an
executive role. The alignment of political and executive powers should not be restricted at
the city level and must also extend to zones and wards. Hence, instead of the Joint
Commissioner, the Zonal Council, headed by the zonal chairperson, shall be vested with the
executive powers of the Zone and the Ward Committee, headed by the ward corporator, shall
be vested with the executive powers of the Ward.
3.2 Role of Parastatal Agencies
Despite Constitutional provisions and state legislations, many fundamental aspects of local
governance in Bengaluru continue to be dealt by parastatal agencies and not the municipal
corporation. Though urban planning and development are essential functions of the
municipal bodies, parastatals like Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and Bangalore
Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) perform these functions. The various
urban services like water supply, electricity and transport are also performed by parastatals
like Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (BWSSB), Bangalore Electricity Supply
Company (BESCOM), Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) and not the
city corporation. However, none of these parastatal agencies have any locally elected
representatives in their panel nor are they held accountable to the BBMP.31 They are only
answerable to specific departments in the state government and not the local government.
Hence these agencies are not held accountable to the people of Bengaluru.

30

See Pinto, Marina. Metropolitan city governance in India. Sage Publications, 2000. Ch. 7 Calcuttas Mayor-inCouncil, pp. 161-189
31
See Idiculla, Mathew Prasad A guide to Bangalores Civic Agencies, Citizen Matters, April 28, 2010. Available at
http://bangalore.citizenmatters.in/articles/view/1968-all-about-bangalore-civic-agencies

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Another issue which Bengaluru faces with the multiciplity of parastatal agencies is that there
is hardly any overlap between the administrative jurisdictions of these agencies. The
geographical extent of each of these parastatals are different and the various sub-units of
these bodies also have no geographical congruence.32 With each agency having a different
jurisdiction there is difficulty in coordinating the different civic services. The underlying
problem is that none of these bodies have any political accountability either at the ward or
municipality level. There are also many functional overlaps in these bodies as multiple
organs are responsible for similar tasks. For example the BBMP, the BDA and the KSCB
(Karnataka Slum Clearance Board) are responsible for the improvement of slums while the
BBMP, BDA and PWD (Public Works Department) are responsible for road maintenance.33
To ensure democratic accountability, service delivery agencies like BWWSSB, BMTC and
BESCOM need to be brought within the control of the BBMP. This can be done broadly in
three different ways: BBMP having ownership over parastatal agencies, BBMP having
administrative control of the parastatals and BBMP and parastatals having a contractual
relationship. We feel that the relationship between the elected bodies (BBMP, Zonal Councils
and Ward Committees) and the service delivery agencies should ideally be contractual.
Having contractual control over parastatals gives the BBMP and other local bodies the option
to deliver services to the citizens in various innovative ways. Depending upon the kind of
service, the elected bodies at the appropriate level must be free to award contract for service
to the agency of its choice. Hence, the parastatals need to be stripped off their statutory role
and monopoly control over delivery of services.
However, it might be not feasible to immediately opt for these measures. Hence, in the first
stage, other measures of administrative streamlining and political accountability need to be
introduced. The geographic unit and subunits of the various parastatal agencies should be
made as congruous as possible with the units and subunits of BBMP to ensure smooth
delivery of services. The roles of each agency be defined in such a way that two agencies are
not made responsible for the same task. The BBMP, Zonal Councils and Ward Committees
must also have oversight over the functioning of service delivery agencies at various levels
to establish a clear link between democratic governance and service delivery function.
Hence parastatals which perform a service delivery function can be made accountable to the
elected government by oversight measures in the first stage and having a contractual
32

Ramanathan , Ramesh Urban Services: Too many cooks, India Together, 17 January 2005. Available at
http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jan/gov-manycooks.htm
33
Idiculla, Mathew Prasad A guide to Bangalores Civic Agencies, Citizen Matters, April 28, 2010

P a g e 15 | 24

relationship in the second. However, parastatals which perform essential regulatory

functions like urban planning and land use should be stripped off those powers. We
recommend that parastatals like BDA and BMRDA should be not be made responsible for
urban planning and land use and instead these should be performed by the Municipal
Corporation and the appropriate units below it. In this manner, the democratic
accountability of executive action can be ensured. Realignment of political and executive
powers along with political devolution are at core of Bengalurus governance crisis. Any
attempt to restructure BBMP to improve civic life must begin with these structural reforms.

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4. Governance of Metropolitan Bengaluru

As the demographic and spatial growth of Bengaluru continues to take place at a very fast
rate, the functional areas of the city is spilling over to spaces that were hitherto rural. This
poses concerns regarding the manner in which the urbanizing areas in the peripheries are
planned and administered. In this context, any discussion on restructuring governance of
Bengaluru cannot be limited to the present BBMP boundaries. Hence, we need to focus our
attention on the governance system of the larger metropolitan region, a topic that has not
received much attention.34 Examining whether empowered metropolitan level governance
institutions is needed for the administration of the Metropolitan Bengaluru is hence
worthwhile.
There is a need to explore metropolitan and regional forms of governments also because of
some of the perceived risks of localism.35 While the principles of subsidiarity is important,
we cannot assume that every issue is local since they can simultaneously have regional and
state-wide implications. Though local self-governance is vital for promoting the interests of
a particular locality, there is also a need to further the collective interest of the region.36
However, the promotion of governance at a metropolitan or regional level should not be
assumed to go against the decision-making authority of lower levels of government.37 Still,
for resolving any matter in which there is a conflict or contestation between two or more
local bodies within an a Metropolitan area, a governmental body representative of all the
various local bodies in the Metropolitan area is more suitable than either the core Municipal
Corporation of the region or the State government.
Ultimately, in restructuring Bengalurus urban governance system, irrespective of whether
BBMP is split, it is essential to examine the institutional mechanisms that are key for
governance reform at all levels- local, city and metropolitan. Strengthening Ward
Committees and Area Sabhas is crucial for addressing the issues of governance at the local
level and restructuring the role of the Mayor and parastatals is necessary for dealing with
city level governance. Since the Metropolitan area consists of multiple local governments,

34

See Sivaramakrishnan, K C. Governing Megacities: Fractured Thinking, Fragmented Setup, Oxford University
Press, 2014
35
Prud'Homme, Remy. "The dangers of decentralization." The World Bank research observer 10.2 (1995): 201-220.
36
Frug, Gerald E. "Beyond regional government." Harvard Law Review (2002): 1763-1836.
37
Briffault, Richard. "Localism and regionalism." Columbia Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper 1 (1999); Frug, Gerald E. "Beyond regional government." Harvard Law Review (2002): 1763-1836.

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each with its sub-units, the Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) as a representative unit
of the whole region has a vital role to play.
4.1 Metropolitan Area
One of the primary questions to consider while discussing metropolitan governance is what
constitutes the larger Bengaluru area. Currently, the region constituting the larger
Metropolitan Bengaluru has two spatial boundaries- i) The Bangalore Metropolitan Area
(BMA) which is the area coming under the BDA covering 1219 sq. km. and ii) the Bangalore
Metropolitan Region (BMR) which is the area under the BMRDA covering 8000 sq. km. The
area that has been notified for the constitution of the Metropolitan Planning Committee is
the 1219 sq. km. Bangalore Metropolitan Area under the BDA and not the 8000 sq. km region
coming under the BMRDA.
The Kasturirangan Committee had recommended that MPC covers the territorial area
presently covered by BMRDA which includes the districts of Bangalore Urban, Bangalore
Rural and Ramanagaram.38 Since the demographic growth of Bengaluru goes beyond the
Bangalore Metropolitan Area covered by the BDA, we feel that the area covered by the MPC
currently is not sufficient. The Bangalore Metropolitan Region, presently coming under the
BMRDA, would be a more suitable boundary for which MPC is given jurisdiction. However,
these need to be verified based on a comprehensive study of the current and projected
spatial and demographic growth of Bengaluru.
4.2 Metropolitan Planning Committee
The 74th Constitutional Amendment requires that a metropolitan area, consisting of two or
more Municipalities or Panchayats with a total population of more than ten lakhs, shall have
a Metropolitan Planning Committee to prepare a draft development plan for the
Metropolitan areas as a whole.39 Despite being a mandatory provision of the Constitution,
Bengaluru never had an MPC even 20 years after the passing of the 74th Amendment. Though
the members to the MPC in Bengaluru were recently elected, it has not started functioning.
The failure to institute a regional level planning body like the MPC is not only a violation of

38

Report on Governance in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region and the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike
(Kasturirangan Committee Report on BBMP) August, 2008. 4.15, p. 35. Available at
http://www.kuidfc.com/website/webpage.nsf/8f50067eff32acf3652574190040e0a2/0214c48af06bc65a65257419
0040ae1a/$FILE/Dr.%20Kasturirangan%20Committee%20Report%20on%20BBMP.pdf
39
Article 243-ZE, Constitution of India

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the Constitution, but has also not allowed Bengaluru and its suburbs to grow and develop in
a planned manner.
As per the Constitution, at least two-third of the members of the MPC are to be elected
members of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) coming within the metropolitan region while the
rest of the members can be nominated.40 Currently, while the Mayor of Bengaluru is not a
member of the MPC, the Chief Minister of Karnataka is a member and could even be elected
as the Chairperson of MPC. The Kasturirangan Committee had suggested that the Chief
Minister should be made the Chairperson.41 But if the Chief Minister is the Chairperson of
MPC, the powerful regional body might work in a centralized manner under the influence of
the State government. To ensure that the MPC works as a metropolitan-level body which is
representative of the interests of the various localities within the metropolitan area, we
recommend that no state level leaders be made part of the MPC.
Currently, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) is assigned as the Local Planning
Authority (LPA) under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961
responsible for preparing the Master Plan of the Local Planning Area for Bengaluru which
constitutes 1307 sq.km.42 The Bangalore Metropolitan Region Development Authority
(BMRDA) is responsible for preparing the Structure Plan for the BMR of 8000 sq.km and shall
also discharge the functions of the Director of Town Planning whereby BDA and other LPAs
within BMR have to submit their plans to BMRDA for approval.43 The Kasturirangan
Committee had recommended that the MPC be invested with planning and coordinating
functions, necessary executive powers including power to review and suggest changes and
in certain cases, overrule plans of the BBMP and other ULBs and the power to control land
use.44
However if the MPC is made an all-powerful regional government vested with the wide
administrative powers, including the power to overrule the plans of ULBs, the democratically
elected local bodies could be weakened. Following principles of subsidiarity, we suggest that
MPC must not be engaged in a top-down planning process for the whole of the Bengaluru
Metropolitan Region. The Constitution requires the MPC to prepare a draft development
plan having regard to the plans of varios local bodies and the objectives of the State and

40

Article 243-ZE, Constitution of India

Kasturirangan Committee Report on BBMP, August, 2008. 4.26, p. 39.
42
Section 25Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961
43
Section 81-C, Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961
44
Kasturirangan Committee Report on BBMP, August, 2008. 4.31, p. 42.
41

P a g e 19 | 24

Central governments. Hence we propose that the MPC not be made the Local Planning
Authority for the whole of the Metropolitan area. We recommend that the MPC be vested
with the task of preparing the regional development plan of the larger Bangalore
Metropolitan Region while various ULBs in the region be vested with the powers of a Local
Planning Authority. The regional development plan must be based on the inputs of various
city plans which itself must be based on the inputs of various ward level plans. Thus, the
MPC's role is threefold: preparing development plans based on inputs from various local
bodies, coordinating with various local bodies in administering projects spread across more
than one municipality, resolving conflicts that arise between local bodies in the region
including those related to the boundaries of each local body.
Essentially, the MPC works as the aggregate body representative of all the various urban and
rural local bodies and acts as a bulwark against regressive localism as demonstrated in the
NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) syndrome.45 Creating an MPC for Bengaluru can ensure that
the agency responsible for urban planning is not unaccountable parastatal agencies like the
present BDA or the BMRDA. The BMRDA can be made the secretariat to the MPC ensuring
that there is an appropriate administrative machinery that can carry out the political
decisions made by MPC effectively. The Metropolitan Planning Committee, consisting of a
majority of local representatives and also some nominated members, can work as a planning
body that satisfies both democratic accountability and technical expertise.

45

Stahl. Kenneth A. "Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City." U. Pa. L. Rev. 161 (2012): 939

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5. Conclusion
The task before the Expert Committee is to solve Bengalurus governance crisis. We argue
that this is not merely an issue of the territorial boundaries of BBMP. It is an issue of the
failure of institutional design, namely the misalignment between executive power and
democratic responsibility and the over-centralization of power in the hands of the state
government and the BBMP. We propose an option that redesigns Bengalurus governance
through the devolution and realignment of power. We recommend that powers be devolved
from the state to the wards to make them the basic unit of governance and also to the zones.
We also recommend that political power and executive power be aligned to ensure
democratic accountability. To ensure statutory basis for these reforms, a separate law needs
to be passed for the local governance of Bengaluru.
Since the problem with Bengalurus governance is in the way power is organized, we reject
a restructuring of BBMP based on purely administrative decentralization or a division of
BBMP within the current framework in which power is distributed. The underlying issue
with a purely administrative decentralization is the absence of any form of political
accountability at the zonal or any other level to which administrative powers are proposed
to be decentralized. If the problems faced by the peripheral areas is that of political distance
from the centre, administrative restructuring is not likely to suffice. Purely administrative
decentralization is hence severely limited in addressing the multiple civic problems faced by
the citizens.
The underlying problem with a division of BBMP not accompanied by political devolution or
governance realignment is that it will merely result in the replication of problems currently
faced by BBMP at a smaller scale. We are however not opposed to a division of BBMP if it
also includes the rapid devolution of powers to the wards and the restructuring of
governance structures that ensures the executive power of the Mayor and the accountability
of parastatal organs. Hence, having separate Municipal Corporations in place of the proposed
Zonal Councils is a viable option if it is accompanied by political devolution and governance
realignment in the manner we propose.
However, division of BBMP into multiple corporations poses questions regarding geographic
inequality and administrative capacity. Having multiple Municipal Corporations in place of
BBMP would mean that each Corporation is also responsible for raising its own revenue. One
of the issues with the division of the city into independent Corporations is that it can result
P a g e 21 | 24

in segregating the poorer areas from richer areas and result in Corporations with poorer
regions not having the resources to generate its own revenue. Division of BBMP also means
the creation of entirely new administrative machineries for the new corporations which
would be cost intensive. Most of bureaucratic infrastructure of BBMP would go to the
Corporation in the core region while entirely new administrative infrastructures would be
needed to be created for the other Corporations.
Considering these issues, any division of BBMP into multiple corporation must be preceded
by a proper study ascertaining the revenue-generation capacities of each of the proposed
Municipal Corporations and the costs involved in setting up new Corporations. The division
of BBMP into multiple Corporations/Zones must take into consideration the economic,
demographic, ecological and social conditions that exist in each of the proposed units.
Ultimately, regardless of the number of Municipal Corporations Bengaluru has, the
restructuring of BBMP must include the devolution of power to the wards and the alignment
of political and executive powers that ensures democratic accountability.

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6. Summary of Recommendations

Ward as the Basic Unit of Governance: The Ward must be made the basic unit of
governance whereby it is empowered to take necessary actions required to solve any
issue faced by a locality. Only those matters that cannot be decided at the ward level
should be taken up to the higher levels of government.

Ward Administration: The Ward must have permanent officers to perform the key
functions of BBMP like public health, sanitation, solid waste management and local
infrastructure. A percentage of the property tax and all cesses and fees collected from a
Ward needs to be directly remitted to the Ward.

Ward Committee and Area Sabha: 2/3rd members of the Ward Committee shall be
constituted of the Area Sabha Representatives to ensure that there is more synergy
between the two bodies. Area Sabhas need to be institutionalized and Area Sabha
Representative shall be directly elected from voters in a particular area.

Zonal Council: The Zone must be made a political unit by the creation of a Zonal Council
consisting of all the councillors elected from the wards coming within the Zone. They
must be entrusted with specific functions of the BBMP within the Zone.

Devolution of Powers to BBMP: Political, administrative and revenue powers must be

devolved from the state to the BBMP. State level leaders like MLAs should not be allowed
to override the decisions of the local bodies.

Mayor-in-Council: BBMP should opt for a Mayor-in-Council system with a fixed term of
5 years where the Mayor and cabinet are chosen among the councilors. The executive
power of the Corporation should be shifted from the Municipal Commissioner to the
Mayor-in-Council.

Streamlining Parastatals: The unit and subunits of the various parastatal agencies
should be made as congruous as possible with the units and subunits of BBMP to ensure
smooth delivery of services. The roles of each agency should be redefined in such a way
that two agencies are not made responsible for the same task.

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Service Delivery Parastatals: The relationship between the elected bodies (BBMP,
Zonal Councils and Ward Committees) and the service delivery agencies (BWWSSB,
BMTC and BESCOM) should be contractual. Elected bodies at the appropriate level must
be free to award contract for service to the agency of its choice.

Regulatory Parastatals: Essential municipal functions like urban planning and land use
should not be carried out by parastatals like BDA and the BMRDA but by the Municipal
Corporation and units below it.

Metropolitan Area: The area covered by the Bangalore Metropolitan Region, presently
coming under the BMRDA, should be the spatial boundary of the Bengaluru Metropolitan
Area for which MPC is given jurisdiction.

Metropolitan Planning Committee: MPC should be vested with the task of preparing
the regional development plan of the larger Bangalore Metropolitan area while various
Local Bodies in the region should be vested with the powers of a Local Planning
Authority.

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