G.R. No.

L-32485 October 22, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF
R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and
non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132
and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed
materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11
of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate
its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it
violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent
the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal
protection of the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal
change for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and
conscience," are interests that should be accorded primacy.1
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law is likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws
which are given retroactive effect.4

While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed
only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary,
See. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970. WHEREFORE, the prayer
of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.

[G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA, DIONISIO
SARMIENTO, ARCADIO BALMEO, PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO FLORES, CRISPIN ESTRELLA, FELIPE CALISON,
PEDRO VILLAREAL, CLAUDIO REYES, PETER DOE and JOHN DOE Defendant, AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant.

DECISION
FELIX, J.:
At about 11:00 oclock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the reports of gunfire awaked the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana
Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Ciprianas mother, Monica del Mundo, in their house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid
himself inside the ceiling.
In the meantime, someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, and a few moments later a person suddenly entered
the dining room and shouted that the door leading to the living room be opened. As no one of the house members obeyed, the
intruder removed 3 board pieces in the wall and through the opening thus made he entered the living room. The intruder who was
armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan, who was previously known to her. Agustin
removed the iron bar from the door leading to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 persons whose identity has not been
ascertained entered. Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from
her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the person of
Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200. But not contented with the loot, the same
individual asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce, and for this reason, he strucked
her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his mother and
that unidentified person, irked by the boys impudence, made a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her
right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the
ceiling. Afterwards, Appellant and his two unidentified companion left the place.
After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and she
found him lying face downward already dead. According to Dr. Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy, Vicente Pacson sustained
the injuries described in his autopsy reports, which reads as follows:

November 6, 1953
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Post-mortem findings on cadaver Vicente Pacson, age-37 years, married, of barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Time take: 8:20 a.m.
1. Entrance fracture of the frontal region of head due to gunshot wound.
Exit wound at left side of the head, about the upper portion of the left ear.
2. Entrance gunshot wound, left lateral side of the left middle arm.
Exit gunshot wound inner side of left arm.
3. Entrance gunshot wound, left lateral of the left forearm.
Exit gunshot wound, left inner side of the left forearm.
4. Entrance gunshot wound around 2 inches more or less above the middle of the right clavicle.
Exit gunshot would at the back in the region of the spinal cord between the two scapula.
Cause of death severe hemorrhage due to go gunshot wound of the frontal region of the forehead.
(Exhibit C).
The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening and in the ensuing investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the
Chief of Police that Agustin Mangulabnan was one of the malefactors who entered their house. When the latter was investigated, he

readily and voluntarily subscribed before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, an affidavit admitting his participation in
the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson (Exhibit A and B). Much later, however, he subscribed to another affidavit before the Clerk of
Court wherein he exculpated from any participation Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his previous affidavit, though
admitting the truth of the other allegations contained therein (Exhibit D).
As the result of the investigation conducted by the authorities a complaint was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija, against Agustin Mangulabnan alias Guinita, a surrendered Huk and 10 other unidentified persons. But the complaint was
amended on January 13, 1954, to include Dionisio Sarmiento, together with Arcadio Balmeo, Patricio Gonzales, Florentino Flores,
Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio Reyes, Peter Doe and John Doe, who were still at large, as Defendants. After the
preliminary investigation the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija where Defendants were accused of
robbery with homicide. In that Court, Agustin Mangulabnan was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400; Cipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; P6,000 to the heirs of
Vicente Pacson, and to pay the costs. Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted while the information as against the
other Defendants who continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.
Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Hence his appeal which is now before Us.
The motion for a new trial was based on the affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong and Patricio
Gonzales but they were not really newly discovered nor could they alter the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. As stated by the
Solicitor General, it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must be shown: (a) That the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) That such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence (U. S. vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51; U.S. vs. Palanca, 5 Phil.
269; U.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 188; U. S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. 582; U. S. vs. Torrente, 2 Phil. 1); and (c) That is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching (U. S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343), and of such a weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted (U. S. vs. Zamora, supra; U. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. 24; U. S. vs. Luzon, supra.; U. S. vs. Hernandez 5 Phil.
429; U. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U. S. vs. Tongco, 2 Phil. 189; People vs. Cu- Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; and People vs. Reyes, 71
Phil. 598). The motion for new trial did not comply with these requisites and was properly denied by the trial Court.
Appellants objection to the admissibility in evidence of post- morten report (Exhibit C) is evidently untenable. The fact that it is a mere
carbon copy is of no amount, for it has been signed by the physician who executed the same and his signature was identified by him at
the witness stand. Furthermore, Appellant did not offer any objection to its admission when it was presented in evidence at the
hearing. His objection now comes too late (Hodges vs. Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567; U.S. vs. Ong Shiu, 28 Phil. 242).
The lower court did neither err in rejecting Exhibit 1 for the defense. This is an affidavit purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan Fernando of
the Philippine Constabulary. The main portion of it (quoted in Appellants brief, page 32, and appearing on page 21 of the record), is as
follows:
The Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, who first arrived at the scene of the crime, have already picked up the empty shells of
Cal. 30, Carbine type and were delivered to Cpl. Lopez, one of the investigators of our unit. Information revealed that Civilian
Commando of barrio Pulo, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, has something to do with the crime committed, so I proceeded to barrio Pulo to
confiscate their arms. Among those arms confiscated were those registered under Pedro Villareal and Claudio Reyes and upon
examination of the Ballistic Experts in Camp Crame, it appeared positive as per Ballistic Report (Exhibit 1).
As may be seen, the latter part of the aforequoted testimony of Sgt. Adan Fernando is hearsay and, anyway, it is of no moment in the
case at bar, because 2 of the 3 persons who entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were unidentified.
There is no denial that the crime of robbery with homicides was committed as described in the information. By Appellants own
admission (Exhibit A and B) and the testimony of Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to Appellants participation in the
execution thereof. And as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Appellant and the rest of the malefactors came together to the house of
the offended parties to commit the robbery perpetuated therein and together went away from the scene of the crime after its
perpetration. This shows conspiracy among the offenders which rendered each of them liable for the acts of the others (People vs.
Delgado, 77 Phil. 11).
Moreover, the record shows that Appellant participated in the criminal design to commit the robbery with his co-Defendants (People vs.
Flores, et al., G. R. No. L-231, August 21, 1946), and it is settled rule in this jurisdiction that unity of purpose and action arising from a
common design makes all parties thereto jointly liable (U. S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188), each being responsible for the result,
irrespective of the character of their individual participation (U. S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil., 434).
It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by one of the 2 unidentified persons who climbed up a table and fired
at the ceiling, was an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the amount and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson
was hiding therein, and that the English version of Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special, single and
indivisible crime of robbery with homicide only punished any persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have
been committed, but this English version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads
as follows:
1. Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio.
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would
result by reason of on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7,
1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of
the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident
(Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision
of January 12, 1889 see Cuello Calons Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
The crime committed in the case at bar, of which Appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-participant, is the crime of robbery with
homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of
the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength and with the aid of
armed men, and in consonance with the provisions of Article 63, No. 1 of the same legal body, Appellant should be sentenced to the
capital punishment, as recommended by the Solicitor General. However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the
capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or
reclusion perpetua (Section 9, Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).
Wherefore the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed with costs against Appellant.
It is SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44896

July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently
charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below
had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to
preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try
the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the
Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,
and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of
the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of
an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. ( Ex parte Baiz, 135 U.
S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides.
(U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this
case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case. We
do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner
extended ex propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on
November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date
mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government of the
Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to
the great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound
by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond
this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of
this court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as
may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."

In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and
exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the
Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law."
Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of
First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction
possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not
exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this
court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the
jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction,
and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on
the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred
dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as
we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the
laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in
force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter,
they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National
Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in
force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court
by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in
force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not
inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National
Assembly to amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.],
Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of
prohibition must be denied. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-17905

January 27, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN MORAN, FRUCTUOSO CANSINO, and HILARIO ODA, defendants-appellants.
Pedro Ma. Sison for appellants.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
ARAULLO, C. J.:
On March 31, 1922, the decision of this court in the present case, affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
was published, but the term of imprisonment by the said court upon the accused, for a violation of the Election Law, defined and
punished in section 2639 of the Administrative Code, was increased to six months from which judgment the present appeal was taken
by the accused. The accused, after asking for a reconsideration of the said decision and a rehearing and pending the resolution on the
said petition, filed a special motion on May 2d of this year, alleging that the crime complained of had prescribed under the provision of
section 71 of Act No. 3030, enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922, and praying that they be absolved from the complaint. Upon
this motion the Attorney-General was heard, having filed an answer and a supplemental answer, with the corresponding arguments,
opposing the same, as well as the accused who filed their reply thereto and supplementary replies, both parties stating at length the
reasons and legal grounds for their respective contentions.
While it is a rule of general application that unless the defense of prescription is pleaded in the trial court, it will be deemed to have
been waived and cannot later be raised, yet this rule is not of absolute application in criminal cases, for if the prescription of the crime,
as well as of the penalty whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as is the case here with regard to the former, be
provided by statute after the termination of all the proceedings in the trial court, as well as in the appellate court, and when the case
has already been submitted for discussion and is awaiting only the final judgment; and if the prescription of the crime is but the
extinguishment of the right of the State to prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond question that, once the State has lost or
waived such right, the accused may, at any stage of the proceeding, ask and move that the same be dismissed and that he be
absolved from the complaint. And not only that, the right to prosecute and punish the criminal having been lost by the prescription
of the crime expressly provided by the statute, the State itself, the Government through the proper court, is in duty bound to make a
pronouncement to that effect. Therefore, as on March 9th of this year, 1922, when Act No. 3030 went into effect, providing in its
section 71 that offense resulting from the violations thereof shall prescribe one year after their commission, the accused and the
Attorney-General had already filed their respective briefs in this court for the prosecution of the appeal taken from the judgment of the
court below, and the hearing of the case had already been held, this court itself, without the necessity of any motion of the accused, or
of the Attorney-General, should have declared the crime in question to have prescribed, in view of the provision of said section.
Consequently, as this court had not up to that time made such pronouncement, the accused are perfectly justified in asking, as they
have done in their motion of May 2d of this year, that the offense having prescribed, they be absolved from the complaint. This duty is
imperative upon the courts of justice at any moment that the offense appears to have prescribed under the provision of the law. With
particular reference to the present case, this conclusion is necessarily reached from the letter as well as the spirit of the provisions of
the Penal Code relative to prescription, and from that of section 71 of the aforesaid Act No. 3030, for once the offense or the penalty
has prescribed, the State has no right to prosecute the offender, or to punish him, and if he has already been punished, it has no right
to continue holding him subject to its action by the imposition of the penalty. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal
Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, even if
they may be serving sentence, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty,

irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime
and the penalty.
That such is the duty of the courts of justice and has been so recognized by this court, is shown by the decision in the case of United
States vs. Rama, R. G. No. 16247,1 for the crime of murder of four persons, committed in the month of July, 1902, in the province of
Cebu, in which one of the accused was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of the said province to death and the other two to life
imprisonment. That case was brought to this court on appeal and, after the filing of the respective briefs of the accused and the
Attorney-General a hearing was had. No allegations was made as to the prescription of the crime, yet this court rendered a decision
(not yet published in the Official Gazette) wherein, after finding that two crimes of murder and two of homicide had been committed
and that seventeen years had already elapsed from the commission of the latter to the institution of the judicial proceeding for the
investigation and punishment thereof, that is, more than the fifteen years fixed by lay for the prescription of the crime of homicide,
this court held that the said two crimes of homicide had prescribed and the criminal responsibility of the three accused for the said
crimes extinguished, convicting the accused only of the two crimes of murder. There is, therefore, on reason whatsoever why the
allegation of prescription made by the accused in their motion of the 2d of May of this year cannot legally be considered; on the
contrary, said motion must be decided before the petition for the reconsideration of the decision published on the 31st of March of last
year, and for a rehearing of the case, or, to be more exact, the said petition must be ignored, for the resolution of the aforesaid
motion, if favorable to the accused, would put an end to the proceeding right at its present stage.
The first question to be decided, in connection with the contention of the accused, is whether or not the prescription provided in
section 71 of Act No. 3030 refers only to that Act and not to any other, for said section 71 says: "Offenses resulting from violations of
this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission," and section 72 adds: "This Act shall take effect on its approval."
It is enough to take into consideration the fact that Act No. 3030, is, as its title indicates, amendatory to several sections and parts of
sections of chapter 18 of the Administrative Code, known as the Election Law, and of chapter 65 on penalties for the violation of
various administrative laws, among them, those of the Election Law itself, included in said chapter 18 of the Administrative Code, in
order to understand that when the Legislature used the words "This Act," that is, Act No. 3030, it referred, necessarily, to the Election
Law included in various sections and provisions of the aforesaid two chapters of the above-mentioned Code, that is, the Election Law
prior to Act No. 3030, under which the herein accused were convicted. One needs but examine one by one all the sections of said Act
No. 3030, each of which declares the sense in which each of the sections included in said chapters in amended, in order to convince
himself that said Act No. 3030 is similar to the law that preceded it, with the amendments and some additions thereto. If the
Legislature had passed and enacted a new Election Law different from that contained in the above-mentioned chapters of the
Administrative Code, then it may be said that the phrase "This Act" can in no way refer to the prior Election Law. Furthermore, if the
offenses resulting from the violations of the Election Law, the provisions of which are contained in the aforesaid chapters of the
Administrative Code, are the same offenses provided for in Act No. 3030, though with some modifications in the details as to some of
them and with increase in the penalty, it cannot be denied that when the Legislature used the words "This Act" in section 71 of Act No.
3030, wherein it is provided that said offenses shall prescribe one year after their commission, it necessarily referred to offenses
resulting from the violations of the former Election Law, as amended by said Act No. 3030. Besides, one of the objects of this Act, as
its title indicates, is to make more effective the provisions and the purposes of the former Law contained in the Administrative Code;
so that Act No. 3030 rather than being an integral part of the former election law is in conjunction with the latter the only Election Law
in force; and any other interpretation to the contrary of the phrase "This Act" cannot, in our opinion, be accepted as good logic and in
accordance with the principles of sound reasoning.
It is true that in the next section, 72, it is provided that said Act No. 3030 shall take effect on the date of its approval, which took
place on March 9, 1922, but the meaning of such an expression in connection with prescription is that prescription can be invoked from
that date, as was done by the accused, and not that such provision may have a retroactive effect from that same date.
In this connection, there arises the second question as to whether or not the provision of article 22 of the Penal Code above cited,
declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to the defendant in a criminal action for a felony or
misdemeanor, is applicable to crimes penalized by special laws, as does Act No. 3030, account being taken of the fact that, under
article 7 of the Penal Code, offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the said code.
Several decisions have been rendered by this court on this question in which the distinguished members of this court hold opposite
views. Among those may be cited the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), which is cited in a later case, United States vs.
Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil., 86), in which case this court did not lay down a definite rule, but expressly reserved its opinion as to whether
or not article 22 of the Penal Code above referred to was applicable. And it was so recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in an appeal taken by writ of error by the accused, Ong Chang Wing (40 Phil., 1046), said high court having limited itself to
declaring that the accused, not having been convicted by this court of an offense which was not punishable when committed, and this
court having held only that the right to impose the penalty prescribed by the Penal Code of the Philippines had not been lost by the
subsequent statute, Act No. 1757, of the Philippine Commission, the accused had not been denied due process of law, for as the
Supreme Court of the United States says in its decision, the duty of that court in that case was to determine whether or not the
judgment of this court amounted to a denial of due process of law. Therefore, the decision rendered in those two cases cannot be
invoked in the one now before us.
In the case of United States vs. Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil., 86) and United States vs. Calaguas (14 Phil., 739), cited also in support of the
contrary opinion, as the offenses therein involved were penalized by special laws, that is, by the Opium Law, in the former, and by the
Law of Police and Railroad Preservation, in the latter, this court held, as it could not have done otherwise, that, under article 7 of the
Penal Code, the provisions of the said Code were not applicable to those offenses, inasmuch as said offenses were penalized by the
said law which prescribed a special and definite penalty for said offenses, but in those cases said article 7 of the Penal Code was not
interpreted in connection with the application of article 22 of the same Code, providing for the retroactivity of penal laws favorable to
persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor. Wherefore neither can the holding of this court in those cases have any application to the
one before us.

The case in which this court plainly and definitely decided the question under consideration is that of United States vs. Parrone (24
Phil., 29). There the said accused was charged with the crime of falsification of a cedula certificate, definite and punished in section 55
of Act No. 1189 of the Philippine Commission, but before the conviction of the accused, said Act was amended by Act No. 2126 of the
Philippine Legislature, which prescribed a lesser penalty than the previous Act, and this court, after a careful perusal of all its decisions
dealing with that question, as above indicated, and a luminous and exhaustive discussion on the interpretation of article 7 of the same
Code in connection with the retroactivity of the penalty, in so far as it is favorable to the accused, held, upon the appeal taken by the
said accused from the judgment of the court below, that, under the provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code, the penalty provided in
Act No. 2126, which was later than Act No. 1189, was the proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused in that case. In the course
of that decision, the court said:
Considering the provision of article 7 of the Penal Code, are the provisions of article 22 of the same Code applicable to the
penal laws of the Philippine Islands other than the provisions of the Penal Code? Article 22 is found in chapter 1 of title 3 of
the Penal Code. Said chapter is entitled "Penalties in General". Article 21 of said title and chapter provides that "no felony or
misdemeanor shall be punishable by any penalty notprescribed by law prior to its commission." This article is general in its
provisions and in effect prohibits the Government from punishing any person for any felony or misdemeanor with any penalty
which has not been prescribed by the law. It (art. 21), therefore, can have no application to any of the provisions of the Penal
Code for the reason that for every felony or misdemeanor defined in the Penal Code a penalty has been prescribed.
The provisions of article 21 can only be invoked, therefore, when a person is being tried for a felony or a misdemeanor for
which no penalty has been prescribed by law. Article 21 is not a penal provision. It neither defines a crime nor provides a
punishment for one. It has simply announced the policy of the Government with reference to the punishment of alleged
criminal acts. It is a guaranty to the citizen of the State that no act of his will be considered criminal until after the
Government has made it so by law and has provided a penalty. It (art. 21) is a declaration that no person shall be subject to
criminal prosecution for any act of his until after the State has defined the misdemeanor or crime and has fixed a penalty
therefor. The doctrine announcement by this section has been considered of so much importance to the citizen of a State that
many of the States of the Union have been pleased to include its precepts in their constitutions or have so declared by
express provision of law.
Article 22 provides that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or
misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving same." This provision clearly has no direct application to the provisions of the Penal Code. Its (art. 22) application to
the Penal Code can only be invoked where some former or subsequent law is under consideration. It must necessary relate
(1) to penal laws existing prior to the Penal Code; or (2) to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal Code, in which the penalty
was more favorable to the accused. Rule 80, Ley Provisional para la aplicacion de las disposiciones del Codigo Penal. Under
the provisions of said article 22, if a crime had been committed prior to the date of the Penal Code the punishment for which
was more favorable to the accused than the provisions of the Penal Code, it is believed that the accused might invoke the
provisions of said article (22) even though he was not placed upon trial until after the Penal Code went into effect. (U.
S. vs. Cuna 2). So also if by an amendment to the Penal Code or by a later special law the punishment for an act was made
less severe than by the provisions of the Penal Code, then the accused person might invoke the provisions of said article. It
appears to be clear, then, that article 22 of the Penal Code can only be invoked when the provisions of some other penal law
than the provisions of the Penal Code are under consideration. In other words, the provisions of article 22 can only be invoked
with reference to some other penal law. It has no application to the provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with some
other law. It is not believed, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting article 7 of the Penal Code intended to provide that
article 22 should not be applicable to special laws.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that such was the intention of the legislature, in view of the doctrine laid down by the supreme
court of Spain, whose authority as regards the application and interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code of the Philippines is
unquestionable, because said Code is the same as that of Spain. In two cases (decisions of July 13, 1889 and April 26, 1892), among
others decided by that court, in which article 22 of the Penal Code was alleged to have been violated by the imposition of the penalty
of prison correccional prescribed by the said Code, instead of prison menor, prescribed by article 168 of the Election Law of August 30,
1870, upon the accused therein, who were found guilty of a violation of the said Election Law, which, was therefore, a special law in
force prior to the said Penal Code of that same year, the said Code having substitute the penalty of prision correccional for that
of prision menor, said court held that the appeal was not well taken on the ground that the penalty of prision correccional had taken
the place of that of prision menor prescribed by the Election Law, and while the duration of both penalties was the same, the
correctional penalty was lighter and more advantageous and favorable to the accused than prision menor, as it was of a less grave
nature; so that in those two cases, the supreme court of Spain not only applied the provisions of the Penal Code to a special law, but
also gave retroactive effect to said provisions on account of being more favorable to the therein accused, in accordance with the
precept of article 22 of the Penal Code. And here we have a most complete, clear and satisfactory solution of whatever doubt might
have arisen as to the interpretation of articles 7 and 22 of the Penal Code aforesaid.
It cannot be maintained that said article 22 of the Penal Code refers only to penalties and is not applicable to appeals and proceedings,
because the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty, for the length of time fixed by the law for the
prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense, as may be seen from Title VI of Book I of the Penal Code, containing, as its
heading indicates, "General Provisions Regarding Felonies and Misdemeanors, the Persons Liable and the Penalties," without
distinguishing between the penalties and the extinguishing of the criminal responsibility dealt with in said Title VI of said Book, which
title comes next to Title V, treating of the penalties incurred by those who evade service of sentence and those who, while serving
sentence, or after having been convicted by a final judgment not yet served, commit some other crime. And aside from this intimate
connection between the prescription of the crime and that of the penalty, a statute declaring the prescription of the crime has no other
object and purpose than to prevent or annul the prosecution of the offender and, in the last analysis, the imposition of the penalty.
Moreover, if the provisions relative to the prescription of ownership and to the prescription of actions in civil matters are part of the
civil law, it cannot be denied that the provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and of penalties are penal laws or form part
thereof.

With regard to the question whether prescription must be considered as a matter of procedural or formal law, or as a substantive law
for the purpose of the retroactivity of laws, we must state, with reference to the present case, that the prescription provided in section
71 of Act No. 3030 is of the nature both of a substantive law, in so far as it gives a person accused of any of the crimes therein
referred to, the right not to be prosecuted nor punished after the lapse of the period of one year from the commission of said crimes,
within which the criminal action must be commenced, and of a procedural or adjective law in so far as it fixes the time within which
such action must necessarily be commenced in order that the prosecution may be legal and the proper penalty may lawfully be
imposed. but however said provision may be considered, the same must have a retroactive effect, as will be seen later on.
Therefore, as the instant case involves two special laws of the Philippine Legislature, to wit, the Election Law contained in the abovementioned chapters of the Administrative Code, and Act No. 3030 which amended and modified the former, it is evident that the
provision declaring that offenses resulting from the violations of said Act shall prescribe one year after their commission must have
retroactive effect, the same being favorable to the accused.
This, however, is objected to, although it is based on a general principle frequently applied by many courts of the American Union, and
in support of the objection, several decisions of the said courts and a doctrine concerning the matter found in Corpus Juris (volume 16,
p. 222) and in Ruling Case Law are cited, wherein it is established that laws fixing a period of prescription are not applicable to crimes
previously committed, unless by their terms they are clearly retroactive or contain an express provisions to that effect.
We need not discuss each and every one of the said cases, it being sufficient for our purpose to take up one of them, namely, that of
Martin vs. State ([1859], 24 Tex., 62). There the Supreme Court of Texas held that as regards crimes and misdemeanors, prescription
had no retroactive effect and that the Statute of Limitations enacted in 1854 could not have the effect of barring a criminal action
instituted within two years after the enactment of said Act, provided that no period of prescription was fixed in a former law for the
crime in question, that is to say, that prescription cannot be invoked as a bar to a criminal action for an offense like that of falsification
involved in that case, where said action was commenced under a statute authorizing it and in the old law penalizing that crime no
period was fixed for the prescription thereof. As can be seen from a reading of the context of the decision in the aforesaid case and the
opinion of the writer thereof, said doctrine was announced without taking into account the difference between the rule governing
prescription in criminal procedure and that applicable to civil actions, but on the contrary, application was made only of the latter;
hence the holding that a special provisions as to prescription was necessary in the later statute to give it a retroactive effect.
It should be noted, however, that the Chief Justice of that Supreme Court voted vigorously against the said decision, stating in a wellreasoned dissenting opinion the following:
I . . . am of opinion, that the limitation prescribe to prosecution applies as well to prosecutions for offenses, committed before
the passage of the statute, as afterwards; and that, as the words of the statute plainly import, the limitation commences to
run from the time of the "commission of the offense," whether that was before or after its passage. The statute makes no
distinction, as respects the limitation; it makes no exception, from its provision, of offenses previously committed; and I know
of no principle, or rule of construction, which will authorize the court to engraft an exception upon the statute. It is a statute
relating to the remedy, and being enacted for the benefit of persons accused, is not an ex post facto law. The constitutional
inhibition of the enactment of retroactive laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, has no application to penal
statutes. Retroactive criminal laws, which are forbidden, are those which come under the denomination of ex post facto laws.
There is nothing to prevent statutes, respecting crimes, from being restrospective, provided they do not come under that
denomination.
It is an acknowledged general rule, in the construction of statutes, that they will not be construed to have a restrospective
operation so as to destroy or impair rights of property, or of action, unless the legislature have plainly expressed such to be
their intention. But laws which affect the remedy merely are not held to be within the rule or the inhibition against
retrospective laws, unless the remedy be entirely taken away, or so restricted, as to impair the right. Nor, as I conceive, do
statutes relating to the punishment of offenses come within the rule of construction, or the constitutional inhibition, though
their effect should be wholly to defeat a prosecution. On the contrary, laws respecting crimes, whether they relate to the
remedy merely, or to the offense, are, I think, always construed to relate to past, as well as future offenses, where their
operation is in any wise beneficial to the accused; unless the legislature have plainly declared that they are not to receive
such a construction. To give such effect to laws respecting crimes and punishments, is not to render them retrospective, or
retroactive laws, in the sense of the constitutional inhibition. These terms have no application to such laws, but relate
exclusively to laws affecting civil rights. (De Cordova vs. City of Galveston, 4 Tex., 470.)
I do not think the reservation contained in the 81st section of the act was intended to have, or should be construed to have,
any effect upon the limitation contained in the 75th section. That section was intended only to prevent repeals by implication,
and to enforce the observance of the rule, which would have applied on general principles, without its enactment, that where
the act mitigates the punishment, the milder penalty should be imposed. To hold it to apply to the limitation prescribed for
prosecution by the act, would be to except all offenses committed before the passage of the act, from the operation of the
periods of limitation therein contained, and to hold that those offenses would never become barred under its provisions. I
cannot think that such was the intention of the legislature.
There may be differences of opinion, respecting the policy of prescribing so short periods of limitation, to prosecution for high
crimes. But that was a question for the law-making power; and I can see no reason why the legislature should have intended
the limitation to apply to future, and not to pas, offense. The same reasons, and the same policy, which dictated that the
prosecution should be commenced within a prescribed period, after the offense was committed, would seem to apply equally
to offenses committed before, as to those committed after the passage of the statute.
Entertaining these views, I could not give my assent to the imposition of the pains and penalties of the law, where the
prosecution had not been commenced until after the expiration of the time within which the legislature have positively
enacted that the offense "shall be prosecuted," or be forever barred.

Furthermore, Mr. Wharton, cited in one paragraph of the said dissenting opinion, in his work entitled Criminal Pleading and Practice,
9th edition, 1889, says that, as a general rule, the laws of prescription of actions apply as well to crimes committed before the
enactment, as afterwards, and speaking of the rule to be applied to the prescription of actions and the interpretation of the laws on
that subject, he says in section 316, page 215, of said book the following:
We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statute of limitation in criminal suits the
construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially
different. In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In
the construction of the statute, therefore, the is no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to
the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made. But it is
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its
rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of
process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that
from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is
that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed
and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in
instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and
distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt,
and that statutes enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subaltern, and to secure for criminal trials the best
evidence that can be obtained.
But even if the rule generally and frequently applied by many courts of the American Union and the doctrine laid down by them were
those announced in the above-mentioned paragraphs of the Corpus Juris and the Ruling Case Law, the precept of article 22 of the
Penal Code being clear and unmistakable, according to which, penal laws have retroactive effect in so far as they are favorable to
persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, the courts of justice of these Islands cannot, and must not, make any application of the
said rule and doctrine, but must, on the contrary, abide by the said precept and comply with it and carry it into effect, as hereinbefore
stated, although no petition to that effect is made by the accused that may be favored by those laws. And a provision for the
retroactivity of penal laws having, as it has, been made in the said article in the terms already mentioned, it is evidently that when the
Philippine Legislature, the majority of whose members are also members of the Philippine Bar, and, therefore, were aware of this legal
provision, drew section 71 of the Election Law, Act No. 3030, to the effect that the offenses resulting from the violations of the said law
prescribe one year after their commission, it ought to have known that it was not necessary for it to say that said provision was to
have retroactive effect in so far as it was favorable to the accused, inasmuch as such provision had already expressly been made in
article 22 of the Penal Code, which was applicable not only to the prescription therein provided when the same might be favorable to
persons accused of those crimes, but also to every penal law the retroactivity of which might be favorable to persons accused of a
felony or misdemeanor. And, this is the best and most conclusive proof that in making the provision in section 71 aforecited, the
Legislature intended that same be given a retroactive effect, because the members thereof could not ignore the law. From all of which
it also necessarily follows that, if that doctrine established by many courts of the metropolis is to be applied in the instant case, it must
be by saying that the same is useless or that it was complied with in so far as the giving of a retroactive effect to the said prescription
was concerned, because that provision regarding retroactivity has already been expressly made in article 22 of the Penal Code, and,
therefore, it is of no importance that in the former Election Law, that in, the amended law, no provisions was made regarding
prescription to give immediate and full effect to the retroactivity provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030. The provisions of article 22 of
the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of laws favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, is to be deemed as if also
expressly made in any new law at the time of its enactment, when said law is a penal law, or one of a penal character, such as the
prescription contained in section 71 of Act No. 3030 here in question, which is of that nature, as above stated, and there is no
necessity of making in that law any provisions to that same effect. And this is the reason why in the case of Pardo de Tavera vs.
Garcia Valdez, one of the first cases in the Philippine Jurisprudence (1 Phil., 468) in which, the question, among others, was raised
whether the defendant, who was accused of grave insult defined and punished in paragraph 1, article 458, of the Penal Code, should
be punished under said article, or under the provisions of Act No. 277, which is the Libel Law and went into effect after the publication
of the libelous article and the institution of the criminal action, the court held, as stated in the syllabus, that:
"The general rule that penal laws shall be retroactive in so far as they favor the accused has no application where the later law is
expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing cause of action," which clearly means that in order for a penal statute
favorable to the accused to have a retroactive effect, it is not necessary that it be so expressly provided in the statues, or, to put it in
another way, that the provision declaring the retroactivity be repeated therein, but that if the Legislature intends it not to have a
retroactive effect, it should expressly so state in the same statute. And the reason for it is obvious. For it being the general rule,
according to article 22 of the Penal Code, that penal laws have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the accused, said general rule
applies to all laws that may be enacted in the future, and if the Legislature intends to make an exception to the said rule, it should
expressly say so.
Now, the eminent professor of International Law, Mr. Fiore, in his work on the Irretroactivity and Interpretation of Statutes, which is
termed by various eminent jurists "a work full of juridical science," after recognizing as a rule universally accepted by the courts and
expressly sanctioned by most of modern legislation that no penal law can have any retroactive effect, that is, that no action or
omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed,
advocates the retroactivity of a penal law favorable to the offender, not as a right of the latter, but founded on the very principles on
which the right of the State to punish and the combination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on
political consideration, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.
The same author, on studying the question that may arise in case the new land should have changed the rules regarding prescription,
that is to say, the retroactivity of the law as to prescription, says:

The modifications as to prescription introduced by the new law may affect the penal action or the penalty itself. With respect
to the former, it can be imagined that the new law has modified the rules as to the applicability or inapplicability of the
prescription to a given crime, or the necessary conditions for its effectiveness, or, finally, the time and period when it will have
effect.
The authors who had studied this question have reached different conclusions, because some have considered prescription as
a law of procedure or of form, while others have regarded it as a substantive law, thereby admitting, therefore, the principle
of vested right on the part of the offender.
Those who have considered the statutes of limitations as of a formal or remedial nature have maintained the opinion that the
new law must always be applied in all cases of prescription where the period was already running at the time of the
enactment of the new law on the ground that all procedural laws must be deemed retroactive by nature. Against this theory,
however, it has been said that even admitting the principle enunciated, the truth is that the culprit cannot be placed in a
worse situation, as would be the case if that theory is adopted, for although the prescription begun under the former law,
fixing a shorter period, might have been completed, he would be subject to criminal action under the new law prescribing a
longer term, even if the provisions of the latter, concerning the substance of the penal action, were not in force at the time of
the commission of the crime. Again, setting aside the theory of vested right on the part of the accused, as we have already
done (for we cannot admit any vested right on the part of a private individual as against that which is considered by the
sovereign power as indispensable for maintaining the juridical order), it can, however, be maintained that the application of
the new law about the prescription of the criminal action, when said law has extended the time of the prescription, is
tantamount to giving that penal law a retroactive effect, as regards the very substance of punishment, thus prejudicing the
offender and admitting, as to him, a right to punish, which, on account of the longer period fixed in the new law, cannot be
considered as based on any law in force and already promulgated at the time of the commission of the crime.
On the other hand, those who have considered prescription as a substantive law hold that the old law should always be
applied, the principal reason adduced by them in support of this opinion being that the accused must at all events suffer the
consequences of the situation created by himself by committing the crime. Against this opinion, it has been held, however,
that the consideration of public policy, which naturally prevails in matters of prescription, constitutes an obstacle to the
invariable application of the old law, for if the new law is less severe as regards prescription, the result would be that the
culprit would be subject to the more severe law, which has been modified in harmony with the more modern criteria
sanctioned by the new law as more in consonance with justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

To our mind, in accordance with the principles underlying all the foregoing theories regarding the retroactivity of a less severe
penal law, it must be admitted that also when the question is one of prescription must the new law be considered retroactive
if it is more favorable to the accused than the former law, and that contrariwise it should not be so considered, if it is found to
be more prejudicial. Although we are maintaining this opinion, we do not thereby accept the unjustified theory above set forth
of those who believe that there must be admitted here the supposed vested right on the part of the offender, for we have
already stated the reason why no such vested right can be recognized as against the penalty provided by law. On the
contrary, we admit this theory, but founded on the principles of justice itself upon which the right to punish, considered as a
supreme right of sovereignty, rests.
In fact, where the new law has shortened the time of prescription or established easier conditions for its effectiveness with
respect to a given crime, it is clear that the reduction of the period made in the new law implies an acknowledgment on the
part of the sovereign power that the greater severity of the provision of the former statute relative to the substance of the
criminal action is unjust.
Consequently, if the sovereign power should enforce its right under the former law it would be guilty of an inconsistency in
view of its implied admission that the old law was too severe and consequently unjust. The necessity therefore of applying the
less severe new law rests upon the principle that the sovereign power cannot exercise its right to punish except only within
those limits of justice which that sovereign power has established as being just and equitable at the time of exercising that
right.
On the other hand, when the latter statute of limitations of criminal actions is more severe than the former, either as to the
applicability of the prescription itself, or as to the requirements and duration of the action, the application of the said law to
crime committed before its enactment must be avoided not because the culprit has acquired any right to prevent said
application, but for the reasons above set out. Indeed, on what ground can the culprit pretend to prevent the sovereign power
from doing what it has the right to do for the purpose of maintaining the juridical order? There exists, therefore, no reason in
support of the theory of vested right on the part of the culprit, but what must inevitably be admitted is that the sovereign
power cannot, without doing an injustice, apply the more severe legal provision in the matter of prescription; and that that
provision cannot justly be applied unless it was previously promulgated, as even the right itself to punish cannot come into
existence except by virtue of a law duly promulgated and in force at the time that it was violated and the crime committed.
The more severe law in matter of prescription extends the field of criminal action and affects the substance of the same,
because it determines the basis and the sphere of the right to punish. Now, can the sovereign power do all this without any
law? Can it, without committing an injustice, extend the effect of the new law to acts committed before its enactment? As the
sovereign power cannot punish any act not expressly penalized by a former law, nor punish with a more severe penalty any
act performed before said penalty was prescribed and the law fixing it promulgated, so it cannot extend the criminal action
(that is, its right to punish) by virtue of a later law by applying to acts completed before its promulgation the less favorable
provisions therein made regarding prescription. In fact, in any case where reduction of the time of prescription formerly fixed
is to be made under a new law, or where harder conditions are required by said law for effectively taking advantage of the
prescription, the sovereign power is exercising the right to punish acts committed prior to the promulgation of the new law,
and it is evident that no such right can be recognized in the sovereign power.

From all of the foregoing, we conclude that upon the very principles of justice, under which the less severe provisions of the
new law must regulate all the elements of the criminal action, said less severe new law must also control the matter of
prescription, provided that there is no final and irrevocable judgment, and this rule holds good even if the modifications of the
statute have reference to the prescription of the penalty, because in substance the prescription of the penalty is equivalent to
the prescription of the criminal action. (Fiore, pages 423-428.)
Wharton gives a clear explanation of the distinction to be made between the construction of prescription in criminal actions and that of
prescription in civil case in the paragraph above quoted from his book, and the grounds for the distinction are also clear and are not
unknown to anybody, for, as Wharton says, they are inherent in the origin and nature itself of the law of prescription, which must be
liberally construed in favor of the accused for if prescription in criminal matters is, as said author says, a benefit, a grace granted by
the State, and a waiver of its right to prosecute and an announcement that the crime is no longer the subject of prosecution, from the
moment that the granting of that grace or benefit, or the making of such waiver, is known, the prosecution for the said crime and the
punishment of the offender would be a juridical contradiction.
But the opinions discussed by Fiore in his book abovementioned are more in point, for he refers precisely to the prescription provided
in a later statute the subject of which is the criminal action or the penalty, that is, the prescription of the crime, as is the case now
before us, or the prescription of the penalty, whether prescription be regarded as a law of procedure or of form, or as substantive law.
After examining the different opinions of the writers on the matter, Fiore has come, as seen from the above quotation, to the
conclusion that, whether the statute relative to prescription be considered as of a procedural or formal, or substantive, nature, the new
statute must be applied if it is less severe or more favorable to the accused, but not if it is more prejudicial, notwithstanding the
general rule that all procedural laws are retroactive in regard to prescription. In view of the special motion filed by the accused on May
2, 1922, it does not matter and it is of no importance, so far as the question herein raised is concerned, whether the provision
contained in section 71 of Act No. 3030 be considered as of a substantive, procedural, or adjective character, because applying the
principles above enunciated, the result is the same, and the more severe law in the matter of prescription extends, as Fiore says, the
field of the criminal action and affects the very substance thereof, because it determines the basis and the sphere of the rights to
punish.
It may, perhaps, be argued that no term having been fixed in the Election Law prior to Act No. 3030 for the prescription of the offenses
resulting from the violations thereof, and said Act No. 3030 having fixed at one year the period for the prescription, the former law is
more lenient, less severe, and more favorable to the persons accused of those offenses than the latter. Such an argument, however, is
absolutely erroneous and untenable, if it is borne in mind that no period of prescription having been fixed in the former law, those
offense were imprescriptible, and the offender could be prosecuted and punished at any time and indefinitely, even ten, twenty, or
more years after the commission thereof, whereas the new law, that is, Act No. 3030 in providing the period of one year for the
prescription, has, in effect, shortened the time of prescription fixed in the old law by virtue of the silence thereof, reducing it to one
year and has established less difficult conditions for the application of the same as regards those offenses, which is evidently more
favorable and lenient to the violators of the said former law, and, as Fiore says in one of the paragraph above quoted from his book,
the reduction made by the new law implies a recognition on the part of the sovereign power that the greater severity of the former
law, as regards the substance of the criminal action, is unjust, and it would contradict itself if it would attempt to enforce its right
under the conditions of the former law which has already been regarded by the conscientious public opinion as juridically burdensome,
and, therefore, unjust, and the sovereign power cannot exercise the right to punish except within the limits regarded by it as just at
the time of exercising it.
If, therefore, in reviewing the former Election Law contained in the two chapters of the Administrative Code hereinbefore mentioned,
for the purpose of amending and reforming it in accordance with the dictates of reason, justice and experience, the Legislature did
amend and reform it by the enactment of Act No. 3030, which supplied the deficiency found in the old law with regard to the
prescription of the crimes penalized therein, by providing in section 71 of Act No. 3030 that those crimes, which year after their
commission, because their imprescriptibility was considered by the conscientious public opinion as juridically burdensome, and,
therefore, unjust, it is evident that the State, the Government and the courts of justice representing it, cannot, without committing a
gross injustice, exercise the right to prosecute and punish the violator of the old law under the conditions required by the law and
outside of the limits now regarded by the sovereign power, that is to say, the Legislature, as just by the enactment of said Act No.
3030, which took effect on March 9, 1922. And such injustice would be more apparent still, if the violators of the old Election Law,
which was amended by Act No. 3030, would be prosecuted and convicted five, ten, twenty, or more years after the said violations
when the proof of their innocence may not have been kept by them, while violators of Act No. 3030, who may not have been
prosecuted within the one year fixed by section 71 aforesaid, would be free from being prosecuted and punished for the crimes
committed by them. And this injustice, which is so contrary to conscientious public opinion and repugnant to humane sentiments,
would necessarily result, if the provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030, which is now in force, are not immediately applied right at this
stage of the case in favor of the herein accused, by taking up first the special motion of the accused filed on May 2d of this year, before
the petition for reconsideration and re-hearing hereinbefore mentioned, or, better, by ignoring the said petition and disposing of the
case by deciding the motion of May 2d, wherein the accused invoked the prescription provided in the said section, for the reason that
this action was commenced on December 20, 1920, one year and a half after the commission of the offense resulting from the
violation of the Election Law with which they are charged.
In view of the foregoing, we find the said crime to have prescribed, and setting aside the decision of this court published on the 31st of
March of this year, the present action is dismissed with all the costs de oficio, and the bond given by the accused for their provisional
release is cancelled, which release is hereby declared final. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-5270

January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No.
275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that
the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the
conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a
steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting
cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull,
while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said
H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for
trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means
of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said
vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of
the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals,
from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the
port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every
twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from
one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals,
and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are
transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions
of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five
hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First
Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were
disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the
province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides
generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts
over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws
thereof. (U.S. vs.Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which
such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been
committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian
vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof,
when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana
ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to
the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial
waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor.
During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated
at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the
further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control
and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly
power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public
ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until
within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the
effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country
into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to
the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144),
Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as
"containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle
was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war
has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and
mutual
deference
between
nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but little control over their
actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe
allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds
its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are
essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same
degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to
them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity
of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French
courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member
of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339;
Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great
Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial
Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall,
who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the
ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are
touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the
jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented
to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich.
Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and
would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the
purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as
in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between
Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each
country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels
belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the
conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p.
754.) This exception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding
wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are
affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew
upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the
cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galveston,
Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to
take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard
against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876;
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of
Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault
and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through
diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the
Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of
your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and
Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that
jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence involving
offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred
upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise
between captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the
captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is
competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such
circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to
forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in
the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and
if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such
punishment as may be defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one
member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and
reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the
country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It
was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the
nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law,
are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of
Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon
this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals
is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the
disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the defendant knowingly andwillfully failed to
provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of
the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act
forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and
directed the act." So in Wongvs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the
words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was
done by design done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same
effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that "according
to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission
complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be
in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and
the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4
Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such
animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads
in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said
animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient"
and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original
complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words " adecuado," "suficiente," and
"conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for
the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a
fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to
the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating
commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of
Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional principles different from
those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which
govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all
nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the
possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in
express terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and
until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the
territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local
government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to
organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic
act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution
of the government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by
the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto
(U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its
wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local
legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of the history of the
United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U.
S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in
legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there
by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited
only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all
other respects it is plenary. (De Limavs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197;
Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and legislation founded on the theory
was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides
that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all
the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized
a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine
Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the war with Spain, the
executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was
surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then
devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the occupied territory. Provision
therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace
was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and
the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty

therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United
States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until
Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the President as
commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President
embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in
his report for 1901
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It
not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these
different powers the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the
organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually
transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power
of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to the
Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as
complete civil government should be established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes,
customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational
system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to
provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in
conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights.
The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our
theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should
be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment
of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the
declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy
for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a
punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances;
that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill
passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until
otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the
United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands
in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised
previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the
President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the
President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection
with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President had erected. Congress adopted
the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the
limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus
extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated
powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission
establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing
a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act
of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to
continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of
the United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses
the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power
to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of
both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its
creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and
Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the
Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed
control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular

sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power
its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative,
and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as
in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the
doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls
legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The GovernorGeneral, the head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as
executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar,
and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in
the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under
the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of
legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same
independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that
government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the
question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the
State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of
the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former operates
under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United
States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State
constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has
not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its
enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant
is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true
that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has
itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was
fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion
of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to
confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of
enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to
the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they
met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to
Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision
does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by
acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners
Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or implication
forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has
no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by
virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may
do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by
direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized
the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other
specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the
Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval.
The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this
act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce
between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall.
(U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full
constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands,
and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master
of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull
brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals,
contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts,
all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six
months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from
Chines and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of
Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant,
behind the breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of
said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said
cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship,
without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and
security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay,
and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof
to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in
the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front
sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms,
which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling,
individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were
transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has
testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he
is acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last
year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle
loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of
the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three
hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them individually can safely and suitably
carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal
falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon
the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR,

Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 172716

HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan

Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
Promulgated:
EVANGELINE PONCE,
Respondents.
November 17, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts
ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and

(2) Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. [3]

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without
acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.[4] Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. [5]Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A.

No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners

forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.[6]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial
appeal of a judgment of conviction.[7]

Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues
that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses
(e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries
from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as
the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed
by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, [8] in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to also, upon motion of the appellee ormotu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition

contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated
the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. [10]

The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of
his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 [11] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance
does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding [12] at
the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order
for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense [13] protects
him from, among others,

post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent

jurisdiction upon a valid information. [14] It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the same offense. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property as the [latter] requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not.[15]
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the
Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to
three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall
be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasioffenses of imprudence and negligence (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of reckless
imprudence and simple imprudence (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,[16] unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional
crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple,

are distinct species of crime, separately defined and

penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring
clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x [17] on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as
opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated
as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding
penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each
penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.[18] (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to
person or property.[19]
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence, its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,
[21]

stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller[22] that [r]eckless impudence is not

a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x, [23] has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizonjurisprudence[24] only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception
of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another
resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the
dismissal of a case for damage to property thru reckless imprudence because a prior case against the same accused for reckless
driving, arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the
same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga[26] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero[27] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes,J.), People v. Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in
1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals[32] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila[33] (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasioffenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for serious physical
injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence because of the accuseds prior acquittal of slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence, with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: [34]
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.[35] x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more
than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,[36] decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.Estiponas

inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were
laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for damage to property for
reckless imprudence despite his prior conviction for slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, arising from
the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength
of Buan:[38]
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs.
Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29,
1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.[39]
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969
(page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy
and submits that its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs . He stressed that if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap.[40] (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People
v. Silva, [41] a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence and Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence. Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diazand its progeny People v. Belga:[42]
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated
in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless
imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same
collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by
the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident.
Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga
moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed
against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one
filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied

and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one
of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against
Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance,
upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On
appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case
filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for
multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading
double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense
of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal
Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether
or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9).
Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other
that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have
been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one
crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could
not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. [43]

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) for the purpose of delimiting
or clarifying its application.[44] We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless
Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views
expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device
allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies [46]); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental attitude x x x behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,[47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent
acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under
either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying
penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasicrime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to complex the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a
single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence

adopts both approaches.

Thus,

one

line

of

rulings

(none

of

which

involved

the

issue

of

double

jeopardy) applied Article 48 by complexing one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences [48] unless one consequence amounts to a
light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies
and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts. [49] Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes),
even though under Republic Act No. 7691,[50] the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under
Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the complexing of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave
or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from
the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,[51] penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles
v. Jose,[52] we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and less serious physical injuries, as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein
shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property , x x x.
[53]
(Emphasis supplied)

By additional penalty, the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over
the other. Either (1) we allow the complexing of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for
light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under

the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasicrimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as
provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and
applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.

A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep
inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to
the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting
two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back
in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case ofPeople vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now
in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries
through
reckless
imprudence
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. [54] (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number
and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence
alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court.[55]
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as light offenses (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can recraft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying
a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 97170 December 10, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUDY MOSENDE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joselito R. Enriquez for appellant Mariano.
Benjamin A. Opena for appellant Rafols.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The conviction for murder subject of the present appeal rests on circumstantial evidence which, as is axiomatic, is as valid and as
persuasive a foundation for conviction for a crime as direct and positive testimonial proof of the specific constitutive elements thereof.
No motive or reason for the killing here dealt with is revealed by the proofs. This is immaterial, where the evidence otherwise
persuasively demonstrates who is the killer and the acts by which he has carried out his nefarious intent. This is not to say that what
lies in the murky criminal mind is not of interest, specially to penologists, criminal psychologists or social scientists; but it is scarcely
material in reaching a conclusion of guilt and imposing an appropriate penalty on the basis of a cold, dispassionate appraisal of the
bare facts exposed by the evidence.
The murder victim in this case was a fifteen year-old boy named Carlo Alipao, who was living in the town of Mainit, Surigao del Norte
with his mother, Gloria Alipao. He was last seen alive by his mother in the late afternoon of September 18, 1986, when he left his
home with two friends, Jinky Mozol and Marlon Escuyos, to visit another friend, Rudy Mosende. Carlo, or "Lelot," as he was more
familiarly called, was then wearing a T-shirt and dark-colored short trousers with stripes.
There is no narration in the record of what Lelot and his companions did after leaving his home and before Lelot was killed. What the
record contains is the narrative of Benceslao Resullar, Jr. and Fidelino Balaga, the former, a friend of Rudy Mosende, of events
transpiring after Lelot's death.
According to Benceslao and Fidelino, at about 7 o'clock in the evening of that day, September 18, 1986, they were drinking rum at
Benceslao's house when Rudy Mosende dropped by and asked them to take a stroll. They agreed. When they reached a street corner,
Mosende asked them to take some "pulutan" at his shack. Again they agreed. On entering Mosende's shack which was in a
dilapidated state and had no flooring Mosende shut the door and told them to dig a hole in the ground. Again the two agreed and
did as they were told, thinking that they would bury the entrails and hide of the animal slaughtered by Mosende for their pulutan.
When the hole was knee-deep, Mosende told them to go to the shack's toilet.
Benceslao and Fidelino were aghast to find in the toilet the dead body of a male person, whose hands and feet were bound with rope,
and whose head and upper torso were encased in a sack. Mosende now told them to bury the cadaver in the hole they had just dug.
This time, the pair demurred. However, they eventually did as they were told when Mosende drew out a bolo and angrily threatened
them with it. Fearing for their lives, they carried the corpse to the hole, dropped it in, and covered it with soil. Benceslao asked
Mosende who was the person they had just buried. Mosende said it was Lelot Alipao ("Lelot" being, as already mentioned, the
nickname of Carlito Alipao). Mosende then told them that if word ever got out of Lelot's (Carlo's) killing, they and their parents would
themselves be slain. With Mosende's threat ringing in their ears, Benceslao and Fidelino left the shack; and not long afterwards, fled to
Surigao City. 1 They returned to Mainit after Mosende was arrested sometime in April, 1987, and revealed what they knew to the
authorities. 2
Carlo (Lelot) Alipao's remains were discovered after seven (7) months or so. The events leading to that discovery, as disclosed by the
largely undisputed evidence given by Lelot's mother and other disinterested witnesses, are succinctly recounted by the Trial Court.
Those events include the extraordinary dream of Mrs. Alipao which supposedly revealed to her the place where her son's body lay. The
Trial Court's summary is as follows: 3
. . . (A)fter Carlo failed to come home, Mrs. Gloria Alipao asked Jinky Mozol and Marlon Escuyos about her son but
they did not know where he was. She searched for her missing son in different places in the vicinity of Mainit but
without success. When she met Rudy Mosende a few times, he gave her false leads as to the whereabouts of Carlo.
When she went to the places indicated by him, she did not find her son. Mrs. Alipao declared that she made to look
like a fool by Rudy Mosende.
Eventually, Gloria Alipao dreamed that her son was buried somewhere in the place of Rudy Mosende. When she went
to the place and stood outside, she smelled a very bad odor coming from inside the lot. She told many people about
her belief that her son was buried there.
For his part, Police Lieutenant Ranulfo Demiar, Station Commander of Mainit, declared that on April 13, 1987, he
received an order (Exhibit C) from Judge Desiderio Custodio, presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Mainit,
authorizing the exhumation of a body within the Mosende family lot. After securing the consent in writing of Arthur
Mosende (Exhibit D), brother of Rudy Mosende, as both their parents were dead, an exhumation was conducted in
his presence by Dr. Lourdes Alabat, Chief of the Mainit Medicare Community Hospital. Also present were Barangay
Captain Dioscoro Montaner of Barangay Quezon, Mainit poblacion, some policemen and other government and health
officials of Mainit.
Exhumed from the residential lot in Mainit of the Mosende family were the remains of a human body wearing a Tshirt
(Exhibit
F-2)
and
dark-colored short pants with stripes (Exhibit F-3). The hands and feet of the deceased were tied with rope while the
head and upper body were placed inside a sack. The body was identified by Mrs. Alipao to be that of her missing son
Carlo Alipao.
Witness Dr. Lourdes Alabat testified that on April 13, 1987, she conducted the exhumation and autopsy of a human
body which was identified by Gloria Alipao to be that of her son Carlo. After a physical examination of the dead body,
she prepared an Exhumation Report (Exhibit A) dated April 14, 1987 which contained her medical findings and
conclusions. Among other things she declared that she found a softening of the skull of the victim at the right
occipital region or the area just behind the right ear. She opined that the cause of the softening was heavy pressure
or a blow to that region with heavy object like a piece of wood. At the right jaw of the head, she also discovered a
linear fracture and a circular softening of the bone which was probably caused also by a heavy pressure or blow
applied to that area. In view of these injuries to the head, she concluded that the victim probably died of intra-

cranial or brain hemorrhage. She issued the Death Certificate of Carlo Alipao (Exhibit B) on the basis of the
identification made by his mother.
An information was filed on June 10, 1987 in the Regional Trial Court at Surigao City accusing Rudy Mosende, Jinky Mozol and Marlon
Escuyos as co-conspirators in the killing of Carlo Alipao, "with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength." 4 The
three accused were separately arraigned, and after they all entered a plea of not guilty, trial ensued.
After the prosecution rested its case, Mozol and Escuyos filed a demurrer to evidence. By Order dated October 7, 1989, the demurrer
was sustained and the case dismissed against the two (2) movants. Trial resumed and was concluded only against Rudy Mosende.
Mosende sought to prove an alibi through his testimony and that of two (2) others, Police Corporal Jose Arlan and Ponso Pecan, a hired
helper at the sari-sari store of his sister, Alma Mosende Dumadag. he had ceased to reside in Mainit as early as 1984 when the family
residence was destroyed by a typhoon and, both his parents being already dead at the time, had then decided to live with his elder
sister, Alma, in the town of Tubod, eight kilometers away from Mainit. He claims further that he never left Tubod on September 18, and
19, 1986 because of a swollen foot, sprained during a basketball game. He denied stories of Benceslao Resullar and Fidelino Balaga,
asserting that the former bore him a grudge because they had once fought in a basketball match.
As already mentioned, the Trial Court found Mosende guilty of the murder of Carlo Alipao, on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
refusing to believe his alibi. The Court's judgment dated October 2, 1990 5 made the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Rudy Mosende, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a principal of the crime
of murder, qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Art. 248, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no other modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties; to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, Carlo Alipao, in the amount of P30,000.00, and
moral damages of P10,000.00; and the costs.
Mosende assigns as errors allegedly fatal to the judgment of conviction
1) the Trial Court's acceptance of the amended information after Mosende had already pleaded to the original one, and its omission to
cause his re-arraignment and entry of a new plea with respect to said amended indictment;
2) its failure to accord credit to the entry of September 17, 1986 in the blotter of the Mainit Police Force to the effect that "together
with Virgilio Mujica and Victor Aguho all of the seabees, up to this date, subject Lelot Alipao not return home and not known of his
whereabouts (sic);" and
3) said Trial Court's failure, otherwise, to acquit him on reasonable doubt.
The appellant's objections to the amendment of the information must be overruled. The amendment consisted solely in the addition of
a statement that his two (2) co-defendants, who were minors, had "acted with discernment." 6 No other change was made in any other
allegation of the original indictment, much less as to the acts or omissions ascribed to Mosende himself. As regards Mosende, there
was no revision of the charges of any sort whatsoever which could affect the nature of the offense charged, the modifying
circumstances alleged, or the evidence against him, or the defense he could present. The amendment was in other words purely
formal, one which could cause him no prejudice at all. Such an amendment, adding nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged vis a vis Mosende himself, causing him no surprise and incapable of causing injury to his substantive rights, is one of form
which may be made at any time, even after arraignment. 7 The admission of the amended information by the Trial Court over the
objections of Mosende's counsel 8 must thus be sustained.
So, too, the Trial Court's refusal to accord any probative value to the entry in the blotter of the Mainit Police Force cannot be faulted.
That entry allegedly reflected the report of the mother of Carlo Alipao to the effect that as of September 17, 1986 her son was already
missing ("subject Lelot Alipao not return home and not known of his whereabouts [sic])." It contradicts, it is claimed, her testimony
that she had last seen Carlo alive in the late afternoon of September 18, 1986, when he left his home with two friends, Jinky Mozol
and Marlon Escuyos, to visit another friend, Rudy Mosende. 9 The Trial Court evidently imputed the contradiction simply to a clerical
error, some slight imperfection either in the reporting by a distraught mother, or in the recording by an unconcerned or passive police
officer, and did not consider the blotter entry to be entitled to full credit, or deserving of more than, or otherwise militating against, the
positive and more categorical and detailed statements of Mrs. Alipao on the witness stand. It acted correctly in doing so, consistently
with this Court's observations in earlier cases on the probative value of police blotters generally. 10
The Court agrees that there is no reason to disbelieve and discard the testimonial evidence of Benceslao Resullar, Jr. and Fidelino
Balaga, notwithstanding Mosende's contention that the former bore him a grudge and seized the opportunity to embroil him in the
murder of Lelot Alipao. It taxes credulity to suppose that an altercation or exchange of blows during a basketball game should have so
filled Benceslao with deep-seated hatred of his antagonist and so imbued him with great artfulness as to lead him to concoct the
elaborate scenario that he described to the Court, implicating Mosende by indirection in the crime. And even if Benceslao were to be
discredited, for the reason Mosende advances, no cause exists to accord similar treatment to Fidelino, who echoed and confirmed
Benceslao's narrative.
Taking account of the facts laid before the Trial Court by Benceslao and Fidelino, in relation to others confirmed with like
persuasiveness by other evidence, the Court is again impelled to agree that although there is no proof directly linking Mosende to the
actual murder of Carlo (Lelot) Alipao, the established circumstances cannot but lead to the conclusion of his guilt thereof.
The law is that circumstantial evidence will support and justify a verdict of conviction if there be more than one circumstance, if the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt. 11 These requisites are adequately met in this case at bar. There are several circumstances generating
certitude of Mosende's guilt, these being:
1) it was in the shack of the family of Rudy Mosende that the corpse of Lelot Alipao bound hand and foot, head
and upper body encased in a sack, dead from severe blows to the head from a blunt instrument was dug up from
a shallow hole in the dirt floor;
2) the body had been buried in that place by Benceslao Resullar, Jr. and Fidelino Balaga some seven months earlier;
3) it was on the invitation and request of Rudy Mosende that Benceslao and Fidelino had gone to that shack and dug
the hole themselves;
4) it was Rudy Mosende who showed them the cadaver of Lelot Alipao, lying in the toilet; and it was Rudy who told
them to carry it to the hole and bury it there, and who bullied them into doing so when they initially demurred;
5) Mosende told them it was Lelot Alipao they were interring;
6) Mosende threatened to kill Benceslao and Fidelino and their parents if anyone should come to know of the
evening's bizarre event; and because of their fear, the two exiled themselves in Surigao City, returning to Mainit only
after they learned of Mosende's arrest;
7) when Lelot left his home for the last time, with two friends, it was allegedly to visit Rudy Mosende.
The foregoing circumstances are incapable of no rational explanation save Mosende's wish to conceal the fact that Lelot Alipao had
died a violent death; and there can be no rational cause for that wish except his being himself the cause of Alipao's violent demise.
There was satisfactory identification of the exhumed corpse made by the victim's own mother and another person, distantly related to
Rudy Mosende, as well as by the latter himself. As the Trial Court observed:
With respect to the identity of the exhumed human remains, the evidence clearly showed that it was that of the
missing Carlo Alipao. The victim's mother, Mrs. Gloria Alipao, definitively declared that the short pants (Exhibit F-3)
and the T-shirt (Exhibit F-2) were the very same ones worn by her son when she last saw him in the afternoon of
September 18, 1986. On cross-examination she described the T-shirt as having several figures in front and the short
pants as dark-colored with stripes (tsn, Gloria Alipao, pp. 62-63, April 18, 1989). Although the face of Carlo Alipao
was no longer recognizable, she identified him thru his clothes.
Aside from Mrs. Alipao, another person present at the exhumation, Vicente Montaner, Jr., declared that he recognized
the pair of short pants worn by the deceased because it had been given by his wife to Carlo Alipao who was her
nephew. Incidentally he is also related to Rudy Mosende as the latter's late mother and the father of Vicente were
second cousins (tsn, Vicente Montaner, Jr., p. 10 and p. 21 January 6, 1989).
Rudy Mosende's proffered alibi must rejected in line with familiar jurisprudence. It cannot stand in the face of the positive declarations
of disinterested witnesses having no reasonable motive to give false evidence that he was at the scene of the crime on the day of its
commission and consummation and in fact sought to conceal it, apart from the fact that Tubod, the place where he claimed to be
residing, is "only eight kilometers away from Mainit," as the Trial Court points out, "and there are public conveyance(s) plying the
road . . . (and it) would have been quite easy for the accused to take a jeepney ride to Mainit considering that it was nearly fiesta and
there were many jeeps going to town.
Appreciated against the appellant was the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, for when found the corpse was trussed hand and foot
"like an animal," according to the Court. It was while the victim was thus helpless, in no position to offer any sort or resistance or
defense, that in the Trial Court's view, the fatal blows on the head were inflicted; that Alipao, in other words, was tied up and rendered
defenseless before he was killed; and that it makes no sense to assume that he was bound only after he was killed. This inference of
the Trial Court will not be disturbed either.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Trial Court subject of the appeal at bar, being in accord with the evidence and applicable law and
jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED, with costs de officio.

G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from
the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other
evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same
place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house
situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and
were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there
was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee
by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow
had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events,
it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by
the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who
slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a
house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a
knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his
identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10
o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the
party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps
fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately
went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of
mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give
his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the
wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the
fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal
liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous
thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to
resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to
desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been
wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the
thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of
the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful
aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which
under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and
cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38
Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or
criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal
Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent
in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to
the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the
United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that
malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly
indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence
of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be
looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature

does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a
corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act
is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there
can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the
former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when
the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence,
nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there
can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than
real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in
order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall
within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it
made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the
will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription
of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of
the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act
defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision
of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be
punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules
prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those
contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they
may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its
provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in
English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means
little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing
lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other
words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought"
are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word
"malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from
our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed
"voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal
intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the
decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between
private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from
a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness,
without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in
any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this
doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has
supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others
of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we
hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of
mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every
guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he
who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve
punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the
seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance
of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only
the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the
adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could
not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of
the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held
that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is
clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists
only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing
which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with
otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed.,
190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509;
Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is
to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined
by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a
killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he
does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person
is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes
the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and
disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his
money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were
such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice
or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the " act punished by law" was
committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under
that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it
will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such
belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his
hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A,
who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies.
It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable
man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such
doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is
loaded a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury
who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because
the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without
other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly
entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving
the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion
resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code?
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and
that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87
of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was
nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed
their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation
and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child,
more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts
that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a
point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the

voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to
his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined,"
realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted
in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not
that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years
and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the
accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that
under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable.
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his
window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his
money, otherwise his house would be burned" because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was
found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just selfdefense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months
of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the
accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism,
was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow
alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or
criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted
by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge. The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of
the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of
Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide
through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and
two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000.
Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that
he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon
order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram
and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of
loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide
the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party.
The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route
to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached
one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and
upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room
which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an
seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .
45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot
and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and
upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's
body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea.
Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived
at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke
up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and
shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas
stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he
had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who
was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a
natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at
Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand,
Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise.
Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to
exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and
corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping
in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their
mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was
awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and
considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was
committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful
examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of
veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the
truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact
made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta,
on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any
reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death
thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court
held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under
the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.,
488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the
Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice,
"who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you
enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and
believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be
his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a
lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend
under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or

carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the
instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if
the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only
if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
(People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the
new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not
be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil.,
109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace
of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or
in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in
U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such
notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something
which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety
can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled
official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of
the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of
a reasonably prudent man, condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in
the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya
mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido,
por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is
wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil.,
605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance ofalevosia. There is, however,
a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised
Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only
the first requisite is present appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by
them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him
dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to
take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without
any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally
an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and
ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and
Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet
arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were
sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During
the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accusedappellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole
before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed
decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peacerrada in the amount
of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review. 6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo,
was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their
landlord, Lloyd Peacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in
the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police
authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay
Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno,
and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the
lifeless body of Lloyd Peacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an
hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought
back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at
Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident,
were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were
likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was
made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right,
directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm.
in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound
exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located
1.5 inches below the right nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left
scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper
3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming
out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the
aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial border of the right
scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic),
INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D.
ROJAS,
M.D.
Rural
Health
Physician
Ajuy,
Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the
internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and
voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of
Lloyd Peacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained
having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for
murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The
information read as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided at
the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown
by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said
Lloyd D. Peacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.

14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose
Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peacerrada, the victim's
widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused
Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the
accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of
the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the
Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose
Huntoria; and Nanie Peacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on
February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds
comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated
wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability
that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she
incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender
of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave
his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at
Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut
route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for
help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he
hid
himself
behind
a
clump
of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim
Lloyd Peacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
"linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his
wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27 Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for
fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter,
he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21,
1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused
denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house
which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came
to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform
him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on
the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of
Peacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a

distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If
Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were
moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He
said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The
natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin,
'. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared
not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he
and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that
he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is
beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by
the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 isreclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity
for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado,
128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion
perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime
charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police
force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he
made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene
of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering
that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a
more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the
bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On
the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in
that place would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that
accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would
even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise
admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any
evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned
in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in
killing Lloyd Peacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused
by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus,
insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for
the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that
could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the
basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood
concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him,
he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the
stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six
accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance
by the herein accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was
hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peacerrada and were in constant movement, I could not
determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid
movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was
stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because
according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir. 39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing
of Lloyd Peacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the
criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant
perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent ; and there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under
the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of
Lloyd Peacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as
used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any
harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus
this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not
know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of
the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of
the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia
argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already
sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds,
including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But
more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or
eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to
the police authorities the crime he had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for
several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long
delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be
endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true
that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and around; they
were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he
testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the
deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking
of Lloyd Peacerrada when you told Mrs. Peacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim. 46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if
not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden
to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto
Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which
Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get
into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the
victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances,
we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada doubtful
it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated
by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much
younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant,
in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence

was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding
his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing
of Lloyd Peacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of
the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of
alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de
oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152644

February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash
Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002
Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager,
and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in
mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings 3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel
leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March

1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC")
with violation of Article 91(B), 4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD
1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), 7 Section 1088 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), 9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of
Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of
Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute
legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC 12 initially deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of "indubitable
ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on
petitioners motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to
its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation
of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the
Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting
violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of
pollution, in proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both
instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set
of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws
and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation
of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the
same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 9648 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 9651 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial
because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property
which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act
is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997,
petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge
for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense.
After making of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas
on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part,
public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion,
Branch 38 ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside
the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three
other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation
are not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit
and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a wellestablished rule in this jurisdiction that

"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one another. Each of these
laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from a single act. 15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because
(1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single
act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the
Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. 16Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. 17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in
nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be
quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for
being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses
being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the
petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not
possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the
Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial courts denial
of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067)
AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D.
984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM
AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU
DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY

MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS
EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER
CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.] 19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the
charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 20 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. 21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 22 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to
quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense.23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition
deserves outright denial.

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges
since the element of "lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. 24 The only limit to this
rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." 25 In People v.
Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where
two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of
the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. 28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting
petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD
1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit
River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the
absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984
(Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for
violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental
Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the
pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized
dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of
the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should
ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect,
and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt
materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law
and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or
adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This
element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or
causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled
doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and
RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova.
In particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of
electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation
of electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those
two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus
falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised
Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional
provision involved which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the terms
of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first
sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first
and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x 30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of
double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or
incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the
first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses
arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the
Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157171

March 14, 2006

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24547 1that affirmed the conviction of
petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. 3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30,
1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de
Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election
Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, ViceChairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully,
and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninetyeight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of
Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one
thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and
Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was
convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined
under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg.
881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS
as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6)
MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors of the
appellate court:
I

ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER
DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE
ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT
IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL. 7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of
substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class
of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith
and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala
prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With
these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by
a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes
or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with
malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall
appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos,
Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were sealed and
forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the Statement of Votes with
appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in
his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six
Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan.

3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements
of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads
the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then]
records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals
appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was handed to appellant
who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of
Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes
entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received
by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423. 15The grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This
error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero. 16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently
entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board. 17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who
prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an
intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC
reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the
dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not
added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere
decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision. 20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has consistently held that
factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal,
particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. 21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the
results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. 22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual
votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue.
However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be
allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to
another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but
increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 42122

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. INOCENTES MOLDES, defendant-appellant.
December 1, 1934
Fidel J. Silva for appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for appellee.
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte of the crime of homicide. On the night of the 3rd of April in the barrio of
Maya, municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, there was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of
ceremonies at that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to the
porch of the house and with his bolo began cutting down the decorations. He descended into the yard of the house and challenged
everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his challenged for a fight.
The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in a friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the
ground, appellant struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm, which was described by the sanitary inspector on post
mortem examination as follows:
A long incised wound located on the lower portion of the left arm directed inwards downwards and extending as low as the anticubital
fossa and cutting the inferior part of the biceps muscle, and the branches of the brachial artery. It measured 2 inches long, 2 inches
wide and 1 inches deep.
As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of action.
The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the care of a
local "curandero." This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the deceased died on the 15th of April, 1934.
The theory of the defense was that appellant was behaving at the dance, that the deceased was the aggressor, that he struck him on
the dance floor with a cane, and that when appellant ran from the house, deceased followed him about 200 yards until they came to a
creek and appellant could not retreat any further, and that when being attacked by the deceased with a cane and a bolo, he succeeded
in wrenching the bolo from the hands of the deceased and in self-defense inflicted the wound.
While there is testimony to the above effect, the witnesses for the defense were not believed by the trial court, and the testimony to
that effect does not read as clear and convincing as does that of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the dark and
in self-defense.
It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the use of a
lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the
natural consequences of his act.
It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the wound would not
have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this assault took place, proper modern surgical service is not available.

The general rule is "... that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is,
calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical
treatment ... ." (29 C. J., 1081, and the numerous cases there cited.)

Ruling Case Law is in strict accord with Corpus Juris.

. . . The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all criminal jurisprudence. It
is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person
inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious
and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing the fatal
result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which were of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which
were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however this may be, the rule surely seems
to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. . . . (13
R. C. L., 751, 752; 22 L. R. A., New Series, 841.)
This court in the case of United States vs. Escalona (12 Phil., 54), following a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, adopted the
same rule.
Therefore this contention of appellant must be held to be without merit.
During the trial, counsel for the defense asked several questions as to the character and habits of the deceased, but the court
sustained the objections of the fiscal as to the propriety of such questions. Appellant urges that this was prejudicial error. That such
questions were relevant to the issue then in question is not obvious. It is not necessary to pass upon the merits of this contention, as
such questions were not insisted upon at the trial, and no exception was taken to the rulings of the court.

Fixing the period of confinement at six years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, the judgment appealed from as thus modified is affirmed. No expression as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the
canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the
opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide)
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed
ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him
from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian
to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural
health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla
had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for medicolegal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for
the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close
relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all
the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated
anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's
house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier
found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm
which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He
was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been
re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of
Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring
water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33,
Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this
provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch
incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the
hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful
act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded
to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the
deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately
caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the
infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death
was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for
all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78
Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to
work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the
first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the
predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr.
Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm
and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction
of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of
the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence,
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his
death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate
approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but
the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing.
As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In
fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients,
only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time . As
in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous
and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately
severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe
tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp.
1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking
him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such
prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty
of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act.
After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier
forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather
unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case ofPeople v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041,
July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability
is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind
of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the
civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall
not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose
of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance
of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It
will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause
for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43530

August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty
of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of
ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs
of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the
City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the
last named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only
succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him
and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge and the SolicitorGeneral, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was
the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make
on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first
steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause
and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it
is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may
be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the
purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day
in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical
conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective,
once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is
nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.1avvphil.et
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the
nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the
acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which
they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must
show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation , that
is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and can not
furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from
the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to directly
infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the
legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would
be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the commission of the offense, are not
punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution, and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to
the offense."
Considering says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892 that in order to declare that such and
such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective be known and established, or that said acts
be of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective
and finality to serve as ground for the designation of the offense: . . . .
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery
but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein
cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another
against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the
evidence and the following allegation contained in the information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store
by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and that the accused did not succeed in entering
the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the

wall, promptly approached the accused ... ." Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed.
(U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs.
Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft
have been rendered against him and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall should
not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the
offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if committed with force,
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty
corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its
maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive
imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed
by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto
mayor, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

[G.R. No. 135204. April 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NARCISO RAMOS y MATIAS, RAMON SAN ROQUE y DELA CRUZ, EULALIA SAN
ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias LALING, WILLIAM RAMOS alias WILFREDO RAMOS, (provisionally
dismissed), and three (3) other John Does, accused.
EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias LALING, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Appeal by Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz from the Decision [1] dated April 24, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
122, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-46010, declaring her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She was also adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim,P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Information[2] dated December 14, 1993 filed against appellant and her co-accused Narciso Ramos y Matias alias Narcing,
Ramon San Roque y dela Cruz, Wilfredo Ramos and three (3) other John Does is quoted as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of February 1993 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie up on a santol tree, stab,
shoot and burn one WILLIAM LOMIDA, resulting to the death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1994, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The case against Wilfredo Ramos was provisionally dismissed. The other accused, Narciso Ramos and Ramon San Roque, have
remained at large.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Bernie Ambal, Saturnino Rivera, Mariano Lomida and NBI
Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera. Their testimonies, woven together, established the following facts:
On February 11, 1993 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, Bernie Ambal was standing outside his store at 168 De Paro St.,
Caloocan City. Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three (3) others passed by. They proceeded to the house of William Lomida and
appellant, who were then live-in partners. Narciso and Ramon stood by the door, while one of their companions, holding an armalite,
positioned himself behind Narciso. Their other companion, armed with a pistol, stayed on the street, and the third one, also armed
with a pistol, went to the backyard. At a distance of ten (10) meters away, Ambal saw Narciso pulling out his .45 caliber pistol and
knocking at the door. Appellant then opened the door and Ramon went inside.
Soon thereafter, William and appellant, accompanied by Narciso, Ramon, and three (3) others left the house. As they were
passing by the store, Ramon stopped and borrowed Ambals jacket. At that instance, William suddenly held his arm and whispered,
Samahan mo naman ako, baka kung ano ang gawin sa akin ng mga ito, tutal barkada mo naman si Ramon. But Ambal was scared
and hesitant. William then requested him to look for Saturnino Rivera.
The group headed to Narcisos house, about kilometer away from Ambals store. Unknown to them, Ambal trailed
behind. Hiding himself behind a tree fifteen meters away, Ambal saw one of their companions poking his armalite at William. Then,
they tied William to a santol tree. He was pleading to appellant, but she simply turned her back. Ramon stabbed William twice at the
stomach with a 29 bladed knife. Then Narciso shot William five to seven times with his .45 caliber pistol. When William was already
dead, Ramon and Wilfredo Ramos untied his body and brought it to a dumpsite (of used tires) twenty five meters away. There they
placed Williams body atop a pile of rubber tires. Ramon poured gasoline on his body and set it on fire. Appellant and the others were
closely watching. After thirty minutes, appellant and the men left. Ambal immediately reported the incident to Saturnino
Rivera. They proceeded to the dumpsite where they saw the charred body. According to Ambal, Ramon, appellant and Narcisos sister
are brother and sisters.
Saturnino Rivera declared on the witness stand that he considered William his best friend. William and appellant frequently
quarreled and sometimes, he maltreated her. Saturnino corroborated Ambals testimony that they went to the scene of the crime and
saw the charred body of William; and that they reported the gruesome incident to the NBI.
Mariano Lomida testified that on February 19, 1993, or eight days after the incident, appellant suddenly arrived in Atimonan,
Quezon looking for William. She told Mariano that William left their house on February 9, 1993 without her knowledge. She
borrowed P3,000.00 from him (Mariano) with a promise to pay on March 27, 1993. But since then, he never saw her again. Mariano
further testified that due to the death of his son, he suffered wounded feelings.
Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division conducted the investigation. He took the
statements of Bernie Ambal, Saturnino Rivera and Mariano Lomida. Upon the arrest of appellant and Narciso Ramos by the Capital
Command (CAPCOM) of the Philippine National Police, they were turned over to the NBI.

After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed a demurrer to evidence but was denied. Meanwhile, appellant jumped
bail. On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case was submitted for decision.
On April 24, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz alias Laling GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the Information and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties as provided by the law and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum
of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Appellant appeared during the promulgation of the Decision.
In her brief, appellant raised the following assignments of error:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO Y DELA CRUZ alias LALING
CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-ACCUSED IN PERPETRATING THE CRIME OF MURDER, WHEN THE FACT OF SUCH
CONSPIRACY HAS NOT BEEN SATISFACTORILY PROVEN TO EXIST BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DURING THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE WEAK EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO PROVE ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AND
THE CORPUS DELICTI.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BY THE MERE FACT THAT SHE FAILED TO
APPEAR AFTER THE CASE WAS REVIVED SUCH FAILURE HAVING BEEN APPRECIATED BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A CLEAR INDICATION
OF HER GUILT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE BASIS ALONE OF
THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS IN THIS CASE, WITHOUT BEING SUPPORTED THEREBY BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
We shall discuss the above assignments of error jointly.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and
shall be punished by reclusion temporal,[4] in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1.
With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aim of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense
or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2.

In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3.
By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4.
On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5.

With evident premeditation.

6.
With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.
In convicting the appellant of murder, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution lone eyewitness,
Bernie Ambal. An extract from his testimony is quoted hereunder:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROS. MANAQUIL:
xxx

And in the evening of that date, could you recall at about 7:00 in the evening of February 11, 1993, if there was any
unusual incident that happened?

Yes, sir.

Will you please tell us what was that unusual incident all about that you observed and noticed?

Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three men of Narciso Ramos got the victim and Eulalia San Roque was also with
the group.

Court:
Q

Who was taken?

The victim, your Honor.

What is the name of the victim?

William Lomida was taken by these people.

Pros. Mananquil:
Q

From where the accused picked up by these people?

Lomida was taken from the house where Eulalia San Roque and William Lomida were living.

William Lomida is the victim in this case. Now, how is he related to Eulalia San Roque?

They are not married.

Now, how far from the store where this house of William Lomida and Eulalia San Roque is located?

More or less, ten meters away.

Is it located in front of the store, on the left side or at the back of the store?

The house of Eulalia is alongside of our house.

What part of your store where you were at the time you saw these people picked up Lomida?

I was outside the store standing.

After the accused picked up the victim, what happened or where did they go?

William Lomida, the victim, was brought to the house of Narciso Ramos.

They are live-in partners.

xxx
Court:
xxx
Q

So the persons whom you saw got Lomida were Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque, William Ramos alias Wilfredo
Ramos and three men of Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San Roque?

Yes, your Honor.

xxx

Pros. Mananquil:
Q

Now, you said that the accused brought William Lomida to the house of Narciso Ramos.
Narciso Ramos located in relation to the store, your store?

About half kilometer away.

xxx

How far is this house of

Now, when the victim was brought to the house of Narciso Ramos, what happened next?

The victim was tied to a santol tree.

Where is this santol tree where the victim Lomida was tied?

How far is this from the house of Narciso Ramos?

Court:
Q

Who tied the victim?

Ramon San Roque, Wilfredo Ramos and the three others unidentified men.

Pros. Mananquil:
Q

After the accused tied William Lomida on a santol tree, what happened next?

Ramon San Roque stabbed William Lomida.

And with what kind of weapon was used by Ramon San Roque?

A bladed 29.

How long?

I cannot say how long, sir.

How many times did you see Ramon San Roque stabbed the victim with the 29?

About two times, sir.

And did you see if Lomida was hit with that two stab thrust?

He was stabbed on the stomach.

Pros. Mananquil:
Q

What happened after Ramon San Roque stabbed the victim?

The victim, William Lomida nangisay and then Narciso Ramos came near the victim and shot him.

How many times?

About 5 to 7 shots.

And did you see if the victim was hit?

It seems that the shots were directed to his face because he was bloodied all over his face.

With what kind of firearm, if you remember?

When the investigator showed me some guns, I noticed that the one gun that Narciso Ramos used was a .45 caliber.

Was it magazine or revolver?

Magazine type.

After Narciso Ramos shot the victim 7 times on the head, what happened next?

When the group made sure that the victim was dead already, they untied him and brought the body where there was a
pile of tires, piles of pieces of rubber tires.

By the way, at the time when the victim was shot by Narciso Ramos and stabbed by Ramon San Roque, where was
Willy Ramos, Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San Roque?

They were just there standing and afterwards, turned their back around.
xxx

Prosecutor:
Q

How far was Eulalia San Roque from Lomida when Lomida was shot by Narciso Ramos and stabbed by Ramon San
Roque?

This place up to that wall.

And what was Eulalia doing at the time when the victim was stabbed and shot?

She turned her back and face the kitchen of the house of Narciso Ramos.

Did she not try to intervene, this Eulalia, being the live-in partner of William Lomida or did not exert effort to pacify?

Distance of about 8 meters.

xxx
Prosecutor:
Q

Just turning her back, what else that she did, being live-in partner of William Lomida?

She did not do anything anymore.

After the victim was stabbed and shot, he was untied from the santol tree.

It was Ramon San Roque, Willy Ramos and the three others.

Willy refers to Wilfredo Ramos?

Yes, sir.

Where was Eulalia at the time?

She was still there standing.

Now, you said after the victim was untied from the santol tree, he was brought to where pieces of rubber tires were
piled, recycled, how far is this from the santol tree where the victim was tied?

About 25 meters.

Now, after the accused brought the victim to the piles of recycled tires, what happened next?

Ramos San Roque got a can and poured something on the body of the victim and then, lighted it up.

What happened to the body of the victim, William Lomida?

The body was burned.

At the time when this Ramon San Roque poured something on the body of the victim and then lighted the same, where
were Wilfredo Ramos, Eulalia San Roque and Narciso Ramos and the other unidentified persons?

There were They were there in front of the burning body.

How long did the fire last?

It took a long time, about more than one hour.

After one hour, what happened next?

They left the place.

The group left the place.

Court:
Q

What happened to the tires?

The tires also burned.

And where was the body of Lomida in relation to the tires?

Who untied him?

The body of the victim was almost burned and when we went back to the place, the shape of the charred was still
there. The same of human body.[5]

The foregoing testimony clearly shows that Ambal, being then present at the locus of the crime, was able to identify the appellant
and the other accused as the persons who killed William. Ambal narrated the incidents leading to the victim's death with clarity and
lucidity that they could not have been fabricated or concocted. The records show that throughout the trial, he remained steadfast in
his testimony. There is thus no doubt in our minds that this lone eyewitness is credible. While his testimony is uncorroborated, still it
sustains the conviction of appellant. In People vs. Toyco,[6] we held:
It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The testimony of a
single witness if positive and credible is sufficient to support a conviction even in charge of murder.
We are not persuaded by appellants contention that the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of conspiracy among the accused. She vigorously contends that she did not participate in the killing of the victim.
In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim.
The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the
crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. There must be a showing
that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially
through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case,
the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. [8]
[7]

The series of events in this case convincingly show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and cooperated with each
other in killing William Lomida. Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed the other accused to enter the house. She
joined them in bringing the victim to the residence of Narciso Ramos, her brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the helpless
victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant merely watched
intensely. She even turned her back as the lifeless body of the victim was being burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled
with the other accused.
The above circumstances clearly show the common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant and her co-accused.
We agree with the trial court in concluding that their acts were indications of a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime of murder.
The only remaining question is whether the crime was attended by aggravating circumstances.
The killing of the victim was attended by treachery. Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. [9] Here, appellant and her co-accused tied William to
a santol tree before they stabbed and shot him to death, thus, insuring the execution of the crime without risk to
themselves. Obviously, he could not retaliate. This aggravating circumstance qualifies the crime to murder.
However, we cannot sustain the trial courts appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of superior strength as this is absorbed
in treachery.[10]
It bears stressing that this crime of murder was committed on February 11, 1993.[11] The law applicable is Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code then penalizing murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Article 64 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, in cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, and there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of
the crime, the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period shall be imposed.
The range of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime, the maximum period is the medium of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua. The minimum
period is one degree lower, or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, the range of which is
10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. The minimum period of the penalty imposable is anywhere within this range, or 10
years and 1 day. Hence, appellant should be sentenced to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, toreclusion perpetua, as
maximum.
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victims heirs. When death occurs as a
result of a crime, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without need of any
evidence or proof of damages.[12]
We likewise award temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. Here, the prosecution failed to present any proof of the
expenses incurred by the victims heirs. However, as they actually incurred funeral expenses, we award P25,000.00 by way of
temperate damages.[13]
Anent moral damages, we award the victims heirs the amount of P50,000.00.[14] For verily, moral damages are not intended to
enrich the victims heirs; rather they are awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral
and psychological sufferings.[15] Mariano Lomida, victims father, equivocally described how he suffered untold wounded feelings for the
loss of his son.

We also award the victims heirs P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is pursuant to our ruling in People vs. Catubig[16] that if
a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated April 24, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case
No. C-46010, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. She is ordered to pay
the victims heirs (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages and
(d) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 132330. November 28, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO[1] and PO3 CESAR BANISA, accusedappellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO and PO3 CESAR BANISA appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City convicting
them of two (2) counts of murder and two (2) counts of frustrated murder, imposing upon them the corresponding prison terms, and
to pay damages plus costs.[2]
The facts: On 27 June 1993, at around 8:30 in the evening, Pacson Cogasi, Julio Clemente, Leandro Adawan and Richard Lino
were at the Skyview Restaurant, Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, drinking and listening to folksongs. Moments later, a group of five
(5) arrived and sat one table away from Pacson Cogasi and his friends. Among the newcomers was a thin person wearing a blue longsleeved jacket, later identified as SPO1 Jose Bangcado, and a heavier one wearing a t-shirt and maong pants, later identified as PO3
Cesar Banisa. The rest of their group were not identified.
At that time, members of the police force of Baguio City were conducting Operation Kapkap at the Skyview Restaurant. They
however exempted the table of PO3 Cesar Banisa as they knew him to be a fellow policeman.
At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Cogasi and his friends left the restaurant to go home. They were residents of La Trinidad,
Benguet. As they went behind the restaurant where their Ford Fierra was parked, they noticed SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar
Banisa following them. Cogasi and his group recognized Bangcado and Banisa to be customers at Skyview Restaurant. Bangcado and
Banisa approached them. First, Banisa asked Richard Lino for a light. Then Bangcado and Banisa asked the group if they were willing
to be frisked. Since the two (2) police officers were armed with handguns and smelled of liquor, the group agreed to be frisked. As
Leandro Adawan stepped aside to urinate, Bangcado slapped him and then asked the group where they came from. Their answer was,
from Besao, Mt. Province, except Clemente who said that he came from Balili, La Trinidad. Bangcado, with Banisa standing guard
behind him with a drawn gun, ordered Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to form a line against the Ford Fierra facing him in that
order. Adawan was only one meter away from Bangcado. Lino and Cogasi were about 1-1/2 meters away, while Clemente, four (4)
meters away. Without any warning, Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick succession at the four (4) persons lined up against the
Ford Fierra. Cogasi saw Adawan and Lino fall down. Cogasi then felt he was hit on the left side of his neck and he also fell down. He
managed however to crawl away and run to the Hilltop where he was able to ask for help before falling unconscious.
Cogasi woke up to find himself confined at the Baguio General Hospital together with Clemente. There Cogasi learned that Lino
and Adawan died from gunshot wounds in their heads. Cogasi himself suffered a gunshot wound at the neck, at the junction of his left

jaw near the ear, while Clemente received two (2) gunshot wounds on his right shoulder with one (1) of the bullets being lodged just
below his right eye.
After their release from the hospital, Cogasi and Clemente filed a complaint with the NBI in Baguio City. On 8 July 1993, four (4)
civilian males were presented to Cogasi for identification by the NBI, but he told them that the suspects were not among those
present. Clemente did not participate in the identification process because of his eye injury.
In the morning of 10 July 1993 Bangcado and Banisa reported for their regular rank inspection at the La Trinidad Police
Station. The policemen were told to remain in formation after the inspection. Cogasi went around the formation four (4) or five (5)
times before pointing to Bangcado and then to Banisa. Clemente also went around the formation but despite going around longer than
Cogasi, Clemente was unable to identify anybody. Clemente started to point to James Tagle but withdrew his identification of him
when some people then present laughed and shouted "Hoy!" and "Sabali!" meaning "Wrong!" or "Different!" Accused-appellants insist
that Clemente could not have made a reliable identification of them at the NBI and La Trinidad line ups, nor even in open court,
because his eye injury blurred his vision.
The rule is that positive identification of witnesses prevails over the simple denial of the accused. It cannot be doubted that
Clemente and Cogasi had a good view of the faces of the accused. From the testimonies of various witnesses, including PO3 Jimmy
Baybay, one of the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap, the Skyview Restaurant was well-lighted. Banisa himself testified that
although the lighting may be "somewhat dim," he could still recognize a person from a distance of four (4) meters. [3] This is relevant
considering that the two (2) groups were seated only one (1) table apart. Thus, Cogasi and his friends were able to recognize their
assailants as the persons who came out from the Skyview Restaurant.
The crime scene was illuminated by two (2) streetlights and the lights coming from the nearby Garden Inn and various sari-sari
stores. The fact that the policemen who responded to the report of the incident had to use a flashlight in their investigation did not
prove that the area was so dark as to preclude the identification of the persons involved. For one thing, the policemen had to be
careful not to overlook any piece of evidence, such as a spent bullet. For another, SPO4 Antonio Naungayan of PNP Baguio City, who
was part of the investigating team, testified on cross-examination that even if the area was not brightly lighted, one could still
recognize people.[4] According to Clemente, he was only four (4) meters away from his attackers when they fired upon him and his
friends. Cogasi was only 1-1/2 meters away while Adawan and Lino, who died on the spot, were each only about a meter away.
It cannot be doubted that Cogasi and Clemente had enough time to take a good look at their assailants faces who conversed
with their victims, ordered them to fall in line, frisked them one by one, and asked them questions before shooting them. When
Bangcado and Banisa leaned over to frisk Cogasi and his friends, their faces must have only been inches away from their victims; and
when they ordered their victims to line up against the vehicle, they stood only a few meters away.
Although Clemente admitted to be suffering from blurred vision, Cogasis positive identification of appellants could be sufficient to
establish their identities. Indeed, there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness must be corroborated except, of
course, when expressly mandated. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, in determining the credibility of witnesses and the
value of each piece of evidence. In fact, the testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict, [5] and must
be given full faith and credence when no reason to falsely testify is shown. [6]
Assuming arguendo that Clemente was unable to identify accused-appellants during the line-up in La Trinidad as his right eye was
still bandaged from his injuries, he was able to make a positive identification in open court. Neither is it material now that Clemente
made some attempts to point to policeman James Tagle for it seems clear that he withdrew his identification. Besides, Clemente
admitted candidly that he could not identify anyone in the line-up since his right eye was still covered with a bandage and was still
suffering from blurred vision.
Further, the defense failed to shake Cogasis certainty, either when he declared that he recognized accused-appellants as being
those who were earlier in the Skyview Restaurant, or when he pointed to them in the line-up at La Trinidad. The fact that he took
some five (5) minutes and had to go around the line-up four (4) or five (5) times did not detract from his credibility. Rather, it is to his
credit that he took time to look closely into the faces of more than twenty-four (24) or so similarly garbed men to make sure that he
did not make a mistake in identifying his assailants.
Neither should the defense attempt to mislead the Court by pointing out that Cogasi was not able to identify Bangcado during the
NBI line-up since it is clear that that line-up did not include accused-appellants. Instead, it was composed of four (4) civilians, none of
whom he had ever seen before. Since these four (4) had no connection with the crime, there was no reason for Cogasi to implicate
any of them in the murder.
The defense also points out that the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap indicated in their joint affidavit that they only
saw Banisa present inside the Skyview Restaurant, along with three (3) unidentified companions. According to the defense, this only
proves that Bangcado was not there since the policemen personally knew Bangcado and thus should have included him in their joint
affidavit.
However, the theory of the trial court that the reason why they did not see Bangcado with Banisa was because he went to the
washroom or elsewhere deserves credence. Considering that the Skyview Restaurant had some thirty (30) to fifty (50) customers that
night; that the four (4) policemen were busy going around the tables conducting Operation KapKap; that they did not approach the
table of Banisa to frisk him and his companions because they recognized him as a policeman, then it is evident that their attention was
elsewhere, and that they did not bother to inquire whether Banisa had other fellow officers with him. Further, the policemen testified
that they were in the restaurant for only a few minutes.
Further, PO Delfin Balan-eg, one of the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap, testified that he saw Bangcado and Banisa
drinking beer inside the restaurant. The defense tried to destroy his credibility by establishing that he and the two (2) victims as well

as the two (2) complaining witnesses were related. However, it must be stressed, that relationship, much less bias, cannot be
established by the fact that two (2) persons live in different barangays that form part of the same town.
The defense insist that neither could Cogasis testimony be given any weight since his testimony in open court contradicted his
sworn affidavit executed immediately after the incident before the investigating officer. While he testified that he saw the accused
emerge from the Skyview Restaurant, in his affidavit, he swore that their attackers actually alighted from a red -colored car. The
theory of the defense is that if the gunmen alighted from a red or maroon colored car immediately before the shooting, then they
could not have come from the Skyview Restaurant, and vice versa.
An affidavit taken ex parte is judicially considered to be almost incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the incident. [7] Further, an examination of Cogasis sworn statement
shows, however, that there was actually no contradiction. His testimony was as follows: "x x x I noticed a maroon car x x x I noticed
also two persons who were immediately following us went (sic) near the parked maroon car and one of them opened the door at the
drivers side but immediately closed it." [8] Quite obviously, the two (2) persons who emerged from the Skyview Restaurant intended to
board the parked car but changed their minds and, instead, followed Cogasi and his friends to the Ford Fierra that was parked.
The accused-appellants raise the defense of alibi which is inherently weak. To prosper, alibi must be so convincing as to preclude
any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the crime scene at the time of the incident. [9] The alibis of the
accused clearly show upon examination that this could not have been so.
Bangcado testified that he stayed at home because he served his tour of duty from 12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m. the previous
day. Thus, on the day of the incident, he was at home where he slept, read the newspapers, watched television and played with his
one-year-and-seven-month old daughter. After dinner, he took a nap until his mother-in-law woke him up before 11:00 p.m. so he
could report to the police station before 12:00 midnight. As police officer assigned to patrol his area of responsibility, his job was to
ride in the police vehicle going around La Trinidad. [10] This was confirmed by Bangcado's mother-in-law Angela Gondales when she
testified for the accused.
Yet, Bangcado himself told the court that Central Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, where his mother-in-laws house stood, was only five
(5) kilometers away from Skyview Restaurant and could be negotiated in thirty (30) minutes using a motor vehicle. [11] The fact that La
Trinidad was only thirty (30) minutes away from Baguio City was corroborated by Banisa himself. [12] And Bangcados house is near a
national highway where jeepneys pass by on their way to Baguio City, which means, it was not impossible for Bangcado to have left
the house earlier than 11:00 p.m. and be in Baguio City at the time of the incident.
The defense failed to establish with credible evidence that SPO1 Jose Bangcado was on duty from 11:00 o'clock in the evening to
8:30 the following morning. SPO4 Lilia Pascual, Records Custodian of the PNP at La Trinidad, Benguet, testified that there was no
record of the attendance of PNP officers from June to December 1993. SPO4 Carlos Layagan, Bangcados Patrol Section Supervisor,
testified that on that day, Bangcado was present for his regular tour of duty from 12:00 o'clock midnight to 8:00 o'clock the following
morning and conducted routine patrol by mobile, [13] but the incident occurred at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening according to the
police who responded when the crime was reported to them. Thus, Bangcado had plenty of time to do what he did and still go on his
tour of duty. More damaging was the admission of Layagan in his cross-examination that before 12:00 o'clock midnight of 27 June
1993 he was not in the company of SPO1 Jose Bangcado.[14]
The alibi of PO3 Cesar Banisa was even more incredible. He admitted being at the Skyview Restaurant when Cogasi and his
friends were there, but claimed that he left with his brother to eat mami and siopao at the Baguio First Hotel, which is only about a
hundred (100) to a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from Skyview Restaurant and could be reached in five (5) minutes of walking.
[15]
He explained however that "this bold admission x x x placing him within the vicinity of the crime scene shows his clear
conscience. For, if he was involved in the crime, he would naturally put himself in other places." [16] His testimony was corroborated by
Abelardo Lucas who testified that he, along with Arsenio Palileng and Raymund Banisa, accused-appellants brother, was with Banisa
that night.
While flight of an accused is competent evidence to establish prima facie his guilt, there is no law or principle that non-flight per
se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of innocence. Much like the defense of alibi, non-flight cannot prevail against the weight of
positive identification of the accused.[17] It is more credible to believe that Banisa had no choice but to tell the truth regarding his
presence at the Skyview Restaurant because four (4) policemen who knew him well saw him there while they were
conducting Operation Kapkap.
PO3 Banisa further claims that his group stayed at the Baguio First Hotel Restaurant for only ten (10) minutes and then went
down the road to the jeepney station where they boarded a jeepney at 9:00 o'clock in the evening bound for La Trinidad and got home
after twenty-five (25) to thirty-five (35) minutes. Yet he also testified that the boarding station for jeepneys bound for La Trinidad was
only across the road from Skyview Restaurant.
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa could have accosted their victims, gone back to Skyview Restaurant and joined their
companions who may have thought that they (Bangcado and Banisa) just went to the comfort room or stepped out for some fresh
air. Abelardo Lucas himself testified that while they were at the Skyview Restaurant his companions would frequently stand up and
leave, purportedly to go to the restroom.
The defense bewails the fact that nothing seemed to have been done to the deformed slug found near the body of the deceased
Richard Lino, nor to the other slug extracted from Clemente, and that no ballistics examination was conducted to determine from what
caliber they were fired and if the gun used was the same. Investigators did not even cause the surrender of accused-appellants
firearms for examination and comparison. Neither were accused-appellants required to undergo a paraffin test.

Nonetheless, a ballistics examination is not indispensable, and even if another weapon was in fact actually used in killing the
victim, still the accused cannot excape criminal liability therefor as he was already positively identified. [18] Because credible witnesses
had already demonstrated accused-appellants' culpability, there was no need to present further evidence linking them to the
crime. There is no requirement of a certain quantum of evidence before one may be justly convicted of an offense except when
specifically required by law. The only requisite then is that the guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt. [19]
Accused-appellants insist that they had no motive to shoot the victims and/or the complaining witnesses. However, even the
absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of
the culprit.[20] Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused therein are definitely
shown,[21] particularly when we consider how nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed
serious offense for no reason at all.[22]
The defense also tried, but failed, to establish that Cogasi and Clemente knew beforehand that Bangcado and Banisa were
policemen as they all lived and worked together in the same neighborhood. This allegation is not sufficient to prove that the witnesses
for the prosecution had any ill motive to testify against accused-appellants. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive
on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime,
the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. [23]
The defense also assails the conclusion reached by the trial court that the accused were guilty because they remained silent when
they were pinpointed by Cogasi during the police line-up. The trial court asked, "Is it not that 'Qui tacen concentire videtur,' meaning,
'Silence means consent'?"[24]
Although the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a
party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when
proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him, [25] courts should be cautious in interpreting silence against
the accused. Further, the facts do not support the conclusion that the accused remained silent. Both Bangcado and Banisa gave their
individual reactions during the line-up but police discipline kept them from breaking rank. [26] As police officers, they are bound by the
strict discipline of their profession, as well as an awareness of their rights to remain silent and to avail of the services of
counsel. These rights are not diminished by the fact that they are policemen.
However, the trial court ruled, and correctly so, that at the time of the police line-up, accused-appellants were not yet under the
custody of the police agencies. Their rights had not yet been restricted or curtailed. The right to counsel attaches from the moment
the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer begins to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions
from the accused.
From the testimony of the victims as well as from the physical evidence, it seems that SPO1 Bangcado was the lone gunman,
while PO3 Banisa merely stood behind him with his gun drawn. In his testimony, Cogasi narrated how the shooting occured Q: You testified that the thin one who called himself Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at Leandro Adawan, what type of gun is (sic)
that x x x x
A: It was black and short.
Q: What about the fat man at that time, was identified as Cesar Banisa, what was he doing at that time?
A: He was also standing beside him and was holding his gun.
Q: Would you illustrate to this Court how Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at Leandro Adawan?
A: Witness stretch[ed] both his arms and clasped his hands together with the forefinger extended in front of him.
Q: After you saw Jose Bangcado point a gun at Leandro Adawan, what else transpired, Mr. Witness?
A: He suddenly fired his gun.
Q: To whom Mr. Witness did he fire his gun?
A: He fired his gun to the four of us.
Q: After firing his gun what else transpired, Mr. Witness?
A: I just felt that I fell down.
Q: Why did you fall down?
A: Because I was shot.[27]
On cross-examination, Cogasi affirmed his sworn statement taken by the investigating officer immediately after the incident
wherein he referred to only one (1) gunman who did the shooting. He further testified that he heard four (4) successive shots when
the gunman started shooting, then heard more shots only after he had succeeded in running away.

On his part, Clemente attested in his sworn statement that "the man in jacket then ordered us to line up. After we have formed
a line, he started shooting at us starting from the left. He shot first Leandro, then Richard and followed by Pacson. After hearing the
shots and seeing my companions fall, I turned my back and held my nape with my two (2) hands and started to run but I got hit and
fell. I got up and tried to run but I fell down again."[28]
On the other hand, during his direct examination Clemente testified Q: Now, Mr. Witness, when these two (2) persons followed you and your companions, what did you observe from them that time?
A: They have (sic) guns, sir.
Q: What kind of guns do (sic) they have?
A: Short and black, sir.
Q: And were they holding their guns?
A: They were holding their guns, sir x x x x
Q: After you were made to fall in line, what happened next?
A: He pointed a gun, sir.
Q: Who pointed the gun to whom?
A: The thin man pointed his gun at Leandro Adawan, sir.
Q: What else transpired after that?
A: They fired their guns at us, sir.
Q: Who shot at who (sic)?
A: The two (2) of them, sir, because there were two of them.[29]
On cross examination, Clemente testified Q: So, you said on that date you were frisked and then later on lined-up and when you heard successive shots, you fell down?
A: When I heard the three (3) successive shots, I saw one pointing the gun again at me, so, I turned around and prepared to run,
but I was hit, sir. When I turned my back and started to run, I was hit, sir.
Q: So, because you turned your back, you did not really see who actually shot you?
A: I saw the thin one point the gun at me and both were armed with guns, sir x x x x
Q: So, you want to tell the court that it was the thin one who shot you because he was holding the gun that way, is that correct?
A: I do not know because both of them have (sic) guns, sir. But I saw the thin one pointing a gun at me, sir.[30]
Thus, as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that both witnesses were positive only as far as Bangcado was
concerned. However, it seems that they only concluded that Banisa participated in the shooting because he was also holding a
gun. The failure of the surviving victims to assert with confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises reasonable doubt as to whether
he participated in the shooting.
Accused-appellants deny the existence of treachery, nighttime and abuse of public position to aggravate the commission of the
crimes. It is settled that qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence, as
conclusively as the killing itself.[31] The defense alleges that there is no evidence that accused-appellants made some preparation to kill
the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend
himself. For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.[32] In this case, treachery was not present. In a long line of cases, the Court held that "the essence of treachery is the swift
and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part." [33]
To ensure that he was not in any risk, accused-appellant Bangcado frisked and searched Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to
see if they were concealing any weapons. After making sure that the victims were unarmed, Bangcado directed the victims to form a
line against the Ford Fierra to separate the victims from each other and so that the latter could not rush to their friends
defense. Because Bangcado and Banisa were holding handguns, Cogasi and his friends did as they were told and were caught

unaware when they were shot. In fact, Adawan and Lino died of gunshot wounds in the head, while Cogasi and Clemente only
sustained head wounds that did not prove fatal.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts
directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own
acts.[34] Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims. It is clear that neither the
victims nor Banisa could have anticipated Bangcados act of shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any reason
or purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed prior to the killings.
For public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use his influence, prestige and
ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his
position, then there is no abuse of public position. [35] Hence, that aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated here. While it may
seem that accused-appellants intended to assert their authority as policemen and encourage in the victims minds the belief that they
were part of Operation KapKap when they frisked the victims, both Cogasi and Clemente testified that they never told the investigating
officers that their assailants might be policemen. In fact, because the assailants were not in uniform, they believed the latter to be
civilians.
The defense claims that the injuries of the surviving victims were not serious enough to classify the attack under the frustrated
stage, therefore, they committed only attempted homicide. However, the doctors who attended to the surviving victims testified that
had they not treated Cogasi and Clemente's injuries the latter would have suffered from infection which could result in their death. It
is clear that only timely medical attention saved both victims from imminent death.
Accused-appellants deny that there was an offer to compromise when their relatives visited Miguel Adawan, the 81-year old
father of Leandro Adawan. The old Adawan in tears testified that he came to know of the accused Bangcado and Banisa through their
relatives when the latter came to his house in Besao, Mt. Province. Although the incident occurred on 27 June 1993, the first visit was
sometime in April 1995 when Magdalena Mabiasan, the mother of Jose Banisa came "for a possible settlement of the case." [36] Again,
sometime in August or September 1996, Bangcados wife and parents, along with Banisas mother Magdalena, visited him at Pico, La
Trinidad.[37]
The defense claims that the only reason the relatives of accused-appellant went to visit and talk to Miguel Adawan was to prevent
him from avenging his sons death on the families of accused-appellant, in keeping with the tradition of the Igorot indigenous
people. Therefore, this cannot be interpreted as an implied admission of guilt. Moreover, Sec. 27 of Rule 130 [38]contemplates an offer
of compromise from the accused himself. There is no showing that the visits were made with the knowledge or upon the instructions
of accused-appellants. Thus, even if the purpose of the visit was to negotiate a settlement, accused-appellants had nothing to do with
it, since they were neither participants nor initiators. [39]
The trial court believed in the testimony of Adawan, compared to that of the relatives of accused-appellants who could be biased,
partial and, of course, hoping to save the two (2) accused from the serious predicament they were in. [40] It posited this question:
But why is it that during the first time that they approached the 77-year old man Adawan in Besao, Mountain Province, they were
already assured that the family of the deceased Adawan would not take revenge and for the last three years, nothing happened to the
families of the accused, still they again went to the residence of Miguel Adawan at Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. This would only show
that they tried to amicably settle the cases, but they were rebuffed. [41]
But an offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself. [42] Although the
Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, [43] we
believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should be present or at
least had authorized the compromise.
In People v. Macatana[44] it was held: "No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the
courts, primarily because appellant did not take part in any of the negotiations. The efforts to settle the case x x x in accordance with
the established Muslim practices, customs and traditions were initiated by acknowledged leaders x x x in an effort to prevent further
deterioration of the relations between the tribes." [45]
The general rule is that claims for actual damages should be supported by actual receipts. However, it is undisputed that the
victims are members of the indigenous community and were buried according to their customs and traditions. The relatives of the
victims attested that they incurred expenses for the caao, the traditional gathering of Igorots. The Court is not unaware that the
informal market system still governs the economic transactions of indigenous communities. Thus, receipts and other documents do
not play a large role in their daily commercial transactions. In this case, wherein it is clearly established that the claimants were indeed
members of indigenous communities, then the court should allow reasonable claims for expenses incurred in relation to traditional
burial practices.
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Leandro Adawan. The fact that the
prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does
not preclude recovery of the damages. [46] Testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and
reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning capacity.[47] Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of
a deceased victim, the Court can consider the nature of its occupation, his educational attainment and the state of his health at the
time of his death.[48] The testimony of Adawans father sufficiently established the basis for making such an award. It was shown that
Adawan was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death in 1993 and earned P4,000.00 a month as a mechanic.
Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court in several cases, [49] the loss of his
earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:

Net Earning Capacity (x) = Life Expectancy x Gross annual income living expenses (50% of gross annual income)
where life expectancy =
x

2/3 x (80 - age of deceased [37 years])

2/3 x (80 - 37) x [(P4000.00 x 12) - (P4000.00 x 12)50%]

2/3 x 43 x [P48,000.00 - P24,000.00]

[2/3 x 43] x P24,000.00

28.67 x P24,000.00

P688,080.00

Since Leandro Adawan was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death, his life expectancy was 28.67 years. Considering
that his average monthly income was P4,000.00, his gross annual income would be P48,000.00. Using the above formula, the victims
unearned income would thus be P688,080.00.
On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award damages for Richard Lino loss of earning capacity because the prosecution
failed to introduce any evidence on this matter.
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the offended
party, or his/her heirs in case of the formers death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of
the aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may be separately granted in
addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance
with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts. [50]
Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. Moral
damages, vis-a-vis compensatory damages or civil indemnity, are different from each other and should thus be awarded separately.
[51]
Thus, as explained in People v. Victor,[52] the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended
party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other established actual damages, is itself equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. [53]
In People v. Victor the Court increased the civil indemnity for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances
under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. The Court held that "This
is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." [54] It is submitted that the heirs of
victims of murder, which is also a heinous crime, should not receive less than what victims of rape receive as civil indemnity. If the
civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the offense,
all the more reason should the same minimum amount be imposed on those convicted of murder, as more often than not the victims
who are killed leave behind grieving families who are depended upon them for support. Thus, indemnity of P75,000.00 should
therefore be reckoned for each count of murder committed by accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado.
Since the crime was committed on 27 June 1993, the penalty for murder prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior
to its amendment by RA 7659, which took effect only on 31 December 1993, should be applied in imposing the penalty for frustrated
murder, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum to death.
The penalty for frustrated murder is one (1) degree lower than that prescribed by the Penal Code for the consummated offense,
hence, the imposable penalty for frustrated murder should beprision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the
offense, the penalty to be imposed for the frustrated murder shall be taken from the range of prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years as minimum, to the medium period of prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal or twelve (12) years five (5) months and eleven (11) days to fourteen (14) years ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days as maximum. Hence, an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days
of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum may be considered reasonable for the frustrated murder under the facts of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo in Crim. Cases Nos. 11619-R to 11622-R imposing reclusion perpetua for the two
(2) counts of murder and the indeterminate prison term ofprision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period for two (2) counts of frustrated murder on both accused-appellants SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa is MODIFIED as
follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 11619-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code qualified by treachery, and is sentenced toreclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Richard Lino P75,000.00 as
indemnity for his death, P59,300.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 11620-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and is sentenced toreclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Leandro
Adawan P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P93,100.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;

3. In Crim. Case No. 11621-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of frustrated murder under Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of modifying circumstances,
he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for the frustrated
murder of the victim Julio Clemente, and pay himP100,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs; and,
4. In Crim. Case No. 11622-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of frustrated murder under Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of modifying circumstances,
he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for the frustrated
murder of Pacson Cogasi, and pay himP100,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
There being no finding of conspiracy with accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado, PO3 Cesar Banisa is ACQUITTED of all the
charges against him and, consequently, is ordered released from custody in connection with herein cases, unless he is held for other
lawful causes.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2189

November 3, 1906

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down,
and destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine Islands, as
defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de Guzman
and Tomas Puzon, and each of them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the said
appellants to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency
and failure to pay their respective fines.
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy
entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be known as the Republica Universal
Democratica Filipina; that one Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the
military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward the end of December,
1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in hidding on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the
Philippines he held a number of meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the above-mentioned
conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at these meetings new members were taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the
enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of money by national and private loans to carry on the campaign; that to this end
bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the
officers thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and that the conspirators did in fact take the field and offered
armed resistance to the constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the Government because
of their failure to combat successfully with the officers of the law who were sent against them and of the failure of the people to
rise en masse in response to their propaganda.
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of
the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded
to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in several of the above-mentioned
meetings whereat the plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in answer to
a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness."
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the conspirators through the agency of one Jose R. Muoz, who was
proven to have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds
and nominate and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that
at the time when the conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several conferences with the said Muoz
whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muoz offered Puzon a commission as
brigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook to do his part in organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he assured
the said Muoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with the terms of his
commission.
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the conspirators; that he had accepted the appointment as brigadiergeneral of the signal corps of the revolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking any further action in the matter, and merely
because he did not wish to vex his friend Muoz by refusing to do so, and that when Muoz offered him the appointment as brigadiergeneral he did so in "a joking tone," and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy at that
time.
These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the testimony of Muoz as to the fact that he had several interviews
with Puzon at which plans were entered into for the advancement of the cause of the conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the
light of a written statement signed by Puzon himself at the time when he was first arrested, part of which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation? A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo in
the Province of Manila; 37 years of age; married; by profession a teacher of primary and secondary schools, and residing in
Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? A. Personally I do not know him, but by name, yes.1wphil.net
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with what object he came here? And if you know it to
be true, through whom did you get such information? A. In the first place I had notice of his coming to the Islands as well
as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and secondly because J. R. Muoz told me the same on one occasion when
I was in his house to visit him.
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? A. No, sir; I have no more information than that which I
have mentioned.

Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is the employment (empleo) which you have in this organization, and who is it who invited you to join it? A. J. R.
Muoz, who is general of division of this new organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking me to accept employment
as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which I, on account of his request and in view of the fact that the said Muoz is
a friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have organized absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission for it? A. Yes, sir; I accepted said employment
and although they gave me an order to organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I had neither the confidence nor the
will.
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out what was intrusted to you, why did you accept
employment as general of the brigade? A. I accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a friend, but I never have
the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this statement, but he attempted to explain it away by saying
that when he made it he was so exited that he did not know just what he was saying. He does not allege that improper means were
taken to procure the confession, and it was proven at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence,
intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent man and was for eighteen
years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish Government, and during the insurrection he held a
commission as an officer in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His confession is clear and intelligible and in no way supports
his pretense that he was so excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far it
inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record in this case.
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the military forces of the conspiracy should not be
considered as evidence against him in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los
Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio Nuez et al.2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et
al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be distinguished from
these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment in
question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy,
and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with
the conspirators. In the first of these cases the United States vs. De los Reyes the accused was charged with treason, and the
court found that the mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing else being done either by himself or by his
companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within the meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game of government like children, the secretaries,
colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of duping and misleading
the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be dignified by the name of treason.
In the second case the United States vs. Nuez et al. -- wherein the accused were charged with brigandage, the court held that,
aside from the possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they had committed the crime
and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never united with any party of brigands and never had been in any way connected with
such parties unless the physical possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that each one of the
defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed men while working in the field and were virtually compelled to
accept the commissions."
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that de la Serna had confessed that "he was one of the
members of the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion that the evidence did not sustain a finding that
such confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of such an
appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was
"the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was testimony that four appointments of officials in a revolutionary
army were found in a trunk in the house of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in said case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere
possession of the documents of this kind is not sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was "evidence in the case that
at the time these papers were received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the assistant councilmen of the barrio in
which lived, a witness for the Government, showed him the envelope, and stated to him he had received these papers; that he didn't
know what they were and requested this councilman to open them. The coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and
sent it to the councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the appointments in question and that the
appellant did not act under the appointment but immediately reported the receipt of them to the authorities."
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise connected with them to some high office in the
conspiracy, in the hope that such person would afterwards accept the commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is even
possible that such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the person thus
nominated, and that such appointment might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in whose possession
the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators
to use his name in this manner nor to send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal
prosecutions wherein it has been proven that such appointments have been concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the
accused persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as evidence against the accused. But
where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an
appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his
relations with the conspirators.

Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt
act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this case, but this court has
always held, in conformance with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring to commit
treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in such
cases. (In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs.Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest substantially upon his
acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the conspirators for the purpose
of raising funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence
of the conspiracy or that, when he received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was, nor that
ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the bundle and
discovered the nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any dealings with the conspirators in relation
to the conspiracy or the object for which it was organized.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in so far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be
reversed, with his proportionate share of the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should be
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and set a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of the trial court, in so
far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as it imposes subsidiary
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective fines, and, there being no authority in law of such provision,
so much of the sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby reversed.
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the record will be returned to the trial court for execution. So
ordered.

[G.R. No. 124871. May 13, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO @ Joann Redillo, JOHN DOE @ Eladio M.
Consuelo, Jr. and Boyet, PETER DOE @ Danny Dineros, and RICHARD DOE @ George and/or
Cayo, accused,
MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO @ Joann Redillo and JOHN DOE @ Eladio M. Consuelo, Jr. and Boyet, accused-appellants.
D E C IS I O N
PUNO, J.:
To support his family, ROLANDO ANDASAN left Cabanatuan City and landed a job as messenger/collector at the Sunshine
Moneychanger in Pasay City, earning a measly net income ofP2,000.00 per month. On July 25, 1995, in the course of his employment,
he was mercilessly stabbed 28 times and died.[1]
For his demise, an Information [2] for robbery with homicide was filed against four (4) accused, viz: Marife Bello y Rosco alias
Joann Redillo, Eladio M. Consuelo, Jr. alias Boyet, Danny Dineros and Cayo or George. It reads:
That on or about 25 July 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, by means of violence, intimidation, force and other unlawful means, take, divest and carry away from one ROLANDO
ANDASAN y LEGASPI P114,000.00 cash belonging to the Sunshine Money Changer (sic) Shop, to its damage and prejudice in said
amount, and during the occasion of which, repeatedly stab the latter with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him fatal wounds,
which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only accused Marife and Eladio, Jr. were arrested. Accused Danny and Cayo remain at large.
As there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime, the prosecution built its case through circumstantial
evidence. The unbroken chain of events was testified to by prosecution witnesses: Eduardo Rafael, OIC of the Sunshine
Moneychanger; the employees of Queensland Lodge, namely: roomboys Mayonito Wayco and Jonathan Deniega, security guard
Leonardo Acosta, accounting clerk Rose Caharian and telephone operator Digna Siazon; cab driver Ernesto Ramos; police
investigators SPO3 Danilo Unico, SPO2 Angel Palattao, PO3 Warlito Hermo and PO3 Ronald Cabaliw; NBI medico-legal officer Ravell
Baluyot; and, the victims wife, Zenaida Andasan. Their testimonies are summarized below.
On July 25, 1995, at about 10:30 a.m., a cab entered the Queensland Lodge in Pasay City, with accused Marife and Eladio, Jr.
on board. They alighted in front of the private garage of room no. 2 and informed Jonathan Deniega, a roomboy, that they needed
a room. Jonathan led them inside the private garage of room no. 2 and the three went up a flight of stairs leading to the
room. Jonathan ushered them in, turned on the lights, aircondition unit and television set in the room before leaving. [3] Jonathan then
gave a stub to their telephone operator, DIGNA SIAZON,where he indicated that two customers checked in at room no. 2.
At about 11:00 a.m., accused Marife called up Digna and asked for an outside line. Initially, Digna was unable to grant her
request as the telephone lines were busy. When a similar request was made by accused Marife at about 1:30 p.m., she was able to
give her a line.[4] Accused Marife then called up the Sunshine Moneychanger in Pasay City and talked with the officer-incharge,EDUARDO RAFAEL. Identifying herself as Joann Redillo, accused Marife misrepresented to Eduardo that she came from Japan
and would like to convert her 40 pieces of yen to pesos. She requested that the currency conversion be made in her room inside the
nearby Queensland Lodge as she did not want to carry around a huge sum of money. Eduardo agreed to the arrangement as their
office was used to extending such service to the customers of the lodge.
Eduardo instructed his messenger ROLANDO ANDASAN to proceed to the lodge and give the lady occupant of room no. 2 the
sum of P114,000.00 in exchange for her 40 pieces of yen. Rolando left the office at about 1:35 p.m. and arrived at the lodge ten
minutes later. When he asked security guard LEONARDO ACOSTA where he could find room no. 2, he was instructed to inquire from
a roomboy inside the lodge.[5]

At about that time, ROSE CAHARIAN, an accounting clerk of the lodge, saw Rolando standing by the hallway. Rolando informed
her that he had about a hundred thousand pesos with him as they have a female guest in room no. 2 who wanted to have her yen
converted into pesos. Rose escorted Rolando to Digna, the telephone operator, and directed the latter to call up room no. 2 and
announce the presence and purpose of Rolando. Digna called up room no. 2 and accused Marife confirmed the currency transaction. [6]
Roomboy MAYONITO WAYCO escorted Rolando and directed him to wait in the garage while he first went up the room to
announce his presence. Accused Eladio, Jr. opened the door and instructed Mayonito to let Rolando in. Mayonito returned to the
garage, fetched Rolando and ushered him to the room. Mayonito returned to the garage and waited.
At about 2 p.m., accused Marife called up telephone operator Digna and informed her that they were checking out of the
room. Seconds later, Mayonito, who was still waiting for Rolando in the garage, saw accused Marife emerge from room no. 2. She
inquired about the cost of their room occupancy and, without waiting for his reply, immediately handed him a P500.00 bill. Mayonito
called on Jonathan to arrange for the payment of the bill and handed him the P500 bill. Jonathan then signaled security guard
Leonardo to hail a cab for accused Marife. In the meantime, Mayonito stayed in the garage with accused Marife.
While waiting for the bill and the cab, Mayonito inquired from accused Marife where Rolando was. She dismissed his query and
directed him to follow-up instead the preparation of their bill as she and her companion were in a hurry. Mayonito rushed to the
cashier to get the bill, only to be told that it was already with Jonathan.
Meanwhile, Jonathan returned to accused Marife with the bill. He waited with her at the garage for about 5 minutes for the
arrival of her cab. As she seemed quite impatient to leave, they started to walk towards the gate of the lodge. Just then, security
guard Leonardo was able to hail a cab and instructed it to enter the lodge. [7]
Thus, when Mayonito returned to the garage of room no. 2, he saw accused Marife about to board the cab inside the
lodge. Mayonito instructed cab driver ERNESTO RAMOS to stay for a while as they still had to inspect room no. 2. Accused Marife
likewise directed Ernesto to wait for her companion accused Eladio, Jr. who, seconds later, emerged from the garage but did not board
the cab and fled on foot. Accused Marife then ordered Ernesto to follow him.
In the meantime, roomboys Mayonito and Jonathan discovered the lifeless body of Rolando inside the room, lying beside the bed
and covered by blood-stained bedsheets. He sustained multiple stab wounds and a TV cable wire was tied around his neck.
Mayonito immediately left the room to pursue its former occupants but he saw accused Marifes cab already on its way out of the
lodge and accused Eladio, Jr. fleeing on foot. Mayonito and Jonathan chased after them while shouting at the guard to stop the
accused at the exit.[8] Responding, security guard Leonardo grabbed the hand of accused Eladio, Jr. as he went past by him near the
exit, thinking that the latter had not yet paid his bill. However, Eladio, Jr. deftly freed himself from Leonardos grip and ran inside the
nearby Violeta Court Subdivision. At about the same time, the cab boarded by accused Marife left the premises of the lodge and
followed accused Eladio, Jr. in the subdivision. Leonardo was about to pursue them but the guard stationed at the gate of the
subdivision advised him to wait by the entrance as there was no other way out except through the same gate. The subdivision guard
then immediately closed the gate to prevent the cab from leaving. While the two guards were waiting, Jonathan arrived and informed
them that the accused killed Rolando in room no. 2 and that the policemen had been notified. [9]
Inside the subdivision, accused Eladio, Jr. boarded the cab and sat beside accused Marife. When he asked if there was another
way out of the subdivision, Ernesto replied that there was only one gate. When the cab reached the end of the road, the two accused
alighted and scaled the wall of the subdivision. Accused Eladio, Jr. succeeded but Marife failed to climb over the wall and was left
behind.
When Ernesto drove back to the gate of the subdivision, the security guards stopped him, inspected his cab and saw a brown
envelope which was left by accused Marife at the backseat. They instructed Ernesto to return to the lodge as a crime had been
committed by his passengers.[10]
Pasay City police operatives rushed to the lodge to investigate the crime scene. SPO3 Unico and PO3 Hermo proceeded to the
subdivision and pursued the accused. They found accused Marife in a photo printing office inside the subdivision. Pale and trembling,
she was holding a blood-stained face towel. [11] When interrogated by the policemen, she identified herself as Joann Redillo and her
companion as one Danny Dineros who ran away with the money. The policemen then brought her back to the lodge for identification
by the employees.
At the lodge, the employees identified accused Marife as one of the persons who occupied room no. 2. Cab driver Ernesto
surrendered to the police authorities the brown envelope left by Marife in the cab containing a scabbard for a knife and a shirt. SPO2
Palattao placed the blood-stained towel he confiscated from accused Marife in the envelope.
PO3 Warlie Hermo and Sgt. Danilo Unico [12] investigated room no. 2 and discovered an improvised knife under the mattress, near
Rolandos cadaver. The cadaver was then brought to the Rizal Funeral Homes for a medico-legal examination while accused Marife was
taken to the police station for further investigation. [13]
The autopsy conducted by NBI medico-legal officer DR. RAVELL RONALD BALUYOT revealed that Rolando sustained 28 stab
wounds on different parts of his body; the stab wounds on the chest penetrated the heart and lungs; the widest width of the wounds,
caused by a single bladed weapon, is 3.5 cms.; and, as the knife found by the policemen in the crime scene was about 3.4 cms. wide,
Dr. Baluyot opined that it may possibly be the weapon that killed the victim. [14]
At the police station, accused Marife was asked about the possible whereabouts of accused Danny. She opined that he might be
hiding in his rented house in Bacoor, Cavite and volunteered to lead the operatives to his house.

They arrived in Cavite at past 3 p.m. of the same day but found the house of Danny uninhabited. According to the neighbors,
Danny and his family left at about 2:30 that afternoon, bringing with them all their belongings. Marife then suggested that Danny
might be hiding in their hometown in Samar. From Cavite, the group thus proceeded to Samar. Marifes aunt, a neighbor of Danny in
Samar, informed them that she had not seen Danny. The police operatives also learned that the name Joann Redillo given to them by
accused Marife was a mere alias and that her real name was Marife Bello. [15] The group then decided to return to the Pasay City police
station where Marife was detained.
Subsequently, on October 25, 1995, accused Eladio, Jr. was arrested by the NBI operatives at the house of his legal wife in Pasay
City.
According to REMEDIOS VALDEZ, the owner of Sunshine Moneychanger, accused Eladio, Jr. worked for her from May until
September 1994 as messenger/collector. He was thus familiar with their offices arrangement with the Queensland Lodge to service its
guests who may want to convert their foreign currency into pesos and have the peso equivalent delivered to the hotel room. During
this time, accused Marife who was then cohabiting with accused Eladio, Jr. would frequent their office at least twice a week to visit her
paramour.[16]
On September 23, 1994, accused Eladio, Jr. misrepresented to them that a client called up and requested for the conversion of
yen to pesos and the delivery of the peso equivalent to the client. For this spurious transaction, accused Eladio, Jr.
received P213,000.00 from their cashier for delivery to the alleged client but he absconded with the money and never
returned. Remedios filed an estafa case against him.
ZENAIDA ANDASAN, widow of the victim Rolando, testified about the damages she suffered and expenses incurred by reason of
Rolandos death. Rolando, born on May 13, 1952, was buried in July, 1995 in Cabanatuan City; the cost of transporting the deceased
to and burial in Cabanatuan City, duly supported by receipts, was P50,000.00; she suffered anxiety and pain over the loss of her
husband as she was left to take care of their two (2) kids; Rolando used to give her monthly support in the amount of P2,000 when
he visits them in Cabanatuan City.[17]
After the prosecution rested its case, the two (2) accused foisted separate defenses. While accused Marife admitted that she
participated in the perpetration of the crime, albeit under duress, accused Eladio, Jr. raised the defenses of denial and alibi.
ACCUSED MARIFE admitted that she was present at every stage of the crime from the time it was planned until its
consummation. She alleged however that she joined the conspirators under duress as Danny threatened to kill her if she refused to
cooperate. Her account of the events that transpired is as follows: She cohabited with accused Eladio, Jr. for a year and bore him a
child. They parted ways in May 1995 after she gave birth and it was two months later when she saw accused Eladio, Jr. again.
On July 25, 1995, at about 8 a.m., she was staying in the house of her friend in Bacoor, Cavite when accused Danny arrived. He
asked her to act as godmother to his child who would be baptized that day. She acquiesced and went with him to his house also in
Bacoor, Cavite.
When they arrived at his house at about 9 a.m., she was surprised to find only accused George Rebello, alias Cayo, and her
former paramour accused Eladio, Jr. waiting for them. Accused Danny then told her that no baptism would be held that day. It was
just their scheme to get her to go with him as they wanted her to do something for them. When she inquired what it was, Danny
dismissed her query and assured her she would know later.
After learning about the ploy, her first reaction was to leave but accused Cayo and Danny angrily twisted her arm and prevented
her from leaving. She remained seated in the living room with Dannys wife while the three accused momentarily locked themselves in
the bedroom and talked. She begged Dannys wife to let her go but the latter refused.
Accused Danny then emerged from the bedroom and brought her back to the room with the other accused. Danny then told her
that they would have to go some place which he would divulge later on. Frightened, she asked where they would bring her but Danny
got mad at her persistence, cursed her and told her to shut up if she did not want to get hurt. She cried and begged them to release
her. Her pleas fell on deaf ears. Accused Danny and Cayo then dragged her out of the house. They walked for about 10 meters
towards the Panapaan highway. She was unable to seek help from the other people along the road as Danny and Cayo were twisting
her arm. When they reached the highway, a red cab driven by accused Eladio, Jr. arrived. Danny pushed her to the backseat and he
and Cayo sat on either side of her. She cried as she was afraid but the accused just laughed at her. When she cursed Danny, he
slapped her. Everytime she struggled, Danny and Cayo would twist her arm. Danny threatened to kill her inside the cab if she did not
stop resisting. He then guided her hand to his waistline and let her touch the wooden handle of a knife tucked in his pants. Accused
Danny then threatened to use the knife on her if she refused to cooperate. [18]
The cab stopped in Baclaran. Accused Cayo alighted and hailed a tricycle. Accused Danny then dragged Marife out of the cab,
pushed her into the tricycle and sat beside her. They then proceeded to the Queensland Lodge in Pasay City, with Eladio, Jr. and Cayo
following them in the cab.
However, only the tricycle entered the premises of the lodge. It stopped in front of the garage of room no. 2. A roomboy
approached accused Marife and Danny and guided them to room no. 2. The roomboy turned on the lights, television and aircondition
and then left. Danny ordered Marife to seat at the corner. He removed the knife tucked in his pants and told her to obey everything
he ordered her to do. He then handed her the telephone and directed her to ask the operator for an outside line. Initially, she failed
to get a line but eventually she was able to get connected to the manager of a moneychanger, Eddie. As per instruction of accused
Danny, she introduced herself as Joann Redillo and explained that she wanted to have her 40 pieces of yen converted into
pesos. Eddie agreed and asked her to call again so he can prepare the money.

When she hung up, she pleaded with accused Danny to let her go. Danny slapped her across the face and told her she could
leave only after she has finished what he wanted her to do.
At about 1 p.m., Marife again called up Eddie. When she mistakenly told Eddie to deliver the money at Winners Hotel, accused
Danny slapped her and scolded her for giving the wrong instructions. He directed her to hang up and tell Eddie that she would call
again later.
In anger, Danny twisted her arm. She apologized for her mistake and begged him to release her for the sake of her child. Danny
ignored her pleas. When she repeatedly inquired where accused Eladio, Jr. and Cayo were, Danny told her that the two were also in on
the plan and she could not rely on them for help.
At about 1:30 p.m., accused Marife placed her last phone call to Eddie. She directed him to have the money delivered to room
no. 2 of the lodge. After a couple of minutes, the messenger from the moneychanger arrived. She did not see his features as the
room was dark. After accused Danny let him into the room, he poked a knife at the messenger and demanded to know where the
money was. Whereupon, the messenger pulled up his shirt and showed the money to accused Danny who pulled it out of the
messengers waistline. The messenger threw a punch at accused Danny. A fight ensued. Accused Marife shouted for help but no one
heard her as the television was loud. Danny then threatened to kill her if she did not stop shouting and ordered her to lie face down
on the floor. She complied and did not witness the succeeding events that transpired. She heard a commotion. Then there was
silence. Accused Danny then ordered her to stand up and told her she can already leave. When she stood up, she saw the messenger
lying on the floor which accused Danny covered him with a blanket.
She rushed out of the room. A roomboy approached her and inquired if she was already leaving and if she needed a cab. He
also asked her why she was crying. She did not respond to the last question but merely said that she needed a vehicle. When a cab
arrived inside the lodge, she boarded it. However, the roomboy ran after her and demanded that she first pay her bill. She pulled out
an envelope from her pocket and took out a P500 bill.
As her cab approached the gate of the lodge, she saw a man chasing her but she did not pay any attention to him as she was not
in her right frame of mind. Then, she saw accused Danny fleeing on foot. She repeatedly ordered the cab driver to chase him and ran
over him. The driver followed Danny inside the Violeta Court Subdivision. When Danny saw the cab, he boarded it and handed the
driver several bills. The driver then ordered accused Marife to alight from the cab before it sped away.
Left on her own, accused Marife entered a house in the subdivision where she was subsequently found and arrested by the police
officers. She was puzzled why they were arresting her as she had not done anything wrong, but the policemen directed her to go with
them to the police station.
During the investigation, she volunteered to accompany the investigators to the house rented by accused Danny in Cavite.
They arrived in Cavite at about 2:30 p.m. that day only to find the house rented by Danny abandoned and in complete
disarray. The investigators then discovered a blood-stained face towel in Dannys house and confiscated it.
[19]

They returned to the Pasay City police station at about 4 p.m. where the police officers showed her a brown envelope containing
a knife and a black shirt. She confirmed to the officers that she saw these things in the lodge but denied that she was in possession
thereof.
Later on, Marife suggested to the investigators that Danny may be hiding in his house in Samar. She claimed to know where
accused Danny resided in Samar as they were neighbors in that province. That evening, she and six (6) other policemen left for
Samar but they failed to locate accused Danny. They interviewed a neighbor, the aunt of accused Marife, who told them that Danny
had not been to that place. They returned to the Pasay City police station where she refused to give any statement to the police
officers as she was not in her right frame of mind. Later, she wrote her own statement regarding the stabbing incident and gave it to
her brother.[20]
For his part, ACCUSED ELADIO, JR. had a completely different story. ANITA CONSUELO, the wife of his cousin, testified that
accused Marife and Eladio, Jr., together with their child, stayed in their house in Paraaque on June 22, 1995. Both accused were then
unemployed and their plan was for accused Marife to seek overseas employment. Four (4) days later, accused Marife left her house to
look for work but she never returned, leaving behind accused Eladio, Jr. with their child. Efforts to locate her proved futile. Accused
Eladio, Jr. temporarily left the child to her sister while he looked for work. [21]
ACCUSED ELADIO, JR. then transferred to the house of his cousin, Nestor Marcos, in Carmona, Cavite. On that fateful day of
July 25, 1995, he cleaned the house, watched television and had a drinking spree in Nestors house with his cousins. His testimony
was corroborated by one Lourdes Bacongga who visited Nestors house on said date and stayed there from 9 a.m. until 6 p.m. [22]
Accused Eladio, Jr. charged that accused Marife and the other prosecution witnesses falsely implicated him in the crime of which
he had no knowledge or participation. Neither did he know their fugitive co-accused Danny Dineros and Cayo. He claimed that his
innocence regarding the conspiracy is supported by the letter sent to him while he was detained in the NBI by accused Marife who was
then confined at the Pasay City jail. It reads:
Boyet sa pangalan ng panginoong Jesus sanay nasa mabuti kang kalagayan. Pagkabasa mo nitong sulat Boy, wag kang mag-alala
nasa akin lahat ang buhay ng kaso mo. Pinipiga nila ako. Anut-ano man ang mangyari hindi ko pwedeng idiin ang taong alam ko na
walang alam sa krimeng binibintang nila sa iyo. Ako na lang ang magsasalita, ingat ka ng lang lagi, okey lang ako dito ang sarap nga
ng buhay ko dito. Magkikita rin tayo alam kong itratransfer ka dito sa Pasay City Jail. Huwag kang matakot or mag-alala. Ako naman
ang magsasalita. Di kita ididiin dahil pareho tayong walang alam sa mga nangyari. Huwag mo laging kalimutang magdasal. Di niya
tayo pababayaan. Hanggang dito na lang ang sulat ko. Take care coz I care a lot, I love you and we miss you so much.

Marife B.
Accused Eladio, Jr. testified that he again met Marife and was reconciled with her in November 1995 when he was transferred to
the Pasay City jail. During the time they were in jail, accused Marife never told him what really happened that fateful day. He only
came to know about Marifes involvement in the crime when she testified at the trial. He charged that her testimony implicating him in
the crime was a lie as he did not even know their co-accused Danny and Cayo. He claimed that Marife changed her mind and later on
implicated him as she was under duress, as shown by her second letter to him on January 6, 1996 after her court testimony. It reads:
My dear husband, Im sorry for what happened. I cant understand my feelings, I love you, I really love you. My dear, I dont know
why about myself. Im liar. From now on, please dont talk to me. Im sick about my decision. I love my mother, sisters and
brothers, specially my daughter. I love my baby please understand my situation. This is my first and last letter to you. Im very sorry
papa. Do you remember Im everything your self. Oh! My god, papa dont talk to me all my remembering to each other, like please
forgive me. Im sorry my dear for all my sins. Take care coz I care a lot. Your love one Mama.
After trial, the court found the accused guilty as charged and imposed on them the maximum penalty of death as they were
found to be part of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Marife Bello y Rosco and Eladio M. Consuelo, Jr. are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the
commission of the crime of robbery with homicide, as charged in the aforequoted Information; and because of the aggravating
circumstance of their having collaborated, confederated and mutually helped one another for the purpose of gain in the preparation of
the offense, they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Both accused are also ordered, jointly and severally, to return to
or reimburse the Sunshine Money Changer the sum of P114,000.00 as restitution or reparation of the damage caused; and to pay
Zenaida Andasan, the surviving wife of the deceased Rolando Andasan, P50,000.00 as indemnification for consequential
damages; P50,000.00 as compensation for the death of her husband; P591,999.98 as indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased; and P40,000.00 as moral damages.
Accused Bello and Consuelo are likewise required to shoulder the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
On automatic appeal, the two accused filed separate Briefs.
In assailing the Decision of the trial court, appellant MARIFE assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARIFE BELLO WAS IN CONSPIRACY WITH THE
OTHER ACCUSED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARIFE BELLO VIA CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HAVING ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARIFE BELLO ACQUITTED BASED ON FACTS
EXTRACTED FROM HER DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AND WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
For his part, appellant ELADIO, JR. contends that the trial court erred in convicting him for: (1) his identity as a co-conspirator
was not established beyond reasonable doubt as appellant Marife herself identified accused Danny Dineros as her companion in room
no. 2 on that fateful day, and; (2) the trial court failed to give weight to his alibi which was duly corroborated by Lourdes Bacongga.
The trial court rejected the appellants defenses and we find no reason to disturb its guilty verdict.
Appellant Marife avers that her alleged conspiracy with the other accused was not sufficiently established by circumstantial
evidence as there was no showing that she had the same purpose and united with the other accused in the execution of the
crime. She alleges that her mere presence in the crime scene is not per se a sufficient indicium of conspiracy. She insists that she
acted against her will due to the irresistible force employed by her co-accused.
We are not persuaded.
Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it. [24] Conspiracy is
predominantly a state of mind as it involves the meeting of the minds and intent of the malefactors. Consequently, direct proof is not
essential to establish it. The existence of the assent of minds of the co-conspirators may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of the complete plan to commit the crime.
In the case at bar, the records clearly reveal that appellant Marife was part of the plan to rob the moneychanger. This
plan was mapped out in accused Dannys house in Cavite by appellants, together with accused Danny and Cayo. The four drove in a

cab from Cavite to Baclaran. As the robbery will be set up inside a motel room, only appellants Marife and Eladio, Jr. boarded a tricycle
and checked in the lodge so as not to arouse suspicion. A number of employees of the Queensland Lodge and the cab driver testified
on the conduct of appellant Marife inside the lodge on that fateful day: the roomboys identified her and Eladio, Jr. as the ones who
alighted from the tricycle and checked into room no. 2; contrary to her account, the employees did not notice that appellant Marife was
nervous, crying or trembling due to fear when she entered the lodge; appellant Marife asked the telephone operator thrice that day for
an outside line; using an alias, she called up the moneychanger twice to set up the robbery; appellants were the last to see the
victim alive; after they accomplished their criminal design, appellant Marife rushed out of the room, personally paid for the bill and
asked for a cab; the roomboys noticed that she was nervous and in a hurry to leave; after she boarded the cab, she ordered the
driver to wait for her companion; she and Eladio, Jr. then fled from the lodge while the roomboys were inspecting their room; both
sought refuge in a subdivision; and, finally, they tried to scale the wall of the subdivision in an attempt to get away. All these chain
of events and the conduct of appellant Marife lead to no other conclusion than that she conspired with her co-accused to
commit the crime.
Neither can we give credit to appellant Marifes claim of duress and irresistible fear. Her story simply does not add up. First, the
records show that she had close relations with all her co-accused: she has a child with appellant Eladio, Jr.; she and her co-accused all
resided in Cavite; accused Danny Dineros asked her to be the godmother of his child; she knew where Danny resided in Cavite and
they both hail from Samar; and, even Marifes aunt in Samar was acquainted with Danny. Indeed, her claim of irresistible force from
her co-accused is difficult to fathom as it would be easier to instill fear on a stranger than on a friend or close relation. Second, while
appellant Marife claims that she was mostly in tears during the time she was abducted by her co-accused, none of the employees of
the lodge noticed any manifestation of fear or coercion on her part. Third, her claim of duress and irresistible fear is negated by her
failure to escape or ask for succor during her alleged abduction despite several opportunities to do so. She could have asked help from
the people she saw along the road when they left Dannys house in Cavite and while she was allegedly being dragged towards the
cab; from the tricycle driver who drove them to the lodge; from the roomboys who stayed with her in the garage after the stabbing
incident, while she was waiting for her bill and cab; and, from the cab driver who picked her up from the lodge. She could have
escaped after the stabbing incident when she went out of the room alone and conversed with the roomboy. An innocent victim of
circumstances would have waited for and eagerly grabbed the first chance to escape or seek help; but not appellant Marife. Fourth,
she escaped from the lodge, fled to the nearby subdivision and tried to scale its wall with appellant Eladio, Jr. who, moments before,
was supposed to be her aggressor. Finally, even at the time she was arrested, she stuck to her alias and identified herself as Joann
Redillo to the police authorities. Hence, apart from her biased testimony, the records are bereft of evidence to corroborate and bolster
her claim of coercion. The more logical and inescapable conclusion is that she was part of the conspiracy. Plainly, her conduct all
throughout the incident reveals that she was united in purpose with her co-accused in the execution of the crime.
On the whole, the incriminating circumstantial evidence against the appellants sufficiently proves their complicity.
Circumstantial evidence is that which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference.[25] Resort to circumstantial evidence is, in the nature of things, a necessity as crimes are usually committed clandestinely
and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. To require direct testimony would, in many cases, result in freeing
criminals and deny proper protection to society.[26] Thus, the guilt of an accused may be established through circumstantial evidence
provided that the requisites are present, viz: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences must be based on proven
facts; (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt as to the guilt of the accused. [27]
In the case at bar, while no witness testified to the actual stabbing and robbing of the victim, the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution supports a judgment of conviction. Appellants asked roomboy Jonathan for a room; Jonathan
escorted them to room no. 2, prepared the room for them by turning on the lights, television and airconditioning unit before ushering
them in. The telephone operator received a request for an outside line from the lady occupant of room no. 2 thrice that day. Eduardo,
the manager of the moneychanger, got phone calls from the lady occupant of room no. 2 who identified herself as Joann Redillo; the
caller pretended that she just arrived from Japan and asked her yen be converted to pesos. Eduardo gave his messenger, the victim
Rolando Andasan, the amount of P114,000.00 to be delivered to the lady occupant of room no. 2. Rolando arrived at the lodge and
explained his purpose to the employees therein. Rolando was a familiar face in the lodge which had an internal arrangement with the
moneychanger to extend currency conversion services upon the request of their guests. Appellant Eladio, Jr. used to be employed as a
messenger of the moneychanger and knew about the offices internal arrangement with the lodge. Roomboy Mayonito escorted
Rolando to room no. 2 for the currency transaction; when appellant Eladio, Jr. opened the door to Mayonito, the latter informed him
about the presence of Rolando in the garage; appellant Eladio, Jr. gave the go signal for Rolando to come up to the room; Mayonito
returned to the garage, fetched Rolando and escorted him to room no. 2; again, it was appellant Eladio, Jr. who opened the door and
let Rolando in. That was the last time Rolando was seen alive and the money was no longer to be found.
After accomplishing their criminal design, appellants emerged from the room, hurriedly paid their bill and left. The roomboys
discovered the cadaver of Rolando in the room which sustained several stab wounds. Appellants fled and scaled the wall of the
subdivision. The police authorities recovered a knife under the bed of room no. 2 which fitted the scabbard left by appellant Marife in
the cab, together with a bloodied face towel. The width of this knife is compatible with the width of the stab wounds sustained by the
victim.
Thus, while no person actually witnessed the appellants rob and kill the victim, the confluence of the incriminating circumstances
enumerated above clearly shows that the appellants had motive and opportunity to kill the victim when he resisted the robbery. As
the victim was last seen alive with them, coupled with their conduct that fateful day and their possession of the deadly weapon, there
can be no other reasonable conclusion than that the appellants authored the crime. To be sure, their conviction is essentially based on
this unbroken chain of events as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and not on the uncounselled interrogation of appellant Marife
by the police authorities.
On the other hand, the alibi proffered by appellant Eladio, Jr. does not hold. Alibi is a Latin word which means elsewhere or in
another place.[28] Where the defense of alibi is raised, the accused must show that he was at some other place when the crime was
committed at such length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis; or that the distance is such as to
preclude the possibility or probability for the accused to be at the crime scene at the time it was committed; or that it would have been
physically impossible for the accused, by reason of illness or physical condition to be at the place where the crime was committed. It

is doctrinally settled that alibi is the weakest defense that can be put up by an accused, especially where there is direct testimony of
an eyewitness, duly corroborated by another.
In the case at bar, while appellant Eladio, Jr. insists that he was in his cousins house in Cavite that day, the employees of the
lodge, all strangers to him and had no motive to distort the truth or falsely implicate him, categorically identified him as one of the
occupants of room no. 2. Roomboys Jonathan and Mayonito identified the appellants as the occupants of room no. 2. They had every
opportunity to remember the appellants on that fateful day due to several encounters: the appellants asked roomboy Jonathan for a
room; Jonathan escorted them to room no. 2, prepared the room for them by turning on the lights, television and airconditioning unit
before ushering them in; roomboy Mayonito accompanied the victim Rolando to the room for the currency transaction; it was appellant
Eladio, Jr. who opened the door to Mayonito who informed him about the presence of Rolando in the garage; Mayonito returned to the
garage, fetched Rolando and escorted him to room no. 2; again, it was appellant Eladio, Jr. who opened the door and let Rolando
in; minutes later, after the stabbing incident, appellant Marife went down to the garage and asked Mayonito to prepare her bill and get
a cab for them; Jonathan handed her the bill and waited with her for about 5 minutes until her cab arrived; the roomboys and
security guard of the lodge pursued appellants Marife and Eladio, Jr. when they fled from the crime scene.
Interestingly, while a different version was offered by appellant Marife as to the exact participation of Eladio, Jr. in the crime
(i.e., that he merely drove the cab from Dannys house to Baclaran but it was accused Danny who checked in the room with appellant
Marife and killed the victim in the course of the robbery), Marifes testimony nonetheless placed appellant Eladio, Jr. at the house of
accused Danny during the planning of the conspiracy, all the way to the entrance of the lodge that fateful day, contrary to his claim
that he was in Cavite that entire fateful day. These eyewitnesses accounts regarding appellant Eladio, Jr.s complicity in the crime and
presence at the locus criminis effectively shattered his proferred alibi. The settled rule is that where there is positive testimony of
eyewitnesses regarding the presence of the accused at the locus criminis on the date and time the crime was committed, a negative
defense of alibi is undeserving of weight or credence.[29]
In sum, we find that the defenses raised by the appellants are clouded with improbability and uncertainty. As the conspiracy
among the accused was sufficiently established by the prosecution, the appellants are equally guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. [30] Thus, although the original plan may have been to simply rob
the victim and while appellant Marife may not have actually participated in the horrendous killing, the conspirators are equally liable as
co-principals for all the planned or unanticipated consequences of their criminal design.
Be that as it may, we find that the trial court erred in holding that the appellants were part of a syndicated or organized crime
group under Article 62 (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, [31] as amended, which merits the imposition of the maximum penalty of
death. While the appellants and their co-accused confederated and mutually helped one another for the purpose of gain, it was neither
alleged nor proved that they formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain which is
the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group.[32]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with modification. Appellants MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO and ELADIO M.
CONSUELO, JR. are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery with homicide and, in the absence of
any aggravating circumstance, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally
reimburse the Sunshine Moneychanger the amount of P114,000.00 as restitution for the damage caused, and to pay Zenaida Andasan,
widow of the victim Rolando Andasan, the total amount of Seven Hundred Thirty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine and 98/100
(P731,999.98), broken down as follows: P50,000.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as compensation for the death of her husband
Rolando; P591,999.98 as indemnity for loss of Rolandos earning capacity; and, P40,000.00 as moral damages. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 126531. April 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN y
ZACARIAS alias KIRAT,accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GILBERT ELIJORDE Y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN Y ZACARIAS alias Kirat were convicted of murder by the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan for the killing of Eric Hierro. Both accused were sentenced to death and ordered jointly and severally to
indemnify the heirs of Eric Hierro P50,000.00 plus P35,000.00 for actual damages, P100,000.00 for moral damages and P25,000.00
for exemplary damages. The case is now with us on automatic review.
The records show that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 21 May 1995 Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado
were drinking in the house of the latter. Sometime later, Hierro and Visbal went out to buy mango at a nearby sari-sari
store. Accused Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and a certain Edwin Menes were at the time in front of the store. As Menes
approached Hierro the latter warned Menes, Dont touch me, my clothes will get dirty. Suddenly Menes punched Hierro on the face,
followed by Elijorde who also boxed Hierro on the face, and Punzalan who kicked Hierro at the back. Hierro and Visbal ran for their
lives. They sought shelter at Contemplados house. After some three (3) minutes, Hierro went out of the house to go home together
with Visbal and the latters wife.
As they walked home, Visbal noticed the accused Elijorde, Punzalan and Menes waiting for them. As Hierro and company drew
near, Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back for the second time. Visbal tried to retaliate by punching Punzalan on the face but was held
back by his wife. Hierro ran away pursued by Elijorde. They were followed by Visbal. Elijorde stabbed Hierro at the back. When
Hierro fell down, Elijorde placed himself on top of Hierro who was now raising his arms defensively and pleading, Maawa na kayo,
huwag ninyo akong patayin, wala akong kasalanan sa inyo. Despite the pleas of Hierro for mercy, Elijorde stabbed him with a knife
on the chest and then fled. Visbal and his wife brought Hierro to the hospital where he died soon after.
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan, conducted a post-mortem examination of Eric Hierro, and reported
that the cause of his death was shock resulting from multiple stab wounds in the thorax penetrating the aorta and vena cava. [1]
Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes alias Nonong[2] were accordingly charged in an Information for murder of
Eric Hierro qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. But only Elijorde and Punzalan were arrested
and tried. Menes has since remained at large.

Both accused contend that the court a quo erred in finding that treachery qualified the killing of Hierro to murder, and in finding
Punzalan guilty of murder by reason of conspiracy with Elijorde. The defense argues that Punzalan did not conspire with Elijorde
because the only participation of Punzalan in the commission of the offense was his kicking of Hierro twice: first, after Hierro was
boxed by Elijorde and Menes in front of the nearby sari sari store, and the second time, when Hierro was on his way home; that
Punzalan remained in the place where he kicked Hierro and did nothing more; that he did not join or cooperate with Elijorde in
pursuing and stabbing the deceased; and, that the acts of kicking Hierro were neither in pursuance of the same criminal design of
Elijorde nor done in concert aimed at the attainment of the same objective of killing Hierro.
Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. To
convict him as a principal by direct participation in the instant case, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and his co-accused
Elijorde be proved. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself
through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. [3] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[4] Hence, conspiracy exists in a
situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. [5] In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done
in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or
design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do
reasonably yield that inference.[6]
Clearly, the testimony of eyewitness Benjamin Visbal narrated the circumstances surrounding the killing of Hierro, to wit:
Q:

Now, you said that Eric Hierro went to the store to buy mango, do you know the reason why there was a boxing incident?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

What was the reason?

A:

When Nongnong approached Eric, Eric stated, "Dont touch me, my clothes will become dirty."

Q:

Who is this Nongnong?

A:

Edwin Meneses,[7] Your Honor.

Q:

When Eric Hierro said that what did Edwin Menes(es ) do?

A:

He suddenly punched Eric Hierro.

Q:

When Eric Hierro (was) punched what did this Gilbert Elijorde do?

A:

Gilbert Elijorde also punched Eric Hierro.

Q:

How about Reynaldo Punzalan?

A:

Reynaldo Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back, Your Honor.

Q:

That was during the first incident?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

You mean to say they were three at that time?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

Now, after that Eric Hierro went home?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

How long did Eric Hierro stayed (sic) at that place?

A:

For about three (3) minutes, Your Honor.

Q:

When Eric Hierro went out you went with him together with Eric Hierro?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

Together with your wife?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

When the three of you went out what happened?

A:

While we were walking home this Kirat (Reynaldo Punzalan) suddenly kicked Eric Hierro at the back.

Q:

Do you mean to say aside from the first incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro, (during) the second incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

When you were approaching, how many of them were there waiting for Eric Hierro?

A:

The three of them were waiting for Eric Hierro but during the chasing it was only Gilbert Elijorde who chased us.

Q;

What did Edwin do during the second incident?

A:

He did nothing.

Q:

How about Kirat?

A:

He kicked Eric Hierro at the back.

Q:

After that what did you do?

A:

I cant (sic) do anything, Your Honor, because I was being held by my wife.

Q:

How about Eric Hierro what did he do?

A:

He ran away x x x x

Q:

While Eric Hierro was running did you see that Gilbert stab Eric at the back?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

That was the first stab that was made by Gilbert is that correct?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

What happened to Eric when he was stabbed at the back?

A:

He continued running, Your Honor.

Q:

And how about Gilbert what did Gilbert do?

A:

He continued chasing, Your Honor.

Q:

How about your wife where was your wife?

A:

At my back, Your Honor.

Q:

When you met Eric Hierro at a certain point what did you actually see?

A:

That was when I saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro right on the chest.

Q:

And when Eric Hierro was already lying (facing?) up?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

And Gilbert was on top of Eric Hierro?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

And you saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:

How many times?

A:

Only once, Your Honor.

Q:

During those incidents where was Kirat?

A:

He did not run after Eric Hierro. He remained in front of the house of my cousin Rodel.

On the basis of the above testimony, the only involvement of Punzalan was kicking Hierro at the back before the latter was
pursued and stabbed by accused Elijorde. After kicking the victim, Punzalan remained where he was and did not cooperate with
Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to ensure that the latter would be killed. There is no other evidence to show unity of purpose and design
between Punzalan and Elijorde in the execution of the killing, which is essential to establish conspiracy. His act of kicking Hierro prior
to the actual stabbing by Elijorde does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action. For it is possible
that the accused Punzalan had no knowledge of the common design, if there was any, nor of the intended assault which was
committed in a place far from where he was. The mere kicking does not necessarily prove intention to kill. The evidence does not
show that Punzalan knew that Elijorde had a knife and that he intended to use it to stab the victim. [8] Neither can Punzalan be
considered an accomplice in the crime of murder. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice in the commission of the
offense, the following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without
previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by
indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation. There is nothing on record to show that accused Punzalan knew that Elijorde was going to stab Hierro, thus creating
serious doubt on Punzalans criminal intent.[9]
In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed
against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own acts.
[10]
Consequently, accused Punzalan must be absolved from all responsibility for the killing of Hierro. It may be emphasized that at the
time accused Elijorde intervened in the assault, Punzalan had already desisted from his own acts of aggression. He did nothing in fact
to assist Elijorde in the immediate commission of the murder. Moreover, the act of kicking by Punzalan prior to the actual stabbing by
Elijorde was evidently done without knowledge of the criminal design on the part of the latter as that design had not yet been revealed
prior to the killing of Hierro.
As regards the kicking of the victim by Punzalan, which the latter admits, there is nothing on record to show that the kicking
resulted in any injury on any part of the body of Hierro. Neither is there any evidence that the victim was hit at all when Punzalan
kicked him. Of what then can Punzalan be held liable?
With regard to the principal accused Gilbert Elijorde, the trial court correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing of Hierro
thus qualifying the crime to murder. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
any defense which the offended party might make. The fact that a verbal confrontation accompanied by physical assault by the group
of Elijorde preceded the actual killing did not negate the treacherous character of the stabbing which resulted in the death of
Hierro. After the first physical assault which sent Hierro retreating and seeking shelter in the house of a friend, the victim did not
expect that the accused would persist in inflicting harm upon him who, unaware of the impending danger, proceeded home with his
friends. Unfortunately, however, Elijorde was waiting for the deceased and pursued him to his end. After stabbing Hierro at the back,
and if only to ensure the success of his criminal design, accused Elijorde persistently chased his unarmed quarry until he finally
overpowered his victim and delivered the fatal stab on his chest. In one case, treachery was present where the accused stabbed the
victim with a bladed weapon even as his hands were raised and he was pleading for mercy.[11] In another case where the accused who
was armed with a revolver had an altercation with the victim, fired at him, pursued him, and when cornered he
(victim) threw himself on the floor, raised his hands and begged the defendant not to shoot him as he was already wounded, but
the malefactor just the same shot him thrice, we held that there was treachery in the killing. [12]
We likewise agree with the trial court when it disregarded the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength alleged in the Information. No sufficient evidence exists to show that the requisites of evident premeditation were
present, to wit: (a) the time when the offender decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his
determination to commit it; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its
warnings.[13] Where there is no showing that the accused Elijorde prior to the night of the commission of the crime resolved to kill the
victim nor proof that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated against him.[14] Moreover, the time interval of three (3) minutes between the first and the second assault on Hierro is too
brief to have enabled Elijorde to ponder over what he intended to do with Hierro. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery; hence, it cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is already
present.[15]
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. As
regards the accused Gilbert Elijorde, the killing although qualified by treachery was not attended by any generic modifying
circumstance; consequently, the penalty to be imposed upon him must be the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.[16] With respect
to the accused Reynaldo Punzalan, he should be acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
Although not objected to by the accused, we modify the award of damages adjudged by the court a quo in favor of the heirs of
the victim, particularly with regard to the moral and exemplary damages. The award of P100,000.00 for moral damages may seem
excessive considering the purpose of the award which is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings.
[17]
For this reason, an award of P50,000.00 may be adequate and reasonable.[18] The exemplary damages awarded by the trial court
may be deleted since they are granted only when the crime is committed with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances. In the
instant case, treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying
circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages was

already absorbed in the treachery.[19] But the indemnity for death fixed at P50,000.00 and the actual damages representing
uncontested funeral expenses of P35,000.00 should be affirmed.
On the part of accused Reynaldo Punzalan as there is no finding of criminal responsibility against him, only accused Gilbert
Elijorde should bear the liability for such civil indemnity as well as the actual and moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Accused GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ is found GUILTY of
MURDER and is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged and is ordered RELEASED FROM CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY unless legally held for another cause. In this regard, the Director of
Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Accused ELIJORDE is solely
held responsible for the payment to the heirs of the victim Eric Hierro the amounts of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P35,000.00 for
actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 114261. February 10, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERLY FABRO y AZUCENA, accused-appellant. Slxsc
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Appellant Berly Fabro y Azucena, together with her common-law husband Donald Pilay y Calag and Irene Martin, was charged with the
crime of "violation of Section 21 (b) Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended," under Criminal
Case No. 11231-R of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, in an information that reads:
That on or about the 7th day of April 1993, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to PO2 ELLONITO APDUHAN, who acted as poseur-buyer,
one (1) kilo of dried marijuana leaves, a prohibited drug without any authority of law, in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon arraignment, appellant and Donald Pilay pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. [2] A co-accused, Irene Martin, remains at large.
The prosecutions case against herein appellant is as follows:
At around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 7, 1993 in Camp Henry Allen, Baguio City, two "concerned individuals," later identified
as Gloria and Emma Borce,[3] reported to Chief Inspector Allyn Evasco of the 14th Narcotics Regional Field Office, that a couple living
together as husband and wife in Quirino Hill, Baguio City, was engaged in selling marijuana. They added that sales usually took place
between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m.[4]slxmis
Acting on that report, Chief Inspector Evasco organized two teams to conduct a buy-bust operation. The first team was composed of
SPO1 Modesto Carrera, SPO3 Delfin Salaria, SPO1 Galutan and one civilian agent while the second team had Senior Inspector Franklin
Mabanag and three (3) members of the 191st Mobile Force Company. [5] Mabanag was to be the overall team leader with Batag as his
assistant.[6] SPO2 Ellonito Apduhan was designated poseur-buyer in the operation. After briefing the group, Chief Inspector Evasco
gave P600.00 as purchase money to Apduhan. The amount consisted of six P100-bills with their serial numbers duly listed down. [7]
With the civilian informers in tow, the group proceeded to Quirino Hill on board three vehicles. They arrived at around 5:45 p.m. [8] All
of them disembarked from the vehicles except for Mabanag who stayed in his car. Apduhan, Gloria and Emma took a stairway down to
the house of Pilay and appellant below street level. Batag stationed himself on the top portion of the stairway about twenty (20)
meters from Pilays house.[9] Carrera positioned himself at the upper portion of the road about thirty (30) meters away from the same
house.[10] The back-up team deployed within the immediate vicinity in such a way that they could clearly see the transaction between
the suspected pushers and the poseur-buyer. Missdaa

As Apduhan, Gloria and Emma drew near Pilays residence, appellant met them. Her common-law husband who appeared drunk was
inside the house by the main door.[11] Gloria and Emma introduced Apduhan to appellant as a stranger in the place who wanted to buy
marijuana. Appellant told them that a kilo would cost them P700.00 but she agreed to Apduhans price of P600.00. [12] After Apduhan
had ordered a kilo of the contraband, appellant told them to wait a while. [13] Appellant then went to a house just behind her own.[14]
After a few minutes, she returned in the company of another woman who was later identified as Irene Martin. Appellant was holding
something that looked like a brick wrapped in newspaper and placed inside a transparent plastic bag. [15] Appellant handed the stuff to
Apduhan. Her companion, Irene Martin, demanded payment therefor. Apduhan gave her the P600.00. Apduhan removed the wrapper
of the merchandise. After ascertaining that it was a brick of marijuana, he made the pre-arranged signal of lighting his cigarette.
[16]
Immediately, the back-up team rushed towards their direction. However, before the team could reach them, Irene Martin ran away.
Apduhan held appellant so that she could not escape. [17] Donald Pilay was also arrested. The buy-bust team in pursuit of Irene Martin
ended up in her house with barangay councilman Dominic Dicoy. Since her house was locked, the team forcibly opened it. Inside, they
found Irenes husband, Eusebio Martin. The team obtained his consent to search the house. [18] The search proved futile - neither Irene
nor marijuana was found there.[19] Thereafter, the team brought the suspects and the confiscated marijuana to their office at Camp
Allen. Sdaadsc
The police prepared the booking sheet and arrest reports as regards Donald Pilay and appellant. [20] SPO1 Carrera, SPO2 Apduhan and
SPO3 Batag executed a joint affidavit of arrest. [21] The police requested the PNP Crime Laboratory Service to examine the confiscated
item. To identify it, Apduhan, Batag and Carrera affixed their signatures thereon. [22] Forensic Chemist Lalaine Ong Rodrigo confirmed
that the seized item weighing one (1) kilo was indeed positive for marijuana. [23] However, since she could not go to Baguio City to
testify, another forensic chemist, Alma Margarita Villaseor conducted another test on 995.5 grams of specimen and found it to be
positive for marijuana.[24]
The defense presented a different version of the incident leading to the arrest of appellant and her common-law husband. Appellant
denied having sold marijuana to Apduhan, claiming that Gloria and Emma were the ones carrying the pack of marijuana when the
team approached her. According to appellant, at around 6:00 p.m. of April 7, 1993, she was busy cooking in her house at Middle
Quirino Hill, Baguio City. Her "husband" Donald was then drinking liquor with their neighbors Eusebio Martin, George Matias and
others.[25]Rtcspped
While cooking, appellant noticed Gloria and Emma Borce pass by. They went straight to the house of her neighbor Irene Martin which
was just behind her own house. [26] After a while, Irene summoned appellant to her house where she was introduced to Gloria and
Emma. The two asked appellant if she could do home service for them as appellant was a beautician. They added that they needed a
favor from appellant. However, they were not able to tell appellant what favor it was because appellant excused herself to go back
home and resume cooking. Moments later, Gloria and Emma followed appellant to her house. They reiterated their need for appellants
services as a beautician provided that she would do them a favor. Appellant replied that she could not attend to them. Hearing this, the
two women left her. Appellant noticed that Gloria and Emma carried a regular-sized black shoulder bag. [27]
Gloria and Emma returned three minutes later. Gloria was no longer carrying the shoulder bag. Instead, she was holding something
wrapped in a newspaper.[28] Appellant overheard Emma telling Gloria to hold the marijuana. [29] Armed men also accompanied the two
women. Despite her objections, appellant was immediately handcuffed by one of the armed men. [30] A commotion ensued in the midst
of which Gloria and Emma disappeared. Appellant was led to a waiting vehicle and was brought to the investigating division of the 14th
NARCOM unit in Camp Allen, Baguio City.
Appellants co-accused, Donald Pilay recounted that on April 7, 1993, he and one Pelayos were at the house of Dr. Pilando to get their
wages as the latters workers. Subsequently, they engaged in a drinking spree somewhere in Hilltop near the vegetable section. In the
afternoon of the same day, they transferred to Doros place. They resumed their drinking session at the house of Eusebio Martin in
Quirino Hill. On his way home, someone poked a gun at him and placed him in the trunk of a vehicle. He was brought to Camp Allen
where he saw his wife, appellant herein, with barangay councilman Dicoy.[31]Korte
Dominic Dicoy, the other witness for appellant, testified on how Donald Pilay wrestled with four NARCOM agents on April 7, 1993 prior
to his arrest. He corroborated the testimonies of the arresting officers regarding the search conducted on the residence of Irene
Martin.
On January 4, 1994, the trial court rendered the Decision disposing of Criminal Case No. 11231-R as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds the accused Berly Fabro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
Section 4 Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended (Sale and/or Delivery of Marijuana) as charged in the body
of the Information, not its caption, and hereby sentences her to Life Imprisonment and to pay a Fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of Insolvency and to pay the costs. Sclaw
The marijuana confiscated from accused Berly Fabro (Exh. H) being the subject of the offense is hereby ordered
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State and referred to the Dangerous Drugs Board for immediate destruction.
The accused Berly Fabro being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited in the service of her sentence 4/5 of her
preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
For failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Donald Pilay is Acquitted of the
offense charged in the Information with costs de oficio.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against co-accused Irene Martin to be implemented by any law enforcing
agency in the country so that upon her arrest she shall have a separate arraignment and trial of her own.

SO ORDERED.[32]
In this appeal, appellant assails her conviction on the ground that her guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. She
contends that the following circumstances create a doubt as to her culpability for the crime charged: (1) Contrary to the allegation of
the prosecution, the amount of the confiscated marijuana "weighed only 99.5 grams and not one (1) kilo;" (2) The marked money
allegedly used in the buy-bust operation was not recovered and presented during the trial; and (3) Based on the testimony of the NBI,
the real possessor of the confiscated properties was her co-accused Irene Martin.
The grounds relied on by the appellant are clearly without merit. Sclex
Appellant posits that the amount of marijuana confiscated weighed only 99.5 grams.
Appellant relies on the testimony of Forensic Chemist Alma Margarita Villaseor where she referred to the confiscated marijuana as
weighing 99.5 grams:[33]
q
Could you remember madame witness if your predecessor Sr. Inspector Lalaine Ong conducted her own
examination of this item?
a

It states on the chemical report that she conducted the examination?

And how many grams of this item did she use of the examination (sic)?

I did not see the representative sample.

But when you received the item, how much did it weight?

99.5.

So it must be lesser now? xlaw

Yes, sir.[34]

However, it should be noted that in her written report Villaseor indicated that the specimen had a "total of 999.5 grams of dried
suspected marijuana fruiting tops."[35]
As between a writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue,
when admitted as proof of these facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative value than oral testimony
of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection. The reason behind this is obvious, human memory is fallible and its
force diminishes with the lapse of time. [36] Hence, as between Villaseors testimony and her written report, the latter is considered as
the more accurate account as to the amount of marijuana examined.
Moreover, the initial Chemistry Report conducted by Forensic Chemist Lalaine Ong Rodrigo on April 8, 1993, a day after its confiscation,
recorded that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was "one (1) kilo of suspected dried fruiting tops." [37]xsc
This Court is convinced that despite Villaseors testimony that the marijuana weighed 99.5 grams, there is overwhelming
documentary and testimonial evidence, as correctly appreciated by the trial court, pointing to the fact that the contraband weighed
one (1) kilo when it was seized.
The prosecutions failure to present the marked money used in buying marijuana from appellant did not cause a dent on the
prosecutions case. Such failure was on account of Irene Martins flight after taking the money used in the sale. It must be stressed,
however, that failure to present the marked money is of no great consequence. The Dangerous Drugs Law punishes the mere act of
delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the prohibited drug seller. [38] Rather,
of importance are the facts that the prohibited drug given or delivered by the accused was presented before the court and that the
accused was clearly identified as the offender by the prosecution eyewitness. [39] Stated differently, the buy-bust money is not
indispensable to the conviction of an accused provided that the prosecution has adequately proven the sale of the dangerous drug.
[40]
Sc
Appellants contention that Irene Martin was the real culprit being the source of the contraband does not in any way absolve her of the
crime of selling marijuana. While it is true that it was Irene Martin who took the money, appellant was the one who negotiated with the
poseur-buyers; fetched her co-accused; carried and handed over the marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin and appellant clearly
show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the sale of marijuana. In other words, between Martin and appellant, conspiracy in
the commission of the crime was indubitably proven by the prosecution.
A final note. The information denotes the crime as a "VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 (b) ART. IV IN RELATION TO SECTION 4/ARTICLE II
OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425 AS AMENDED".[41] This is an erroneous designation of the crime committed. Section 21 of R.A. 6425 reads:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense shall be
imposed in case of any xxx conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases: Scmis
xxx

b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs.

It is clear that Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of selling, delivering, distributing and
transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual execution
thereof. While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception is
when such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be
distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the case at bar.
In any event, such error in the information is not fatal. The body of the information states that the crime for which the petitioner is
charged is as follows:
"the above-named accused, conspiring , confederating and mutually aiding one another, did there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and/or deliver to PO2 Elonito Apduhan, who acted as poseur buyer, one (1) kilo of dried
marijuana leaves..."
It has been our consistent ruling that what is controlling are the actual recital of facts in the body of the information and not the
caption or preamble of the crime.[42]
Having considered the assignments of error and finding no basis which, from any aspect of the case, would justify us in interfering with
the findings of the trial court, it results that the appealed decision must be AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-28451

August 1, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NARCISO CABUNGCAL, defendant-appellant.
Esteban del Rosario for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
The appellant, Narciso Cabungcal, was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the crime of homicide to fourteen years,
eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P500 and to pay the costs of the action.

On March 21, 1926 the appellant invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery of his property in the barrio of Misua, municipality of
Infanta, Province of Tayabas. They spent the day at said fishery and in the afternoon returned in two boats, one steered by the
appellant and the other by an old woman named Anastasia Penaojas. Nine persons were in the boat steered by the appellant, the great
majority of whom were women and among them the appellant's wife and son and a nursing child, son of a married couple who had
also gone in this boat. The deceased Juan Loquenario was another passenger in this boat. Upon reaching a place of great depth the
deceased rocked the boat which started it to take water, and the appellant, fearing the boat might capsize, asked the deceased not to
do it. As the deceased paid no attention to this warning and continued rocking the boat, the appellant struck him on the forehead with
an oar. The deceased fell into the water and was submerged, but a little while after appeared on the surface having grasped the side of
the boat, saying that he was going to capzise it and started to move it with this end in view, seeing which the women began to cry,
whereupon the appellant struck him on the neck with the same oar, which submerged the deceased again. With the movement that
the appellant made in giving him the second blow, the boat upset and then the appellant proceeded to save his passengers. In the
meantime the aged Anastasia Penaojas, who steered the other boat, and who at that time was about 200 or 300 meters away, having
heard the cries of the wrecked persons, quickened its speed, repaired to and arrived in time to pick up the passengers who are clinging
to the side of the capsized boat, taking them later to the river bank. The appellant, after having thus saved his passengers, proceeded
to search for the deceased but was unable to find him and his body was recovered later.
The Attorney-General is of the opinion that the mitigating circumstances described in the first, third, fourth and seventh paragraphs of
article 9 of the Penal Code are present without any aggravating circumstance, and the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should
be one or two degrees less than that prescribed by the law.
In view of the facts stated, we are of the opinion that the appellant is completely exempt from all criminal liability.
Due to the conditions of the river at the point where the deceased started to rock the boat, if it had capsized the passengers would
have run the risk of losing their lives, the majority of whom were women, especially the nursing child. The conduct of the deceased in
rocking the boat until the point of it having taken water and his insistence on this action, in spite of the appellant's warning, gave rise
to the belief on the part of the plaintiff that it would capsize if he did not separate the deceased from the boat in such a manner as to
give him no time to accomplish his purpose. It was necessary to disable him momentarily. For this purpose the blow given him by the
appellant on the forehead with an oar was the least that could reasonably have been done. And this consideration militates with
greater weight with respect to the second blow given in his neck with the same oar, because, then the danger was greater that the
boat might upset, especially as the deceased had expressed his intention to upset it.
In view of all the circumstances of the case, in doing what the appellant did was in lawful defense of the lives of the passengers of the
boat, two of whom were his wife and child. The recourse of taking the boat to the shore was not adequate in those circumstances,
because that would require sometime, whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time to
arrive at the shore.
The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and the means employed having been
reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost of the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal
liability.
Reversing the judgment appealed from, the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-162

April 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO ALCONGA, appellant.
Jose Avancea for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Barcelona for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality of San Dionisio, Province of Iloilo several persons
were playing prohibited games (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). The deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, and Maria
de Raposo, a witness for the prosecution, was one of those playing the game (t.s.n., p. 95). Upon invitation of the said Maria de
Raposo, the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner, each of them contributing the sum of P5 to a common fund (t.s.n., pp.
95, 125). Maria de Raposo played the game while the said accused posted himself behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the
cards of the latter and communicating by signs to his partner (t.s.n., pp. 95-96, 126). The deceased appears to have suffered losses in
the game because of the team work between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). Upon discovering what
the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant and expressed his anger at the former (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). An
exchange of words followed, and the two would have come to blows but for the intervention of the maintainer of the games (t.s.n., p.
96). In a fit of anger, the deceased left the house but not before telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give you a
breakfast" (t.s.n., p. 96), which expression would seem to signify an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered under such
circumstances.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of May 29, 1943, when the latter was in the
guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home guard" (t.s.n., pp. 98-100). While the said accused was
seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the deceased came along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast,"
followed forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan" (t.s.n., p. 100). The accused avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench
with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse (t.s.n., pp. 100-101). A second blow was given but failed to hit the accused, hitting
the bench instead (t.s.n., p. 101). The accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen (t.s.n., p. 101). While
the deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a crawling position (t.s.n., p. 119), fired at him with
his revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the ground (t.s.n., p. 101). Rising to his feet, the deceased drew forth his dagger and
directed a blow at the accused who, however, was able to parry the same with his bolo (t.s.n., pp. 101-102). A hand-to-hand fight
ensued (t.s.n., p. 102). Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed by the accused (t.s.n., p. 6). After
running a distance of about 200 meters (t.s.n., pp. 21, 108), the deceased was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which
the mortal bolo blow the one which slashed the cranium was delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face
downward, besides many other blows deliver right and left (t.s.n., pp. 6, 28). At this instant, the other accused, Adolfo Bracamonte,
arrived and, being the leader of the "home guards" of San Dionisio, placed under his custody the accused Alconga with a view to
turning him over to the proper authorities (t.s.n., pp. 102-105).
On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan Collado, a guerrilla soldier (t.s.n., pp. 80, 104). Adolfo
Bracamonte turned over Alconga to Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104). In the afternoon of the
same day, Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio Barredo, a municipal policeman of San Dionisio, together with the weapons used in
the fight: a revolver, a bolo, and a dagger (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104).
The injuries sustained by the deceased were described by police sergeant Gil G. Estaniel as follows:
P. Y que hicieron ustedes cuando ustedes vieron a Silverio Barion? R. Examine sus heridas.
P. Donde ha encontrado usted las heridas, en que parte del cuerpo? R. En la cabeza, en sus brazos, en sus manos, en la
mandibula inferior, en la parte frente de su cuello, en su pecho derecho, y tambien en el pecho izquierdo, y su dedo meique
habia volado, se habia cortado, y otras perqueas heridas mas.
P. En la cabeza, vio usted heridas? R. Si, seor.
P. Cuantas heridas? R. Una herida en la region parietal derecha y una contusion en la corona de la cabeza.
P. Vio usted el craneo? R. En la craneo llevaba una herida, en quel el craneo se ha roto.
P. En el pecho, herida ha encontrado usted? R. Debajo de la tetilla derecha, una herida causada por una bala.
P. Y otras heridas en el pecho, puede usted decir que clase de heridas? R. Heridas causadas por bolo.
P. Como de grande acquellas heridas en el pecho? R. No recuerdo la dimension de las heridas en el pecho.
P. Pero en la cabeza? R. La cabeza se rajo por aquella herida causada por el bolo. (T.s.n., p. 25.)
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased. The initial stage commenced when the
deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on the part of the latter. Resisting the aggression, appellant managed to
have the upper hand in the fight, inflicting several wounds upon the deceased, on account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that
moment there was no longer any danger to the life of appellant who, being virtually unscathed, could have chosen to remain where he
was. Resolving all doubts in his flavor, and considering that in the first stage the deceased was the unlawful aggressor and defendant
had not given sufficient provocation, and considering further that when the deceased was about to deliver the third blow, appellant

was still in a crawling position and, on that account, could not have effectively wielded his bolo and therefore had to use his "paltik"
revolver his only remaining weapon ; we hold that said appellant was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense, there being then no more aggression to defend against,
the same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels. During the second stage of the fight appellant inflicted many
additional wounds upon the deceased. That the deceased was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact
that he was still able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken by appellant. Under such circumstances, appellant's
plea of self-defense in the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression.
Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from criminal liability for the reason that it is shown that he
struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after the necessity for defending himself had ceased, his assailant being then
in retreat. Therefore one of the essential ingredients of self-defense specified in No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code is wanting
(now article 11, case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil., 475, 476; words in parenthesis
supplied.)
. . . Even if it be conceded for the moment that the defendants were assaulted by the four (offended parties), the right to kill
in self-defense ceased when the aggression ceased; and when Toledo and his brothers turned and ran, without having
inflicted so much as a scratch upon a single one of the defendants,the right of the defendants to inflict injury upon them
ceased absolutely. They had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. A fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from
whom he flees. When danger ceases, the right to injure ceases. When the aggressor turns and flees, the one assaulted must
stay his hand. (United States vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1, 19; emphasis supplied.)
Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The
learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the
deceased. The first was properly appreciated; the second was not, since it is very clear that from the moment he fled after the first
stage of the fight to the moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue much less further to
attack him.
The only provocation given by him was imbibed in, and inseparable from, the aggression with which he started the first stage of the
fight. The evidence, as weighed and appreciated by the learned trial judge, who had heard, seen and observed the witnesses testify,
clearly shows that said stage ended with the flight of the deceased after receiving a bullet wound in his right breast, which caused him
to stagger and fall to the ground, and several bolo wounds inflicted by appellant during their hand-to-hand fight after both had gotten
up. The learned trial judge said:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in support of their respective theories of the case vary materially
on certain points. Some of these facts have to be admitted and some have to be rejected with the end in view of arriving at
the truth. To the mind of the Court, what really happened in the case at bar, as can de disclosed by the records, which lead to
the killing of the deceased on that fatal morning of May 29, 1945 (should be 1943), is as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the morning of May 29, 1943, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone in the guardhouse performing his duties as guard or
"ronda" in Barrio Santol, the deceased Silverio Barion passed by with a "pingahan". That was the first time the deceased and
the accused Alconga had met since that eventful night of May 27th in the gambling house of Gepes. Upon seeing the accused
Alconga, who was then seated in the guardhouse, the deceased cried: "Coroy, this is now the breakfast!" These words of
warning were immediately followed by two formidable swings of the "pingahan" directed at the accused Alconga which failed
to hit him. Alconga was able to avoid the blows by falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen until he was outside the
guardhouse. The deceased followed him and while in the act of delivering the third blow, Dioscoro Alconga fired at him with
his revolver thereby stopping the blow in mid-air. The deceased fell to the ground momentarily and upon rising to his feet, he
drew forth a dagger. The accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being armed, a hand-to-hand fight followed.
The deceased having sustained several wounds from the hands of Alconga, ran away with the latter close to his heels.
The foregoing statement of the pertinent facts by the learned trial judge is in substantial agreement with those found by us and
narrated in the first paragraphs of this decision. Upon those facts the question arises whether when the deceased started to run and
flee, or thereafter until he died, there was any provocation given by him from appellant to pursue and further to attack him. It will be
recalled, to be given with, that the first stage of the fight was provoked when the deceased said to appellant "Cory, this is now the
breakfast," or "This is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing or two of his "pingahan." These words without the immediately
following attack with the "pingahan" would not have been uttered, we can safely assume, since such an utterance alone would have
been entirely meaningless. It was the attack, therefore, that effectively constituted the provocation, the utterance being, at best,
merely a preclude to the attack. At any rate, the quoted words by themselves, without the deceased's act immediately following them,
would certainly not have been considered a sufficient provocation to mitigate appellant's liability in killing or injuring the deceased. For
provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. (Revised Penal Code, article
13, No. 4.)
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled without having inflicted so much as a scratch
upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid,
the right of appellant to inflict injury upon him, ceased absolutely appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said
deceased for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees." If the law, as interpreted and applied
by this Court in the Vitug case, enjoins the victorious contender from pursuing his opponent on the score of self-defense, it is because
this Court considered that the requisites of self-defense had ceased to exist, principal and indispensable among these being the
unlawful aggression of the opponent (Rev. Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed., 173).

Can we find under the evidence of record that after the cessation of said aggression the provocation thus involved therein still
persisted, and to a degree sufficient to extenuate appellant's criminal responsibility for his acts during the second stage of the fight?
Appellant did not testify nor offer other evidence to show that when he pursued the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of
the effects of what provocation, be it anger, obfuscation or the like. The Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
It is therefore apparent that the Code requires for provocation to be such a mitigating circumstance that it not only immediately
precede the act but that it also be sufficient. In the Spanish Penal Code, the adjective modifying said noun is "adecuada" and the
Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment of June 27, 2883, interpreted the equivalent provision of the Penal Code of that country, which
was the source of our own existing Revised Penal Code, that "adecuada" means proportionate to the damage caused by the act. Viada
(Vol. 11, 5th ed., p. 51) gives the ruling of that Supreme Court as follows:
El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que la provocacion o amenaza que de parte del ofendido ha de preceder para la disminucion
de la responsabilidad criminal debe ser proporcionada al dao que se cause, lo cual no concurre a favor del reo si resulta que
la unica cuestion que hubo fue si en un monton de yeso habia mas omenos cantidad, y como perdiera la apuesta y
bromeando dijera el que la gano que beberia vino de balde, esa pequea cuestion de amor propio no justificaba en modo
alguno la ira que le impelio a herir y matar a su contrario. (S. de 27 de junio de 1883, Gaceta de 27 de septiembre.)
Justice Albert, in his commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 edition, page 94, says: "The provocation or threat must be
sufficient, which means that it should be proportionate to the act committed and adequate to stirone to its commission" (emphasis
supplied).
Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven by the accused. This the instant
appellant has utterly failed to do. Any way, it would seem self-evident that appellant could never have succeeded in showing that
whatever remained of the effects of the deceased's aggression, by way of provocation after the latter was already in fight, was
proportionate to his killing his already defeated adversary.
That provocation gave rise to a fight between the two men, and may be said, not without reason, to have spent itself after appellant
had shot the deceased in his right breast and caused the latter to fall to the ground; or making a concession in appellant's favor
after the latter had inflicted several bolo wounds upon the deceased, without the deceased so much as having scratched his body, in
their hand-to-hand fight when both were on their feet again. But if we are to grant appellant a further concession, under the view most
favorable to him, that aggression must be deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the deceased upon the end of the first stage of
the fight. In so affirming, we had to strain the concept in no small degree. But to further strain it so as to find that said aggression or
provocation persisted even when the deceased was already in flight, clearly accepting defeat and no less clearly running for his life
rather than evincing an intention of returning to the fight, is more than we can sanction. It should always be remembered that "illegal
aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.
Agresion ilegitima. Agresion vale tanto como acometimiento. Para que exista el derecho de defensa es preciso que se nos
acometa, que se nos ataque, o cuando menos, que se nos amenace de atacarnos de un modo inmediato e inminente; v.
gr., desenvainando el pual para herirnos con el o apuntando la pistola para dispararla contra nosotros. (Viada, 5. a edicion,
173.)
After the flight of the deceased there was clearly neither an assault nor a threatened assault of the remotest kind. It has been
suggested that when pursuing his fleeing opponent, appellant might have thought or believed that said opponent was going to his
house to fetch some other weapon. But whether we consider this as a part or continuation of the self-defense alleged by appellant, or
as a separate circumstance, the burden of proof to establish such a defense was, of course, upon appellant, and he has not so much as
attempted to introduce evidence for this purpose. If he really thought so, or believed so, he should have positively proven it, as any
other defense. We can not now gratuitously assume it in his behalf.
It is true that in the case of United States vs. Rivera (41 Phil., 472, 474), this Court held that one defending himself or his property
from a felony violently or by surprise threatened by another is not obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary until he has
secured himself from danger. But that is not this case. Here from the very start appellant was the holder of the stronger and more
deadly weapons a revolver and a bolo, as against a piece of bamboo called "pingahan" and a dagger in the possession of the
deceased. In actual performance appellant, from the very beginning, demonstrated his superior fighting ability; and he confirmed it
when after the deceased was first felled down by the revolver shot in right breast, and after both combatants had gotten up and
engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the deceased using his dagger and appellant his bolo , the former received several bolo wounds while
the latter got through completely unscathed. And when the deceased thereupon turned and fled, the circumstances were such that it
would be unduly stretching the imagination to consider that appellant was still in danger from his defeated and fleeing opponent.
Appellant preserved his revolver and his bolo, and if he could theretofore so easily overpower the deceased, when the latter had not
yet received any injury, it would need, indeed, an unusually strong positive showing which is completely absent from the record
to persuade us that he had not yet "secured himself from danger" after shooting his weakly armed adversary in the right breast and
giving him several bolo slashes in different other parts of his body. To so hold would, we believe, be unjustifiably extending the
doctrine of the Rivera case to an extreme not therein contemplated.

Under article 249, in relation with article 64, No. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, the crime committed by appellant is punishable
by reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which would be from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. However, in imposing
the penalty, we take into consideration the provisions of section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), as amended by
Act No. 4225. Accordingly, we find appellant guilty of the aforesaid crime of homicide and sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of
from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816
for murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the
following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P
2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the
costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs
(p. 48, rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the
two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis
Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located
in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant
Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that
the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go
on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the
group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good,'
addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No,
gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting
him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at
Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the
shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which
deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of
Cotabato, among whom was appellant.

From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R)
and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former
sitio of Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the
area, and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation
and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales
application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company,
covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the survey report was not
submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots
Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to
6 hectares each to be distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for disposition, appraised and
advertised for public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for
P6,000.00. But because of protests from the settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator
was sent by the Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days with an
amicable settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the settlers, but the
Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to
Fleischer and Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the
decision in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala,
for the purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of
Lands awarding the contested land to the company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which
they had repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of
the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision
of the Court of First Instance in favor of the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24, 1966, from the land which
they had been occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his
house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the
highway. The second house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. June Talens
who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store from his former residence to the house near the highway. Aside from
the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the
house, which is used for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755
in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for
preliminary injunction. During the pendency of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the
company whereby he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh. 9, p.
1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although the
ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the
agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased
Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in which your house and ricemill
are located as per agreement executed on February 21, 1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts
of collection made by Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no alternative but to terminate our
agreement on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land of
Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on December 31, 1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month period, the company shall cause
their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the
property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally
across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence,
when finished, would have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the door
of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four
strands of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning, was awakened by some
noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of

Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the
barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway. The
rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him
shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them from the window of his house
with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his
rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order
for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code,
as amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit,
avante", in answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pagusapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of
his house being chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing and the
appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this
reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without
realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer
and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep
and thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim, however, that the deceased were in
lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to
the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons, consisting of the deceased and
their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made
of bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be
lethal weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not
disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near
the steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the
window. Then he saw the damage being done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from
the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing
and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed his men to proceed with what
they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of
the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent
but were actually in progress. There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was
ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his
property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property, to destroy
appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and
Company was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case would be
dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in
view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the
company, between the same parties, which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent
repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental

petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding
certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to his
failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was
premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November
14, 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during
cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place because even though we do not
know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because
at that time, it was not known who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will clear up and
determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He
should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and
closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall
be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles
536 and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his
accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property,
therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind (People vs.
Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429
of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights
under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his
resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant
who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was
only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things
over with him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. He
should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because
of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a
sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately
chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed
might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Caete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently established. The only evidence
presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibaez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South
Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company, which may be summarized as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying corn near the house of Mr. and
Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs.
Narvaez asked him to help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced their

house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer
because there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but
the latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have
consistently held, there must be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that
premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the
determination to commit the crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused
premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that there was sufficient interval between the
premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102
SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibaez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims nor that the accused
premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may
not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to
talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that
appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being
damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully
violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to
the time when his first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so aggravated his
obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights.
Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with
dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his
dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating
circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the
penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be
reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award
for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims
not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's
standing in the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently designed to humiliate him
and destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and
detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of
the prosecution dated October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI
rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a
Central Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capabilityfinancial and otherwise-to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil
in Luzon to take advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners, were
the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision correccional or arrests mayor and fine who
has no property with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50.
However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Considering that
Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE
PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF

HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4912

March 25, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIA GUY-SAYCO, defendant-appellant.
C. Ledesma for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
Long before the commission of the crime herein prosecuted, Gelasio Galupitan, the husband of the accused, entered into unlawful
relations with the deceased Lorenza Estrada; all were residents of the town of Santa Cruz, the capital of the Province of La Laguna.

The accused, Emilia Guy-sayco, duly became aware of this relation. As her husband had stayed away from the home for more than two
weeks, remaining in the barrio of Dujat, distant about two or one-half hours' walk from the said town under the pretext that he was
engaged in field work, on the 20th of March, 1907, at about 2 p. m., she decided to go to said barrio and join him. To this end she
hired a carromata, and after getting some clothes and other things necessary for herself and husband, started out with her infant child
and a servant girl; but before reaching the barrio and the camarin where her husband ought to be, night came on, and at about 7
o'clock she alighted and dismissed the vehicle after paying the driver. They had yet to travel some distance, and for fear of being
attacked she disguised herself, using her husband's clothes and a hat given to her by her companion, and dressed in this manner they
continued on their way. On seeing her husband's horse tied in front of a house she suspected that he was inside; thereupon she went
to the steps leading to the house, which was a low one, and then saw her husband sitting down with his back toward the steps. She
immediately entered the house and encountered her husband, the deceased, and the owners of the house taking supper together.
Overcome and blinded by jealousy she rushed at Lorenza Estrada, attacked her with a penknife that she carried, and inflicted five
wounds upon her in consequence of which Lorenza fell to the ground covered with blood and died a few moments afterwards. The
accused left the house immediately after the aggression, and went to that of Modesto Ramos where she changed her clothes.
From an examination of the body made on the following day by Dr. Gertrudo Reyes, it appeared that five wounds had been inflicted by
a cutting and pointed weapon, one of which was on the left side of the breast and penetrated the left ventricle of the heart; this wound
was of necessity mortal, the others being more or less serious.
A complaint was thereupon filed by the provincial fiscal on May 31, 1907, and the corresponding proceedings were instituted. The
court below entered judgment on June 29, 1908, sentencing the accused, Emilia Gut-Sayco, to the penalty of twelve years and one
day of reclusion temporal, to suffer the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs. From said judgment she has appealed.
The above-stated facts, which has been fully proven in this case, constitute the crime of homicide defined and punished by article 404
of the Penal Code, for the reason that in the violent death of Lorenza Estrada, occasioned by the infliction of several wounds, one of
which was mortal, none of the circumstances were present that qualify the crime of assassination and for a heavier penalty as imposed
by the previous article 403 of the code.
The reality and certitude of the crime at bar can not be denied. It has been proven by the testimony of several witnesses, to wit,
Roberto Villaran, Susana de Mesa, the owners of the house, and Maria Ramos, all of whom witnessed the aggression; they saw the
deceased die as the result of five wounds inflicted upon her, one of which was, of necessity mortal; it was also proven by the testimony
of the surgeon who examined the body, which was seen by the said witnesses and by others who went to the place of the occurrence.
The accused pleaded not guilty, and in exculpation she alleged that, when Lorenza Estrada saw her and heard her remonstrate with
her husband, she being then upstairs, Lorenza at once asked what had brought her there and manifested her intention to attack her
with a knife that she carried in her hand, whereupon the accused caught the deceased by the right hand, in which she held the
weapon, and immediately grappled with her, and in the struggle that ensued she managed to get hold of a penknife that she saw on
the floor close by; she could not say whether she struck the deceased with it as she could not account for what followed.
From this allegation of the accused, her counsel, with a view to asking that she be absolved, claims that in wounding the deceased she
acted in proper self-defense.
It has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that as soon as the accused entered the house where she found her husband, without
saying a word, she attacked the deceased with a penknife and inflicted wounds that caused the immediate death of the latter. Such an
allegation can not therefore be admitted, even though corroborated by the husband and the servant of the accused, inasmuch as the
testimony of the latter is entirely contradicted and destroyed by the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, who were present
at the aggression, and who deny that the servant was present; it is not true that a penknife was found on the floor of the house; it is
probable that the instrument with which the crime was committed was carried by the accused when she went to said house; and even
though it were true that when the accused, Emilia, made her appearance, the deceased Lorenza arose with a knife in her hand and in
a threatening manner asked the accused what had brought her there, such attitude, under the provisions of article 8, No. 4 of the
Penal Code, does not constitute that unlawful aggression, which, among others, is the first indispensable requisite upon which
exemption by reason of self-defense may be sustained.
In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression, an
offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption
from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense. It has always been so recognized in the decisions of the courts, in
accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code.
In the commission of the crime the presence of mitigating circumstance No. 7 of article 9 of the code should be considered, without
any aggravating circumstance to neutralize its effects, for the reason that it has been proven that the accused, at the time when the
crime was committed, acted upon the impulse of passion and under great jealous excitement at the sight of her husband taking supper
in the company of his mistress, after he had been absent from the conjugal dwelling for several days.
As to the penalty of indemnity contained in the judgment appealed from and impugned by the defense, article 17 of the code reads:
"Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable," and according to the established rule of the courts, in
order that an accused person may be declared to have incurred civil liability, it is sufficient that said liability shall proceed from, or be
the consequence of the criminal liability, and in addition thereto, article 122 of the said code provides that the courts shall regulate the
amount of indemnity for damages under said civil liability, upon the same terms as prescribed for the reparation of damage in article
121 of the code, and a finding on the matter should be contained in the judgment.
For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it in all
its parts with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-38180 October 23, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO and INOCENCIO RAGSAC, accused-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
In an information dated July 9, 1973 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, Salvador Crisostomo
and Inocencio Ragsac were charged with murder alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1972 , in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while then confined at the said institution, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and deliberate intent to kill, each
armed with improvised bladed weapon-did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and wound
therewith one Antonio Waje, No. 21909-P, a sentenced prisoner in the same institution, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body while then unarmed and unable to defend himself from the
attack launched by the accused, as a result of which the said Antonio Waje died instantly.
The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and quasirecidivism based on the previous convictions of the above-named accused as follows:
Salvador Crisostomo having been convicted of Theft by the JPC Tanauan, Batangas on November 5, 1953; Robbery
by the CFI Batangas, 18th Judicial District, Lipa City on March 25, 1954; Illegal Possession of Firearm and
ammunition by the same court on June 16, 1955; Murder by the CFI Davao, Branch II on June 12, 1958 and Evasion
of Service of Sentence by the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII on March 4, 1970;
Inocencio Ragsac having been convicted fo Homicide by the CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III on May 20, 1968 and Evasion
of Service of Sentence by the CFI Rizal, Branch X on July 20, 1971.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The two accused, duly assisted by their counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
After trial, Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, rendered judgment on December 28, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court
hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of
P10,000.00; to pay moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 and another P5,000.00, as exemplary damages,
jointly and severally; and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 2
Hence, the present automatic review of the trial court's decision by this Court.
The trial court convicted the two accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac of murder as charged in the information on the
following findings of fact:
Four days prior to May 27, 1972, the accused Crisostomo gave sixty-two (P 62.00) to the victim Maje to buy
cigarettes and sugar. When Crisostomo asked for the things he requested Waje to buy, the latter replied that the
money was lost. Crisostomo then asked Waje to repeat what he Waje said and the latter said, "Maulit ka" and dared
Crisostomo to fight it out with him. Infuriated by the actuations and remarks of Waje and compounded by the facts
that Waje killed prison guards Anselmo Villablanca and Fortunato Villareal, of the Davao Penal Colony on November
13, 1958, who were the former supervisors of Crisostomo, the accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac
planned to kill Waje. At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1972, the two accused went out of their
dormitory to carry out their plan. Crisostomo followed the group of prisoners who were assigned to collect garbage
inside the prison compound while Ragsac proceeded to the general kitchen. Then Crisostomo went to the general
kitchen where he met Ragsac. There they waited for the opportune time. When the accused saw the deceased
walking towards the Reception and Diagnostic Center, they followed him. Upon hearing the victim, Crisostomo
immediately stabbed Waje. The first trust did not prove fatal, so Ragsac stabbed Waje and the two accused took
turns in stabbing the victim. When Servideo Camarillo saw Crisostomo and Ragsac stabbing the deceased, he fired
shots in the air. The two accused ran towards the direction of the general kitchen and they lied face down. The PC
and the security guards arrived. Camarillo then went to the place where the accused ran to and there he recovered
the weapons used by the accused in the stabbing. 3
Waje was brought to the prison hospital but he died on arrival. The cause of his death was determined to the hemorrhage secondary to
stab wounds. The post-mortem examination disclosed that Waje was stabbed seven times. 4
That same morning of May 27, 1972, Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac were treated for their wounds at the prison's hospital
by its resident physician, Luz Alma Romero Santos. The accused Crisostomo was found to have sustained the following injuries:
abrasion-bridge of the nose; ecchymosis right eye; abrasion with contusion chin right; abrasion, right and 'left knee; lacerated
wound, 1 1/2 inch above the right ear; and contusion right index finger. The accused Ragsac was found to have the following injuries:

abrasion with contusion left wrist; abrasion with contusion dorsal surface of left arm, proximal third; contusion left cheek-bone;
contusion dorsal surface of left hand; abrasion both knees; lacerated wound occipital region right head. 5
After having been treated in the prison's hospital, the two accused Crisostomo and Ragsac were investigated by prison guard Tolentino
Avelina, the one assigned as investigator for the death of Waje. 6 The investigation was conducted in Tagalog. The accused Crisostomo
was interrogated between 11:00 a.m. and 12:40 p.m. on May 27, 1972. He executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F") 7 wherein he
related that he had been in prison since 1953 for the crimes of theft, robbery in band, murder and illegal possession of firearms; that
about 7:00 A.M. on that day he plotted with the accused Ragsac to kill Waje; that his reasons for wanting to kill Waje were the
following. a) because Waje killed prison guards Anselmo Villablanca and Fortunato Villareal and wounded prison guard Predisvino
Calugay who were his supervisors and friends at the Davao Penal Colony in 1958; and b) because Waje swindled him in 1962 of the
amount of P62.00. When asked who were his companions in stabbing the victim, he pointed at Inocencio Ragsac. 8
Likewise, the accused. Ragsac executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G"). 9 He admitted therein that he stabbed Waje several times.
His motive was that he killed Waje because he was asked by Crisostomo and that he cannot refuse him because he is a friend.
Moreover, the victim was a member of the Commando Gang, an enemy of the Genuine Ilocano Gang to which he belonged. 10 He was
interrogated from 1:00 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. on the same day.
Aside from the two accused, prison guard Servideo Camarillo, who was an eyewitness to the commission of the crime, was also
investigated (Exhibit "H"). 11 He was asked by the investigator to Identify from among four weapons the two that he had recovered
from the two accused. He pointed at the weapons marked as Exhibits "C" and "D" as the ones used by the accused Ragsac and
Crisostomo respectively. These were the very same weapons Identified by the two accused when they were investigated by Avelina.
During the trial, the two accused gave a version of the incident which was different from the one they related in their respective sworn
statements, Exhibits "F" and "G". According to their new version, the accused Crisostomo was the only one who stabbed Waje. The
accused Ragsac denied participation in the stabbing for he was with the brigade of prisoners collecting garbage in the prison premises.
Furthermore, the accused Crisostomo allegedly acted in self-defense. According to him four days prior to the incident, he requested
Waje to buy him sugar and cigarettes at the prison Post Exchange. For that purpose, he gave Waje P62.00. On May 27, 1972, he saw
Waje and asked him about his request. Waje said that he lost the money. When asked how the money was lost Waje became irritated
and threatened to add him to the persons he had killed. At the same time, Waje struck him with a "chaco" (a weapon made of two
sharp-edged pieces of wood, connected together with a string). Crisostomo allegedly saw Waje pulling something from his body, so
Crisostomo immediately brought out his own weapon (Exhibit "D") known in prison parlance as "matalas" and stabbed Waje with it. 12
In their brief, the two accused assigned the following errors:

13

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO AND
INOCENCIO RAGSAC CONSPIRED TO KILL ANTONIO WAJE AND THAT THE LATTER WAS KILLED WITH EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INOCENCIO RAGSAC PARTICIPATED IN THE
KILLING OF ANTONIO WAJE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO DID NOT ACT IN
SELF- DEFENSE WHEN HE KILLED ANTONIO WAJE.
It is apparent that the trial court's finding of the existence of conspiracy to kill Waje between the two accused and the alleged
treacherous manner in which the killing was executed is based on the sworn statements executed by Salvador Crisostomo (Exhibit "F")
and by Inocencio Ragsac (Exhibit "G").
It is, therefore, necessary to pass upon the admissibility of the confessions and their sufficiency to sustain the conviction.
For a confession to be admissible in evidence, it is a general rule that it must have been made without hope of benefit, without fear or
duress, and without the use of threat, torture, violence, artifice or deception. 14 Likewise, "written statements which were made freely
and voluntarily whereby they admitted participation in the act complained of and sufficiently corroborated by other and independent
evidence introduced during the trial of the case are sufficient basis for conviction. 15
The question before the Court is whether the sworn statements made by the two accused were freely and voluntarily given.
There is merit in the contention of the Solicitor General. 16 that the injuries suffered by the two accused (Exhibits "1" and "2") do not
necessarily prove that they were maltreated. The injuries of the two accused consisted of bruises and abrasions in the arms and knees
and ecchymosis in the right eye. Indeed, these kinds of injuries are very likely to be sustained by one who suddenly drops prone to the
ground while in the act of running very fast as the two accused did when they heard the shots fired by prison guard Camarillo.
Likewise, if the testimony of the accused Crisostomo that he was hit in the head with a "chaco" by Waje is to be given credence, then
his head wound was not due to maltreatment.

Moreover, as pointed out in the Appellee's Brief, 17 assuming arguendo that the two accused were tortured, the torture was inflicted
when the guards and soldiers were trying to apprehend them following their assault on Waje, 18 and not when their admissions were
taken by Tolentino Avelina. In fact, the two accused admitted during the trial that Avelina was good to them and that the latter did not
threaten or maltreat them. 19
Notable also is the time which lapsed between the alleged maltreatment which was around 9:00 A.M. to 9:30 A.M. of May 27, 1972, as
in fact they were treated for the injuries sustained by reason thereof at around 9:35 A.M. of the same day, 20 and the taking of their
admissions which were from 11:00 A.M. to 12:40 P.M. for Salvador Crisostomo and from 1:00 P.M. to 2:40 P.M. of the same days for
Inocencio Ragsac. 21 They had sufficient time to retract whatever admissions they made during the alleged maltreatment when they
were formally investigated more than two hours later by Tolentino Avelina, who was admittedly good to them.
As regards the contention of counsel for the two accused that the admission of their sworn statements is unconstitutional in the light of
Sec. 20, Art. IV of the New Constitution because they were not assisted by counsel, it is settled that proscription against the
admissibility of confessions obtained from the accused during the period of custodial interrogation in violation of the procedural
safeguards, applies to confessions after the effectivity of the new charter on January 17, 1973. 22 The sworn statements of the two
accused were executed before the new constitution took effect.
The question of whether or not the two accused committed the killing in conspiracy and with evident premeditation and treachery will
now be taken up.
The conspiracy between the two accused is shown by the admitted fact that they agreed to kill Waje two hours before he was actually
killed. It is shown by the concerted acts of the two accused of leaving their dormitory XI-B-3 at 7:00 A.M. on the day of the killing, of
meeting at the prison kitchen, of waiting for Waje to appear, of approaching him and simultaneously stabbing him.
Because of the existence of conspiracy between the two accused the acts of one are already considered the acts of the other.
are liable as principals.

23

Both

Treachery is shown by the admission of the accused Crisostomo that he approached Waje from behind, turned him about, then stabbed
him (Exhibit "F"). The suddenness of the attack was consciously adopted to facilitate the perpetration of the crime without risk to
themselves. 24
Evident premeditation can not be appreciated. The two accused allegedly planned to kill Waje at 7:00 o'clock in the morning and the
killing took place at 9:00 A.M. (Exhibits "F" and "G"). The two accused did not have sufficient time to reflect during the two hours that
preceded the killing.
The final question to be resolved is whether the accused Crisostomo acted in self-defense or not. He contends that he should not be
liable for the death of Waje because he acted in self-defense. According to the accused Crisostomo, Waje attacked him with a "chaco"
when he asked him about the P62.00 which he gave him for the purchase of sugar and cigarettes at the prison Post Exchange.
By invoking self-defense, the accused Crisostomo admitted that he killed Antonio Waje. With his admission, the burden is upon him to
prove by sufficient and convincing evidence that he was defending himself when he killed Waje. 25
To avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following elements must be present unlawful aggression, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The trial court found the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense witnesses. This finding is entitled to great weight and
should be given full faith and credit in the absence of a showing that the trial court failed to take into account circumstances of weight
and importance in arriving at the findings.
Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. 26There is unlawful
aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of
weapon.
The claim of the accused Crisostomo that Waje was the one who attacked him cannot be believed. It is contrary to common experience
and to human nature to take offense at the inquiry of the former on how the money was lost.
Although it is claimed by the accused Crisostomo that after he was struck with the "chaco", he grabbed the same, the "chaco" was
never presented to the prison investigator. Nor was the said "chaco" ever mentioned in Exhibits "F" and "G". It was brought up for the
first time during the trial before the lower court.
There is no sufficient showing that Waje was armed at the time he was killed.
The victim not being armed, it was not reasonable for the two accused, both armed with "matalas" to attack Waje and inflict upon him
seven (7) stab wounds. The accused Inocencio Ragsac escaped during the pendency of the review of this case. Being a death convict,
his flight from prison while his case was pending review, as held by this Court in a similar case, 27 is evidence of his consciousness of
guilt.
The two accused participated in the killing of the victim. The crime they committed is murder qualified by treachery with the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Hence the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty. However, for lack of the necessary
votes, the penalty next lower in degree is imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and
the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased Antonio Waje is increased to the sum of P12,000.00, with costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38175 September 28, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO LACHICA and JILLY SIGADOR accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Agnes Cacanindin for accused-appellants.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder before the Criminal Circuit Court of Rizal, Romeo Lachica and Jilly Sigador were found guilty as
charged and sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
The crime was committed in the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa. Lachica was detained therein, pending review by this Court of the
two death penalties imposed upon him by the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte for the crimes of "double murder and
double frustrated murder," 1 , committed while he was serving sentence as a convict in the Davao Penal Colony at Panabo Davao del
Norte; while Sigador was awaiting execution of the death sentence meted out by the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, and
affirmed by this Court in a per curiam decision in L-24877 dated June 30, 1969. 2
Pursuant to the final Judgment in L-24877, Jilly (Gelly) Sigador was executed by electrocution on June 26, 1974. As the charge against
him has become moot and academic, this mandatory review will deal only with the conviction of Lachica.
The evidence on record discloses the following facts: In the morning of March 28, 1971, Dominador Aguilar, also a prisoner in the New
Bilibid Prisons, was stabbed inside his cell in Dormitory 1-C. He died instantly. Dr. Rodulfo Soratos of the NBI, who performed the
autopsy, found that the deceased sustained eight (8) stab wounds, the most serious of which was the injury which penetrated his left
lung and perforated the ventricles of the heart.
Immediately after the incident, the assailants, Identified as Romeo Lachica and Jilly Sigador, were pursued by the prison guards.
Cornered after a brief chase near the main gate of Dormitory I-C, they voluntarily gave themselves up and surrendered to prison
guard Baldovino the knives they admittedly used in attacking the victim.
Lachica and Sigador were then investigated by the officers of the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prison; and they gave their
respective statements confessing responsibility for killing the deceased. 3 Pertinent portions of Lachica's statement read as follows:
T Bakit ka naririto ngayon sa Tanggapan ng Pangkat ng Pagsisiyasat?
S Dahil po sa ako ay isa sa mga nanaksak kanina.
T Kailan nangyari itong sinasabi mong pananaksak?
S Ngayon pong araw na ito humigit kumulang ay mga ika10: 30 ng umaga.
T Sino naman ang tinutukoy mo na sinaksak mo?
S Si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar po.
T Saan nangyari itong sinasabi mong pananaksak mo kay Dominador Aguilar?
S Sa loob po ng selda 43 ng Dormitoryo I-C.

T Bakit mo sinaksak itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?

S Dahil po sa si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar ang siyang mastermind sa
saksakang naganap noong ika-28 ng Septiembre 1970.
T Papaano mo natiyak na itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar ang siyang
mastermind sa saksakang naganap noon, sang-ayon sa sinasabi mo?
S Sapagkat ako po ay dating miembro ng 'Commando Gang' at kilala ko po siya
(Dominador Aguilar) na isang Bosyo ng Commando at siya rin ang supplier ng
matalas.
T Sino o sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasama mo ng pananaksak kay
bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Si bilanggong Gilly Sigador po at si Rodolfo Andaya na kapwa mga taga
Dormitory I-D rin po (Prisoner Lachica pointing his finger to prisoners Gilly
Sigador #8182-D and Rodolfo Andaya #47015-P).
T Kailan po ninyo binalak na saksakin itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Kagabi po nang mga pasadong alas 9:00 ng gabi pinag-usapan po namin nina
bilanggong Sigador at Andaya na saksakin si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar.
T Ano ang ayos nitong si bilanggong Aguilar ng siya ay iyong saksakin?
S Nakaupo po siya at nagsusulat sa loob ng Selda 43 ng Dormitory I-C na
paharap sa pintuan.
T Ilang beses mong sinaksak itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Hindi na po matandaan, pero sa palagay ko po ay mga limang beses.
Lachica and Sigador were thereafter charged with the crime of murder. Assisted at the arraignment by counsel de oficio Atty. Jose 0.
Galvan, they voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged. When informed by the court of the consequences of their plea of guilty,
they manifested that they were fully aware of the fact that "they would be punished in accordance with law." Whereupon the trial court
promulgated in open court a sentence convicting the accused of the crime charged and imposing on each of them the supreme penalty
of death.
The trial court subsequently ordered the prosecution to present evidence for the purpose of determining the degree of culpability of the
accused. At the hearing, the prosecution adduced the testimony of Rodolfo Andaya, a co-prisoner of the accused. He declared that in
the morning of March 28, 1971, Lachica and Sigador met with him and informed him of their plan to kill Dominador Aguilar. Since the
slaying of some of their co-prisoners from Dormitory I-D on September 28, 1970, which Aguilar masterminded, their determination to
take revenge on Aguilar had been frustrated by the tight security measures adopted by the prison authorities. At 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of March 28, 1971, Lachica, Sigador and Andaya the trial court found that the latter was forced by the two accused to go with
them waited for the prison guard to bring the prisoners food inside Dormitory I-C, and once the gate was opened and the guard had
entered, they stealthily slipped inside Dormitory I-C and quickly proceeded to Cell 43 where Aguilar was confined. Without warning,
Lachica repeatedly stabbed the victim who was seated on a chair. Despite the wounds he sustained, Aguilar attempted to escape his
assailants by running to another cell. The accused pursued him, and when they caught up with the wounded man, Sigador stabbed
him several times until he collapsed. Thereafter they went out, and as they were looking for a place to hide, they ran into Baldovino, a
prison guard, to whom they gave themselves up and surrendered their knives.
Testifying in his defense, Lachica gave his version of the incident thus: At 10:00 in the morning of March 28, 1971, he went to
Dormitory I-C to watch a television show of a horse race program being telecast at the time. While betting with the inmates of
Dormitory I-C, an altercation arose between him and Aguilar. As one word led to another, Aguilar threatened accused with the words,
"Baka hindi ka na makalabas nang buhay dito sa Dormitory I-C. "Because he suspected that the deceased would kill him, and rather
than wait to be assaulted, he beat Aguilar to the attack by suddenly stabbing him.
Thus, the accused would seek exemption from criminal liability on the theory of self-defense.
Unlawful aggression is the primordial element of self defense. For the right to exist, it is necessary that the accused be attacked, or at
least be threatened with an attack in an immediate and imminent manner, such as brandishing a knife with which to stab or pointing a
gun to the accused. 4 But when the commission of an act is in response to a mere threat or menacing posture of an unarmed victim,
as in the case at bar the defense cannot be invoked.
From the facts testified to by the accused, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the deceased had the least intention of inflicting
harm on the accused. In fact the latter did not receive any injury at all because neither the victim nor any of his companions was
armed at the time the intimidating words were uttered.
As heretofore pointed out, accused had pleaded guilty to the crime charged. Considering the gravity of the offense, a hearing was
conducted by the trial court, but only for the purpose of ascertaining the degree of culpability of the accused. In his extrajudicial

statement 5 the accused had freely and positively acknowledged having inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the victim. At the
hearing a quo, no attempt whatever was made to repudiate said confession. Such confession therefore constitutes the strongest
evidence of his guilt. The fact that the accused had not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel, as stressed by appellant's
counsel, does not detract from this conclusion, since the confession in question was obtained before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. 6
The facts on record adequately support the lower court's conclusion that the crime was committed with treachery and evident
premeditation. The fact that accused Lachica is a quasi-recidivist the new offense (murder) having been committed while he was
serving sentence for a previous crime more than justifies the death sentence meted out by the lower court. Quasi recidivism is a
special aggravating circumstance which imposes the maximum of the penalty for the new offense without regard to the presence or
absence of aggravating or aggravating circumstances (People vs. Bautista, 65 SCRA 460; Article 160, Revised Penal Code).
However, for lack of the necessary votes, the penalty is hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua. Some Justices hold the view that the
death sentence should not be imposed as the accused has been incarcerated for more than ten years. Accused is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dominador Aguilar in the amount of P30,000.00. Cost against the accused. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3956

January 10, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIO CARRERO, defendant-appellant.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the afternoon of the 24th of November, 1906, several laborers working for the street-railway company, being assembled in the
district of Santa Ana, city of Manila, for the purpose of receiving their wages, were directed to remain in single file and then
successively approach a s mall house, where the paymaster had his office, in order to be regularly paid. The accused, as foreman in
the service of the company, was in charge of the preservation of order and for such purpose he provided himself with a pick or spade
handle, one end of which he daubed with mud and threatened to push against the clothing of the laborers if they left the line or
created trouble. Benedicto Dio Pito left his place and forced his way into the file; the accused ordered him out, but still persisted, and
the accused then gave him a blow with the stick on the right side of the head, above the ear, in consequence of which the deceased,
Benedicto Dio Pito, fell to the ground holding his head with his hands; thereupon the accused and another laborer rendered him
prompt assistance and took him to the interior of a warehouse close by; the injured man shortly afterwards asked for water, which,
however, he was unable to drink, and became unconscious, and upon being taken to St. Paul's Hospital died there a few hours later.
In consequence of the foregoing, an information was filed with the Court of First Instance charging Emilio Carrero with the crime of
homicide, and after proceedings in prosecution, the court entered judgment on the 4th of December, 1906, sentencing the accused, as
guilty of the crime of homicide to the penalty of six years and one day of presidio mayor.
The fact that the deceased received a heavy blow with a stick, on the right side of the head, above the ear, and that in consequence
thereof he died shortly after, was fully proven in the trial, and constitutes the crime of homicide as defined in article 404 of the Penal
Code; in the commission of the above crime none of the characteristics of the crime of murder, as described in article 403 of said code,
were presents.
The accused pleaded not guilty, although he confessed to having struck the deceased on the right side of his head with a pick handle,
one of the working tools; it is therefore unquestionable that he is the author of the violent death of Benedicto Dio Pito.
The accused, however, alleges that when he struck the blow he merely acted in self-defense in view of the attitude of the deceased,
who, after insulting him, thrust his hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of drawing a dagger or a pocketknife and that in order to

defend himself, because he believed that the deceased, owing to his attitude, was about to attack him, he struck him the blow with the
stick he had provided himself with, in consequence of which the deceased fell to the ground, then arose at once, vomited, and then sat
down; that he and two other men then assisted the deceased and conducted him to the interior of a warehouse, where he became
unconscious, and later on he died in St. Paul's Hospital, whereto he was removed.
The statement of facts as made by the accused, by his counsel, and witnesses is lacking in truth; it is rather exaggerated and is not
supported by the evidence adduced at the trial. But even taking the same to be true, it is unquestionable that there was some insult or
provocation on the part of the unfortunate Benedicto Dio Pito, but no attack or aggression was made by him upon the accused to
justify the violent assault by the latter with a stick, for it has not been shown that the deceased carried in his pocket or elsewhere any
weapon or deadly instrument, so that there was not even an actual threat or imminent peril of an attack upon the accused.
Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of self-defense and the complete or incomplete
exemption from criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain that a person acted in self-defense within
the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other two conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code.
When an act of aggression is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it can not be considered as a defense but as the punishment
which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the court can at most consider it as a mitigating
circumstance, but never as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the Penal Code.
The theory that by the simple belief of a person that he would be attacked, a deadly blow may be inflicted on the ground of selfdefense, even though it be with a stick, is not authorized by the law nor is it a doctrine established by the decisions of courts. In the
judgment of the supreme court of Spain, dated October 31, 1889, not only was the belief of the individual who was obliged to defend
himself considered but also the hostile attitude and other acts, which in the opinion of the court, were considered as real and
obstensible acts of aggression; and, in other decisions of October 30, 1884, March 19, 1885, and November 15, 1889, a uniform
doctrine was established to the effect that a threat even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked,
is not sufficient, but that it is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. In this case the attitude and behavior of the deceased at the
time certainly did not constitute the unlawful aggression which the law requires, and the insulting words addressed to the accused, no
matter how objectionable they may have been, could not constitute so important a requisite as the aggression defined in the Penal
Code.
It is not shown in the record of the case that the serious injury suffered by the deceased, and which caused his death, was not due to
the blow he received from the accused, but to the striking of the head of the deceased against the ground when he was allowed to fall
by the two men who removed him to the warehouse, as alleged by the accused; apart from the fact that the floor of the warehouse is
of pine wood, and not of stone, even though the shock was received, one can not believe that it was so heavy as to produce cerebral
hemorrhage, and that death ensued in consequence thereof. Therefore, the lower court has rightly concluded that the death of the
deceased was due to the blow he received on the head, not to the shock of his fall, and this conclusion is supported by the evidence
which counsel for the accused has not rebutted nor contested in this instance.
In the commission of the homicide in question the circumstance of the accused being under 18 years of age must be considered,
according to No. 2 of article 9 of the Penal Code, which requires, in connection with paragraph 2 of article 85 of said code, that the
penalty next lower to the one imposed by article 404 should be applied. The penalty of prision mayor should ordinarily be imposed on
the accused, but taking into account the mitigating circumstances 3 and 4 of said article 9, viz, that he never intended to cause so
serious a harm as the death of Benedicto Dio Pito, and owing to the fact that provocation on the part of the latter immediately
preceded the attack by the accused, and also considering that no aggravating circumstance is present, and, under rule 5 of article 81
of the code, the appropriate penalty to be inflicted on the accused should be the next lower to the above-mentioned penalty of prision
mayor, that is, prision correccional in its medium degree. Therefore,
In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and that Emilio Carrero should be
sentenced to the penalty of two years four months and one day of prision correccional, to suffer the accessory penalties of article 61 of
the code, to pay 1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed one-third
of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs of both instances, and it is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-23734

April 27, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORO SABIO, defendant-appellant.
Antonio T. de Jesus for defendant and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P. J.:
At about six p.m. of April 12, 1963, Teodoro Sabio was squatting with a friend, Irving Jurilla, in the plaza of Central Manapla, Manapla,
Negros Occidental. Romeo Bacobo and two others Ruben Miosa and Leonardo Garcia approached them. All of them were close
and old friends.
Romeo Bacobo then asked Sabio where he spent the holy week. At the same time, he gave Sabio a "footkick greeting", touching
Sabio's foot with his own left foot. Sabio thereupon stood up and dealt Romeo Bacobo a fist blow, inflicting upon him a lacerated

wound, inch long, at the upper lid of the left eye. It took from 11 to 12 days to heal and prevented Romeo Bacobo from working
during said period as employee of Victorias Milling Co., Inc.
Sabio was thereafter prosecuted for less serious physical injuries. In the municipal court he was found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment of 5 months and 10 days plus costs. In the Court of First Instance, however, to which he appealed, he was found guilty
but with the mitigating circumstance of provocation, so that the penalty imposed was one (1) month and five (5) days of arresto
mayor plus indemnity of P100 and costs.1wph1.t
Defendant appealed from this judgment to Us to raise as a pure question of law the sole issue of whether, under the facts is
determined below, a fist blow delivered in retaliation to a "foot-kick greeting" is an act of self-defense and/or justifying circumstance
entitling the accused to acquittal and relief from all liabilities, civil and criminal.
A primordial requisite for self-defense is unlawful aggression (Art. 11, Rev. Penal Code). And for unlawful, aggression to be present,
there must be real danger to life or personal safety (People vs. Beatriz Yuman, 61 Phil. 786). For this reason, a mere push or a shove,
not followed by other acts, has been held insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (People vs. Yuman, supra). A playful kick the
lower court rejected defendant's claim that it was a "vicious kick" at the foot my way of greeting between friends may be a practical
joke, and may even hurt; but it is not a serious or real attack on a person's safety. Appellant's submission that it amounts to unlawful
aggression cannot therefore be sustained. As rightly found by the Court of First Instance, such kick was only a mere slight provocation.
Reference is made to a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain (prom. Jan. 20, 1904, 72 Jur. Crim. 123-125), considering a slap on the
face an unlawful aggression. No parity lies between said case and the present. Since the face represents a person and his dignity,
slapping, it is a serious personal attack. It is a physical assault coupled with a willful disregard, nay, a defiance, of in individual's
personality. It may therefore be frequently regarded as placing in real danger a person's dignity, rights and safety. A friendly kick
delivered on a person's foot obviously falls short of such personal aggression.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-43469

August 21, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BEATRIZ YUMAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Advinvula and L.P. Hamilton for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:

Marciano Martin and Beatriz Yuman without being joined in lawful wedlock, lived as husband and wife for three or four years until
February 26, 1935, when Marciano left their common dwelling. On the afternoon of March 5, 1935, Beatriz went to look for him at the
cockpit of Mandaluyong From there they came to Manila in a vehicle and while on the way they talked of "his absence and the many
debts they had". Marciano intimated to Beatriz his determination to end their relations, and urged her to return home alone. When
they arrived in the district of Sampaloc at the corner of Legarda and Bustillos street, they alighted and she suggested that they go
home together, to which Marciano, rude and hostile, objected warning her at the same time not to meddle with his affairs and to do as
she pleased, whereupon Beatriz stabbed him with the penknife she was carrying thereby inflicting a wound in the "right lumbar region
which injured the kidney". When Marciano realized that he had been wounded, he started to rum pursued by Beatriz, weapon in hand.
In his flight Marciano ran into traffic policeman Eduardo Dizon whom he asked to arrest "that woman" who had wounded him.
Policeman Dizon saw Beatriz and commanded her to surrender the penknife, while she did instantly. When asked why she had
wounded Marciano she replied that Marciano "after having taken advantage of her" had abandoned her. Immediately the aggressor
was arrested and placed in custody, where she freely and voluntarily gave to the police officials the statement Exhibit D, from which he
took, with respect to the act and circumstances of the aggression, the foregoing statement of facts because in our opinion the said
statement constitutes a true, correct and spontaneous version of the occurrence.
The following day Marciano Martin died as a result, according to expert testimony, of the wound inflicted upon him by Beatriz Yuman.
Charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of homicide, Beatriz Yuman indeterminate penalty ranging from six
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the
heirs of the deceased as indemnity of P1,000, and the costs. From said sentence the defendant appealed, alleging as error the failure
of the trial court to take into consideration the presence of all the elements of legitimate self-defense, or at least certain circumstances
mitigating her criminal liability.
Inasmuch as this court is of the opinion that the act complained of occurred in the manner and under the circumstances stated in the
statement Exhibit D the Spanish translation of which is Exhibit D-1, and not in accordance with the subsequent testimony of the
accused given at the trial as a witness in her favor, it is evident that our conclusion will have to be that her act of mortally wounding
her lover Marciano Martin had not been preceded by aggression on the part of the latter. There is no occasion to speak her of the
"reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it", nor is it necessary to inquire whether or not there was "sufficient
provocation" on the part of the one involving legitimate self-defense because both circumstances presuppose unlawful aggression
which, we repeat, was not present in the instant case. Even in her testimony given during the trial, the appellant, momentarily
forgetting her theory, admitted that the act performed by her was not justified:
Q. And was there no motive on your part to justify your assaulting him? A. There was none.
Q. And why did you stab him? A. I did not have any intention of attacking him either; as a matter of fact I was looking for
him so that we could live together.
Q. If you had no intention to attack him, and much less to kill him, why did you open that penknife? A. That penknife was
closed, so much so that I only opened it when I felt dizzy and my sight became dim and in fact I do not know where I hit him.
(Beatriz Yuman, transcript pp. 27-28.).
The obfuscation alleged by the accused was due according to her to the fact and "the deceased compelled me to alight from the
vehicle and pushed my head on account of which I felt dizzy and hit my peg against something which hurt me" and it was then when
"I took from my under-garments the penknife I was carrying and I opened it ... ". We do not think that such an incident took place as
no reference thereto has been made by the accused in her written statement of March 6th, regarding which the only comment she
made during the trial upon being questioned, was that "I was not able to declare very well because they had been intimidating me
during the night", without making any attempt, however, to deny or attack openly its contents.
However, admitting as true the act imputed by the accused to the deceased, a slight push of the head with the hand which,
according to her was the cause that led her to stab him, such act does not constitute the unlawful aggression mentioned by the Code,
to repel which it is lawful to employ a means of defense which may be reasonably to necessary. "Considering that an unlawful
aggression, as a fundamental requisite of self-defense is not necessarily implied in any act of aggression against a particular person,
when the author of the same does not persist in his purpose or when he desists therefrom to the extent that the person attacked is no
longer in peril: ..." (Decision of November 30, 1909, Gazette of April 21, 1910.) "Considering that the trial court in finding that the now
deceased Manuel Quiros insulted and gave Jose Izquierdo a hard blow on the head without specifying whether he used his hand or any
instrument, and this being the only act preceding the pulling of the knife and the mortal wounding of his adversary, it is clear that
there is no evidence of a situation calling for legitimate defense by reason of unprovoked aggression, etc." (Decision of November 19,
1883, Gazette of February 3, 1884.) "Considering that from an examination of the finding of the verdict as a whole, it is evident that
from them the existence of unlawful aggression constituting the first requisite of article 8, No. 4 of said Code cannot be inferred;
because the act of the deceased of holding the appellant by the necktie and of giving him a blow on the neck with the back of the hand
without injuring him, are not acts which would really put in danger the personal safety of the appellant and would justify the defense
referred to by the aforesaid provisions, but were real provocations correctly appreciated by the trial court, whose effects would be
restricted to a mitigation of criminal liability, thus giving them the full extent claimed by the appellant, inasmuch as nowhere in said
verdict is found an assertion showing that the deceased had drawn a weapon or had it in his possession at the time he was provoking
the accused with said acts; and because the aforesaid unlawful aggression did not exist in the criminal act referred to in the verdict,
there is no doubt that the appeal cannot be sustained etc." (Decision of January 25, 1908, Gazette of July 12, 1909.) "Considering that
the judicial concept of the exempting circumstance of article 8, No. 4 of the Penal Code requires, as characteristic elements, an act of
violence amounting to an unlawful aggression which would endanger the personal safety or the rights of the offended party; and this
being so, it is evident that neither the shove which the deceased gave the accused, nor the attempt to strike him with a bench or chair,
all which took place in the bar, constitutes a real aggression etc." (Decision of May 4, 1907, Gazette of October 16 and 22, 1908.)
From the foregoing it may be inferred that, with respect to the question of legitimate self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
the appeal is without merit. But the appellant prays as an alternative that the following mitigating circumstances be taken into
consideration:

(a) Lack on intention to cause so grave an injury as that committed.

In the sentence appealed from, this circumstances was taken into consideration, which we think was an error. The stab-wound
inflicted upon the deceased by the accused was not only mortal, but the victim thus wounded and running away was also
pursued by the accused, knife in had, and the latter would perhaps have inflicted upon him other wounds had it not been for
the timely arrival of policeman Dizon who calmed her bellicose attitude and placed her under arrest. This marked obstinacy of
the accused in her aggression clearly reveals her intention to cause to its full extent the injury she has committed.
(b) That provocation on the part of the deceased has immediately preceded the attack. The appellant claims that the
deceased pushed her head, by reason of which her foot was injured. As stated above, this belated allegation made by the
accused at the trial while testifying as witness in her favor, and of which she made no mention in her statement before the
police, is in the opinion of the court not established by the evidence.
(c) That she acted under obfuscation. We believe that this mitigating circumstance should be taken into consideration in favor
of the accused of the accused, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, especially the fact that the accused for three
or four years, and the harsh treatment which the deceased gave the accused on the afternoon of the day in question, a short
time before the aggression. The facts of the instant case are different from those upon which a contrary ruling was laid down
by the court in the cases of United States vs. Hicks (14 Phil., 217), and People vs. Hernandez (43 Phil., 104), cited in the brief
for the prosecution.
(d) Voluntary surrender of the accused to the authorities. The trial court acted correctly in not taking into consideration this
circumstance. (People vs. Siojo, p. 307, ante.)
(e) Lack of Instruction of the accused. This circumstance should be taken into consideration in her favor, it appearing from the
record that she is a mere wage-earner and could not sign her statement before the police and had to affix thereto her
thumbmark.
Except that, in view of the presence of two mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating circumstances, the appropriate
indeterminate penalty to be imposed upon the appellant is from four years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one
day of prision mayor as maximum, in all other respects, the sentence appealed from is affirmed with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-7929

November 18, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GENOVEVA APEGO, defendants-appellant.
Tirso de Irureta Goyena, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This case comes to us on appeal from a judgment of February 15, 1912, by which the Honorable Mariano Cui, judge, sentenced the
appellant to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to the accessories, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the
heirs of the deceased, and the costs.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of December 24, 1911, the spouses, Pio Bautista and Maria Apego, coming from the municipality of
Nasugbu, returned to their house, situated in the barrio of Sampaga, pueblo of Balayan, Batangas, and before entering the same
called to Genoveva Apego, the woman's sister, who they knew was therein, and as they received no reply, went up into the house; the
husband led the way and opened the door; he was followed by band led the way and opened the door; he was followed by his wife
who, once inside, lit a match and then a small kerosene lamp there was in the house. In the meantime the husband approached the
place where Genoveva was, who, startled, immediately awoke, seized a pocketknife used in spinning hemp, which was in a box at her
side, and with it attacked and struck Bautista, who was near her, a blow in the breast; thereupon her sister Maria, who was not aware
of the aggression, asked Genoveva why empty tincans and other articles were scattered about the azotea of the house, to which
Genoveva replied by saying: "What! have you arrive already?" and at once got up in front of the said spouses; at this moment Maria
advised her to cogitate and reflect, but Genoveva immediately ran out of the house, asking for help; it was then that the wife noticed
that her husband was seriously wounded, and when he was afterwards examined by a physician it was ascertained that he bore a
downward, penetrating wound, in the shape of a T, in the intercostal space between the second and third ribs of the left side, that it
reached one of the lungs and the heart, was necessarily fatal, and was inflicted with a sharp-pointed, cutting instrument. A few
moments after its infliction the injured man died.
By reason of the foregoing, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, on January 8, 1912, by the provincial
fiscal, charging Genoveva Apego with the crime of murder, and upon the institution of this case the aforementioned judgment was
rendered.
We accept the classification of homicide given by the trial judge to the facts involving the violent death of Pio Bautista, since, in the
commission of the crime, it does not appear that there was present any of the qualifying circumstance that determine a more serious
crime and penalty.
It is unquestionable and beyond all doubt that Genoveva Apego, un unmarried woman of about 25 years of age, inflicted upon the
deceased with a pocketknife a serious wound of a necessarily mortal nature, for he died shortly afterwards between the second and
third ribs of the same side from an upper toward a lower and an outward toward an inner direction and reached the heart and one of
the lungs.
The record does not show whether the deceased was able to make any ante-mortem statement, nor does it appear to have been
ascertained what was the motive of the fatal aggression of which the said Pio Bautista was the victim.
The following conclusions of fact are derived from a careful study of this case: upon the arrival of Maria Apego and her husband, Pio
Bautista, at the stairs of their house, and as Genoveva Apego did not reply to the call made to her from the outside by her sister
Maria, the said spouses went to the upper floor of the house; Bautista led the way and, in order to enter, opened the outside door, a
sliding door, and as there was no light inside stumbled against Genoveva Apego, who was sleeping near the said door, and touched her
left arm; thereupon, Genoveva awoke and believing, as she testified, that somebody was trying to abuse her, seized the pocketknife
aforementioned, asking at the same time who was beside her, and as she did not receive a reply immediately, she got up and struck
the person before her a blow with the said knife; in the meanwhile Maria Apego had separated from her husband to light a match and
then a kerosene lamp there was in the house and was not aware of the assault made upon her husband by her sister Genoveva in
front of Bautista, who had already been wounded and was in an attitude indicating that he was about to fall to the floor; thereupon
Genoveva went down out of the house, calling for help, and ran to the house of an aunt of hers where she was arrested by the
policeman, Manuel Peinado, to whom she then and there delivered the pocketknife with which she had assaulted her brother-in-law.
In view of the shape and direction of the wound received by the deceased and the part of the body where it was inflicted, according to
the detailed report of the medical examination, it is questionable that the wound was inflicted by the defendant after she was arisen
from the place where she had been sleeping, or, at least, when she had raised up in a sitting posture or was seated on the floor, at the
time that the deceased perhaps stooped over, in stumbling against her, and touched her left arm; but in no manner may it be
presumed that she was assaulted her brother-in-law, Bautista, while she was still lying on the floor of the house; such a presumption
is precluded by a consideration of the direction the weapon took penetrating the deceased's breast.
Maria Apego testified that, during the two years her sister Genoveva lived in their house, the latter had conducted herself correctly,
that they had always gotten along well and harmoniously together and had never the least misunderstanding between them. The
record does not show whether there had been any trouble or there existed any resentment between the defendant and the deceased
who, before he died and during the few moments he lived after he was wounded, made no statement whatever relative to this point or
to the conduct observed by the defendant with respect to the assault of which he was the victim, and, therefore, the defendant's

testimony must be accepted, to wit, that she struck a blow with the pocketknife at the person beside her, and who afterwards turned
out to be her brother-in-law, Pio Bautista, without knowing who he was and in the belief that, since he touched her left arm, he was
about to commit an attempt against her honor.
Under this hypothesis, it can not be denied that, upon the defendant's awakening, startled at feeling somebody grasp her left arm and
believing that an attempt was being made against her honor, as she received no reply whatever to her question as to who was beside
her in the darkness of the house, she understood that there was a positive unlawful aggression from which she had to defend herself
with the said pocketknife, and it is also undeniable that there was no previous provication on her part; but it is unquestionable that, in
making use of this deadly weapon, even in the defense of her person and rights, by decidely wounding him who had touched her or
caught her by the arm, the defendant exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real need of wounding with the said weapon
him who had merely caught by her arm, and perhaps did so to awake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to her sister's calls;
and as the party who she believed was making an attempt against her honor, because he had caught her by the arm, performed no
other act of aggression such as might indicate a decided purpose to commit an attempt against her honor than merely to catch her by
the arm, and although the defendant believed that it was the commencement of such an attempt and that she had to defend herself
therefrom, it is true that, once awake and provided with an effective weapon for her defense, there was no just nor reasonable cause
for striking a blow therewith in the center of the body, where the principal vital organs are seated, of the man who had not performed
any act which might be considered as an actual attempt against her honor.
From the foregoing considerations it is concluded that in the commission of the crime there was present the circumstance of
incomplete exemption from responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in subarticle 4 of article of the Penal Code are not
applicable; wherefore the criminal act is not altogether excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said requisites, although
a majority of them were present, that is, the first and the third requisites; and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article
86 of the code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by article 404 of the code, in the discretion of the court,
must be imposed upon the defendant.
In view of the fact that the accused is an ignorant woman, wholly uneducated, and that it was not shown that, at the time when she
assaulted the deceased, she knew that he was her brother-in-law, account must be taken of the circumstance prescribed by article 11
of the code, in connection with Act No. 2142, as no aggravating circumstance whatever was present to counteract the effects of the
said extenuating circumstance; therefore, the penalty applicable to the defendant is the one lower by two degrees and in the minimum
period.
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, the defendant, Genoveva Apego,
should be, as she is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of two years of prision correccional, to the accessories of article 61, to pay an
indemnity of five hundred pesos to the heirs of the deceased, and, in case of insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment which shall not
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of both instances. In computing the time of the sentence,
credit shall be allowed for one-half of the time of imprisonment suffered by the defendant while awaiting trial. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-34750

December 31, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO MONTALBO, defendant-appellant.
Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
The judgment appealed from convicts the appellant of the crime of homicide with the extending circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, and sentences him to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and the costs.
Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon of August 14, 1930, a basketball game was in progress in the army gymnasium on General
Luna Street of this City of Manila. Among those present at the game were: The appellant, Potenciano Montalbo; the deceased, Jose
Paras; and a companion of the latter, Conrado Lorenzo, all students. The deceased stood with one arm leaning against one of the
goal post with Conrado Lorenzo to his right. The appellant was behind him. As the deceased's right arm, which was against the post
obstructed the appellant's view, so that he could not see the game well, he called the former's attention to it, but the deceased said he
had to lean his arm against the post in order to keep his balance. After a few moments, the appellants caught the deceased's right
sleeve and jerked it strongly downward. The deceased turned towards the appellant who stepped back two paces, saying, "What do
you want?"lawphil.net
According to the Government evidence, when Conrado Lorenzo saw this, he stepped in pushing the deceased away with his right hand
and holding the appellant off with his left. In spite of this, the appellant approached the deceased and hit him in the chest; and it was
then that Lorenzo say the appellant had a penknife in his hand, and that the deceased was wounded and he gradually fell until a
bystander held him up.
According to the evidence of the defense, when the deceased turned towards the appellant, and the latter took two steps backward, he
followed him up and struck him with his fists. One of the witnesses corroborated this, saying that fist blows were indeed exchanged by
them. Moreover, the trial court found that the deceased had attacked the defendant with his fists. This finding must have been based
upon the evidence of the defense, for that of the prosecution makes no mention if the circumstance. The trial court, however, further
held that there was not sufficient proof that the attack took place before the appellant had used his knife. We do not find this borne
out by the evidence for the defense, which the court took into consideration. And as for the evidence of the prosecution, it does not
admit of this conclusion, for it shows that upon the deceased being wounded in the chest he began to sink little by little, and being in
such a state, he could not have attacked the appellant.
Notwithstanding all this, we hold that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the elements of which were not all present in this case.
Though the deceased struck him with his fists, the appellant was not justified in mortally wounding his assailant with the penknife. This
was not a reasonably necessary means of repelling the attack. (U.S.vs. De Castro, 2 Phil., 67; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of November 28, 1885; 35 Jurisprudencia Criminal, 858-861.) Moreover, the appellant provoked the attack by jerking down the
deceased's coat-sleeve, taking two steps backward, and challenging him with the words, "What do you want?"
The trial court justly took account of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. We find the judgment appealed from to
be borne out by the evidence and in accordance with the law, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

C.A. No. 384

February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..
DE JOYA, J.:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which
Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days
of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the
sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered
by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her brief
filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she
should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of
the authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of
September 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal
night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being washed by her
cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke to her of his love, which
she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute
and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following
morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out,
evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and surreptitiously entered the
room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help,
which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room
and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat

Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue
sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's parents came to the house
of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end the
conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of
having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she
would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same
day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day
Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his house, to attend religious services,
and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada.
Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were electric lights.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending
religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the
chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her
right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and
honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of
punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was
necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the
altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering
him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant
Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered
herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at
your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant
and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied
by him. That father and daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for
the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and
questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed
said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already
stated above, and went with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which were
presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It has been entertained and
has existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And
they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked,
women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and
courts of justice have entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a country
where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they always receive the protection of all.
That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right to
property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172,
173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a
woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman
who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada,
Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus, where
the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind,
without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was
unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in repelling what
she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other means of defending herself, and
consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo which she happened to
be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby, when the deceased tried to
assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases
(United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and, believing that some
person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person with a

pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or
aggression to justify her completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt
against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own
brother-in-law returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her honor
(United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house late at night on
September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous
acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the
authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side
of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her
right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of
them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base
of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot
be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said
chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and
to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil.,
472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments
before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs.
Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand
with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance
which should be considered in her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the defendant and appellant, with
the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there
is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina
is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of our
country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their
elders and now drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first assignment of
error to a certain degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form
and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating
circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and,
in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the
penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should be
accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41
Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty
to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the
Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently,
with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day ofprision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in
the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and
the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..

G.R. No. L-9247

October 15, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GENARO PASCA, defendant-appellant.
Andres Asprer for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted of homicide and sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the minimum
penalty prescribed for that crime. The appellant admitted the killing, but pleaded self-defense.
The judgment of conviction was rendered on February 19, 1912, but on the 12th of March, 1912, the trial court set aside its former
decision and entered a new judgment acquitting the defendant on the ground of self-defense.
Thereafter, upon the prayer of the Government, a writ of certiorari was issued by this court, and the record having been brought here,
we held that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to set aside the judgment of conviction rendered on February
19, 1912, more than fifteen days after it had been lawfully entered. The result of our disposition of those proceedings was to leave the
judgment of conviction rendered on February 19, 1912, in full force and effect, and this appeal that judgment before us for review.
The defendant and the deceased owned adjoining rice lands. At or about 6 o'clock on the evening of the day mentioned in the
information, both were working on the their respective parcels of land, and a quarrel having arisen between them the defendant struck
the deceased a blow on the right temple with a piece of bamboo about 7 feet long and as thick as a man's arm, inflicting a wound as a
results of which the deceased died a few hours later without regaining consciousness.

The defendant admitted that he struck the fatal blow, but claimed that he did so in self-defense. He testified that the deceased was
constructing a fence upon his, the defendant's, and; that he asked the deceased why he built the fence upon his land;; that the
deceased came over into defendant's land, struck him and knocked him down in a pool of water which was about knee-deep; and as
he fell he seized a price of bamboo which happened to be floating on the water, and, raising himself to a half-sitting posture, struck the
fatal blow. in answer to the question: "What did you think that the deceased wished to do to you?" he replied: "He wished to kill me
because he pushed me down into the water."
The son of the deceased, 18 years of age, testified that he was working at a point some 10 brazas distant, facing away from the
defendant and his father. That although he saw the fatal blow delivered he heard no altercation and observed no indication of a quarrel
between his father and the defendant. At first he swore that this was all he saw, but later he added that he saw the defendant
approach his father and strike the blow without saying a word. That thereupon he went to the assistance of his father and asked the
defendant why he had struck him, to which defendant replied: "I did not know what I was doing."
Robert Panet, who was also working some little distance away, rushed to the scene of the occurrence upon hearing the cries of the son
and when he came up to the place where they were standing he said to them: "What have you done, sons of man?" to which the
defendant replied that he did not know what he had done. From the undisputed testimony of this witness and of the son, it would
appear that the deceased had his bolo in its sheath strapped upon his person underneath his shirt at the time when he came to his
death.
The president of the municipal board of health arrived on the scene a short time thereafter and made an examination of the body of
the deceased. His testimony corroborates the testimony of the accused as to the fact that he struck but one blow, upon the head of
the deceased.
This is all the material evidence in the record, and upon this evidence the trial judge convicted the defendant of the crime of homicide.
In attempting to set this judgment aside, he says that upon mature consideration he had concluded that the testimony of the son of
the deceased was not worthy of credence, and that he had evidently testified falsely when he denied all knowledge of the altercation
which resulted in the striking of the fatal blow. We agree with the trial judge in this regard. The boy was standing at a distance of only
10 brazas from the defendant and his father, and yet he says he saw the fatal blow struck without hearing any words pass between
them and without observing any indication of a quarrel. He would have us believe that without provocation and without any motive
whatever the accused deliberately walked toward his father and struck him a deadly blow upon the head. We think the testimony of
the accused as to the existence of a quarrel is much more reasonable than that of this witness and we are convinced that this witness
deliberately refused to tell the whole truth as to what really occurred. On the other hand, the defendant's testimony in support of his
plea of self-defense is not wholly satisfactory. He claims that he struck the fatal blow because the deceased was pushing him in the
water and he feared that he was going to drown him. In view of the fact that at the moment when he struck the fatal blow he must
have been some little distance from his opponent, it seems hardy possible that he could have believed that he was in any real danger
of his life from drowning in the shallow pool of water into which, as he claims, the deceased attempted to thrust him.
According to the story told by the accused, he was half sitting and half rising out of the water when he struck the fatal blow. The trial
judge in his decision points out that from the very nature of the wound the blow must have been delivered "with terrible force," and
the description of the bound upon the head of the deceased by the president of the municipal board of health amply confirms this
understanding. The accused is a man 5 feet 2 inches high and weighs only 110 pounds, and it is, to say the least, difficult to
understand how he could have picked up a bamboo pole 7 feet long and as thick as man's arm, and then strict the fatal blow from the
half-sitting, half-rising position which he described in the court below.
We think that giving the accused the benefit of all reasonable doubts as to the circumstances under which the blow was struck, we
must find that the accused, having discovered that the deceased had built a part of his fence on the land of the accused, asked the
deceased why he had done so; that the question angered the deceased so that he rushed at the accused and pushed him into a
shallow pool of water, and then made some attempt to push him still further into the pool; that the deceased made no attempt to draw
a bolo which he had at his side; that the accused had no reason to believe that the deceased intended to take his life or do him any
grave bodily harm; that the fatal blow was struck by the accused in the heat of anger, in an attempt to defend himself from the
unprovoked assault of the deceased, and that the fatal blow was struck "with terrible force" on the head of the deceased, and with a
heavy bamboo pole 7 feet long and as thick as a man's arm.
Upon this findings of facts we are of opinion that while the defendant's plea of self-defense is not established, so as wholly to exempt
him from criminal liability, it should be taken into consideration in accordance with the provisions of article 86 of the Penal Code to
reduce the degree of the penalty prescribed for the commission of the crime of homicide.
Article 86 is as follows:
A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed were not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required for exemption from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
article eight, provided that the majority thereof be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the degree which may be
deemed proper, in view of the number and weight of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
This provision is understood to be without prejudice to that contained in article eighty-four.
Subsection 4 of article 8 is as follows:
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
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4. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it:
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.lawphil.net
We are of opinion, giving the accused the benefit of all reasonable doubts, that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
accused, but that there was no reasonable necessity for the use of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the
aggression, to more accurately speaking, that the mode of defense adopted by him was in excess of what was reasonably necessary to
protect himself from the aggression of his adversary.
While the accused might have been and doubtless was justified in picking up the bamboo pole to keep his adversary at bay, we do not
think that under all the circumstances he was justified in using it as he did. He was not in any real danger of his life, and he must have
known that he was not. His adversary, although armed with a bolo, had not attempted to draw it, and limited his assault to an attempt
to push the defendant back into the shallow pool into which he had been thrown at the outset of the quarrel. The accused must have
been at some little distance from his victim when he struck the fatal blow with a bamboo pole 7 feet long, and we are satisfied that to
repel the assault of the deceased, there was no reasonable necessity for his delivering a fatal blow at the head of his adversary, with
such weapon, and with such "terrible force."
We think that the judgment of the court below convicting the defendant of the crime of homicide must be sustained, but we think that
in imposing the penalty he should be given the benefit of the provisions of article 86 of the Penal Code, and that having in mind the
low order of intelligence of the accused (article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142) the penalty should be reduced to
six years and one day of presidio mayor.
The judgment of the court below, modified by substituting the penalty of six years and one day of presidio mayorfor so much thereof
as imposes twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome
(BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because
there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke
down her psychological resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power, thereby
entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her battererspouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of
her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
(Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos ( P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly
protrudes out of the mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel, [5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. [6] In due course, she
was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of
Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995,
however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two
children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of
beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out
that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until
9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That
was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared uninhabited and was
always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house,
to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle
to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of
their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he
was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben
and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have
a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen
door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the
offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was
only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben
about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report
regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with
a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet
and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one
end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before
the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte
responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against
appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due
to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband
who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at
the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas
house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and,
with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben
was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the
bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed
clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her
by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that she was aware that there was
a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however,
smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the
pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the
gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7](Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1.
Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from
San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and
Marie Bianca.
2.
Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates;
and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop
other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

3.
After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In
the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their
fights would become violent.
4.
Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that
when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in
one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood.
Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22,
1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding
an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here
in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said
that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a
table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a
sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the
third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was plastered
as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
5.
Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we collected our salary, we went to the
cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only
two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a
while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during
that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. On his
way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him
was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent. Basobas thought they were
joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were
always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle by
Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had
a wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
6.
Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out,
promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic
said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
7.
In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at
the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a
quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling with
each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic
shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and
saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to
work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night
as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about
fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was
always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went
to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while
Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, Teody because that was
what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would box
his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according
to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified
only that morning.

7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995,
Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other
places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house because
she might be battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her
husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also detect
his face. Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified
to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would
be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the
evening when Ben arrived because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She
said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife
through the window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said
that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient
many times and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995,
there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the
PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
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Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at
Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six
(6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the
crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is
capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben
died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they
might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.
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Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was
born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow
her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he
was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be
heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995;
that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous
Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was
arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she
used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by
Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.
9.
The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from
the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10.
Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among
her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of
cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by
the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben
Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
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Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the head which she described as a
fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his
death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

11.
The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE
committed with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit
and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
12.
Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997,
15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13.
On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide,
and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14.
The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial
lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2)
drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15.
Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the
same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her Brief
without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16.
In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000,
undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and
the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the
country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17.
In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and
remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18.
On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the
Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were
done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected
presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption
College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in
Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological
Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International
Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic
and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing
research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots
of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse
to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and
self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually
think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken
homes.

Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have
superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very
low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.
The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything.
Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt
that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the
family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or
sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of them. She said that in a normal marital relationship, abuses also
happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the
abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile
of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss,
such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint
of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the
abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx

xxx

xxx

19.
On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and testified before RTCBranch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the
Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he
was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he
was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior
to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the
University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which
was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000,
which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a ParkeDavis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in
1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain
and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish
medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in
relations, and testified in a case in 1964.
probably ten to twenty thousand cases.
experience with domestic violence cases,
Deproza.

V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family
In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen
In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his
he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita

As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping,
pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina
of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced
by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not
actually being beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless.
She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care
and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him within the environment. And it becomes his
own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are
doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering,
that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his
mind.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually
pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17)
minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a
Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition
was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the
trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the reexperiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert
anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxx

xxx

xxx

20.
No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the
Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quowere elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had
killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with
a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa
and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of
the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the
experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court
for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower
court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence,
were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the
case.[12]

The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration:
1.
The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to
self-defense.
2.
The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was
therefore liable for parricide.
3.

The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.

4.
The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben
Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered
husband.
5.

The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.

6.
The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt,
instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
7.

The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.

8.
The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the existence of self-defense
and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus;
and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As
consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion
or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of
the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts
that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors
of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced
as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the
prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation,
findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she,
or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence,
that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner. The Information had been filed
with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the
trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the
case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch
with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional
obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the nonpresentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of
the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however,
oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that
Ben had been married to Marivic. [17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination,
appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben. [18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon

the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no
admission was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no
proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with
a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant
has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his
head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the
victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater.
Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such
evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly,
the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the
death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the
solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion
to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present. [20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to
her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial
courts appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child.
When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. [22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine
jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete selfdefense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their
understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior
by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or
women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and
the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions;
and false hopes that the relationship will improve. [26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases:
(1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. [28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of
hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out
of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants
is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her
placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or
physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to
an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered
woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an

end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember
every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much
stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often
very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt. [30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows
that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the
other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for
the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and
despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving
professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional
help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer
are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable
cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may
really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]
History of Abuse in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her
heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q

How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?

In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual
drinker.

You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was
this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?

He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes
beat me.

How many times did this happen?

Several times already.

What did you do when these things happen to you?

I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.

What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?

He is following me, after that he sought after me.

What will happen when he follow you?

He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he said sorry.

During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to
see a doctor?

Yes, sir.

Who are these doctors?

The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxx

xxx

xxx

You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

Yes, sir.

Who inflicted these injuries?

Of course my husband.

You mean Ben Genosa?

Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[Court] /to the witness

Q

How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?

Everytime he got drunk.

No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage,
from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?

Everytime he got drunk.

Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?

Three times a week.

Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me. [32]

Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing
testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q

So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?

Yes, sir.

Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?

I did.

Will you please read the physical findings together with the

dates for the record.

1.
May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending
physician: Dr. Lucero;
2.
March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast.
physician: Dr. Canora;

Attending

3.

March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

4.

August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;

5.

April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and

6.

June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.

Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that correct?

Yes, sir.

Did you actually physical examine the accused?

Yes, sir.

Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion
furuncle left axilla?

Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is applied.

What is meant by furuncle axilla?

It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast.
tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.

So, [pain] meaning there is

So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

xxx

xxx

xxx

Were you able to talk with the patient?

Yes, sir.

What did she tell you?

As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her
by her husband.

You mean, Ben Genosa?

Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 when
this incident happened?

As per record, yes.

What was the date?

It was on November 6, 1995.

So, did you actually see the accused physically?

Yes, sir.

On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?

Yes, sir.

Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?

Eight (8) months pregnant.

So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

Yes, sir.

What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?

No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.

When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

Yes, sir.

For how many days?

One day.

Where?

At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her personally on
November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.

What is this all about?

A

Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the
same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.

For what?

Tension headache.

Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?

Q
A

The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response when the
medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of giving the root
cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic
problem.

You mean problem in her household?

Probably.

Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not
response to the medication.

In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused?

On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

Is this considered hypertension?

Yes, sir, severe.

Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?

It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the
couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were
inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the
latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten
oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running
into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They
returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at
their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.

On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple
quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the
process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?

Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and
went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second child
said, he was not home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So
while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.

This is evening of November 15, 1995?

Yes, sir.

What time did Ben Genosa arrive?

When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.

So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?

Yes, sir.

Did you come back to your house?

Yes, sir.

By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?

Bilwang.

Is this your house or you are renting?

Renting.

What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?

I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.

What happened when you arrived in your residence?

When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he
was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she
resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.

Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?

Ecel Arao, the one who testified.

Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?

No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.

During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

Yes, 8 months.

How advance was your pregnancy?

Eight (8) months.

Was the baby subsequently born?

Yes, sir.

Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

Marie Bianca.

What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

Yes, sir.

What time?

When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.

Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?

He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.

What was he yelling all about?

His usual attitude when he got drunk.

You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any?

He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.

What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?

He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk
and he would beat me again.

You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?

He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me
again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said
to him, why did you switch off the light when the children were there. At that time I was also attending to my
children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the
kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.

What did he do with the bolo?

He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.

What else happened after he cut the wire?

He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already holding the bolo.

How do you described this bolo?

1 1/2 feet.

What was the bolo used for usually?

For chopping meat.

You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?

He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

I screamed for help and then he left.

You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

Yes, sir.

You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?

Outside perhaps to drink more.

When he left what did you do in that particular time?

I packed all his clothes.

What was your reason in packing his clothes?

I wanted him to leave us.

During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?

After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me
again of the bedroom holding my neck.
You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A

And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

Where did he bring you?

Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me.

So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

Yes, sir.

What is there in the drawer?

I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

Were you actually brought to the drawer?

Yes, sir.

What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not
have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it
was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to
the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?

Outside.

xxx

xxx

In what part of the house?

Dining.

Where were the children during that time?

My children were already asleep.

You mean they were inside the room?

Yes, sir.

You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
look like?

Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

Is it a flexible blade?

Its a cutter.

How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

Yes, because he once used it to me.

How did he do it?

He wanted to cut my throat.

With the same blade?

Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of
a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the
former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans term describe to this Court what
her life was like as said to you?
A:

What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There
were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very
meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a
lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband
for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying
was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out. [39]

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional
supporting evidence as shown below:
Q

In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three hours, what was the
most relevant information did you gather?

The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were escalating abuses
that she had experienced during her marital life.

Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the case or at least you
have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?

I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of battering their wives?

I also heard that from her?

You heard that from her?

Yes, sir.

Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering their wives?

What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.

Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her
and battered [her] several times in that room?

She told me about that.

Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?

Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.

Several times in that room?

Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.

Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we
have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?

Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe
that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety
reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost shes not
during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.

I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?

Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

Q

And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?

The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the
lying prone[ne]ss of the person.

What do you mean by that?

Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will]
tell a lie[?]

And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?

She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the data that Im
gathering from her are the truth.[41]

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report, [42] which was based on
his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything
looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed
in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report
continued: At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the
viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she
suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight
years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought
the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a
severely abused person.

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In
determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be
appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We
would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife syndrome. [44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable
person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute
common myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the
United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the
killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women
are in greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She
has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they
provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty,
self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact
at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change. [49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving violent family
relations, having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical
abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness. [50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety
neurosis or neurologic anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons may believe that they are
essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an active response to try to escape
further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has
control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses
rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He
referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the
individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont attempt to leave the battering situation, even
when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or
anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also
believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape. [55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and
usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a
means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more. [57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated
abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We,
however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence
that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail
the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words,
she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to
Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more
violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would
usually run away to her mothers or fathers house; [58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change;
and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only
hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was
she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully
demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully,
albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of
repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and
thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To
repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested
specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. [59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the
battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed
in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the
following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1.

Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. [63] It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or
an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. [64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his
attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there
was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon
her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the
battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by
installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants
use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
[66]
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. [67] In the absence of such aggression,
there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. [68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty,
we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine
that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. [69]

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated
November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a
form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she
developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands
of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious
battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic
stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q
A

What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?

What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the
prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and
constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody
is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx

xxx

xxx

You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder,
Dr. Pajarillo?

The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head,
banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating
the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like
for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to
protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.

But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?

We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?

Q
A

The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional
instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6)
months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated
in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the
individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these
cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
Q

But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?

Yes, your Honor.

As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?

Of course obfuscated.[73]

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which
broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or
impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise
by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of
her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a

result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had
further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled
that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. [79] His abusive and violent
acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation
overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued.
According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about
to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic
could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect
on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not
actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she
suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar
circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal
equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise
from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the battererspouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing.
That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life,
but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue: Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. [81] In order to qualify an act as
treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. [82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this
qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed,
circular fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution
failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
Q

You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A

And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

Where did he bring you?

Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag me

So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

Yes, sir.

What is there in the drawer?

I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER

(At this juncture the witness started crying)

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

Were you actually brought to the drawer?

Yes, sir.

What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not
have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it
was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to
the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx

xxx

xxx

You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
look like?

Three (3) inches long and inch wide.

It is a flexible blade?

Its a cutter.

How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

Yes, because he once used it to me.

How did he do it?

He wanted to cut my throat.

With the same blade?

Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q

You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

Yes, because I smashed him.

What happened?

Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.

What else happened?

When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my
blood pressure.

COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her
neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:

You said you went to the room, what else happened?

Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to
die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.

COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q

You shot him?

Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the victims position relative to
appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the
thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in
order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be
lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 [88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one
degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. [90] Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision
mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8
months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be
released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize
vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took
great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the
proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad
in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the
Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such
learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given
facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum
up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau
of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being
held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72976 July 9, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO EDUARTE @ Tinong, FREDESWINDO EDUARTE @ Indoy Acquitted, and JULIE EDUARTE AT large.
FLORENTINO EDUARTE @ Tinong, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Maximino Z. Baaga, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In this appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Abra, Branch II in Criminal Case No. 250 the accused-appellant prays for
a judgment of acquittal in lieu of the verdict of conviction rendered by the trial court on October 31, 1985 with the following dispositive
portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds and holds Florentino Eduarte guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery as charged in the information, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Fredeswindo
Eduarte is ACQUITTED, for lack of sufficient evidence. (Rollo, pp. 25-26)
In resolving the issue of whether or not the defense of relatives under Article II, subparagraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code can be
invoked by the accused-appellant in his favor, we are confronted with two conflicting versions of the facts.
The evidence for the prosecution establishes the following facts:
Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindo Eduarte and Julie Eduarte are brothers and residents of Dolores, Abra. Fredeswindo
Eduarte married the sister of Roberto Trinidad. On the night of December 4, 1984, Fredeswindo Eduarte, Roberto
Trinidad and Sonny Testado were in the house of Roberto Trinidad at Dolores, Abra drinking liquor. Fredeswindo lost
control of himself and suspecting that his wife had an illicit relation with another man, he quarrelled with his wife. He
became violent and made loud outburst to the extent of getting a scissor inside the house. Seeing the intention of
Fredeswindo Eduarte, Roberto Trinidad pacified him. Instead of being appeased, Fredeswindo Eduarte thrusted (sic)
the scissor he was holding to his brother-in-law Roberto Trinidad. Vicente Trinidad and his brothers went to the
rescue of their brother Roberto Trinidad and wrestled the scissor from Fredeswindo Eduarte. Thereafter, Roberto
Trinidad drove his jeep and together with Sonny Testado, went to the Municipal Building of Dolores, Abra to seek the
help of policemen. On their way back and while approaching their house, Roberto Trinidad and Sonny Testado saw
Fredeswindo Eduarte lying flat on the road through the head lights of the jeep. Roberto Trinidad stopped his jeep.
Without putting off the light of the jeep, he alighted to help Fredeswindo Eduarte. When Roberto Trinidad was in the
act of extending assistance and asking what happened to Fredeswindo Eduarte, Florentino Eduarte, who was beside
the road, shot him, which caused his death. Not long after, police authorities arrived at the place and looked for
Florentino Eduarte but failed to locate him. (Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 4-5)
On the other hand, the defense, in its counter-statement of facts, relates as follows:

On the early night of December 4, 1984, accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte, together with Larry Baaga and
Belleng Alfaro, were working in the house of his uncle Maximino Baaga (T.S.N. p. 3, Oct., 1985). Just about that
time, his brother Julie Eduarte arrived and informed him that they are killing his older brother (Fredeswindo Eduarte)
(T.S.N. p. 4, Oct. 1, 1985; T.S.N. p. 51, Sept. 2, 1985). Surprised upon hearing the news (T.S.N. p. 8, Oct. 1, 1985),
Florentino Eduarte rushed from his place of work, proceeded to their house, got a gun from the trunk owned by his
late father and went directly to the scene unmindful whether the gun was loaded or not (T.S.N. p. 7, Oct. 1, 1985).
When he arrived at the place of incident, he saw Roberto Trinidad (victim) clubbing his brother who was lying, face
downward and his shirt soaked with blood (T.S.N. p. 5, Oct. 1, 1985).
Earlier that day at about 4:30 p.m. Fredeswindo Eduarte who is living with his in-laws, had a drinking spree in his inlaw's house with the brother of his wife Rita namely Roberto Trinidad (the victim), a cousin Jimmy Trinidad, and an
uncle of the deceased, Sonny Testado (T.S.N. p. 17, August 20, 1986).
While they were drinking, Fredeswindo Eduarte confronted his wife about her illicit relationship with another man and
irked by the accusation, his brother-in-law, Roberto Trinidad (victim), butted in and berated him as merely affiliated
with the deceased family (T.S.N. p. 17, Aug. 20, 1986). An exchange of words ensued leading to an altercation
involving Roberto and his brother Vicente Trinidad. Fredeswindo Eduarte defended himself by grasping a scissor from
his back and thrusting it against his assailant. This incident was witnessed by the victim's wife, Delia F. Trinidad, who
sought the help of the other brothers of the deceased (T.S.N. p. 25, July 25, 1985) namely Roque and Bienvenido
Trinidad.
At this juncture, Julie Eduarte, a brother of Fredeswindo Eduarte saw the four Trinidad brothers namely, Roberto
(victim), Vicente, Bienvenido & Roque, ganging up on his brother. He approached and stoned the house as a
consequence of which he was chased by the two Trinidad Brothers. (T.S.N. pp. 41-42, Aug. 19, 1985).
Julie Eduarte immediately proceeded to the house of his uncle Maximino Baaga where his brother AccusedAppellant Florentino Eduarte is (sic) working to secure assistance. (Rollo, pp. 118-120)
At the arraignment, the accused-appellant and Fredeswindo Eduarte whose name has been repeatedly misspelled in the records
pleaded not guilty to the crime of murder as charged in the information which reads:
That on or about December 4, 1984, at about 8:00 o'clock at night, at Curapo, in the municipality of Dolores,
Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and
while armed with a long firearm and a bolo (unrecovered), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one Roberto Trinidad, hitting him on the left chest and on other parts of his body, which
multiple gunshot wounds caused his death shortly thereafter. (Rollo, p. 21)
Co-accused Julie Eduarte has remained at large up to the present.
After trial, the lower court adjudged the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder while his brother
Fredeswindo was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence.
The accused-appellant maintains that he is innocent of the crime as charged invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of
relatives. Instead of making an assignment of errors, the accused-appellant states that the trial court was confronted with two
conflicting versions, one asserting that Roberto Trinidad was shot while assisting Fredeswindo Eduarte and the other stating that
Roberto was shot while clubbing Fredeswindo. In both cases, the appellant states that defense of relative should be appreciated.
Article II, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, orlegitimate, natural
or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstances
are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one
making defense had no part therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The first and second requisites are unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression. Hence, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to prove the existence of the three essential requisites of
the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part
therein.
The accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto Trinidad considering that the scenario he saw
after he was summoned from his place of work by his other brother Julie was that of his allegedly assaulted brother Fredeswindo
sprawled on the ground and bathed in his own blood with Roberto Trinidad clubbing Fredeswindo. It was when Roberto was about to
deliver the final blow to Fredeswindo that the accused-appellant claimed he shot Roberto in defense of his brother. Thus, according to
the accused-appellant, the second requisite is also present considering that the use of a gun at that pressing moment was reasonable
and necessary to prevent or repel the aforestated unlawful aggression. As regards the third requisite, the accused-appellant contends
that there is no debate as to its presence since the accused-appellant was clearly not a part of the melee in question.
We find no merit in the claim that the shooting of Roberto was done in defense of a relative. For this justifying circumstance to prosper,
the evidence adduced must be persuasive. Although it is true that the accused-appellant took no part in the provocation that led to the

killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated. The trial
court discredited the accused-appellant's version and made the following observations:
The following circumstances render the pretension or claim of Florentino Eduarte unreliable and unworthy of belief:
First, the position of the jeep in relation to Fredeswindo Eduarte. It is unrebutted that the jeep was driven by Roberto
Trinidad and stopped near Fredeswindo Eduarte who was lying on the road. If Roberto Trinidad had any ill feelings
towards his brother-in-law, Fredeswindo Eduarte, he would not have stopped his jeep and alighted. It was not so
hard for him to accelerate the speed of his jeep and run over the body of Fredeswindo Eduarte who was lying flat on
the road, rather than alighting (sic) from his jeep and club him.
Second, the headlights of the jeep remained lighted. If Roberto Trinidad had an intention to club or to harm his
inebriated and helpless brother-in-law lying on the road, he should have put off the light of his jeep before alighting.
His having alighted from his jeep without putting off the light shows his intention of extending assistance to his
brother-in-law Fredeswindo Eduarte.
Third, failure of Florentino Eduarte to present himself to the authorities. It is clear that immediately after having shot
Roberto Trinidad, Florentino Eduarte ran away and never presented himself to the authorities. If true that he shot
Roberto Trinidad while in the act of clubbing his brother Fredeswindo Eduarte, why did he not present himself to the
authorities and relate what happened? The natural instinct of any person who killed someone in defense of his
person or relative is to present himself to the authorities and relate what happened to him and what he did.
Fourth, the immediate flee (sic) of Florentino Eduarte and Larry Baaga without verifying the actual physical
condition of Fredeswindo Eduarte. Larry Baaga and Florentino Eduarte testified that they proceeded to the place of
the incident to see Fredeswindo Eduarte, that when they arrived, they saw Fredeswindo Eduardo lying on the road. If
it were true that they saw Roberto Trinidad club Fredeswindo Eduarte and was in the act of clubbing when Florentino
Eduarte shot him, why did they immediately run away without extending any assistance to Fredeswindo Eduarte, or
verifying his actual condition? This action of Florentino Eduarte and Larry Baaga is strange and demerits human
experience. It is indicative of a guilty conscience. (At pp. 24-25, Rollo)
In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge who had the privilege of examining the demeanor of the
witnesses and who thus, ably ascertained the credibility of said witnesses during the trial proceedings, we find no cogent reason to
depart from the well-entrenched principle that findings of fact of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to our
highest respect. (People v. Norberto Clores y Coral, G.R. No. 82362, April 26, 1990; People v. Rolando Caldito, et al., G.R. Nos. 7843233, February 9, 1990; People v. Pedrosa, 169 SCRA 545 [1989]; People v. Ramos, 167 SCRA 476 [1988]). Hence, for lack of a clear
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Roberto and of the reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accusedappellant, the justifying circumstance of defense of relative cannot be availed of. (See People v. Sagre, 89 SCRA 570 [1979]; People v.
Reynaldo Lingatong, G.R. No. 34019, January 29, 1990)
The accused-appellant himself categorically stated in open court that when he saw his brother Fredeswindo soaked with blood, he
thought that his brother was already dead at the time (TSN, October 1, 1985, p. 5). Moreover, defense witness Larry Baaga testified
that he was with the accused-appellant when the latter was summoned by his other brother Julie who informed the accused-appellant
that their brother Fredeswindo had been killed. (TSN, September 2, 1985, p. 50). itc-asl In the light of these declarations, the flight
of the accused-appellant after shooting Roberto without even bothering to examine the actual state of his sprawled brother
Fredeswindo all the more discredits the allegation that the killing was done by the accused-appellant in defense of a relative. No better
test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind. (See People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292 [1987]) Suffice it to state that under the facts of this case flight is indicative of guilt
as we have held time and again. (People v. Wilfredo Malinao alias"Welly", et al., G.R. No. 63735, April 5, 1990; People v. Cesario
Degamo, et al., G.R. No. 60945, March 6, 1990; People v. Aurelio Espinosa alias "Rolly", et al., G.R. No. 72883, December 20, 1989;
People v. Noelito Manzanares, G.R. No. 82696, September 8, 1989.)
As regards the presence of treachery qualifying the act of killing to murder, we find the records bereft of any proof that the mode of
attack was consciously adopted by the accused-appellant to insure that the killing will be nicely executed without any risk to himself.
The act of the accused-appellant in taking a gun with him on his way to the scene of the reported killing coupled with the attendant
circumstances that he was working at the time when one of his brothers related the slaying of their brother and that he knew nothing
about the earlier brawl in his brother-in-law's place shows that it was more the product of an impulse rather than a conscious and a
discerning mind. For treachery to exist, there must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the
appellant to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. (Art. 14, subpar. 16, Revised Penal
Code; People v. Virgilio Uribe, G.R. No. 76493-94, Feb. 26, 1990 citing People v. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 [1988]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The prescribed penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period but applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant is hereby SENTENCED TO EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as MINIMUM and SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal as MAXIMUM. The indemnity imposed by the trial court in the amount of P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant.
Tancinco & Rosales for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.
Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a
pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The
policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without
parting with his weapon. These peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties. He appeals from
that judgment which must be reversed.

That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after
evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to
resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.lawphil.net
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de
oficio. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-1940-42

March 24, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IGNACIO LAGATA, defendant-appellant.
Vicente del Villar for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
The witnesses in the this case testified in substance as follows:
PROSECUTION
1. Eusebio Abria 20 single farmer Jinangutdan, Santa Rita Samar. On October 3, 1946 he was in the provincial jail detained for
illegal possession of firearm, but his case was dismissed. Ignacio Lagata was a provincial guard Six Prisoners were then assigned to
work in the capitol's plaza; Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio Mariano the witness and Epifanio Labong. their guard ordered them to go to the
nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing. The nursery is near the
provincial hospital in Catbalogan. The place was grassy. Lagata ordered the five prisoner to call Labong (4-7). As Labong did not
answer Lagata ordered the five prisoners to look for him. They followed the trail. Upon reaching the nation highway, Lagata called
them. As Labong did not answer their call Lagata ordered the five to look farther for him. The five prisoners went towards the
mountain. Upon reaching a camote plantation, "I saw footprints. I called my companions. While we were all in the camote plantation I
did not know that I was shot by Ignacio Lagata. He was about four meter away from me. He fired at my left arm." At the time the
witness was standing one of his companions was at his right side three or four meter behind him. All walked almost together at the
moment because they wanted to see the footprints pointed by the witness. "At the moment that he was hit he immediately called the

attention of Ignacio Lagata 'Mano, I am wounded.' He said it is because you did not approach to me." (8-9). "When I saw that he again
manipulated the chamber of his gun I ran away. When I say that my other companion ran away, I ran also. I noticed that my left arm
was wounded. When I was already sitting by the front of the coconut tree I heard another gun shot." Tipace is already dead "I did not
see him anymore. When Ignacio Lagata passed by where I was I Requested him to take me. He brought me to the justice building
Hospital. My left arm is amputated just right at the joint between the shoulder and the arm. It is not yet completely healed." The
witness had no intention to run from Lagata. (11). Labong asked Lagata permission to gather gabi. The other prisoner did not say
anything. Lagata told them to go to the nursery. While they were gathering gabi Lagata was near them. (12). But he could not see
everybody because there was talahib growing in the place and it was tall. The witness heard three shots. The second one hit him. After
the first shot "we were all assembled." (132-14). The witness did not see Tipace being shot. "The reason as to why I ran was because I
was afraid that I might be shot again." (16). His companions were probably scared and that is why they ran. (17).
2. Mariano Ibaez, 25, married detained prisoner Zumarraga, Samar. On October 3, 1946, he was in the provincial jail as a detained
prisoner. After breakfast, six prisoner were called: Epifanio Labong Ceferino Tipace, Eustaquio Galet, Jesus Manoso, Eusebio Abria and
the witness, Mariano Ibanez. They went to work in the plaza of the provincial jail. At about 11:00 o'clock they were taking a rest and
while they were taking a rest the witness heard Lagata inviting the prisoners to go the nursery to gather near the provincial hospital.
They scattered to get gabi. "We scarcely got three gabis when I heard Ignacio Lagata calling us to assemble." The place was grassy
were picking gabi Lagata was standing by the side of a mango tree. At the call of Lagata only five them to call for him. (19-21).
"Inasmuch as Epifanio Labong did not answer our call Ignacio Lagata ordered us to go to the mountain and look for Epifanio Labong.
Eusebio then went to the camote plantation. He foundfootprints and he called Ignacio Lagata to inform him that he saw footprints. On
account of this report of Eusebio that he saw flattened grass and that hewas unable to look for Epifanio Labong sa Ignacio Lagata filed
at him and he was hit on the left arm." He was at about three meter from Lagata. (22). The witness was at the left side of Ceferino
Tipace at about two meter from Abria.Abria said, "Mano, I am wounded." Lagata said in turn, "Come around assemble here." Abria
came to the right side of Lagata. (23). "Oncewe were already assembled there Ignacio Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace
and when I saw that Ceferino Tipace was hit then I ran away because I had in mind that had i not ran I would have been shot also." At
the time Tipace was "standing and carrying with him on his left arm some gabi and when he turned to the left that was the time when
he was shot by Ignacio Lagata. The bullet penetrated from the left side of the armpit and came out from the right side of the body."
Tipace was at about two meter then from Lagata. "At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day I returned to the provincial jail. I
did not return immediately because I was afraid." Tipace was killed. (23). One morning, Lagata gave the witness fist blow on the
abdominal region and kicked him at the back Because the pervious night the witness told the prisoners not to make much noise. "I did
not have ill-feeling because he had the right to maltreat me even if I was not at fault." (29). At the time they were searching for
Labong before the shooting they were walking in an ordinary way looking toward the ground one after another at about half a meter
from each other. Lagata was behind all of them. (31).
3. Gilberto C. Rosales 63, married, president Sanitary Division Catbalogan, Samar. On October 17, 1946, the cadaver of Ceferino
Tipace was exhumed. (35). The witness found in it, "A gun shot wound which went through the body from the lower left axillary region
to the right shoulder." (36).
4. Eustaquio Galet, 20, married detained prisoner. On October 3, 1946, he was one of the six prisoner who worked in the premises
of the capitol building. (38). "We went to the nursery and each one of us got gabi. The guard Ignacio Lagata was under the mango
tree. I was about ten meter awayfrom him. It was grassy in the place where we were picking gabi. Not long after we were called by
Ignacio Lagata because we were going home already. One was missing, Epifanio Labong. Ignacio Lagata ordered us to call Epifanio
Labong but Epifanio Labong but Epifanio Labong did not answer." (39) The talahib plants growing in the place were taller than myself. "
Lagata orderedus to search for Epifanio Labong. We went around the place and then crossed the national highway and went up the
mountain until we reached tom place where cogon grass were growing. Eusebio Abria and myself saw flattened grass. We informed
Ignacio Lagata that there was a trace where a person had passed by or he may have gone that way. Then Ignacio Lagata fired one
time. While we were searching for Epifanio Labong each one of us were bent and leaning looking downward. I heard a gun shot and
that was the time when Eusebio Abria was shot and then once he was hit he called Ignacio Lagata his hand at his wound and then got
near Ignacio Lagata." (40). "Upon seeing that one of our companions was already shot without fault, I ran away and came down to the
capitol building and then went to the provincial jail and reported the matter to the sergeant of the guard." His companion then was
Jesus Maoso. They reached the provincial jail at about 12 o'clock noon. The shooting took place at about 11:30. (41). The witness
heard Labong ask Lagata to accompany their group to the nursery to gather gabi. When he was shot Abria was bent and leaning his
body downward to the ground while Lagata was behind him. (42). The witness heard the shot that killed Ceferino Tipace. "I was
already descending near the Capitol building that was the time when I heard the shot." (43). Jesus Manoso ran away with the witness,
but Ceferino Tipaceand Mariano Ibanez remained. The treatment received by the witness from Lagata was good. (44).
5. Pedro Mayuga, 39, married, chief, Samar Provincial Hospital. On October 3, 1946, prisoner Eusebio Abria was brought to the
hospital with a wound on the upper side of his left arm which was amputated from the shoulder joint. "The patient was at first given
resuscitating medical treatment to combat the shock caused by the hemorrhage and later the shoulder joint was disarticulated." After
his arm was cut, he was confined in the hospital until November 6. The wound must have been produced by a gun shot. There are
indications that the shot was fired at close range. Very likely around five meters. (48). There was no possibility of saving the arm
because "all the vital tissues were destroyed and the bone in all the vital parts of the tissues destroyed from outward and inward."
(50).
DEFENSE
1. Andres Saludario, 49, married, nursery foreman, Catbalogan, Samar. On October 3, 1946, he saw Lagata in the nursery guarding
six prisoners. (53-54). The prisoners were just within the premises of the nursery just beyond the mango tree. Lagata was about
seven meters from them and he was looking at them all the time. The place was grassy. The grass was about half a meter tall. (55).
The ground near the hill was covered with cogon and talahib. By the height they could cover a man in standing position. The witness
heard about the disappearance of prisoner Epifanio Labong. At the time, the witness was already far, because he had to attend to
several laborers detained at the capitol building. When he returned from the capitol building, he was informed that Epifanio Labong
disappeared. (57-59). The witness did not hear any gun shot explosion in the nursery. He saw the accused guarding the prisoners at
about 8:00 o'clock in the morning. (60). The witness stayed in the nursery until about 8:30, when he came to the capitol building.
(61).

2. Ignacio Lagata, 27, married, Catbalogan. On October 3, 1946, he accompanied the six prisoners from the provincial jail to the
plaza of the provincial capitol. He remained there until 10 o'clock in the morning, when he told them to return to the provincial jail.
The six prisoners requested him to allow them to get some gabi in the nursery. Lagata went with them to a spot around the mango
tree. (63-64). The grass in the place was knee-high. Lagata was under a mango tree about five meters from the prisoners. He was
watching all of them. They were scattered back, Epifanio Labong took advantage and escaped. "I did not discover that but when I
called them to assemble I found out that one missing. I asked the rest of the prisoners as to where Epifanio Labong was. I told the
prisoners to go to that spot. We went there and the prisoners were ahead because they know the place. (66). When we arrived at the
place, we did not see Labong and Tipace called our attention telling us that this is the place through which Epifanio Labong passed."
The witness did not see the track of Epifanio Labong but the prisoners, however, were the ones who indicated to him the place through
which Epifanio Labong passed. "I followed them. Up to above the national highway. When we reached up the place another prisoner
called also our attention telling us that here is the place through which Labong passed and so went up. When we reached above, they
were already far from here. So I told them to stop because they were already far from me. They did not heed my order to stop. Then I
fired up to the air. They scattered. I could only see two of them I also saw one of them running towards the mountain. So I fired at
him." It was Eusebio Abria, and he was at about five meters from him. "He was going up the mountain. After I fired at Eusebio Abria, I
saw him running. I just left him because I was looking for the rest. I saw also Ibanez running. He was running towards me and then
around me. I called his attention and told him to stop from running or else lie down and give up your arm. He did not heed my order. I
fired at him." (67-69). The witness saw Ibanez running before him towards the south road. He was Tipace. One minute elapsed from
the time the witness fired at Abria to the time he fired at Ibaez. The witness fired at them because he sympathizes with other
policemen from whom other prisoners escaped. (70). "Because if it so happened that a prisoner escaped under my custody, I would be
the one to be put in jail and if I cannot fire at him, I will be the one to be put in jail. "The truth is that they ran away." At the time he
fired at Tipace and Abria, they were running away. (71). "What was in my mind was that if I could overtake them and not fire at them,
I would meet the same situation as what other guards met under whose custody prisoners escaped and some of them were discharged
from their duty." Ibanez testified against the accused because the latter fired at his father-in-law. (72). One day, the accused
maltreated Ibanez. He slapped him two times. He was the only prisoner he slapped. (73). At the time they were looking for Labong,
the prisoners were walking in line one meter from one to another. The accused was near them. (77). When he fired at Abria, the latter
was about five meters from him and when he fired at Tipace, the latter was four meters from him. At the time, Tipace was running
side-wise to the accused and he could see where the accused was. His face was facing the accused. (78). When he fired at Abria, he
lost hope to recover Labong. "I was hopeless already." (80) The picking up of gabi was not part of the work of the prisoners. (81).
Appellant was charged with murder, serious physical injuries and evasion through negligence in three separate cases which have been
tried jointly.Finding him guilty, the trial court sentenced him as follows:
(a) For Murder (Case No. 809) Reclusion Perpetua with civil interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification,
indemnify the heirs of Ceferino Tipace Two Thousand Pesos (2,000) and pay the costs of this action
(b) For serious physical injuries (Case No. 810) An indeterminate imprisonment of two (2) year and four (4) month as
minimum to four (4) year nine (9) month and ten (10) days of prison correccional as maximum and pay the cost of this
action; and
(c) For evasion through negligence (Case No. 811) An indeterminate imprisonment of two (2) months one (1) day of
arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year one (1) month and ten (10) days of prison correccionaland pay the costs, (p. 45,
rec.)
The evidence is conclusion to the effect that the escape of prisoner Epifanio Labong was due to the negligence of the appellant. The six
prisoner were supposed to work in the plaza of the provincial capitol and to return to jail after said work but appellants allowed them
instead to go to the nursery to gather gabi without any apparent authority to do so.
Considering that the place was grassy and tall talahib was growing therein the height of which could conceal persons in standing
position appellant must have seen immediately that it was a choice place for any prisoner that may want to escape. Such negligence of
appellant is punishable under article 224 of the Revised Penal code, and the penalty imposed by trial court is in accordance with law.
As regards the shooting of Abria and Tipace we are convinced that the facts were as narrated by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Abria was shot when by the witnesses for then prosecution. Abria was shot when he was onlythree meter away from appellant and the
latter has not even shown that Abria attempted to escape. Tipace was also shot when he was about four or fivemeter away from
appellant. The latter's allegation that Tipace was running conveying the idea that said prisoner was in the act of escaping appears
to be inconsistent with his own testimony to the effect that Tipace was running sidewise with his face looking towards appellant
andwith the undisputed fact that Tipace was hit near one axilla, the bullet coming out from the opposite shoulder. If Tipace's purpose
was to escape the natural thing for him to do would have to give his back to appellant.
The criminal responsibility of appellant regarding the killing of Tipace can be exacted from him on the basis of his own testimony. The
way he fired at Tipace ( whom he misnamed first as Ibaez) is described by appellant in the following words:.
He was running towards me and then around me.
I called his attention and told him to stop from running or else lie downand give up your arm. He did not heed my advice.
Inasmuch as he did not heed my advised so I fired at him.
His direction while he was running not exactly towards me but running in front of me to the left side. (69).

Explaining his reason for firing at Abria and Tipace, appellant gave the following reason: "Because I sympathize with the other
policeman from whom prisoners escaped." (70). "If it so happened that a prisoner escaped under my custody, I would be the one to be
put in jail and if I cannot fire at him I will be the one to be put in jail." (71). (Emphasis ours)
It is clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. Lagata could have fired at him in self defense or if absolutely
necessary to avoid his escape. The record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression " he was running
towards and then around me". (Emphasis ours) How could anyone in his senses imagine that Tipace intended to escape by running
towards and around the very guard he was supposed to escape from?
There is no question that the escape of Labong scared appellant according to him because of the experience of other guard who were
dismissed from office or even prosecuted because of prisoners who had escaped under their custody and that it was his duty to fire
against the prisoner if he wanted to be exempt from any responsibility. Even if appellant sincerely believe, althougherroneously that in
firing the shots be acted in the performance of his official duty the circumstances of the case show that there was no necessity for him
to fire directly against the prisoners so as seriously wound one of them and kill instantaneously another. While custodians of prisoners
should necessity would authorize them to fire against them. Their is the burden of proof as to such necessity. The summary liquidation
of Prisoner under flimsy pretexts of attempts of escape, which has been and is being practiced in dictatorial system of government has
always been and is shocking to the universal conscience of humanity.
Human life is valuable albeit sacred. Cain has been the object of unrelentlesscurse for centuries and millennia and his name will always
be remembered in shame as long as there are human generation able to read the Genesis. Twenty centuries of Christianity have not
been enough to make less imperative the admonition that Thou shall not kill," uttered by greatest pundit and prophet of Israel. Laws
constitution world charters have been written to protect human life. Still it is imperative that all men be imbued with spirit of the
Sermon on the Mount that the words of the gospels be translated into reality and that their meaning fill all horizon with the eternal
aroma of encyclical love of mankind.
As recommended by the prosecuted appellants is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance in paragraph5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently appellant shouldbe sentenced for homicide to an
indeterminate penalty of six years andone day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and in the case of
serious physical injuries to an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional.
Modified as above stated the appealed decision is affirmed with costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-26458 January 30, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO PAJENADO @ OSOY EDILBERTO PAJENADO, CECILIO PAJENADO, CARLITO PAJENADO, and ANICETO
TOLING, defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Teodulo R. Dio for plaintiff-appellee.
Cesar A. Seville for defendants-appeallants.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Mandatory review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar finding the accused guilty of the crime of Murder and
sentencing all of them to DEATH, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jorge Tapong the sum of P6,000.00, and
to pay the costs.
In the evening of March 26, 1966, there was a party at the house of Constancio Pajenado in barrio Dapdap, Las Navas, Samar, to
celebrate the betrothal of his daughter to the son of one Guillermo Quebec. Food and drinks were served to the guests among whom
were the municipal mayor of Las Navas, one Ases Jolejole, barrio captain Teofilo Jorda, barrio policemen Domingo Pajac and Benito
Sacay, the deceased Jorge Tapong, and the five accused. At the height of the festivities, Mayor Jolejole commented that the deceased
Jorge Tapong was already drunk and should be brought home. Consequently, the barrio captain, Teofilo Jorda, ordered two of his barrio
policemen then present, Domingo Pajac and Benito Sacay, to help him in taking
Tapong to the house of Pelagia Tapong Gutaba, a cousin of the deceased. While they were on their way, the five accused, each armed
with a piece of wood suddenly emerged between the houses of Victoria Pajac and Elicito Gutaba, and with the accused Alfonso
Pajenado focusing his flashlight on the eyes of Tapong, they started beating the latter in different parts of his body until he fell. At the
time of the incident, the street was well-lighted by the light coming from a Petromax lamp in the house of one Donata Pajac. Teofilo
Jorda who was following behind and who witnessed the entire incident blew his whistle and tried to stop the said accused from beating
Tapong, but they did not heed him. After Tapong fell down, the five accused ran away.
Teofilo Jorda aided by rural policeman Pajac and Sacay brought Tapong to hs house and attempted to secure a statement from him.
But, the deceased was already in a coma and was unable to talk. So, Jorda sent for Tapong's relatives who took the deceased to the
poblacion of Las Navas to seek medical attendance, but Tapong died while they were on the way.
Jorda immediately reported the incident to the chief of police of Las Navas. Thereafter, an autopsy of the deceased was made by Dr.
Angel Tan. The medical examiner found that the deceased suffered the following external injuries:
1. Hematoma 4 cm. x 1 cm., irregular in shape, left supraorbital region.
2. Abrasion-hematoma, linear in shape surrounded by an area of swelling, forearm, right, proximal portion.
3. Abrasion-hematoma, 6 cm. x 1 cm., with its long axis perpendicular to the neck, situated at the left supraauricular region.
4. Abrasion-hematoma, 4 cm. x 4 cm. infra-suricular region, right.
5. Abrasion-hematoma, linear in shape 3 cm. x 3 cm. situated at the left lateral aspect of the trunk, crossing the 6th,
7th, 8th, and 9th ribs backwards and downwards.
6. Swelling neck, right side.
7. Hematoma with swelling right parieto-temporal region.
He concluded that the cause of death is "Uncal herniation leading to death from an increase in intracranial pressure brought about by
an intracranial hemorrhage on account of a fracture of the right parieto-temporal bone"; and that "the swelling in the right side of the
neck could have exerted pressure on the trachea thereby further embarrassing respiratory excursions and should therefore be
considered as contributory factors in the causation of death." 1 The doctor further testified that the aforesaid injuries could have been
caused by a blunt instrument like a piece of wood.
The accused Aniceto Toling admitted responsibility for the injuries sustained by the deceased Jorge Tapong and denied that his other
co-accused had any hand in beating up the deceased. In justification, he claims that he acted in the lawful performance of a duty or
office. According to him, he was a barrio policeman of barrio Dapdap and was also present in the house of Constancio Pajenado when
the incident' complained of took Place; that when Tapong became drunk and noisy at the party, he helped Teofilo Jorda and Benito
Sacay taking Tapong to the house of Pelagia Tapong Gutaba; that while they -were on their way, Tapong was asking why he was taken
away from the party; that when they arrived at the house of Pelagia Tapong again asked them why he was brought there, and the
barrio captain relied that his actuations were shameful to the mayor; that Tapong became angry and got a bolo depang from the wall
of the house and jumped out; that the barrio captain blew his whistle and ordered them to disarm Tapong; that in compliance with
said order, he picked up a piece of bamboo and told Tapong to drop his weapon, but Tapong, instead, lunged at him, for which reason,

he struck Tapong in the arm; that Sacay, who was behind Tapong, also beat Tapong several times with a lice of wood; that his coaccused Alfonso. Pajenado was focusing his flashlight on Tapong while he was beating up the latter; that after Tapong fell, he got the
bolo from the hands of the ate Tapong and handed it to Patrolman Ortiz who was standing nearby, and then left for home, across the
river; that the following morning, he went to his farm and while there, his conscience bothered him for which reason, he went to the
chief of police of Las Navas the next day and reported the matter, but the chief of police told him to wait for the complaint; and that in
the meantime, he was held in protective custody.
The accused Alfonso Pajenado admitted that he was the one focusing his flashlight on the deceased when Toling was beating Tapong,
but denied having participated in the said beating of the deceased.
All the other accused, namely: Edilberto Pajenado, Cecilia Pajenado, and Carlito Pajenado, did not testify in court.
Inasmuch as Aniceto Toling admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased Jorge Tapong, it was incumbent upon him, in
order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him on the strength of his own evidence without relying
on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the killing. 2
A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise-of a right or office. 3 There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. 4 In the case at bar, we find no legal basis to justify Toling's
action. As found by the trial court, Toling's claim that he was a barrio policeman of Dapdap at the time of the incident is not worthy of
belief as his appointment as such by the Municipal Mayor of Las Navas, Samar on February 24, 1964 is null and void inasmuch as the
municipal mayor does not possess the power to appoint barrio policemen, such power being vested in the barrio captain pursuant to
the provisions of Section 14 (e) and (i) of Republic Act No. 3590. Further, barrio captain Teofilo Jorda categorically stated that the
accused Aniceto Toling is not a policeman of the said barrio.
Besides, we find Toling's action not indicative of a person clothed with authority performing a lawful duty. Thus, he testified that after
Tapong fell he ran towards the people who had gathered around, especially towards the person who was focusing a flashlight, and after
recognizing his co-accused Alfonso Pajenado to be the one doing it, he came back to the deceased and picked up the bolo depang from
the hands of the prostrate Tapong and gave it to the municipal policeman who was standing nearby. Immediately thereafter, he ran
home and the following day, he went to his farm. Why did he run? To run away from the scene of a crime is indicative of guilt. Why did
he not inform the barrio captain of the incident considering that it was the barrio captain who had allegedly ordered him to disarm
Tapong? Such unnatural action negates and renders improbable the claim that he was acting in the fulfillment of a duty.
Appellants' counsel points to several facts and circumstances which the trial court allegedly failed to appreciate or give due weight to,
which should have caused the rejection of the case for the prosecution or, at least, rendered it doubtful.
Foremost, is the alleged lack of motive for the five accused to harm the deceased. It is true that no motive has been shown why the
appellants would beat Jorge Tapong to death, but this Court has repeatedly held that motive is pertinent only when there is doubt as to
the Identity of the culprit, something which does not obtain in the case at bar as the five accused were Positively Identified by
prosecution witnesses to be the assailants of the victim. 5
Appellants make capital of the affidavits executed by prosecution witnesses Teofilo Jorda and Domingo Pajac which are conflicting and
contradictory to what they have testified in court. It is unfortunate that the original records of this case were lost 6 and the
aforementioned affidavits have not been reconstituted. At any rate, it can be gleaned from the records that on March 28, 1966, when
Teofilo Jorda and Domingo Pajac reported the incident to the chief of police of Las Navas, their statements were reduced to
writing. 7 In said statements, they said, among others, that while they were escorting Jorge Tapong to the house of Pelagia Tapong
Gutaba, Tapong got sore and attacked the policemen with a bolo depang so that they scampered away and did not know who later on
beat up Tapong. Then, on March 29, 1966, they subscribed to affidavits 8 pointing to the accused as the assailants of the declared but
disclaiming knowledge of the start of the incident, for Jorda stated that he just saw the accused beating the deceased, while. Pajac
said that he arrived at the scene only upon hearing the whistle blown by Jorda Admittedly, their declarations are conflicting. These
inconsistent statements, however, were explained by Jorda and Pajac to the effect that their first statements (Exhs. 2 & 4) were
dictated to them by Mayor Jolejole who wanted to protect the accused who were his political followers and they were afraid to
displease the mayor, 9 and that the wording of their second statements (Exhs. 1 & 3) was that of the chief of police who typed the
same. 10 Anyway, the inconsistency refers to a trivial detail. It cannot destroy the probative value of their consistent testimony on how
the five accused assaulted the deceased.
Counsel for the appellants would also want this Court to disregard the testimony of the People's rebuttal witnesses Gertrudes Adora,
Angel Tapong, and Pelagia Tapong Gutaba for the reasons that Gertrudes Adora, being the sister-in-law of Domingo Pajac is biased that
Angel Tapong and Pelagia Tapong Gutaba, brother and sister, being cousins of the deceased, and the son of Angel Tapong having been
recently slain by the son of the accused Alfonso Pajenado, have plainly an axe to grind against the defendants surnamed Pajenado
Mere relationship, however, is not sufficient to discard the testimony of credible witnesses, especially where there is no showing that
these witnesses have testified merely by reason of relationship or alleged interest in the case, other than a desire to see that justice is
done.
It results that the trial court did not err in accepting the prosecution's version as worthy of belief and in concluding that the guilt of the
five accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellants dispute the findings of the trial court that all the accused helped one another in beating the deceased Tapong with
pieces of wood. Conspiracy, however, may be inferred from the appellants' conduct. The five accused emerged between the houses of
Victoria Pajac and Elisoto Gutaba. All of them were armed with pieces of wood. The accused Alfonso Pajenado had with him a flashlight

which he focused on the eyes of Jorge Tapong while they were all beating Tapong. All of them fled after Tapong fell down due to the
blows inflicted upon him. It is evident that they had community of design.
The appellants, likewise, contend that the crime committed by them, if any, is only homicide and not murder in view of the absence of
the qualifying circumstance of either treachery and/or abuse of superior strength. There was treachery because the five accused
suddenly intercepted Tapong while he was on his way to the house of Pelagia. The appellants resorted to a mode of attack which
insured the consummation of the crime without any risk to themselves. The victim was unarmed and he had no time to defend himself
in view of the suddenness of the assault and the fact that he was drunk at the time. Alevosia qualifies the killing as murder. It is not
necessary to resolve whether there was abuse of superior strength because the circumstance, if present, would be absorbed in
treachery. 11
Appellants further contend that the trial court failed to appreciate in their favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong. They claim that the weapons used are mere pieces of wood, and the fact that only seven blows were dealt
the deceased by the five of them, only two of which turned out to be fatal, shows that the tragic and grievous result was far from their
minds. The record shows, however, that the offense committed was characterized by treachery and tile appellants left the scene of the
crime only after the victim had fallen down. Hence, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention cannot be appreciated in favor of
the appellants. 12
The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery. Although, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is merged in treachery, there is, however, present the aggravating circumstance of the offense having been
committed by a band. 13 The penalty to be imposed should therefore be DEATH. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes,
we hereby impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The indemnity should be increased to P12,000.00.
WHEREFORE, modified as thus indicated, the decision under review is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2681

March 30, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DARIO MARGEN, ET AL., defendants.
ANDRES MIDORANDA, appellant.
Tomas Gomez, Jr. for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar convincing appellant of murder and sentencing him to life
imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Diego Testor in the sum of P2,000 and to
pay the costs.
The evidence shows that some time before March 11, 1944, the now deceased Diego Testor was asked by one Ponting in the barrio of
Trinidad, municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar. The detachment was made up of seven or eight men with Dario Margen in
command. Needing food for his children, Testor traded the fish forcamote, and when he was sent for the Sergeant Margen to make him
to the barracks a quantity of another kind of fish, called kalapion. Irritated by Testor's conduct, Sergeant Margen took hold of the fish
and threw them into Testor's face, and then he had Testor's hand tied behind his back and gave him fish blows. Taking their cue from
the sergeant, three of the soldiers namely, Julian Tarrayo, Domingo Ramos (now deceased) and Andres Midoranda also maltreated
Testor's by hitting him in different parts of the body. Thereafter, Sergeant Margen forced Testor to eat up to two of the kalapions. In
this the sergeant forced Testor's mouth, and by Miranda, who had the lose end of the rope with which Testor's hand were tied. After
this ordeal Testor was taken to Calbayog where, despite medical attendance, he died the following day, March 12, 1944. The cadaver
presented various contusions, but autopsy revealed that death was due the intestines by fish bones.
For the death of Diego Testor, Margen, Tarrayo, and Midoranda were prosecuted for murder. But only Midoranda, the herein appellant,
was tried because the other two were able to escape.
There is hardly any doubt as to the essential facts. While appellant would have the court believe that he did not join his companions in
maltreating the deceased, alleging that all he did was stand by the watch, this allegation is believe by the testimony of eye-witness
whose veracity has not been put in doubt. Indeed, appellant's own witness, Eleuterio Anabeso, admitted on cross-examination that
appellant was among those who slapped the deceased in the face. The evidence is, we believe, quite clear that appellant cooperated
with his codefendants in binding and beating up the decease as well as in the no less inhuman act of making him devour raw fish
flesh, scales, spines, and all.
It is not disputed that the crime of murder was committed in this case, it appearing that the acts which resulted in the death of Diego
Testor were performed when the latter, with his hands bound behind his back, was entirely defenseless. But counsel for the defense
argues that, in the absence of proof of conspiracy, appellant should not be held liable for the said crime because he merely obeyed the
orders of his superior.
Obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for some lawful purpose (art.
11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code). Sergeant Margen's order to have the deceased tortured was not that did not give the sergeant the
right to take the law in his own hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and appellant
was not bound to obey it. Moreover, it does not appear that in taking part in the maltreatment of the decease, appellant was prompted
solely by his sense of duty toward his superior. What appeared is that he and his companions had a common grievance against the
deceased, because the latter had misappropriated a quantity of fish intended for their consumption. It was, therefore, but natural that
they should all want to teach the deceased a lesson by making him suffer for the fault he had committed.
Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts which resulted in the death of the deceased and nothing having been proved which would
exempt him from criminal liability, appellant must be held as coprincipal of the crime of murder changed in the information. We do not

find in circumstances attending the commission of the crime anything that should aggravate or mitigating criminal liability, and as the
penalty imposed below is in accordance with law, the sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-4445

February 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of
April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese
occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December
18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the
15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military
Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them
"to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9).
He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which
included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and
gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to
La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody
and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of
authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and
Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen,
Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors,
Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared
and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters,
15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him
instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review.
Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

16 April 1945

Msg. No. 337

Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and
Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last confession to the
prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the
execution, Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following message:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

22 April 1945

Msg. No. 398

Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding
same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your
trial was absolutely impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent way of
handling the whole case.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel,
Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as
executioner, Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First
Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late
President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under
the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty
Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their application for amnesty with

the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely
personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty
Commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged
from the information so that he might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against
defendants Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members
of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting
defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation
in the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and
co-principals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that
while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits
thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the
deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done
pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its
jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them
guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted
(Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of
superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity
against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann,
overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which
the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:

"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE
THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR
ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA
CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was
relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of
Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a).
Obviously, if the Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can
not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the
radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what
papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken),
who claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of
Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's
shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before
Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the
affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio
Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should
be tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet
learned of the decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being
ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but
instead told me that I should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia,
and Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise
Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that
having learned of the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the
latter's family, considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution
witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal
in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the
accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.

Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior
orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20),
half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt.
Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way
of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to
Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no
need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of
personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of
the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives"
(People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that
these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command;
the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial
lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in
Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose
suggestions on procedure were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were
sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later with the
statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent
to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts,
(causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that
"the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9;
Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers
that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any
fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs.
Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March
1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by
such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non
facit reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
(U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their
claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal
took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of
liberation of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original accused Jesus
Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge
Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who
subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the Department of the Interior, dated August 12,
1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly
contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946)
that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the
accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-28129

October 31, 1969

ELIAS VALCORZA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Nemesio G. Beltran for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for
respondent.
DIZON, J.:
Elias Valcorza was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon where, after trial, he was found guilty thereof, with
the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as the one committed and voluntary surrender, and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, nor more
than eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of Roberto Pimentel in the amount of 6,000, but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals where, on August 16, 1967,
judgment was rendered modifying the decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment is modified as to the prison term and appellant Elias Valcorza is declared guilty of homicide with
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation and, accordingly, he is sentenced to serve
an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessories of the law; to pay the heirs of the deceased,
Roberto Pimentel, in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), together with the costs.
In all other respects, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

From the above decision the present appeal by certiorari was taken, it being petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals committed the
following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ALTHOUGH IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY AS PEACE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SHOOTING THE DECEASED BECAUSE THERE WAS
NO DANGER TO HIS LIFE OR LIMB, A RULING WHICH IS BEYOND THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND CONTRARY TO THE RULING LAID BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN PEOPLE VERSUS
DELIMA, 46 PHIL. 738;
II
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN LIKING PETITIONER TO A TRIGGER-HAPPY
POLICEMAN AND IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEASED HAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A DANGEROUS PERSON, A RULING WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO ITS FINDING OF FACTS;
III
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BASED ON
THE FACTS IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The facts found by the Court of Appeals which must be deemed conclusive for the purpose of this appeal are as follows:
The deceased, Roberto Pimentel, was confined an June 4, 1960 in the municipal jail of Maramag, Bukidnon, as a detention
prisoner to answer a charge of stealing a chicken. At about 1:00 p.m. when appellant was the police guard on duty, Roberto
Pimentel escaped. The following day a police patrol team composed of Police Sgt. Federico Daiton and Patrolmen Melquiades
Caas, Pablo Lubido and the appellant himself went to a place called Poultry Area in barrio Cuya, Maramag, Bukidnon, where
the accused had been reported to be hiding, for the purpose of bringing him back to jail. Their efforts to locate and apprehend
Roberto Pimentel having been fruitless, they decided to pass the night in the house of one Gavino Tirayosa intending to return
to town the following morning.
At about five o'clock in the morning of the next day, June 6, 1960, Sgt. Daiton went down from the house of Gavino Tirayosa
to answer a call of nature. He went to a nearby bridge and squatted thereon to defecate. While he was in that position, he
saw a person approaching slowly and he ordered him to halt. The latter instead of doing so, jumped down into the creek
spanned by the bridge. He yelled for his companions, saying that the person who jumped into the creek could be their quarry.
Patrolmen Caas, Lubido and the appellant rushed out of the house of Gavino Tirayosa, Caas and appellant going to the
place at the creek where the person had jumped down.
Sgt. Daiton stationed himself near the bridge and Patrolman Lubido went to the other side of the creek. Appellant and Caas
followed the course of the creek and after covering a distance of 100 meters they came across footprints which they
examined separately. While they were doing so, Roberto Pimentel emerged suddenly from the bushes and lunged at the
appellant, hitting him with a stone at the right cheek and causing him to fall to the ground. When appellant Valcorza was on
the ground, Roberto Pimentel again struck him with a stone on the right arm. Fearing that Pimentel might grab his service
revolver, appellant Valcorza summoned Patrolman Caas who dashed towards the place but Pimentel ran away. Appellant
Valcorza regained his composure and immediately chased the deceased, firing a shot into the air and ordering him to stop. As
the deceased did not heed his order, appellant fired four times into the air, at the same time pursuing the prisoner for a
distance of about 100 meters. At that point, fearing that the patrol team might fail in apprehending the deceased, appellant
Valcorza fired a fifth shot at Pimentel as the latter was in an act of again jumping down into another part of the creek and
when the distance between the two was only three meters. Patrolman Ca__as could not be of much help in the chase
because his revolver got entangled with some vines and he dropped it. After recovering his revolver he joined Valcorza but
Pimentel had already jumped down into the water of the creek.
The members of the patrol team went down into the water to locate Pimentel and they saw him floating, with a wound on his
back. As Pimentel was still alive, he was placed in the police jeep and taken to the poblacion of Maramag for treatment, but
he died a few minutes after arrival in the municipal building.
The physician who examined the cadaver of the victim gave the opinion that the missile from the gun fired against the victim
entered at the right side of the back but the slug was lodged inside the body. The gray discoloration at the edge or rim of the
wound of entry showed the presence of powder burns which, in the opinion of the physician, indicates that the gun was fired
at close range.
Elias Valcorza surrendered himself and his firearm to the Chief of Police upon arrival in the municipal building of Maramag.
Appellant seeks to justify his firing the shot against the deceased by stating that he tried to hit him only at the leg, after he
had disregarded his several warning shots and orders to stop running away. He claims that he did so at the spur of the
moment probably because he feared that his patrol team might not succeed in apprehending the deceased and bringing him
back to jail. Furthermore, he also claims that he only fired at the deceased when the latter was in the act of jumping down
into the creek which had water of 8 feet deep, and if the deceased succeeded in crossing the creek the patrol team might not

be able to apprehend him. In brief the appellant conveys idea that he had to fire at the deceased in order that he may not
continue escaping.
The above version of the appellant was given in open court when he testified on October 4, 1962 (t.s.n. pp. 9, 76).
However, he claims that he aimed only at the leg of the deceased is not consistent with what he said in his sworn statement,
Exhibit A. 'Question and Answer No. 7' (p. 1, Criminal Case Record), given to the Constabulary soldiers on the afternoon of
the day of the incident, or at 3:15 p.m. of June 6, 1960. In narrating how the deceased was shot, appellant Valcorza stated in
part as follows:
"But said Roberto Pimentel tried his very best to make another escape then he ran away cause I was fell down on the
ground during the time I wrestled him, Roberto Pimentel. Then I still follow him and fire my revolver four (4) times
up in the sky to stop him but still he continue running, so what I did I fired him one direct hit shot on his back then
he tried dive escape into the water, and because he could not do anything cause he was already suffering from a
gunshot wound we pick him up and bring him to our headquarters in the Office of the Chief of Police of Maramag,
Bukidnon, for the necessary treatment of the gunshot wound on his right side back ... ."
What the appellant said on June 6, 1960 in his statement, Exhibit A, which he subscribed and sworn to before the Justice of
the Peace of Maramag, Bukidnon, on June 7, 1960, is an unadulterated narration of what happened on the day of the incident
more than two years before he took the witness stand. This first narration is more reliable because it was made when there
was yet no time for reflection so as to make his story fit into the facts of the incident. After the lapse of two years during
which he could deliberate and analyze the occurrence and prepare his defense, his testimony in court no longer jibed with
what he said shortly after the event. This inconsistency affects his credibility and wrecks his theory that he had no intention to
kill the deceased but only meant to disable him from further escaping. It also seriously impairs his defense as it shows that
there was no reasonable necessity for appellant to shoot the deceased at the time he was running away with no weapon in his
hands which he could use for aggression against the appellant in case he desired to turn back and face the latter. (pp. 3-7,
Annex "A", Petitioner's brief.)
There is no question, therefore, that: on June 4, 1960, the deceased Roberto Pimentel was a detention prisoner confined in the
municipal jail of Maramag, Bukidnon, from which he escaped at about one o'clock p.m. that day when petitioner was on guard duty;
the following day four members of the police force of the municipality, petitioner included, went after him to a place called Poultry Area
in barrio Cuya, their first efforts to locate him there being unsuccessful; early the following morning, while Sgt. Daiton, who led the
patrol, was squatting on a bridge to answer a call of nature, he saw a man approaching slowly and he ordered him to stop; the latter,
who happened to be the escaped detainee, instead of doing so, jumped into the creek spanned by the bridge, whereupon Sgt. Daiton
summoned his three companions who all rushed out of the house where they had spent the night, and went after the escaping
prisoner; petitioner and policeman Ca__as, while following the course of the creek and examining certain footprints they had found,
saw their quarry suddenly emerging from nearby bushes; the latter lunged at petitioner hitting him with a stone on the right cheek, as
a consequence of which he fell down, and while in that position on the ground he was struck again with a stone by the escaping
detainee; thereafter the latter ran away pursued by petitioner and his companion; in the course of the pursuit the former fired a
warning shot into the air, and as the escaping detainee paid no heed to this, petitioner fired into the air four times more and kept on
pursuing him; as the latter was apparently widening the distance between them, and fearing that he might finally be able to elude
arrest, petitioner fired directly at him while he was in the act of jumping again into another part of the creek, the shot having hit him
on the back; as a result of the wound thus inflicted upon him, Pimentel died a few minutes after arrival at the municipal building to
which he was taken.
While We have not lost sight of the fact that the deceased Pimentel was charged with a relatively minor offense, namely, stealing a
chicken; and while We do not in any way wish to encourage law enforcing officers to be trigger-happy nor to employ force and violence
upon persons under their custody, We cannot, in the consideration of this case, disregard the following facts: the said deceased, in
violation of the law, had escaped from detention; when ordered to stop by Sgt. Daiton whom he must have recognized as a peace
officer in his pursuit he ran away and then threw himself into a creek to elude his pursuer; after sometime he suddenly emerged
from bushes near which petitioner and a fellow policeman were and assaulted the former twice with a stone and then ran away again
pursued by petitioner and his companion; that petitioner does not appear to be a trigger-happy policeman as shown by the fact that
he had fired five cautionary shots into the air and decided to aim directly at the escaping detainee only when he had already reasons
to fear that the latter would be able to elude him and his companions. These facts and circumstances constrain Us to hold that the act
thus performed by petitioner and which unfortunately resulted in the death of the escaping detainee was committed in the
performance of his official duty and was more or less necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully eluding the officers
of the law. To hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of demoralizing police officers discharging official functions identical or
similar to those in the performance of which petitioner was engaged at the time he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that
thereafter We would have half-hearted and dispirited efforts on their part to comply with such official duty. This of course, would be to
the great detriment of public interest.
CONSEQUENTLY, in the spirit of our decision in People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and, as
a consequence, petitioner is acquitted, with costs de officio.

G.R. No. L-12462

December 20, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMEON GUENDIA, defendant-appellant.

Gurrea and Villalobos for appellant.

Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This case is brought to this court by appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo convicting the
defendant upon the charge of frustrated murder.
There is no doubt that an assault with intent to kill was committed by the defendant at the time and place mentioned in the record
upon the person of his querida; but the proof shows, in our opinion, that the defendant was crazy at the time and has remained so
since. He has now been committed by order of the Governor-General to the San Lazaro Hospital for confinement and treatment. The
trial judge says, "I really believe that this man is crazy; or appeared so, at least, during his trial in this court;" and the action of the
trial judge in passing sentence upon the defendant must have been in part due to a desire to keep a dangerous insane person in
confinement until proper disposition might be made of him. It is clear from the evidence submitted at the trial that the defendant was
insane at the time of the perpetration of the act, and he therefore exempt from criminal liability under subsection 1 of article 8 of the
Penal Code. It results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the defendant acquitted.
It has been suggested in this case that inasmuch as it appears from the evidence that the accused was insane at the time of the trial
in the court below it was improper for the court to proceed to hear the case and furthermore that it is now improper for this court to
reverse judgment and acquit the accused of the offense with which he is charged. This court by no means concurs in this suggestion.
Undoubtedly the rule is well established that no person afflicted with imbecility or insanity in such a degree as to disable him from
making his defense should ever be put upon his trial for an alleged crime or made to suffer the judgment of the law.
In Blackstone's Commentaries we find the following Passage:
Also if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not
to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that ought; and if after he has
pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence? If, after he be tried; and found
guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of non-sane
memory, execution shall be stayed; for peradventure says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound
memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.
There were good reasons for this tenderness or "humanity" of the English law, as the reader will appreciate when reminded of the fact
that until modern times no prisoner arraigned before the bar of an English court was ever permitted to have counsel to assist him in
his defense; that until within the memory of living man no accused person was ever permitted to give testimony in his own behalf; and
finally that it was only in our own day that a person convicted of a crime in an English court has been allowed an appeal for a review of
the facts.
When Blackstone here speaks of madness he refers to a general perversion and obliteration of the mental powers much more
pronounced than that which is considered sufficient to exempt from criminal responsibility. This is apparent from the fact that the
courts have always treated a person as sane for the purposes of being tried if he has sufficient powers to comprehend the nature of
the proceedings in which he is involved and to conduct his defense.
In the State of New York, as appears from the case of Freeman vs. People (4 Denio, 9; 47 Am. Dec., 216), there was in force in 1847 a
statute expressly declaring that no insane person could be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime. In discussing this provision, the
court said:
In its terms the provision is broad enough to reach every possible state of insanity, so that, if the words are to be taken
literally, no person while laboring under insanity in any form, however partial and limited it may be, can be put upon trial. But
this the legislature could not have intended; for although a person totally bereft of reason can not be fit subject for trial or
punishment, it by no means follows that one whose insanity is limited to some particular object or conceit, his mind in other
respects being free from disease, can justly claim the like exemption. This clause of the statute should receive a reasonable
interpretation, avoiding on the one hand what would tend to give impunity to crime, and on the other seeking to attain the
humane object of the legislature in its enactment. The common law, equally with this statute, forbids the trial of any person in
a state of insanity. This is clearly shown by authorities which have been referred to, and which also show the reason for the
rule, to wit, the incapacity of one who is insane to make a rational defense. The statute is in affirmance of this common law
principle, and the reason on which the rule rests furnishes a key to what must have been the intention of the legislature. If,
therefore, a person arraigned for a crime, is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on
against him; if he rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defense in a
rational manner, he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane, although on some other subjects his mind may be
deranged or unsound. This, as it seems to me, is the true meaning of the statute; and such is the construction put by the
English courts, on a similar clause in an act of parliament.
For the purpose of securing these unfortunate persons from the danger of being improperly arraigned and tried, statutes have been
enacted in many jurisdiction requiring the court, where the issue of present insanity is raised, or where the present insanity of the
accused is otherwise brought to the attention of the court, to submit to the jury a preliminary issue to determine whether the accused
is so far insane as to require a suspension of the proceedings; and even in States where no such statute has been enacted it is
recognized that the issue of present insanity ought properly to be tried, either by the court itself or by the jury, as a separate
issue. lawphi1.net

It is, however, entirely clear that, in a jurisdiction like this, where there is no controlling statute, the trial court has a discretion as to
whether a preliminary investigation into the prisoner's sanity shall be made. In Jones vs. State (13 Ala., 153), it was said:
But in the case before us the judge did not see proper to test the prisoner's sanity by any preliminary inquiry to ascertain
whether he was capable of pleading to the indictment he did plead, and a trial and conviction was the result, although we
are of opinion that the facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions might well have warranted the preliminary inquiry as to the
prisoner's mental condition, yet this must be left to the sound discretion of the court below.
In State vs. Peacock (50 N. J. L., 34), it was held that it rests in the sound discretion of the court whether a preliminary examination
shall be had to ascertain the mental condition of the prisoner at the time of trial, and that where no exception is taken at the trial to
the failure of the court to order such examination, it is not available upon appeal. Said the court:
The method of settling this preliminary question, where it is not subject of statutory regulation is within the discretion of the
trial court. The court can itself enter upon the inquiry, we submit the question to another jury empaneled for that purpose.
Whether the action of the court is the subject of exception it is not now necessary to decide, for in the present case no
objection was made to the action of the court in respect to a suspension of the proceedings, nor was there any request made
by the counsel who defended him that such an inquiry should be instituted. There was nothing proved that displayed such a
condition of mental derangement that the court, of its own motion, was called upon to direct a further inquiry into the matter.
No court would be bound to stop or justified in arresting the progress of a trial by a mere suggestion of, but in the absence of
any substantial evidence of the existence of a degree of mental disorder which would unfit the defendant from conducting his
cause or instructing his counsel.
In Webber vs. Commonwealth (119 Pa. St. Rep., 223; 4 Am. St. Rep., 634), it was likewise held that the making of a preliminary
inquiry into the sanity of the prisoner before the trial upon the criminal charge is begun is discretionary with the court. It was there
said:
The existence of the doubt as the prisoner's present insanity is a matter which, by the very necessity of the case, could only
be determined by the court itself. Up to the time of pleading there is no other tribunal which has the prisoner in charge, and
there is no other which can say whether there is a doubt upon that subject. It is one of the functions which must be intrusted
to the court, and it is not to be presumed that it will in any case be abused.
Where the court examines into the mental condition of the accused and discovers that he is laboring under a condition of insanity such
that he ought not to be brought to trial, it is of course the duty of the court to hold the criminal proceedings in abeyance and commit
him to an asylum or hospital for the insane, as the case may require. If, on the other hand, no preliminary investigation into the
mental condition of the accused is considered necessary by the trial court, and the accused is brought to trial on the complaint, the
question whether he was mentally responsible at the time of the commission of the alleged offense is an open one and if it be found
that he was insane when the alleged crime was committed, he will be acquitted. We have found no reported decision in which it has
been held or even suggested that an accused person should not be acquitted when it appears at the trial that by reason of lunacy or
imbecility he was exempt from criminal responsibility. And the circumstance that he may still be an imbecile or lunatic at the time of
the trial does not by any means destroy the power of the court to declare him not guilty. In Queen vs. Berry (1 Q. B. Div., 447, 451), it
was said by Baron Kelly:
I believe it to have been the law from the earliest times, that if it is found at the trial of a prisoner that he cannot understand
the proceedings, the judge ought to discharge the jury and put an end to the trial, or order a verdict of not guilty.
It is very general practice in England and the United States, where a person acquitted on the ground of insanity, for the court to order
his detention in a lunatic asylum. (People vs. Chandler, 196 N. Y. 525; 25 L. R. A. [N. S.], 946; Caffey vs. State, 78 Miss., 645;
Peabody vs. Baker, 59 Misc. [N. Y.], 359; People vs. Lamb, 118 N. Y. Supp., 389; Ex parte Brown, 1 L. R. A. [N. S.], 540.) Indeed there
is a presumption that a person once shown to have been afflicted with insanity or lunacy of a permanent character has remained so,
and this presumption prevails, even in the absence of a special finding of the court, until the contrary is shown. (State ex rel.
Thompson vs. Snell, 46 Wash., 327; 9 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1191; 89 Pac., 931; In re Thomas Brown, 39 Wash., 160; 2 Ann. Cas., 492.)
This idea is at the basis of numerous decision holding that the statutes providing for the confinement of such persons, without further
trial of the issue of insanity, are valid. itc-a1f
In Rex vs. Little, Russ and R. C. C. 430, the defendant was found to have been insane at the time of the commission of the offense,
and also at the time of the trial, and was acquitted on account of such insanity. The trial judge ordered him to be kept in strict custody
in jail till His Majesty's pleasure should be known.
In U. S. vs. Lawrence (4 Cranch, C. C., 518; Fed. Cas. No. 15,577) it was proved that the defendant had not shot at the President of
the United States under the insane delusion that he himself was King of England and of the United States as an appendage to England,
and that the President stood in his way in the enjoyment of his right, and that the shooting was done under such delusion. The jury
found him not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court remanded him, being of opinion that it would be extremely dangerous to
permit him to be at large while under such delusion.
The conclusion to which we arrive is that when a judge of first instance is informed or discovers that an accused person is apparently
in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of
any such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of his counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the
proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. If, however, such investigation is
considered unnecessary, and the trial proceeds, the court will acquit the accused if he be found exempt from criminal responsibility by
reason of imbecility or lunacy. In such case an order for his commitment to an asylum should be made pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code. In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an
accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair

trial, with the assistance which the law secures or give; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours where every
accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate
but himself.
Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted, with costs of both instances de officio. But the defendant shall be kept in confinement in
the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to
depart therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 125334. January 28, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRESENCIO TABUGOCA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the joint decision [1] rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 finding accused appellant Cresensio Tabugoca guilty of two counts of rape committed against his very own
daughters and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the first case and death penalty in the second.
In two informations simultaneously filed on January 20, 1995 in the aforesaid trial court, accused-appellant was accused of raping
his daughters in two separate incidents. The information in Criminal Case No. 2386 charges him as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of March, 1992 in the municipality of Naguilian, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused , did then and there willfully , unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own daughter JACQUELINE A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 14 years old
(sic), against latters will and consent.[2]
The information in the Criminal Case No. 2387 alleges:
That on or about the 9th day of December, 1994, in the municipality of Naguilian, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own daughter JINKY A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 12 years old (sic),
against the latters will and consent.[3]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when duly arraigned separately on the two indictments with the assistance of counsel de
oficio.[4] After a consolidated trial on the merits, on March 15, 1996 the court a quo rendered the decision now under mandatory
review.[5] The commission of the two felonies was found by the lower court to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of
relationship and intoxication purposely sought by accused-appellant to embolden him to commit the same.
In Criminal Case No. 2386, accusedappellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and directed to
indemnify Jacquiline Tabugoca in the sum of P50,000.00. In Criminal case No. 2387, wherein the crime charged was committed after
the effectivity Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, [6] he was condemned to suffer the capital punishment of death and
ordered to indemnify Jinky Tabugoca in sum of P50,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the conclusion that, beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant had committed the crimes charged on
the bases of the testimonies of the victims, as corroborated by the medical reports, and the testimony of the physician who examined
them.
The respective complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 2386 and 2387, namely, Jacqueline Tabugoca and Jinky Tabucoga, are the
daughters of the accused-appellant.[7] This was not denied by him. He even expressly declared during his testimony that
Jacqueline[8] and Jinky[9] are his daughters.
Complainant Jacqueline testified that she and her three younger sisters, Janet, Jinky and Jewel, lived under the sole care of their
father after their mother died on August 28, 1991. While she and her sisters were sleeping in their house at Barangay Roxas,
Naguilian, Isabela at around 10 oclock in the evening of March 28, 1992, she was roused by her father who asked her to scratch his
back. It turned out, however, that accused-appellant had other intentions that night aside from relief from his itchy discomfort.
While Jacqueline was thus scratching her fathers back, he told her to stay and wait for a while. Without any intimation, accusedappellant then removed her shorts and underwear and made her lie down beside him. Jacqueline could only cry at this point. As soon
as she was completely disrobed, accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. With his manhood inside his daughter, accusedappellant warned her not to tell anyone of his dastardly act if she would not want to be harmed ( makaala ha kaniak). Complainant was
so petrified with fear that she did not even dare ask her father why he was sexually molesting her.[10]
Jacqueline was twelve years old and three months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on December 27, 1979.
[11]

Because of the incident, Jacqueline harbored ill-feelings against her father, and she reportedly became the object of gossip by her
classmates in school.[12] However, she did not tell anyone about her ordeal at the hands of her own father until she learned that the
same misfortune had befallen her sister, Jinky.

In criminal Case No. 2387, complainant Jinky declared in the court below that her father tried to rape her in the early morning of
December 9, 1994. While she was cleaning some articles in their house, accused-appellant approached her and then took of his
clothes. He then ordered Jinky to lie down and he removed her shorts and panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina.
Jinky cried and complained to her father that she was in pain. Accused-appellant explained that it is ordinary to feel pain because it
was her first time to experience coitus.
After a while, he did not persist anymore in his sexual pursuit. Appellant lay down beside Jinky and told her that they will
continue the following day. At dawn of December 10, 1994, accused-appellant made another attempt to carnally molest Jinky. This
time, however, Jinky resisted, thereby causing appellant to just lie down and leave her alone. [13]
Jinky was only 12 years and nine months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on March 5, 1982.

[14]

Later, on the same day, while Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their grandmothers house nearby, Jinky confided
to her grandmother about the sexual abuses of her father against her. Upon hearing the revelation of her sister, Jacqueline also
disclosed to her grandmother her own experience with her father two years before. [15]
The victims grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, forthwith brought her granddaughters to the police authorities and then to the
Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian for physical examination. The two were examined on December 12, 1994 by Dr. Maryann M.
Fontanares.[16]
For Criminal Case No. 2386, with respect to Jacqueline, the doctor reduced her findings into a medico-legal certificate [17] attesting
as follows:
LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. PE findings: essentially normal except for the anxiety that the victim exhibited
2. Internal Examination: multiple healed lacerations/scars at 3, 5, 6 and 9 oclock position of the hymen.
: introitus admits two fingers with ease * * * no other findings noted * * *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Impression: The above findings suggest that the victim was forcibly abused and the incident, the first one happened long ago based on
the healed scars of the hymen.
For Criminal Case No. 2387, regarding Jinky, the medico-legal certificate [18] of the doctor states:
LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. The vulva is edematous although the hymen is intact.
* * * no other findings noted * * *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The above findings suggest that full penetration was not successful although attempts were done based on the swelling vulva of the
victim.
During her testimony in court, Dr. Fontanares explained that the lacerations found on Jacquelines hymen were the result of
sexual intercourse which happened approximately on the date alleged. She added that, aside from the swelling of Jinkys labia, she
found out that they were tender and reddish.[19]
After the examination, Jacqueline executed a criminal complaint [20] for rape against accused-appellant, while Jinky charged
accused-appellant with frustrated rape in her own criminal complaint. [21]
At the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of his having been completely unaware of what transpired on March 28, 1992
and on December 9, 1994 as he was very drunk on those occasions.
According to him, he does not know if he had sexually assaulted his daughter, Jacqueline. He only came to know of the complaint
of Jacqueline against him after the policemen who arrested him on December 10, 1994 told him thereof. On the same day, Jacqueline
allegedly informed him that he was drunk on March 28, 1992, but he claimed that he could not recall if indeed he drank liquor that
day. He then surmised that perhaps he did drink liquor based only on the supposed statement of Jacqueline. [22]
With regard to the complaint of Jinky, accused-appellant similarly declared in the lower court that he drank liquor in their house
on December 9, 1994. Again, he claimed that he could not recollect the ensuing events after he had finished drinking. He was
allegedly merely informed by the arresting policemen on December 10, 1994 that Jinky was accusing him of attempted rape.
Jacqueline, on cross-examination, stated that her father smelled of liquor and may have taken some drinks at the time of the
incident.[23] On the part of Jinky, she testified in turn that her father was drunk on the night of December 9, 1994. [24]

Accused-appellant claimed that he learned to drink liquor after his wife died on August 28, 1991. Prior to his wifes death, he was
not used to drinking alcoholic beverages. He later resorted to alcohol whenever he would remember his deceased wife, but the
allegedly drank only once in a while.
Accusedappellant also opined that Jacqueline and Jinky must have filed their respective complaints in order to get back at him
for castigating or whipping them whenever they committed mistakes.
In view of the gravity of the crimes charged and of the penalty imposable therefor, we patiently considered and thoroughly
deliberated on all the arguments and defenses presented by defendant-appellant not only in his brief but even in his memorandum
before the trial court, with all the possible implications and possibilities thereof, no matter how specious and ridiculous some of them
may appear to be. We have likewise taken into account the socio-economic status and the apparent intellectual level of accusedappellant as may be gleaned from the record.
After much thought and reflection, we find no reason to depart from the judgment of the court a quo.
On its own, the defense presented by accused-appellant before the lower court is pitifully and completely unavailing. In law and
in truth, he neither denied the charges against him nor raised any absolutory cause in his defense. His feeble excuse of having been
under the influence of liquor in order to disclaim knowledge of his felonious acts does not inspire belief at all. The defense did not even
comply with the evidentiary elements whereby he could claim intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. The categorical and
untraversed testimonies of his daughters as to how committed the bestial outrage, and their identification of accused-appellant as their
defiler, remain uncontroverted and fully establish the charges.
Accused-appellants pretext that he could not remember the events of March 28, 1992 and December 9, 1994 is rendered more
effete in light of the arguments in his memorandum [25]submitted before the lower court, There, he claimed exemption from criminal
liability on the ground of insanity brought about by intoxication, invoking therefor some dicta in American jurisprudence.
We have held that the law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstances of insanity has necessarily the consequent burden of proving it. [26] Further, in order that insanity may be taken as an
exempting circumstance, there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted
without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability.[27]
Accused-appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The defense did not present any expert witness, any
psychiatric evaluation report, or any psychological findings or evidence regarding his mental condition at the time of the commission of
the offenses. Accused-appellants charade of amnesia is evidently a desperate gambit for exculpation. Yet, amnesia, in and of itself, is
no defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his
action and that it was wrong. Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime was
performed.[28]
Also in the same memorandum, accused-appellant posits that he cannot be prosecuted for rape in Criminal Case No. 2386
because the criminal complaint of Jinky only accuses him of frustrated rape. With such a charge, he argues that the trial courts
jurisdiction to punish him is limited only to said offense and cannot cover consummated rape.
This is a meritless argument. When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the offended party in case of rape is jurisdictional,
what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceedings, but it is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction
on the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. [29] Since the penalty for the rape in Criminal
Case No. 21387 is properly within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court, [30] then Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan,
Isabela may hear and try the offense charged in the information and impose the punishment for it.
In People vs. Bangalao, et al.,[31] we convicted an accused of rape committed against a minor as charged in the
information, despite the allegation in the complaint that the rape was committed through force and intimidation, on this ratiocination:
It must be borne in mind that complaints are prepared in municipalities, in most cases without the advice or help of competent
counsel. When the case reaches the Court the First Instance, the Fiscal usually conducts another investigation, and thereafter files the
information which the results thereof justify. The right and power of the court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon
the filing of the complaint, and a change in the allegations thereof as (to) the manner of committing the crime should not operate to
divest the court of jurisdiction already acquired.
In his brief,[32] accused-appellant contends that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. In
support of this lone assignment of error, he seeks to capitalize, among others, on the failure of Jacqueline to immediately report the
crime. Such failure, appellant contends, renders doubtful the truth of her accusation.
The failure of complainant Jacqueline to immediately report the incident to the authorities does not necessarily cast doubt on the
credibility of the charge in Criminal Case No. 2386. It is a settled decisional rule that delay in reporting a rape case committed by a
father against his daughter due to threats is justified. [33] In the numerous cases of rape that have reached this Court, we find that it is
not uncommon for young girls to conceal, for some time, the assaults on their honor because of the rapists threat on their lives. [34]
In many instances, rape victims simply suffer in silence. With more reason would a girl ravished by her own father keep quiet
about what befell her. Furthermore, it is unfair to judge the action of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms
of behavior expected of mature individuals under the same circumstances. [35]
In People vs. Melivo,[36] we declared that:

x x x. Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim. A rape victims
actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator
hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and
protection to the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the
sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.
This Court further trechantly observed in the same decision that:
In all of these and other cases of incestuous rape, the perpetrator takes full advantage of his blood relationship, ascendancy and
influence over the victim, both to commit the sexual assault and to intimidate the victims into silence. Unfortunately for some
perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims mange to break out from the cycle of fear and terror. In People vs. Molero we
emphasized that an intimidated person cowed into submitting to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows
older and finally state that enough, the depraved malefactor must be punished.
We cannot therefore expect young Jacqueline to disregard the threat to her life and immediately cry rape in the face of the
threats of her father and his constant presence in their home.
Accused-appellant next asserts in his briefs that Jacqueline filed her complaint in Criminal Case No. 2386 only out of sympathy
with, and by way of revenge for what her father had done to, her younger sister. We find it opportune to discuss, together with his
contention, the lame excuse of the defense before the trial court that Jacqueline and Jinky filed their complaints because they suffered
beatings from accused-appellant. We find that the motive imputed to the sisters are grossly implausible and insufficient to make them
falsely charge their own father. It is highly inconceivable that they would claims having been raped just because their father spanks
them whenever they commit mistakes.
Mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would only bring
shame and humiliation upon them and their own family and make them the object of gossip among their classmates and friends. It is
unbelievable that Jacqueline would fabricate a serious criminal charge just to get even with her father and to emphasize with her
sister. The sisters would not contrive stories of defloration and charge their own father with rape unless these stories are true. For
that matter, no young Filipina of decent repute would falsely and publicly admit that she had been ravished and abused considering the
social stigma thereof.[37]
At their tender age, Jacqueline and Jinky needed sustenance and support from their father. They certainly were aware that they
would be deprived of a provider once their accusations against him are proven. In fact, the consequences of filing a case of rape are
so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts about filing charges against her assailant. It requires much more for a
thirteen-year old or a twelve-year old provincial lass to devise a story of rape, have her private parts examined, subject herself to the
indignity of public trial and endure a lifetime of redicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would at least put her own father for the rest of remaining life in
jail and drag herself and the rest of her family into a lifetime of shame. [38]
Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motives on the part of the victims would not destroy the credibility reposed upon them by the
trial court because, as we have held, a rape victims testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having
raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.[39] Furthermore, the testimony of the victim who was only twelve years old at
the time of the rape as to the circumstances thereof must be given weight, for it is an accepted rule that testimonies of rape victims
who are young and of tender age are credible. [40]
Accused-appellant also faults the trial court for not duly appreciating the testimony of Jinky to the effect that he only attempted
to rape her and then desisted after she felt some pain. In relation to this, appellant maintains that there was no rape in Criminal Case
No. 2387 because of the absence of laceration on Jinkys vagina as found after medicolegal examination.
It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the female genital organ is not
required. It is enough that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ within labia of the pudendum of the female
organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of hymen, suffices to warrant
conviction for rape. The rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for
rape. Thus, a finding that the victims hymen is intact and has no sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape was
committed.[41]
Jinky, being young and unschooled in the ways of the law, may have entertained the notion that complete penile penetration is
necessary when she declared that her father only attempted to rape her. She was, of course, not in any position at legally distinguish
consummated from attempted rape. This matter concerns a conclusion of law addressed to the judgment of the court. The
declaration of Jinky that her father inserted his penis into her vagina and the finding of swelling on her labia are enough to prove that
rape was committed as these are telltale signs of entry into the vaginal lips.
Accused-appellant contends in his memorandum that the prosecution failed to prove the employment of force and intimidation
against complainants in both criminal cases. Corollary to his reliance on the absence of force or intimidation, he asseverates in his
brief that the absence of resistance from Jinky suffices to hold that the sexual intercourse was voluntary. The defense then begs for
this Courts liberality in considering that Jinky was moved to engage in copulation by a spirit of adventurousness.
There is no doubt that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his two daughters. The fact of sexual intercourse was indubitably
shown by the testimony of Dr. Fontanares, and even by the alternative submission of appellant that his sexual intercourse with Jinky
was consensual. Clinging to his vain hope for acquittal, he then claims that the element of force or intimidation essential in rape is
lacking in the cases filed against him.

In direct refutation of appellants theory, we once again declare that in incestuous rape, it is not necessary that actual force and
intimidation be employed. It is sufficient that the accused exercised a pervasive influence and control over the victim. [42] Even if there
was no violence employed in sexual congress, the moral influence of appellant over the complainant suffices to constitute it into the
crime of rape.[43]
In People vs. Mabunga,[44] where we convicted the accused for raping his thirteen-year old daughter, we held that:
x x x Hence, even assuming that force or intimidation had not been actually employed, the crime of rape was nevertheless
committed. The absence of violence or offer of resistence would not be significant because of the overpowering and overbearing moral
influence of the father over the daughter which takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by
an accused having no blood relationship within the victim.
The rationale for such a ruling can be found in our discourse in People vs. Matrimonio [45] to effect that:
In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for
violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the fathers parental authority, which the Constitution
and law recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the from the childrens duty to obey and observe reverence and respect
toward their parents. Such reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the
minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby forcing her
to do whatever he wants.
Thus two forms of intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code were recognized in Matrimonio, that is (1) threats and
(2) overpowering moral influence. Accused-appellant exercised such moral influence over herein complaints. Being the victims father,
accused-appellant had that moral ascendancy and influence over his daughters which, in itself was sufficient to intimidate and force
them to submit to his desires.[46] The fact that no resistance was offered by Jinky did not any way qualify the coitus as freely consented
to by her. Judging accused-appellants threats and intimidation in the context of Jinkys understanding at the time of the rape, it can
readily be concluded that her will to resist was overcome by her fathers strong parental authority.
As we held in the aforecited case of Mabunga, in rape the manner, form and tenacity of resistance of the victim therein are
dependent on a number of factors, among which are the age and size of the victim, as well as of the aggressor himself; the degree of
actual force and intimidation employed; and., of utmost importance, the relationship between the rapist and his prey. Complementary
thereto, we ruled in People vs. Navarrete[47] that
It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and daughter, the degree of force or intimidation need not
be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties involved have no relationship at all with each other; because the father
exercises strong moral and physical control over his daughter.
Parenthetically, we digress to observe that for rape to exist it is not necessary that the intimidation employed be so great or of
such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the
accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the
incident. Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off her
attacker.[48]
With the previous beatings Jinky received from accused-appellant, resistance could not have been expected from her. She dared
not risk another whipping from her father should she defy his advances. Coupled with the respect demanded from Jinky by her father
no matter how unreasoning the gap between their ages, and Jinkys own youthful immaturity, the lack of resistance from Jinky
becomes easily understandable. And, if resistance would after all be futile because of continuing intimidation, as in the strong moral
dominance of accused-appellant, then offering none at all would not mean consent to assault as to make the victims participation in
the sexual act voluntary.[49]
The insistence of accused-appellant that Jinky consented to his advances is downright ridiculous. It is hard to believe that a
daughter would simply give in to her fathers lascivious designs had not her resistance been overpowered. [50] If Jinky had consented to
the sexual intercourse, she would have kept it to herself and not denounce it immediately as rape. Jinkys crying during sexual act, and
her evasion of her fathers advances the following day, belie his pretense that she voluntarily participated in the intercourse. There is
no showing whatsoever that complainant Jinky is a sexually perverted woman or one of extremely loose morals.
Consent obtained by fear of personal violence is no consent at all. Though a man puts no hand on a woman, yet if by the use of
mental and moral coercion the accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result she dare not resist the dastardly act
inflicted on her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him. [51] On the other hand, it is hard to accept that Jinky was that
audacious as to seek and satisfy wordly pleasures from her own father. To cite Navarrete again, no daughter in her right mind would
voluntarily submit herself to her own father unless there was force or intimidation, as a sexual act between a father and a daughter is
extremely revolting.
On the matter of the imposable penalties in the crime of rape when attended by modifying circumstances, it is opportune to make
some clarifications in light of succeeding amendments to Article 335 of the Code. With respect to simple rape, whether in the original
codal provision of after the amendment thereto, the penalty being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua is not affected by
the presence of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
4111 consisting of the so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, or
when an attempted or frustrated rape is accompanied by homicide, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the presence
of generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances will determine whether the lesser or the higher penalty will be imposed. [52]

Republic Act No. 7659 has added seven more attendant circumstances which, in effect also create other variants of qualified
rape punishable with the single indivisible penalty of death. In line with the immediately preceding observation, the presence of
ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances would be of no moment since the death penalty shall be imposed regardless of the
number of any of them. [53] The only possible basis for a reduction of such penalty under the rules for graduating penalties under the
code is the presence of a privileged mitigating circumstances. [54]
Now, it used to be the accepted doctrine that in crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship was always aggravating.
However, among the qualifying circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 is the situation when the victim is under
eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity of affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Obviuosly, in such a factual milieu, relationship having been
used as an element in that qualified form of rape, the same circumstance cannot be used again to aggravate the penalty to be
imposed on the offender.[56]
[55]

In the case at bar, therefore relationship cannot be applied as an aggravating circumstance. However, we are persuaded to affirm
the attendance of intoxication as an aggravating circumstance on the additional finding that it was habitual on the part of the accusedappellant. Indeed, he admitted in his memorandum [57] that he took liquor to forget the memory of his wife ever since she died on
August 28, 1991. Such admission together with the declarations of his daughters and his own testimony in court that he was also
inebriated on the two occasions when he separately raped the victims, reasonably yields the inference that accused-appellant was a
habitual drunkard.
Yet, even on the remote assumption ex gratia argumenti that intoxication can be considered as a mitigating circumstance in his
favor, its presence would not affect the two penalties imposed by the court below. Being indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and
death must be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed. The rule, however, is slightly different with respect to the civil liability.
On this point, we note that the lower court did not award moral and exemplary damages to either Jacqueline or Jinky
Tabugoca. Having suffered wounded feelings and social humiliation, [58] Jacqueline is entitled to an award of moral damages therefor.
[59]
In view of the presence of an aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages should also be awarded to her. [60] An appellate
proceeding in a criminal case, whether at the instance of accused or by mandatory provision of law, throws the whole case open for
review, hence this modification by reason of the oversight of the trial court.
On the other hand, while Jinky is entitled to actual or compensatory damages, no moral damages may be awarded to her
because no sufficient evidence was introduced in the court a quo which would have entitled her thereto.[61] However, exemplary
damages can be awarded to her since she has been correctly granted compensatory damages and offense against her was committed
with an aggravating circumstance.[62]
WHEREFORE, THE JUDGEMENT OF Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and
2387 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant Cresencio Tabugoca is further ordered (1) in Criminal Case No.
2386, to pay Jacqueline Tabugoca the additional amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages andP25,000.00 by way exemplary
damages.
Two Members of the Court voted to impose on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon the finality of
this decision, let the record of this case be forwarded immediately to the office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise
of the pardoning power. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.: HTML
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is designed for rational
beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by
disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are
asked to resolve whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG in an Information [1] which
reads:
"That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and treachery,
armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M.
MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es)long and 3/16 of an
inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the
interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep,
located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla
which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang."
"Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code."
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At
the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed behaving in an
abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the
questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the same date, the Court issued an Order [2] directing the transfer of the accused to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. CODES
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia.
The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2)
years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to
face the charges against him.[3]
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at
the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the
following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7)
children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he
worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta,
Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. [4]
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the
accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth. [5]
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of another man and was
accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her
untimely demise.[6]
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying inside her house. She
called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the children
one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the
accused emerge from the house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety.[7] yacats
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice anything peculiar in
accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the
accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any argument while they were living with her.[8]
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on that
fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a
picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that
he did not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. [9]
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that the accused was
committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations
of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, [10] the accused was found

to be suffering from insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental
abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor selfcare, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations
were violent.[11]A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from
wrong.[12] Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was
highly possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. [13]
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia. After one and a half
years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996,[14] showed that his mental condition
considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and
recommitted to jail to stand trial. [15] olanski
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that accused
Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut by
convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since the death
penalty was suspended or abolished at the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the
accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
"SO ORDERED."[16]
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act
involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful day and must have
committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr.
Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes -- he may be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The appellant
exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran
away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further
injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime
would have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already suffering from
insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993.[17] The defense posits that his mental illness may have
been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through 16 years of working as a seaman, went
bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his
capacity to handle. haideem
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be
considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned
violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior
to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his
child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted
on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent
of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be
no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is
served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot
be deterred from similar behavior in the future.[18]
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten
rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a
cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was
wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal wrong. The
importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen [19] as follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but
under an insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the
word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it

referred solely to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may know in
his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions. [20] MNaghten was condemned as based
on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also
affects the whole personality of the patient, including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a
personality and does not solely determine man's conduct.[21] kirsten
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the
nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of
or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even
if the accused knew that what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses
that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and wrong. [22] This test was likewise
criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the
"irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3)
it will not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and;
(4) it is difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. [23]
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or defect."[24] Critics of this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the
prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that
accused's act was the result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes
completely dependent on the testimonies of experts. [25]
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which
improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as
a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.[26] Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and
"appreciate" as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient.
[27]
Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. [28] barth
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation. It enacted the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made theappreciation test the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar
to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation
test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity
and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. [29]
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there
must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is atotal deprivation of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. [30]
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. [31] The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged.[32] Jksm
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH
months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is
the most common form of psychosis. [33] Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre
behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In the
most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought
disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are disregarded. [34] During the initial stage, the common
early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would
seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect.
He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is shallowness of
affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and
cleanliness.[35] A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest
behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation
manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as blocks or breaks in
conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may
appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. [36]
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated
with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a
single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that
there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared

that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.[37] Hence the
importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although
the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of
commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. [38] Chiefx
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense
insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the
appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced
by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the
stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were
frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the
appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he
stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance.
Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's
unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is
replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest reason. The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that
he lost his business and became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely
speculative andunsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the
appellant after he lost his fortune and prior to his commission of the crimethat may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In
fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house, she
did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was suffering
from any mental illness. An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the
crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue
of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as
hehad already admitted committing the crime.[39] As the appellant, in the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his
alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the
trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-45130

February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendantappellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with
the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his
body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and
three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which
directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith objected to the
arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The
court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused.
Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case
was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring
the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental
condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the
necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for
questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The
trial court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic
Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose
A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the
case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a
condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for
trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had
recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted and sentenced him to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only occasionally and
intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.

B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and immediately after the
commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or
any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to show hat the accused
was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to
this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on
Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the
defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife,
from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed
Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan
and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C
is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in any extended analysis
of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in
this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind
and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States
proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et
seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) Thefirst view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance
and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not
made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal act
should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N.
J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this
view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I,
sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the
prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440;
Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true
that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence
affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the
duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is
on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . .
when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon
him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of
proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of
evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind
that the accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the
time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs.
Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts
of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts.
Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice
of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos
[1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of the act for which he was
prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p.
757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We
appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with connecting two or
more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular
and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be
overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion
different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the herein defendantappellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the
insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia prcox. His confinement
during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a
circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely
lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia prcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a degree that
disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in
Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of
the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms ofdementia prcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those
of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person

becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia prcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of
excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-legal
classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations
of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case
with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson,
Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for
four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 the date when the crime was committed the defendant and
appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia prcox (Exhibit 3,
defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very same day of the
perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B
and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital
the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental
normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro
Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made within the first
month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the
report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

SUBJECT:

Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,

Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and
practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and
other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by his
mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several
occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would
also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking
his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his
fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his
hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in any
form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was
mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with a cross
made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as for
example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty
are among the attributes of a dependable character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He himself
states that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place and person but he
did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear
voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed
because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There
are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not talk in his first day in
the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already
buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. None.
(h) Memory. The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for recent events or for
example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He could not, however, do
simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane during his first days
in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of
course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement in his
behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of physchosis, called Manic
depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular
Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It
might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person
is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly serious in
his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times
executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate beyond normal acceptance. He is
sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the average conception
of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the
prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the
latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that
appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order
to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That
such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr.
Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p.
382), that in the type of dementia prcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complainingand planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious
offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph
1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for
the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.

G.R. No. 87236 February 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTOR TANEO y CAADA, alias OPAO, a certain BEBOT ESCOREAL and a certain ROY CODILLA,accused.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente A. Torres & Mildred C. Duero, Quisumbing, Torres Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista counsel de officio for accused-appelant
Roy Codilla.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The above-named accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of Cebu
City in an Information 1 filed on 29 December 1986 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1986, at about 5:30 p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping
with one another, armed with bottle (sic) of beer grande and RC Cola, with deliberate intent and by means of force
upon things, to wit: by entering the inhabited house of one Herminia Sia y Sy and once inside, with intent of gain
and without the knowledge and consent of said Herminia Sia y Sy, the owner thereof, did then and there take, steal
and carry away the following:
one (1) sharp cassette valued at P 3,500.00
one (1) Denonet Karaoke valued at 7,000.00
one (1) Sony cassette recorder 1,000.00
Fifty (50) pcs. cassette tape 2,000.00
one (1) Casio calculator 100.00

TOTAL P 13,600.00
valued in all (sic) at P13,600.00, belonging to said Herminia Sia y Sy, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the amount of P13,300.00, Philippine Currency; and with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault and use
personal violence upon Linda (sic) Aglipa Robert, maid of Herminia Sia y Sy, owner of the said house, who was the
only person inside the house at that time, by hacking said Linda (sic) Aglipa Robert with said bottle of beer grande
and RC Cola at her head and face, thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries:
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST
MASSIVE PNEUMONIA BL
CEREBRAL CONTUSION
OPEN DEPRESSED COMMUNIATED FX FRONTAL
AREA (R) MULTIPLE LACERATIONS ON THE FACE

as a consequence of which said Linda (sic) Aglipa Robert died instantaneously.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only accused Victor Taneo y Caada and Roy Codilla were apprehended. Accused Bebot Escoreal has remained at large and an alias
warrant for his arrest issued on 9 February 1987 had been returned unserved for the reason that he is not known at the given
address. 2
On 9 February 1987, Roy Codilla, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty while Victor Taneo voluntarily pleaded guilty. 3 In
view thereof, the trial court 4 issued an Order finding the latter guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Victor Taneo y Caada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as charged and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA.
It appearing that the articles stolen were recovered, no pronouncement as to indemnity. 5
Trial on the merits against Roy Codilla then ensued. The witnesses who testified for the prosecution were Dr. Herminia Sia, accused
Victor Taneo, Pat. Enrico Ministerio and Dr. Jaime Perez, and those who testified for the defense were accused Roy Codilla, Police Cpl.
Jovito Roa, Lolit Cabriana and Felicidad Pareo. The evidence for the parties is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Dr. Herminia Sia, an Optometrist, is a resident of Saint Michael Village at Banilad, Cebu City. Her clinic is located at
Junguera Street, Cebu City. Two years ago, sometime in 1984 when she lost two big cassette recorders in her
residence, she decided to hire the services of a guard. A Sgt. Codinas and an army man named Bros, recommended
accused Roy Codilla to her.
Employed on a daily basis, accused Codilla spent most of his time in securing the Banilad residence. There are ( sic)
times though that he would guard the Junguera clinic for a few hours. On one occasion at the clinic, Codilla
introduced to Dr. Sia Bebot Escoreal as his friend.
When Codilla started bringing his friends to the house of Dr. Sia, the latter felt peeved because Codilla's friends were
of questionable and suspicious-looking characters (sic). She was told by Codilla that his companions were jeepney
dispatchers in the downtown area. Not being at ease with such situation, she fired Codilla.
Almost two years later, at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of December 22, 1986, Dr. Sia's neighbors Nicky Padriga and
Ricardo Ferrer went to her clinic and informed her that some persons who burglarized her house were apprehended
by them and that they brought the injured maid, Landa, to a hospital.
At
the
Mabolo
Police
Station,
she
saw
Victor
Taneo,
a
young
boy Arnel Go and Jose Robert her houseboy and brother of her maid, Landa Robert. She inquired from Jose why
he was at the police station and the latter replied that after Taneo and Go were arrested, he was brought along by
the police for questioning. Jose further disclosed that he was invited by Roy Codilla for a round of beer drinks at a
small store behind Dr. Sia's residence and that when he returned to the house, his sister was already injured. The
young boy, Arnel, explained that Roy invited him to go to Dr. Sia's house. Victor Taneo claimed that it was Roy Codilla
who told him to go along with him (Codilla) to the house of Dr. Sia to get some valuables, like cassette recorders.
She saw blood-stains inside her house splattered in the kitchen, on a beer bottle and on the telephone set.
At the groundfloor of Perpetual Succour Hospital, the severely injured and bloody maid managed to reveal to her (Dr.
Sia) in the presence of Corazon Gonzales and Patrolman Lopez, that Roy Codilla was the who (sic) struck her.
Co-accused Victor Taneo, alias Opao (Kalbo) testified that he is a jeepney dispatcher (barker). Bebot Escoreal,
another accused herein who has remained at large, is his long-time friend who is also a barker at Juan Luna Street,
Cebu City.
On December 22, 1986 at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw Bebot Escoreal talking to a person. He approached
Escoreal and the latter introduced him to the person who turned out to be Roy Codilla. After knowing each other, the
conversation continued with Codilla saying that he (Codilla) planned to rob the house of his former employer, Dr. Sia,
as his revenge. Codilla then told him (Taneo) to procure money to be used in entertaining Dr. Sia's houseboy, Jose
Robert. They were briefed by Codilla that in the house of Dr. Sia are a maid and houseboy. Codilla stated that after
the robbery has been pulled (sic), Codilla will bring them to Manila. With his P20.00, they, Codilla, Arnel Go, Escoreal
and himself, boarded a jeepney towards the place of Dr. Sia.
While houseboy Jose Robert and househelper Landa Robert were cleaning the yard, Codilla entered the Sia premises
for the purpose of inviting Jose Robert outside. Codilla told his companions to stay behind at the corner street and to
wait for his signal. Later, he saw Codilla placing his arm around the shoulder of Jose proceeding towards the store
where the houseboy was offered some drinks. After the agreed signal of Codilla, placing his right hand on the right
side of his head, they went inside the house of Dr. Sia. Leaving behind Jose at the store, Codilla joined them.
Escoreal stayed outside as lookout. Once inside, Codilla boxed the maid hitting her in the midsection of the stomach.
The maid fell on the floor and Codilla ordered them to finish her off as she can identify them. He and Codilla got coke
bottles under the dining table and struck the maid on her forehead, head and mouth. They took from a room Sony

(sic) Cassette Recorder, Sharp (sic) Cassette Recorder and some tapes, while Arnel Go in another room, gathered
some calculators.
Outside the house with the loot, Codilla directed him and Arnel Go to pass out one way while Codilla and Escoreal will
proceed to the main road. Along the way, he and Arnel were arrested and were brought back to the house of Dr. Sia.
There they saw the neighbors carrying the body of the maid who was still alive and moaning. Later, the houseboy
arrived.
In jail (BBRC) Codilla offered him P2,000.00 to save him (Codilla) because he has a wife and children.
At the outset he refused, but the wife of Codilla forced him to receive the money with her plea that I ( sic) save her
husband for the sake of their family. Every visit of the wife of Codilla to jail, he was given money by Mrs. Codilla
which totalled all in all P400.00. In Court, he pointed at the wife of Codilla. His mother paid Roy Codilla P400.00
because she bulked (sic) at the idea of saving Codilla. And even if he were given the promised sum of P2,000.00, he
still would take the witness stand considering that he landed in jail because of Codilla.
Arresting officer Rico Ministerio declared that in response to a phone call, he and some police companions went to
the house of Dr. Sia and took custody of Taneo and Arnel Go who were captureden (sic) flagrante delicto by the
civilians of St. Michael Village. The following day, they arrested Roy Codilla at the Duty Free Shop at Lahug, Cebu
City.
Dr. Jaime Perez testified that on December 22, 1986 he treated Landa Robert for multiple lacerations in head (sic)
and face caused by a blunt object. Five hours later, the patient died due to compression ( sic) of vital brain centers.
He issued the corresponding death certificate (Exh. "A").
For the defense:
Police Cpl. Jovito Roa, a guard at BBRC testified that on November 23, 1987, he caught two persons digging a tunnel
at BBRC and one of them was Victor Taneo. Upon inquiry, Taneo told him that actually Roy Codilla has nothing to do
with the robbery-homicide in Dr. Sia's residence. He cannot recall, though, who the other inmate was. Neither can he
recall until now the name of the BBRC investigator at that time. Taneo told him that the reason why he (Taneo)
implicated Codilla was because the complainant (referring to Dr. Sia) promised him P300.00 but only P200.00 was
given to him.
Accused Codilla, testified that in 1982 he was enlisted in the Philippine Army. He was discharged in 1984 fro (sic)
having gone AWOL. In April 1984, he was hired by Dr. Sia as security guard of her residence at St. Michael Village,
Banilad, Cebu City. On May, 1985, Dr. Sia terminated his services.
He denied the charge that he and Taneo committed robbery-homicide in Sia (sic) residence at 5:30 p.m. of
December 22, 1986 because on that day he was in the house of Jose Robert, his friend, who just arrived from Manila
and went home at 10:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, passing first in his aunt's house at Camp Lapulapu..
He came to know co-accused Taneo only after he was arrested by the police on December 25, 1986.
During his employment as guard, he sleeps (sic) in the bedroom of Dr. Sia since there are two beds one for her
and the other for him. Dr. Sia used to call him whenever she counts ( sic) her money and deposit (sic) them in the
safe inside her room. There were two instances when she let him count a sizeable sum of money. He has never taken
any valuable thing from the Sia residence.
Dr. Sia instigated Taneo to implicate him because at one time that Dr. Sia hired somebody to lob a grenade in the
house of the wife of her boyfriend, he stopped her. (A picture of the alleged boyfriend Eliezer Magdales was produced
by him in Court Exh. "1"). That is the only reason why Dr. Sia wanted him to be jailed.
On cross examination, he testified that while employed by Dr. Sia, he has (sic) good relations with her. Dr. Sia even
at times gave him T-shirts aside from his pay. Living in the Sia house are the doctor herself, her four children,
houseboy Jose Robert and maid Landa Robert. He was ordered by Dr. Sia to throw a hand grenade at the house of
her (Sia's) boyfriend which (sic) he relented. As a result, she scolded him and then he left for Manila. In November,
1986, he returned to Cebu and went to the house of Dr. Sia but houseboy Jose told him that the doctor was not
there. On December 22, 1986, at 10:00 a.m. he returned to Dr. Sia's house to say hello because it was Christmas
time and besides, the houseboy invited him to a drinking spree. He found out that the persons in the Sia residence
were only the houseboy Jose, maid Landa and Pableo, the water-gatherer. When he, Jose and Pableo went to the
liquor store, only the maid was left in the house. After partaking one bottle of beer grande at 11:00 a.m. he
proceeded to the house of his brother at Hipodromo where he stayed until 4:00 p.m. From there he went home to
Camputhaw, Lahug.
He meet (sic) co-accused Taneo only at the prison cell at Mabolo Police Station. There Taneo told him that he (Taneo)
does not know him. He only knew Bebot Escoreal. He was picked up by some policemen near his home. Before his
arrest, he did not know the arresting officers, thus, he has no quarrel of misunderstanding with them.
Mrs. Lolit Cabriana, a volunteer worker in the jail ministry testified that she met Taneo in jail and he told her that he
killed the maid of Dr. Sia in St. Michael's Village at Talisay, Cebu using an empty beer bottle. His companion at that
time was only Bebot Escoreal. She knows Roy Codilla and she asked him why he was in jail and the latter answered

that he was not in the house of Dr. Sia when the crime was committed. Codilla told her that he was then in his house
at Lahug and in his brother's house at Lahug and in his brother's house in Mandaue City.
Later, on cross-examination, she declared that for the four years of her missionary work in BBRC jail she did not
have an occasion to talk to Codilla because he is not under her bible class.
Felicidad Pareo of Camputhaw, Lahug, Cebu City testified that she is a neighbor of accused Codilla. Her house is two
houses away. Her closeness to the mother of Codilla is such that they treat each other like sisters.
In the afternoon of December 22, 1986, she was in the Codilla residence for their prayer meeting and she saw for
the first time accused Codilla at past 4:00 o' clock that afternoon viewing TV in the second floor of their house. She
went home at about that time also and never saw Codilla anymore. 6
Giving full faith and credit to the prosecution's version of the incident, particularly to the testimonies of Dr. Sia, which it describes to be
straightforward, without hesitation and concise." 7 and that of Victor Taneo who "[V]ividly in detail, . . . disclosed how he met Codilla"
and how the latter "laid his plan to 'hit' the house of his former employer for revenge," 8 and considering the statement given by Landa
to Dr. Sia at the hospital that she, Landa, was struck by Roy Codilla as part of the res gestae, 9 the trial court, in its Decision
dated and promulgated on 14 December 1988, 10 found the accused Roy Codilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Roy Codilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally with accused Victor
Taneo the heirs of the deceased Landa Robert the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The Sentence on accused Taneo contained in the Order dated February 9, 1987 insofar as indemnification is
concerned is hereby modified.
SO ORDERED. 11
The trial court rejected Codilla's defense of alibi because his residence in barangay Camputhaw, the place where he claims to have
been
at
the
time
of
the
robbery,
"is
only
less
than
an
hour
by
jeepney
to
the
Sia
residence
in
Banilad . . . It was therefore not physically impossible for Codilla to be at the scene of the crime when the crime was
committed." 12 Moreover, Codilla was positively identified by Taneo who had no motive to perjure his testimony.
Accused Roy Codilla, hereafter referred to as the Appellant, seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal, 13 manifesting therein that he is
appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal should have been elevated to this Court. On
the other hand, for obvious reasons, accused Taneo did not interpose an appeal.
The records of the case were erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals which, however, forwarded them to this Court on 10
March 1989. 14 This Court accepted the appeal on 20 September 1989. 15
In his brief, the appellant, through his counsel de officio 16 who were appointed as such by this Court due to the death of his counsel de
parte, 17 submits the following assignment of errors:
I. The Trial Court erred in considering the alleged statement of the victim, Landa Roberts ( sic), as part of the res
gestae.
II. The Trial Court erred in giving weight to the testimony of appellant's co-accused, Victor Taneo.
III. The Trial Court erred in declaring that accused-appellant's identity was established. 18
In support of the first assigned error, appellant claims that the alleged statement of Landa Robert could have been made at least four
(4) hours after the occurrence of the incident a considerable lapse of time. Hence, per People v. Roca, 19 it cannot be said that the
declarant did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive her statement. Neither can such statement qualify as a dying declaration
because it does not concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death and that at the time it was made, the
declarant was not under the consciousness of an impending death. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful if Landa did indeed make the
statement considering that as testified to by the doctor who had treated her, she had impaired consciousness; besides Mrs. Sia's
companions, one Corazon Gonzales and a policeman named Lopez, were not presented to corroborate Sia's testimony.
Anent the second assigned error, appellant contends that in view of the first error and the inadmissibility of the statement of Landa
Robert, the prosecution was left with nothing save for the testimony of Victor Taneo which, however, is weak and does not constitute
sufficient basis for the appellant's conviction. In the first place, Taneo admitted to Pat. Ministerio that he (Taneo) and Bebot Escoreal
were the ones who manhandled the maid. Second, Taneo's credibility as a witness is questionable; he had twice been apprehended for
robbery under P.D. No. 532, and had twice been prosecuted therefor in Criminal Case No. CBU-5871 and Criminal Case No. CBU-5881
before Branches XVI and XIV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Both cases, however, were dismissed on the ground of failure to
prosecute. Appellant then pontificates: "From a hardened soul like Victor Taneo's, it is very difficult to elicit the
truth." 20 In addition thereto, appellant alleges that Taneo's testimony would indicate that the same was for sale as the latter claimed
that he was asked by Roy Codilla to testify in his favor for the amount of P2,000.00, but that Codilla's wife could only raise P400.00.

The third assigned error is premised on the assumption that the appellant's conviction is based solely on the bare allegation of Mrs. Sia
that the victim, Landa Robert, had identified Codilla as her mauler, and on the testimony of Victor Taneo which, as claimed in the first
and second assigned errors is inadmissible and weak. Appellant then faults the prosecution for not presenting Jose Robert who could
have attested to the appellant's presence and participation in the crime or shed light on Taneo's claim that (a) the appellant went to
the Sia house ahead of the rest to distract Jose Robert's attention by inviting him to a drinking spree and (b) the appellant left Jose at
the sari-sari store and went back to Sia's house.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
At the outset, it is to be observed that at the bottom of the assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of witnesses Herminia Sia and
Victor Taneo. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence and amply supported by an impressive array of cases is the rule that when the
issue of credibility of a witness is concerned, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering
that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and observed his deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance and value had been plainly overlooked which, if considered,
might affect the results of the case. 21
We have painstakingly examined the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses
and find no cogent reason to disregard the rule and give way to the exception. The full faith and credit given by the trial court to the
testimonies of the Herminia Sia and Victor Taneo are supported by the evidence. In fact, the tenor of the assigned errors and the
arguments summoned to support them betray the appellant's realization of the infirmity of his stand. Were it not for the gravity of the
offense charged and the penalty imposed, this conclusion could have written an early finis to the appeal. But then, We are called to
squarely meet the issues raised by the assigned errors.
1. The court a quo correctly considered the statement given by the victim, Landa Robert, to Herminia Sia as part of the res gestae.
Landa's declaration that it was the appellant who struck her was given while she was still at the ground floor of the Perpetual Succour
Hospital awaiting to be admitted for treatment. She was rushed to said hospital immediately after the incident in question and was
operated on for four (4) hours starting at 8:00 o'clock that evening until 12:00 midnight. She died five (5) days later.
The following three (3) requisites must concur before evidence of the res gestae may be admitted: (1) the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 22
In People vs. Ner, 23 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion, held:
. . . All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under
the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration 24before he had time to think
and make up a story, 25 or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, 26 or to fabricate an account, 27 and without any undue
influence
in
obtaining
it, 28 aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. 29
The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurence of the startling event from the making of the
declaration. What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made "so nearly contemporaneous as to be
in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to
exclude the idea of design or deliberation . . ." 30
In the instant case, We find the interval of time between the robbery and the infliction of the injuries upon Landa Robert, and her
making of the statement, which the appellant claims to before (4) hours or more, to be sufficient and adequate to bring such
statement to be so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction or occurrence which it illustrated or explained.
Landa was brought to the hospital where she made the statement immediately after the commission of the crime. Given her condition
at that time she was hovering between life and death she could have hardly been expected to conjure up a story or concoct and
contrive a falsehood by falsely imputing upon the appellant responsibility for her injuries. There is as well no doubt that the principal
act in question was a startling occurrence upon which Landa's statement about her assailant relates to. In short, all the requisites for
the admission of such statement as part of the res gestae are present.
Appellants claim that Landa could not have uttered the incriminatory words because she had "impaired consciousness," as testified to
by the doctor, is pure speculation. She gave her statement while she was still awaiting treatment in the hospital. There is no evidence
on record to show that at the time she did so, she was in no condition to speak, utter a word or answer questions. Moreover,
appellant's counsel failed, on cross-examination, to extract from the doctor any admission that "impaired consciousness" would include
inability to speak or answer a question, or that such a condition existed for some time before he had seen or examined the patient.
Neither was expert testimony introduced to prove that the injuries sustained by Landa rendered her unconscious upon their infliction or
sometime thereafter specifically, when she had reached the hospital.
As to the appellant's insinuation that Mrs. Sia may have fabricated her testimony regarding Landa's statement, suffice it to restate
what We had said earlier: The full faith and credit accorded by the trial court to her testimony is supported by the evidence and its
observation of her demeanor. Declared the lower court:
The Court painstakingly scrutinized the testimonies of the witnesses of both sides including close examination of the
demeanor of those who took the stand.
The testimony of Dr. Sia was straightforward, without hesitation and concise. 31

While it may be true that Dr. Sia's companions, Corazon Gonzales and a policeman (a certain Lopez), could have been presented to
corroborate her testimony, such non-presentation did not affect the probative value of such testimony for, as even the appellant
candidly admits, the testimony of the companions could only be corroborative. As such, therefore, their testimonies were properly
dispensed with and their non-presentation did not imply suppression of evidence and did not prove to be fatal to the prosecution's
case. 32 Besides, if the appellant was honestly convinced of the falsity of Sia's testimony and the fact that none of her companions
would corroborate her story, he should have availed of the compulsory process to have them produced as his own witnesses, or even
as hostile witnesses. 33
2. Appellant insists that Victor Taneo's credibility is questionable because the latter had earlier been charged in two criminal cases for
robbery; the former admits, however, that these cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a
person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify such person
from being presented as a witness unless otherwise provided by law. 35 At his arraignment, Victor Taneo voluntarily pleaded guilty to an
information which charges conspiracy. He was not discharged as a state witness a sure guarantee of acquittal 36 and he did not
impute criminal responsibility solely on the appellant. Thus, if he were to testify falsely against the latter, he must have been moved by
a strong, improper and ulterior motive. That motive must have been established; appellant failed to do so. In the absence of evidence
to show any reason or motive why witnesses for the prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper
motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 37
3. Since the appellant had been identified, his defense of alibi must fail. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 38
The prosecution's failure to present Jose Robert a fact capitalized upon by the appellant in his third assignment of error was not
fatal. At best, Robert's testimony would have been merely corroborative.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, We find the appealed decision of the trial court to be in accordance with the facts and applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Except for the indemnity which is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 to conform with the
present policy of this Court, the said decision must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of 14 December 1988 of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu in Criminal Case No. CBU10135 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the above modification on the indemnity. As modified, the indemnity is hereby increased to
P50,000.00. Costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3246

November 29, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The
following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother,
Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After
about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house.
The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife,
Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The
blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms,
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the
people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the
stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The
motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he
often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he
noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit
E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel
presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was
rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the
presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take
a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow
prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from
inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12
of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the
very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt
from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal
Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and
applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary
that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 1 that there be a complete absence
of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the
imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of
will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously
lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he
was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a
person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and
absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward
or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant
acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in
confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his
marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an
imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of
jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in

doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little
or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a
disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by
appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother,
Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was
settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even
partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded,
whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead,
taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one
though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee
and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the
trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of
catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended
the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was
not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the
benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that
the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or
paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power."
To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, that of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the
possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetuato death. It will be observed however, that article
64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the
present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of
the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like
that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in
the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the
old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano
said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature,
which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that
imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept
similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30,
1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the law, must be
sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with the
executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in
it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castaeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of
conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to
exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life
imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of
the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of
confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the modification that
the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is
entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the
penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

G.R. No. 46539

September 27, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan
Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after
trying the case, held that the accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the
Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an appeal
alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The incident that gave rise to the
aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang
were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein
accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach.
For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
Said accused then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased struck
him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing
with him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more
robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he
approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard
what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he might attack Juan
Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's
pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doquea approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him
another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was
bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus
unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which
he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not being called upon or
authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade
pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said
school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was
testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from said order is absolutely
unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by
him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only
the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in
article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited
by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the
very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is
correct.

[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]

ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with
modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation of
Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in an Information, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, not being licensed or authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or
shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an information from an unnamed
informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was
that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real,
Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo
Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a
bundle of make-believe money bills supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and
Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at
the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin
Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and
informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny
Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. He
showed the aforecited bundle of money bills. Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to
Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8).
Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They
arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of money bills and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought
to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean
Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine
hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:

Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to
change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were later able to
identify three of these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian
clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another car while another person drove
Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to
Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarragas car. One of the men saw a substance inside the said
compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even
showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarragas cellular phone rung. It was a call from
Sonny Zarragas wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release of
Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The agreement was
that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. The
agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money
as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank manager to call the
police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There,
they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarragas car spare tire, jack
and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarragas ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged and sentencing each of them
to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A.
6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING
PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST
THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND
THE COST OF THE SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty
imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime; hence, he was
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was
committed and that the prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.

Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A
DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which
case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179,
as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists that the
court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since
the CA made no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the Information that the petitioner and his coaccused conspired and confederated to sell the shabusubject of the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with
discernment; hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted.
It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the petitioner acted with
discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with
judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if
charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In
such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the
exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as
distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral
wrong.[9] However, such presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is
burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt
acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the
crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of
age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only
evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter
inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative,
after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper.
The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q

Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?

The two of them, Sir.

While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them?

They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.

And what was your response?

I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.

And what happened next?

After that I showed my money, Sir.

Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically. I withdraw that.

When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that question?

Sonny Zarraga, Sir.

And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?

He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.

Did his companion bring out the shabu?

Yes, Sir.

What happened to the shabu?

Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.

After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?

He handed it to me, Sir.

After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?

After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the money, Sir.

When you say money, which money are you referring to?

The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.

Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?

I made signs to my companions, Sir.

What signs did you give?

I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.

And how did your companions respond to your signal?

After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.

Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?

Yes, Sir.

Tell us.

SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.

Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by these police officers?

Yes, Sir.

Please tell us.

They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.

And after that, what happened?

They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]

What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?

It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.

Who made the request for its examination?

SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.

Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the shabu?

While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.

Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container was it contained?

When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.[14]

It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also
accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to
accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the
accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper
before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer:
ATTY. VERANO:
Q

Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?

No, Sir.

Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?

I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.

Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?

I dont know, Sir.

Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the boy?

I cannot recall anymore, Sir.

Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not surprised that a young boy like that would
be in a group selling drugs?

FISCAL:
It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams
of shabu.
COURT:
The witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A

No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers. [15]

Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity
to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioners answers
thereto:
FISCAL:
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
COURT:
Please proceed.
FISCAL:
Q

Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right that you went to
Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, Sir.

Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 oclock?

No, Sir.

What time did you leave?

After lunch, Sir.

Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the police, you said that at one occasion on
that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when
your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that correct?

Yes, Sir.

Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to anybody since the day that you were
arrested?

He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.

Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car?

No, Sir.

Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted by a male person at the workshop and
then you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. At
whose waist?

From my cousin.

And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?

No, Sir.

And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area of SM Megamall, is that correct?

Yes, Sir.

And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?

No, Sir.

Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not made any call?

No, Sir.

And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed that there was already this group
which met you?

Yes, Sir.

And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person who arrested you?

Yes, Sir.

Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?

No, Sir.

These people do not know your car?

No, Sir.

FISCAL:
No further question, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
No re-direct, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q

Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen any shabu. In support of your claim, are
you willing to submit yourself to an examination?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, Your Honor.

Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?

Yes, Sir.

COURT:
The witness is discharged.[16]
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the
poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an
agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties
to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with
discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano,[17] we held that:
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he
knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a coconspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on
his part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him
positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate
him.[18]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5418

February 12, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CECILIO TAEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited
him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which
destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased
in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased
to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should
remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts. The accused was a landowner.
On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano,

went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt
wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away
across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other
side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who,
with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked
the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the
interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a
short distance from the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the
question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction
between the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the
boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused,
however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he
remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to
hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat on that day. So when I
arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the
chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went back toward the
malecon, where my companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree
not far from where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to
him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa
heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable
qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the
accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The
accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they
went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay
and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed
in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a
place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the accused.
He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a
gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass
where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and
buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa
said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the
whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased had been normal. The
deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between
them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The
Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be
found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the
man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of
causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable
doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the
performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
(Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160;
Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L.
R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to

cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and
denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance
of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was
intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is
relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was
intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury.
And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an essential element in
criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio.
So ordered.

G.R. No. L-34665

August 28, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the
accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting
upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod,
municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas
(alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused
to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between
Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a
disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to
see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that
the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused
was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the
combatants when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on
the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to
wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was
trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he
lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges that it was
caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony
is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew
of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on
that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit
Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of
committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had
wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs
criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have
said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling
for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at
the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because
Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his
wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she
doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony
of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this
case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining
and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused
is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8,
Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 136844. August 1, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 RODOLFO CONCEPCION y PERALTA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Appellant seeks the reversal of the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9776, finding
him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On January 22, 1998, an information [2] for murder was filed with the trial court charging him with murder allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about November 24, 1997 between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock in the evening, in Brgy. Cut-Cut II, Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with his Armalite rifle Lorenzo Galang hitting him at the different parts of
his body and as a result of which said Lorenzo Galang died instantly.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter trial commenced.
The prosecution relied mainly on the eyewitnesses Maximo Sison, Jr., an employee of Hacienda Luisita, and Arturo Yarte, a
tricycle driver, both of Barangay Cut-cut II, Tarlac City. Other prosecution witnesses were Orlando Galang, brother of the victim
Lorenzo Galang, and Concordia Galang, his mother.
Both MAXIMO SISON, JR. and ARTURO YARTE testified [3] that between 10:00 and 11:00 in the evening of November 24, 1997,
Lorenzo Galang, a resident of their barangay, got involved in a quarrel at the town plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for
questioning by Barangay Captain Remigio Capitli.
Shortly after, appellant Rodolfo Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears of Lorenzo, who was then
sitting, but without injuring him. After that, however, appellant thrust the barrel of the gun against the abdomen of Lorenzo. Then
there was an explosion. Lorenzo was shot in the thigh. At least three more shots were fired, hitting Lorenzo in the chest. According
to Sison and Yarte, appellant shot Lorenzo deliberately. Lorenzo died instantly.
ORLANDO GALANG, the victims brother, recalled that he arrived at the scene of the crime after Lorenzo was slain. [4] According to
him, his brother was not brought to the hospital.[5]Orlando testified on the anguish he suffered for having lost his brother. [6]
CONCORDIA GALANG, mother of the victim, testified that Lorenzo worked at the Hacienda Luisita and was earning P1,000 more
or less a week.[7] According to her, Lorenzo was 27 years old when he died. He was married and had two children. [8] As a result of
Lorenzos death, the Galangs incurred expenses amounting to approximately half a million pesos. [9]Concordia Galang presented a list
of these expenses amounting to P257,259,[10] but without supporting receipts.
In his defense, appellant RODOLFO CONCEPCION claimed that the shooting was only accidental. According to him, he was
investigating Lorenzo for the latters disorderly behavior at the town plaza when it happened. He said Lorenzo appeared drunk and
unruly, and even verbally challenged him to fight. At this juncture, according to appellant, he fired two shots in the air, but Lorenzo
grabbed the barrel of his gun. The gun accidentally fired and Lorenzo was hit. [11]
Defense witnesses ESTELITA BALUYOT and MILAGROS VILLEGAS corroborated appellants story. They said they witnessed the
incident because they were among the bystanders who saw the event happen from the time Lorenzo was brought to the barangay hall
for investigation until he was shot.
Estelita and Milagros testified that Lorenzo was seated while being questioned and pacified by appellant. Appellant was then
standing. All of a sudden, according to the lady-witnesses, appellant fired two warning shots in the air. Lorenzo stood up and grabbed
the barrel of the gun which was then pointed upwards. When it fired, Lorenzo was hit.[12]
On November 10, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder. Its fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder punished and defined by Article 248 in relation to
RA 7659, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P50,000.00 for his loss of life; P120,000.00 as expected income; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees.[13]
Seasonably, appellant filed his notice of appeal. In his brief, he makes but one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED WERE UNINTENTIONALLY
INFLICTED WHILE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS IN THE COURSE OF PERFORMING HIS LAWFUL DUTY AS A POLICE OFFICER. [14]
The sole issue in this case is whether appellant is exempt from criminal liability. Under Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code,
among those exempted from criminal liability is:

Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused.
However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an exempting circumstance as a defense,
the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is
entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code.
[15]

The existence of accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For this to be properly appreciated in
appellants favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the
injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury. [16]Appellant must
convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. However, his
defense utterly failed to discharge this burden. Thus, we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court.
By appellants own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In contrast, appellant had an armalite and a handgun. It is highly
inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily harm to another who is heavily armed.
We note, that appellants gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victims body. Was the discharge purely
accidental? We dont think so. As observed by the trial court, recklessly appellant had put his finger on the trigger of his cocked and
loaded rifle. In that state, with the slightest movement of his finger,[17] the rifle would fire readily. And it did not just once but several
fires.
Appellant claims that the victim Lorenzo, who was drunk at the time, was brought to the barangay hall for investigation. Lorenzo
became unruly while being questioned, so appellant was constrained to fire two warning shots in the air to frighten him. However, the
latter stood up and immediately grabbed the nozzle of the gun and pulled it towards him. The gun accidentally went off and hit
Lorenzo in the body. To buttress his claim, appellant rationalizes that he could have killed Lorenzo immediately while creating trouble
at the plaza, if that was indeed his intention. Since he did not, appellant posits that there was no intent on his part to kill Lorenzo.
But we note patent inconsistencies in his claims. He testified on query by the trial court that when he was pacifying the victim,
his rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel, with its barrel pointed to the floor. At that instance, the victim grabbed the barrel of
the gun which accidentally fired.[18] However, on direct examination by his defense counsel, he testified that the victim grabbed his rifle
only after he had fired the two shots in the air.
His claims do not square with and could not overcome the testimony of prosecution witnesses on this score. Note that Maximo
Sison, Jr., an eyewitness, categorically declared that he saw appellant shoot the victim with an M-16 armalite. [19] On direct
examination, Sison testified as follows:
Q:

Earlier, you stated at the time you arrived at the barangay hall, Rodolfo Concepcion was eight (8) meters away from Lorenzo,
at that time Rodolfo Concepcion shot Lorenzo Galang, how far is Rodolfo Concepcion from Lorenzo Galang?

A:

He was near him because he approached him, sir. He was very near.

xxx
Q:

How many times did Rodolfo Concepcion shot (sic) Lorenzo Galang?

A:

The first firing were two (2) shots, sir.

Q:

Was Lorenzo Galang hit?

A:

No sir.

Q:

At the time Rodolfo Concepcion fired these two (2) shots, according to you, it was near his left ear?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

How far is the barrel from the ear of Lorenzo Galang when he fired those two shots? Will you indicate by pointing your left
ear?

A:

Less than a foot, sir.

Q:

When you are referring to the barrel of the gun which was pointed at the left ear of Lorenzo, how far is the barrel of the gun
from the ears of Lorenzo?

A:

The barrel was lampas tainga so Lorenzo was not hit, sir.

Q:

What happened after that?

A:

He put down and thrust the barrel of the gun toward the stomach of Lorenzo Galang, sir.

Q:

After Rodolfo Concepcion thrust the barrel of his gun towards the abdomen of Lorenzo Galang what else transpired?

A:

Because he was hurt he tried to push the barrel of the gun, sir.

Q:

What did Lorenzo Galang use in pushing the barrel when Rodolfo Concepcion thrust it towards the stomach?

A:

He just pushed a little bit to remove the barrel of the gun from his abdomen, sir.

Q:

After that what happened?

A:

After pushing the barrel of the gun simultaneously the firing and hitting Lorenzo at his right thigh, sir.

Q:

What did Lorenzo Galang do after he was hit on the right thigh?

A:

Because Lorenzo was seated, he was lifted from his seat, sir.

Q:

Incidentally at that time when Rodolfo Concepcion placed the barrel of his gun about a distance away from the ear of Lorenzo,
how far was Lorenzo Galang positioned that time?

A:

He was leaning on the chair sir.

Q:

What about Rodolfo Concepcion how was he positioned when he fired those first two shots?

A:

He was standing, sir.

Q:

Now after the right thigh of Lorenzo Galang was hit by third shot what else transpired?

A:

He again thrust the barrel of his gun on the chest or towards the chest of Lorenzo and simultaneously fired the gun. [20]

The autopsy report corroborates Sisons testimony that the victim had three gunshot wounds: one at the right nipple, another at
the mid-femur (thighbone), and another above the knee. [21] Likewise, Sisons declaration on material details coincide with those
narrated by Arturo Yarte, a barangay tanod who also witnessed the shooting incident. There is no proof of ill motive on the part of
Sison and Yarte that could have impelled them to falsely testify against appellant. In fact, Sison was appellants childhood friend.[22]
The trial court found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. As hereafter explained, however, in this case
treachery is only an aggravating and not a qualifying circumstance.
To constitute treachery (alevosia), two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.[23] Here, treachery was clearly present considering that the victim was totally unprepared for the barrage of gunshots made
by appellant. It was undisputed that the victim was brought to the barangay hall for questioning. He had submitted himself to the
authority of the barangay officials and to the police authorities. He was seated, thereby excluding any insinuation that he was violent
and unruly. He was weak from drinking at the time so that he had very little physical ability to cause harm to anyone, more so in the
presence of the barangay captain, barangay tanod and a police officer in the person of appellant. [24]
From the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees with the prosecution that appellant consciously and purposely adopted the
means of attack to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
However, we note that treachery, though stated in the information, was not alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to
murder. Following People vs. Alba, G.R. No. 130523, January 29, 2002, the information should state not only the designation of the
offense and the acts and omissions constituting it, but should also specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Since the
information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under the present Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure,[25]treachery has to be considered a generic aggravating circumstance only. Consequently, the crime committed
by appellant is homicide and not murder.
Further, we find that the trial court misappreciated as an aggravating circumstance the fact that appellant was a policeman on
duty at the time of the killing. The information charging appellant bears no mention of this aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2000, every complaint or information must state not only the
qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.[26] This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well-settled rule
that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.[27] The aggravating circumstance of abuse of official position, not having been alleged in the information, could thus not
be appreciated to increase appellants liability.
At any rate, appellants immediate surrender to police authorities after the shooting should be credited in his favor as a mitigating
circumstance, pursuant to Article 13 (7) of the Revised Penal Code. [28]
In sum, we find appellant guilty of homicide. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and one aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants sentence should be within the range
of prision mayor as minimum, and the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.

As to the award of damages, the trial court offered no explanation for the award of P120,000 as expected income. This figure is
without basis. The victims lost earnings are to be computed according to the formula adopted by the Court in several decided cases,
to wit:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of the

a reasonable portion

victim at the time of

his death)

of the annual net

income which would
have been received by
the heirs for support[29]

Lorenzo was 27 years old at the time of his death. His mother testified that he was earning P1,000 a week during his lifetime or
an annual income of P48,000. In the absence of proof of his living expenses, his net income is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross
income.[30] Using the above formula, we fix the indemnity for loss of earning capacity of Lorenzo at P848,000, thus:
Net earning capacity = 2 (80-27) x [P48,000 P24,000]
3
= 2 (53) x P24,000
3
= 35.33 x P24,000
= P848,000
We find the award of P50,000 as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to be in accordance with existing jurisprudence.
This civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any evidence other than the fact of the
commission of the crime.[32] As for moral damages, the amount should be reduced to P50,000 also in accordance with existing
jurisprudence.[33] The award of P10,000 as attorneys fees is sufficient and justified.
[31]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9776, convicting appellant Rodolfo
Concepcion of the crime of murder, is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P848,000 as lost earnings, P10,000 as attorneys fees, and the costs. SO
ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140794. October 16, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICARDO AGLIDAY y TOLENTINO, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Malice is the antithesis
of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proven, recklessness disappears.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the September 14, 1997 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City (Branch 57) in
Criminal Case No. SCC 3054. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the court finds the accused Ricardo T. Agliday guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of parricide and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00).
The PNP Bayambang[,] Pangasinan is directed to turn over the shotgun to the Firearm and Explosive Division, Camp Crame, Quezon
City.[2]
This case originated from the April 22, 1999 Information, [3] in which Ricardo Agliday y Tolentino was accused of parricide,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about February 25, 1999, in the evening, at [B]arangay Nalsian Sur, [M]unicipality of Bayambang, [P]rovince of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot his son Richard V. Agliday with a shotgun, unlicensed causing his death shortly
thereafter due to [c]ardio respiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock, gunshot wound, pt. of entry at the (L) upper inner quadrant of
gluteus, 3 x 3 cm. (+) contusion collar, as per Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Rod Alden Tamondong, M.D., medical officer III,
Region I Medical Center, Arellano St., Dagupan City, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.[4]
On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Atty. Bernardo S. Valdez, pleaded not guilty. [5] After trial in due course, the lower court
rendered the assailed Decision. Atty. Carlito M. Soriano, counsel for appellant, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 22, 1999. [6]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General summarized the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
Prosecution witness Conchita Agliday, wife of appellant Reynaldo Agliday, testified that about 8:00 oclock on the evening of February
25, 1999 while washing dishes in the kitchen of their house, her son Richard Agliday was shot with a shotgun by her husbandappellant Ricardo Agliday (pp. 4-5, tsn, July 5, 1999). As a result, her son Richard fell on his belly; her husband-appellant ran
away. Although shocked, Conchita was able to rush out of her house to call for help. Richard was first brought to the Sto. Nio
Hospital, then to the San Carlos General Hospital, and finally to the Region I Hospital in Dagupan City (pp. 5-6, id.).
Before the shooting, Conchita and her husband quarreled over her working as a laundrywoman (p. 7, id.). Her son, Richard, at the
time of his death, was only nineteen (19) years old and in 4 th year college (p. 9, id.).
Prosecution witness Rey Agliday, another son of appellant, testified that he was in their house resting on a wooden bed at the time of
the incident in question (p. 3, tsn, June 18, 1999). Rey saw his father-appellant shoot his brother Richard with a shotgun, as he was
about four (4) meters from them (p. 4, id.).
Before the shooting incident, Rey recounted [that] his mother and his father-appellant had a quarrel, but he did not interfere. His
brother Richard, on the other hand, intervened and for that reason appellant got his shotgun and shot Richard. Appellant surrendered
to the barangay captain who accompanied him to the police authorities. Rey executed a sworn statement (Exhibit A) on the shooting
incident (p. 5, id.).
Dr. Rod Alden Tamondong, medical health officer, Region I Medical Center, Dagupan City declared that he attended to the medical
needs of Richard Agliday. Richard came in looking very pale, weak, and semi-conscious (p. 3, tsn, July 13, 1999). He died at the
emergency room.
Dr. Tamondong found a gunshot wound at the left buttock of the victim which had no point of exit; he also found multiple metallic
objects therein based on the contusion color of the wound and the x-ray result (pp. 4-5, id.). He stated that the cause of the victims
death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to the decrease of the circulating blood of the victim (pp. 4-5, id.). But he did not issue
a medical certificate as he was then on official leave; he only issued a death certificate (Exhibit D) (p. 5, id.).[8]

Version of the Defense

Appellant, in his Brief,[9] submits his own narration of the events:
Appellant Ricardo T. Agliday is a barangay tanod of Nalsian Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Sometime on February 25, 1999, at or about 8:00 oclock in the evening, appellant was at the first floor of his house. He was
cleaning a homemade shotgun which he intended to bring to [his] night patrol in their barangay, with fellow barangay tanods.
While his wife Conchita and his son Richard were about to go upstairs, and while appellant was cleaning the homemade shotgun, the
gun accidentally went off and Richards buttock was hit.
Appellant went near his son and embraced him. Appellant and some relatives brought Richard to the Sto. Nino Hospital at
Bayambang, Pangasinan. They later transferred him to the San Carlos General Hospital. Finally, they brought him to the Region I
Medical Center at Dagupan City, where he expired.
Thereafter, appellant returned to Bayambang, Pangasinan. He directly went to the house of Barangay Captain Jose Matabang, Jr. to
whom he voluntarily surrendered. The barangay captain brought the appellant to [the] police station of Bayambang, Pangasinan, with
the homemade shotgun which [had] accidentally hit Richard.[10]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Faced with two conflicting versions of the facts, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution witnesses who gave
straightforward, spontaneous, sincere and frank accounts of the events that had unfolded before their very eyes. Because of their
relationship with appellant, there was no reason for them to testify falsely against him. The first witness (Rey) was appellants son
who was the victims brother, while the other witness (Conchita) was appellants wife who was the victims mother.
The defense of appellant that what happened was an accidental shooting was disbelieved by the trial court. It viewed such
stance as his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from the consequences of his acts.
Hence, this appeal.[11]
The Issues
Appellant submits the following issues:
First Assignment of Error
The Honorable Court a quo erred in its findings of facts which[,] had they been in accordance with the evidence adduced, will
suffice to support a judgment of acquittal for accused-appellant.[12]
Second Assignment of Error
The Honorable Court a quo erred in convicting accused appellant of parricide.[13]
This Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses despite his avowals to the
contrary. He claims that it should have believed him because he had absolutely no reason or motive to kill, much less shoot, his own
son whom he considered to have had a very bright future. He further alleges that the corroborating testimonies of Jose Matabang and
SPO1 Emilio Opina, who were not related to the parties and had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against him, were more credible
than those of his wife and other son.
We disagree. Long settled is the rule in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate
court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court. [14]That is, unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are
clearly unsupported by evidence, or unless it has overlooked some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered,
would affect the results.[15]
Matabangs testimony was basically what appellant had told him and, hence, biased and limited. The testimony of Opina -- that
he had been told by Conchita that the shooting was accidental -- was contradicted by her own statements in open court that she was
still in shock when the police officer conducted the preliminary investigation. Such statements taken ex parte, like affidavits, are held
as inferior to testimonies given in open court. [16] Thus, we find no ground in the case at bar to overturn the factual findings of the trial
court.
Second Issue: Accident as an Exempting Circumstance

Appellant protests the trial courts ruling that his defense of accidental shooting was fabricated. According to him, he was
cleaning the shotgun that he would have used for the evening patrol with other barangay tanods when he accidentally touched the
trigger and hit Richard, who was going up the stairs into the house with Conchita. [17] He therefore contends that he should be acquitted
on the basis of the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the Revised Penal Code.
We are not persuaded. Both the trial court and the solicitor general rejected this defense on the basis of the eyewitness
testimonies of Conchita and Rey. Under Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the Code, criminal liability does not arise in case a crime is
committed by [a]ny person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it. The exemption from criminal liability under the circumstance showing accident is based on the lack of criminal
intent.
The declarations of innocence by appellant are contradicted by the testimonies of his wife and son. On the witness stand,
Conchita recounts the incident as follows:
Q:

You said that you were at home on February 25, 1999 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening; what were you doing if you can
still remember?

A:

I was washing dishes, sir.

Q:

While doing so, do you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What was that unusual incident?

A:

My son was shot by my husband, sir.

Q:

Where did your husband [shoot] your son?

A:

In the kitchen, sir.

Q:

What weapon did your husband use in shooting your son?

A:

Shotgun, sir.[18]

In her Sworn Statement given to SPO1 Emilio Opina of the Bayambang Police Station, she declared:
04. Q:
A:

Will you please narrate to me briefly all you know about the incident you are referring to?

That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening o[n] February 25, 1999 while I and my husband Ricardo Agliday y Tolentino
were quarreling in connection [with] his drinking (liquor) habit[,] my son Richard V. Agliday tried to [pacify] us but my
husband, instead of listening, x x x got his gun [from] the bed where we are sleeping and shot our son Richard V. Agliday." [19]

Rey corroborated his mothers testimony that his brother was shot by their father. His testimony proceeded as follows:
Q:

On February 25, 1999 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, do you remember where you were?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Where were you on that day and [at that] time?

A:

I was under the house resting on a wooden bed, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

While you were under your house resting do you remember if there was any unusual incident that happened?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What was that unusual incident?

A:

My brother was shot by my father, sir.

Q:

How far where you when your father shot your brother?

A:

About four (4) meters, sir.

Q:

What weapon did your father use in shooting your brother?

A:

A shotgun, sir.
xxx

xxx

Q:

Where was your mother, Conchita at the time your father shot your brother Richard?

A:

She was there and they were both quarreling, sir.

Q:

They were both quarreling before the incident happened?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And while your father and mother were quarreling what did you do?

A:

xxx

I did not interfere[;] it was my brother who intervene[d] between them that is why my father got his gun and shot my
brother, sir.[20]

Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following elements must
concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it.[21] For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful. [22] The
act of firing a shotgun at another is not a lawful act.
An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our
will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.[23] It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental
state, the existence of which is shown by a persons overt acts. [24] In the case at bar, appellant got his shotgun and returned to the
kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in the quarrel between the former and Conchita. It must also be pointed out that the
firearm was a shotgun that would not have fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the shotgun before
discharging it, showing a clear intent to fire it at someone.
The Resolution[25] dated April 22, 1999, filed by 4th Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emilio R. Soriano, reads thus:
[O]n the evening of February 25, 1999 at about 8:00 oclock, complainant and her husband were then quarreling in connection with
his liquor drinking habit. While they were quarreling, their son Richard intervened and tried to pacify his father who [was] under the
influence of liquor. Apparently angered and not listening to his son, he proceeded inside their bedroom and took his gun and
thereafter shot his son Richard who was trying to pacify them. After seeing her son being shot by her husband, complainant ran
outside and called for help. x x x.
After carefully considering the uncontroverted evidence adduced by complainant, undersigned sufficiently finds a probable cause for
[p]arricide with the use of an unlicensed firearm x x x.[26]
Appellant contends that since he was only negligent, he should have been convicted, not of parricide, but only of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.[27]
We disagree. Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act. Past jurisprudential cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide were as follows: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a
friend, who got killed by the accidental discharge arising from negligent handling; (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones
house and killing a neighbor who, at just that moment, leaned over a balcony front; and (3) firing a .45 caliber pistol twice in the air to
stop a fist fight; and, as the fight continued, firing another shot at the ground but, after the bullet ricocheted, hitting a bystander who
died thereafter.[28]
Intent is not lacking in the instant case. Appellants external acts prove malice or criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence. [29]
In People v. Belbes,[30] the Court found no reckless imprudence in the shooting of a student who, in the act of destroying the
schools bamboo wall, had been caught by a policeman who was responding to a report that somebody was causing trouble in a school
affair. The policemans action cannot be characterized as reckless imprudence, because the shooting was intentional. The accused had
intended to fire at the victim and in fact hit only the latter. In this case, resenting his sons meddling in his argument with his wife,
appellant purposely took his gun and shot his son.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 106210-11. January 30, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO RAMBO LISING, RODOLFO MANALILI, FELIMON GARCIA,
ENRICO DIZON and ROBIN MANGA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The parents of Cochise and Beebom must have lifted their sorrowful faces heavenward and blurted out an anguished cry: Oh
God! Why must it be they, so young, so loving, so beautiful and so promising, to be brutally snatched from our embrace and never to
be seen again?
Conchise, whose full name was Ernesto Bernabe II, was 26 years old on the fateful day of April 26, 1990 and Ana Lourdes
Castaos, or Beebom to her family and friends, was 22. Cochise had just graduated from the University of the Philippines with a
degree of Bachelor of Laws and was reviewing for the bar examinations, while Beebom was a graduating student at the College of
Mass Communications from the same university. Both excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities.
The senseless and gruesome killing of the young man and woman, both full of promise, horrifies us. But what makes this crime
more despicable in our eyes is the involvement of people sworn to uphold the law.
For the crimes for which they were charged and sentenced, appellants now come to this Court asking us to give their case a
second look, insisting on their innocence.
Sometime in March, 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman asked Felimon Garcia, his townmate, if he knew somebody who could
allegedly effect the arrest of one Robert Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili.
Felimon Garcia said he knew one and arranged a meeting with him.
On April 21, 1990, Felimon Garcia called up Manalili and informed him that he already contacted a policeman to help him and said
that the policeman wanted to talk to him. So an appointment was set at 12:00 p.m. of April 22, 1990 at Dau Exit, North Expressway,
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
On said date Manalili, together with his son Richard, arrived at the Dau Exit at about 12:30 p.m. of April 22, 1990. Felimon
Garcia was already there waiting for Manalili.
They proceeded to the Golden Palace Chinese Restaurant where they would meet Roberto Lising. They, however, had to change
venue because Roberto Lisings live-in partner, Ligaya Faustino and other companions were in the restaurant. So they went instead to
a nearby carinderia and instructed Felimon Garcia to follow them there.

Shortly, Felimon Garcia arrived and introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and another man armed with a service pistol to
Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili gave them P2,000.00 and instructed them to go and see Vic Nabua,* his employee who will point
to them the person to be arrested.
On April 23-24, Lisings group went to Quezon City and met Vic Lisboa. They conducted a surveillance on the Castaos residence
in the hope of seeing Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to come back the next day.
On April 25, the same group arrived at the vicinity of the Castaos residence at around 5:00 p.m. to resume their
surveillance. Two hours later, Lisboa alerted the group after allegedly spotting Herrera entering the Castaos residence.
Later, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise and Beebom leave the Castaos residence in a green box
type Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and Lisboa and Garcia in a
motorcycle.
The Lancer car went to Dayrits Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle, Quezon City where the couple intended to have
dinner. Alighting from the car, they were accosted by Dizon and Manga who were both carrying firearms. Amidst protestations, Dizon
poked his gun at Cochise, handcuffed him, and shoved him into the car. Beebom protested loudly at the arrest and was also shoved
into the back of the car.
The young couples failure to go home that night and the next day alarmed their parents, so a search was then initiated by close
friends and relatives - inquiring from hospitals, restaurants, friends houses and possible places where the couple would go.
One group chanced upon Dayrits Ham and Burger House where they were told that a couple who fitted their descriptions were
taken by three (3) men believed to be from the military in the evening of April 25, 1990.
The abduction of Cochise and Beebom hit the front pages. Appeals by the parents to locate them reached the authorities where
all possible angles of their disappearance were explored but there were no significant leads. After about two (2) months of futile
search for their whereabouts, a break came on June 21, 1990 when two (2) security guards working in a Shellane Warehouse in San
Fernando, Pampanga went to see Ms. Rosie Bernabe at her Pasay City Hall office and had information concerning her son,
Cochise. Mrs. Bernabe referred the two guards to the CAPCOM who interviewed them.
The two guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano, both employees of Roberto Lising, informed
them that Lising killed a mestisuhin man and a woman in their warehouse.
On June 23, 1990, Raul Morales was picked up and told his story. In a sworn statement executed on even date, he stated that he
was a pahinante residing in the warehouse where LPG cylinders are stored, located near Valle Verde Drive-In Lodge in San Fernando,
Pampanga, owned by Ligaya Fausto, common-law wife of Roberto Lising alias Rambo. In the main, he said:
21. T:
Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito, maaari bang isalaysay mo ang sinasabi mong hindi pangkaraniwang
pangyayari?
S:

Nangyari yan alas 2:00 ng madaling araw ng 26 April 1990 natutulog ako, nang mayron kumatok sa pinto ng bodega at
nagising ako. Tinawag ko si Aida Morales para buksan ang gate tapos sabi ni Aida Ikaw na lang ang magbukas pagkatapos
kinuha ko yung susi sa kanya para buksan ang yong gate. Noong binubuksan ko yong gate sabi sa akin ni Roberto Llising
Bakit ang tagal mo tapos pakabukas ko ng gate pumasok yong dalawang kotse una yung itim pagkatapos yung green na
kotse na Lancer, tapos unang bumaba sa kotse na itim si Rambo, pangalawa si Felimon bumaba sa kotse na Lancer may dala
na pala. Pagkatapos lumabas ng gate si Felimon may dala na pala. Si Rambo naman binuksan yong dalawang pinto ng
kotseng itim bumaba yung babae at saka yung lalaki hinila palabas ni Rambo. Pagkatapos tinalian niya ng alambre bukod pa
sa pagtali ng alambre pati pa yong mukha tinalian ng damit. Pagkatapos pagtali ni Rambo, biglang dumating si Felimon dala
pa yong pala pagkatapos sininyasahan si Rambo na ilabas na iyong lalaki. Dinala ulit ni Rambo yung pala noong palabas na
sila nung lalaki. Pagkatapos ayaw nga lumabas ng lalaki, itinulak ni Rambo papunta sa labas, sabi naman ng babae maawa
naman po kayo sa amin dahil wala kaming kasalanan pagkatapos tinutukan ni Rambo yong babae at sabi Putang ina mo,
wag kang maingay, papatayin rin kita. Noong dinala na ni Rambo, umiiyak na lang yong babae. Mga kalahating oras bago
bumalik si Rambo sa bodega na hindi na kasama yong lalaki. Nakahubad siya at pinapawisan, bukod pa yan, naghugas pa ng
kamay siya. Pagkatapos nag-usap-usap silang tatlo, si Rambo, si Felimon at yong kasama ni Rambo. Pagkatapos nagsabi si
Rambo sa akin na buksan na ang gate at aalis na sila. Binuksan ko ang gate at nagsakayan sila sa kotse, si Rambo sa itim at
saka yong babae, sa Lancer naman ang nakasakay yong kasama niya at si Felimon, at pagkatapos lumabas na sila, tuloytuloy na umalis.[1]

On June 25, 1990, the body of Cochise was exhumed. An autopsy was conducted where the finding was: Cause of Death:
Multiple Stab Wounds
The next day, Beeboms body, which was in an advanced decomposing stage was exhumed from a shallow grave, two (2)
kilometers from where Cochises body was found.
After evading arrest the previous days, Roberto Lising was finally apprehended on June 30, 1990. In a Sworn Statement on the
same day at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, he implicated Felimon Garcia and Roberto Manalili. According to him, this is what
happened:
x x x at about 11:00 oclock in the evening of April 25, 1990, he received a telephone call from FELIMON GARCIA informing
that he and his companions were at Valle Verde Lodge at San Fernando, Pampanga and that they have a problem. He
immediately went to that place and saw FELIMON GARCIA who introduced to him RUDY MANALILI who was then
accompanied by six (6) other men; that he saw a yellow Mercedes Benz, a black Torana and a green Lancer; that on board
the Lancer were a man and a woman who were blindfolded and were introduced to him by RUDY MANALILI as ROBERTO
HERRERA and JOY MANALILI; that they proceeded to one of the rooms of the motel where MANALILI told him that the two
persons should die because they killed his brother DELFIN MANALILI; that afterwards RUDY MANALILI paid the chit and they
proceeded to the warehouse at Villa Victoria, San Fernando, Pampanga, owned by LIGAYA FAUSTO where he bound COCHISE
and led him back of the warehouse; that MANALILI stabbed COCHISE and he acted only as a look-out; that FELIMON
GARCIA and another person brought the blindfolded woman to Brgy. San Agustin where she was killed that before he,
FILIMON GARCIA and RUDY MANALILI parted ways, MANALILI told him to take care of the Lancer, change its color and later
he will get it and after that he was given P40,000.00 in check which he encashed at the UCPB Diliman Branch, Quezon City
on April 26, 1990; that he gave P15,000.00 to FELIMON GARCIA and kept the rest; that he had the Lancer repainted and
used it.[2]
Thereafter, the manhunt for Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili began. One by one, the men responsible for the killing of
Cochise and Beebom fell into the hands of the authorities.
On January 4, 1991, Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named Pat. Enrico Dizon as the companion of Lising
when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped and brought to Valle Verde Lodge. He refused to make a statement or give further
information until Rodolfo Manalili was arrested.

On January 16, 1991, Enrico Dizon was turned over by his superiors to the NBI. He named a certain CIC Robin Manga as one of
their companions and owner of the car they used when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped. Thus, Manga was also picked up.
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Manalili, who was in Australia at that time was fetched by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim and Atty. Diego
Gutierrez after proper representations were made with the Australian police.
On January 17, 1991 Felimon Garcia, with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Redemberto Villanueva, executed a statement
revealing that:
x x x he met RODOLFO MANALILI sometime in April 1987 in his office at No. 71 Mapang-akit Street corner V. Luna, Quezon
City while soliciting contribution for Barangay fiesta of San Isidro, Minalin. The relationship continued until he was requested
by MANALILI to look for persons who could help in arresting ROBERTO HERRERA, the suspect in the killing of his brother
DELFIN MANALILI. He contacted ROBERTO LISING alias RAMBO, a policemen assigned with Pampanga PC Intelligence Unit,
thru LIGAYA FAUSTO, his relative and live-in partner of LISING, to help in the arrest of HERRERA, and on April 21, 1990,
while in the residence of LISING, he placed a long-distance call to MANALILI to inform him that LISING is willing to
help. They talked over the phone and agreed to meet the following day in Dao.
He met MANALILI at the Dao-Mabalacat exit and accompanied the latter to LISING, ENRICO DIZON AND ANOTHER MAN
ARMED WITH SERVICE PISTOL (.45 CALIBER AND Armalite. MANALILI, during the meeting, said that VIC NABUA, his
employee, will act as pointer of the persons to be arrested and LISING agreed and asked from MANALILI P50,000.00 for the
job to which MANALILI agreed. Initially MANALILI gave P2,000.00 to LISING as expenses.
He together with LISING, ENRICO DIZON and the driver of a Tamaraw went to Quezon City on April 23 and 24, 1990, but
VIC NABUA failed to spot HERRERA. On April 25, 1990, LISING and DIZON returned on board a black car, Colt Galant (sic)
driven by ROBIN MANGA and NABUA finally told then that HERRERA was at a house near the Camelot. After a few minutes
of surveillance NABUA approached them and told them to follow the car driven by a man with a woman companion. Said car
proceeded to Timog Circle and parked in front of Dayrit Hamburger House, followed by the Colt Galant which they likewise
followed on board a motor and handcuffed the man and the woman. Then LISING instructed him to contact MANALILI and
VIC NABUA proceeded to Pampanga PC where they were instructed by the military on duty to proceed to Valle Verde Lodge,
San Fernando, Pampanga. There they saw LISING and ERNESTO COCHISE BERNABE and BEEBOM CASTAOS. MANALILI
identified them and instructed him and LISING to release COCHISE and BEEBOM and assured that whatever MANALILI
promised to LISING WILL BE PAID. Lising AGREED. However, after MANALILI left, LISING told him to bring COCHISE and
BEEBOM to a warehouse owned by LIGAYA FAUSTO where COCHISE was killed by LISING. Thereafter BEEBOM was forced
by ENRICO DIZON and ROBIN MANGA top board the Galant car which left the warehouse towards Barangay San Agustin.
He and LISING were left in the warehouse and proceeded to the house of LIGAYA FAUSTO at MALIGAYA Village in San
Fernando. At about 9:00 a.m. he and LISING went to the warehouse of MANALILI at Xavierville Subdivision, Quezon City
and there a check for P40,000.00 was given to LISING who encashed it with Fareast Bank and went to Pampanga. He
alighted at Sto. Domingo, Minalin, Pampanga after LISING gave him P500.00.[3]
Rodolfo Manalili, on the other hand, with the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez manifested on January 18, 1991:
That he met LISING through FELIMON GARCIA whom he requested to look for some police officers who could help in the
arrest of ROBERTO HERRERA, the accused in the killing of his brother DELFIN MANALILI.
He met LISING together with a certain Pat ENRICO DIZON of the Guagua police and another police officer in Dau, Pampanga
on April 22, 1990, and gave them a sketch of HERRERA. On April 24, 1990, he told GARCIA to postpone their plan against
HERRERA due to his forthcoming travel to Germany on April 25. However, at about 10:00 p.m. of April 25, GARCIA came to
his office at No. 71 Mapangakit, Diliman, Quezon City and informed that they have already arrested HERRERA with a lady
companion and that he was instructed to go to Pampanga, which he did. He was accompanied in his car by GARCIA and
VICTOR LISBOA.
They proceeded to Valle Verde Hotel in San Fernando, Pampanga, and brought him to Room 213 where he saw a man
slumped on the floor with his eyes and mouth covered with tape. The lady companion sitting on the bed had her eyes also
taped. He told LISING that the man is not HERRERA. He was forced to peek (sic) inside the room anew, and this time
recognized the woman to be BEEBOM CASTAOS. He pleaded to LISING and companions to release them and would give
them whatever amount he promised them.
After he was told that BEEBOM and COCHISE would be released he instructed GARCIA to stay behind and see to it that his
instructions were complied with. Then, he returned with VICTOR LISBOA. The following day, at about 8:00 a.m., LISING
and GARCIA came to his house and told him that the man and BEEBOM were already released and in turn gave them a Far
East Bank check in the amount of P40,000.00.
On April 26, he left for Germany and returned on May 28, 1990. While still in Germany his wife and househelps have been
receiving threatening telephone calls and on the first week of June he received a call from GARCIA who gave the telephone
to LISING who asked for P60,000.00, otherwise he will kill him or implicate him in the crime.
On June 21, 1990 he left for Hong Kong then to Melbourne for fear of his life and that of his family.
He claimed that the police officers he saw in Valle Verde Hotel were Pampanga policeman and not Quezon City policeman. [4]
Consequently, two (2) Amended Informations were filed in court against Roberto Rambo Lising, Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon
Garcia, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga, and Ligaya Fausto.
Criminal Case No. Q-90-15239
For Carnapping (Violation of Republic Act No. 6539)[5]
That on or about the 25thday of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, P/Pfc. Roberto Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga y Quimzon, being then members of the Integrated National
Police with Presidential waiver, and Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia and Ligaya Fausto, private individuals and several Does, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, by means of violence and intimidation against persons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob and carry away one G.T. Lancer, with plate No. PER 942 in an undetermined value and belonging to Ernesto Bernabe II, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code. [6]

Criminal Case No. Q-90-15240

For: Kidnapping with Double Murder[7]

That on or about the 25 th day of April, 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, P/Pfc. Roberto Rambo Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Roberto (sic) Manga y Quimzon, being then members of the
Integrated National Police with Presidential waiver,and Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, both private individuals, and several Does,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
for the purpose of detaining Ernesto Bernabe II y Blanco @ Cochise and Ana Lourdes Castaos y Jis de Ortega @ Beebom, kidnap or
in any manner deprive them of their liberty and thereafter, pursuant to their conspiracy, took them to San Fernando, Pampanga, and
with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and cruelty, did, then and there stab them several times in the chest and slit
open their necks, augmenting their sufferings which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths and thereafter burying them
to prevent discovery, and Ligaya Fausto, also a private individual, knowing the criminal intent of the above-named principal accused
cooperated in the execution of the crime by supplying material and/or moral aid, to the damage and prejudice of the Heirs of said
victims in such amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the New Civil Code. [8]
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
In building up their case, the prosecution presented two vital witnesses: Froilan Olimpia, who witnesses the abduction of the
young couple at Dayrits Ham and Burger House; and Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of Cochise.
On May 27, 1991, Froilan Olimpia testified in court and stated that he was 31 years old and was formerly a security guard of
Nationwide Security and Investigation Agency. He was assigned at the Rotonda Wine Station, the establishment beside Dayrits Ham
and Burger House along Timog Circle, Quezon City. His tour of duty on April 25, 1990 was from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight.
At about 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening, Olimpia was at his post in front of the Wine Station. There was a green box type Lancer
car which parked in front of the Dayrits Ham and Burger House carrying a man and a woman. Then a black car with no license plate
parked behind the green car and two men alighted from it carrying guns. They announced that they were policemen, one was carrying
a .45 caliber firearm in his holster and other was carrying a long firearm. These men went towards the green box type Lancer and
handcuffed its driver. He only heard the man being handcuffed retort Bakit? When asked about the female companion, he said that
his attention was more focused on the handcuffing incident and just later noticed that the woman was already seated at the back of
the car. He did not even see the other man driving the black car.
Olimpia further explained that the security guard of Dayrits Ham and Burger House, Anastacio dela Cruz, was not really able to
witness the whole incident since he was busy buying a cigarette stick from a nearby vendor. Just when the latter was returning to his
post, the cars were already backing up ready to leave.
He did not tell anyone about the incident nor bothered to report to the authorities since he was aware that the perpetrators were
policemen. He came to know about the identities of the man and woman and their disappearance when two persons were making
inquiries about them on April 27, 1990. The next time, another group of people asked him about what he witnessed until he was
picked up by the NBI for further questioning about the whole incident.
Raul Morales was presented in court on April 17, 1991. He stated that since March 1988, he had been working for Ligaya Fausto
and Roberto Lising as a pahinante or truck helper of Crown Gas Commercial, a dealer of LPG, located in Valle Victoria Village, San
Fernando, Pampanga. He knew Roberto Lising to be a policeman and is known by the name Rambo Lising. He works as a policeman
in the morning and when he returns home after work, helps in delivering gas. During his testimony, Morales was given a clean sheet
of paper and pen where he was asked to make a sketch of his place of work.
At about 2:00 in the morning of April 26, 1990, he was awakened by a knock at the gate of the warehouse. When he opened the
gate, two cars came in: a green box-type Lancer car driven by Lising, with Felimon Garcia seated in front, a man and a woman at the
back seat of the car; and a black car with Dizon and Manga. After the two cars entered the premises, he saw Lising go behind their
sleeping quarters and get a wire. Lising and Dizon then brought Cochise to an area in the middle of the warehouse while Manga led
Beebom to another end. After alighting from the car, Felimon Garcia got a spade from the back compartment of the car and went out
of the warehouse. Lising and Dizon then removed the handcuffs of Cochise, tied his hands with the wire and blindfolded him with a
tape and torn cloth.
Morales further testified that it was Lising who closed the gate but left it ajar. In a little while, he noticed another man enter the
gate and walked towards Beebom. He heard the woman plead: Uncle, maawa po kayo sa amin, while Manga was tying Beeboms
hands with the wire. Garcia, after going inside the warehouse, was handed a knife by Lising which he used to stab Cochise on the
chest. Lising then retrieved his knife from Garcia and continued to stab Cochise. When Cochise was already dead, the four men,
namely, Lising, Garcia, Dizon and Manga carried Cochise out of the warehouse. They were away for about half an hour and when they
came back, the four men directly went to the well and washed their hands. The four walked towards Manalili and talked with each
other. He could not hear the conversation but saw that they grouped themselves together.
Before leaving, Lising called on Morales and told him to close the gate and keep the shoes of Cochise. Lising boarded the green
box-type Lancer car with Garcia and the woman. He noticed Rudy Manalili walk out of the gate.
On April 26, 1991, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime. Witness Morales pointed to the court how
events transpired from where he was seated.
On the basis of the testimonies of the above witnesses, plus the confessions made in the extrajudicial statements executed by
Roberto Lising, Felimon Garcia, and Rodolfo Manalili, the prosecution presented their version of the incident as quoted from the trial
courts decision, to wit:
1.
The conspiracy to abduct and subsequently kill Ernesto Cochise Bernabe II and Ana Lourdes Beebom Castaos
was hatched sometime in March 1990 when accused Rodolfo Manalili secured the services of accused Felimon Garcia to look
for men who would be willing to commit the dastardly deed for a fee. (Exhibits HH and MM).
2.

Accused Garcia then set about on his task and contacted accused Roberto Lising and Enrico Dizon for the job. (Ibid.)

3.
At a meeting arranged by Garcia on 22 April 1990, accused Manalili talked with Lising and Dizon at Mabalacat,
Pampanga about the details of the conspiracy. (Ibid.)
4.

Accused Manalili promised Lising, Dizon and their companions the amount of P50,000.00 for the job. (Ibid.)

5.
Lising and Dizon readily accepted Manalilis using a total of P10,000.00 as downpayment, the balance of P40,000.00
payable after the victims have been kidnapped and killed. (Ibid.)
6.

Accused Lising and Dizon then recruited accused Robin Manga to help implement the orders of Manalili. (Ibid.)

7.
On 25 April 1990, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga, on board
Mangas black car, went to the vicinity of the Camelot Hotel at Quezon City. They positioned themselves about 60 meters
away from the Castaos residence and waited for the victims. (Exhibit MM)

8.
At around 6:30 oclock in the evening of the same day, Cochise and Beebom went out of the Castaos residence,
boarded Cochises green colored 1985 Lancer car with plate No. PER 942. (Ibid.) This Lancer car is owned by, and registered
under the name of Cochises father, Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe. (Exhibit DD)
9.

Cochise and Beebom then proceeded toward Dayrits Ham and Burger House at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. (Ibid.)

10.

Accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga immediately boarded Mangas black car and tailed the green Lancer. (Ibid.)

11.
Upon reaching Dayrits hamburger House, Cochise parked the green Lancer in front of the restaurant. (TSN, 7 May
1991, p.6)
12.

Immediately thereafter, Mangas black car was parked immediately behind. (Ibid.)

13.
Accused Dizon, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, and accused Manga, carrying a long firearm, alighted from the black
car, proceeded towards the green Lancer and announced that they are policemen. (Id. At 7)
14.
While Cochise and Beebom were alighting from the green Lancer, Dizon approached, pointed the .45 caliber pistol at
Cochise and handcuffed Cochises hands behind his back. (Id., at 8)
15.

Cochise, visibly surprised and confused, asked Dizon, Bakit? (Id. at 14)

16.

Accused Dizon ignored the question and rudely pushed Cochise into the back seat of the green Lancer. (Id., at 7-9)

17.
Similarly, accused Manga approached Beebom at the other side of the green Lancer, and pushed her into the other
back seat of the green Lancer. (Ibid.)
18.
Accused Dizon and Manga then boarded the front of the green Lancer, backed the car out of the parking area of
Dayrits Ham & Burger House and drove away towards EDSA. (Id.at 11)
19.

Accused Lising and Garcia, on board Mangas black car, immediately followed. (Ibid.)

20.
After the forcible abduction of Cochise and Beebom, Garcia informed Manalili of the success of the operation. Garcia
further told Manalili to go to a designated place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where Cochise and Beebom will be
taken. (Exhibit MM)
21.

Manalili then proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga on board his gray Mercedes Benz. (Ibid.)

22.
At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of 26 April 1990, accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought Cochise and
Beebom to a bodega in San Fernando, Pampanga owned by accused Ligaya Fausto. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p.6)
23.
At this time, Lising was driving the green Lancer with Garcia at the front seat. At the rear of the car were Cochise and
Beebom. (Id. at 8)
24.

Manga, on the other hand, was driving the black car, with Dizon beside him. (Id., at 8)

25.
After the green Lancer and the black car were parked inside the bodega, Cochise, blind-folded, handcuffed and
gagged with several strips of masking tape, was dragged out of the green Lancer by Lising and Dizon towards an area near
the toilet. (Id., at 9-10; TSN, 26 April 1991, p.3)
26.
Beebom, on the other hand, was taken by Manga to another area of the Bodega where she could not see Cochise or
hear what was being done to him. (Ibid.)
27.
At this point in time, Manalili arrived, parked the car on the road outside the bodega and walked inside towards
Beebom. (TSN, 18, April 1991, p.11)
28.

Beebom, seeing Manalili, pleaded, Uncle, parang awa mo na. Wala kaming kasalanan. (Ibid.)

29.

Manalili simply ignored Beeboms plea for mercy. (Ibid.)

30.
Meanwhile, Garcia went to the back of the green Lancer, got a spade from the truck compartment, and went out of
the bodega. (Ibid). Garcia walked towards the back of the bodega and there, dug a shallow grave. (Exhibit HH)
31.
Lising went to the clothesline area of the bodega, got a length of a laundry wire and some clothes which he tore apart
and made into makeshift ropes. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 12)
33.

Garcia then returned to the bodega with the spade still in his hands and approached Cochise. (Id., at 14)

34.

Lising handed a knife to Garcia, who then stabbed Cochise in the chest. (Ibid.)

35.
Lising, appearing, dissatisfied, grabbed the knife from Garcia and stabbed Cochise several times in the chest and
stomach area, as if telling Garcia how to do it. All this time, Dizon was holding Cochise. (Id., at 14-15)
36.

Cochise then fell to the ground, mortally wounded. (Ibid.)

37.
Thereupon, Dizon motioned to Manga to help carry the body of Cochise. Manalili then was left to keep watch over
Beebom. (Id., at 16)
38.
Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought Cochise to the back of the bodega, into the shallow grave dug by
Garcia. The four then covered cochise with soil. (TSN, 26 April 1991, p. 6; Exhibit MM)
39.
18)

They then reported to Manalili for final instructions. The order was for all of them to leave. (TSN, 26 April 1991, p.

40.
Beebom inquired about Cochise, Lising and Dizon answered that they had released Cochise, and that they would
likewise release her. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 18; Exhibit MM)
41.
Thus, the five accused left the bodega, Dizon and Manga on board the black car, Manalili in his own car, and Lising,
Garcia and Beebom in the green Lancer. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 18)
42.
Later, upon the instructions of Lising, Dizon and Manga took Beebom with them on the black car. (Exhibit MM). This
was the last time that Beebom was seen alive.
43.
At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, Fausto arrived at her bodega and waited for Lising to
arrive. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 20)

44.
About an hour later, Lising arrived on board the Lancer car taken from Cochise. Lising alighted from the Lancer car,
proceeded to one of the huts in the bodega where Fausto was staying, and informed Fausto about the taking of the Lancer
car. (Id., at 21)
45.
After a few minutes, Fausto emerged from the hut and instructed a certain Jun Medrano, one of Faustos helpers in the
bodega, to drive the Lancer car to her house in Maligaya Village, San Fernando, Pampanga, and hide it there. (Id., at 22)
46.
Pursuant to Faustos instruction, Jun Medrano, together with two other helpers of Fausto, Raul Morales, and a certain
Nonoy, drove the Lancer car to Faustos house and hid it in the barbelan area of the house. (Id., at 23-24; Exhibit Y)
47.
Meanwhile, satisfied that his orders had been fully implemented, Manalili paid Lising the P40,000.00 balance of the
contract, by issuing a Far East Bank check for the said amount to Lising at around 8:00 oclock in the morning of 26 April
1990. (Exhibits K and HH)
48.
Lising immediately encashed the check and distributed the proceeds among himself and the other accused, Exhibits
K-2 and MM)
49.
The Lancer car taken from Cochise, on the other hand, remained hidden for sometime at the residence of Fausto in
Maligaya Village where it was repainted to a light gray color upon the instruction of Fausto. (TSN, 18 April 1991, pp. 26-27;
Exhibits CC, CC-1 to CC-6)
50.
After the Lancer car was repainted to light gray, Faustos helpers in the bodega, namely, Jun Medrano, Raul Morales,
Rudy, Bebot and Arnold, upon Faustos instructions, pushed the Lancer car for about fifteen minutes to have its engine
started. Thereafter, the Lancer car was driven to Faustos bodega. (TSN, 18 April 1991, pp. 28-29)
51.
Lising and Fausto thereafter started using the Lancer car in going to the bank and other places in San Fernando,
Pampanga. (Ibid.)
52.
The Lancer car was subsequently recovered by the PC/CAPCOM and turned over to the custody of Fiscal Ernesto
Bernabe. (Exhibits CC, CC-1 to CC-6 and EE)
53.
On 25 June 1990, after two months of frantic and exhaustive search made by the Bernabe family, the body of Cochise
was found and exhumed from the grave where Cochise was buried by Lising, Garcia Dizon and Manga at the back of Faustos
bodega in San Fernando, Pampanga. It was determined during an autopsy that Cochise died to multiple stab wounds in his
chest and upper stomach. (TSN, 10 April 1991, p. 33; Exhibits D, D-1 E and E-1
54.
The next day, also after two months of frantic and exhaustive search made by the Castaos family, the body of
Beebom was found and exhumed from a shallow grave about two kilometers from the bodega of Fausto. It was determined
during the autopsy that Beebom died of severe hemorrhage, secondary to two stab wounds in the chest. (TSN, 10 April
1991, p. 40; Exhibits 1 and J)
55.
Cochise was 26 years old and Beebom was 22 years old when their lives were untimely ended by the
accused. Cochise had just finished his Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of the Philippines and was then
reviewing for his bar examinations when he was abducted on 25 April 1990. Beebom, on the other hand, was a graduating
Mass Communication student of the University of the Philippines when she was abducted on 25 April 1990. Both Cochise and
Beebom excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities, their written works having been published in periodicals and
other publications. Cochise and Beebom were in the best of their youth and health at the time of their untimely
death. (TSN, 9 August 1991, pp. 4-7; TSN, 23 July 1991, pp. 24-26; Exhibit II)
56.
The Bernabe family, in their attempt to locate Cochise spent a total of P380,000.00. in laying Cochise to his final rest,
the Bernabe family spent a total of P632,222.00 for funeral and other expenses. (TSN, 9 August 1991, p. 12; Exhibits LL,
LL-1 to LL-3)
57.
The Castaos family, on the other hand, spent a total of P350,000.00 for the funeral services for Beebom. (TSN, 23
July 1991, p. 39)[9]
In their defense, the accused policemen claimed that there was insufficient evidence to sustain their conviction. At the same
time, each one had an alibi.
Roberto Lising asserted that on April 25, 1990, he took a leave of absence from office to be able to celebrate his fathers birthday
in Arayat, Pampanga and stayed there for the night. His father was presented to corroborate his assertion.
Enrico Dizon testified that April 25, 1990 was an ordinary working day for him. He left the office at 5:00 p.m. and headed for
home at NO. 107 Kamia St., Bgy. Sindalen, San Fernando, Pampanga. In fact, two of his neighbors recounted in court the verbal
exchange they had when they saw each other in their neighborhood.
Roberto Manga, meanwhile averred that it was impossible for him to participate in the commission of the crime since he was still
nursing his gunshot wounds sustained in an encounter with lawless elements for about a year already.
Garcia and Manalili did not take the witness stand. They opted to rely on their extrajudicial statements executed the previous
days manifesting the absence if criminal intent.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING y CANLAS, FELIMON
GARCIA, ROBIN MANGA y QUIMZON and ENRICO DIZON y ESCARIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Double Murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by evidence premeditation and abused of public position by Lising,
Manga and Dizon, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer a penalty of double Reclusion Perpetua with all its
accessory penalties provided by law (the death penalty having been abolished by the 1987 Constitution); to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Ernesto Bernabe II;
(a)

P1,000,000.00 as funeral and other expenses;

(b)

P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;

(c)

P500,000.00 as moral damages;

(d)

P2,000,000.00 for Cochises loss of earning capacity;

The heirs of Ana Lourdes Castaos:

(a)

P350,000.00 for funeral and other expenses;

(b)

P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;

(c)

P500,000.00 as moral damages;

The Court also finds accused Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and Robin Manga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Slight Illegal Detention aggravated by use of a motor vehicle and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty
of Reclusion Temporal with imprisonment from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and one (1) day to Twenty years, and to pay
the cost.
Accused LIGAYA FAUSTO who is charged as an accessory after the fact (not accomplice as alleged by the Prosecution), is hereby
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Accused RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING, ENRICO DIZON, ROBIN MANGA and FELIMON GARCIA are given full credit of
their respective sentences in this case.
With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-15239 for carnapping, all the accused are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, it
appearing that the use of the car was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of Slight Illegal Detention. [10]
In this appeal, the following assignment of errors were made:
Roberto Lising contends that:
I.

THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND CONSIDERING THE STATEMENTS OF
RODOLFO MANALILI (EXHS. HH:, HH-1 TO HH-25) AND THAT OF FELIMON GARCIA (MM, MM-1 TO MM14) ADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ROBERTO RAMBO LISING;

II.

THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RAUL MORALES AS A CREDIBLE WITNESS, ALSO
AS AGAINST ROBERTO RAMBO LISING;

III.

THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED, LIKEWISE, IN STATING THAT HEREIN APPELLANT IMMEDIATELY
ENCASHED THE CHECK AND DISTRIBUTED THE PROCEEDS AMONG HIMSELF AND THE OTHERS (EXHS. K-2
AND MM);

IV.

THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE STATEMENT OF THE HEREIN APPELLANT AS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS AGAINST HIM;

V.

THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT HEREIN APPELLANT (LISING IS EQUALLY
LIABLE FOR KIDNAPPING THUS, JIVING (SIC) THE PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF JURISDICTION; AND

VI.

THAT THE HON. COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING TE HEREIN APPELLANT (ROBERTO LISING) AS ONE OF ALL THE
ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES OF DOUBLE MURDER AND WITH ENRICO DIZON AND ROBIN MANGA FOR SLIGHT
ILLEGAL DETENTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[11]

Enrico Dizon argues that:

1.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DROP THE NAMES OF ROLANDO KHO, ROLANDO
FERNANDEZ, NOEMI PANGAN AND JESUS REMOLACIO FROM THE INFORMATION AND ADMIT AMENDED INFORMATION
IMPLICATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ENRICO DIZON DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF KHO,
FERNANDEZ, PANGAN AND REMOLACIO;
2.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PROSECUTIONS VERSION OF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ALTHOUGH
THERE WERE MISLEADING STATEMENTS AS PROVED BY THEIR CONTRADICTIONS TO THE TRANSCRIPTS OF STENOGRAPHIC
NOTES, AND AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED;
3.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FOR IT RELIED IN
THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI, WITHOUT REGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS RAUL MORALES AND FROILAN OLIMPIA;
4.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY LISING,
MANALILI AND GARCIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT PRESENTED AS WITNESSES BEFORE THE LOWER COURT;
5.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADJUDGING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTS
BASED ON THE DECLARATION OF FELIMON GARCIAS EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION WITHOUT ESTABLISHING FIRST THE
CONSPIRACY TO WHICH ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIZON WAS A PART.[12]
Robin Manga asserts that:
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF COACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI AND FELIMON GARCIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO DID NOT TAKE THE
WITNESS STAND NOR THEIR STATEMENTS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE;

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF RODOLFO MANALILI AND
FELIMON GARCIA AFFIRMED CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE ITS UTTER LACK OF
EVIDENTIARY VALUE;

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT ON THE TESTIMONIES OF RAUL MORALES
AND FROILAN OLIMPIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENTS OF THE TWO ARE REPLETE WITH
INCONSISTENCIES, SELF-CONTRADICTIONS AND ARE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE;

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FELIMON GARCIAS NARRATION OF THE ABDUCTION WAS
CONSISTENT WITH THE TESTIMONY OF FROILAN OLIMPIA WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROBIN MANGA DESPITE STATEMENTS BY OLIMPIA THAT HE SAW QUEZON CITY
POLICEMEN ROLANDO KHO AND ROLANDO FERNANDEZ AS THE PERSONS WHO ABDUCTED COCHISE AND
BEEBOM IN THE EARLY EVENING OF APRIL 25, 1990 AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
STATEMENT FELIMON GARCIA WAS NOT EVEN IDENTIFIED BY THE LATTER DURING THE TRIAL OF THESE
CASES;

V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE MATTERS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA;

VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MANGA BEING INVOLVED IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED;

VII.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA.[13]

Rodolfo Manalili avers that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING TOTAL CREDIBILITY TO RAUL MORALES AND IN NOT FINDING
THAT RAUL MORALES WAS A REHEARSED AND PERJURED WITNESS INSOFAR AS IMPLICATING ACCUSED
RODOLFO MANALILI IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER IS CONCERNED;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI DID NOT HAVE ANY
CRIMINAL INTENT OF DOING AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAOS
AND THAT HE LIKEWISE DID NOT HAVE ANY MOTIVE WHATSOEVER IN CONSPIRING TO DO SO;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI NEVER
ENTERED INTO A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER NOR DID HE COMMIT ANY ACT/S
ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT HE ENTERED INTO SUCH A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THE
CRIME IMPUTED TO HIM;

IV.

SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIAL OF THE SEVERAL ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH REPRESENTED BY
SEPARATE LAWYERS AND CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN MANALILI AND HIS CO-ACCUSED HAS
NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR DECLARATION DURING ITS EXISTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO LISING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST RODOLFO
MANALILI TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PURPORTS TO ATTEST TO MANALILIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIME;

V.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ON THE
BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT ANOTHER PARTY WHO WOULD BE MOST BENEFITED BY DOING
AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF THE VICTIMS, WAS BEHIND THE COMMISSION OF DOUBLE MURDER;

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW
THAT WHEN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TWO REASONABLE
INTERPRETATIONS: ONE REASONABLE INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A DECISION OF CONVICTION, AND THE
OTHER REASONABLE INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A FINDING OF ACQUITTAL, THEN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT FULFILLED THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW OF PROVING THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI BEYOND DOUBT AND THEREFROM SAID ACCUSED MANALILI IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL; AND

VII.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING INFLATED, UNSUBSTANTIATED, AND SPECULATIVE
DAMAGES WHICH ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.[14]

Felimon Garcia contends that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RAUL MORALES WAS A REHEARSED AND PERJURED
WITNESS TO MAKE FALSE ASSERTIONS IMPLICATING APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER;

II.

SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIALS OF THE SEVERAL ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH REPRESENTED
BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA AND
HIS CO-ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR DECLARATION DURING ITS EXISTENCE, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO LISING AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA DID NOT HAVE ANY
CRIMINAL INTENT NOR MOTIVE WHATSOEVER TO CONSPIRE WITH APPELLANT LISING ET AL TO KILL ERNESTO
BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAOS BOTH OF WHOM APPELLANT GARCIA HAS NEVER KNOWN OR MET
BEFORE APRIL 25, 1990;

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA PERFORMED THE
ACTS ADMITTED BY HIM UNDER THE COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR UNDER THE IMPULSE
OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY AND THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY; AND

V.

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
DOUBLE MURDER AND THEREFORE
SURRENDER, OBFUSCATION, AND
CIRCUMSTANCES.[15]

APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IS NOT EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY,

IN NOT FINDING HIM GUILTY MERELY AS AN ACCOMPLICE OF THE CRIME OF
ENTITLED TO A LOWER PENALTY IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF VOLUNTARY
LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG, AS MITIGATING

Basically the present appeal is anchored on three issues: (a) the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements of appellants
Manalili, Garcia and Lising; (b) the credibility of prosecution witnesses Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales and the (c) finding of
conspiracy among the appellants.
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon the presumption that
no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. A mans act, conduct and declarations wherever
made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the
truth and it is his fault if they are not.[16]
There is no question that their respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were
assisted by their counsel and properly sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on their extra-judicial statements
and did not take the witness stand during the trial.
Lising, on the other hand, claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial statement but nothing appears
on record that such extrajudicial statement was made under compulsion, duress or violence on his person. Lising did not present
himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative charges against his alleged tormentors which would necessarily buttress
the claim of torture in the absence of such evidence. There are in fact indicia of voluntariness in the execution of his extra-judicial
statements, to wit: (a) it contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have known and could have
supplied, without the knowledge and information given by Lising himself; (b) it bears corrections duly initialed by him; (c) it tends to

explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili. Moreover, the claim that Lising was not assisted by counsel
is belied by the fact that the signature of his counsel Atty. Yabut appears in all the pages of his extrajudicial statements.
The rule that an extrajudicial statement is evidence only against the person making it, also recognizes various exceptions. One
such exception worth noting is the rule that where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several persons charged with an
offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the facts that the statements are in all
material respects identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated
therein.[17] They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the
latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other
facts and circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. [18] These are known
as interlocking confessions.
No doubt that the statements were independently executed and rather identical with each other in their material details. There
are also distinct similarities in the narration of events leading to the killings of Cochise and Beebom.
Manalili and Garcias statements reveal that Manalili wanted to effect the arrest of Robert Herrera; that he asked help from Garcia
if the latter knew of policemen who could do the job for the promised consideration of P50,000.00; that a downpayment of P2,000.00
was made; that Manalili was informed that Robert Herrera and Joy Ortega were arrested; that Manalili together with Garcia and Nabua
proceeded to Valle Verde Motel; that they were met by Dizon and Manga at the motel and were told that Herrera was inside the room;
that upon discovery that Lisings group had taken the wrong person and recognized Beeboms voice, Manalili pleaded to the group that
the victim be released, assuring Lising that the balance P40,000.00 would still be paid; that Lising and his group refused but relented
upon Manalilis persistence; that Manalili left for Manila but instructed Garcia to stay behind and ensure the release of the victims; and
that the next day Lising went to his office and claimed the balance to which Manalili issued the corresponding check.
Garcia added that after Manalili had left, Lising told him to bring Cochise and Beebom to the warehouse owned by Ligaya where
Cochise was killed. Thereafter, they forcibly took Beebom into the car and proceeded to Brgy. San Agustin.
Likewise, we find Lisings statement as corroborative evidence against the others. Except as to that portion where he exculpates
himself from any liability stating that it was Manalili and Garcia who actually stabbed Cochise in the warehouse and that he was merely
a lookout, Lisings statement is identical as to the other material facts, namely, that Cochise and Beebom were brought to the Valle
Verde Motel, blindfolded where he met Manalili and Garcia; that they were brought to the warehouse on board a green box type Lancer
car, where Cochise was killed; that Beebom was brought to Brgy. San Agustin where she was eventually killed; that he should take
care of the green box type Lancer car and was given P40,000.00 in check.
Nonetheless, the trial courts decision, in convicting all the accused was based not on the aforesaid extrajudicial statements of the
accused alone but mainly on the eyewitness account of the two witnesses, Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales, which the trial court gave
weight and credence as bearing the chime of truth and honesty. Well-established is the rule that the trial courts evaluation of the
credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses should be accorded great respect. [19] Froilan Olimpia, a security guard
of the Rotonda Wine Station, an establishment adjacent to the Dayrits Ham and Burger House who witnessed the abduction of Cochise
and Beebom in front of the said restaurant.
He testified that he saw three men in a black car without a license plate drive to Dayrits Ham and Burger House and park behind
the green Lancer car. When the two men alighted from the car, they introduced themselves as policemen to the by-standers, one
carrying a .45 caliber firearm in his holster and the other carrying a long firearm. The two men approached the green Lancer car and
handcuffed its driver. Olimpia only heard the man say: Bakit? He later noticed that the woman was already seated at the back of the
car. These two men drove the green Lancer car which was followed by the black car. When asked to identify the three men, Olimpia
unhesitatingly identified Dizon and Manga.
Q.

Mr. Witness, on April 25, 1990, where were you employed?

A.

Security Guard of Nationwide Security & Investigation Agency.

Q.

You said you were employed with Nationwide Security & Investigation Agency, as Security Guard on said date, where were
you assigned as security guard?

A.

At Rotonda Wine Station, sir.

Q.

Where is this Rotonda Wine Station located?

A.

At Timog Ave., sir.

Q.

What city?

A.

Quezon City, sir.

Q.

You said you were employed as security guard of Rotonda Wine Station, Timog Ave., Quezon City, do you have proof to show
that you were a security guard of said Rotonda Wine Station on April 25, 1990?

A.

I have, sir, but it is filed with the agency.

Q.

This Rotonda Wine Station, what establishments are beside this establishment, and let us talk first on the left and then right?

A.

The left side of Rotonda Wine Station is the Dayrit Hamburger House and the right is a drugstore.

Q.

What was your tour of duty on April 25, 1990?

A.

12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight, sir.

Q.

And did you report for duty on said date?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

On or about 7:00 to 7:30 oclock in the evening of April 25, 1990, what particular portion of Rotonda Wine Station were you
posted?

A.

I was at the door, sir.

Q.

Door of what, front or back?

A.

Front door of the Rotonda Wine Station, sir.

Q.

When you said you were at the front door, inside the building or outside?

A.

Outside of the door, sir.

Q.

You mentioned a while ago that on the left side of the Rotonda Wine Station where were posted is the Dayrit Hamburger
House, was there a security guard there?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And do you know him?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What is his name?

A.

Anastacio de la Cruz, sir.

Q.

You stated that at 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening of April 25, 1990, you positioned yourself in front or outside the door of
Rotonda Wine Station, did you notice anything unusual while you were posting there?

A.

Yes, sir, there was.

Q.

What was that unusual incident that took place, if any?

A.

There was a vehicle parking in front of Dayrit Hamburger house.

Q.

What kind of a vehicle parked there?

A.

Green Lancer, car, box type.

Q.

Where was it parked particularly?

A.

In front of Dayrit Hamburger house, at the side of the street.

Q.

Did you notice the passenger of that green Lancer car?

A.

No, I did not know them, sir.

Q.

But did you have the occasion to look and see them?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How many were they?

A.

Two, sir.

Q.

Were they male and female?

A.

Yes, sir, one man a and one woman.

Q.

You said you noticed the car with two persons boarding it, what happened after the vehicle parked on the side of the street in
front of the Dayrit Hamburger house?

A.

After they had parked their vehicle, I noticed that another car parked behind that green Lancer car without any plate number.

Q.

Did you notice what kind of a car was that which parked behind the green Lancer car?

A.

I noticed it was a black car without plate number but I did not notice the make.

Q.

What happened after the black car parked behind the green Lancer car?

A.

Two men from the black car alighted.

Q.

What did the two men do after they alighted?

A.

After they alighted they announced and introduced themselves that they were policemen and they went towards the green
Lancer car.

Q.

You said they introduced themselves as policemen, to whom?

A.

To the people around the vicinity, to the by-standers.

Q.

When the two men who introduced themselves as policemen, did you notice if they were armed?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Please inform us what arm or weapon did they carry?

A.

The other one was carrying a .45 firearm on his holster and the other one was carrying a long firearm, I do not know what
kind of firearm that long firearm was.

Q.

This person carrying 45 firearm, could you still recall him or his figure or feature?

A.

If I see him again, I could recognize him.

Q.

But can you describe him before this Court?

A.

Yes, sir, he is tall, a little bit dark complexion and with a little mustache.

Q.

You said that if you see that person again, you can recognize him. Will you please look around the courtroom and point to him
if he is now inside?

A.

Yes, he is here, sir.

Q.

If he is here, will you please point to him?

A.

Yes, I can point to him.

Q.

Will you please go down from the witness stand, go to him and tap him on his shoulder?

A.

(Witness went down from the witness stand, went to the person and tap the shoulder, who when asked of his name answered
as ENRICO DIZON).

Q.

Go back to the witness stand.

ATTY. CRESCINI:
May we make it of record, Your Honor, that at the time the witness was asked to identify Enrico Dizon, there are many people, at
least one hundred in number, standing inside the courtroom closely to each other.
FISCAL:
I would like to adopt the same manifestation, Your Honor.
Q.

You have identified the person with 45 caliber firearm, the person who was carrying a long firearm, can you still recognize him
or can you remember his feature?

A.

If I could see him again, I can recognize him.

Q.

You said that you can see that person with long firearm again, you can recognize him, will you look around the courtroom and
tell us if that person you are referring to is here?

A.

Yes, he is here.

Q.

Will you please point to him?

A.

(Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when asked of his name answered as ROBIN MANGA).

Q.

Now, that you identified the two armed men who alighted from the black car and introduced themselves as policemen, what
did these two men do after that?

A.

They went towards the parked green Lancer car.

Q.

And what did they do when they went towards the green Lancer car?

A.

They immediately handcuffed the man driving the green Lancer car.

Q.

This person who was handcuffed, were you able to look and see him?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Can you still recognize him if you see him again?

A.

Yes, sir, I can recognize him if I see him again.

Q.

What about a picture, if you are shown a picture of that man who was handcuffed, could you still be able to identify him?

A.

Yes, sir, I can.

Q.

I am showing to you a picture marked as Exh. X-4 please look at this picture and tell us if you could recognize this picture?

A.

Yes, sir, I know this person.

Q.

Who is this person?

A.

He is Ernesto Bernabe II, sir.

Q.

What relation has this person in this picture and the person who was handcuffed in the evening of April 25, 1990 at the time
you saw him?

A.

I know, sir, this person in the picture and the one who was handcuffed refer to one and the same person.

Q.

You said that Ernesto Bernabe was handcuffed, you know where was his companion at the time, who was a woman?

A.

I noticed she was already inside the car.

Q.

What car are you referring, the green Lancer car or the black car without plate number?

A.

The green Lancer car, sir.

Q.

You said you saw the woman, were you able to look and see her that evening?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Would you still be able to identify her if you see her again?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

I am showing to Exh. X-4 will you look at this picture, and tell us what relation has this person in this picture to the one who
was together with the man who was handcuffed?

A.

She is the woman I am referring to, sir, whom I saw inside the green Lancer, they are one and the same.

Q.

You said you saw the man whom you identified as Ernesto Bernabe being handcuffed by the two policeman, how far were you
from them?

A.

Five armslength (sic), sir.

Q.

By the way, this front of Dayrit Hamburger house and this Rotonda Wine Store, are they lighted at night?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What kind of light illuminates the area?

A.

Mercury lamp, sir.

Q.

How many lights are there?

A.

Many, sir.

Q.

You said there were lights, in the area during nighttime, can you describe to us from your point of comparison in daytime
whether it is bright or not more particularly at the time of the incident in question?

A.

It was bright just like daytime, sir.[20]

As to the killing of the two victims, Raul Morales testimony about what transpired in the warehouse in the morning of April 26,
1990 satisfied the trial court beyond reasonable doubt, as being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the accused for the
crime of murder. He testified positively, that on that fateful morning, two cars entered the warehouse after he opened the gate. Lising
and Garcia alighted from the green Lancer car and brought out from the backseat Cochise and Beebom. The other black car carried
Dizon and Manga. Soon after, Manalili entered the gate which was left open by Lising, and stood beside Beebom. Cochise, whose hands
were tied with a wire was brought to an area far from Beeboms view. He was stabbed by Garcia, and then by Lising. After killing
Cochise, the four men carried him out of the warehouse while Manalili stayed with Beebom.
The trial court was even more convinced about the witnesses credibility after conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the
crime.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Q.

Now, Mr. Morales, from yesterdays hearing, you mentioned that at about 2:090, April 26, you were awakened by a sound of a
motor vehicle and somebody was knocking. Do you recall having stated that yesterday?

A.

Yes, I remember that, sir.

Q.

Now, apart from the sound of the motor vehicle and the knock at the door, what else do you recall?

A.

Somebody called for Aida, sir.

Q.

What else?

A.

I heard somebody said Aida, you open the door and she told me just open the door, Sir.

Q.

And what did you do?

A.

I opened the door, Sir.

xxx.

Q.

After the gate was opened, what happened?

A.

Two (2) cars got inside, Sir.

Q.

Can you describe the first car that entered he gate.

A.

The first one that got inside was colored green, Sir.

Q.

Do you know the make model or kind of vehicle that is colored green?

A.

It was a Lancer car, Sir.

Q.

Did you notice also who was driving?

A.

Yes, I saw, Sir.

Q.

Who?

A.

It was Roberto Lising, Sir.

Q.

Was there anybody else inside the car?

A.

There was, Sir.

Q.

Who were inside that car?

A.

One was in front and two were at the back seat, Sir.

Q.

The one in front, do you know who was that?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Who?

A.

Felimon Garcia, Sir.

Q.

Was that the first time that you met this person?

A.

Felimon Garcia?

ATTY. LLORENTE:
Yes.
A.

That was the third time, Sir.

Q.

Why do you know Felimon Garcia?

A.

Because he is a cousin of Ligaya Fausto, Sir.

Q.

Can you please look around the Courtroom and tell us if you can point to this Felimon Garcia and if you can, please do.

That man, Sir.

(Witness pointing to a man in white t-shirt who when asked answered by the name of Felimon Garcia).
Q.

What about the two (2) passengers at the back of the Lancer car, who were they?

A.

There was one woman and one man but I dont know their names, Sir.

Q.

Lets go to the man. Did you see his condition? Physical condition, his appearance?

A.

Tall, medium built, good-looking and hairy on the arms. He was wearing white t-shirt and was in shorts, Sir.

Q.

What about the condition under which this person was seated at the back of the car, can you describe that?

A.

I was not able to observe how he was seated, all I know is that I saw him when he went out of the car, Sir.

Q.

What about the other passengers, the woman passenger. Can you describe her.

A.

She was medium built, she was beautiful and fair complexioned puti.

Q.

Now, lets go to the second car. Did you notice the driver of the second car?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you recognize this person?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Would you be able to identify him?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Can you please look around if this person driving the second car is in this Courtroom and if so, please point to him.

(witness pointing to a man in white shirt who when asked answered by the name of ROBIN MANGA).
Q.

Was there anybody else inside the second car aside from the driver?

A.

There was, Sir.

Q.

Would you be able to identify that person?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Can you again look around the Courtroom and tell us if that person is present and if so, please point to him?

A.

(Witness pointing a man in stripe shirt who when asked answered by the name of Enrico Dizon).

Q.

Now, the two (2) cars having entered the premises, could you please tell us what happened with these two (2) cars after
entering the premises?

A.

I saw Roberto Lising went behind the place of our sleeping quarters and got a wire, Sir.
xxx

Q.

How did that woman reach that portion of the Lancer car? Can you describe that?

A.

She was brought to that portion by he companion of Rambo, Sir

Q.

Who in particular?

A.

That man, Sir, (witness pointing to accused Robin Manga).

Q.

What about the man, how was he brought to that portion which you have identified from the Lancer car?

A.

It was Roberto Lising who brought him there, Sir.

Q.

All by himself?

A.

They were two (2), Sir.

Q.

Whos the second aside from Mr. Lising?

A.

(witness pointing to accused Enrico Dizon).

Q.

After the man and the woman were placed in that position as you described, what happened?

A.

Felimon Garcia came out and he was bringing with him a spade (pala), Sir.

Q.

Did you notice where Felimon Garcia got that spade or pala?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Where?

A.

They got it from the Lancer car, Sir.

Q.

In what particular portion of the Lancer car?

A.

At the back compartment of the car, Sir.

Q.

Incidentally, Mr. Morales, what happened to the gate? Who closed the gate?

A.

It was they who closed the gate, Sir.

Q.

Did anybody else arrive?

A.

Yes, there were, Sir.

Q.

Who?
(witness pointing to accused Rodolfo Manalili) witness pointed to a man in eyeglasses who when asked answered by the name
of Rodolfo Manalili.

Q.

Now, this person that you said arrived, how did he arrive?

A.

When he arrive, he went direct to the woman and talked with the woman, Sir.

Q.

Did you hear any conversation between that man as you identified as accused Manalili to the woman that you pointed to here
in the sketch?

A.

I only heard Dont harm us. We have done no wrong.

p. 46 missing
person that you have described in that area present at that time?
A.

They were sweethearts, Sir.

Q.

Let me just refer you to the woman that was brought out of the green car, Lancer car. Did you ever come to know his name
later on?

A.

When I read it from the newspaper, Sir.

Q.

And what was the name that you were able to read from the paper that made you identified that woman from the Lancer car?

A.

Beebom, Sir.

Q.

What is the complete name?

A.

Beebom Castaos, Sir.

Q.

What about the man. Did you also get his complete name.

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

What is his complete name?

A.

Cochise Bernabe, Sir.

Q.

Now, after this man that you have just identified as Cochise Bernabe, after his hands were tied at the back, what else did Mr.
Lising and Mr. Dizon do with this man?

A.

Felimon went inside the bodega, Sir.

Q.

And what did Felimon do?

A.

After that, he went towards Lising, Sir.

Q.

And when Felimon approached Lising, what happened?

A.

Felimon was given a knife, Sir. (Witness in the vernacular said kutsilyo)

Q.

What did Felimon do with the knife?

A.

They went towards the man, Sir.

Q.

And what happened?

A.

Then he stabbed the man once, Sir.

Q.

How? Can you demonstrate?

A.

Yes, Sir.

ATTY. LLORENTE:
Please do.
(witness demonstrating by placing his left hand on the height of his shoulder and making a thrust by his left hand forward).
Q.

What else happened after what you had demonstrated happened?

A.

Rambo grabbed and took the knife from Felimon, Sir.

Q.

And what did Rambo do with the knife?

A.

He also stabbed the man, Sir.

ATTY. LLORENTE:
Can you demonstrate to us how did he do this?
A.

Yes, sir. (witness demonstrating by putting his left hand forward at the height of his shoulder and making a forward thrust by
his right hand several times).

Q.

Did you notice what portion of Cochise was stabbed when Lising was doing this?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Where?

A.

Inside the bodega, Sir. Sa may bodega.

xxx.[21]

The defense, however, would discredit the of Raul Morales alleging that he was not a credible witness considering that there were
inconsistencies and improbabilities in his testimony. To them, he was a rehearsed witness, since he was taken from the NBI to the
residence of Governor Remullas son, a good friend of Cochise, as sanctuary during the trial of this case.
Some of the inconsistencies pointed out are as follows: (1) in the sworn statement, Morales claimed that the black car driven by
Lising entered the compound ahead followed by the green car driven by Garcia while he stated in his testimony in court that the green
Lancer car was first to enter, driven by Lising with Garcia in the passenger seat followed by the black car with Manga and Dizon on
board; (2) in his statement, Morales indicated that he did not see the actual killing of Cochise since the victim was brought out, while
he testified in court that Garcia and Lising stabbed the victim inside the compound; (3) Morales made mention of a total of five

persons, including the two victims, in the early morning of April 26, while in court, he identified the five accused seen with the two
victims.
In has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect
of the crime do not impair the witness credibility.[22]These inconsistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility
of witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[23]
The defense finds it also improbable for Morales to have witnessed the events at such a vantage point from the steps of the hut,
since the perpetrators of a crime would not unnecessarily expose themselves in the committing the act to prevent possible
identification.
Obviously, it never occurred to Lising at the time that Morale, who was under his control and who was afraid of him, would ever
testify against him.
Manalili makes capital of the fact that Morales did not mention him at all in his prior sworn statement as being present at the
scene of the crime. For Manalili, the omission of his name was a significant development as it appeared improbable that a vital witness
will miss out an alleged perpetrator if indeed he was present at the scene of the crime.
Raul Morales himself admitted later on that there were omissions in his sworn statement made before the CAPCOM because he
was afraid of his employer Lising and his companions. Understandably, he was reluctant to volunteer all the information about the
killing for fear that he would suffer the same fate of Cochise and Beebom. The initial reluctance of witness to volunteer information
about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is of common knowledge and has been
judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility.[24] Besides, at that time, Raul Morales was merely concerned with bringing out his
story without really paying particular attention to the details. He related that his employer Lising and companions brought a man and a
woman to their warehouse and killed them both. He saw Cochises face on the papers and recognized him to be the man whom Lising
s group killed. Morales only mentioned Lising and Garcias names in his sworn statement because they were the only ones known to
him. Such omission and discrepancies should not be taken against him. It bears emphasis that a sworn statement or an affidavit does
not purport to be a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. [25] It is a matter of judicial experience
that a sworn statement being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often and often inaccurate. Thus, discrepancies between
the statements of the affiant in his sworn statement and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him. [26] There is
no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in an affidavit or sworn statement would estop an affiant in making
an elaboration thereof during the trial. [27] Whenever there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of the witness, the
latter commands greater weight.[28]
Roberto Lising discredits Raul Morales as having a motive in implicating him to the crime since he quelled a rally staged by
Morales who was the most arrogant and stubborn of Faustos employees, seeking an increase in pay. As pahinante in their LPG
business, Morales, according to Lising, was oftentimes reprimanded for not doing his job well and held responsible for lost gas tanks.
The motive imputed to Morales, a mere pahinante, if he were arrogant and stubborn, would be tolerated by Lising, the live-in
partner of Fausto.
By and large, the defenses raised by the accused do not persuade us. When it comes to the issue of credibility of the witness,
appellate courts give much weight and respect to the findings of the trial court since the trial court is in the better position to examine
real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of the witness. [29] With the eyewitnesses account of Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales,
the culpability of the accused for the crimes charged have been established.
This brings us to the third issue of whether or not there was conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. [30] Where two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it then conspiracy exists. While direct evidence is not
necessary, conspiracy may be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when during and after said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. [31]
Undoubtedly, the trial court did not err in finding the existence of conspiracy in this case. With the interlocking confessions of
Manalili, Garcia and Lising, the group came to an agreement to effect the arrest of Robert Herrera for a considerable sum
of P50,000.00. The stake-out at the Castaos residence, the tailing of the car, the abduction at Dayrits Ham and Burger Restaurant
and the detention in the Valle Verde Motel and the subsequent killing of the two victims all show that all the accused acted in unison
and cooperated with each other towards the accomplishment of a common criminal design. Where conspiracy is established, the act of
one is the act of all.
Garcia, for his part, prays that his liability be mitigated on grounds of lack of intent or motive, acts made under the compulsion of
an irresistible force, and voluntary surrender, which if considered would make him merely an accomplice to the crime. Unfortunately,
these defenses and unavailing.
To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. [32] That compulsion must be of
some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat of for escape. [33]
Garcias participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched, up to the killing of the victims is undisputed. He
was very well aware of Manalilis plans. He was instrumental in introducing Lising to Manalili. Likewise, Lisings intentions to silence
both Cochise and Beebom at the end upon realizing an alleged mistake was known to him. He did not do anything to deter the
commission or to report the crimes immediately thereafter. In fact, he stated that he and Lising saw each other after the incident but
never mentioned anything about it, which only goes to show their intention of concealing the crime. Only after several months of being
hunted, did he send feelers for this surrender.
Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary
since the act of one is the act of all. [34] The degree of actual participation in the commission of crime is immaterial. In People v.
Degoma, the Court explained:
x x x. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges
his will into the common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have casts his lot
with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry and that the offended party may resists
or third persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself from such criminal
liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or
related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. (People v. Salvador, 163
SCRA 574, 580-582 [1988]; People v. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 [1988]; People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541 567 [1988];
People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-160 [1967] (Italics supplied).[35]
For the same reasons. Manalili can not likewise be exonerated from the crime. We have examined carefully the arguments of the
Solicitor General in urging Manalilis acquittal, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the case do not support his stand.

We find it difficult to accept Manalilis contention that he had contracted the services of policemen to effect the legal arrest of
Robert Herrera, the main suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili. Equally preposterous is his assertion that upon arriving at
the Valle Verde Hotel in San Fernando, Pampanga, he realized there was a mistake in the identities of the persons arrested, so he
insisted that they be released. Neither is there factual basis to his claim that he had every reason to protect the life of Beebom, in
particular, since the latter is a principal witness against Robert Herrera, the suspect in the shooting of his brother.
In the first place, why did he take it upon himself to employ persons unknown to him to effect the arrest of Herrera? The
warrant of arrest of Herrera, if one was really issued, was never presented in evidence. In the second place, the surreptitious meeting
of Manalili with Lising arranged by Garcia, the surveillance or stake out of the Castaos residence, the manner of abduction where the
victims were blindfolded, handcuffed and gagged at Valle Verde Motel, cannot certainly be considered as acts in the regular
performance of their duties as policemen. Thirdly, if it was true that Manalili just wanted the arrest of Robert Herrera, why did he have
to seek the assistance of Pampanga policemen? It would have been more logical and expedient to have utilized the NBI or Quezon City
Police especially when the alleged warrant of arrest was issued by a Quezon City court. After all, is was not difficult to locate Robert
Herrera as he was reportedly frequenting the Castaos residence in Quezon City. Fourthly, it does not stand to reason why the victims
were taken to Pampanga after allegedly being arrested in Quezon City. It would have been more cogent for the appellants to have
delivered the victims to the nearest station of the Quezon City Police Department considering that the warrant of arrest was allegedly
issued by a Quezon city court. If arrest was really in the minds of the accused, why did they hole-up with the victims in a motel when
they arrived in Pampanga? Finally, if they were bent on legally arresting one Roberto Herrera, it was not necessary for them to also
take the woman companion of the person they mistook as Herrera.
All these only shows that Manalili had premeditated in his mind a more sinister plot than merely effecting a legal arrest.
It is an unmitigated absurdity for Manalili to pretend that upon his realization of the mistake in their arrest, he insisted upon the
release of the victims since he had every reason to keep Beebom alive. If he had just a bit of concern for Beeboms safety, why did
Manalili leave for Manila without bringing her and Cochise with him to make sure that no harm would befall them, knowingly full well of
Lisings resolve just revealed to him to silence both victims? What should be nearer the truth in that Beebom and Cochise became
aware of Manalilis presence at the motel together with the other accused and this was the added reason why the two had to be
eliminated, to do away with having to explain why he was at the scene. His pretension that he wanted to keep Beebom from harms
way because she was to have testified in the prosecution of his brother brings hollow. It cannot be assumed that had she lived she
would have testified in court and pointed to Robert Herrera as the killer of Manalilis brother.
In any case, assuming the remote possibility, the mistake in the identity of the victims does not exonerate Manalili pursuant to
the rule that one who performs a criminal act should be held liable for the act and for all its consequences although the victim was not
the person whom the fellow intended to injure.[36]
We are reminded of the rule that the conviction must not rest on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence. In the instant case, apart from its interlocking sworn statements of appellants, Raul Morales positive testimony
that he saw Manalili enter the bodega, and stand beside Beebom, while Cochise was being killed, convinces us with moral certainty
that Manalili is equally guilty of the crime charged. His presence in the warehouse clearly belies his claim that from the motel, he left
for Manila already. As against the positive testimony and identification, mere denials of the accused cannot prevail to overcome
conviction by the court.[37] The inaction of Manalili where he could have prevented the killings only reveal his complicity to the crime.
Manalili is certainly part of a complete whole without whom there would be no Cochise-Beebom double murder case.
Furthermore, the decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the crime of Kidnapping and finding the rest of the
accused guilty for the crime of Slight Illegal Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the accused should be
equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can no longer convict Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with
the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double
murder. The crime of Slight Illegal Detention should be qualified to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code considering that a female victim was involved.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1.
The decision of the lower court finding accused Rodolfo Manalili, Roberto Rambo Lising, Felimon Garcia, Robin Q.
Manga and Enrico Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder, including their civil liability is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, and
2. The decision of the lower court finding accused Roberto Rambo Lising, Enrico Dizon, and Robin Manga guilty of the crime
of slight illegal detention aggravated by the use of motor vehicle is hereby MODIFIED, in that the said accused are hereby
declared guilty of the crime of Kidnapping under Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-11439

October 28, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO ELICANAL, Defendant-Appellant.

Francisco Villanueva, Sr., and Francisco Villanueva, Jr., for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:
The appellant in this case is one of several persons arrested and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death and this case comes
to this court not only en consulta but by appeal also.

The accused was a member of the crew of the lorcha Catalua cruising in the waters of the Philippine Islands off Iloilo under the
captaincy of Juan Nomo. The first mate was Guillermo Guiloresa. The accused is about 22 years of age, without education or
instruction and somewhat weak physically. The lorcha left the mouth of the Iloilo river early in the morning of the 11th of December,
1914. She had scarcely cleared the river when Guillermo, the chief mate, suddenly and without having mentioned the subject to the
accused before, said to him that he was going to kill the captain because he was very angry with him, and asked him to assist him.
The accused took this statement as a joke as, according to him, the chief mate was a great joker; and particularly as he was smiling
at the time he made the statement; and naturally paid no more attention to it. Neither he nor the other members of the crew held
any resentment against the captain and he had no idea at that time that he would take part in any acts directed against him.

The following morning while the crew were engaged in their daily occupation, Guillermo, finding the captain in his cabin, assaulted
him, attempting to seize and hold his hands and, at the same time, calling to the crew to come forward and help him. The crew,
drawn by the cries, hastened to the spot where Guillermo was engaged in a hand to hand fight with the captain. At the request of
Guillermo the crew, with the exception of the accused, seized the captain and tied him with the rope. After he had been rendered
helpless Guillermo struck him in the back of the neck with an iron bar an then, delivering the weapon to the accused, ordered him to

come forward and assist in disposing of the captain. The accused thereupon seized the bar and, while the captain was still struggling
struck him a blow on the head which caused his death.

The sole defense of the accused is that, in killing the captain, he was acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury induced by the threat of Guillermo, the chief mate, and that he was so absolutely overwhelmed thereby that, in striking the
blow which killed the captain, he acted without volition of his own and was reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of the chief
mate.

The learned trial court refused to accept this defense holding that the chief mate did not exercise such influence over the accused as
amounted to an uncontrollable fear or that deprived him of his volition. We are satisfied from the evidence that the finding of the trial
court was correct. It was held by the supreme court of Spain in a decision of the 5th of November, 1880, that "a threat, in order to
induce insuperable fear, must promise such grave results, and such results must be so imminent, that the common run of men would
succumb. The crime threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which we are compelled to commit." In a decision of
the same court of April 14, 1871, it was said that "inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing
the criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed." That is substantially the principle which is at the bottom of
subdivision 9 of article 8 of the Penal Code. That article defines the different circumstances under which a person will be exempt from
criminal liability. Subdivision 9 thereof covers "any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force." The foundation of
these decisions and the basis of the defense in this case is subdivision 10, which exempts from liability "any person who acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury."

As we have already intimated, before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an effect upon the
individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a crime. It must
be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey. He
must act not only without will but against will. Such a force can never consist anything which springs primarily from the man himself;
it must be a force which acts upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take advantage of
subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury, it must appear that the threat which caused the uncontrollable fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it
might safely be said that the ordinary run of men would have been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be greater than, or
at least equal to, that which he is compelled to cause. The legislature by this enactment did not intend to say that any fear would
exempt one from performing his legal duty. It was intended simply to exempt from criminal responsibility when the threat promised
an evil as grave, at the very least, as that which the one threatened was asked to produce. Viada in his commentaries on this
subdivision of article 8 of the Penal Code gives this illustration:

Certain evil-minded persons seize me and threaten me with death If I do not set fire to a neighbor's house; if I perform the act under
such threat, as grave as it is imminent, I would fall within the exemption from criminal responsibility provided for in this number; but
if the same persons threatened to lay waste my forest if I do not kill my father my act would not come within the exemption for the
reason that the evil with which I was threatened was much less than that of killing my father.

The evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to the accused by the chief mate, if any, was of such a character as to deprive
him of all volition and to make him a mere instrument without will of his own but one moved exclusively by him who threatened. Nor
does the threat appear to have been such, or to have been made under such circumstances, that the accused could reasonably have
expected that he would suffer material injury if he refused to comply. In other words, the fear was not insuperable. Indeed, it is
doubtful if any threat at all in the true sense was made; certainly none of such serious nature as would justify an illegal act on the
part of the accused.

This discussion disposes of the first error assigned by counsel for the appellant. The second relates to the finding of the trial court that
the crime committed was murder instead of homicide; and counsel for appellant urge, under this assignment, that the evidence does
not sustain the finding of any qualifying circumstance which would raise the crime from the grade of homicide to that of murder. It is
quite true, as counsel argue, that qualifying circumstances must be as clearly proved and established as the crime itself; and, unless
the evidence in this case shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed with one or more of the qualifying
circumstances required by the Penal Code to constitute murder, it must be denominated homicide and not murder. (U. S. vs.
Beecham, 15 Phil. Rep., 272; U. S. vs. Gavarlan, 18 Phil. Rep., 510; U. S. vs. Aslul, 21 Phil. Rep., 65; U. S. vs. Ibaez, 19 Phil. Rep.,
463; U. S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. Rep., 170; U. S. vs. Amoroso, 5 Phil. Rep., 466; U. S. vs. Cagara, 5 Phil. Rep., 277.)

We agree with counsel that the evidence does not establish the existence of premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. In the case of
United States vs. Baagale (24 Phil. Rep., 69), the court said with respect to the facts which must be proved to establish
premeditation:

The record does not show whether Banagale, upon extending the invitation to Domingo Posada through Mariano Ilao, did so for the
purpose of killing the former, inasmuch as there is no proof that he had resolved upon doing so, through deliberation, meditation, and
reflection, and performed acts revealing his criminal purpose, some days or even hours prior to carrying out his criminal determination
to kill the unfortunate Posada. Article 10, circumstance 7, of the Penal Code establishes the requisite that the criminal should have
acted, in the perpetration of the crime, with deliberate premeditation or that he should have prepared for its commission by outward
acts such as denote in the agent a persistent criminal purpose and a meditated resolution to consummate the deed. (U. S. vs. Nalua
and Kadayum, 23 Phil. Rep., 1 ; U. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. Rep., 24; U. S. vs. Lasada and Lasada, 21 Phil. Rep., 287; U. S. vs. Catigbac,
4 Phil. Rep., 259; U. S. vs. Angeles, 6 Phil. Rep., 480; U. S. vs. Idica, 3 Phil. Rep., 313; U. S. vs. Buncad, 25 Phil. Rep., 530.)

In the case at bar it does not appear that there was ever any consideration of the question of killing the captain of the launch by the
members of the crew, in which this accused took part. The matter, so far as the evidence goes, was never mentioned except on the
day before the crime was committed and then in such a way as not to show any fixed purpose or determination even on the part of
the chief mate and much less on that of the accused. The fact that he, with the rest of the crew, answered the call of the chief mate
while he was engaged in his endeavor to make way with the captain is not sufficient by itself, or in connection with the conversation of
the day before, to establish that sustained reflection and continued persistence which are the special features of the qualifying

circumstance of premeditation. It does not appear that the accused had even thought of taking any part in the death of the captain up
to the very moment when the iron bar with which he dealt the fatal blow was handed him by the chief mate. Under such
circumstances it is error to find the existence of premeditation as a qualifying circumstance (U. S. vs. Beecham, 15 Phil. Rep., 272.)
We cannot agree with counsel fro the appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, or alevosia, has not been proved. It
appears undisputed that, at the time the accused struck the deceased with the iron bar and thereby caused his death, the latter was
bound hand and foot and was helpless and defenseless. While it is quite true that there was no treachery at the beginning of the
struggle terminating in the death of the captain, that is, the initial attack was open and fair, the struggle being man to man between
the chief mate and the captain, both unarmed, this does not necessarily dispose of the question of treachery. This court has held
repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort,
nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself.
While the writer of this opinion holds the view that, where there is not treachery in the attack which results in the death of the
deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow
was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, but, the court having held so frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the
doctrine so well established. Counsel for the appellant, however, maintain that the doctrine of the court in this regard was modified in
the case of United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 164). In that case the deceased was walking with the two accused in
single file in a narrow street, the deceased being between the other two.

When they were about ninety yards from any house and while in an obscure place on the railroad track, at about eight o'clock at
night, the deceased was knocked down, and while down was struck two or three blows in the face and rendered practically
unconscious. While in this unconscious condition, but still groaning, the two defendants, one taking him by the head and the other by
the feet, carried him across the embankment, which was alongside the railroad track, and threw him into a small pond of water, face
downward. The defendants then returned to their house. The deceased remained in that position until the following day when his body
was found there by the policemen, Hartpence and Solis, who conducted the body to the morgue where it was later identified as that of
Simeon Flores by Valentin Franco, a friend and neighbor of the deceased.

The question arose in that case, under the facts just stated, whether the act of throwing the deceased into the water while he was still
alive but in a perfectly helpless and defenseless condition constituted alevosia, and made the crime murder instead of homicide. It will
be noted that the attack was not treacherously made, that is, begun with treachery. This the court held; and, therefore, if that
element is to be found at all in the case it must be found from the fact that the decease was thrown into the water and drowned while
he was unconscious and in a helpless and defenseless condition. Discussing that question the court said:

But assuming that the deceased would have recovered from the effects of the four wounds, if he had not been thrown into the water,
yet we still think that the proofs fail to show that there was present treachery, as the knocking down of the deceased, striking him
while on the ground, and throwing him into the water were all done in so short a time and one movement followed the other in such
rapid succession. constitute one and the same attack. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise
the classification of the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must be shown that the treacherous acts
were present at and preceded the commencement of the attack which caused the injury complained of. After the commencement of
such an attack and before its termination an accused person may have employed means or methods which were of a treacherous
character, and yet such means or methods would not constitute the circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack, such as the one
which resulted in the death of the deceased Flores, cannot be broken up into two or more parts and made to constitute separate,
distinct, and independent attacks so that treachery may be injected therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance.

While the writer of this opinion is inclined to agree with the contention of counsel that the doctrine laid down in this case is quite
different from, if not directly opposed to, that already stated as, theretofore, the unform holding of this court, nevertheless the
majority of the court being of the opinion that it was not the intention of the court in the case just cited to reverse the previous
decisions of this court and to set down a new doctrine, the writer accepts that view, particularly in the face of the almost unbroken
line of decisions on the subject now to be reffered to. In the case of United States vs. De Leon (1 Phil. Rep., 163), it appeared that the
accused entered the house of the deceased, drew their bolos and compelled him to follow them. On arriving at a place called Bulutong
the deceased was bound and in that condition murdered. It was held that the fact that the accused was bound at the time he was
killed, although there was no treachery at the beginning of the assault resulting in his death, the qualifying circumstance was present.
The court said:

From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To show this it is only necessary to mention the fact that
the deceased was bound.

The head note to that case says:

The fact that the deceased was bound while killed constitutes the qualificative circumstance of alevosia and raises the crime to the
degree of murder,

The same was held in the case of U. S. vs. Ricafor (1 Phil. Rep., 173); U. S. vs. Santos (1 Phil. Rep., 222); U. S. vs. Abelinde (1 Phil.
Rep., 568); U. S. vs. Hinto Santos (2 Phil. Rep., 453); U. S. vs. Jamino (3 Phil. Rep., 102); U. S. vs. Abaigar (2 Phil. Rep., 417); U. S.
vs. Gloria (3 Phil. Rep., 333); U. S. vs. Gabriel (4 Phil. Rep., 165); U. S. vs. Doon (4 Phil. Rep., 249) U. S. vs. Colombro (8 Phil. Rep.,
391); U. S. vs. Tupas (9 Phil. Rep., 506); U. S. vs. Nalua and Kadayum (23 Phil. Rep., 1); U. S. vs. Indanan (24 Phil. Rep., 203); U. S.
vs. Reyes and De la Cruz (11 Phil. Rep., 225)

For these reasons we are of the opinion that the crime was committed with treachery and that it was properly denominated murder
instead of homicide.

The third error assigned charged that the court erred in refusing to apply article 11 of the Penal Code in favor of the accused. We do
not agree with this contention. The personal qualities and characteristics of the accused are matters particularly cognizable by the trial
court; and the application of this section is peculiarly within the discretion of that court.

There being neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is hereby
sentenced to cadena perpetua. No costs in this instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. 1352

March 29, 1905

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,

vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years ofpresidio mayor as
accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A.
Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the
burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only
does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a
witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member
of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he
heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to
him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted,
doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime
with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor
was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before
an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can
not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a
confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias,
that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would
be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of
pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the
conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that
can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants,
with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 102361-62 May 14, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUDY FRONDA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan T. Antonio for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
Appellant, Rudy Fronda, together with Reynaldo Agcaoili were charged with murder before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan in two separate information, Criminal Cases No. 10-304 and 10-308 alleged to have been committed in conspiracy with
several John Does. Appellant and his co-accused were accused of killing the brothers Esminio and Edwin Balaan of Allacapan, Cagayan
in the two identically worded informations alleging the offense to have been committed as follows:

That on or about June 11, 1968, in the municipality of Allacapan, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, Reynaldo Agcaoili and Rudy Fronda, together with several John Does who
were not identified, armed with guns and sharp-pointed instruments, conspiring together and helping one another,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, with treachery, inconsideration of a price or reward and with the aid of
armed men, forcibly took one Edwin Balaan from his residence and brought him tothe mountains of Barangay Tulong,
Allacapan,Cagayan, and there and then, the accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack torture and stabbed (sic) the said Edwin Balaan/Esmenio Balaan inflicting
upon him wounds on his body which cause his death. (Rollo, pp. 122-123)
On May 29, 1989, Reynaldo Agcaoili was arrested but was subsequently released on bail two days after. On June 2, 1989, appellant
Rudy Fronda was arrested and detained. Upon arraignment, both appellant and accused Reynaldo Agcaoili pleaded not guilty to the
charge of murder. Thereafter, trial ensued.
On August 7, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting appellant and acquitting Reynaldo Agcaoili of the crime charged,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience, the Court enters a verdict of
acquittal in favor of the accused Reynaldo Agcaoili for the crime of murder as charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos.
10-304 and 10-308, with costs de oficio. His bail bond is cancelled and the documents submitted in support thereof
may now be withdrawn from the records under proper receipt.
As against the accused Rudy Fronda, the Court finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by
indispensable cooperation for the crime of murder as charged in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10-304 and 10-308, and
sentences him to suffer in each case, the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties provided
for by law and to pay the costs. He is ordered to each pay (sic) the heirs of the deceased Edwin (Eduardo) Balaan
and Esminio Balaan, the amount of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

P50,000.00
P50,000.00
P20,000.00
P30,000.00
P15,000.00
P10,000.00

compensatory damages
death indemnity
moral damages
exemplary damages
expenses during the wake of Esmenio Balan
expenses during the wake of Edwin Balaan.

all for the grand total of Three Hundred Twenty Five Thousand (P325,000.00) Pesos, but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In the service hereof, the accused Rudy Fronda shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent preventive
imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC, as amended by RA
617, June 17, 1979; US vs. Ortencio; 38 Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
MORE, there being two (2) perpetual penalties imposed upon the accused Rudy Fronda the maximum simultaneous
service of his sentence shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. (Art.70, RPC, amended by Com. Act No. 217,
threefold rule).
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 76-77).
The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court are as follows:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1986, the deceased Eduardo (Edwin) Balaan And Esminio Balaan
who are brothers, were take by seven (7) armed men in fatigue uniform with long firearms, suspected to be NPA
members, accompanied by accused Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua from the house of one Ferminio Balaan, at
Barangay Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan. The said Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua are residents of the same place.
The armed men tied the hands of the deceased at their back lying down face downward, in front of the house of
Ferminio Balaan. The armed men together with Roderick Padua and Rudy Fronda proceeded towards sitio Tulong,
Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan passing through the ricefields (taking along with them the Balaan brothers).
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Rudy Fronda testified that on the night of June 10, 1986, he was taken by the NPA's from his house,
accompanied by Robert Peralta, alias Ka Jun and Roderick Padua, to look for the Balaan brothers. They were around
nine (9) NPA's with then. They found Edwin Balaan and Esmineo Balaan, at the house of Ferminio Balaan, a brother.
They tied their wrists/hands and brought them to the mountain at Sitio Tulong, Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan. After
that, the NPA's instructed them to go home, but in the afternoon of the same day June 11, 1986, Robert Peralta,
alias Ka Jun, sent Elmer Martinez, Orlando Gonzales, George Peralta and Librado Duran to get him and further he
was ordered to get a spade and a crowbar. They were ordered to dig a hole in the mountain, one (1) kilometer away
from his house.

On March 21, 1989, the bodies or remains of the Balaan brothers were examined by the 17th Infantry Battalion,
under Capt. Benedicto. After which, the remains, (bones) were brought to the house of one Freddie Arevalo, a
relative of the deceased, at Barangay Cataratan, where they were laid in state for the wake. (Rollo, pp. 27-29)
In its decision, the trial court made a lengthy enumeration of established facts and circumstances which was made the basis of the
conviction of appellant, to wit :
1) Appellant and Roderick Padua, and NPA member were the ones who pointed the house where the brothers Balaan were to be found,
2) appellant and Roderick Padua accompanied the members of the armed group to said house, and tied the victims' hands, 3)
appellant was handed a hunting knife by one of the armed men when they left the house, 4) appellant joined the members of the
armed group in bringing the victims to a forested area in the mountains, 5) it was appellant who provided the spade and crowbar used
in digging the hole where the Balaan brothers were buried, 6) appellant was the one who pointed the location where the victms' bodies
buried, 7) appellant, for a period of more than three (3) years, failed to report the incident to the authorities, and 8) appellant did not
in any way object, when he was ordered to tie the hands of the victims.
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court declared:
In fine, all of these circumstances constitute a unbroken chain which leads to a fair conclusion that accused Rudy
Fronda is guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation (People vs. Colinares, 163 SCRA 313), even as the same
circumstances are inconsistent with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis, except
that of guilty (People vs. Trinidad 162 SCRA 714), all cited in the recent case of People vs. Tiongson, G.R. No. 89823,
June 19, 1991).
It is crystal clear and conclusion is inescapable that his cooperation was indeed indispensable in the consumation of
the crime charged, without which it would not have been accomplished, (Art. 17, No. 3, RPC).
Accused Rudy Fronda shared the guilty purpose and encouraged and abetted the crime by his actuations as above
illustrated, even though he may have taken no part in the execution. The chain of circumstances as narrated above
will show that he has rendered the required assistance intentionally and knowingly, which led to the execution of the
felony. His external acts more than explain his participation as principal by indispensable cooperation. Such external
overt acts, are more than significant enough constittuting convincing proof leading to the ineluctable finding that
accused Rudy Fronda is guilty as such. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
Appellant assails the decision of the trial court, setting forth the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER IN TWO COUNTS AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUAIN EACH COUNT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
Accused-appellant maintains that the prosecution was not able to present evidence to prove his participation in the killing of the
brothers Balaan. The defense submits that appellant was merely taken by the armed men as a "pointer" and as such, he could not be
considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation for the reason that the armed men could have taken other persons to perform
the acts done by appellant. Furthermore, appellant interposes the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear (Art. 12 [6] RPC)
claiming that all his acts were performed under the impulse of uncontrollable fear and to save his life.
This case hinges on the issue of whether or not accused-appellant could be convicted as a principal by indispensable cooperation
through circumstantial evidence.
Paragraph 3, Article 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers as principals by indispensable cooperation "those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it could not have been accomplished". Its requisites are (1) participation of the
subject accused in the criminal resolution and (2) performance by him of another act indispensable to the accomplishment of the
crime.
Records show that appellant's participation in the commission of the crime consisted of: (1) leading the members of the armed group
to the house where the victims were found; (2) tying the victims' hands and (3) digging the grave where the victims were buried.
However, it has been established through the testimony of Alex Utrera, a former member of the NPA, that appellant was only pickedup by the armed men for the purpose of pointing the residence of the victims. The armed men never disclosed their purpose in looking
for the brothers Balaan who were former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines nor did the armed men inform appellant of
their plan to abduct and kill the two brothers.
Save for the open admission of appellant that he was an NPA "supporter", no incontrovertible proof was adduced by the prosecution
supporting the conclusion that appellant agreed with the members of the armed group to kill the brothers Balaan.
Furthermore, prosecution witnesses Freddie Arevalo and Gilbert Viernes testified that the members of the armed group were
accompanied by, aside from appellant, another barriomate, Roderick Padua, known to be a member of the NPA (Tsn p. 8 & 76).

Undoubtedly, ever without appelant's participation, the assailants could have easily located the Balaan brothers thru the assistance of
Roderick Padua. Taking account of the number of the assailants alone, it is apparen that the armed men could have nevertheless
committed the crime easily without the appellant abetting the commission thereof.
The acts performed by appellant are not, by themselves, indispensable to the killing of the brothers Balaan. As aforesaid to be
considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, there must be direct participation in the criminal design by another act without
which the crime could not have been committed. We note that the prosecution failed to present any evidence tending to establish
appellant's conspiracy with the evil designs of the members of the NPA armed group. Neither was it established that appellant's acts
were of such importance that the crime would not have been committed without him or that he participated in the actual killing.
Under the circumstances, appellant cannot therefore be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The trial court,
therefore, erred when it found appellant guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
However, appellant's act of joining the armed men in going to the mountains, and his failure to object to their unlawful orders, or show
any reluctance in obeying the same, may be considered as circumstances evincing his concurrence with the objectives of the
malefactors and had effectively supplied them with material and moral aid, thereby making him as an accomplice. He cannot with
candor, claim that he was unaware of the evil intentions of the armed men which may have been the case had appellant merely guided
the group to locate the victims' abodes. On the contrary, appellant himself tied the victims' hands and even joined the armed men in
taking the victims to the hills. Appellant's complicity is made more manifest by the fact that without any justifiable reason he failed to
report the incident to the authorities for a period of more than three (3) years.
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a principal, "cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts". Under this provision, a person is considered as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration
of the crime is of a minor character. To be convicted as such, it is necessary that he be aware to the criminal intent of the principal and
thereby cooperates knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.
It is well settled that if there is ample of criminal participation but a doubt exist as to the nature of liability, courts should resolve to
favor the milder form of responsibility, that of an accomplice. (People vs. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632, [1991] citing People vs. Torejas,
43 SCRA 158, [1972])
Appellant cannot claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear (Art. 12, par. 6, RPC). Fear in order to be valid should be
based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb (People vs. Abanes, 73 SCRA 44, [1976]). In the case at bar,
records indicate that appellant was seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed men a hunting knife. Also, as afoesaid,
appellant was not able to explain his failure to report the incident to the explain his failure to report the incident to the authorities for
more than three (3) years. These circumstances, among others, establish the fact that appellant consciously concurred with the acts of
the assailants. In order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People vs. Loreno, 130 SCRA 311, [1984]) Appellant
had the opportunity to escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go hoome after bringing the victims the mountains. He did
not. Instead he joined the armed men when required to bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig the grave. Appellant also
chose to remain silent for more than three (3) years before reporting the killing to the authorities. Based on these circumstances, We
hold that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of appellant can not be regarded as having been done under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred when it convicted him of the crime charged, alleging that no evidence was presented to
prove any circumstance that would qualify the crime committed to murder. Appellant's argument is devoid of merit. Paragraph 1,
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person who kills another, taking advantage of superior strength shall be guilty
of murder, and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in the maximum period to death. It is manifest that the group of assailants
composed of seven (7) armed men, and two (2) civilians including appellant Fronda. It had been repeatedly held that the number of
assailants, if armed, may be considered as a qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. It is indubitable that assailants
deliberately used superior force of such nature as to be clearly out of proportion to the means or defense available to the
victimsPeople vs. Tandoc (40 Phil. 954 [1920]) and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403 [1967]). The assailants took advantage of their
numbers in order to ensure that the brothers Balaan who are said to be former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines would
not be able to put up any defense. The crime thus committed is murder.
Be that as it may, and after considering the attendant circumstances, We hold that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accomplice to the crime charged i.e. murder. As such, the proper imposable penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed for
murder (Art. 52, Revised Penal Code). The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, RPC).
One degree lower is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal medium (Art. 61 (3), RPC). There being no mitigating
nor agravating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime, the penalty impossable under the law should be applied in
its medium period (Art. 64 [1], RPC) and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is hereby sentenced in each case to
suffer imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED to the extent above indicated and AFFIRMED in all other
aspects. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of
Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of
the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No.
Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing
that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors
Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.
Contrary to law.[3]
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue. The data are hereunder
itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No.

Check No.

Postdated

Amount

93-130459

487710

30 March 1993

93-130460

487711

30 April 1993

P30,000.00

93-130461

487709

01 March 1993

P30,000.00

93-130462

487707

30 December 1992

P30,000.00

93-130463

487706

30 November 1992

P30,000.00

93-130464

487708

30 January 1993

P30,000.00

93-130465

487712

30 May 1993

30,000.00

P30,000.00[4]

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital)
from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment
in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account [7]shows the total liability of the
mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992,
incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.[8] The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5
June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. [9] To assure payment of the
obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the
amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid
to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand
letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7)Informations subject of the
instant case.[10]
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that
she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not
discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit,

refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers
food and refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her
mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter
contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the
demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect
her mothers immediate discharge.[11]
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of
the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense. [12] Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court
rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive
part of the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation, which turned
unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she
issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She also
argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the
issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court
should not have applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos ( P60,000.00) equivalent to double the
amount of the check, in each case.[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the
hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check
punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. [16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were
issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she
ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF
THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B.

THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN
AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.

C.

THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE
OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.

D.

IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN
THE ACCOUNT.

E.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE
APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as an
evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within
the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of
whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing
a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great
weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts
or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. [22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the

Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive,
and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. [23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that the issuance of the checks
was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also have the
Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the
grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had in
fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below, rather than questions of law appropriate for
review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal
liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or
at least equal to that committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would
have succumbed to it.[25] It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. [26] A mere threat of a future
injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. [27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore
that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. [28] It
must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. [29]
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue
the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged for fear that her mothers
health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital
suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws
intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of
the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security
the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. [30] And if indeed she was
coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She
even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks because the moment I will not
have funds it will be a big problem.[31] Besides, apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1)
that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be
no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. [33] Ty could have taken advantage of an available
option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of
postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by
the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was
brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the
issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither
uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.

Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case [35] for damages filed by Tys mother against
the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a claim for
damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable
doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the
same was issued for valuable consideration. [36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party
to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration [38] or for value.[39] In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the
checks were issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Valuable consideration may in general
terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply
defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as
the maker or indorser.[40]
In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had
a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her mothers
Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she was not the patient, and
therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41] tells us that it is no defense to an action on
a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the
consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the
promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment
of the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement. Appellee accepted one debtor in place of
another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for
the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are
issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. [43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into circulation. [44] As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,[45] what is primordial is
that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused
by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. [46] If not rebutted, it suffices to
sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and
such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not
an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice
and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential. [48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals [49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction
between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her
case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from those established
in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease contract, where the
lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods
while privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling
victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since
the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for value. Substantial evidence, as found
by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a
first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000, [50] adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain

conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-2001 [53] which clarified
Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to
lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such
that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of
whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment
is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for
violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. [54]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding
petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is
ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private
complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount
of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6082

March 18, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W. Ney for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining
witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the
exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful
detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for
the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest,
the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three
days without having him brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was
arrested. But so far as we can gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a
justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively
proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to
reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The
evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the
adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which
was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to
the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were
controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made
the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable
inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his
defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties;
and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the
offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where
the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary,
we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by
the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith
to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order
were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense
with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. 45186

September 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory
penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her
newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket
about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place
used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in
the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that
she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked
before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to
be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later
requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about
five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments
before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the
baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division
of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house
and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that
the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child
was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that
the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on
the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the
opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree
with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276
of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that
the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed
through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person
who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts,
in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the
thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with
a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with
Kirol she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that
the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from
the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to
remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will
clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the
appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had
fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon
giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as
to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol a
mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day is uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from

books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it
did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to
constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it
birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from
liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary
childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby
acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in
connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 148145-46

July 5, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
On automatic appeal1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 50, finding appellants
Felix Ventura (Ventura) and Arante Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 and
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, without any justifiable cause or motive,
with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber
Home-made Revolver and Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by taking advantage of their superior strength,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with bladed weapon one Aileen Bocateja y
Peruelo, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
-

Cardio respiratory arrest

Hemothorax

stab wounds

which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the latter.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, without any
justifiable cause or motive, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores y
Ventura armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and
abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with said
bladed weapon one Jaime Bocateja, thereby causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
-

multiple stab wounds

#1 Posterior axillary area right

#2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax

lacerated wound right parietal area

OPERATION PERFORMED:
-

Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body

thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or accident independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, due to
the timely and able medical assistance, which saved the life of the victim and the victim was able to escape.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time, and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.3 (Emphasis supplied)
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges. 4 The two criminal cases were consolidated following which they were
jointly tried.5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast asleep in their room on the ground floor of
their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding door which
was closed but not locked. The kitchen light was open, as was the light in the adjoining room where the couple's young children,
Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza Mae, were asleep in their rooms
on the second floor.6
At around 2:00 a.m.,7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together with his nephew appellant Flores, had
stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained entry into the house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following transpired thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the head with the gun and asked him for his
keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the revolver. The two men then struggled for
possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to appellant
Ventura to stab Jaime. Using the knife he
was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw a nearby plastic stool at the
jalousy glass window causing it to break and cried out for help.9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her husband in mortal danger. Appellant Flores
stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued
stabbing her.10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding appellant Flores whom she recognized as a
former employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses. Pleading with appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs
into Rizza Mae's room, and the two called to their neighbors for help. 11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house, 12 bringing nothing with them.13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrived in response to a flash
report.14 Some of the police officers took the spouses to the Western Visayas Regional Hospital, 15 while other elements of the CIU team
intercepted appellants Ventura and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of the spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo.
Recovered from appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with five (5) live bullets, and from appellant Flores a blood stained
knife16 measuring 14 inches from tip to handle with a 10-inch blade.17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to whom they admitted responsibility for
stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions from the reporters, appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was
carrying on an affair with Jaime.18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses' room in disarray, with some cabinets opened and
blood splattered all over the floor, the bed and the ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the crime. 20 Dr. Luis Gamboa, City Health Officer of
Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy of her body, found that she suffered a hack wound on her face and four stab wounds on her
body, three at the chest and one at the back of the right shoulder, all caused by a sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife
recovered from appellant Flores. One of the stab wounds penetrated Aileen's chest near the left nipple, the intercoastal space and the
middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage and ultimately resulting in her death. 21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson, 22 who certified that he sustained the following nonlethal injuries: 23
Multiple Stab Wounds
#1 Posterior Axillary Area Right
#2 Posterior Axillary Area Left with Minimal Hemothorax

Lacerated Wound Right Parietal Area24

From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura and Flores and Primitiva Empirado, the following
version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from Manila where he had been working as a
security guard,25 he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja spouses, was
wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said that it came from Jaime who was courting her, and that it was because Jaime's
wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she had been dismissed from the Bocateja household. Incensed at the
revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left the conjugal home. 26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria, Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental to get
her things. After a verbal confrontation with her husband, she left to find work in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This was the last
time that Johanna and appellant Ventura saw each other.27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and appellant Flores, who had previously
worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses, confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair.28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked him to go with him to their residence so he
could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna.29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence still on the same day, February 22,
2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m. They were not able to immediately enter the premises, however. After boring a hole through
the kitchen door with the knife, appellants entered the Bocateja residence at 2:00 a.m. of the next day, February 23, 2000. 30
Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked sliding door. Appellant Ventura woke Jaime up,
confronted him and told him to stop his relationship with Johanna. Jaime fought back, and he and appellant Ventura grappled for
possession of the latter's gun.31
Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant Flores whom she attempted to strangle with an
electrical extension cord. Unable to breathe, appellant Ventura stabbed Aileen twice with his knife. And seeing that Jaime had wrested
control of the gun from appellant Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed Jaime. 32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of which Jaime began shooting at them with a 9
mm pistol. Appellants were eventually intercepted by policemen who placed them under arrest. 33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted to confront Jaime about the latter's
relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna.34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as Principals by Direct Participation of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER as alleged in Criminal
Information No. 00-20693 with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling, nighttime and
the breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, they are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they shall serve a
prison term of from Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Eighteen (18) years of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s] by Direct participation for the crime
of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20692 qualified by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are present in the commission of the crime .
There is no mitigating circumstance. The accused, therefore, are meted the Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocoteja the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity. The accused are likewise held solidarily liable to pay Jaime Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages
and the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.35 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Brief,36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in considering abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 0020892; (3) in considering
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and (4) in considering the aggravating
circumstances of breaking of door and nocturnity in both cases.37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the stabbing of Jaime and homicide for the fatal
stabbing of Aileen.38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 39 For it to be appreciated,

the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. 40
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of the illicit affair between his wife and Jaime, it is
not, by itself, sufficient proof that he determined to kill the latter; that with Jaime's testimony that appellant had announced a "holdup," they, at most, intended to rob, but not kill the spouses; that their only purpose was to confront Jaime regarding his supposed
affair with appellant Ventura's wife, Johanna; and that if they had truly intended to kill Jaime, then appellant Ventura would not have
bothered to awaken him, but would just have shot him in his sleep.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants' own admissions.
Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously entered therein at 2:00 a.m. At that time,
the surrounding premises were decidedly dark, and all the members of the household were fast asleep. Armed with a gun and a knife,
they proceeded directly to the bedroom of the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke up Jaime. These actuations are not of those
seeking parley, but instead betray an unmistakable intention to kill, not merely confront, Jaime.
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront" Jaime under the foregoing circumstances,
appellant Ventura became evasive and did not give a clear answer:
Q
Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime was only to confront him. My question is, why
is it that you went there at 11:00 o'clock in the evening and not in the morning so that you will have all the
opportunity to confront him?
A

Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind.

Q
Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already told by your wife that there was that
relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your wife?
A

Yes, sir.

Why did you not immediately confront Mr, Bocateja after that day or February 17?

WITNESS:
A

On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja.

xxx

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q
On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of Jaime Bocateja was at that time you
were by him on February 22, 2000?
A

Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja.

Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time?

What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City.

Q
Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja. Did you not
confront your wife or perhaps ask her about the place or where this Jaime Bocateja was at that time and have
the intention to confront him, if that was really your intention to confront him?
WITNESS:
A

No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next day, February 17, she left.

Q
Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at 11:00 o'clock in the evening, you were armed at
that time, is that right, you and your companion, Arante Flores?
A

Yes, sir.

What was that weapon at that time?

.38 caliber revolver.

xxx

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q
Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, why is it that you did not wait or you
did not come to that place earlier so that at that time, Jaime Bocateja was still awake or perhaps waited until the
next day?
COURT:
Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his mind.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually revealed that the timing and method of entry
were purposely chosen to avoid detection by either the Bocateja family or their neighbors:
Q

You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that right?

Yes, sir.

Q
And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront Jaime Bocateja about his relationship with
Johanna is that right?
A

Yes, sir.

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q
Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix Ventura wait for three (3) hours for
you to confront him in his house?
WITNESS:
A

Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the door could not be opened.

Q
My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad market at about 8:00 o'clock why did you
not go to the house of Jaime Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock immediately after supper? At that time when the members
of the family were yet awake?A We stayed at Burgos market and then from Burgos to Libertad we only walk and
from Libertad to the house of Bocateja.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q
You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy. Alegria you were already armed, is that
right?
WITNESS:
A

Yes, sir.

Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that right?

Yes, sir.

And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct?

Yes, sir.

Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness?

We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the] confrontation.

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q

Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him you have to bring this [sic] weapons?

WITNESS:
A

Yes, sir.

Q
When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock. . . by the way when did you arrive at the house
of Jaime Bocateja?

11:00 in the evening.

Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?

No, sir.

Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door for] you, is that right?

WITNESS:
A

No, sir.

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q

As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter the compound of the Bocateja family?

We scaled over the gate.

Q
And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a hole at the kitchen for you to confront
Mr. Jaime Bocateja if that was your purpose?
A

The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.

Q
And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more knock at the door, perhaps call any
member of the family inside the house?
WITNESS:
A

No, sir.

ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q

Why Mr. Witness, Why?

A
We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will make noise or calls and alarm to the
neighbors.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the lips of appellants themselves. Thus, on
clarificatory questioning by the trial court, appellant Ventura testified:
COURT:
Q

I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon?

I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

4:00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that correct?

Yes, sir.

From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make?

A
From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to Bacolod we took the passenger
jeepney.
Q

From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How many kilometers?

Four (4) kilometers.

Q
And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with Arante Flores, your nephew, about the
plans to go to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A

Yes, sir.

COURT:
Q

By the way, what did you do at Alangilan?

I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house.

So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?

We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.

I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?

Yes, sir.

And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house of Jaime Bocateja?

Yes, sir.

It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less?

More than one (1) hour.

Q
And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores [about] the course of action that you will
take once a confrontation takes place with Jaime Bocateja?
WITNESS:
A

Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the house of Jaime Bocateja.

COURT:
Q

I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, correct?

Yes, sir.

You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate?

Yes, sir, we scaled the gate.

You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over?

Yes, sir.

Q
And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you tell the Court, how did you destroy
the main door of the house?
A

No, the kitchen door, sir.

COURT:
Q

How were you able to destroy it?

WITNESS:
A

We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.

You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock the inside lock because of the hole?

Yes, sir.

And I assume that it took you twenty (20) thirty (30) minutes to make that hole?

Yes, sir.43 (Emphasis supplied)

The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the following testimony on direct examination:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q

So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed?

WITNESS:

We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan.

This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan?

The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3) kilometers.

So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan?

We walked in going to Alangilan.

When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do?

WITNESS:
A

We went to our aunt's house.

ATTY. JACILDO:
Q

From Alangilan where did you proceed?

In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we proceeded to Bacolod.

So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod?

8:00 o'clock in the evening.

When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?

We ate our supper at Libertad Market.

After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do?

After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime Bocateja.

ATTY. JACILDO:
Q

What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime?

WITNESS:
A

11:00 o'clock in the evening.

When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?

We enter[ed] the gate of their house.

Please continue?

Then, we opened the door.

And then?

A
We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we tried to open the door but we could
not open the door immediately. We made a hole so that we can get in the house. We entered the house at about
2:00 o'clock in the morning the following day.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and methodical manner by which they
sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, unless shown to be customary, 45 appellants' act of arming
themselves with a gun and a knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing. Consider the
following ruling of this Court in People v. Samolde:46
As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow Cabalin's tear gas gun. This attempt by the
accused-appellant and his co-accused to arm themselves prior to the commission of the crime constitutes direct
evidence that the killing of Feliciano Nepomuceno had been planned with care and executed with utmost
deliberation. From the time the two agreed to commit the crime to the time of the killing itself, sufficient time had lapsed for
them to desist from their criminal plan had they wanted to. Instead, they clung to their determination and went ahead with
their nefarious plan. x x 47

From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront Jaime, to the time they entered the
Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed sufficient for appellants to dispassionately reflect on the consequences of
their actions and allow for their conscience and better judgment to overcome the resolution of their will and desist from carrying out
their evil scheme, if only they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this, appellants evidently clung to their
determination to kill Jaime.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those of the prosecution witnesses is of
no moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to be witnesses against themselves, 48 they waived this right by
voluntarily taking the witness stand. Consequently, they were subject to cross-examination on matters covered by their direct
examination.49 Their admissions before the trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence which the trial court correctly
appreciated against them. 50
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by claiming that he was impelled by the need to
prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle, appellant Ventura. This pretense does not impress.
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation have
been given by the relative attacked. 51 Of these, the requisite of "unlawful aggression" is primary and indispensable without which
defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked. 52
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts, it was appellants who initiated the unlawful
aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who acted in self defense. Hence, neither the justifying circumstance of defense of a
relative53 nor the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative 54may be appreciated in appellant Flores' favor.
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held both appellants collectively
liable for the attempt on the latter's life since they were shown to have acted in conspiracy with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.55 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these cases, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the commission of murder directly by overt
acts. Despite their efforts, however, they failed to inflict a mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their liability only for attempted murder.57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder qualified not by evident premeditation but by
taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The accused Arante
Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big and strong, standing about five feet and six (5'6") inches tall. His
weapon was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood] only about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of their
strength is enormous.59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.60 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and probably stronger than the victim Aileen
Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that the accused appellant Flores was armed at that time x x
x."62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death was not attended by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though ultimately
unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that appellant Flores
deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, 63 taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the
aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not annulling it.64 Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her
husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the
latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. 65 Thus, in People v. Molas,66 where the accused was
convicted of murder for stabbing to death two women and an eight year old boy, this Court discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the three victims was raised to
murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.There was abuse of superior
strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger,
was armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present when
he hacked eight-year old Abelaro and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was
unarmed.67 (Emphasis supplied)

And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto,68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a crime
against persons is aggravated by the accused taking advantage of superior strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding
abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean numerical
superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis--vis the victim. There is abuse of superior
strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense,
although not annulling it. The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of the crime. In this
case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the same in repeatedly stabbing Leah, a young wisp of a girl,
no less than eighteen times after overtaking her in the sala of Dan's house. Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused
his superior strength in stabbing Leah. In a case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at 1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself (U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446). The
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by the trial court, as qualifying the offense as
murder.69 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which his
strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a relative, one claiming self defense must prove
by clear and convincing evidence70 both unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured and reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite, he must also prove lack of sufficient provocation on
his part.71 None of these requisites was shown to be present. As expounded by the trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an extension cord so he stabbed her. Arante was
suggesting that had Ai[l]een remained cool, composed and friendly, she would not have died.
This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going aggression being committed inside her house and
within the confines of her room, hence, Aileen's actuations were perfectly just and legitimate. 72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno,73 did not consider evident premeditation as having aggravated the killing
of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this
aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident
premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the
conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. 74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants, Aileen immediately called for help and hurled
objects at appellant Flores. And it was because of this passionate defense of her husband that appellant Flores hacked at her face and
stabbed her four times. These factual circumstances are analogous to those in People v. Belga,75 where this Court had occasion to
state that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and Arlene Rose, this does not negative the
presence of evident premeditation on the physical assault on the person of Raymundo Roque. We have established
jurisprudence to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than
the intended victim was killed (or wounded, as in this case), if it is shown that the conspirators were determined
to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. Here, Raymundo
Roque provided such violent resistance against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to eliminate him
from their path.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held both of them
responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such other crimes which could be foreseen and are the natural and
logical consequences of the conspiracy.77 In Pring, et al. v. Court of Appeals,78this Court held:
While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is no question that they
were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against the group of Loreto Navarro. Thus, they
must share equal liability for all the acts done by the participants in such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners herein,
Rogelio Pring and Alberto (Roberto) Roxas, on their part, had ganged up Jesus Yumol who belonged to the group of their
adversaries by hitting the latter with a bench and a piece of wood, and that it was a certain David Ravago who stabbed the
deceased Loreto Navarro, nevertheless, it is a rule that conspirators would necessarily be liable also for the acts of
the other conspirators unless such acts differ radically or substantially from that which they intended to
commit (People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536; People vs. Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs. Enriquez, still serve as the governing rule that
should be applied to the case at bar. In the said case, this Court stated:
"x x x x x x x x x

'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had undoubtedly conspired to do grave
personal injury to the deceased, and now that the injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot
escape from the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different way from
that which had been intended. x x x x x x x x x.
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of persons agree to commit, and enter
upon the commission of the crime which will probably endanger human life such as robbery, all of them are
responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law. ed.
1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man
with dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with increased numbers, and
continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of the
them during the beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C.,
239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein was directed against the other
members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the deceased, this would not relieve them from the consequence of the
acts jointly done by another member of the petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro. 79 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,80 this Court held:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the
execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended
as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a
particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the
purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States
v. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its
content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife Aileen was also sleeping,
appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape
accountability for the tragic consequences of their actions.
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated
dwelling,81 nighttime82 and breaking of door83 in connection with both crimes.

the

generic

aggravating

circumstances

of

Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode. 84
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces
greater alarm.85 Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the crimes were committed in the place of abode of the victims who
had not given immediate provocation.86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the breaking of a door was not alleged in either of
the two informations. Thus, the same cannot be appreciated against appellants. On this point, this Court's discussion in People v.
Legaspi,87 quoted in the Solicitor General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death
upon accused-appellant. In People v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338 SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule
thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form death because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable. Any decision
authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to
exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not
eliminate the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment
for an erroneous conviction 'will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.' The accused must thence be
afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the
difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the
parties' evidence.' This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising
the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow
the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated against him.
xxx

The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that due to their non-allegation in the
Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be
considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been formalized in the Revised Rules of
Criminal procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.88(Emphasis supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been considered since Jaime himself testified that their
bedroom was well-lit and there was light coming from the kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of their children. 89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under which nighttime is aggravating
because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating
because the darkness was purposely sought by the offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court
concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance of their murderous intent,
appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as well as the fact that the household members were asleep, in order to gain
entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own testimony indicates that while they were already outside the Bocateja house at
around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call the attention of the
Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took advantage of the darkness of the night, not to
mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal their actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the
victims' home would be undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating circumstances. While the trial Court noted that appellants
were apparently motivated by their belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying on an illicit relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna Ventura, wife of the accused Felix Ventura, were
maintaining an illicit relationship. The evidence on this point is principally hearsay the alleged admissions made by Johanna
of the relationship. There is no doubt, however, that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime Bocateja are
clandestine lovers. It is fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is Ventura's belief of this illicit
relationship which prompted him to confront Jaime Bocateja, 91
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation92 or immediate vindication of a grave offense93 as mitigating circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation, 94 for the appreciation of this mitigating circumstance it is necessary that the act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.95 In the same vein, while "immediate" vindication should be construed as
"proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling Spanish text 96 of the Revised Penal Code, still this mitigating circumstance
cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. 97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost a week before the stabbing incidents on
February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring. Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the time
appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City. Within
that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay and both
appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside the Bocateja
residence before carrying out their plan. Without question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to
recover their equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder qualified by evident premeditation with
the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in
imposing the sentence of Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) Years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated penalty shall
be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.98 Applying Section 1 of
Act No. 4103,99 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the presence of two aggravating
circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls within the range of prision mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and

One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years) as maximum and prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years) as
minimum. Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of prision correccional as
minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength with the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty shall be imposed when, in the commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is present. Consequently, the trial court's
imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray100 that Republic Act
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil indemnity for her death is sustained, the
commission of the crime by appellants having been duly proven. 101 The award of moral damages to her heirs is likewise proper
considering that the prosecution presented adequate proof that they suffered mental anguish and wounded feelings. 102 However, the
amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.103 It should be borne in mind that the purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to
their feelings and not to enrich them.104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such award is proper in view of the presence
of aggravating circumstances.105 Furthermore, considering that counsel for appellants admitted that the heirs of Aileen incurred funeral
expenses of P100,000.00106 and such admission has not been shown to have been made through palpable mistake, the same should be
awarded as actual damages.107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00 in actual damages for hospitalization
expenses since he failed to present any receipts to substantiate the same. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Jaime was actually
hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages. 108 Moreover, Jaime is also
entitled to moral damages in accordance with Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this Court hereby awards in the
amount of P25,000.00.109 Finally, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are also in order considering that the crime was attended by two
aggravating circumstances.110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and
Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder qualified by evident premeditation with the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years ofPrision Mayor as maximum.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of: (a) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as
temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages; and (c) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime and are SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of: (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; (c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages; and (d) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 7659, let the
records of the cases be immediately forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the exercise, at her discretion, of her power to
pardon appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33281

March 31, 1930

CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin Ah Kim,petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO, respondents.
Harvey and O'Brien for petitioners.
Lazaro Pormarejo for respondent Lee Voo.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent judge.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question for decision in this certiorari proceeding concerns the power of a Judge of First Instance, who has in effect acquitted a
man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and who has ordered the confinement of the insane person in an asylum,
subsequently to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Otherwise stated,
the factor determinative of the question has to do with the effect, if any, of section 1048 of the Administrative Code on article 8 of the
Penal Code.
On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the murder of
Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the trial judge rendered judgment declaring the accused not responsible for the crime, and dismissing the
case, but requiring the reclusion of the accused for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code,
with the admonition that the accused be not permitted to leave the said institution without first obtaining the permission of the court.
In compliance with this order, Chan Sam was confined for approximately two years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period, efforts
to obtain his release were made induced by the desire of his wife and father-in-law to have him proceed to Hongkong. Opposition to
the allowance of the motions came from the wife and children of the murdered man, who contended that Chan Sam was still insane,
and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he would kill the wife and the children of the deceased and probably
other members of his own family who were living in Hongkong. These various legal proceedings culminated in Doctors Domingo and De
los Angeles being delegated to examine and certify the mental condition of Chan Sam, which they did. After this report had been
submitted, counsel for the oppositors challenged the jurisdiction of the court. However, the respondent judge sustained the court's
right to make an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the San Lazaro Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-infact of his wife so that he might be taken to Hongkong to join his wife in that city.
Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported to act in issuing his order of release, provides that among
those exempt from criminal liability are:
1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his
confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as
to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the insane the following:
When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for the insane is
temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may discharge such patient, and shall notify the
Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court.
An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of
one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution. The respondent judge
has based his action in this case on this provision of the law. On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the
Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of
Health has exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express his opinion.
Contrasting the two provisions of Philippine law which have been mentioned, it is self-evident that for section 1048 of the
Administrative Code to prevail exclusively it would be necessary to find an implied repeal of a portion of article 8 of the Penal Code. But
it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal none is presumed to be intended. The most

reasonable supposition is that when the Legislature placed the provision, from which section 1048 of the Administrative Code was
derived, on the statute books, it did so without any consideration as to the effect of the new law on article 8 of the Penal Code. It is
likewise a canon of statutory construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together, this
should be done. In this respect, we believe that the authority of the courts can be sustained in cases where the courts take action,
while the authority of the Director of Health can be sustained in other cases not falling within the jurisdiction of the courts. This latter
construction is reinforced by that portion of section 1048 of the Administrative Code which requires the Director of Health to notify the
Judge of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patients is confined by order of the court.
In 1916, the Director of Health raised this same question. He then took the view that section 7 of Act No. 2122, now incorporated in
the Administrative Code as section 1048, applied to all cases of confinement of persons adjudged to be insane in any Government
hospital or other places for the insane, and that the entire discretion as to the sanity of any patient whatever was vested by this
section exclusively in the Director of Health. The Attorney-General, who at that time was Honorable Ramon Avancea, ruled against
the Director of Health, saying that "the Legislature could not have intended to vest in the Director of Health the power to release,
without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the
Penal Code."
In at least two cases, United States vs. Guendia ([1917], 37 Phil., 337), and People vs. Bascos ([1922], 44 Phil., 204), this court has
relied on article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code. The judgments in the cited cases concluded with this order: "The defendant shall be
kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not
be permitted to depart therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo (Pangasinan)."
Due to differences in statutory provisions, the American authorities on the question are not very helpful. However, one case has been
found where the facts were practically identical with the ones before us, where the law is much the same as Philippine Law, and where
the procedure which should be followed was outlined by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. We refer to the case of State
vs. Snell ([1908], 49 Wash., 177). In the decision in the cited case, the court, speaking through Justice Rudkin, said:
On the 7th day of July, 1906, the relator, Chester Thompson, killed George Meade Emory in the City of Seattle, and by reason
thereof was informed against in the superior court of King county for the crime of murder. A plea of not guilty was interposed,
and the place of trial was changed to the superior court of Pierce county. The relator was tried in the latter court before the
respondent as presiding judge, and the jury be returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. On the 3rd day of May,
1907, the respondent entered an order reciting that the relator was then insane; that he had been acquitted of the crime of
murder by reason of insanity; that his discharge or going at large would be manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of
the community; and committed him to the county jail of Pierce county. It was further ordered that, on the 12th day of June,
1907, the relator should be taken from the county jail of Pierce county and transferred to the state penitentiary at Walla
Walla, to be there confined in the ward set apart for the confinement, custody, and keeping of the criminal insane until the
further order of the court and until discharge therefrom by due process of law. The relator was committed to the county jail
and thereafter transferred to the insane ward of the penitentiary in obedience to this order, and is now confined in the latter
institution. On the 19th day of February, 1908, he applied to the physician in charge of the criminal insane at the state
penitentiary for an examination of his mental condition and fitness to be at large, as provided in section 6 of the act of
February 21, 1907, entitled, "An act relating to the criminal insane, their trial, commitment, and custody." Laws of 1907, page
33. After such examination, the physician certified to the warden of the penitentiary that he had reasonable cause to believe
that the relator had become sane since his commitment, and was a safe person to be at large. The warden thereupon granted
the relator permission to present a petition to the court that committed him, setting up the facts leading to his commitment,
and that he had become sane and mentally responsible, and in such condition that he is a safe person to be at large, and
praying for his discharge from custody. A petition in due form was thereupon presented to the respondent judge, after service
thereof upon the prosecuting attorney of Pierce county, but the respondent refused to set the matter down for hearing or to
entertain jurisdiction of the proceeding,. . . . Application was there-upon made to this court for a writ of mandamus, requiring
the respondent to set the petition down for hearing, and the case is now before us on the return to the alternative writ.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion, therefore, that the procedure adopted by the relator is in conformity with the law, and the writ will issues
as prayed.
The foregoing is our understanding of the law on the subject. The following represents our deductions and conclusions. Article 8 of the
Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048
of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as in force and
construing this article and section 1048 of the Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the
opinion that the Director of Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the
court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the converse proposition is equally
tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be
discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the
person is temporarily or permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts and the
Director of Health are complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to adopt all
reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can
best be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.
Various defenses were interposed by the respondents to the petition, but we have not been impressed with any of them except the
ones which go to the merits. After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent Judge acted patiently and cautiously in
the matters which came before him, yet he exceeded his authority when he issued his orders of December 26, 1929, and March 17,
1930, without first having before him the opinion of the Director of Health.
The writ prayed for will issue and the temporary restraining order will be made permanent, without costs.

G.R. No. L-31563

January 16, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUCIANO BARROGA Y SALGADO, defendant-appellant.
M. H. de Joya and Briccio de Jesus for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document, the defendant appeals from the judgment sentencing him to one year,
eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of
P10,857.11, with subsidiary imprisonment, the accessaries of law, and the costs.
The errors attributed by the appellant to the trial court are:
1. In considering the evidence of the prosecution more worthy of credit than that of the defense.
2. In finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the crime of falsification of private documents, and in imposing upon him the
penalty of one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the Compaia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs of the trial, notwithstanding the insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The defendant freely admits that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their falsity; but he alleges that he did so
from data furnished by his immediate chief, the now deceased Baldomero Fernandez, and only in obedience to instructions from him.
As regards the data, we find it to be sufficiently proven that they were not supplied by the aforementioned Baldomero Fernandez, but
by the head of the pressmen, Hermenegildo de la Cruz, and the defendant later collated them with the books of the daily pressings.
With respect to the alleged instructions give by said Baldomero Fernandez, even supposing that he did in fact give them, and that the
defendant committed the crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as such instructions were not lawful, they do not legally shield the
appellant, nor relieve him from criminal liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it
must be a compliance with "a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the person commanding, act
within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has said,
"between a general law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plaintiff forbids what
that superior commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th edition, p. 528.)
We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant committed the acts charged in the information in obedience
to the instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of argument, that such was the case, we repeat that such
obedience was not legally due, and therefore does not exempt from criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil., 433.)
There being no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi,
Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised
by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41,
Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their
backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty
(20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate
occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case
against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which
narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did then
and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22
caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence
one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR
JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon. However, the
resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:

I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS
THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is
evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with
"intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People
vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the
requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his
syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with
discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner
an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action
or constitute a legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265
of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is
essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other
two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs.
Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years
of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the
mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that
person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as
petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be
done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of
his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action,
or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. 1In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus,
Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts
to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3(has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other
hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without
criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and
criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element
of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People
vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two different
concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and
negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary
that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a
quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a
minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the

said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex
non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People
vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she. . ."with the intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the
Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there.' This
allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of pushing her
victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant was that the
combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or
rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it in
effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the
latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should have first been
brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his
entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty
imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as
prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty
imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima,
69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of
P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; ... (emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance
as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances
affecting criminal liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the
penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and
categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order
effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3731

April 20, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO DEGUIA, FLORENTINO DEGUIA, and FRANCISCO DEGUIA, defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
Marino T. Regalado for appellants.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the story of two jack fruits, the dispute over whose ownership ended in tragic death of Jesus Ogalisco on the morning of June 4,
1949, in sitio Binog, barrio of Makiwalo, municipality of Mondragon, province of Samar. According to the medical certificate, Exhs. "G"
and "2", the deceased sustained 20 wounds in all, 4 on the head, 3 on both sides of the neck, and 1 on the back, all of which were
mortal, the other wounds being found on the chest, shoulders and the right arm. For the killing, Domingo Deguia, and his two
sons, Florentino and Francisco, were charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of Samar, were found guilty of the crime and
crime and sentenced each to life imprisonment with the accessories of the law, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P2,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The case is here on appeal
by the three defendants.
Domingo Deguia readily admitted responsibility for the killing, but he claims that he alone killed Jesus Ogalisco, and in self-defense.
According to the version given by Domingo and his witnesses, at about two o'clock in the afternoon of the day in question, he was
riding on his carabao drawing a sled loaded with two jack fruits, a sack of casava and bunches of bananas. On passing near the house
of Jesus in the sitio of Binog, the latter stopped him, claiming, the two jack fruits as his and accusing Domingo of having stolen and
taken them from his tree. Domingo denied the accusation and was in the act of continuing on his way when Jesus without warning,
boloed him on the right side of his face, inflicting an ugly wound that is described in the Certificate (Exh. "1") as a wound "five inches
long and inch deep." In retaliation Domingo unsheated his own bolo and struck Jesus on the head. But his assailant countered with
another blow on the head. Domingo, however, in the course of the fight, succeeded in inflicting several wounds on different parts of
the body of Jesus who thereafter fell down and succumbed to his injuries.
After considering the testimonies of the defense witnesses given during the trial, the lower court rejected the story told by them as
improbable, and the version given by the witnesses for the prosecution, particularly by Petra Liwanag, the widow of Jesus and Juanito
Barcelon, as the more credible and acceptable.
After carefully going over the record of the case, we find no reason for disturbing the action of the trial court in giving more credit to
the witnesses for the prosecution and in rejecting the story of the defense.
On the basis of the evidence, oral and documentary, we find the following facts to have been duly established. On June 4, 1949, Jesus
Ogalisco was living in his small house in the sitio of Binog, barrio of Makiwalo, Mondragon, Samar, with his wife Petra Liwanag and his
minor children. At about ten o'clock in the morning, Francisco Deguia, riding on his carabao drawing a sled containing two jack fruits,

passed near the house. Jesus, suspecting that the said fruits had been surreptitiously taken from his tree, accused Francisco of having
stolen the same, and summarily got the two fruits from the sled and took them into his house. Francisco, apparently resenting the
charge of theft, hurried to his home about a kilometer away and told his father Domingo, his mother Gregoria Toltol, and his brother
Florentino Deguia, of what had happened. About two hours thereafter, Domingo accompanied by his two sons, Florentino and
Francisco, each armed with a bolo and a bamboo spear, arrived in front of the house of Jesus, Domingo asking in a loud voice why
Francisco had been unjustly accused of stealing the two jack fruits, at the same time demanding that Jesus come down. Jesus, sensing
danger and considering the prospects of an unequal combat and heeding the dictates of caution, kept quiet and made no move to
comply with the demand. Then, Domingo in the same tone warned Jesus that if he did not come down, he (Domingo) would kill every
member of Jesus' family in the house, and immediatetly the three men deployed around the house, and thrust the points of their
spears through the sidings of the low dwelling.
Fearing that his family, specially his children might be hurt, Jesus decided to face the situation and went down his house by the back
door, with his bolo hanging from his waist. Father and sons immediately closed upon and surrounded him, Domingo from in front,
boloing him on the head, Francisco spearing him in the right arm and Florentino from behind, stabbing him with his bolo on the back.
It was then that Jesus unsheated his own bolo to defend himself, and in the course of which, he inflicted the wound on the right side of
the face of Domingo. But being outnumbered and surrounded, the outcome of the encounter was not hard to see. Jesus, overcome by
the numerous blows inflicted on him from all sides, tried to run away from his assailants and finally fell down face downward at a spot
about seventeen meters away from his house. His wife Petra, seeing the predicament of her husband, jumped down from the house to
aid him. Florentino met her and threatened to kill her but she begged him to spare her and her children. At that moment, Gregoria
Toltol, wife of Domingo and mother of Florentino and Francisco, appeared at the scene and urged her husband and sons to kill the
entire family, but fortunately, her wishes were not carried out. While the two sons retired with their mother, Domingo approached
Jesus and asked him if he wanted some more, meaning, if he had not had enough, but the question remained unanswered for Jesus
was already dead.
It so happened that same morning, two boys named Juanito Barcelon and Agapito Taroma, both nephews of Jesus, had come from
their homes in the neighboring barrio of Cawayan, to get Palawan, and about the same time that the three defendants Domingo and
his two sons arrived at the scene, they (the boys) were resting under a cabac tree, near the house of Jesus, slicing some vines.
Naturally they witnessed all that transpired near and around the house.
After finding that Jesus was already dead, Domingo discovered the presence of the two boys, Juanito and Agapito, near the premises
and he chased them away. While Agapito remained and hid in the bushes, Juanito ran toward his home and notified his grandmother
and other relatives of his uncle's death. The grandmother hurried to thepoblacion of Catarman, being the town nearest to the scene,
and notified the police authorities, and policeman Porfirio Marquez hurried to the sitio of Binog where he found the body of Jesus in the
same place where he fell. In the meantime, for fear that Domingo and his sons might return, Jesus' widow, Petra Liwanag, was still
hiding in the bushes and policeman Porfirio Marquez had to blow his whistle three times before she ventured out from her hiding place.
Policeman Marquez found three bamboo spears near the body of Jesus, and in the house he found the two jack fruits already
mentioned.
That same afternoon, Domingo, rather weak from loss of blood due to his wound, accompanied and supported by his sons, Florentino
and Francisco, repaired to the house of Sinforiano Coche, lieutenant of the barrio of Makiwalo, and informed the said official that he
had killed Jesus. Domingo was later sent to the poblacion of Mondragon where he was treated and then placed under arrest.
The two brothers, Florentino and Francisco, interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that it was their father who drove the sled where
the two jack fruits were loaded; stripping abaca, and that it was only later in the afternoon that they were informed by one Felix de la
Cruz that their father had met with an accident; that they (Florentino and Francisco) with their mother went to the house of Jesus and
there saw his body; and that at some distance along the trail, they found their own father lying on the ground nursing his wounds.
There are several reasons why this story of the defense can not be accepted. As pointed out by the trial court, Felix de la Cruz was not
presented as a witness in order to support the theory of alibi. Moreover, the participation of the two brothers, Florentino and Francisco,
in the attack was witnessed by Petra Liwanag and Juanito Barcelon, whose testimonies were accepted by the trial court. These same
testimonies as transcribed, we have read, and they appeared to be straightforward and sincere. Besides, as observed by the trial court
and the Solicitor General, it is incredible that Domingo who was far inferior to Jesus in build, stature, and strength could, alone, have
overcome him and inflicted so many wounds on different parts of the body, in front and from behind, especially if we bear in mind the
claim of Domingo that it was Jesus who initiated the fight and therefore had a distinct advantage and opportunity in killing his foe
instead of himself of being overcome and killed. Furthermore, the version given by the prosecution that the three appellants, father
and sons, were armed not only with bolos but also with bamboo spears, is confirmed by the finding near the body of Jesus of said
three spears by policeman Porfirio Marquez who was the first agent of persons in authority to arrive at the scene. The story of the
defense that Jesus had taken the two jack fruits from the sled to his house was also confirmed by the finding of the two fruits by
Porfirio in the house of Jesus. There are other details pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief against the acceptance of the
theory of said defense which we consider unnecessary to mention and discuss.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court should have considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of Domingo his
having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. We, however, disagree with the Solicitor General in his contention that the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place be considered as having attended the commission of the crime. It is true that the house
nearest to the dwelling of Jesus was about a kilometer away but it should be remembered that the appellants did not select the place
either to better attain their object without interference, or to secure themselves against detection and punishment. We are, moreover,
inclined to find as we do find in favor of the three defendants the existence of the mitigating circumstance of provocation. In our
opinion the act of Jesus in accusing Francisco Deguia of stolen the two jack fruits and in summarily taking the same from the sled into
his house was an insult and provocation not only to Francisco but also to his family, particularly his father who must have resented the
accusation. We do not, for certain, know who really owned the fruits. Petra Liwanag, widow of Jesus, admits that neither she nor Jesus
saw the taking away of the fruits from their tree. On the other hand, Domingo claims that he did not have to steal jack fruits because
he had plenty of them at home, giving us to understand that the two jack fruits in question, belonged to him.

In conclusion, we agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General that the appellants are guilty of murder, the killing being raised to
that category because of the qualifying circumstance of superior strength. In relation with Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code and
because of the existence of a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the two brothers,
Florentino Deguia and Francisco Deguia, deserve the imposition of the penalty for the crime of murder in the minimum degree. As to
Domingo, with the existence of two mitigating circumstances, namely, voluntary surrender and provocation, with no aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law should be imposed. We also agree with the Solicitor
General that the indemnity which the appellants are sentenced to pay should be increased to P6,000.00.
Florentino Deguia and Francisco Deguia is hereby sentenced each to not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not
more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Domingo Deguia is hereby sentenced to not less than ten (10) years of prision
mayor and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal. The three should be credited with any
preventive imprisonment they may have already suffered. The indemnity to be paid by them is increased from P2,000 to P6,000. With
these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-45100

October 26, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EPIFANIO DIOKNO and ROMAN DIOKNO, defendants-appellants.
Ramon Diokno and Gabriel N. Trinidad for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno guilty of the crime of
murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentences each of them to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs of the suit. It is so ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its judgment in
question, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in accepting Exhibit E as evidence.
2. The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit K as evidence.
3. The lower court erred in not acquitting the appellant Roman.

4. The lower court erred in sentencing the appellant Epifanio to reclusion perpetua.
The following facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt during the trial:
The deceased Yu Hiong was a vendor of sundry goods in Lucena, Tayabas. At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 4, 1935,
Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year, invited the latter to go with her. Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but
he told Salome that her father was angry with him. Salome answered him: "No matter, I will be responsible." At about 6 o'clock in the
afternoon of said day, Yu Hiong and Salome Diokno took an automobile and went to the house of Vicente Verina, Salome's cousin, in
Pagbilao. As they found nobody in the house, they went on their way up to San Pablo, Laguna. On January 5th or 6th of said year,
Roman Diokno telegraphed his father Epifanio Diokno, who was in Manila, informing him that Salome had eloped with the Chinese Yu
Hiong. On the morning of January 7, 1935, Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno went to San Pablo, Laguna, in search of the elopers.
Having been informed that the latter were stopping at the house of Antonio Layco, they went there. Upon arriving near the house, they
saw Yu Hiong coming down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them, he ran upstairs and they pursued him. As the Chinese found the door
of the house locked, he shouted that it be opened for him. At that moment, he was overtaken by the accused who carried knives
locally known as balisong, of different sizes. Yu Hiong fell on his knees and implored pardon. In that situation Roman Diokno stabbed
him with the knife in the back and later in the left side. Epifanio Diokno also stabbed him once. Yu Hiong fell on the landing of the
stairs in the balcony, and there he was again stabbed repeatedly. Then Roman Diokno said: "Enough, father." Yu Hiong lost
consciousness. Juan Alcantara, who lived on the same street, Hermanos Belen, in front of Antonio Layco's house, saw the accused
pursue Yu Hiong and fired shots for the police to come. Upon hearing the shots, municipal policeman Francisco Curabo appeared and
found Yu Hiong pale and lying on the landing of the stairs. He then asked who had wounded the Chinese and the accused Epifanio
Diokno answered that it was he. The policeman took the knife (Exhibit C) which Epifanio Diokno carried in his right hand and brought
him to police headquarters. Roman Diokno had left before the policeman arrived and he was not located until after three days. The
municipal president of San Pablo, Laguna, also went to the scene of the crime, found the Chinese almost unconscious and questioned
him, putting down his answers in Exhibit E. The Chinese was brought to the provincial hospital of San Pablo where he was examined by
Drs. David Evangelista and Manuel Quisumbing, who found that he had five incised wounds in different parts of the body, one of them
at the back and about three and a half inches long, piercing the pleura and penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung about an inch,
which wound was necessarily mortal and which caused the death of the victim. On January 8, 1935, while the said Chinese was in a
serious condition in the hospital, he made a statement telling how he was attacked by the accused (Exhibit K).
The accused, testifying as witnesses in their own behalf, stated that they had not gone to San Pablo together on the day in question;
that when Roman Diokno arrived, his father Epifanio Diokno was coming down the stairs of Antonio Layco's house with a knife in his
hand; that Epifanio Diokno told his son Roman to go home and tell their relatives what had happened; that when Epifanio Diokno
overtook Yu Hiong on the landing of the stairs of Antonio Layco's house, he asked Yu Hiong whether he was willing to marry his
daughter; that the Chinese answered him in the negative and at the same time tried to take something from his pocket; that as
Epifanio knew that Yu Hiong carried a revolver, he feared the Chinese might harm him; he became obfuscated, drew his knife and
knew not what happened afterwards.
The first question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in admitting as evidence Exhibit E,
consisting in the investigation conducted by the municipal president of San Pablo in the same place where Yu Hiong had fallen a few
minutes before, at about 1.30 p. m. on January 7, 1935, and wherein Yu Hiong, answering the questions asked by said municipal
president, stated that it was Ramon Diokno and Epifanio Diokno who had wounded him.
It is argued by the defense that said document Exhibit E should not be admitted on the ground that some words had been altered and
because it has not been proven that declarant had a sense of impending death.
It does not appear that said document was altered after it had been signed, but on the contrary, municipal president Jacinto Peaflor,
upon being cross-examined by the defense, declared that he neither erased any word nor put another in its place after said document
had been finished.
The fact that Yu Hiong failed to state that he had given up all hope of life, in answering the municipal president's questions, does not
make his declaration inadmissible. It is enough if, from the circumstances of the case, it can be inferred with certainty that such must
have been his state of mind (People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182). In the present case, Yu Hiong was semiconscious as a result of
the wounds received by him and, consequently, he could not have the hope to live when he made his declaration immediately after he
was mortally wounded. But even if the document Exhibit E were not admissible as an ante mortem declaration, it is admissible as a
part of the res gestbecause it was made under circumstances so proximate to the incident that it may be considered as a part
thereof. (People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971; People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil., 601.)
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, untenable.
With respect to the second assignment of alleged error consisting in that the court a quo erred in admitting Exhibit K as an ante
mortem declaration of Yu Hiong, because it does not appear that when the declarant made it he was aware of impending death and
that he did not die until three days after making it, all that has been said relative to Exhibit E, which is the subject matter of the first
assignment of alleged error, may be repeated in connection with said Exhibit K, in the sense that it is admissible as an ante
mortem declaration. Furthermore, when the deceased made the declaration Exhibit K, he complained of great difficulty in breathing
and of being very ill. The fact that he did not die until three days later neither implies that he had no sense of impending death when
he made his declaration because he did not improve thereafter but became worse until he died; nor detracts from its character of
an ante mortem declaration because what gives the declaration such character is the declarant's conviction, upon making it, that he is
not going to live (U. S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14).
The third assignment of alleged error consists in the failure of the court a quo to acquit the appellant, Roman Diokno.
The testimony of the eyewitnesses Juan Alcantara and Antonio Layco corroborated by the different dimensions of the wounds which,
according to Dr. Manuel Quisumbing, were caused by two instruments of different sizes, and theante mortem declarations (Exhibits E

and K) of the deceased, leave no room for doubt that Roman Diokno cooperated with his father and stabbed the deceased Yu Hiong
with a knife in different parts of the body. Furthermore, the deceased stated in his ante mortem declaration (Exhibit K) that it was
Roman Diokno who inflicted the necessarily mortal wound in his back, which caused his death.
We find the fourth assignment of alleged error well founded. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength, qualifying the crime of
murder, which the trial court found to have been proven, has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of United
States vs. Devela (3 Phil., 625), this court said that "the mere fact that the number of the assailants is superior to that of those
attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority." In this case we have the
photographs of the body of the deceased (Exhibits D and D-1) showing that he had a strong constitution: but there is no evidence of
the physical constitution of the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno. Therefore, we cannot determine whether or not said
accused were physically stronger than the deceased and whether or not they abused such superiority.
Neither does this court find the existence of the other circumstance qualifying murder, that is, evident premeditation, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt because, even assuming that both the accused went to San Pablo, Laguna, each carrying the knife used by him in
attacking Yu Hiong, it being customary for the people of said province to carry it, it cannot be inferred with certainty from the mere
fact that they carried knives that their intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the deceased in order to kill him. In order that
premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating circumstance or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident, that is,
the intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. It is not
enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression.
Therefore, there having been neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation, the crime committed by the accused is
simple homicide.lwphi1.nt
The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, that is, immediate vindication of a grave
offense to said accused, may be taken into consideration in favor of the two accused, because although the elopement took place on
January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th of said month and year, the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts
remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was
committed to the vindication thereof. Our opinion on this point is based on the fact that the herein accused belong to a family of old
customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the
peace and tranquility of the home and at the same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the members thereof.
The presence of the sixth mitigating circumstance of said article 13, consisting in having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or ofuscation, may also be taken into consideration in favor of the accused. The fact that the
accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having
gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led
them to commit the crime with which they are charged, as held by the Supreme Court of Spain in similar cases in its decisions of
February 3, 1888, July 9, 1898, February 8, 1908, May 25, 1910, July 3, 1909, and in other more recent ones.
The seventh circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, consisting in having surrendered himself immediately to the agents
of persons in authority, should also be taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court concludes that the accused are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide defined and punished in article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed therein being reclusion temporal in its
full extent. Three mitigating circumstances must be taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno and two in favor of
the accused Roman Diokno, with no aggravating circumstance, thus authorizing the imposition of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law (reclusion temporalin its full extent), or prision mayor in its full extent, in the period that this court deems
applicable, which is the medium period in this case, in accordance with the provisions of article 64, rule 5, that is eight years and one
day ofprision mayor.
Both accused should be granted the benefits of the indeterminate sentence provided in Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225,
which prescribes a penalty the minimum of which shall be taken from that next lower to prision mayor, or prision correccional of from
six months and one day to six years. Taking into account the circumstances of the case, the indeterminate penalty to which each of
said accused must be sentenced is fixed at from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, crediting each with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment (art. 29, Revised Penal
Code).
Wherefore, this court declares the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno guilty of the crime of homicide
and sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day
of prision mayor, crediting them with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs of both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-38091 December 17, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
RODOLFO CABILING and ROBERTO LOPEZ, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Agcaoili for appellant Roberto Lopez.

Cirilo F. Asperilla, Jr. counsel de oficio for appellant Rodolfo Cabiling.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Wilfredo D. Reyes
for appellee.
ANTONIO, J.:
Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1332-Q.C., imposing upon appellant
Rodolfo Cabiling the penalty of death for the murder of Guido Fermin, and appeal of the same judgment insofar as it imposed upon
Roberto Lopez the penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Both appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P12,000.00, to pay P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and their proportionate shares of the costs.
The following are the pertinent facts:
On April 28, 1973, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Murder against appellants Rodolfo Cabiling and
Roberto Lopez (alias Betty Lopez) and one John Doe, alleging:
That on or about the 11th day of December 1972 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of GUIDO FERMIN by then and there hitting
him several times with a lead pipe on the head and inflicting upon said Guido Fermin serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in such amount as
may be awarded under the Civil Code.
Upon arraignment, defendants-appellants pleaded "not guilty" and trial was accordingly had.
Benjamin Juliano, 21 years of age, resident of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, testified that on December 10, 1972, he and his companions, namely
the driver of the truck the deceased Guido Fermin, Restituto Surbito, Danilo Sulit and their employer, one Mr. Ramos, left Jaen,
Nueva Ecija to deliver a truckload of rice in Manila. As they were about to enter Balintawak, Quezon City, their truck broke down due to
a mechanical defect. Guido Fermin parked the truck on the shoulder of the North Diversion Road, just beyond the toll gates, after
which Mr. Ramos left them to buy the necessary spare parts. No spare parts were, however, available as the stores were closed as it
was Sunday. In the meantime, he and his companions spent the night in the truck. Shortly after noon of the following day, while he
was seated on the driver's seat and his comrades were asleep, or resting on top of the sacks of rice, three men approached their truck.
For no reason at all, one of the three men, whom he later Identified as appellant Rodolfo Cabiling, suddenly lunged at him and
attempted to stab him with a knife. After he succeeded in parrying the thrusts, he slid down right side of the truck and ran away in
order to summon help. In the ensuing melee, Guido Fermin woke up and alighted from the truck. He was immediately attacked by the
two other men. One of them, wielding a lead pipe about two feet long, 1 started hitting Guido on the head with the pipe. He Identified
appellant Roberto Lopez as the one who clubbed Guido Fermin with the pipe.
From a distance, he saw Cabiling return to the place where his two other companions were and he also hit Guido Fermin. When a
policeman arrived at the scene in answer to his outcries for help, the three ran away pursued by the policeman.
Restituto Surbito, 30 years of age, a resident of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, also testified that he was inside their truck at around 1:45 p.m. on
December 11, 1972, when his companion, Danilo Sulit, woke him up. Sulit told him somebody was making trouble. Upon waking up,
he saw a policeman chasing three men. At that juncture, he also noticed the driver already in a serious condition, hence, they had to
bring him to the hospital in a car.
A few days after the incident, Benjamin Juliano had occasion to go to the market at Clover Leaf, Balintawak, Quezon City, and there he
saw the man who clubbed Guido Fermin on the head with a lead pipe. He made inquiries at the market place and found out that his
name is Roberto Lopez. He reported the matter to the police and his statement was taken down. 2 Earlier, or on December 15, 1972,
he had given a statement to the police narrating the incident leading to the death of Guido Fermin. 3 At the time his supplemental
statement was being taken, the police showed him pictures of several persons and from among them he picked out the picture of the
accused Rodolfo Cabiling, whom he pointed to as the one who tried to stab him several times. 4 Rodolfo Cabiling was thus arrested by
Pat. Cuenca. Roberto Lopez, on the other hand, upon being informed that he was implicated in the killing of Guido Fermin, voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities.
At the trial, the prosecution presented in evidence the Necropsy Report, 5 prepared by Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation. In his testimony, Dr. Reyes stated that Guido Fermin died upon arrival at the National Orthopedic
Hospital. His post-mortem examination of the deceased showed the presence of lacerated wounds and contused abrasions on the
different parts of the body, thus:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Blood coming out of nostrils and mouth.
Contused Abrasions: scalp parieto-occipital region, right side, 10.0 x 8.0 cms.; back, right side, 36.0 x 16 cms.;
elbow, right, antero-lateral aspect, 8.0 x 1.0 cm.; leg, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 12.0 x 5.0 cms.; foot, left,
medial aspect, 12.0 x 9.0 cms.; foot, left, lateral aspect, 22.0 x 6.0 cms.

Wounds, lacerated, sutured: scalp, parieto-occipital region, right side, 6.0 cms.; leg, right, upper third, antero-lateral
aspect, 19.0 cms.; leg, left, lower third, antero-medial aspect, 2.0 cms.
Hematoma, scalp, temporo-parieto-occipital region, right side.
Fractures: depressed, comminuted, skull, right, parieto-occipital bone with linear extensions to the temporal bone,
right, floor of the middle cranial fossa, bilateral, and posterior cranial fossa, right: compound, complete,
comminuted, tibia and fibula, right, upper third; complete, simple, fibula, right, lower third; compound, complete,
tibia and fibula, left, lower third.
Hemorrhages, meningeal, subdural and subarachnoidal, generalized.
Brain and other visceral organs congested.
Heart, small amount of dark clotted and fluid blood.
Stomach, one-half filled with partly digested rice and other food particles.
He attributed the death of the victim to: "Hemorrhages, intracranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries on the head."
On the part of the defense appellant Rodolfo Cabiling, 20 years of age, resident of Sampaloc, Manila, testified that at around 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1972, while he and his two companions one "Boy Bicol" and a certain "Joe" were
walking along the North Diversion Road towards the direction of Balintawak, intending to bring "Boy Bicol" home because he was
drunk, the latter suddenly collided with a man who was running towards a parked truck. Upon noticing that the man was visibly irked
by the physical collision, Cabiling apologized for "Boy Bicol". The man, however, retorted: "Iinom-inom kayo bago hindi naman kaya."
This angered "Boy Bicol" and as he tried to hit the other man, Cabiling pushed "Boy Bicol" towards the wire fence. The other man then
ran inside the truck and came out armed with a "buriki". 6 As the man went after "Boy Bicol", Cabiling ran behind the wire fence. The
man and "Boy Bicol" confronted each other and when the former lunged at the latter, the two grappled for the possession of the
"buriki". Cabiling, upon seeing another man coming down from the front left door of the truck, approached the man and tried to stab
him several times, but this man was able to parry his attacks. Thereafter, the man returned to the truck. When he saw the other
occupants come down from the vehicle, he ran away.
For his part, appellant Roberto Lopez alleged that on the day of the incident, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at his
residence at No. 19-G Balintawak, Quezon City. He denied having participated in the killing of Guido Fermin.
Pat. Ricardo Manuel, of the Caloocan City Police, resident of 44 G. de Jesus, Caloocan City, testified that in the afternoon in question,
while he was in the house of his brother in Progreso St., Bagong Bayan, Quezon City taking a bath, he heard a gun report coming from
the direction of the North Diversion Road. At that moment, he saw three policemen, one of whom, he recalled, was Pat. Amparo of the
Quezon City Police, chasing three (3) suspects. Upon seeing this, he joined the pursuers. He stated that he recognized only one of
those three suspects. This man he Identified as appellant Rodolfo Cabiling. He also declared that he did not see appellant Roberto
Lopez on that occasion. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that Roberto Lopez is his neighbor, being the son of a policeman
of Quezon City. He also admitted that he never gave any statement before any police authority in connection with the case, although
he promised Det. Bijasa who was investigating the case that he will help him and that he testified not in response to any subpoena,
but in compliance with the request of the father of the appellant who is also his neighbor. On re-direct, he mentioned that only two
policemen chased the three suspects.
Another witness, Bernardo Romero, a barber, of Balong Bato, Quezon City, testified that when he went to fetch water at about 12:00
o'clock in the afternoon of the day in question, he saw Roberto Lopez. The latter was near his house, selling ice candy and arranging
the queue of those who were getting water from his artesian well. He alleged that Lopez remained in that area for about two (2)
hours. He also declared that he approached the defense counsel and volunteered to be a witness. Rodolfo Cabiling likewise stated that
Roberto Lopez was not one of his companions at the time of the incident in question.
On the basis of the afore-mentioned evidence, the court a quo rendered the afore-mentioned judgment of conviction, stating that:
The defense of denial and alibi made by the accused Roberto Lopez cannot be given much weight because admittedly
being in his house which is near the North Diversion Road, the scene of the crime, he had all the chances within
which to perpetrate the crime imputed to him by reason of geographical proximity. The trustworthiness of his
corroborative witnesses cannot also be given much consideration, because admittedly, they are close friends of the
accused Roberto Lopez and as such, it is expected that their testimonies would be self-serving in a desperate effort
to salvage a friend who is in trouble.
On the part of he accused Rodolfo Cabiling, his testimony which was uncorroborated cannot be given much probative
value it being self-serving to evade criminal liability.
The court a quo further found that:
The killing of Guido Fermin was qualified by the circumstance of treachery. The deceased was sleeping at the time
when the two accused and their unidentified companion approached the parked truck. He was awakened and when
he alighted from the truck the accused Roberto Lopez struck him with a lead pipe. He was unarmed and defenseless
at the time and he posed no resistance or danger to his killers.

The fact that the accused and their companion used their combined strength in hitting and killing the victim
convinced the Court that the crime was aggravated by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Accordingly, the afore-stated penalties were imposed upon Rodolfo Cabiling and Roberto Lopez, the court appreciating, in favor of the
latter, the mitigating circumstances of minority and voluntary surrender. Hence, the instant appeal. After the two appellants and the
Solicitor General, in behalf of the People of the Philippines, had filed their respective briefs, and after this appeal had been submitted
for decision, appellant Roberto Lopez, on October 30, 1976, filed a Motion for Withdrawal of Appeal.
I
Appellant Cabiling claims that there are inconsistencies in the statement of Benjamin Juliano in his affidavit of December 15,
1972, 7 his direct testimony and his testimony on cross-examination which render the testimony unworthy of credit. Thus, appellant
claims that Juliano stated in his affidavit, 8 as well as in his direct testimony, that appellant Cabiling, after attempting to stab him, ran
away. It is contended that this is inconsistent with his testimony in court, when he declared that after Cabiling failed to stab him he
jumped out of the truck, while Cabiling went to the side of the truck to join his two companions who were attacking the driver.
From a careful consideration of the affidavit 9 and his testimony in court, We find no such inconsistency. The pertinent portion of
Juliano's affidavit reads as follows: "When the three men had already approached us, one of them suddenly stabbed me repeatedly. I
kept on parrying the trusts, until Fermin woke up. When Fermin was about to alight from the truck I saw the other two men approach
Fermin and I saw that the other one was holding a lead pipe. I saw that they repeatedly struck Fermin on the head with the lead pipe
and afterwards, they ran away. When the three men had already left, a policeman happened to pass by." It is true that in the
beginning of his testimony on direct examination, in answer to the question: "Was he able to hit you with the knife?", Juliano
answered: "The one who was stabbing was not able to stab me and he ran away", but this statement must not be considered in
isolation but in relation to the rest of his entire testimony. Thus, he subsequently declared that after eluding the stabbing thrusts of
Cabiling, he went down the left side of the truck, ran a few meters and shouted for help. Cabiling in turn went to the side of the truck
to join his two companions who were attacking the driver, Guido Fermin. Thus, on cross-examination, he stated the following: "Q. You
testified after that when you were able to get out from the truck this Cabiling ran away. Is that correct? A. That is it. He went to our
driver." The contradictions pointed out by appellants do not affect the essential facts and they are such inconsistencies as may be
committed by honest witnesses regarding unimportant details. They refer to minor matters which could be attributed to defects in the
translation of either the question or the answer of the witness, if not to confusion engendered by long cross-examination and his lack
of experience as a witness. It has been noted that in view "of the lapse of time and different capacities for observation, the witnesses
cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity matters connected to the main overt acts." 10 The stubborn fact that can be
drawn from a careful consideration of Juliano's testimony is his certainty and conviction that the two appellants are the authors of the
cold- blooded death of Guido Fermin.
II
Neither are We impressed by appellant Lopez's alibi and claims of innocence. Benjamin Juliano clearly and positively Identified Lopez
as the person who clubbed the deceased with a lead pipe. 11 Obviously, Juliano had no motive to testify falsely and impute to appellant
Lopez the commission of a serious crime. Neither he nor Lopez knew the other prior to the date of the incident. As a matter of fact,
Juliano only learned of appellant's name when, upon seeing him some days later at the market near the Clover Leaf highway at
Balintawak, and recognizing him to be the assailant of the deceased, he inquired from the people in that place appellant's name and
address. It was only then that Juliano learned that the name of appellant is Roberto Lopez alias Betty Lopez, as well as his residence at
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The circumstance that he saw appellant for the second time and recognized him as the one who clubbed
the deceased is confirmed by the fact that he executed a statement to that effect before Det. Rey S. Bijasa, of the Detective Bureau,
Quezon City Police at 6:00 p.m. on January 16, 1973, 12 which statement he affirmed under oath before the City Fiscal of Quezon City
on March 12, 1973.
In the absence of any reason or motive why a witness for the prosecution should testify falsely, the logical conclusion is that there is
no such improper motive, and consequently, the testimony of such witness should be accorded full faith and credit. 13 There is no
cogent and sound reason to doubt Juliano's Identification of appellant Lopez. The crime was committed in broad daylight at 1:45
o'clock in the afternoon. It is not disputed that Juliano was present when the crime was committed. His promptness in informing the
police on January 16, 1973 of the name of the afore-mentioned appellant immediately after he learned of it demonstrates his candor
and sincerity. It will also be noted that the trial court has observed that Juliano "* * * stuck to the substance of his direct testimony,
he has withstood the rigors of an intense and thorough cross-examination made by defense counsels. He has shown sincerity in his
testimony. It is highly improbable for him to falsely testify against the interest of the two accused * * * considering that before the
commission of the crime he is a total stranger to the accused." The rule is well-settled that when the issue involves credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court, as the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves, and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. The exception is
when it is shown that the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered, might affect the result of
the case. 14 We find no ground to disturb such findings. Appellant Lopez having been positively Identified by the prosecution witness as
the person who clubbed the victim, his alibi is worthless. It has been repeatedly held that the defense of denial and alibi could not
prevail over the positive Identification of an accused by the prosecution witnesses as the author of the crime. This rule is wellsettled. 15
Apart from the foregoing, for an alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but he must also clearly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time it was committed. 16 According to the trial court, the house of appellant Lopez is situated near the North Diversion Road near the
scene of the crime. It was not, therefore, impossible for Lopez to have left his house that afternoon, participated in the commission of
the crime, and returned to his abode to evade arrest when they were pursued by the police.
It is true that Pat. Ricardo Manuel of the Caloocan City Police Department, in testifying for the defense, stated that he did not see
appellant among the three men whom they were pursuing. It must be noted, however, that this witness conceded that he did not

recognize two of the suspects they were pursuing. Assuming that he was telling the truth, it is possible that at the time he joined in
the chase, appellant was already too far away for him to be able to recognize. At any rate, Pat. Manuel does not appear to be an
impartial or disinterested witness. Roberto Lopez is the son of Pat. Elino Lopez of the Quezon City Police Department, a neighbor and
an acquaintance of Pat. Manuel. His interest in testifying favorably for said appellant could have been motivated by a spirit of
camaraderie or neighborliness. This is manifest from the fact that, although he was not subpoenaed he voluntarily appeared as a
witness for said appellant. This he did, according to the findings of the court a quo, without notifying the Chief of Police or his
immediate superior in the police department, in violation of existing regulations. 17 Indeed, if it were true that he was one of the
policemen who chased the three suspects, no explanations had been given why no official police report about the incident showing his
participation had been submitted in evidence. Neither does it appear that he testified during the preliminary investigation of the case
before the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, nor has any police authority who had anything to do with the investigation of the crime
been presented to corroborate his testimony. As a neighbor of appellant and one bound by fraternal ties to the father of said party, this
witness was certainly interested in the exoneration of said accused. There is no question that the bias, interest or motive of a witness
may affect his credibility and justify the court in disbelieving his testimony.
III
Having found that the two appellants nave committed the aforestated criminal overt acts, the next question to be resolved is the
criminal responsibility of each of the appellants. Appellant Cabiling insists that he cannot be held responsible for the death of Guido
Fermin since there is no evidence that he clubbed the deceased. It was sufficiently established by the evidence, however, that the
three appellants Cabiling, Lopez and another companion approached the truck of the deceased together; that two of them were
armed, Cabiling with a knife while Lopez had a lead pipe; that upon reaching the truck, appellant Cabiling, without the slightest
provocation from the occupants of the truck, immediately attacked Benjamin Juliano, who was then seated in the driver's seat, by
attempting to stab him several times with his knife, but which trusts Juliano was fortunately able to parry while, his two companions,
upon seeing the driver Guido Fermin, alight from the truck, went after said driver and attacked him, appellant Lopez hitting Fermin on
the head with a lead pipe; that later, Cabiling went to the assistance of Lopez and when the police authorities arrived, the three ran
away together.
These circumstances sufficiently indicate in their totality that the three acted pursuant to a common criminal design. Certainly,
Cabiling's action in immediately attacking Juliano with a deadly weapon, without any immediate provocation from the latter, while
Lopez clubbed the driver, Guido Fermin, with a lead pipe the moment he alighted from the truck, shows the existence of a previous
understanding among them to kill the personnel of the truck. The time-honored rule is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design, understanding or agreement among the
conspirators to commit the offense charged. 18 It is not essential that each conspirator shall take part in every act, or that one should
know the exact part to be performed by the other conspirator in the execution of the conspiracy. Conspiracy implies concert of design
and not participation in every detail of execution. 19
Thus, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of some unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy may be inferred although no actual meeting between them to conspire is
proved, 20 for the prosecution need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime or that
they were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy. It is enough that from the individual acts of each accused, it may be
reasonably deduced that they had a common plan to commit the felony. 21
Conspiracy having been established, every one of the conspirators who took active part in its execution, such as Cabiling and Lopez, is,
therefore, responsible for all of the acts of the others done in furtherance of the common design. 22
Appellants assign as error the trial court's application of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. It is argued that the driver could not have been unaware of the danger because the fact that he alighted
from the truck as a consequence of the struggle between Cabiling and Juliano indicates that he was alerted to the danger and was
then moving away to ensure his own safety. We find such observations tenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. 23 So it has been held that where the victim, upon stepping outside her house, asked the accused: "What do you
want of me?" and the latter, without saying anything, stabbed her mortally, the attack was held treacherous. 24 Similarly, where the
victim was fetching some water from a container and the appellant suddenly gave him a blow with a bolo on the left side of the
neck, 25 or where the victim and the accused were casually passing each other in the street, and the latter suddenly and unexpectedly
stabbed the victim, 26 the attack was considered qualified by alevosia. In a case where the victim was awakened when the accused
asked him: "Are you Tasio?" and this was followed by a thrust at the victim's abdomen, the assault was held treacherous. The Court
ruled that: "Even if the deceased was already awake when the aggression commenced, and even if there was light, it is nevertheless
true that Hichon (the victim) was down on his back, still drowsy, and unarmed. He was unaware of the defendant's intention; the
blows were delivered of a sudden and without warning." 27 And in People v. Jumdatal, 28 where Jumdatal suddenly hacked Hadjirol with
his barong when they met in the trail, the Court held that sudden attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim
constitutes treachery.
The doctrine deducible from the cases is that if the slayer makes a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an
unarmed and unsuspecting victim under conditions which make it impossible for the party attacked to flee or make defense before the
fatal blow is delivered, the criminal overt act has been considered as qualified with treachery. 29
It must be recalled, however, that the deceased Guido Fermin alighted from the truck precisely because he saw his companion being
attacked. At the time he went out of the truck, he was not unprepared as he must have sensed the impending danger they were in.
The circumstance that the deceased sustained multiple injuries which were found on various parts of his body, such as lacerated

wounds on the head and injuries on the legs, may indicate that there was some kind of a struggle between the victim and his
aggressors. The circumstance that at the time he was attacked he was unarmed does not necessarily mean that he posed no
resistance to his assailants. Besides, mere suddenness of an attack is not enough to constitute the qualifying circumstance of
treachery where it does not appear that the accused had consciously chosen the method of attack directly and specially to facilitate the
perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. 30 As indicated in People v.
Tumaob: 31 "The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any
preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. This circumstance can only be applied, according to the tenor of article 13, sub-section
16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specially to
insure the commission of the crime and at the same time to eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the
other party might offer." 32
It is not clear from the evidence of record that the appellants reflected on the means, method and form of killing the offended party.

33

Finally, it is necessary to resolve whether or not the trial court erred in applying the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Upon the question of whether the circumstance that two or more persons attack a single person is of itself sufficient to show
a superiority of strength within the context of the penal law, no fixed and invariable rule can be established. Thus, the mere fact that
the two accused may have inflicted fatal wounds on the deceased with their respective bolos does not justify a finding that advantage
was taken of superior strength in the absence of proof showing that they cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their
superiority of strength. 34 In the Lasada case, 35 where four men, three of whom were armed with clubs or sticks and the other one
with a bolo or knife, simultaneously attacked an unarmed victim, the attack was considered aggravated by the circumstance of abuse
of superiority. Upon the other hand, in the Bustos case, 36 where the two accused (Bustos and Macaspac) on meeting the victim
pursued him until they overtook him, inflicted several wounds upon him as a result of which he died, the Court held that the mere fact
that there were two aggressors cannot constitute per se abuse of superior strength in the absence of evidence in the record of the
relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 37 According to Cuello Calon, it is: " 'Abuse
of superior numbers or employment of means to weaken the defense' (art. 10, 8.a). This circumstance greatly
resembles alevosia when placed in a situation of advantage over those on whom it is employed, such that one is confused for the
other. This circumstance should always be considered whenever there is anotorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of
by him in the commission of the crime. To properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the
protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the incidents and
episodes constituting the total development of the event. There is no need for previous agreement among the aggressors." 38 Thus,
in People v. Verzo, 39 this Court held that there was abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing where three of the defendants
were wielding bolos, whereas the victims was unarmed and trying to flee.
In the case at bar, the circumstance that the victim was unarmed and had just alighted from the truck when he was suddenly attacked
and clubbed by two assailants, to be joined later in the attack by their companion who was also armed, shows that the three assailants
took advantage of their physical superiority. It must be noted that the deceased sustained contused abrasions on the right side of the
scalp, right elbow, left leg, left foot; lacerated wounds on the scalp, right and left leg; and fractures on different parts of the skull
(right parieto-occipital bone with linear extension to the temporal bone, right, floor of the middle cranial fossa, bilateral and posterior
cranial fossa, right), as well as compound and comminuted fractures on the tibia and fibula which show that the victim was struck by
different kinds of weapons, indicating that two or more armed men participated in the attack.
In conclusion, We hold that herein appellants are criminally responsible for the crime of murder because of the attendance of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The penalty for the offense of murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. In the case of appellant Cabiling, the same should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua, there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Insofar as appellant Roberto Lopez is concerned, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, 40 and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. 41 Being a minor of about 17 years of
age, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, which in this case should be prision mayor in its
maximum period toreclusion temporal in its medium period (10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). In view of the existence of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which is not offset by any aggravating circumstance, he should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

G.R. No. L-37271

July 1, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAGDALENA CALISO, defendant-appellant.
Juan Sumulong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of murder by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the parents of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. On this appeal, her counsel de oficioattacks the findings of fact of the trial court, but does not
raise any question of law.
The questions of fact involved in this case are fully discussed in well considered decision of the trial court, presided over by then Judge
Quirico Abeto, which decision reads as follows:
Se halla acusada Magdalena Caliso del delito de asesinato de un nio de 9 meses de edad, ocurrido en La Carlota, Negros
Occidental, el dia 8 de febrero del presente ao, 1932. La querella alega que la acusada, siendo una criada de los Sres.
Esmeralda (Emilio), voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente y con el proposito de satisfacer una venganza, administro cierta
cantidad de acido acetico concentrado, que es una sustancia venenosa, a Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., un nio de 9 meses de edad,
causandole quemaduras en la boca, en la garganta, en los intestinos y otras partes vitales de los organos internos que le
produjeron necesariamente la muerte de la victima, quien sucumbio pocas horas despues; que en la comision de este delito,
han concurrido las circunstancias agravantes de alevosia, abuso de confianza y que el acto se ha cometido en la propia
morada de los padres de la victima.
Despues de presentadas las pruebas, tanto de la acusacion, como de la defensa, y despues de oidos los brillantes informes
aducidos tanto por el Fiscal Provincial, como por el abogado de oficio de la acusada, el Juzgado se ha reservado la decision
para este dia, no sin antes felicitar tanto a la acusacion como a la defenda, la primera por lo concienzudo en la reunion y
presentacion de sus pruebas, y la segunda por el interes grande con que ha demostrado a favor de la acusada. El Juzgado ha
querido tomar tiempo para decidir esta causa, porque se da cuenta de lo grave que es el delito cometido y de las
circunstancias tanto de la acusada como de los ofendidos en esta causa. Por un lado, esta la acusada, que es una mujer que
pertenece al sexo debil, en la primavera de su vida, a quien una sentencia podria privar de todos los beneficios que la vida le

ofrece. Por otro lado, una madre loca de dolor que ha perdido al unico hijo varon de la familia y que considera a la causada
como la persona que le ha arrebatado su unico cario. Por eso el Juzgado ha querido, hasta donde le ha sido posible, poner
toda su atencion en todos los detalles de las pruebas, observando hasta los menores actos de los testigos y de la acusada.
Y de las pruebas presentadas, el Juzgado encuentra que en la tarde del dia 8 de febrero de 1932, mientras los esposos. Sres.
Emilio Esmeralda y Flora Gonzalez estaban durmiendo tomando la siesta, repentinamente la Sra. de Esmeralda se desperto
porque oyo un grito agudo de su hijo Emilio Esmeralda, de 9 meses de edad, que estaba durmiendo en una cama al lado
opuesto del sitio donde estaba ella durmiendo con su marido. Cuando la Sra. de Esmeralda llego, seguida de su marido, a la
cama donde habia dejado dormido a su hijo, al levantar el mosquitero de la cama, percibio inmediatamente un olor fuerte de
acido acetico y encontro a su hijo, que seguia llorando fuertemente, con los ojos en blanco, los labios hinchados y
blanquecinos y la cara amoratada, y al levantarle percibio olor de acido acetico en la respiracion del nio. Entonces grito
preguntando quien habia puesto acido acetico en la boca de su hijo, y como ella es farmaceutica de profesion, se acordo
inmediatamente de un antidoto que podia neutralizar los efectos del acido acetico y ella misma saco agua de cal y mojando
un algodon hidrofilo, limpio la boca del nio, al mismo tiempo que mandaba a su marido que llamara por telefono al doctor.
Pocos momentos despues llego el Dr. Augusto Locsin, quien segun su declaracion, noto inmediatamente el olor de acido
acetico en la respiracion del nio, y quiso hacer la primera cura, lavando el estomago del nio, pero la madre no quiso que el
lavado llegara hasta el estomago, por el temor de lastimar la garganta del chiquillo con el 'catheter', y por este motivo el
lavado solamente se pudo hacer hasta la garganta del nio. Despues de algun tiempo, llegaron, procedentes de Bacolod, los
Dres. Orosa y Ochoa, quienes por telefono habian sido llamados tambien por el padre de la victima. El Dr. Orosa es el jefe
medico del Hospital Provincial de esta provincia, y el Dr. Ochoa es uno de los medicos residentes en dicho hospital,
especialista en las enfermedades de los cinco sentidos. Ambos doctores declararon positivamente que habian percibido el olor
de acido acetico en la respiracion del nio, y habiendo ellos concluido que el chiquillo habia tomado acido acetico, aplicaron la
cura para eliminar dicha sustancia del organismo del nio, y despues de hacer las primeras curas, llevaron al nio al Hospital
Provincial y alli murio pocos minutos despues de haber llegado.
Ambos doctores, asi como el Dr. Locsin, son unanimes en la afirmacion de que la muerte del chiquillo se debio al
envenenamiento por medio de acido acetico, y todos, especialmente el Dr. Ochoa, coinciden en la opinion de que la muerte ha
sido por asfixia, pues el acido acetico ha hecho estragos en la laringe del nio y este no pudo respirar. El Dr. Ochoa que, como
se ha dicho, es un especialista en los cinco sentidos, examino la boca y la garganta del nio y encontro alli quemaduras
ocasionadas, segun el, por el acido acetico. Y tan seguros estan los doctores de que el nio habia tomado acido acetico y que
la muerte del mismo se debio a esta sustancia, que el mismo Dr. Orosa, que es un medico de muy larga experiencia y un
experto cirujano, le aseguro al Fiscal que no habia necesidad de autopsia para llegar a una conclusion rayana a la seguridad
sobre la causa de la muerte del chiquillio, y que aun cuando la autopsia demostrara que no existia acido acetico en los
intestinos de, nio, ya porque este habia sido absorbido por el organismo, o ya porque el estomago habia sido lavado, el
estaba segurismo de que la muerte se debio al envenenamiento por acido acetico, porque el habia olido esa sustancia, cuyo
olor es inconfundible, en la respiracion del nio y ha visto los estragos de la sustancia en la garganta y en la boca del occiso.
Ambos medicos, de un modo positivo, sin dudar ni un momento, aseguraron al Juzgado de que la causa de la muerte, como
se ha repetido varias veces, es por envenenamiento por acido acetico. Y el Juzgado esta conforme en que en tales
circunstancias, no habia necesidad de autopsia para que el Juzgado pueda concluir, en vista de las afirmaciones de los
medicos basadas en los hechos por ellos encontrados, que la muerte ha sido por envenenamiento por acido acetico.
El Juzgado no tiene duda alguna de la competencia de estos dos doctores, sobre todo tratandose de la opinion del Dr. Ochoa,
que es un especialista en los cinco sentidos y que ha reconocido la garganta y la boca del nio, en las cuales encontro
quemaduras pruducidas por aciso acetico.
Aparte de esto, la madre del occiso, que es una farmaceutica, acostumbrada a oler y distinguir sustancias, percibio el olor del
acido acetico en los primeros momentos en que alzo a su hijo de la cama. El marido de esta seora, Sr. Emilio Esmeralda,
tambien es un quimico y aseguro tambien haber olido el olor fuerte del acido acetico desde los primeros momentos. Aparte de
estas dos personas que pueden equivocarse, ya por su pasion o por las preocupaciones de momento por estar interesados por
su hijo, esta el Sr. Julian Gomeri, otro quimico que vivia en la misma casa, quien aseguro al Juzgado que al entrar en el
cuarto donde estaba el chiquillo en brazos de su madre, olio inmediatamente el olor sofocante del acido acetico, tanto es asi
que pregunto inmediatamente quien habia puesto acido acetico en la cama del nio y en seuida se puso a buscar por si habia
dicha sustancia en la cama del nio, pero no encontro ninguna botella de acido acetico, ni rastro de esta sustancia en la
cama, sino en la respiracion del nio.
Por eso el Juzgado repite que esta probado fuera de toda duda racional que el nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., murio a
consecuencia de envenenamiento de acido acetico, y es insostenible la teoria de que pubo haber tenido una indigestion por
haber ingerido jugo de naranja de California despues de haber tomado leche, y de que el olor del acido acetico podia
derivarse del vomito dle chiquillo por la mezcala del jugo de naranja con la leche. Tres medicos y tres quimicos es imposible
que confundan el olor del jugo de naranja que se ha vuelto acido al mezclarse con la leche, con el olor fuerte del acido acetico
concentrado.
Habiendo llegado a esta conclusion de que la muerte del nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., se debio a envenenamiento por acido
acetico, la otra cuestion que el Juzgago tiene que resolver es: quien le administro esta sustancia.
Desde este punto las pruebas son todas circunstanciales unicamente.
Es un hecho probado que dias antes de este suceso, al volver el Sr. Emilio Esmeralda a su casa, procedente de la fabrica de la
Central La Carlota, a eso de la madrugada, not cierto bulto que se movia en los bajos de su cama en el cuarto-habitacion de
el y de su seora cuando esta pasaba algunos dias en La Carlota. Temiendo que algun ladron se habia introducido debajo de
la cama, cogio su revolver y amenazo con dispararle un tiro al que estaba alli metido si no salia. Efectivamente de alli salio un
hombre y, todo temblando, le dijo al Sr. Esmeralda que el no era un ladron, sino que estaba alli porque habia sido llamado por
la acusada con quien estaba en relaciones amorosas. El Sr. Esmeralda entonces le recrimino por su acto y le dejo marchar,

conminandole que no volviera a repetir el acto. Cuando la Sra. Flora Gonzalez llego a La Carlota algunos dias despues, o sea
en el dia de autos, el Sr. Esmeralda, despues del desayuno y estando entonces ausente la acusada por haber ido al mercado,
le conto a su seora lo que habia sucedido en uno de los dias pasados, o sea, el haber sorprendido a un hombre en su propio
cuarto y debajo de su misma cama, acudiendo a una cita que tuvo con la acusada. La Sra. de Esmeralda, dada su educacion y
por ser mujer al fin, se sintio muy ofendida e indignada por el acto de su criada y, muy nerviosa, espero la vuelta de la
acusada, y cuando esta llego, la Sra. Esmeralda la busco en la cocina, la empezo a insultar de pies a cabeza, recriminandola
por su acto inmoral y por haberse permitido ocultar a su amante en el propio cuartro de sus amos, y despues de regaar a la
acusada, se volvio a su cuarto, y pareciendole poco la recriminacion que acababa de hacer a la acusada, otra vez la Sra. de
Esmeralda volvio a la cocina a reprenderla de nuevo, y como no se calmaban los nervios de la Sra. de Esmeralda en estas dos
ocasiones, a medida que volvia a la cocina, emprendia nuevos insultos a la acusada, en terminos que cuando la Sra. de
Esmeralda puso a dormir a su hijo en la cama, cuando encontro algo sucias las fundas de la almohada, otra vez se fue a la
cocina y volvio a amonestar a la acusada recriminandola y diciendola que solamente sabia tener amantes y no sabia cumplir
sus deberes como criada. Apenas dos horas escasas de ocurrir estos insultos, ocurrio el suceso que dio lugar a la muerte del
nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr.
Procediendo por eliminacin, el Ministerio Fiscal ha tratado de probar al Juzgado, y asi alega en su informe, que en el momento
de ocurrir el incidente del envenenamiento del nio, solamente estaban en aquel dia viviendo en la casa donde ocurrio el
suceso, diez personas, a saber: los esposos Esmeralda, sus dos hijas, Lilia y Elsa, el nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., Julai Gomeri,
Jose Colmenares, Catalino Ramos, una criada de unos 12 aos de edad, llamada Magdalena Soriano, y la aqui acusada. El
Ministerio Fiscal dice que no pueden ser autores dle envenenamiento, ni el Sr. Esmeralda, ni su esposa. El Juzgado, desde
luego, esta conforme con esta eliminacion. No es posible que estos sean los autores de tal envenenamiento; ademas de ser
padres, la actitud de la madre, enloquecida de dolor por la muerte de su hijo, aleja toda duda. Seria absurda la mas remota
suposicion de que estas personas fuesen los autores de tal envenenamiento. No podia ser Elsa Esmeralda porque esta, aparte
de sus pocos aos, estaba durmiendo con su hermanito en la misma cama donde ocurrio el incidente. No podia ser Lilia, ni la
criada Magdalena Soriano, porque ambas estaban entonces en el retrete, segun las pruebas; ademas que no podia caber la
suposicion de que, o Magdalena Soriano, o Lilia hayan administrado equivocadamente acido acetico al nio dormido, por
cuanto que la botella que lo contenia estaba en la cocina, segun la acusada misma, cerca del cantaro de agua donde ella
habia puesto, y la acusada, segun ella misma, estaba toda la tarde en la cocina fregando platos, de tal manera que si
Magdalena Soriano o Lilia hubiesen querido alcanzar la botella de acido acetico, la acusada los hubiera visto. Julian Gomeri
estaba dormido en su cuarto; era un compaero del Sr. Esmeralda en el trabajo, amigo intomo de la familia y no ha tenido
ningun disgusto con ningun miembro de ella y no hay motivo alguno para atribuir que el haya puesto en la boca del nio
acido acetico. Jose Colmenares estaba en la fabrica de la Central, que dista medio kilometro de la casa ocupada por los Sres.
de Esmeralda, ocupado en sus trabajos como empleado de dicha Central. Catalino Ramos estaba ausente entonces en la
localidad, pues se encontraba en el pueblo de Talisay. Eliminadas estas personas, solamente queda la acusada como posible
autora del acto de administrar acido acetico al nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr.
Desde luego, la prueba de que la acusada, pocas horas antes del suceso, era la unica de la casa que habia recibido insultos de
la madre del nio, es una prueba circunstancial contra ella. Ninguno tenia motivos de resentimiento hacia ningun miembro de
la familia del occiso mas que la acusada. Ella misma ha admitido durante su testimonio que en aquel dia ella habia sido
reprendida por su ama. Cuando el nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., dio un grito agudo que hizo despertar a su madre, Julian
Gomeri, que estaba dormido en el otro cuarto, pudo abrir los ojos y vio a la acusada saliendo de la puerta de la sala y
dirigiendose hacia la cocina. Por esta sala habia que pasar al salir del cuarto donde estaba dormido el nio, para ir a la cocina;
y la distancia de la puerta de esta sala al sitio donde estaba durmiendo el nio habia apenas 4 o 5 metros. La acusada no ha
podido desmentir esta declaracion de Julian Gomeri, ni ha podido dar explicacion alguna por que en aquel preciso momento
ella salia de la sala para ir a la cocina. Es posible que despues de haberse puesto el acido acetico en la boca del nio, este no
haya podido gritar inmediatamente, sino algunos segundos despues al sentir los efectos del acido, de tal manera que la
acusada tuvo tiempo para abandonar el sitio y volver a la cocina y estando en la sala, el nio dio el primer grito que le hizo
abrir los ojos a Julian Gomeri. Este hecho es otra prueba circunstancial bastante fuerte, a juicio del Juzgado, contra la
acusada. Cuando la madre del nio estaba curando a este, ordeno a la acusada y a Magdalena Soriano a que hirvieran agua
en la cocina, y mientras estas dos criadas cumplian la orden, la acusada, sin motivo alguno plausible, le puso las manos
debajo de las narices de Magdalena Soriano y le dijo: "Mis manos estan oliendo acido acetico porque se ha derramado algo
alli cuando hice vinagre esta maana con acido acetico." Esta explicacion no pedida hecha por la acusada no parece indicar
otra cosa mas que algun temor que abrigaba por si alguien pudiese oler acido acetico en sus manos. Otra prueba
circunstancial contra la acusada es el hecho de que en la casa ella era la unica que tenia bajo su custodia esta botella Exhibit
A que contenia acido acetico. Magdalena Soriano no sabia siquiera donde estaba puesta esta botella. Cuando la Sra. de
Esmeralda busco esta botella, cuyo recuerdo le trajo a la memoria al oler el acido acetico en la boca de su hijo, la acusada fue
quien saco la botella de la cocina y le entrego a la Sra. de Esmeralda, diciendola, poco mas o menos, estas palabras: "Seora,
aqui esta botella; no ha salido de la cocina."
La acusada, al declarar en la silla testifical como testigo a su favor, al ser preguntada por el Juzgado si ha olido acido acetico
al entrar en el cuarto, se inmuto algun tanto; pero inmediatamente se repuso y nego rotundamente haber olido acido acetico.
El Juzgado le dirigio varias veces esta pregunta, y la acusada insistio en su negativa. El Juzgado le pregunto si conocia el
acido acetico y el olor del mismo, y afirmo que si y volvio a afirmar que no habia percibido tal olor en el cuarto al entrar y
durante todo el tiempo que habia permanecido alli. Ahora bien, tres medicos imparciales, does quimicos y una farmaceutica,
aparte de Magdalena Soriano, han olido el inconfundible olor de acido acetico en el cuarto. La unica que no ha podido oler
dicha sustancia es la acusada. En la comisionde un crimen, el unico que tiene interes en negar la existencia de un cuerpo del
delito es casi siempre, o sin casi, el autor del mismo. Y esta actitud de la acusada de negar una cosa tan evidente y sobre la
cual el Juzgado no tiene duda alguna, corrobora, a juicio del Juzgado, todas las pruebas circunstanciales que se han
presentado por la acusacion.
La defensa hace enfasis en el hecho de que la acusada, lejos de escaparse, entro en el cuarto para ayudar a la madre del nio
para salvar a este, y tanto es asi que la misma acusada, segun Julian Gomeri, tan pronto como la Sra. de Esmeralda pidio
algodon, fue la que saco de las manos de Julian Gomeri el algodon y lo entrego a la Sra. de Esmeralda. Este hecho no es, a
juicio del Juzgado, suficiente para demostrar la inocencia de la acusada. Cuantas veces ha sucedido que el que ha realizado

un acto criminal, se arrepiente de su crimen y trata de remediarlo! El que acaba de herir a un hombre, despues de pasado el
primer momento de obcecacion, si el pudiera curarlo, indudablemente no se encontraria mejor medico para el herido. Tambien
puede suceder que la acusada, habiendo querido causar daos unicamente a la criatura, haya querido usar de toda su
habilidad para que los efectos del dao no fuesen tan grandes. La actitud de la acusada, por tanto, es perfectamente
explicable y no incompatible con su culpabilidad. Otra actitud de la acusada que parece tener bastante peso es su actitud
cuando ella volvio por la tarde del dia siguiente del suceso a la estacion de policia cuando el Jefe de Policia le dijo que volviera
en aquella tarde. Y el abogado de la acusada tiene razon para hacer enfasis sobre esta circunstancia. La acusada ha sido
arrestada casi a media noche del mismo dia del suceso. Fue puesta en libertad a las 11 de la maana del dia siguiente, en
vista de que no llegaba orden de arresto contra ella; pero el Jefe de Policia le dijo que volviera a las 3 en punto de la tarde, y
a las 3 de aquella tarde la acusada volvio al edificio municipal. El abogado de la acusada arguye que una conciencia criminal
no procederia como ha procedido la acusada; ella se hubiera escapado. El Juzgado ha considerado detenidamente este
aspecto de la cuestion; ha meditado largamente sobre este acto de la acusada; pero la conclusion del Juzgado es que si la
acusada volvio en la tarde de aquel dia al edificio municipal, era porque la acusada no sabia que el nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr.,
habia muerto. Ademas, ella debia saber que, mujer que era, no podia ir a ninguna parte sin que le alcanzaran las autoridades
correspondientes y, por tanto, era mejor para ella presentarse ante las autoridades aparentando tener una conciencia
tranquila y preparando en esa forma su futura defensa. El Juzgado cree que desde el momento en que la acusada mostro
solicitud suma para salvar la vida del nio que ella habia segado en momentos de colera, la acusada ya habia concebido su
plan de defensa.
Se dira tal vez quo no es usual que, habiendo la madre del nio ofendido a la acusada, esta, en lugar de tomar venganza de
la madre, que muchas oportunidades hubiera ella tenido porque, segun ha tratado de resaltar el abogado de la defensa, la
acusada dormia en el mismo cuarto de los esposos Esmeralda y preparaba la comida de estos, haya dirigido su accion
vengadora a una inocente criatura, maxime teniendo en consideracion que la acusada es una mujer y las mujeras, por regla
general, son mas caritativas que los hombres. En primer lugar, ya sea un hombre, ya sea una mujer, cuando estan obcecados
por el odio y la venganza, ya no consideran las circunstancias y procuran dirigir su venganza al que les ha ofendido alli mismo
donde es mas facil ejecutar. En este caso, el nio Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., era el que dormia mas cerca a la puerta entrando
inmediatamente, procedente de la cocina, y era el que, por su tierna edad, podia sentir inmediatamente los efectos del acido
acetico, pudiendo asi ejecutar su venganza con mayor seguridad de su parte. Causando dao al nio, que, por ser el unico
varon de la familia, era el mas querido por los Sres. de Esmeralda, se causaba mayor dao a la Sra. de Esmeralda. El
Juzgado, desde luego, acepta la teoria de que la mujer es mucha mas caritativa que el hombre y mucho mas debil del
consenso comun; pero precisamente por ser mas caritativa, por ser mas debil, cuando la mujer se vuelve mala y quiere
vengarse, su venganza busca al mas debil tambien y sobre este hace recaer esa venganza, y la experiencia diaria nos ensea
que los seres mas debiles, sean hombres o mujeres, cuando se vuelven malos, son peores enemigos; y no es nada extrao,
por tanto, que la acusada, temiendo atacar al Sr. Esmeralda y a la Sra. de Esmeralda, porque contra ellos no tenia asegurada
la ejecucion de su venganza, ha escogido como victima a una criatura indefensa de 9 meses de edad.
Por las consideraciones expuestas, el Juzgado encuentra probado fuera de toda duda racional que Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., de 9
meses de edad, fallecio el dia 8 de febrero de 1932, a consecuencia de envenenamiento por acido acetico concentrado, y que
la acusada, aprovechando la ocasion en que sus amos estaban durmiendo, administro una pequea cantidad de esta
sustancia a dicho nio, quemandole de este modo la boca y la garganta, a consecuencia de lo cual dicho nio fallecio.
Se declara, por tanto, a la acusada Magdalena Caliso culpable del delito de asesinato, y estimando en la comision del delito la
concurrencia de la circunstancia agravante de alevosia, porque se trata de un ser indefenso, y de la circunstancia de haberse
realizado el acto en la propia morada de los padres de la victima, cuyas circunstancias estan compensadas con las
circunstancias atenuantes de falta de instruccion y de haber obrado la acusada a impulsos de un sentimiento que la hayan
producido arrebato y obcecacion, le condena a la pena de reclusion perpetua, a indemnizar a los padres del occiso en la suma
de P1,000, con las accesorias de ley, y a pagar las costas del juicio. Asi se ordena.
We agree to the conclusions of fact reached by the trial court. As to the application of the law to the facts of the case, we are inclined
to the proposition advanced by the Attorney-General that in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse
of confidence was present since the appellant was the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's amah.
The circumstance of the crime having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party, considered by the lower court as another
aggravating circumstance, should be disregarded as both the victim and the appellant were living in the same house. (U.S. vs.
Rodriguez, 9 Phil., 136; U.S. vs. Destrito and De Ocampo, 23 Phil., 28.) Likewise, threachery cannot be considered to aggravate the
penalty as it is inherent in the offense of murder by means of poisoning (3 Viada, p. 29). Similarly the finding of the trial court that the
appellant acted under an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation should be discarded because the
accused, in poisoning the child, was actuated more by a spirit of lawlessness and revenge than by any sudden impulse of natural and
uncontrollable fury (People vs. Hernandez, 43 Phil., 104, 111) and because such sudden burst of passion was not provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts of the victim or of his parents (U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil., 162), since Flora Gonzalez had the perfect right to
reprimand the defendant for indecently converting the family's bedroom into a rendezvous of herself and her lover.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence being offset by the extenuating circumstance of defendant's lack of instruction
considered by the lower court, the medium degree of the prescribed penalty should, therefore, be imposed, which, in this case,
is reclusion perpetua.
The penalty imposed by the lower court upon the appellant being thus within the limits fixed by law, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 4971

September 23, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,

vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian
Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the
last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis
Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then
went to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said
house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the
Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of
the room, and after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following
question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want
to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I
have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers'
pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped
into the room, hiding himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in
the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour
later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and wrested the weapon from the hand
of the accused. The latter immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking
him to lock him up in jail; and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at
Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges out of the
window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of said
province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the evidence
adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be
executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to this court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the crime of murder, defined and punished by
article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
(alevosia), she being suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank
range, while the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a conversation, in which she
was concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and after usual and customary words had passed between her and her
aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in attack that directly and
specially insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might have been offered by the victim who,
owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place where she was standing, or even escape or divert
the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations which were certainly not borne out at
the trial, the evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his
culpability as the sole fully convicted author of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but managed
to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again the said corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face;
whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking
the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and
Lloyd Nickens in their respective declaration, especially with that of the second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by
the aggressor at the deceased, as shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached the accused in order to take his weapon
away from him which he succeeded in doing after a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the house. Thus, the shot that
struck the deceased in the breast and caused her death was not due to an accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of
the aggressor with intent to deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as
premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased should be taken into consideration. The lastmentioned circumstances appears proven from the testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery, the circumstance of premeditation
should only be considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is, however, manifest and evident by reason of the open acts
executed by the accused. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the former to

be absent from the canteen where he was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his mind was
unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon
the latter's invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was lying on the table on
which were also several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time had come,
adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and when the accused went to bed apparently very much
worried, and refusing to answer when called, the witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's
house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the
woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that
he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his
revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner,
disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his
criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph
7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the
only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not
those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is our opinion that the same
should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed according to the
law in force, and that in the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal
Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon. So ordered.

G.R. No. 95125 May 12, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILFREDO PAGSANJAN alias WILLY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Valmonte Law Offices for accused-appellant.
NARVASA, C. J.:
Wilfredo Pagsanjan (alias "Willy"), at one time a member of the police force of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was charged with the crime of
murder under an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan dated February 26, 1987. The information alleged that on January
13, 1987, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Wilfredo, "with abuse of superior strength, treachery and evident premeditation and with intent
to kill . . ., did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot . . . Marcelo M. de Leon with a firearm
thereby inflicting on the latter mortal physical injuries which directly caused his death."
Assisted by counsel de parte, Wilfredo entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment and was thereafter tried. He was convicted by
judgment promulgated on June 22, 1990, which contained the following dispositive part, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Wilfredo Pagsanjan alias "Willy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUAand to pay the costs.
The accused is hereby sentenced to pay the heirs of Marcelo de Leon the sum of P48,000.00 for funeral services, the
sum of P144,000.00 for the burial lot, and another amount of P10,000.00 for expenses during the wake. He is also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 (People vs. dela Fuente, G.R. No. 62351-52,
December 29, 1983).
Wilfredo's counsel moved for reconsideration contending that his client had been denied due process because by the Trial Court's
refusal to grant him an extension counted from his receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes, he had been constrained to prepare
and submit the memorandum in the defendant's behalf without said transcript of stenographic notes and "with haste." He also moved
for the Judge's inhibition. Both motions were denied. The Court ruled (a) that "memorandum is not part of the trial, it is the evidence
adduced during the trial that has to be considered and evaluated by the Court;" and (b) as regards the motion for inhibition, that since
the decision in the case had already been promulgated, his inhibition would be tantamount to allowing a court of equal jurisdiction to
review the decision of co-equal court."
The accused did not thereafter file a notice of appeal. Nevertheless, the records of the case were transmitted to this Court on
instructions of the Trial Court which evidently entertained the notion that because the accused had been sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, he was "entitled to an automatic appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court." 1 The motion is erroneous.
As this Court has already, stressed in other cases, 2 the constitutional proscription on the imposition of the death penalty,3 has
eliminated the automatic review by the Supreme Court, theretofore existing, of "cases where the death penalty is imposed." 4 Hence,
as the law now stands, in criminal cases, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court in only one of
two ways: (a) the filing of a notice of appeal in those cases where the latter imposes the sentence of reclusion perpetua, regardless
of the questions to be raised on appeal, whether purely legal, or legal and factual; 5 or (b) the filing of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 6 where the penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua, but the appeal would involve only questions of
law. 7 It was therefore necessary for the accused, Wilfredo Pagsanjan, to file a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment of conviction to initiate an appeal. Since no such notice of appeal was filed, no appeal was ever perfected,
and it was clearly error for the Trial Court to send up the records of the case to this Court.
The failure of Pagsanjan or his counsel to file a notice of appeal within the time appointed should ordinarily have brought about finality
of the verdict of conviction. The Court is however loath to declare Wilfredo's right of appeal to have been lost through the common
misapprehension of both his lawyer and the Trial Court. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Wilfredo was misled by the Court's
statement in its Order of August 2, 1990 that he was "entitled to an automatic appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court." There is
moreover on record a handwritten letter of Wilfredo dated March 14, 1991, addressed to former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, 8 in
which he proclaims his innocence, puts in serious doubt the sincerity and quality of the defense put tip by his lawyer in his behalf, and
contends that he had been made "a victim of a well-coordinated conspiracy between and among the police investigators, the Judge,
some court employees, and to some extent the defense lawyer . . . " To the letter, he also attached a typewritten document containing

arguments for his acquittal, 9 a copy of which he claims to have submitted to his counsel, "Atty. Ricardo Valmonte" but which
arguments, according to him, were not included in . . . (the memorandum submitted to his behalf) due to reasons known only to . . .
(his) lawyer." 10 Under these circumstances, the Court feels that a review of his case, taking account of all of the appellant's proffered
arguments, would be more consonant with the ends of justice. That it now undertakes.
Not unexpectedly, the versions given by the prosecution and the defense of the material occurrences, are widely divergent. Following is
the narration of the facts, culled from the prosecution's proofs consisting of the testimony of (a) the victim's wife, Angelina del
Rosario de Leon; (b) P/Sgt. Ponciano M. Casili of the Valenzuela Police Force, (c) Senior Medico-Legal Officer Orlando Salvador, of the
National Bureau of Investigation; (d) P/Sgt. Loreto Rodriguez, and (e) a former police officer, Avelino Francisco, as well as seven
empty shells found at the scene of the crime, various documents and photographs.
Marcelo de Leon was living with his wife, Angelina del Rosario, at No. 42 Tamaraw Hills, Valenzuela. At the time of his death on January
13, 1987, he was the President and General Manager of their business known as "Villamaria Subdivision" and a member of various
civic, religious and sports organizations. The spouses owned apartment dwellings which they let out to different persons. One of these
was 10-door apartment building at the back of their residence, a unit of which, numbered 6, was occupied by Carmen Reyes and her
"live-in partner" or common-law husband, Wilfredo Pagsanjan. At the time of the incident, they had been leasing the place for about
ten (10) years.
That 10-door apartment building was in process of undergoing renovation and repairs on January 13, 1987. Prior to commencement of
the work, the de Leon Spouses had sent written notices for the vacation of the premises to all the tenants. One such notice was given
to Carmen Reyes' mother, who was also staying at said Unit No. 6, but who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. What
the de Leons did was to verbally reiterate their demand to vacate to Carmen Reyes and her mother. But Carmen refused to leave the
place. She simply said she was looking for another place to transfer. She even rejected the de Leons' offer of another apartment
dwelling, protesting that the rental was too high for her considering that her common-law husband, Wilfredo, had been dismissed from
his job as a policeman.
In the morning of that day, January 13, 1987, at around 8:30 o'clock, Angelina de Leon was standing in front of Unit No. 7 of the
apartment building, sweeping the yard and supervising the work being done by the carpenters. Her husband, Marcelo, was in the
second floor of Unit No. 8, in turn supervising the workers in that area.
Angelina saw Wilfredo Pagsanjan enter the apartment tenants' gate carrying what looked like cardboard box, about one meter long
and a foot wide. He went into Unit No. 6 and stayed inside for sometime. Angelina also saw her husband, Marcelo, come down from
apartment No. 8 and go to apartment No. 1.
After a while Angelina heard successive gunshots from the place where her husband had gone. She turned towards that direction. She
saw her husband, Marcelo, lying on his back on top of a pushcart which happened to be there, his feet dangling from one end. She
also saw Wilfredo Pagsanjan, bent slightly toward, with along firearm pointed towards Marcelo. Before the shooting, she had heard no
altercation or exchange of words between Wilfredo and her husband. Her husband had no gun or other weapon on his person, and she
observed no other individual with any firearm in that pIace. Angelina started to run to her husband but was stopped by the carpenters
who brought her inside her home. She used her radio communications system to seek help. According to her, her husband's death
wrought a great change in her life; she was not herself for much of the time; she became fearful of her life and could not eat nor sleep
not only because of her grief but also because she began to receive calls that she would be the next victim.
The post-mortem examination disclosed that MARCELO de Leon died from several gunshot wounds, any one of which was fatal and
would cause death within an hour, and that his wounds were compatible with the number of empty shells recovered at the scene of the
crime.
Police Sergeant Ponciano M. Casili, officer-in-charge of the Investigation Section of the Valenzuela Police Station, received a telephone
call from a certain Edgar of Tamaraw Hills, Marulas, Valenzuela, advising of a shooting in the apartment compound of Marcelo de Leon.
He forthwith proceeded to the place, together with his assistant, and the Chief of the Follow-Up Section. They came upon the lifeless
body of Marcelo de Leon on a pushcart, with several gunshot wounds in the face and head. Casili had the body brought to the Fatima
Hospital and then interrogated the persons at the scene. The victim's wife, Angelina de Leon, was hysterical and was unable to give a
narration of the shooting beyond saying that she had seen Wilfredo carrying a long object. Casili took down the statements of two of
the workers in the apartment building, Fernando Pangan and Gualberto Rivera, Jr. and had them sworn to before MTC Judge Serapio.
Casili's companion, Pat. Salonga, took down the statement of another person, Orlando Caparas, a carpenter. Casili collected seven (7)
empty shells of an Armalite M-16 rifle at the scene of the crime.
Casili later went back to the de Leons' house but was there informed by former Barangay Captain Amang de Guzman that Mrs. de Leon
could not be questioned, He then prepared a "General Alarm Report" for the apprehension of the suspect, Wilfredo Pagsanjan a
former policeman who had been dismissed for cause from the police force but had afterwards succeeded in having himself employed in
the Civil Security Unit in the Office of the Mayor, assigned to the Office of the Chief of the SID (Silid Siyasatan),Valenzuela Police
Station, which was the position he was holding on January 13, 1987.
Casili looked for Wilfredo in several places: at the apartment of his "live-in partner," Carmen Reyes; at the police headquarters; at the
house of Wilfredo's father at Barangay Central and that of his grandmother at Bagbag, Novaliches; at the house of Wilfredo's former
"live-in partner," Erlinda. Wilfredo could not be found in any of said houses. Other police officers searched for Wilfredo in the house of
his uncle at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, in that of his mother, at the CID District, as well as in the houses of some of his known friends at
Dama de Noche, Marulas. Wilfredo could not be found in any of said places either. In fact, Wilfredo was not seen or heard from from
January 13, 1987 until more than two and a half years later, on July 11, 1989, at which time, accompanied by a certain Atty.
Valenzuela, he surrendered to the authorities.
In its turn, the defense presented two witnesses: Valenzuela Police Lieutenant Francisco Rodriguez, and Carmencita Reyes.

Lt. Rodriguez identified the telegraphic report and the letter to the NBI of Sgt. Casili in both of which Casili describes the killer as an
"unidentified" person; this, notwithstanding that he had already spoken to the victim's widow, Mrs. de Leon, and the latter had
supposedly identified the assailant as Wilfredo (Willy) Pagsanjan.
For her part, Carmen Reyes, the appellant's common-law wife, asserted that Wilfredo was not in the apartment building at all when the
shooting of Marcelo de Leon took place; in fact he had not been to that place for a week because they had quarreled over Wilfredo's
having slapped her child by her first husband. She declared that at the time of the shooting, she was, in her apartment taking coffee.
She however ignored the shots, and only went out after two minutes to see what had happened. She heard someone carrying out to
Mrs. de Leon that her husband had been shot, and saw Mrs. de Leon attempting to go out of the Gate but being pulled back by her
son. She saw MARCELO de Leon sprawled on a pushcart. When some police officers arrived, she went back into her apartment. Not
long afterwards, P/Lt. Rodriguez knocked at her door and asked for Wilfredo Pagsanjan so that he could help in the investigation,
Wilfredo being, according to Carmencita, quite experienced or skilled in this sort of work. She told Pat. Rodriguez Wilfredo was not in.
When Rodriguez seemed skeptical, Carmencita even asked him to search her house, which Rodriguez did, together with Sgt. Casili.
Carmencita saw Wilfredo a month after the incident at his house in Meycauayan and told him he was a suspect in the killing of Marcelo
de Leon, and although the latter wished to surrender himself at the time, he was advised against doing so by a certain Pat. Mario
Capangyarihan because Mrs. de Leon had allegedly paid someone P150,000.00 to kill him.
Wilfredo Pagsanjan did not chose to testify in his behalf.
In this Court, appellant Pagsanjan prays for reversal of the verdict against him, ascribing the following errors to the Trial Court, to wit:
1) in failing to consider his memorandum prior to promulgating judgment of conviction;
2) in accepting the prosecution's version of the facts and rejecting appellant's; and
3) in convicting him of murder instead of homicide only, and failing to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
After a meticuluos review of the record, this Court is constrained to agree with the Trial Court's assessment of the evidence, and to
hold that the appellant's guilt of the crime charged has indeed been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Pagsanjan was positively identified by the victim's widow, Angelina de Leon, as the person who had passed through the gate of the
apartments' tenants, bearing what seemed to be l cardboard box and had gone into Unit No. 6 where he stayed for a while. He was
also identified by Ms. de Leon as the man who, after successive gunshots had rung out, had a long firearm pointed towards her
husband then lying on his back on top of a pushcart. The evidence also establishes that Pagsanjan had in fact been residing in one of
the de Leons' Apartments, leased by his common-law wife, Carmen Reyes; that Carmen had refused to vacate her unit despite having
been asked to do so by the de Leons, circumstances which led the Trial Court to opine that, "the motive of appellant in killing the
victim was to get even with the latter for ejecting his live-in partner." 11
There, too, is the intriguing fact of Pagsanjan's flight from the scene of the crane and disappearance from his usual residence and
haunts for some two and a half 1/2) years. Considering that he was once a police officer himself and at the time of the shooting was
employed in the Civil Security Unit in the Office of tile Mayor, assigned to the Office of the Chief of the SID (Silid Siyasatan),Valenzuela
Police Station and therefore well acquainted, perhaps even on intimate or close terms, with some of the other policemen
investigating the case, as well as generally as with other people involved in law, enforcement, his hiding himself for such a long period
of time makes no sense unless it be in the context of his inability to exculpate himself.
Appellant Pagsanjan never having taken the witness stand, no direct Confutation or personal explanation on his part of the foregoing
circumstances is thus found in the record, which circumstances, taken together, irresistibly point to his having killed Marcelo de Leon.
However, the Trial Court's ruling that the qualifying circumstance or treachery should be appreciated against appellant Pagsanjan
cannot be accepted. No one, not even Ms. Angelina de Leon, the lone eyewitness, saw the actual shooting by the appellant of Marcelo
de Leon. Ms. de Leon's testimony is that after hearing several shots, she saw her husband lying or his back on a pushcart and the
appellant leaning forward with a rifle pointed towards Marcelo de Leon. She did not see what transpired immediately before the
shooting. It does not therefore see in possible to this Court to draw the conclusion that appellant Pagsanjan shot his victim suddenly
and without warning, without according the latter any opportunity to make any defense against the assault on his person, thus
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the offender.
Neither does it seem possible to appreciate, as the Trial Court did, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against
Pagsanjan. There is no evidence of when Pagsanjan was made aware of the de Leons' intentions to evict the former's paramour from
her apartment which allegedly caused resentment in the appellant and gave rise to a motive for the killing thus making it
impossible to determine if sufficient time had elapsed between the acquisition of that knowledge and the actual killing for the accused
to meditate and reflect on his intent and to desist therefrom. 12
What all the foregoing imports is that in the state of the evidence it is possible to find applicant Pagsanjan guilty only of the crime of
homicide, without the attendance of aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot, as appellant pleads be considered in his favor. He did not surrender voluntarily. It took two (2) years and five (5)months after
the issuance of warrant of arrest against him, before he surrendered. If he finally gave himself up, it was not to save the State the
time and effort of searching for him, but because he had gotten tired of the life of a fugitive, or seen no other reasonable alternative to
continued absence from his home and constant evasion of police officers.

Pagsanjan's claim that the Trial Court proceeded to assess the evidence and render judgment without giving his counsel sufficient time
to read the transcripts of stenographic notes, said counsel having been thus constrained to file a " hastily prepared" memorandum, did
not result in substantial injury to his rights in the premises.
This Court declines to declare erroneous the Trial Court's ruling(a) that a "(m)emorandum is not part of the trial, it is the evidence
adduced during the trial that has to be considered and evaluated by the Court;" and (b) as regards the motion for inhibition, that since
the decision in the case had already been promulgated, his inhibition would be tantamount to "allowing a court of equal jurisdiction to
review the decision of co-equal Court." As to appellant's claim of irregularity of conduct by his counsel in his defense, he may if he
wishes file the appropriate administrative complaint against the lawyer; in any case, the points he clams were ignored by his counsel,
have been considered by this Court in the resolution of his appeal.
In fine, the decision of the Court a quo in so far as it rules that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
Pagsanjan did indeed shoot and kill Marcelo de Leon and that the killing caused damages to the latter's widow in the amounts set out
in the judgment, must be affirmed. The crime committed however is homicide, not murder. The indemnity required to be paid by the
appellant to his victim's heirs must be increased to P50,000.00 conformably to standing case law.
WHEREFORE, the appellant Wilfredo Pagsanjan @ "Willy" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of homicide and,
there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
seventeen(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum; to pay
the heirs of the victim, de Leon damages of the character and in the amounts set out in the judgment of the Trial Court, viz.:
"P48,000.00 for funeral services, . . . P144,000.00 for the burial lot, and . . . P10,000.00 for expenses during the wake," as well as the
sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32042 December 17, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO BENITO y RESTUBOG accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to the charge of murder for
having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, 1969. The killing was qualified by treachery and
aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty.
After a mandatory review of the death sentence, this Court in its decision of February 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of conviction. It
appreciated in Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351).
Benito filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank should not be appreciated against him.
Benito, 26, a native of Naga City, in his sworn statement , which was taken, about five hours after the shooting, by Corporal E. Cortez
and
Patrolmen
J.
de
la
Cruz,
Jr.,
and
H. Roxas of the Manila Police, recounted the background and circumstances of the tragic incident in this manner (Exh. A):
... alam ninyo ho, ako ay dating empleyado ng Civil Service Commission sa kalye P. Paredes, Sampaloc, Maynila, at
ako ay Clerk 2 sa Administrative Division at ako ay nagumpisa ng pagtratrabaho sa Civil Service magmula pa noong
November, 1965 ng ako ay nasuspende sa aking trabaho dahil kinargohan nila ako ng "DISHONESTY" at nasuspende
ako ng 60 days at nabalik ako sa trabaho noong January 1966 pero kinarguhan uli nila ako ng "MALVERSARTION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS, QUALIFIED THEFT, ESTAFA at FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT at dinimanda din ako ng Civil
Service ng Administrative case ng "DISHONESTY" at dinismiss na ako sa trabaho ni Commissioner Subido noong
February 16, 1966.
At magmula noon ay nawalan na ako ng trabaho pero lahat ho noong kinargo nila sa akin na sinabi ko sa inyo ay
"fabricated" lang ang mga evidensiya at ang gumawa ho noong ay ang binaril ko kanina na si PEDRO MONCAYO JR. Y

RAMOS at naka pending pa ngayon sa City Fiscal ng Maynila kay Asst. Fiscal Magat at iyon namang "dismissal order"
ni Commissioner Subido ay inapela ko sa Civil Service Board of Appeals.
Magmula noong Idinismiss nila ako sa aking trabaho dahil sa "fabricated" charges ay naghirap na ko sa aking buhay
at nahihiya ako sa mga kaibigan ko. Ako ay assign(ed) sa collecting department noon at nagagalit sa akin ang mga
empleyado ng Civil Service dahil mahigpit ako sa kanila.
Noong bandang alas 7:00 ng gabi noong Dec. 11, 1969, ako ay nagpunta sa Civil Service sa kalye Paredes at nakita
ko si PEDRO MONCAYO, Jr. at kinausap ko siya at tinanong ko siya na iyong kaso ko ay matagal na at hindi pa
natatapos at baka matulungan niya ako at ang sagot niya ay "UMALIS KA NA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA
SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO" at umalis na ko.
Kaninang bandang alas 11:00 ng umaga ay nagkita kami ni PEDRO MONCAYO Jr. sa loob ng compound ng Civil
Service at sa harapan ng maraming tao sinabi niya na "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW" kaya ang
ginawa ko ay umalis na ako.
Kaninang bandang alas 5:25 ng hapon, nitong araw na ito, Desiyembre 12, 1969, nakita ko si PEDRO MONCAYO Jr.
na nagmamanejo noong kotse niya sa kalye P. Paredes sa tapat ng Civil Service, sinundan ko siya at pagliko ng kotse
niya sa kanto ng P. Paredes at Lepanto, Sampaloc, Maynila, ay binaril ko siya ng walong beses at tinamaan siya at
napatumba siya sa kaniyang upuan sa kotse.
Pagkatapos ay tumawag ako sa telepono sa MPD Headquarters para sumurender at kayo nga ang dumating kasama
ninyo iyong mga kasama ninyo.
Benito surrendered to the police the revolver (Exh. C) used in the shooting with the eight empty shells of the bullets which he had fired
at Moncayo.
The Police report contains the following background and description of the killing (Exh. B):
According to the suspect, he was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office located at P.
Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up
to Nov. 1965 when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY".
After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC
FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY"
culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service on February 1966.
The aforecited criminal charges against the suspect was allegedly investigated by Asst. Fiscal MAGAT. Records from
the CRID, MPD, reveals that on Dec. 6, 1966, Hon. Judge ROAN of the City Court of Mla. issued a Warrant No. E316758 for the arrest of the suspect for the crime of ESTAFA.
On May 24, 1969, Hon. Judge JUAN O. REYES of the CFI of Mla. issued an order No. OA-87409 for the arrest of the
suspect for the crime of MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS. According to the suspect, the aforecited criminal and
administrative charges filed him were allegedly instigated and contrived by the victim and since the time of his
dismissal, he was allegedly jobless.
On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and requested the victim to help him in his
cases but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect "UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT
BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO".
The suspect left and returned the following morning at 11:00 a.m. of Dec. 12, 1969, and when they met again, the
victim allegedly remarked in the presence of many people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW". The
suspect who was humiliated and incensed, left.
At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22 black
revolver (w/ SN - P-5317, Trademarked "SENTINEL", SQUIRES BINGHAM MFG. CO. INC. MLA. P.I.) loaded with nine
(9) live Cal. 22 bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside the Civil Service compound at P. Paredes st.
Sampaloc, Mla.
The
victim
showed
up
and
drove
his
green
Chevrolet
2
door
car
(w/
Plate
No.
L-10578 Mla. 69) along P. Paredes st. The suspect with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and
when the latter's car was at a full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor
vehicles, the suspect without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot the victim eight (8) times
on the head and different parts of the body at closer range which consequently caused the latter's death on the spot
inside his car.
The suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car (w/ Plate No. L-55117) by his coemployees (composed of VICTOR VILLAR, ELEUTERIO MENDOZA & FORTUNATO JOSE Jr.) to the FEU Hospital.
Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA by Dr. P. PAHUTAN, SOD, at 5:40 p.m. of Dec. 12, 1969.

The thirty-six year old victim, a certified public accountant, was the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Transactions Division and Acting
Chief, Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission (Exh. E to E-2). The accused was a clerk in the cash section,
Administrative Division of the Commission, receiving P1,884 per annum (Exh. D). He started working in the Commission on November
7, 1963.
On October 21, 1965 Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito admitted having
malversed an amount between P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination fee stamps. Moncayo's report reads as follows (Exh.
F):
MEMORANDUM
The
Through Proper Channels

for
Commissioner

This refers to the case of Mr. ALBERTO R. BENITO, Clerk II in the Administrative Division of this Commission, who, as
had previously been reported, malversed public funds in the amount of approximately P5,000.00 out of his
collections from the sale of examination fee stamps.
I wish to state that this matter came to my attention on the evening of March 1, 1965 when Mr. Teodoro Abarquez,
Acting Cashier I, reported to me that fifty (50) money orders at P2.00 each with a total vlaue of P100.00 were
missing from a bundle of money orders received from the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato, which were kept by him
in one of the cabinets inside the Cashier's Cashier' room.
At the same time he also informed me that he suspected that Mr. Benito stole the missing money orders. His
suspicion arose from the fact that he found several money orders marked "Cotabato" as their place of issue among
the cash receipts turned over to him by Mr. Benito that afternoon as his collection from the sale of examination fee
stamps. Mr. Abarquez showed to me the said money orders issued in Cotabato which were turned over to him by Mr.
Benito and after checking their serial numbers with the records of list of remittances on file, we were able to
establish definitely the fact that the said money orders were those missing.
It may be stated that at that time, Mr. Benito was assigned to work in the Cash Section and one of his duties was to
sell examination fee stamps to applicants for examinations. It was then the practice of the cashier to issue to Mr.
Benito in the morning examination fee stamps to be sold during the day and in the afternoon he turned over to the
Cashier the proceeds from the sale of stamps including the unsold stamps issued to him. After considering the work
performed by Mr. Benito, it became evident that he succeeded in malversing the amount of P100.00 by substituting
equivalent amount of money orders in the place of the cash extracted by him from his daily collections from the sale
of examination fee stamps when he clears his accountability with the Cashier.
The following day, I confronted Mr. Benito in the presence of Mr. Abarquez and ask him whether he had something to
do with the loss of the fifty (50) money orders at P2.00 each. At first he denied, but when I asked him where he
obtained the money orders issued in Cotabato which were included in his collections the day preceding, he admitted
having stolen the missing money orders.
Having confessed his guiltk, I then asked Mr. Benito when he started committing the said irregularity and how much
in all did he actually malversed out of his daily collections from the time that he started the anomaly. He stated in
the presence of Mr. Abarquez that he started in January, 1965 and that although he did not know exactly the total
amount malversed by him, he believed the amount to be between P4,000.00 to P5,000.00. He also confessed that he
used the money orders remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental in the amount of P3,436.00 in
substituting various amounts extracted by him from his daily cash collections and used by him for personal purposes.
It appears from the records that the List of Remittances covering the money orders received from the Provincial
Treasurer of Negros Occidental was duly receipted by Mr. Benito. He was supposed to issue an Official Receipt
therefor in favor of the said Provincial Treasurer and then turn over to the Cashier the amount involved for deposit to
the National Treasurer. The said List of Remittances, duly signed by Mr. Benito, is enclosed for use as evidence in this
case.
I told Mr. Benito that I cannot do anything but report the matter to the Commissioner. However, he pleaded that he
be given first an opportunity to restore the amount before I make my report in order that the penalty that may be
imposed upon him may be lessened to a certain degree. As I thought it wise in the interest of the service to recover
the amount involved, I allowed him to go and see his parents in Naga City to raise the amount in question.
After two weeks, Mr. Benito informed me that his parents filed an application for a loan with the Government Service
Insurance System and that the proceeds of the said loan which he intended to use in restoring the amount
malversed by him were expected to be released during the last week of May, 1965. However, when the month of
May, 1965 elapsed without the amount involved having been restored, I conferred with Mr. del Prado, my immediate
superior and asked him whether we should wait further for the release of the said loan in order that the amount
involved may be recovered. Mr. Prado consented to giving him a little more time.
When Mr. Benito still failed to restore the amount in question by the end of June, 1965, I got hold of him on July 5,
1965 and together with Messrs. del Prado, Abarquez and Gatchalian, also of this Commission, brought him before
Deputy Commissioner A. L. Buenaventura and reported the entire matter to the Deputy Commissioner. In the
presence of Messrs. del Prado, Abarquez, Gatchalian and myself, Mr. Benito admitted readily and voluntarily before
the Deputy Commissioner the commission of the offense of malversation of public funds as stated above.

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Mr. Benito be charged formally and that he be suspended from
office immediately considering the gravity of the offense committed by him.
(Sgd.) PEDRO R. MONCAYO
Administrative Officer II
Benito was charged with dishonesty. He had admitted to Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura that he had misappropriated his
collections and spent the amount in nightclubs and pleasure spots and for personal purposes. The decision dismissing him from the
service reads as follows (Exh. G):
This is an administrative case against Mr. Alberto R. Benito, Clerk I, Cash Section, Administrative Division of this
Office, for dishonesty.
The following excerpts from the letter dated October 22, 1965 of the Commissioner of Civil Service connect
respondent with the alleged misappropriation of public funds representing his collection from the sale of examination
fee stamps and constitute the basis of the instant case against him:
An investigation made by this Commission shows that you malversed public funds in the amount of
P3,536.00 out of your collections from the sale of examination fee stamps while in the performance
of your official duties as Clerk II in the Cash Section, Administrative Division of this Office. It
appears that you succeeded in malversing the above-stated amount from your cash collections by
substituting in lieu thereof money orders worth P3,436.00 remitted to this Commission by the
Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental which were duly receipted for by you. It also appears that
you extracted from a bundle of money orders remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato the
amount of P100.00 in money orders which were kept in one of the cabinets in the Cashier's room.
Respondent denied the charge. He explained, among others, that money orders were always kept in the Cashier's
safe and he had no access to them. Although he admitted having received money orders amounting to P3,436.00
remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental and another remittance of the Provincial Treasurer of
Cotabato he, however, disclaimed having substituted the same for cash collections in his sale of examination fee
stamps. He reasoned out further that he could not be charged with malversation of public funds inasmuch as he was
not then an accountable officer.
It appears that respondent, as Clerk in the Cash Section, performs, among other duties, the selling of examination
fee stamps, receiving payments therefor, and receiving remittances in form of cash and/or money orders from
provincial treasurers in connection with examinations held in the provinces. It was also his duty to issue official
receipts for said remittances. In the course of the performance of his duties, he received said remittances from the
Provincial Treasurers of Negros Occidental and Cotabato, but no official receipts were issued by him, as shown by the
reply telegrams pertaining thereto. While records disclose that remittances from the province of Cotabato were
submitted to the Cashier of the Civil Service Commission, there is no evidence showing that remittances from Negros
Occidental were likewise submitted.
Investigation further reveals that 50 money orders were discovered missing from the remittances of Cotabato
Provincial Treasurer which were kept in the cabinet of the Cashier. On or about March 2, 1965, the Cashier of the
Commission noticed that 15 money orders turned over by respondent as part of his collections in the sale of
examination fee stamps were among the missing money orders. This triggered off the filing of this case against the
respondent.
On July 5, 1965, respondent admitted before the then Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura having
misappropriated an aggregate amount ranging from P3,000 to P7,000, which he spent in night clubs, pleasure spots
and other personal benefits. Despite the testimonies of several witnesses regarding his confession, including that of
the then Deputy Commissioner himself, respondent, when asked to take the stand, denied his previous admission.
Instead, he argued that the cash and accounts of the Cashier of the Civil Service Commission, when examined by
representatives of the Auditor's Office, did not indicate any shortage and therefore there was no irregularity involved.
This argument is not well taken. Inasmuch as the remittances received by respondent from said Provincial Treasurers
of Negros Occidental and Cotabato were not in turn given corresponding official receipts, naturally, the same were
not reflected on the Cashier's cash book.
The weakness of respondent's defense lies not so much on its failure to establish convincingly his innocence as its
irreconciliability with established facts. Obviously, none of the circumstances in this case is consistent with his claim
of innocence. On the contrary, all of them put together produce reasonable assurance of respondent's guilt.
In view of the foregoing, this Office finds respondent Alberto R. Benito guilty as charged. Wherefore, he is dismissed
from the service effective upon his receipt of this decision.
In the interest of the service this decision is executed also on the date of his receipt of this decision.
Benito appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from the Commissioner's decision dismissing him. The appeal was pending at the
time when he assassinated Moncayo (Exh. I).

The foregoing antecedents of the assassination shed light on the remark which the victim, Moncayo, allegedly made upon seeing
Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen at eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969
(about six hours before the shooting): "Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw." (Exh. A or 1); or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said:
"Hindi ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw." (27 tsn December 26, 1969).
Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. Benito contends that Moncayo insulted him when he (Moncayo)
remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service Commission. Benito argues that that remark "was tantamount
to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he was
exposed to ridicule in the presence of his officemates.
Benito attached to his motion a copy of the decision of Judge Jose C. Colayco dated January 16, 1975, acquitting him of the charge of
malversation in connection with his alleged misappropriation of the fees collected from the examinees of the 1974 patrolman
examination. That same decision makes reference to Benito's exoneration from the administrative charge. The court's decision reads
as follows:
The accused is charged with malversation under the following information:
That on or about and during the period comprised between October 17, 1964, to February, 1965,
inclusive, in the City of Manila Philippines, the said accused being then employed as Clerk I of the
Civil Service Commission, a branch of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, among
whose duties were to accept payments of fees collected from the examinees of the 1964 Patrolman
examination, and by reason of his said position received the total amount of P3,536.00, with the
duty to turn over and/or account for his collections to the cashier of the Civil Service Commission
immediately or upon demand but the said accused once in possession of the said amount of
P3,536.00, with intent to defraud, despite repeated demands made upon him to turn over and to
account for the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert and malverse the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the
detriment of public interest and to the damage and prejudice of the said Civil Service Commission
in the said amount of P3,536.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
The evidence shows that the accused had an appointment as clerk in the Civil Service Commission from May 27,
1964, as clerk I, range 23 from June 1, 1965 and as clerk I, range 26 from July 23, 1965 (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2). He
had the duty, among others, of selling Civil Service examination- fee stamps and to receive payment therefor, as well
as to receive remittances of money orders and checks from the provincial treasurers for payments of examination fee
stamps (Exhibit B).
Teodoro Abarquez, a cashier of the Civil Service Commission during the period alleged in the information, testified in
his direct examination that Benito was working in his office; that one of the duties that he assigned to him was to sell
examination fee stamps; that it was customary for him to give stamps to Benito at the start of office hours in the
morning and that Benito turned over to him the proceeds of the sale, as well as the unsold stamps, at the close of
office hours in the afternoon; that one afternoon he noticed that Benito turned over to him 50 money orders from
Cotabato, together with some cash, as proceeds of the sale of stamps for that day; that he remembered that he was
missing money orders from one of his cabinets where he kept them; that when he discovered that the 50 money
orders were those which were missing, he reported the matter to Pedro Moncayo, the chief administrative officer; on
March 1, 1965; that the money orders were for P2.00 each, and were payments of the examination fees from
Cotabato (Exhibit F); that he discovered the loss of the 50 money orders on February 28, 1965 and reported it to
Moncayo on March 1, 1965, together with the list of missing orders (Exhibit M); that after receiving the report,
Moncayo called Benito to the office of Abarquez where he admitted taking the missing money orders; that Moncayo
submitted a memorandum to the Commissioner, dated October 21, 1965, after giving Benito a chance to refund the
value of the money orders (Exhibit O). Alipio Buenaventura, acting Deputy Commissioner at the time, and Eliseo S.
Gatchalian, budget officer, testified that when Benito was confronted with the report of Moncayo and Abarquez, he
admitted that he misappropriated about P3,000.00 because of bad company and that he asked for a chance to
refund the money.
Under cross-examination, Abarquez elucidated his testimony in his direct examination and explained that when
Benito turned over the proceeds of the sale of stamps for that particular day, he kept the sum of P100.00 and
replaced it with the 50 money orders that he had taken from the cashier's office to cover up the money that he had
pocketed. When he was asked when he discovered that Benito substituted the 50 money orders from Cotabato, he
answered that he checked them the following night (March 2, 1965) with the list of money orders remitted by the
Provincial treasurer (Exhibits F, F-1); but when he was confronted with his affidavit which he executed on April 18,
1966 (Exhibit R), he reluctantly admitted that he had only verified 15 money orders missing as of April 18, 1966 and
that he did not keep any record of the money and the money orders given to him by Benito on March 1, 1965.
He also admitted that the room where he kept the money orders in an unlocked drawer was also occupied by two
other persons, and that this was the first time that he had not followed the usual procedure of keeping them in the
safe. He further admitted that, although regular examinations were conducted during the period of October 1, 1964
to February 28, 1965 by the examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing
Office, they did not find any shortage in the accounts of Benito.
Finally, when the Court asked him what happened to the 50 money orders, at first he hinted that they were not
deposited with the Bureau of Treasury because they were reported missing; but when pressed further, he said that

he deposited them, but did not issue any official receipt for them. When asked if he had any evidence to show that
they were actually deposited, he admitted that he could not even remember when he deposited them.
The testimony of Teodoro Abarquez upon which the prosecution has built its case, is too weak and shaky to sustain a
finding of guilt because of his glaring inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps in memory. The prosecution has failed
to present convincing evidence that the 50 money orders were even lost: According to Abarquez he had only verified
the loss of 15 on April 18, 1966, although he testified earlier that he determined the loss of 50 the night after March
1, 1965.
The examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing Office did not find any
irregularity in the cash accountability of Benito, according to Abarquez. This was corroborated by Romeo Jarabelo,
auditor of the Commission on Audit and Miguel Games, auditing examiner assigned to the Civil Service Commission,
who testified for the accused. Benito was in fact exonorated the administrative charge filed against him for the time
same transaction (Exhibit E).
In fact, the testimony of Abarquez under cross-examination that he has not issued any official receipt for the 50
money orders and his inability to prove that he deposited them with the bureau of Treasury gives rise to the
suspicion that other persons, not the accused, may have stolen the 50 missing money orders. Even without taking
into account the testimony of the accused, who denied the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, the court
believes that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting the accused, with costs de oficio.
The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise to the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically directed at Benito. The prosecution notes that the remark was uttered by
Moncayo at eleven o'clock in the morning. According to Benito's testimony (not consistent with his confession), he saw Moncayo three
hours later or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and Moncayo said that he had already submitted
his report and he could not do anything more about Benito's case (26 tan). As already stated, the assassination was perpetrated at
around five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.
Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the circumstances recited above for changing
our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of "haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave, causada
al autor del delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it."
"La apreciacion de la proximidad queda al arbitrio del tribunal; el Tribunal Supremo (de Espaa) no ha apreciado la proximidad ...
cuando la ofensa se realizo por la maana y el delito tuvo lugar por la tarde (Sentencia de 11 noviembre 1921); por regla general no
es proxima cuando transcurre tiempo suficiente para la razon recobre su imperio sobreponiendose a la pasion (Sentencias de 28 mayo
1882, 4 noviembre 1893, 24 junio 1908, etc.) ... Si falta el requisito de la proximidad debe desestimarse (Sentencia de 3 julio 1950).
Exige gravedad en la ofensa y proximada en la reaccion." (Note 9, 1 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal. 1975 Ed., p. 564).
The Spanish Supreme Court also held that "no puede apreciarse esta circunstancia atenuante en favor del autor de un homicidio
cometido 'algunas horas despues de haberle invitado el interfecto a renir y golpeado en el pecho con las manos', porque el tiempo
transcurrido entre los golpes y la muerte fue suficiente para que el animo del reo se serenase (Sentencia de 24 Junio 1908, Gaceta 28
Agosto 1909, IV-V Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola 1182).
The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination was more than
sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of
liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He
acted with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged defamatory
remark that the Civil Service Commission compound was a hangout for a thief or for thieves but the refusal of Moncayo to change his
report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise
Moncayo for having exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change his
report.
Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank. Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be considered against him because
there was no evidence that he "deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank" of Moncayo. That contention has no merit.
It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission and that the killer was a clerk in the
same office who resented the victim's condemnatory report against him. In that situation, the existence of the aggravating
circumstance of "desprecio del respeto que por la dignidad mereciere el ofendido" is manifest.
The instant case is similar to a case where the chief of the secret service division killed his superior, the chief of police (People vs.
Hollero, 88 Phil. 167) and to the killing of the acting Spanish consul by his subordinate, the chancellor of the consulate, who had
misappropriated the funds of the consulate, which misappropriation was discovered by the victim (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106
Phil, 597, 606). In these two cases the murder was aggravated by disregard of rank. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
denied. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29776 August 27, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE ECHALUCE, BONIFACIA ECHALUCE, and JOSE SABAS, defendants, JOSE SABAS defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose S. Brillantes for defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
In Criminal Case No. 1895 of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, Jose Echaluce, Bonifacia Echaluce and Jose Sabas were
charged with the crime of parricide in an information filed against them by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1968, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in the barrio of Salvacion,
Municipality of Bagamanoc Province of Catanduanes, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping together for a common purpose did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and
deliberated to kill one Severiano Echaluce, with whom accused Bonifacia Echaluce was united in lawful wedlock, Jose
Echaluce, being the son of the victim and Jose Sabas as stranger in the execution of the crime, cooperating as
principal, armed with a piece of wood (bogus) hammered the victim with the said piece of wood several times on the
head, throat, knee and other parts of the body, employing means, manner and form in the execution of the crime,
which tended directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to the persons of the aforementioned
accused and as a result of which attack, the said Severiano Echaluce received several mortal injuries which directly
caused his death.
That in the commission of the offense the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling were present.
Upon arraignment on August 23, 1968, the three defendants, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. On the same
day defendant Jose Sabas filed a motion to quash the information as against him on the ground that the facts charged with respect to
him did not constitute the offense of parricide since he was not related in anyway to the victim as provided in Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code. In its order issued also on the same day the trial court denied the motion, holding that "the allegations in the
information, if substantiated beyond reasonable doubt, would be sufficient to sustain a finding of ... murder as against Jose Sabas." It
also set the hearing on the merits for September 2, 3 and 4, 1968.
On August 28, 1968 defendant Jose Sabas was re-arraigned. With the assistance of counsel, he pleaded guilty to the charge.
On October 2, 1968 the trial court rendered judgment finding defendant Jose Sabas guilty of murder, with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, of which one was offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Accordingly, the
Court sentenced said defendant to death, but With a recommendation for executive clemency on the ground that "there is a fair
chance that the accused may be rehabilitated and in time reinstated as a useful member of society."
On the other hand, Jose Echaluce, who pleaded guilty after the information was amended by striking out the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in a separate decision. As to the third defendant,
Bonifacia Echaluce, the information was provisionally dismissed upon motion of the prosecution for insufficiency of evidence.
The case is now before this Court for mandatory review insofar as defendant Jose Sabas is concerned.
The appellant, through his counsel de oficio Jose S. Brillantes, contends that the trial court erred in considering the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling against him, in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion in his favor, and
consequently, in imposing upon him the death penalty.
As regards nighttime, the Solicitor General agrees with the appellant that said aggravating circumstance, the presence of which was
admitted when the plea of guilty was entered, is nevertheless absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and therefore
should have not been considered by the trial court in imposing the penalty. We find their position on the point to be correct and
justified by decisions of this Court. 1
With respect to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial court did not err in appreciating it against the appellant. Contrary to
the appellant's claim, dwelling was clearly alleged in the information to which he pleaded guilty, thus: "That in the commission of the
offense the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and dwelling were present." (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, it is not true that the trial court admitted the presence of said
circumstance in the commission of the crime when it made the observation "that the crime is one of passion." What the trial court
obviously meant to convey was that the crime involved a love triangle. Moreover, passion may be considered mitigating only when it
arose from legitimate feelings, 2 which is evidently not the case here.

There is no question that the crime committed is murder. Since only the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may be properly
appreciated against the appellant, and the same is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the penalty for the crime in
its medium period, which is reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed by the trial court.
We agree with the Solicitor General that in addition to the foregoing, provision for indemnification of the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P12,000.00 should have been included in the judgment. However, Jose Echaluce, who has been convicted of parricide for
the murder of his father, should be excluded as beneficiary of this indemnification.
WHEREFORE, modified as to the penalty, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua and as to the indemnification of the heirs of the
victim, except Jose Echaluce, in the sum of P12,000.00, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed.

G.R. No. L-7094

March 29, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
F.C. Fisher for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he was convicted in the court below is conclusively
established by the evidenced of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced
the convict to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the
code. Burt we are of opinion that the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken into
consideration, and that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as
follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx

xxx

xxx

That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been
his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. We think that
under the circumstances the convict was entitled to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under the
provisions of the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as set forth in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is
summarized by Viada (p. 69, in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for having caught her in her underclothes with another
party and afterwards shoots himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible for that crime with the extenuating
circumstance of having acted with violent passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba did not so hold and its
judgment was reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of article 9, number 8, of the Penal Code for Cuba
and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the trial court, and which were the immediate cause of the crime by producing
in the accused strong emotion which impelled him to the criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient
impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special
reason for extenuation, and as the judgment did not take into consideration the 8th circumstance of article 9 of the code,
the Audiencia rendering it seems to have violated this legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the "causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for
the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions," and declined to give the benefit of the provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged
causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill
the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding
the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides
those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what

appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless
in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and
deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right
to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another
man. In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation"
was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his
discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a
"sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be
one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article
9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant.

G.R. Nos. 95358-59 July 5, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO MORATO alias "BOYANG" and EMMANUEL CACATIAN alias "BOY", accused.
ERNESTO MORATO alias "BOYANG", appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dennis M. Socrates for appellant.
MELO, J.:
Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian were charged with the crime of murder in an Information dated February 8,1989, which
pertinently reads:
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1989, at Franco's Chicken House, Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation with intent to kill and while
armed with unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot
therewith one Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon on the different parts of his body, which was the direct and immediate cause
of death. (p. 5, Rollo.)
In a separate Information also dated February 8, 1989, Ernesto Morato was charged for illegal possession of firearms, thusly:
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1989, at Rizal Avenue, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) short firearm, without first securing the necessary permit and/or
license from the proper authorities to possess the same, and which said firearm was used in the commission of
murder against PAT. JOSE PONCE DE LEON.
CONTRARY TO LAW, in Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866. (p. 6, Rollo.)
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty, but after the prosecution had rested its case, accused Emmanuel Cacatian filed a
demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted, thus dismissing the case against him. The trial proceeded insofar as accused
Ernesto Morato was concerned.
On June 21, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as principal as the same is defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. Likewise, he is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearms sentencing the accused in both cases to suffer two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua as well as to pay
the cost.

He is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as and for the death of the
deceased; the sum of Fifty Nine Thousand (P59,000.00) Pesos as and for actual damages incurred by reason of the death of the
victim, as well as the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as and for moral damages. (pp. 37-37a, Rollo.)
Accused Morato has interposed the instant appeal upon the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, THE LAW
PENALIZING THE SAME BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED TWICE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLING AS MURDER.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED WAS CARRYING A FIREARM.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORABLE TO ACCUSED.
The facts of the case as borne out by the evidence are as follows:
At around 9 P.M. of February 7, 1989, Andrew de los Santos and Gabby Burgos arrived at Franco's Chicken House located at Rizal
Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Upon entering the establishment, Andrew saw Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon sitting on a stool at the bar
counter. Andrew sat on the stool to the left of Pat. de Leon while Gabby took the stool to the right of Pat. de Leon.
At around midnight, accused-appellant and Emmanuel Cacatian arrived, proceeded to the bar, and ordered beer. Cacatian sat on the
stool second to the right of Pat. de Leon, while accused-appellant, upon getting his bottle of beer joined another group. Later, Andrew
noticed that Pat. de Leon and Cacatian were arguing. Walfrido Ponce de Leon, the owner of the establishment, was immediately
summoned by his wife and he tried to pacify Pat. de Leon and Cacatian. Andrew approached Cacatian and asked him what the problem
was but Walfrido de Leon answered that everything was all right and led Andrew aside. Suddenly, Walfrido heard the roar of a gunshot.
He looked at the direction where the shot came from and saw accused-appellant holding a gun and shooting Pat. de Leon twice until
the latter fell. Forthwith, accused-appellant fled.
Walfrido, Popoy Lanzanas, and Jimmy Manalang brought Pat. de Leon to a hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr.
Rudolph Bala later performed an autopsy on the body of Pat. de Leon and thence submitted his post mortem report indicating that Pat.
de Leon suffered the following:
1. Gunshot wound, about 1.5 cm in diameter, located over the left lateral side of the chest wall, about 2 inches below
the left axilla.
2. Gunshot wound, about 1.5 cm in diameter, located over the right lateral aspect of the anterior chest wall, about 1
inches lateral to the right nipple.
3. Gunshot wound about 1.5 cm located over the right middle arm, lateral aspect. (p. 54, Rollo.)
The cause of death was shock, secondary to internal hemorrhage, due to multiple gunshot wounds.
Accused-appellant contends that Presidential Decree No. 1866 under which he was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm is unconstitutional because it is allegedly vague and, therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. The supposed vagueness arises from the fact that the law does not allegedly specifically define what constitutes the crime
of illegal possession of firearms. Upon a perusal of Presidential Decree No. 1866, we find no vagueness in the wording of said law.
The first two paragraphs of Section 1 of the decree, which read as follows
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

are specific enough.

It is to be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1866, among other things, is a codification of various laws on illegal possession of
firearms. Section 9 thereof, the repealing clause, does not repeal General Order No. 6 which provides that no person shall keep,
possess or carry outside of his residence any firearm unless such person is duly authorized to keep, possess or carry any such firearm .
. ." Neither does the decree repeal General Order No. 7 which declares that:
1. Only officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and police officers in the actual performance of
official mission or duty shall be allowed to carry firearms outside residence;
2. Guards of private security agencies and public or private corporations or firms are authorized to carry their duly
licensed firearms only from the premises or the offices of such agencies, corporations or firms to their place of work
and return . . .
It is plain from a reading of said decree and general orders that the crime of illegal possession of firearms is committed by a person
who has in his possession a firearm without a license or permit to do so from the proper authorities, or by a person, although
authorized to possess such firearm, nevertheless carries it outside of his residence without permit to do so from the proper authorities.
The pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms are clear and unambiguous. Said laws, not being contrary to any provision of the
Constitution, are constitutional.
Accused-appellant, while admitting killing Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon, interposes self-defense and defense of a stranger to obtain
acquittal.
It is elementary that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the
burden of proof of establishing his plea of self-defense by credible, clear, and convincing evidence (People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243
[1972]; People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48 [1973]; People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245[1974]), otherwise conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim (People vs Dorico, 54 SCRA 172 [1973]; People vs. Boholst-Caballero, 61 SCRA 180[1974]). To
prove self-defense, the accused must establish three concurring requisites, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused (Article 11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Ordiales, 42 SCRA 238 [1971); People vs. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522
[1972]; People vs. Aquino, 54. SCRA 409 [1973]).
The initial and crucial point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for absent this essential
element, no self-defense can be successfully interposed. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and
the second requisite of self-defense will have no basis (Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 38 [1989]).
Accused-appellant claims that "he shot the victim with a gun grabbed from the waist of Andrew de los Santos, because the victim was
pointing his own gun at Boy Cacatian and appellant" and that "appellant had to fire more than once because the victim was still
pointing his gun at appellant". (p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 49, Rollo.)
The evidence disproves this stance. In the first place, the number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim negate the claim
of self-defense. The victim suffered three gunshot wounds. Two of the wounds were inflicted at the left and right lateral sides of the
chest wall of the victim and were fatal wounds. When the victim was first hit in the arm (p. 10, Tsn., October 18, 1989), he was
disabled and his normal movements were impaired. There was no further need for accused-appellant to fire two more shots at the
victim. This circumstance clearly indicates that accused-appellant did not merely intend to disable the victim but was unwavering in his
determination to kill the victim (People vs. Martija, 112 SCRA 528 [1982]). In the second place, accused-appellant's position in relation
to the victim belies his defense. Both witnesses Walfrido Ponce de Leon and Andrew de los Santos testified that accused-appellant was
behind the victim when the latter was shot. With the victim's back turned against accused-appellant, it was impossible for the victim to
have aimed his gun at the former. The victim could not have initiated any aggression against accused-appellant. Thirdly, accusedappellant's assertion that he grabbed the gun, with which he shot the victim, from the waist of Andrew de los Santos runs counter to
the testimony of Andrew that he was not carrying any firearm at the time of the incident, which testimony is corroborated by the
certification issued by the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm that Andrew de los Santos was not on duty at the time and that all firearms
issued to him as a prison guard were duly accounted for and his accountability did not involve any .38 caliber handgun. It is to be
noted that the victim was killed by a .38 caliber gun. Brandeis Flores, an NBI ballistician who conducted a ballistics examination of the
slug extracted from the body of the victim, testified that the slug was fired from a .38 caliber firearm. Furthermore, accused-appellant
testified that when the victim fell his (victim's) gun fell on the floor and that when accused-appellant left the scene he left Andrew's
gun at the scene of the shooting. However, the police did not find any gun at that scene, of the shooting. We, therefore, find that
accused-appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The foregoing discussion likewise disposes of the alternative defense that accused-appellant acted in defense of stranger for the reason
that the first requisite of defense of a stranger, as in self-defense, is that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
(Article 11, No. 2, Revised Penal Code).
The evidence patently shows that accused-appellant is guilty of murder as the shooting of the victim was effected treacherously. There
is treachery when the attack is deliberate, sudden, unexpected and from behind (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679 [1976]; People vs.
Cabalig, 74 SCRA 285 [1976]; People vs. Pascual, 81 SCRA 548 [1978]; People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508 [1978]; People vs. Alegria,
84 SCRA 614 [1978]; People vs. Ruiz, 93 SCRA 739 [1979]). In the case at bar, it has been established that accused-appellant shot
Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon, suddenly and unexpectedly from behind.
It has likewise been established that accused-appellant is guilty of illegal possession of firearms as he had in his possession a .38
caliber handgun for which he had no permit to carry. The Firearms and Explosives Section of the Philippine Constabulary issued a
certification that accused-appellant was not a duly registered licensee/firearm holder of any caliber.

Accused-appellant assails the conclusion of the trial court that he did not voluntarily surrender. We agree with accused-appellant on
this point. The evidence shows that on the day following the killing, accused-appellant surrendered to the Provincial Commander. That
the Provincial Commander announced over the radio that he would issue a "shoot to kill" order unless accused-appellant voluntarily
surrenders, and that accused-appellant was persuaded to surrender by his employer do not militate against the consideration of his
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. The stubborn fact remains that he was not arrested and that he presented himself to
the Provincial Commander to surrender.
Accused-appellant contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with two offenses, murder and illegal
possession of firearms, arising from the same act, in two separate informations, and convicted therefor. This contention has already
been disposed of in the case of People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA, 601 [1990]), where this Court ruled as follows:
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use of such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or
murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was charged in
Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the
Revised
Penal
Code
in
relation
to
Section
17
of
B.P.
Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later
prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense,
although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it
appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of
murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in
themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No.
4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy. (at pp. 615-616.)
In the computation of the penalty for the crime of murder, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
There being one mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period or 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in relation to Paragraph 3, Article 61, of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum
of the penalty immediately following in the scale of penalties. The penalty next lower in degree, therefore, ranges from the maximum
of prision mayor to the medium of reclusion temporal, or 10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified as follows:

1) Accused-appellant is found guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua;
2) Accused-appellant is found guilty of murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum (People vs. Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783
[1988]);
3) Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty-Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00) for actual
damages incurred by reason of the death of the victim; and
4) The amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the trial court is hereby reduced to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130010 May 26, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE RABANILLO y MAGOLONG, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, C.J.:
Accused-appellant Vicente Rabanillo (hereafter RABANILLO) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 43,
with the crime of murder in an information whose accusatory portion reads:
That on or about August 9, 1996, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon at barangay Amansabina, municipality of
Mangaldan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a bladed samurai, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack RAUL MORALES y Visperas, thereby causing his death thereafter due
to:
INTRA THORA-ABODOMINAL, HEMORRHAGE, sec. to open wound.
THORA HEPATIC HEMORRHAGE, sec. to incised wounds.

as per Medico-Legal Report issued by Dr. Reynaldo C. Gabriel, M.D., RHU of Mapandan [sic] Pangasinan, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Raul Morales y Visperas.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. [No.] 7659.
Later,
RABANILLO
filed
a
motion
denominated
"Plea
Bargaining
Offer" 2 stating his willingness to enter a plea of "guilty" to the crime of homicide. This motion was met with vehement objection 3 from
the prosecution and was eventually denied 4 by the trial court. Upon arraignment, the appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" 5 to the
charge of murder.
The undisputed facts 6 are as follows:
In the afternoon of 9 August 1996, appellant RABANILLO; the victim Raul Morales (hereafter MORALES); prosecution witnesses
Perfecto Suarez, Samuel Magalong, and Ramil Morales; and several other persons were having a drinking spree at the store of Narcisa
Morales, mother of MORALES, at Barangay Amansabina, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. At about 5:00 p.m., a certain Willy Vito, one of the
participants in the drinking session, took a bath at the artesian well nearby and jokingly doused Suarez with water. The latter tried to
retaliate but failed; he thus ran after the others and splashed them with water.
RABANlLLO joined the game. He filled a container with water and tried to pour its contents at someone, but drenched MORALES
instead. The latter reprimanded the former because water got into his ear. A heated argument between the two ensued and culminated
into a fistfight. The two were eventually pacified by cooler heads and were ushered to their respective houses, which were just about
15 meters apart. The others milled around by the road.
As to what transpired next, the prosecution and the defense had different versions.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals that half an hour after the fisticuff, while MORALES, Suarez, and one Mauro Pascua were
having a conversation in the terrace of the house of MORALES, RABANILLO went out of his house wielding a one-meter samurai.
RABANILLO went straight to MORALES and hacked him. Instinctively, the latter parried the blow, but he was hit on his right hand.
When he attempted to run away, he tripped and fell down to the ground. At this point, RABANILLO hacked him two times more, hitting
him at his back and left shoulder. That same day, MORALES drew his last breath. 7
On the other hand, the defense presented the following version:
A while later appellant heard Raul Morales, then in the terrace of their house that is beside appellant's house,
shouting and challenging him to come out. Forthwith, appellant, irked by the challenge, emerged from his house with
a bolo on hand and attacked Raul Morales and killed him in the process. Thereafter, accompanied by the barangay
captain, he went to the Town hall of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and surrendered. 8
In its decision 9 of 14 July 1997, the trial court noted that when RABANILLO took the witness stand, he offered his testimony to prove
the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, drunkenness, and voluntary surrender and that he was not, therefore,
denying having killed MORALES. It then limited the issues to the presence of such mitigating circumstances, as well as of the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength.
The trial court ruled out treachery, reasoning that the victim had been forewarned of the evil intention of RABANILLO when the latter
went out of his house armed with a samurai bolo; besides, the initial attack was frontal. It, however, appreciated evident
premeditation as a qualifying circumstance because the period of 45 minutes which elapsed between the time the fight was broken up
and the time RABANILLO decided to kill MORALES was "sufficient period of time to ponder with cold neutrality on what to do in the
premises, whether to do a righteous act or to pursue a criminal overt act despite knowledge of its evil consequences." After the lapse
of that period, RABANILLO still clung to his evil intention and hacked MORALES to death. The trial court also appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength because, aside from the fact that RABANILLO had a "bulkier and strong[er]
body physique . . . as compared to victim's slimmer/thinner body," he still armed himself with a samurai bolo to insure the
perpetration of his evil intention.
RABANILLO's claim of the attenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not considered. The trial court was not convinced
that MORALES had inflicted bodily injury against RABANILLO; if ever the latter sustained injuries, they were incurred when MORALES
and RABANILLO were engaged in a fisticuff. It noted that the fight was ignited by RABANILLO when he poured water into the ear of
MORALES. The trial court also debunked RABANILLO's claim of intoxication for lack of evidence. It likewise refused to give him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, holding that RABANILLO's own testimony that it was the barangay
captain who went to RABANILLO's house and brought him to the police station belied his claim that he voluntarily surrendered.
Accordingly, the trial court convicted RABANILLO of the crime of murder and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Vicente Rabanillo y Magalong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, attended, by
the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength and conformably to law, the Court sentences him to suffer the capital penalty
of reclusion perpetua to DEATH.
Further, the COURT orders the accused to pay Narcisa Morales (mother of Raul Morales) the following, to wit:
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity;

2) P30,000.00 as moral damages;

3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) P41,024.70 representing actual and compensatory damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
6) And costs.
The Provincial Warden of Pangasinan is ordered to commit the person of accused VICENTE M. RABANlLLO to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, immediately without any unnecessary delay.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, RABANILLO appealed the decision to this Court contending that the trial court erred (1) in finding that the killing of MORALES
was qualified by evident premeditation; and (2) in not finding that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation, intoxication, and voluntary surrender.
Anent the first assigned error, RABANILLO maintains that it was only when MORALES and his friends started taunting him, "You come
out, Tanod Commander," that he, in a fit of anger, emerged from his house and attacked MORALES. The killing was not planned, and
there was no sufficient time for meditation and reflection on the nature and consequence of his act.
As to the second assigned error, RABANILLO asseverates that he should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of passion
and obfuscation, drunkenness, and voluntary surrender. The words "You come out, Tanod Commander" are ''enough to make one,
especially a barangay folk who is characteristically sensitive, blinded by passion." Moreover, having imbibed liquor from 2:00 to 5:00
p.m., he must have been surely drunk to be so sensitive to accept the victim's challenge. After killing the victim, he voluntarily went
with the Barangay Captain to the police station to surrender and willingly obliged to be committed in jail even without a warrant of
arrest or an information against him.
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommends that RABANILLO be convicted of homicide only, not murder, in that
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present and that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, which was correctly appreciated by the trial court, was not alleged in the information. It agrees with the trial court in all
other respects.
We agree with the trial court in ruling out treachery. The evidence shows that MORALES was facing towards the direction where
RABANILLO came from. 10 He must then have caught sight of the latter, who was approaching him with a samurai in his hands.
Considering that a fight between them had just taken place, MORALES knew or must have known that he would be the target of
RABANILLO's attack. Since he was still about 10 meters 11 away from RABANILLO, he had an opportunity to escape or avoid the
assault. Hence, it cannot be said that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
However, we are of one mind with the OSG and RABANILLO that evident premeditation was wanting in the commission of the crime.
For evident premeditation to be considered, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender time to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. 12 The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 13
In the present case, there is no showing as to the time RABANILLO decided to commit the crime. Even assuming that it was right after
he was escorted to his house that he conceived the idea of killing the victim, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Only 30
minutes 14 intervened between that time and the time he went out of his house to attack MORALES. It has been held that the lapse of
30 minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for full meditation on the
consequences of the act. Additionally, as aptly observed by the OSG, the attending circumstances of the killing and the external acts of
the appellant negate the existence of evident premeditation; thus:
When accused-appellant rushed out from his house, it was just 5:30 in the afternoon. (TSN, April 11, 1997, p. 10)
Following Philippine norm, it would still be daylight or at least there would still to sufficient light to easily see people
or happenings. The persons who were previously drinking were just milling around by the road. (TSN, November 7,
1996, p. 21). Accused-appellant did not even wait until Raul Morales was alone; he came out of his house with the
samurai parallel to his head and directly went straight to the victim at the time when the latter was conversing with
two of his friends. Also, accused-appellant did not even attempt to disguise his intention by camouflaging his
weapon. He raised it high for all to see. Cool thought and calm judgment, there was none in this case. 16
Since the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation are not present in this case. RABANILLO can be convicted of
homicide only.
We do not agree with the trial court on its finding of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. It appreciated such
circumstance because RABANILLO had a "bulkier and strong[er] body physique . . . as compared to victim's slimmer/thinner body,"
and despite thereof he armed himself with a samurai bolo.

There is abuse of superior strength if, as expressly provided by law, the assailant takes advantage of his superior strength. It must
then be established that not only did the assailant enjoy superior strength over the victim, but that he took advantage thereof in the
commission of the crime. That MORALES was "slimmer/thinner" while RABANILLO was "bulkier and strong[er] was not enough proof
that the latter enjoyed superior strength. There should have been proof that, indeed, RABANILLO's bulkier physique provided him
physical strength superior to that of MORALES. It may further be stressed that a man of "slimmer/thinner body" need not necessarily
be physically weak; he could even be physically stronger than a bulkier person. Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that
RABANILLO was physically stronger than MORALES, the circumstances in this case fail to convince us that RABANILLO took advantage
of his superior strength.
Now on the mitigating circumstances invoked by RABANILLO.
To prove passion and obfuscation, RABANILLO testified that the group of MORALES shouted at him: "You come out, Tanod
Commander." Thereupon, one Meljhones Soriano approached him and held his hands. At this point, MORALES boxed him on different
parts of his body and threw bottles at him. Not contented, the group resumed shouting at him. He was so "blinded by their shouting"
that he did not know anymore what happened next. 17
In his Brief, however, RABANILLO abandoned these allegations that MORALES boxed him and threw bottles at him. He merely stated
that the obfuscation on his part was generated by the victim's words, "You come out, Tanod Commander," which he considered a
challenge against his person and honor as the chief tanod of the Barangay.
We are not persuaded. Prosecution witnesses Perfecto Suarez and Samuel Magalong were one in saying that MORALES was just having
a conversation with his friends when RABANILLO came out of his house ready to attack. It is significant to note that RABANILLO
himself testified that Samuel Magalong is the son of RABANILLO's first cousin, 18 and he did not deny Suarez's testimony that he,
RABANILLO, is Suarez's grandfather. 19 Since Magalona and Suarez are RABANILLO's nephew and grandson, respectively, they would
unlikely omit anything in their testimony that would mitigate the liability of RABANILLO. But, despite their relationship with
RABANILLO, they agreed to tell nothing but the truth and helped in giving justice to MORALES, who was merely a friend and a
barriomate.
Suarez and Magalong testified that before the hacking incident, MORALES reprimanded RABANILLO in front of their drinking mates for
dousing him with water, which entered into his ear. RABANILLO resented it and felt humiliated. Hence, a fistfight ensued, but was
eventually broken up. The event must have continued to dominate RABANILLO's thought that he decided to strike back at the victim
by hacking him to death. Clearly, the assault was made in a fit of anger.
For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings. 20 The turmoil and unreason that naturally
result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to
such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control 21. The excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come
to blows does not constitute obfuscation. 22
Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might have regained his normal equanimity. 23 Thus, it has been held that where at least half an hour
elapsed between the previous fight and the killing, the accused cannot be given the benefit of the attenuating circumstance of
obfuscation. 24
In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the fistfight and the killing of MORALES by RABANILLO. The attack cannot, therefore, be
said to be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. Having been actuated more by the spirit of revenge or by
anger and resentment for having been publicly berated by MORALES, RABANILLO cannot be credited with the extenuating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Neither can we appreciate in favor of RABANILLO the alternative circumstance of intoxication. To be mitigating, the accused's state of
intoxication should be proved or established by sufficient evidence. 25 It should be such an intoxication that would diminish or impair
the exercise of his willpower or the capacity to know the injustice of his act. 26 The accused must then show that (1) at the time of the
commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree
of self-control; and (2) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. 27
It is worthy to note that while RABANILLO was presented to prove drunkenness among other extenuating circumstances, he merely
stated in his testimony that he joined his friends Domingo de Guzman and Elde Soriano in a drinking session, but only for a short time.
His friends started their drinking spree at about 11:00 a.m. of that fateful day, and he was the one serving their "pulutan." It was at
about 12:00 noon that he joined them. At past 12:00 noon, he helped his daughter-in-law in selling cooked foods. From 3:00 to 5:00
p.m., he was cleaning his house. 28 The fact that he was able to resume his routine work belies his claim that he was heavily drunk at
the time he attacked the victim.
The testimony of his daughter-in-law that RABANILLO had been drinking 4 x 4 Ginebra San Miguel from 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 29 is
not sufficient to establish drunkenness. There remains proof that RABANILLO had taken such quantity of liquor as to impair his mental
faculties. His own witness testified that he would drink liquor twice a week. 30 As pointed out by the OSG, this regularity of
RABANILLO's intake must have increased his tolerance for alcohol to such an extent that he could not easily get drunk.
As to his claim of voluntary surrender, RABANILLO testified that a few minutes after the hacking incident, the barangay captain came
to his house and told him that they would go to the Municipal Hall. He agreed. At the time, he had mental blackout, which was why he
failed to tell the barangay captain that he was the one who killed MORALES. At the Municipal Hall, he reported that "there was trouble
in Amansabina." 31

For voluntary surrender to be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntarily. 32 A surrender to be
voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because
(a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) lie wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 33
That RABANILLO submitted himself to the custody of law even though there was yet no warrant of arrest or information against him is
of no moment. The barangay captain had to go to the house of RABANILLO to take the latter to the police station. The latter did not
present himself voluntarily to the former, who is a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
neither did he ask the former to fetch him at his house so he could surrender. 34 The fact alone that he did not resist but went
peacefully with the barangay captain does not mean that he voluntarily surrendered. 35 Besides, voluntary surrender presupposes
repentance 36; this condition could not have existed because at the moment he was brought to the police station, he had "mental
blackout." Moreover, he merely reported to the police that "there was trouble in Amansabina.'' Hence, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of RABANILLO.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance established in this case, the penalty that may be meted out to
RABANILLO is the nmeduim period of that prescribed by law for the offense. 37 The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate penalty whose minimum should
be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and whose maximum should be that of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, may be imposed on RABANILLO. Concretely, such indeterminate penalty should be TEN (10) years
of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years and FOUR (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum.
Before we close this case, two matters deserve few words, First, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to DEATH.
This is clearly erroneous, even if it be conceded arguendo, that the crime committed was murder. While Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes murder with "reclusion perpetua to death", it does not follow that courts should impose these two indivisible
penalties. What should be imposed is one or the other depending on the presence of modifying circumstances. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code expressly provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof, to wit:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by something circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation.
Second, in the body of the decision there is no specific finding on the issue of damages; yet, in the dispositive portion, there are
awards of damages. RABANILLO, however, did not question these awards. Nonetheless, since an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review, we shall determine whether the awards are warranted.
As to actual damages, the sister of MORALES testified that as a result of the death of MORALES, her family spent P41,024.70 38 for the
funeral services, food served during the wake, coffin, tomb, masses and novena. However, on cross examination, she admitted the
existence of contributions in the amount of P15,000.00. 39 The award of P41,024.70 should, therefore, be reduced to P26,024.70.
We sustain the award of moral damages in favor of Narcisa Morales, mother of MORALES, who testified on her suffering brought about
by the untimely death of her son. In view, however, of our finding that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime, no exemplary damages may be awarded. 40 The award of attorney's fees may be allowed under circumstance (11) of Article
2208 of the Civil Code. However, the awards of civil indemnity, actual damages, and attorney's fees should be payable not only to the
mother but also to the other heirs of MORALES.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: Accused-appellant VICENTE RABANILLO, is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of homicide, and not murder; and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) years and FOUR (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessories thereof, and to pay (a) the
heirs of the victim Raul Morales the sums of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of said victim; P26,024.70 as actual damages; and
P10,000 as attorney's fees, and (b) Narcisa Morales, mother of the victim, P30,000 as moral damages.1wphi1Cost de oficio. SO
ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135701. May 9, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The accused, ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete
City, Branch 30. The crime was allegedly committed as follows:[1]
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of September 15, 1996, at Barangay Tambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ALFREDO SENADOR with the use of a knife with
which the said accused was then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon said victim the following injury, to wit:
A stab wound measuring two (2) cm. in length, 0.3 cm. in width and eleven (11) cm. in deepness located at the left side of the trunk,
about two (2) cm. above the left clavicular bone. The wound was directed downward and slightly to the right.
which injury or wound caused the death of said ALFREDO SENADOR shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
When arraigned on June 11, 1997, the accused pled not guilty.

[2]

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Rogelio Kho, Lecpoy Senador, Eduardo Perater, Manuel Gabonales and Francisca
Senador. For the defense, the accused, Elbert Callet, PO3 Roy Balasabas, Barangay Captain Dominador Calijan and Nilo Callet
testified.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 15, 1996, at 5:00 p.m., the victim, Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old
son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater were at the flea market ofbarangay Tambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. There were
many people in the vicinity. Some were playing cara y cruz while others were playing volleyball.
Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a cara y cruz game. Alfredo sat close to the ground, with
his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively.
Out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the base of
the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground,
Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo died shortly thereafter.
Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. At 5:00 p.m., he saw people running away from the place where
there was a cara y cruz game. Next, he saw Alfredo and the accused. Alfredo was soaked in blood while the accused was running
towards the basketball court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him. Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The accused
was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of
bringing Alfredo to the hospital when he saw blood oozing from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died.
Dr. Rogelio Kho, Municipal Health Officer at Tayasan, autopsied the body of Alfredo on September 16, 1996. The doctor found a
stab wound on the left shoulder of Alfredo, near the base of the neck. He opined that the victim died due to severe hemorrhage and
irreversible shock due to stab wound.[3]
The defense gave a different account of the stabbing incident.
Allegedly, at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After two (2) games, he stopped
playing. It was past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played volleyball. While watching the game, he
was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredos elbow. He asked Alfredo why he hit him. Alfredo retorted, Are you angry? Next,
Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it. He pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his
third victim if he would get angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out a hunting knife from his waist, he (the accused) managed to
stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal hall to surrender.

Dominador Calijan, the Barangay Captain of Tayasan, happened to be at the basketball court near the scene of the crime. He
encountered Alfredo along the road after the stabbing incident. Alfredo had a stab wound on the lower nape. Calijan asked Alfredo
who stabbed him and the latter gave the name of the accused. He directed his barangay tanods to arrest the accused.
Barangay tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog were able to catch up with the accused three (3) kilometers away from the scene
of the crime. He was still holding the hunting knife and refused to surrender it for fear that the relatives of Alfredo would
retaliate. The barangay tanods escorted him to the municipal hall. Along the way, they asked him why he stabbed Alfredo. The
accused replied that he could not help it and that everything happened too fast. Upon reaching the municipal hall, the accused
surrendered the hunting knife. He was turned over to PO3 Roy Balasbas for investigation.
After the trial, the accused was found guilty of murder. The fallo of the trial courts decision[4] states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELBERT CALLET Y SABANAL guilty beyond a scintilla of doubt for the crime of MURDER penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any
aggravating circumstance, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided under
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is ordered to pay the legal heirs of Alfredo Senador the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death.
Costs against the accused.
Hence, the appeal. The accused contends that:[5]
1. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED
KILLED THE VICTIM WITH TREACHERY;
2. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED
FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE;
3. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE
ACCUSED DID NOT INTEND TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG.
We affirm. The conviction of the accused is clearly supported by the evidence.
Two (2) eyewitnesses positively identified the accused, Elbert Callet, as the one who fatally stabbed the victim, Alfredo
Senador. Eyewitness Lecpoy Senador testified as follows: [6]
(PROS. HERMOSA):
Q:

About that time 5:00 clock in the afternoon on September 15, 1996, where were you and your companions situated or
stationed since you said you were particularly at the flea market?

xxx

xxx

xxx

A:

We were in Tambulan.

Q:

In what particular place were you at the flea market?

A:

In the place where there was a cara y cruz.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

What were you and your father as well as Eduardo Perater doing at that moment at 5:00 oclock on September 15 at the
place where there was a game of cara y cruz?

A:

We were looking at the cara y cruz.

Q:

While you were looking at the cara y cruz game, do you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened?

A:

Yes, there was.

Q:

What was this unusual incident that happened?

A:

My father was stabbed.

Q:

Who stabbed your father?

A:

Elbert Callet.

Q:

Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago?

A:

Yes.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

Where was Elbert Callet in relation to your father when he stabbed your father?

A:

At the back of my father.

Q:

What was the position of your father when he was stabbed by the accused?

A:

He was sitting.

Q:

Where was your father hit if you know?

A:

Left shoulder.

Q:

What happened after Elbert Callet stabbed your father?

A:

My father walked.

Q:

Towards what place?

A:

Towards the area where there was a volleyball game.

Q:

And what eventually happened to him?

A:

He fell down.

Q:

And then, what happened after he fell down?

A:

We carried him to a place where there was a mango tree.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

What happened or what transpired after you brought your father towards the mango tree?

A:

My father died.

Q:

After stabbing your father, what did Elbert Callet do if he did anything?

A:

He ran away.

Q:

What did he use in stabbing your father?

A:

Hunting knife.

(emphases ours)
Another eyewitness, Eduardo Perater, testified as follows:[7]
(PROS. HERMOSA):
Q:

All right, at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of that day, can you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened?

A:

Yes, there was.

Q:

What was that unusual incident?

A:

There was a stabbing incident.

Q:

Who was stabbed?

A:

Alfredo Senador.

Q:

Who stabbed Alfredo Senador?

A:

Elbert Callet.

Q:

The same Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago in the courtroom?

A:

Yes.

Q:

What was the position of Alfredo Senador when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?

A:

He was sitting down.

Q:

Will you please demonstrate to us the manner how Alfredo Senador was sitting down at the time when he was stabbed by the
accused in this case?

A:

(Witness in squatting position, he was sitting with his buttock on his right foot).

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

Where was Elbert Callet situated when he stabbed Alfredo Senador?

A:

At the back of Alfredo Senador.

Q:

Was there any argument between Alfredo Senador and Elbert Callet before Alfredo Senador was stabbed?

A:

There was none.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

How many times did Elbert Callet stab Alfredo Senador?

A:

Only one (1).

Q:

Was Alfredo hit when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?

A:

Yes.

Q:

In what part of the body of Alfredo Senador was hit?

A:

In the left shoulder.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

What happened after Alfredo Senador was hit by the stabbing of Elbert Callet?

A:

He stood up.

Q:

What did Elbert Callet use in stabbing Alfredo Senador?

A:

A hunting knife.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

What about Elbert Callet, what did he do after stabbing Alfredo Senador?

A:

He ran away.

Q:

What did he do with his knife which he used in stabbing Alfredo senador?

A:

He carried it with him.

(emphases ours)
We give full faith and credit to the testimonies of Lecpoy and Eduardo. Their testimonies were vivid with details. They were clear
and consistent with each other.
The accused laments that Lecpoy Senador is a biased witness, being a son of the victim. We are not convinced.

The fact that Lecpoy is a son of the victim would not necessarily make him untrustworthy. This Court has ruled that (b)lood
relationship between a witness and the victim does not by itself impair the credibility of witnesses. On the contrary, relationship may
strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit. The earnest
desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is
innocent of the crime.[8] Significantly, there is no showing that this young eyewitness has any ill motive to testify falsely against the
accused.
To be sure, even without the testimony of Lecpoy, the testimonies of Eduardo Perater and Manuel Gabonales would suffice to
convict the accused. They are disinterested witnesses.[9] Their identification of the accused as the assailant is beyond question.
Still assailing the credibility of the eyewitnesses, the accused points out that in the joint affidavit [10] f Lecpoy and Eduardo, it was
stated that the victim was standing with his back facing Elbert Callet. However, they contradicted their affidavit when they testified at
the trial that the victim was sitting, with his buttocks resting on his right foot.
The cited inconsistency will not exculpate the accused. We quote with approval the following observations of the trial court:[11]
In the instant case, the direct and candid testimonies of eyewitnesses Lecpoy Senador and Eduardo Perater clearly showed that
the killing of Alfredo Senador was attended by treachery. Alfredo Senador was sitting with his buttocks on his right foot watching
the game of cara y cruz when Elbert Callet who was at the back of the victim stabbed him using a nine (9) inch hunting knife
hitting him near the base of his neck. The victim was not in a position to defend himself from the accused who deliberately
and consciously positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim to ensure the accomplishment of his evil desire without
risk to himself. The location of the stab wound at the left side of the trunk about two (2) centimeters from the base of the neck
and four (4) centimeters above the left clavicular bone with a deepness of eleven (11) centimeters directed downward and
slightly to the right also suggests that the accused deliberately and consciously selected that part of the human body to ensure
the instantaneous death of the victim. Although the counsel of the accused tried to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses by pointing that in their joint affidavit dated 20 September 1996 Lecpoy Senador and Eduardo Perater stated that
Alfredo Senador was standing when he was stabbed, the said discrepancy could not in any way affect the categorical,
candid, consistent and straightforward declaration of the said eyewitnesses made in open court that Alfredo
Senador was sitting when he was stabbed by the accused. Discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits
and testimonies made at the witness stand do no necessarily discredit the witnesses (People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA
19). This is because it is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit being taken ex parte is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate (People vs. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493). Moreover, as noted by this Court the word
standing was superimposed after the original typewritten word was erased using a snopic (sic) or white substance.
(emphases ours)
In addition, we note that Lecpoy and Eduardo did not countersign the superimposition in the subject affidavit. In the absence of clear
proof that they confirmed the change, they should not be bound by it.
The accused invokes self-defense for his acquittal. In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. Thus, he must
present clear and convincing evidence that the following elements are present, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[12] The accused failed to discharge this task.
The accused alleged that he and the victim had hunting knives during their encounter. After the victims elbow hit the left side of
his body, the victim grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it with his right arm. A verbal exchange ensued between them and
then the victim, using the left arm tried to unsheathe the knife that was tucked at his left side. However, the victim was not able to
pull out the knife because it got entangled with his shirt tucked in his pants. In defense, the accused allegedly pulled out his own knife
that was tucked in the right side of his waist using his left arm and stabbed the victim on the left shoulder. He then retreated and left
as the victim was still trying to approach him.[13]
The version of the accused does not inspire belief. The incident happened in plain view of many witnesses at the flea market. He
even claimed he was with a certain Guale and one Sonny Boy at that time. [14] Yet, nobody corroborated his story. Indeed, his narration
on how the victim attacked him is improbable. In the witness chair, he admitted that the victim was bigger than him and that his left
hand was restrained by the victim.[15] It is thus incredible how he could pull out his knife from his right side, with the use of his left
hand,[16] raise that knife high enough to hit the shoulder of the victim and inflict an 11-cm. deep wound upon him. It is more probable
that the victim was sitting down when the accused attacked him from behind as the prosecution witnesses testified. Equally
incredulous is the claim that after being injured, the victim still tried to approach and attack him, hence, he had to retreat. The
accuseds uncorroborated plea of self-defense cannot be entertained, especially when it is, in itself, extremely doubtful. [17]
The Information charged that evident premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the crime. The evidence failed to
prove evident premeditation. Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2)
an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [18] The records show that the prosecution did not adduce
any evidence to prove these elements.
Treachery or alevosia exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.[19]
The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of the victim to murder. The stabbing was from behind, done in a
sudden and unexpected manner while the victim was sitting close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot, and while
his attention was focused on the on-going cara y cruz game.[20] Clearly, the victim was not able to defend himself from the mode of
attack.

The trial court also correctly credited the accused with voluntary surrender to mitigate his liability. Voluntary surrender requires
that the offender had not been actually arrested; that he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and that
the surrender was voluntary.
The records reveal that the accused ran toward the municipal building after the stabbing incident. On his way to the municipal
building, he admitted to Barangay Tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog that he stabbed the victim. Although he did not immediately
turn over his weapon to them for fear of retaliation from the victims relatives, he did so as soon as they reached the municipal
building. Undoubtedly, the conduct he displayed was spontaneous as it shows his interest to give himself up unconditionally to the
authorities, thus saving the State the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. [21]
The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong. We are not persuaded.
The lack of intent to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the
body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the
victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did,
and he must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. [22]
As the killing was attended by treachery, the accused is liable for the crime of murder. The prescribed penalty therefor
is reclusion perpetua to death.[23] In view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua against the accused.
The civil indemnity awarded in favor of the legal heirs of the victim, Alfredo Senador, in the amount of P50,000.00 is in accord
with the Courts current policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from, finding the accused, ELBERT CALLET, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 12995, and sentencing him to sufferreclusion perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of the victim, ALFREDO
SENADOR, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant. SO
ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004]

ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 23753, affirming the
August 16, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC
convicted petitioner Arturo Romera of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He
was also ordered to pay private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages and P10,000 as attorneys fee.
The Information against petitioner reads:
On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod, Barangay Balagnan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Roy Mangaya-ay with the use of a bolo, thus, inflicting a mortal wound on the abdomen of the
latter; accused thereby performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony of Homicide which was not produced
because of the timely and effective medical attendance administered on the said victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. [3]
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other men namely,
Eligario Beboy Acenas, Dennis Bobong Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and Franklin Generol. They were all headed
for Biasong to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining, so they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca
Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette foil on Bebing Zuluetas pants and said, Theres a monkey among
us. Everybody laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing
Zulueta also got angry and pointed a finger at Franklin Generol and said, Even if you are stronger and older, if you will be hit by my
fist, you will crawl. Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone, You all watch out in Balaguan. He pulled Franklin Generol to join
him and said, Lets go, there are many boastful people here. Thereafter, petitioner and Franklin left the group.
At six oclock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by the house of one
Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about one kilometer away from petitioners own, they saw petitioner already carrying a
bolo waiting for them.

Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, Here are the brave ones. Roy and his companions ran away
but Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached Roy and said, Come here, brave one. He held Roy up by the collar and
stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he found himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent
surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.
After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso of the Citizens Armed Force Geographical
Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station.
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven oclock in the evening. Thereafter, they went to
bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not
answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when the latters wife told him that petitioner
was already asleep, he told her to wake her husband up. Petitioner went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he
opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all
about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was
hacking at the wall, petitioners wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy,
who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the
stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more
danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide. The dispositive part of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ARTURO ROMERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the offense charged. Consequently, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the
provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months and
Twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the
private offended party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another sum ofP10,000.00 as attorneys fee without, however, subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the following assignments of error:
1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE
SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE, WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE
DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR MORE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.[5]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. It pointed out that assuming arguendo that it was the victim who was
the aggressor at the start, the unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent
unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 69 [6] of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case. It explained that there
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself. It held, however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was established during
trial that after the incident he surrendered himself to the CAFGU and later on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
erroneously failed to apply Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty by one degree when two or
more mitigating circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him without
warning as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives
of his children, the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes, says the petitioner.
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the mitigating circumstances of provocation and
passion or obfuscation are unavailing to petitioner since it was he who initiated the attack. The OSG insists that it was not the victim
who went to petitioners house, but petitioner who went to where the victim was resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not categorically state who started the attack, it can be reasonably
gleaned from their decisions that it was the victim who initiated the aggressive encounter. This finding of fact is amply supported by
the evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient
provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in

danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there
was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is
the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.
[7]
From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence,
they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code should be applied, to wit:
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
...
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
...
The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 50 [8] of the Revised Penal Code, is the penalty next lower in degree than
that prescribed by law for consummated homicide. The penalty for consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, hence the penalty
next lower in degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article
64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the
Indeterminate Sentence Law herein applicable, the minimum term of the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner for frustrated
homicide should be within the range of arresto mayor in any of its periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months,
while the maximum term should be within the range of prision correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
WHEREFORE,
the
Decision
dated January
11,
2002 of
the
Court
of
Appeals
affirming
the
Order
of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the penalty imposed is concerned. Petitioner
ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is also ORDERED to pay the private offended party P19,361.15 as
actual damages, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costsde oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30849 March 29, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MABINI GARACHICO and ROGELIO DE LA CRUZ, defendants-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Pinamalayan, in Criminal Case No. R-559,
dated July 28, 1969, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, both accused, Mabini Garachico and Rogelio de la Cruz, are hereby found guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide, and are sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of death and to pay indemnity, jointly and

solidarily, to the heirs of both spouses, Raymundo Moral and Concordia Mariveles, the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P12,000.00) and costs. 1
Both accused, Rogelio de la Cruz and Mabini Garachico were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide in an information which
reads:
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1969, at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in barrio Budburan,
Municipality of Mansalay, province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and armed with
deadly weapons, to wit: two (2) boloes, did then an there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with a decided
purpose to rob, kill, attack, assault and wound therewith one Raymundo Moral inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds in different parts of the body which caused his instantaneous death, and immediately thereafter the said
accused entered the house of said Raymundo Moral and thereat wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of
gain and against the will of the owners thereof took and carried away the following personal properties: One (1)
transistorized radio, two (2) lockers containing assorted clothes, and five (5) heads of carabaos belonging to the
deceased spouses Raymundo Moral and Concordia Mariveles with a total value of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS, to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid amount; that on the occasion of said robbery
and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the properties above- mentioned, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their criminal conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength and number, with utter disregard of the respect due
the offended parties on account of old age and weaker sex, and in the very dwelling of the deceased spouses,
treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon an old woman, Concordia Mariveles, by deliberately
tying and knotting a piece of rope around her neck and mercilessly strangled her to death.
That in the commission of the heinous crime aforementioned, the following aggravating circumstances are present,
to wit: treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, nocturnity, dwelling, evident premeditation, utter disregard
of the respect due the offended parties on account of age and sex, and that the wrong done in the commission of the
crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission. 2
The counsel de oficio of the two defendants assign the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS' AFFIDAVITS, EXHIBITS "G" and "H" WERE VOLUNTARILY
GIVEN UNDER NO THREAT OR INTIMIDATING WHATSOEVER,
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS EVIDENT PREMEDITATION ON THE PART OF APPELLANTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF RAYMUNDO MORAL AND HIS WIFE, CONCORDIA MARIVELES,
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS INTENT OF GAIN ON THE PART OF APPELLANTS AND
THEREFORE FOUND THEM GUILTY OF ROBBERY IN CONNECTION WITH THE CARABAOS AND OTHER BELONGINGS
OF SPOUSES RAYMUNDO MORAL AND CONCORDIA MARIVELES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH,
NOCTURNITY AND/OR DWELLING, WERE PRESENT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS FLED AND/OR RAN AWAY FROM THE CRIME.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS' DEMEANOR AND MANNER OF TESTIFYING
STAMMERING AND NOT ANSWERING DESPITE SUFFICIENT TIME GIVEN, ARE ELOQUENT PROOF OF THEIR GUILT,
RATHER THAN INNOCENCE.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF- DEFENSE IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE DEATH OF RAYMUNDO MORAL, AND ACQUITTING THEM THEREOF.
VIII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF LACK OF INTENTION TO
COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AND ACTING UPON AN IMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS TO PRODUCE PASSION AND
OBFUSCATION IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF CONCORDIA MARIVELES.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE IN
CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF CONCORDIA MARIVELES, INSTEAD OF THE SIMPLE CRIME OF HOMICIDE. 3
The accused Mabini Garachico died on March 8, 1976. Hence, in a resolution dated June 18, 1976 this Court dismissed the case in so
far as the criminal liability of Mabini Garachico is concerned.
The trial court found the two accused guilty as charged in the infrmation on the following findings:
The prosecution, through its only eye witness to the incident (Diego Vicente) established the fact of killing of
Raymundo Moral by the said two accused. State witness Vicente came upon the two accused on the precise moment
when they were hacking Moral with their bolos.
From the Affidavit of Rogelio de la Cruz dated February 1, 1969 and subscribed and sworn to before Mansalay
Municipal Judge Adelita Sucgang (Exhibit "G") and also from the affidavit of Mabini Garachico dated March 18, 1969
and subscribed and sworn to before the same Judge, (Exhibit "H"), both of them stated and admitted that they
together boloed victim Raymundo Moral until he died. Nowhere in said two (2) affidavits was it stated that victim
Raymundo started the incident nor did Raymundo make any kind of provocation, by word of mouth or action, that led
the two accused in boloing him. From the affidavit of de la Cruz (Exh. "G"), it appears that accused Garachico
harbored ill-feeling towards Raymundo Moral because Moral had suspected Garachico of having stolen his (Moral's)
chickens about two (2) weeks before the incident in question, Likewise, from the affidavit of Garachico (Exh. "H"), it
appears that victim Moral confronted both accused de la Cruz and Garachico as having stolen his chickens and it was
also stated therein that Barrio Capt. Iluminado Garcia had ordered both of them to kill Moral. The two affidavits had
themselves furnished the motive or some of the motives that prompted the two accused to get rid of victim
Raymundo.
In their defense in the actual trial of this case, however, both de la Cruz and Garachico sought to establish selfdefense to justify their killing of victim Raymundo and to exculpate themselves of any liability therefor. In his
testimony in court, accused Garachico said that after Raymundo had charged him and de la Cruz of having stolen his
chickens and after exchange of words, Moral drew his bolo and struck de la Cruz; then Garachico struck Moral with
his bolo; Moral in turn also struck Garachico with his (Moral's) bolo which bolo Garachico wrested from the victim and
used to kill the victim. In his testimony in court, accused de la Cruz said Moral had charged him and Garachico with
stealing his chickens and after which Moral attempted to slap him de la Cruz) but desisted and Moral instead drew his
bolo and boloed but did not hit him; he de la Cruz) in turn struck back at Moral but failed to hit him; then Garachico
wrested Moral's bolo and used it on Moral, hitting Moral twice, and he de la Cruz) also boloed Moral twice and, as a
result, victim Moral succumbed.
This Court finds the version of the two (2) accused surrounding the killing of victim Raymundo as sham and
fabricated. Not an iota of doubt can exist in the mind about the fact that the accused had perpetrated a cold-blooded
and unmitigated murder of the person of Raymundo. That there was no justification for said murder, much less was
there a valid self-defense in this case, can be gathered and concluded from the following facts and circumstances, to
wit: 1) The affidavits of the two (2) accused, Exh. "G" and "H" which were voluntarily given under no threat or
intimidation whatsoever as testified to by Judge Sucgang before whom they were executed and sworn to, made
absolutely no mention of aggression of provocation by victim Raymundo before the incident of killing happened; 2)
The two accused, as testified by them took the lifeless body of Raymundo and hid it behind a clump of bushy
bamboos some distance away; 3) The two accused, as also testified by them, washed their respective bolos; and
accused Garachico threw the bolo of Moral into a cogonal area according to his own testimony; 4) The two accused
did not surrender to the authorities after the killing-, instead, accused de la Cruz was apprehended by police
authorities in an area by a river while Garachico who was with de la Cruz then ran away and successfully took flight
but was later apprehended by Mansalay Police Chief Quejada, some two (2) months after in barrio Mapaya, San Jose,
Occ. Mindoro; and 5) The demeanor and manner of testifying of the two accused stammering, not answering even
after giving them sufficient time, etc. belie their pretensions of innocence and the more show their guilt.
Not satisfied with killing Raymundo, the two accused proceeded to his house where they found his wife alone, and
killed her. According to their testimony, the accused came to ask her for forgiveness for the killing of her husband but
she scolded them and threatened to report them to the authorities. For these acts of the wife of Raymundo, they
killed her. Accused Garachico said that it was his co-accused de la Cruz who had tied a rope around the neck of
Raymundo's wife strangling her to death; on the other hand, de la Cruz said it was Garachico who had done the tying
of the rope. Even assuming that Raymundo's wife scolded the two accused and threatened to report them to the
authorities, these words, certainly, could not justify them to take the life of the helpless and defenseless woman in
her own dwelling home.
Although denied by the accused in their testimony at the trial that they had taken the carabaos of Raymundo after
killing him, they, however, admitted in their affidavits (Exhs. "G" and "H") that they took the carabaos of Raymundo
after he was killed. This fact is corroborated by the finding and recovery of said animals by the police authorities of
Mansalay at a bushy place some 50 meters away from the house of de la Cruz.

Both the accused also admitted, in their affidavits as well as in their testimony during the trial, having taken trunks
of clothes and other things mentioned in the information filed against them. In his testimony, however, de la Cruz
said they took the things from the house of the spouses-victims after the wife was killed, allegedly to prevent the
things from being stolen by other persons. This reason or pretense is incredible; it is inconceivable that a criminal,
after killing a person, would seek to protect the property of the victim who can no longer make use of material things
on earth.
As proven by the prosecution, all the carabaos and the things stolen were recovered by the aforesaid police
authorities.
The facts of this case as unveiled during the trial and by the affidavits of the two accused, have presented gruesome
and senseless killings which could only be perpetrated by bestial individuals as the accused revealed themselves to
be. Accordingly, the full weight of law and justice should find application in the case. This court finds the two accused
guilty of the crane of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the Information filed against them, with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, nocturnity, dwelling and evident premeditation,
without any litigating circumstance in their favor. 4
Under the first error assigned, the two accused claim that their written statements (Exhibits "G" and "H") which they gave to the police
authorities after their apprehension were not voluntary and were secured through threats and intimidation. The contention of the
accused is untenable.
The statements of both accused were taken on separate occasions. Rogelio de la Cruz executed his affidavit (Exh. "G") admitting his
participation in the robbery and killing of the spouses, Raymundo Moral and Concordia Mariveles, upon his apprehension shortly after
the commission of the offense, while the other accused, Mabini Garachico gave his written statement (Exh. "H"), where he likewise
admitted and narrated his participation in the killing and robbery of the spouses after his apprehension more than a month after the
commission of the offense.
De la Cruz and Garachico with their affidavits, were brought to the municipal judge of Mansalay, Judge Adelita Sucgang Although the
statement of de la Cruz was written in Tagalog, the same was translated to him in Visayan by Judge Sucgang who was herself a
Visayan. De la Cruz was asked whether the statement was true or not. And he answered that the same is correct. Again, de la Cruz
was asked by Judge Sucgang whether he was willing to sign his name. He answered that he was willing but since he does not know
how to write, he affixed his thumbmark to his written statement which was witnessed by the clerk of Judge Sucgang and by a person
who was then present in the office of the judge. De la Cruz was also asked by the municipal judge whether he was threatened,
intimidated or was promised some reward in making the statement and he answered that he was not. After the judge was satisfied
with the answers of de la Cruz, she administered the oath to him. 5 The same procedure was adopted by the municipal judge with
respect to Garachico in connection with his affidavit. 6
The municipal judge also told both affiants that they can change their affidavits if what is contained therein is not true, but both
accused answered the judge that what they stated in their affidavits were true. 7
The municipal judge, satisfied that both affiants gave their statements voluntarily, administered the oaths to each separately.
The allegation of the accused de la Cruz that the extrajudicial statement is inadmissible in evidence because he was maltreated when
he executed the same is devoid of merit. In the case of People v. Ty Sui Wong 8 this Court ruled that failure to file charges against the
alleged tormentors of the accused shows that the claim of maltreatment was a mere afterthought. In the case at bar, no such charge
was filed against the policeman who allegedly maltreated the accused de la Cruz. Hence the conclusion is that he was not really
maltreated.
The presumption of law favors the spontaneity and voluntariness of a statement given by the accused in a criminal case and the
burden is upon him to destroy that presumption. 9 In the instant case, both accused failed to destroy said presumption. Hence, the
lower court did not err in giving full weight to exhibits "G" and "H".
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation on the basis of the affidavit of the accused de la
Cruz stating that the accused Garachico harbored ill-feeling towards Raymundo Moral because the latter had suspected Garachico of
having stolen his chickens about two weeks before the incident; and that the Barrio Captain Iluminado Galicia had ordered both of
them to kill Moral.
The lower court committed an error. The extrajudicial statements of the accused merely furnished the motive that prompted the two
accused to kill Moral. The motive of the killing does not indicate the insistence of a criminal design. 10 Although in the affidavit of the
accused, there is a statement that at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1969, they waited for Moral at Budburan river
because they knew that he was going to have his carabaos drink and that they agreed to take revenge on Moral and to kill him the
moment they see him, there is an entire absence of evidence showing that they meditated and reflected on their intention between the
time it was conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated. The statement of the accused was nothing but an expression of
his own determination to commit the crane, which is entirely distinct from the premeditation which the law requires to be well defined
and established to aggravate the criminal responsibility. 11
To authorize the finding of evident premeditation it must appear not only that the accused had made a decision to commit the crime
prior to the moment of its execution but that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection or persistent
attempt. 12 In the case at bar, the lapse of thirty minutes between the determination and the execution of the crime is not sufficient
time for the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act. There being no evidence to prove that accused meditated and
reflected on their purpose, the killing of both Raymundo Moral and Concordia Mariveles was not attended by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.

Anent the third error assigned, the trial court did not err in holding that there was intent of gain on the part of the two accused and in
finding them guilty of robbery in connection with the carabaos and other belongings of the spouses Raymundo Moral and Concordia
Mariveles. The records of the case show that after the apprehension of the accused de la Cruz, he was immediately questioned by
Chief Quejado De la Cruz admitted to Quejado that he and his co-accused Garachico killed the spouses and that they took the five
carabaos, one radio and two trunks of clothes of the spouses. When de la Cruz was asked where they kept the stolen things he pointed
to the place where they kept the loot. 13 Patrolman Tanado, who was with Chief Quejado, was sent by the latter to accompany the
accused de la Cruz to the place where the stolen carabaos and articles were hidden and to recover them. 14 Pat. Tanado, recovered the
two trunks and one radio from the house where both accused were living. De la Cruz also pointed to Pat. Tanado, where the carabaos
were tethered Tanado found the carabaos (3 tethered 2 loose without ropes) a short distance from the house where the trunks and
radio were recovered.
Both accused declared at the trial that they saw Raymundo Moral at the Budburan River with his carabaos and it was in the vicinity of
this river where Moral was killed by both of them. The evidence on record shows that the carabaos were found tethered near the house
where the two accused were living. Likewise, the other articles stolen were found in the said house. There can be no clearer proof of
asportation by the two accused of the things belonging to their victims than these facts found in the records of the case.
The assertion of the accused that they took the things for safekeeping lest they be accused of stealing them, is puerile and utterly
incredible. The trial court has correctly observed that "it is inconceivable that a criminal, after killing a person would seek to protect
the property of his victims who can no longer make use of material things on earth."
Under the fourth assignment of error, the two accused contend that the lower court erred in holding that treachery, taking advantage
of superior strength, nocturnity and/or dwelling were present in the commission of the crime.
The lower court committed no reversible error in holding that the killing of Raymundo Moral was attended by treachery. The contention
of the accused that there was no treachery when they killed Moral because they were facing each other is untenable. Treachery should
be taken into account even if the deceased was face to face with his assailant at the time the blow was delivered, where it appears
that the attack was not preceded by a dispute and the offended party was unable to prepare himself for his defense. 15 In the case at
bar, although the accused and the victim were face to face with each other, the records reveal that the attack was not preceded by a
dispute. it was shown that upon seeing Moral, both accused hacked him with their bolos simultaneously thus Moral was unable to
prepare for his defense. This Court has consistently ruled that if the slayer makes a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly
weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim under conditions which make it impossible for the party assailed to flee or make
defense before the fatal blow is delivered, the act should be qualified as alevosia. 16
It is true that the killing of Moral was attended with abuse of superior strength because as held by this Court in several cases 17 when
two persons took part in the crime armed with bolos or revolvers and made a simultaneous attack upon a defenseless person, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength should be taken into consideration. However, in the case at bar, the lower court
erred in appreciating abuse of superior strength as a separate aggravating circumstance. Taking advantage of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery. 18
Nocturnity, likewise, should not have been considered by the trial court as an aggravating circumstance, Night is defined as that period
from sunset to sunrise. 19 As testified to by eyewitness Diego Vicente, the sun had not yet set when the incident occurred. Therefore, it
was not yet night time when the killing of Moral occurred. And even granting that it was already night time when the crime of robbery
with homicide was accomplished, still, nocturnity was merely an accidental circumstance. It was not specially sought by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime. Neither was it taken advantage of by the accused to insure its commission with impunity. 20
The circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling aggravated the killing of Concordia Mariveles. The existence of abuse of
superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of the victim, an old woman, 52 years of age
and the two accused who were young and strong and in the manner in which the killing was made, that of giving a karate blow on her
and strangling her to death, thus showing that the accused cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their physical strength.
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that dwelling is not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

21

Hence, dwelling must

Under the fifth assignment of error, the two accused contend that the lower court erred in holding that they fled and/or ran away from
the scene of the crime. The accused wanted to convey the impression that they intended to surrender to the authorities after having
killed and robbed the spouses. This is negated by the evidence on record. If it is really true that they had the intention to surrender to
the authorities, they could have done so without the chief of police and his men surrounding them in the Budburan river while they
were bathing in the river. After the killing, the two accused hid the body of Moral in the bushes quite far from the place where they
killed him. The following morning after the commission of the crime, upon the information that the accused were somewhere in the
vicinity of Budburan, Chief Quejado and his men scoured the area and found the two accused bathing in the river. Instead of
surrendering peacefully, the accused Garachico was able to escape but the accused de la Cruz was apprehended. If de la Cruz had his
way, he would have escaped but the policemen were faster. Garachico made good his escape and remained in hiding until his capture
in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, about two months after the killing and robbery of the spouses. These facts establish that the accused
never had the intention to surrender to the authorities. On the contrary, they intended to flee as in fact the accused Garachico
succeeded in running away from the authorities and escaped to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where he was apprehended.
Under the sixth assignment of error, the two accused submit that the lower court erred in holding that their demeanor and manner of
testifying and in not answering despite sufficient time are proof of their guilt rather than innocence. This contention is without merit.
Firstly, the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, independent of the observation of the lower court as to the
demeanor and manner of testifying of the accused. And secondly, the rule is that the appellate court will not interfere with the
observation of the lower court as to the manner the witnesses testified because the trial judge has the opportunity to see the
witnesses, hear them testify and observe their demeanor on the witness stand. 22

Under the seventh assignment of error, the two accused submit that the lower court erred in not considering self-defense in their favor
in connection with the death of Raymundo Moral. This contention is untenable. In their extrajudicial statements, both accused admitted
that they killed Moral and made absolutely no mention of aggression or provocation by the victim Raymundo Moral before the two
accused killed him. The testimonies in open court of the two accused that they killed Moral in self-defense as the latter assaulted them
with his bolo cannot prevail over their extrajudicial statements. Considering that said statements were given spontaneously at the time
when the facts relating to the incident in question were still fresh in their memory and before they could have an opportunity to
concoct or fabricate a story of the incident, the said statements certainly deserve credence. 23
As held in the case of People vs. Verzola, 24 "There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being,
the burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least extenuate the offense
committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution, for
even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing." No such proof was adduced by
both accused.
The conduct of de la Cruz and Garachico immediately after they committed the crime is incompatible with the reaction of one who
killed another in legitimate self-defense. After the two accused killed Moral they hid his body in bushes at a distance from where they
hacked him to death; 25 they wiped their bolos after killing Moral with banana leaves to remove the blood stain; 26 they threw away the
bolo of the deceased in the cogonal area; 27 and they did not voluntarily surrender but, instead, were captured, in the case of de la
Cruz, a day after the killing while taking a bath in the Budburan river, while Garachico successfully escaped the police and was
apprehended in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, about two months after the killing. All these actuations show that both accused did not
act in self-defense.
It is significant to note that the nature, character, location and number of wounds sustained by the deceased belie the claim of selfdefense. 28 The necropsy findings on the cadaver of Raymundo Moral reveal the following:
1. Clean cut wound about 8 inches long cutting the lower jaws, bony portion of the face;
2. Clean cut wound about 7 inches long and almost cutting through the neck:
3. Clean cut wound about 5 inches long on the palm of the right hand, cutting the bony portion of the big finger;
4. Clean cut wound about 3 inches long on the posterior portion of the left hand almost cutting off the first finger;
5. Clean cut wound about 2 112 inches long on the posterior
6. Clean cut wound 5 inches long on the posterior portion of the left knee reaching the bone;
7. Clean cut wound about 4 1/2 inches long on the upper posterior portions of the right leg. Cause of death-shock
due to the big and deep multiple wounds. 29
The wounds inflicted upon the victim by the two accused who were not wounded at all, sufficiently disprove their allegation that they
acted in self-defense.
In the case of Cudiamot v. People,

30

it was held:

... As was pointed out in the appealed decision: 'The appellant's plea of self-defense must be proved by clean and
sufficient evidence; and in this task, the appellant failed.' His testimony lacked corroboration. Moreover, Justice
Escolin stressed that petitioner 'emerged from the encounter completely unscathed ... He referred likewise to the
'number of wounds sustained by the victim.' Petitioner's claim, therefore, that he perpetrated the act to save himself
lacks persuasiveness. It is not to be lost sight of that the plea of self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must
be proved by the accused with sufficient evidence. It should be satisfactorily established. It is well-nigh impossible to
believe that there was a peril to the life of petitioner considering that he was able to inflict eleven wounds on the
deceased, without himself being injured in any way. To so assert, considering such circumstance is not merely to
strain human credulity, but to shatter it. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the eighth assignment of error, the two accused contend that the trial court erred in not considering the mitigating
circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, and passion and obfuscation in connection with the
death of Concordia Mariveles. This contention is untenable. Article 13, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code "addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during the
planning stage." 31 Therefore, if the original plan, as alleged by the accused, was merely to ask for forgiveness from Moral's wife but
which plan, on account of the fact that Moral's wife scolded them and threatened to report them to the authorities, led to her killing,
the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. The records show that
the accused held Moral's wife until she fell to the floor, whereupon they strangled her by means of a piece of rope tied around her neck
tin she died. The brute force employed by the accused completely contradicts the claim that they had no intention to kill the victim.
The facts of record show that both accused are guilty of robbery with homicide. As such, the accused cannot claim passion and
obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance. In People v. Pagal, 32 it was held that:
... the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which as in the case at bar is planned
and calmly meditated before its execution. Thus in People v. Daos (60 Phil. 143), a case of robbery with homicide,

this Court rejected the claim of appellants therein that passion and obfuscation should have been estimated in their
favor, because the death of the victim therein took place on the occasion of robbery, which, before its execution had
been planned and calmly meditated by the appellants.
Under the ninth assignment of error, the two accused submit that the lower court erred in convicting them of the crime of robbery with
homicide in connection with the death of Moral's wife, instead of the crime of homicide. This contention is without merit. The two
accused are guilty of robbery. And since, the killing of Moral's wife took place on the occasion of the robbery, the two accused are
guilty not only of the crime of homicide but robbery with homicide.
Although two persons were killed on the occasion of the robbery, the accused are nevertheless guilty of only one crime of robbery with
homicide. The juridical concept of robbery with homicide does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim. If more than one
were killed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, this circumstance does not authorize punishment for separate independent
offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long
as all the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 33 In the case at bar, there is no doubt that after the
killing of Moral, the purpose of the accused in going to his house was to rob the place with whatever things they could lay their hands
on, but finding Moral's wife in the house whose presence constituted an obstacle to their purpose, they had to kill her.
The penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. 34 The killing of Raymundo Moral was attended with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery while the killing of Concordia Mariveles was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and abuse of superior strength. There being no mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
death. However, for lack of the necessary votes, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed.
Pending this automatic review, the accused Mabini Garachico died. However, only the criminal liability is extinguished. The claim of the
heirs of the two deceased survives because Mabini Garachico died after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro. 35
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is affirmed with the modification that the accused Rogelio de la Cruz is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and he and the estate of the late Mabini Garachico are jointly and severally ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
two deceased the total sum of P24,000.00. 36 The accused Rogelio de la Cruz shall pay one half of the costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32042 December 17, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO BENITO y RESTUBOG accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to the charge of murder for
having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, 1969. The killing was qualified by treachery and
aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty.
After a mandatory review of the death sentence, this Court in its decision of February 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of conviction. It
appreciated in Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351).
Benito filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank should not be appreciated against him.
Benito, 26, a native of Naga City, in his sworn statement , which was taken, about five hours after the shooting, by Corporal E. Cortez
and Patrolmen J. de la Cruz, Jr., and H. Roxas of the Manila Police, recounted the background and circumstances of the tragic incident
in this manner (Exh. A):
... alam ninyo ho, ako ay dating empleyado ng Civil Service Commission sa kalye P. Paredes, Sampaloc, Maynila, at
ako ay Clerk 2 sa Administrative Division at ako ay nagumpisa ng pagtratrabaho sa Civil Service magmula pa noong
November, 1965 ng ako ay nasuspende sa aking trabaho dahil kinargohan nila ako ng "DISHONESTY" at nasuspende
ako ng 60 days at nabalik ako sa trabaho noong January 1966 pero kinarguhan uli nila ako ng "MALVERSARTION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS, QUALIFIED THEFT, ESTAFA at FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT at dinimanda din ako ng Civil
Service ng Administrative case ng "DISHONESTY" at dinismiss na ako sa trabaho ni Commissioner Subido noong
February 16, 1966.
At magmula noon ay nawalan na ako ng trabaho pero lahat ho noong kinargo nila sa akin na sinabi ko sa inyo ay
"fabricated" lang ang mga evidensiya at ang gumawa ho noong ay ang binaril ko kanina na si PEDRO MONCAYO JR. Y
RAMOS at naka pending pa ngayon sa City Fiscal ng Maynila kay Asst. Fiscal Magat at iyon namang "dismissal order"
ni Commissioner Subido ay inapela ko sa Civil Service Board of Appeals.

Magmula noong Idinismiss nila ako sa aking trabaho dahil sa "fabricated" charges ay naghirap na ko sa aking buhay
at nahihiya ako sa mga kaibigan ko. Ako ay assign(ed) sa collecting department noon at nagagalit sa akin ang mga
empleyado ng Civil Service dahil mahigpit ako sa kanila.
Noong bandang alas 7:00 ng gabi noong Dec. 11, 1969, ako ay nagpunta sa Civil Service sa kalye Paredes at nakita
ko si PEDRO MONCAYO, Jr. at kinausap ko siya at tinanong ko siya na iyong kaso ko ay matagal na at hindi pa
natatapos at baka matulungan niya ako at ang sagot niya ay "UMALIS KA NA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA
SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO" at umalis na ko.
Kaninang bandang alas 11:00 ng umaga ay nagkita kami ni PEDRO MONCAYO Jr. sa loob ng compound ng Civil
Service at sa harapan ng maraming tao sinabi niya na "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW" kaya ang
ginawa ko ay umalis na ako.
Kaninang bandang alas 5:25 ng hapon, nitong araw na ito, Desiyembre 12, 1969, nakita ko si PEDRO MONCAYO Jr.
na nagmamanejo noong kotse niya sa kalye P. Paredes sa tapat ng Civil Service, sinundan ko siya at pagliko ng kotse
niya sa kanto ng P. Paredes at Lepanto, Sampaloc, Maynila, ay binaril ko siya ng walong beses at tinamaan siya at
napatumba siya sa kaniyang upuan sa kotse.
Pagkatapos ay tumawag ako sa telepono sa MPD Headquarters para sumurender at kayo nga ang dumating kasama
ninyo iyong mga kasama ninyo.
Benito surrendered to the police the revolver (Exh. C) used in the shooting with the eight empty shells of the bullets which he had fired
at Moncayo.
The Police report contains the following background and description of the killing (Exh. B):
According to the suspect, he was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office located at P.
Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up
to Nov. 1965 when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY".
After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC
FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY"
culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service on February 1966.
The aforecited criminal charges against the suspect was allegedly investigated by Asst. Fiscal MAGAT. Records from
the CRID, MPD, reveals that on Dec. 6, 1966, Hon. Judge ROAN of the City Court of Mla. issued a Warrant No. E316758 for the arrest of the suspect for the crime of ESTAFA.
On May 24, 1969, Hon. Judge JUAN O. REYES of the CFI of Mla. issued an order No. OA-87409 for the arrest of the
suspect for the crime of MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS. According to the suspect, the aforecited criminal and
administrative charges filed him were allegedly instigated and contrived by the victim and since the time of his
dismissal, he was allegedly jobless.
On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and requested the victim to help him in his
cases but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect "UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT
BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO".
The suspect left and returned the following morning at 11:00 a.m. of Dec. 12, 1969, and when they met again, the
victim allegedly remarked in the presence of many people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW". The
suspect who was humiliated and incensed, left.
At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22 black
revolver (w/ SN - P-5317, Trademarked "SENTINEL", SQUIRES BINGHAM MFG. CO. INC. MLA. P.I.) loaded with nine
(9) live Cal. 22 bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside the Civil Service compound at P. Paredes st.
Sampaloc, Mla.
The
victim
showed
up
and
drove
his
green
Chevrolet
2
door
car
(w/
Plate
No.
L-10578 Mla. 69) along P. Paredes st. The suspect with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and
when the latter's car was at a full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor
vehicles, the suspect without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot the victim eight (8) times
on the head and different parts of the body at closer range which consequently caused the latter's death on the spot
inside his car.
The suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car (w/ Plate No. L-55117) by his coemployees (composed of VICTOR VILLAR, ELEUTERIO MENDOZA & FORTUNATO JOSE Jr.) to the FEU Hospital.
Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA by Dr. P. PAHUTAN, SOD, at 5:40 p.m. of Dec. 12, 1969.
The thirty-six year old victim, a certified public accountant, was the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Transactions Division and Acting
Chief, Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission (Exh. E to E-2). The accused was a clerk in the cash section,
Administrative Division of the Commission, receiving P1,884 per annum (Exh. D). He started working in the Commission on November
7, 1963.

On October 21, 1965 Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito admitted having
malversed an amount between P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination fee stamps. Moncayo's report reads as follows (Exh.
F):
MEMORANDUM for
The Commissioner
Through Proper Channels
This refers to the case of Mr. ALBERTO R. BENITO, Clerk II in the Administrative Division of this Commission, who, as
had previously been reported, malversed public funds in the amount of approximately P5,000.00 out of his
collections from the sale of examination fee stamps.
I wish to state that this matter came to my attention on the evening of March 1, 1965 when Mr. Teodoro Abarquez,
Acting Cashier I, reported to me that fifty (50) money orders at P2.00 each with a total vlaue of P100.00 were
missing from a bundle of money orders received from the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato, which were kept by him
in one of the cabinets inside the Cashier's Cashier' room.
At the same time he also informed me that he suspected that Mr. Benito stole the missing money orders. His
suspicion arose from the fact that he found several money orders marked "Cotabato" as their place of issue among
the cash receipts turned over to him by Mr. Benito that afternoon as his collection from the sale of examination fee
stamps. Mr. Abarquez showed to me the said money orders issued in Cotabato which were turned over to him by Mr.
Benito and after checking their serial numbers with the records of list of remittances on file, we were able to
establish definitely the fact that the said money orders were those missing.
It may be stated that at that time, Mr. Benito was assigned to work in the Cash Section and one of his duties was to
sell examination fee stamps to applicants for examinations. It was then the practice of the cashier to issue to Mr.
Benito in the morning examination fee stamps to be sold during the day and in the afternoon he turned over to the
Cashier the proceeds from the sale of stamps including the unsold stamps issued to him. After considering the work
performed by Mr. Benito, it became evident that he succeeded in malversing the amount of P100.00 by substituting
equivalent amount of money orders in the place of the cash extracted by him from his daily collections from the sale
of examination fee stamps when he clears his accountability with the Cashier.
The following day, I confronted Mr. Benito in the presence of Mr. Abarquez and ask him whether he had something to
do with the loss of the fifty (50) money orders at P2.00 each. At first he denied, but when I asked him where he
obtained the money orders issued in Cotabato which were included in his collections the day preceding, he admitted
having stolen the missing money orders.
Having confessed his guiltk, I then asked Mr. Benito when he started committing the said irregularity and how much
in all did he actually malversed out of his daily collections from the time that he started the anomaly. He stated in
the presence of Mr. Abarquez that he started in January, 1965 and that although he did not know exactly the total
amount malversed by him, he believed the amount to be between P4,000.00 to P5,000.00. He also confessed that he
used the money orders remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental in the amount of P3,436.00 in
substituting various amounts extracted by him from his daily cash collections and used by him for personal purposes.
It appears from the records that the List of Remittances covering the money orders received from the Provincial
Treasurer of Negros Occidental was duly receipted by Mr. Benito. He was supposed to issue an Official Receipt
therefor in favor of the said Provincial Treasurer and then turn over to the Cashier the amount involved for deposit to
the National Treasurer. The said List of Remittances, duly signed by Mr. Benito, is enclosed for use as evidence in this
case.
I told Mr. Benito that I cannot do anything but report the matter to the Commissioner. However, he pleaded that he
be given first an opportunity to restore the amount before I make my report in order that the penalty that may be
imposed upon him may be lessened to a certain degree. As I thought it wise in the interest of the service to recover
the amount involved, I allowed him to go and see his parents in Naga City to raise the amount in question.
After two weeks, Mr. Benito informed me that his parents filed an application for a loan with the Government Service
Insurance System and that the proceeds of the said loan which he intended to use in restoring the amount
malversed by him were expected to be released during the last week of May, 1965. However, when the month of
May, 1965 elapsed without the amount involved having been restored, I conferred with Mr. del Prado, my immediate
superior and asked him whether we should wait further for the release of the said loan in order that the amount
involved may be recovered. Mr. Prado consented to giving him a little more time.
When Mr. Benito still failed to restore the amount in question by the end of June, 1965, I got hold of him on July 5,
1965 and together with Messrs. del Prado, Abarquez and Gatchalian, also of this Commission, brought him before
Deputy Commissioner A. L. Buenaventura and reported the entire matter to the Deputy Commissioner. In the
presence of Messrs. del Prado, Abarquez, Gatchalian and myself, Mr. Benito admitted readily and voluntarily before
the Deputy Commissioner the commission of the offense of malversation of public funds as stated above.
In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Mr. Benito be charged formally and that he be suspended from
office immediately considering the gravity of the offense committed by him.

(Sgd.) PEDRO R. MONCAYO

Administrative Officer II
Benito was charged with dishonesty. He had admitted to Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura that he had misappropriated his
collections and spent the amount in nightclubs and pleasure spots and for personal purposes. The decision dismissing him from the
service reads as follows (Exh. G):
This is an administrative case against Mr. Alberto R. Benito, Clerk I, Cash Section, Administrative Division of this
Office, for dishonesty.
The following excerpts from the letter dated October 22, 1965 of the Commissioner of Civil Service connect
respondent with the alleged misappropriation of public funds representing his collection from the sale of examination
fee stamps and constitute the basis of the instant case against him:
An investigation made by this Commission shows that you malversed public funds in the amount of
P3,536.00 out of your collections from the sale of examination fee stamps while in the performance
of your official duties as Clerk II in the Cash Section, Administrative Division of this Office. It
appears that you succeeded in malversing the above-stated amount from your cash collections by
substituting in lieu thereof money orders worth P3,436.00 remitted to this Commission by the
Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental which were duly receipted for by you. It also appears that
you extracted from a bundle of money orders remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato the
amount of P100.00 in money orders which were kept in one of the cabinets in the Cashier's room.
Respondent denied the charge. He explained, among others, that money orders were always kept in the Cashier's
safe and he had no access to them. Although he admitted having received money orders amounting to P3,436.00
remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental and another remittance of the Provincial Treasurer of
Cotabato he, however, disclaimed having substituted the same for cash collections in his sale of examination fee
stamps. He reasoned out further that he could not be charged with malversation of public funds inasmuch as he was
not then an accountable officer.
It appears that respondent, as Clerk in the Cash Section, performs, among other duties, the selling of examination
fee stamps, receiving payments therefor, and receiving remittances in form of cash and/or money orders from
provincial treasurers in connection with examinations held in the provinces. It was also his duty to issue official
receipts for said remittances. In the course of the performance of his duties, he received said remittances from the
Provincial Treasurers of Negros Occidental and Cotabato, but no official receipts were issued by him, as shown by the
reply telegrams pertaining thereto. While records disclose that remittances from the province of Cotabato were
submitted to the Cashier of the Civil Service Commission, there is no evidence showing that remittances from Negros
Occidental were likewise submitted.
Investigation further reveals that 50 money orders were discovered missing from the remittances of Cotabato
Provincial Treasurer which were kept in the cabinet of the Cashier. On or about March 2, 1965, the Cashier of the
Commission noticed that 15 money orders turned over by respondent as part of his collections in the sale of
examination fee stamps were among the missing money orders. This triggered off the filing of this case against the
respondent.
On July 5, 1965, respondent admitted before the then Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura having
misappropriated an aggregate amount ranging from P3,000 to P7,000, which he spent in night clubs, pleasure spots
and other personal benefits. Despite the testimonies of several witnesses regarding his confession, including that of
the then Deputy Commissioner himself, respondent, when asked to take the stand, denied his previous admission.
Instead, he argued that the cash and accounts of the Cashier of the Civil Service Commission, when examined by
representatives of the Auditor's Office, did not indicate any shortage and therefore there was no irregularity involved.
This argument is not well taken. Inasmuch as the remittances received by respondent from said Provincial Treasurers
of Negros Occidental and Cotabato were not in turn given corresponding official receipts, naturally, the same were
not reflected on the Cashier's cash book.
The weakness of respondent's defense lies not so much on its failure to establish convincingly his innocence as its
irreconciliability with established facts. Obviously, none of the circumstances in this case is consistent with his claim
of innocence. On the contrary, all of them put together produce reasonable assurance of respondent's guilt.
In view of the foregoing, this Office finds respondent Alberto R. Benito guilty as charged. Wherefore, he is dismissed
from the service effective upon his receipt of this decision.
In the interest of the service this decision is executed also on the date of his receipt of this decision.
Benito appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from the Commissioner's decision dismissing him. The appeal was pending at the
time when he assassinated Moncayo (Exh. I).
The foregoing antecedents of the assassination shed light on the remark which the victim, Moncayo, allegedly made upon seeing
Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen at eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969
(about six hours before the shooting): "Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw." (Exh. A or 1); or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said:
"Hindi ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw." (27 tsn December 26, 1969).

Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. Benito contends that Moncayo insulted him when he (Moncayo)
remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service Commission. Benito argues that that remark "was tantamount
to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he was
exposed to ridicule in the presence of his officemates.
Benito attached to his motion a copy of the decision of Judge Jose C. Colayco dated January 16, 1975, acquitting him of the charge of
malversation in connection with his alleged misappropriation of the fees collected from the examinees of the 1974 patrolman
examination. That same decision makes reference to Benito's exoneration from the administrative charge. The court's decision reads
as follows:
The accused is charged with malversation under the following information:
That on or about and during the period comprised between October 17, 1964, to February, 1965,
inclusive, in the City of Manila Philippines, the said accused being then employed as Clerk I of the
Civil Service Commission, a branch of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, among
whose duties were to accept payments of fees collected from the examinees of the 1964 Patrolman
examination, and by reason of his said position received the total amount of P3,536.00, with the
duty to turn over and/or account for his collections to the cashier of the Civil Service Commission
immediately or upon demand but the said accused once in possession of the said amount of
P3,536.00, with intent to defraud, despite repeated demands made upon him to turn over and to
account for the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert and malverse the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the
detriment of public interest and to the damage and prejudice of the said Civil Service Commission
in the said amount of P3,536.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
The evidence shows that the accused had an appointment as clerk in the Civil Service Commission from May 27,
1964, as clerk I, range 23 from June 1, 1965 and as clerk I, range 26 from July 23, 1965 (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2). He
had the duty, among others, of selling Civil Service examination- fee stamps and to receive payment therefor, as well
as to receive remittances of money orders and checks from the provincial treasurers for payments of examination fee
stamps (Exhibit B).
Teodoro Abarquez, a cashier of the Civil Service Commission during the period alleged in the information, testified in
his direct examination that Benito was working in his office; that one of the duties that he assigned to him was to sell
examination fee stamps; that it was customary for him to give stamps to Benito at the start of office hours in the
morning and that Benito turned over to him the proceeds of the sale, as well as the unsold stamps, at the close of
office hours in the afternoon; that one afternoon he noticed that Benito turned over to him 50 money orders from
Cotabato, together with some cash, as proceeds of the sale of stamps for that day; that he remembered that he was
missing money orders from one of his cabinets where he kept them; that when he discovered that the 50 money
orders were those which were missing, he reported the matter to Pedro Moncayo, the chief administrative officer; on
March 1, 1965; that the money orders were for P2.00 each, and were payments of the examination fees from
Cotabato (Exhibit F); that he discovered the loss of the 50 money orders on February 28, 1965 and reported it to
Moncayo on March 1, 1965, together with the list of missing orders (Exhibit M); that after receiving the report,
Moncayo called Benito to the office of Abarquez where he admitted taking the missing money orders; that Moncayo
submitted a memorandum to the Commissioner, dated October 21, 1965, after giving Benito a chance to refund the
value of the money orders (Exhibit O). Alipio Buenaventura, acting Deputy Commissioner at the time, and Eliseo S.
Gatchalian, budget officer, testified that when Benito was confronted with the report of Moncayo and Abarquez, he
admitted that he misappropriated about P3,000.00 because of bad company and that he asked for a chance to
refund the money.
Under cross-examination, Abarquez elucidated his testimony in his direct examination and explained that when
Benito turned over the proceeds of the sale of stamps for that particular day, he kept the sum of P100.00 and
replaced it with the 50 money orders that he had taken from the cashier's office to cover up the money that he had
pocketed. When he was asked when he discovered that Benito substituted the 50 money orders from Cotabato, he
answered that he checked them the following night (March 2, 1965) with the list of money orders remitted by the
Provincial treasurer (Exhibits F, F-1); but when he was confronted with his affidavit which he executed on April 18,
1966 (Exhibit R), he reluctantly admitted that he had only verified 15 money orders missing as of April 18, 1966 and
that he did not keep any record of the money and the money orders given to him by Benito on March 1, 1965.
He also admitted that the room where he kept the money orders in an unlocked drawer was also occupied by two
other persons, and that this was the first time that he had not followed the usual procedure of keeping them in the
safe. He further admitted that, although regular examinations were conducted during the period of October 1, 1964
to February 28, 1965 by the examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing
Office, they did not find any shortage in the accounts of Benito.
Finally, when the Court asked him what happened to the 50 money orders, at first he hinted that they were not
deposited with the Bureau of Treasury because they were reported missing; but when pressed further, he said that
he deposited them, but did not issue any official receipt for them. When asked if he had any evidence to show that
they were actually deposited, he admitted that he could not even remember when he deposited them.
The testimony of Teodoro Abarquez upon which the prosecution has built its case, is too weak and shaky to sustain a
finding of guilt because of his glaring inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps in memory. The prosecution has failed

to present convincing evidence that the 50 money orders were even lost: According to Abarquez he had only verified
the loss of 15 on April 18, 1966, although he testified earlier that he determined the loss of 50 the night after March
1, 1965.
The examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing Office did not find any
irregularity in the cash accountability of Benito, according to Abarquez. This was corroborated by Romeo Jarabelo,
auditor of the Commission on Audit and Miguel Games, auditing examiner assigned to the Civil Service Commission,
who testified for the accused. Benito was in fact exonorated the administrative charge filed against him for the time
same transaction (Exhibit E).
In fact, the testimony of Abarquez under cross-examination that he has not issued any official receipt for the 50
money orders and his inability to prove that he deposited them with the bureau of Treasury gives rise to the
suspicion that other persons, not the accused, may have stolen the 50 missing money orders. Even without taking
into account the testimony of the accused, who denied the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, the court
believes that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting the accused, with costs de oficio.
The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise to the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically directed at Benito. The prosecution notes that the remark was uttered by
Moncayo at eleven o'clock in the morning. According to Benito's testimony (not consistent with his confession), he saw Moncayo three
hours later or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and Moncayo said that he had already submitted
his report and he could not do anything more about Benito's case (26 tan). As already stated, the assassination was perpetrated at
around five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.
Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the circumstances recited above for changing
our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of "haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave, causada
al autor del delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it."
"La apreciacion de la proximidad queda al arbitrio del tribunal; el Tribunal Supremo (de Espaa) no ha apreciado la proximidad ...
cuando la ofensa se realizo por la maana y el delito tuvo lugar por la tarde (Sentencia de 11 noviembre 1921); por regla general no
es proxima cuando transcurre tiempo suficiente para la razon recobre su imperio sobreponiendose a la pasion (Sentencias de 28 mayo
1882, 4 noviembre 1893, 24 junio 1908, etc.) ... Si falta el requisito de la proximidad debe desestimarse (Sentencia de 3 julio 1950).
Exige gravedad en la ofensa y proximada en la reaccion." (Note 9, 1 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal. 1975 Ed., p. 564).
The Spanish Supreme Court also held that "no puede apreciarse esta circunstancia atenuante en favor del autor de un homicidio
cometido 'algunas horas despues de haberle invitado el interfecto a renir y golpeado en el pecho con las manos', porque el tiempo
transcurrido entre los golpes y la muerte fue suficiente para que el animo del reo se serenase (Sentencia de 24 Junio 1908, Gaceta 28
Agosto 1909, IV-V Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola 1182).
The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination was more than
sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of
liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He
acted with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged defamatory
remark that the Civil Service Commission compound was a hangout for a thief or for thieves but the refusal of Moncayo to change his
report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise
Moncayo for having exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change his
report.
Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank. Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be considered against him because
there was no evidence that he "deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank" of Moncayo. That contention has no merit.
It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission and that the killer was a clerk in the
same office who resented the victim's condemnatory report against him. In that situation, the existence of the aggravating
circumstance of "desprecio del respeto que por la dignidad mereciere el ofendido" is manifest. The instant case is similar to a case
where the chief of the secret service division killed his superior, the chief of police (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167) and to the killing of
the acting Spanish consul by his subordinate, the chancellor of the consulate, who had misappropriated the funds of the consulate,
which misappropriation was discovered by the victim (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil, 597, 606). In these two cases the murder
was aggravated by disregard of rank. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied. SO ORDERED.