MANAGERIAL AND SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES

FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HONORABLE

CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, FRANKLIN BAKER BROTHERHOOD ASSOCIATION
(TECHNICAL AND OFFICE EMPLOYEES)-ASSOCIATION OF TRADE
UNIONS (ATU)
G.R. No. 75039

January 28, 1988

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the order of
Mediator-Arbiter Conchita Martinez of Ministry of Labor and Employment
and Dir Cresencio Trajano of MOLE. On April 23, 1984 Franklin Baker
Brotherhood Association filed a petition for certification election among the
office and technical employees of the petitioner company with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment Davao. It alleges that 90 employees in the
Davao plant which is distinct from the regular rank and file employees is
excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. Petitioner company did
not object on the election but manifested that out of 90 employees 74 are
managerial employees and 2 are confidential employees.
Med-Arbiter Martinez issued an order dated Sept. 17, 1984 granting the
petition and certification election among the office and technical
employees of the Davao plant. The petitioner company appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations for the order be set aside and declare the 74
employees as managerial employees. During the pendency of the appeal,
61 employees involved filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition for
certification election praying for their exclusion from the bargaining unit
because they are managerial employees as they are performing
managerial functions. April 7, 1986 Cresencio Trajano of Bureau of Labor
Relations issued a resolution affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Conchita
Martinez.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject employees are managerial employees under the
purview of the Labor Code and it's Implementing Rules?

RULING:
A managerial employee is defined as one "who is vested with powers or
prerogative to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees
or to effectively recommend such managerial actions."
It will be noted that in the performance of their duties and functions and in
the exercise of their recommendatory powers, subject employees may
only recommend, as the ultimate power to hire, fire or suspend as the
case maybe rests upon the plant manager. The test of "supervisory" or
managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority to
act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Art. 212(k) of
the Labor Code and Sec. 1(m) of its Implementing Rules and whether
such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the
use of independent judgement. The subject employees are not managerial

employees because as borne by the records, they do not participate in the

policy making but given ready policies to execute and standard practice to
observe, thus having little freedom of action.
Premises Considered, the petition is dismissed, and the assailed
resolution and orders are Affirmed. So Ordered.

APPEAL; JUDICIAL REVIEW (EXECUTION)

PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or JULIANO LIM VS. NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
PIONEER TEXTURIZING
WORKERS UNION and LOURDES A. DE JESUS
G.R. No. 118651 October 16, 1997

FACTS:
In an illegal dismissal case, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
complainant and ordered his reinstatement.
The employer appealed.
Refusing to reinstate the worker pending appeal, the employer claims that
the order of reinstatement needs a writ of execution.
The employer
further maintains that even if a writ of execution was issued, a timely
appeal coupled by the posting of appropriate supersedeas bond effectively
forestalled and stayed the execution of the Labor Arbiters reinstatement
order.

ISSUE:
Is the employers contention correct?

RULING:
No, the employers contention is erroneous. The law as now worded
employs the phrase shall immediately be executory without qualification
emphasizing the need for prompt compliance. The term shall denotes
an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
The Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement does not need a writ of
execution. It is self-executory. The posting of a bond by the employer
shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.
After receipt of the
decision ordering reinstatement, the employer has the right to chose
whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in
the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee
of his choice.

PROCEDURE
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and MR. ROBERTO NIEVA
G.R. No. 124100 April 1, 1998

FACTS:
Roberto was a driver of Philtranco who was assigned to the Legaspi CityPasay City route.
He was dismissed from the service.
He filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRCs National Capital region
Arbitration Branch in Manila. Philtranco filed a Motion to Dismiss stating
that the complaint should have been lodged with the NLRCs Regional
Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City not only because Roberto was a
resident thereof but also because the latter was hired, assigned, and
based in Legaspi City.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to dismiss filed at NLRC NCR be denied?

RULING:
The Motion to Dismiss must be denied. The question of venue pertains to
the trial and relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than
upon the substance and merits of the case. Provisions on venue are
intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to
promote the ends of justice. The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
cited by Philtranco speaks of the complainants workplace, evidently
showing that the rule is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker.
This being the case, the worker may waive said benefit. Moreover, since
Roberto was assigned to Legaspi City-Pasay City route, the filing of the
complaint with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch was proper,
Manila being considered as part of Robertos workplace.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (JURISDICTION;PROCEDURE)

ATLAS
FARMS,
INC.,VS.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION, JAIME O. DELA PEA and MARCIAL I.ABION,
G.R. No. 142244. November 18, 2002

FACTS:
Jaime O. dela Pea was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner in
December1975. He was among several employees terminated in July
1989. On July 8, 1989,he was re-hired by petitioner and given the
additional job of feed mill operator. He was instructed to train selected
workers to operate the feed mill. Pea was allegedly caught urinating and
defecating on company premises not intended for the purpose.7.From the
start of his employment on July 8, 1989, until his termination on March
20,1993, Pea had worked for seven days a week, including holidays,
without overtime, holiday, rest day pay and service incentive leave. At the
time of his dismissal from employment, he was receiving P180 pesos daily
wage, or an average monthly salary of P5,402.
Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a
maintenance manwhose employment by petitioner commenced on
October 8, 1990. Like Pea, Abion worked seven days a week, including
holidays, without holiday pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay
and night shift differential pay. When terminated on October 27, 1992,
Abion was receiving a monthly salary of P4,500.11.Pea and Abion filed
separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated
The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the
grievance machinery in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not
yet beenexhausted.13.Their cases were consolidated in the NLRC. At the
initial mandatory conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging private respondents themselves
admitted that they were members of the employees union with which
petitioner had an existing CBA. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit, finding that the case was one of illegal dismissal and did
not involve the interpretation or implementation of any CBA provision. He
stated that Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code was inapplicable to the case.
Further, the labor arbiter found that although both complainants did not
substantiate their claims of illegal dismissal, there was proof that private
respondents voluntarily accepted their separation pay and petitioners
financial assistance.15.Thus, private respondents brought the case to the
NLRC, which reversed the labor arbiters decision. Dissatisfied with the
NLRC ruling, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 65, seeking reinstatement of the labor
arbiters decision. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the
NLRC resolution.

ISSUES:
1.
DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN EFFECT
AFFIRMING THERULINGS OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC
THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTSWERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED;

2.
RULING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED
TO SEPARATION PAYAND FULL BACKWAGES;
3.

RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR COSTS OF SUIT

RULINGS:
ATLAS contends that the dismissal of private respondents was for a just
and valid cause, pursuant to the provisions of the companys rules and
regulations. It also alleges lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor
arbiter, claiming that the cases should have been resolved through the
grievance machinery, and eventually referred to voluntary arbitration, as
prescribed in the CBA. Records show, however, that private respondents
sought without success to avail of the grievance procedure in their CBA.
On this point, ATLAS maintains that by so doing, private respondents
recognized that their cases still fell under the grievance machinery.
According to ATLAS, without having exhausted said machinery, the private
respondents filed their action before the NLRC, in a clear act of forumshopping.
However, it is worth pointing out that private respondents went to the
NLRC only after the labor arbiter dismissed their original complaint for
illegal dismissal. Under these circumstances private respondents had to
find another avenue for redress. We agree with the NLRC that it was
petitioner who failed to show proof that it took steps to convene the
grievance machinery after the labor arbiter first dismissed the complaints
for illegal dismissal and directed the parties to avail of the grievance
procedure under Article VII of the existing CBA. They could not now be
faulted for attempting to find an impartial forum, after petitioner failed to
listen to them and after the intercession of the labor arbiter proved futile.
The NLRC had aptly concluded in part that private respondents had
already exhausted the remedies under the grievance procedure. It erred
only in finding that their cause of action was ripe for arbitration. One
significant fact in the present petition also needs stressing. Pursuant to
Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or
designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and
if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred
to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA.
Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. In these
termination cases of private respondents, the union had no participation, it
having failed to object to the dismissal of the employees concerned by the
petitioner. It is obvious that arbitration without the unions active
participation on behalf of the dismissed employees would be pointless, or
even prejudicial to their cause. Coming to the merits of the petition, the
NLRC found that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of a valid
dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that: (1)
the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be
for any of the valid causes provided for by law. No evidence was shown
that private respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the notices
requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents who were
subsequently dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to
air their side at the level of the grievance machinery. Given the fact of
dismissal, it can be said that the cases were effectively removed from the
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the

jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the

interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to
the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary
arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged
violation of the employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor
arbiter.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ordered to pay
private respondents (a) separation pay, in lieu of their reinstatement,
equivalent to one months salary for every year of service, (b) full
backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the date of the
promulgation of this decision, together with (c) the costs of suit.

ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION; RETURN TO WORK ORDER

CATALINO N. SARMIENTO and 71 other striking workers of ASIAN
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION VS. THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R.
TUICO of the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, ROBERTO
PIMENTEL, NELSON C. TEJADA, and the COMMANDING OFFICER,
224th PC Company at Los Baos Laguna
G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988

FACTS:
Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of Catalino
Sarmiento,VP of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for
allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. BATU filed
a notice of strike, claiming that ATC had committed an unfair labor
practice. ATC, then, filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the
same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration .MOLE issued an order certifying
the labor dispute to NLRC. At the same time, it enjoined the management
from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or
similar concerted action. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC,
however, because of the acceptance by Pres. Aquino of the resignations
of 8 of its members, leaving only the vice-chairman in office. MOLE set
aside the previous orders and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute,
at the same time, enjoined the company to accept all returning workers.
This order was later set aside upon motion of both BATU and ATC in view
of the appointment of new commissioners in NLRC. MOLE then returned
the cases to NLRC and directed it to expedite the resolution of all issues
relating to the dispute. Conformably, NLRC issued on Jan 13, 1987 a
resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of Feb 12, denying the motion
of reconsideration. Three criminal complaints were filed against the
workers, two by the personnel administrative officer of ATC and the third
by Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints were for Violation of
Art 265 par 1, in relation to Art 273 Labor Code. The third was for
coercion. In all 3 complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an
illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the
workers through intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for
work. Respondent Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered
the release of 61 of them to the custody of the mayor of Calamba. The
petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the
referral of the coercion charge to NLRC and later, for the dismissal of the
criminal cases on the ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction
of the NLRC.

ISSUES:
1.
WHETHER A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY
ISSUED BY NLRCPENDING DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF
THE STRIKE;

2.
WHETHER
SUCHDETERMINATION,
THE
CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OFCERTAIN PERSONSINVOLVED IN THE SAID
STRIKE MAY BE VALIDLY RESTRAINED.

RULING:
The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code, as amended
by BP blg. 227, which provides: When in his opinion there exists a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities,
companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks,
hospitals, and export oriented industries, including those within export
processing zones, MOLE shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking our locked out employees shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The minister
may seek the assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same.
There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor
dispute to NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause
not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest. Thus,
the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory part and part of
the certification order issued by MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The challenged
order of NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision
of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued by MOLE
in its own assumption order of Sept 9, 1986.
It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order is to
protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for
threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to prevent
impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company
are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed.
More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the
resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to
mention possible cancellation of contracts of the company with foreign
investors.
It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much confers a
right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be
discharged as a duty even against the workers will.Returning to work in
this situation is not a matter of option but of obligation. The suspension of
proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is justified on the ground of
prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are
connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in
NLRC. The 3 criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of
the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the
policy embodied in Circular no.15, series of 1982 and Circular no. 9,
series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the
implementation of BP 227. These circulars require fiscals and other
government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or Office
of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary

investigation and filing in court of the corresponding information of cases

arising out of or related to a labor dispute, including allegations of
violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority
and other similar acts of intimidation, obstructing the free ingress to and
egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines of such
factory, or the employers premises. It does not appear from the record
that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down
to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law.

STRIKES (CONCEPT AND SCOPE)

LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. VS. PERMANENT CONCRETE
WORKERS UNION, Affiliated with the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO DISTOR,
BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO
ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO
G.R. No. L-25003

October 23, 1981

FACTS:
Permanent concrete workers union and its members picketed the gate
leading to Liwayway's bodega. This gate is about 200 meters from the
gate leading to the premises of the employer of the appellants. Liwayway
is not in any way related to the striking union except for the fact that it is
the sub lessee of a bodega in the company's compound. The picketers
belonging to the union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the
Liwayway from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega,
the union members intimidating and threatening with bodily harm the
employees of the Liwayway who were in the truck. The union members
also stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel manager
including the man in-charge of the bodega and other employees of the
Liwayway Publications, Inc. from getting newsprint in said bodega. The
business of Liwayway is exclusively the publication of the magazines
Bannawag Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has
absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause of the
strike of the union against their company, much less with the terms,
conditions or demands of the strikers. As a consequence thereof, plaintiff
rented another bodega during the time members of the defendant union
prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in
terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the
temporary bodega. Liwayway filed a writ of preliminary injunction which
the trial court granted. Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on
the following ground: 1. that this case arose out of a labor dispute
involving unfair labor practices and, therefore, the Court of First Instance
where this action was brought has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction
since this case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations.

ISSUE:
Whether the Liwayway is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose
right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the regular
courts?

RULING:

The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor

dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the
absence of employer-employee relationship. The right is, however, not an
absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to
confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to
the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to
insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression
that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists
between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights. This Court ruled that Liwayway was an innocent bystander and
thus entitled to enjoin the unions strike because Liwayways only
connection with the employer company was the fact that both were
situated in the same premises.
Innocent bystanders' - are entitled to seek protection of their rights from
the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

BAR TO CERTIFICATION ELECTION

VASSAR INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (VIEU) VS. HON.
FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA; as Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), and VASSAR
INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. L-46562

March 31, 1978

FACTS:
There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between private
respondents Associated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc. which
expired on May 15, 1977. Prior to such date, 111 of a total number of 150
employees of such firm disaffiliated from the former labor organization and
formed their own union. Thereafter, they filed an application for registration
of their union with the Bureau of Labor Relations, complying with an the
requirements of both the Labor Code and its implementing regulations.
While such application was pending, petitioner Union filed a petition for
certification as bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of the
company. The Med-Arbiter, on May 24, 1977, denied their plea on the
ground that the union was not duly registered with the Department of
Labor. Then came a motion for reconsideration praying that the dismissal
be set aside until action be taken on its pending application for
registration.
On July 5, 1977, respondent Estrella, then Acting Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, denied, as previously noted, the application for
registration "on the ground that there is a registered collective bargaining
agent in the company." Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the refusal of respondent Francisco L. Estrella, then the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to register petitioner Vassar
Industries Employees Union was proper?

RULING:
No. Petitioner Union should be registered, there being no legal obstacle to
such a step and the duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations being clear in
this regard. "Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond
doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way
of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
representative."
In U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union v. Noriel, reference
was made to the fact that a notable feature of our Constitution is that

"freedom of association is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative,

peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the United States. It can trace
its origin to the Malolos Constitution." In Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. Pan American Employees Association: "There is both a constitutional
and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to
take care of their interests vis-a-viz their employees. Their freedom to form
organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their
own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them." It cannot be
otherwise, for the freedom to choose which labor organization to join is an
aspect of the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. Prior to the
Industrial Peace Act, there was a statute setting for the guidelines for the
registration of labor unions.
Furthermore, the Court in Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of
Labor Relations held that: "It is indisputable that the present controversy
would not have arisen if there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning
union. Such a phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor
movement. Nor is it open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom
of association explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the
incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization of his choice.
That option belongs to him. A workingman is not to be denied that liberty.
He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need of it the institution of
collective bargaining as an aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed.
No obstacle that may possibly thwart the desirable objective of militancy in
labor's struggle for better terms and conditions is then to be placed on his
way. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt,
as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
representative. It is as simple as that."

BARGAINING
PROCEEDINGS

AGENT

AND

CERTIFICATION

ELECTION

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP) VS. THE

SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR,
PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 107792

March 2, 1998

FACTS:
A certification election was conducted among employees of respondent
Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation with No Union winning [NFL
lost]. Later however, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor
organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP)
which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment and
then affiliatedwith the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).
(SMP-PIILU) wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex
Producer and was granted. They then entered into a CBA. A year later,
NFL filed gain for a petition for certification election but was dismissed.
Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended
that petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at
Permex Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner
argues that when a group of employees constituting themselves into an
organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force
requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of
two things.

ISSUE:
Whether the employer has the authority to determine the union of the
employees?

RULING:
First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees claim the employer
may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with
it. The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective
bargaining agreement.
Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union
voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a
certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for
certification election, the union claiming to represent the employees may
submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees
representative or a certification election may be held.

Challenged decision AFFIRMED. The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng

Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja is particularly apropos: . . . Ordinarily, in an
unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union
that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified
bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the
employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the
employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it
as the bargaining representative of the employees A CERTIFICATION
WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the
employees prerogative (not the employers) to determine whether they
want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. In
accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its
voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for
recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of
the company. The company did not have the power to declare the union
the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective
bargaining. It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of
the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit
be given the opportunity to express himself. The effect is one union only.

PROCEDURE
ALEMARS SIBAL & SONS, INC.VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, NLM-KATIPUNAN (representing the group of CHARITO
ALIMORONG)
G.R. No. 114761. January 19, 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent NLM Katipunan filed with the Dole a notice of strike
raising charges of ULP and illegal dismissal against petitioner. The
charges were elevated to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The Labor
Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay private respondent separation pay of
month pay for every year of service. Private respondent filed a motion for
execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Rehabilitation Receiver
of petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion, alleging that petitioner
was not yet in a position to comply with the directive of the Labor Arbiter
as it was still under Rehabilitation Receivership by virtue of the order of
the SEC. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion for execution. Petitioner
contends that public respondent should have denied the order of the LA
for the immediate payment of separation pay because of the order of the
SEC suspending all claims against petitioner pending before any court,
tribunal or body. However, the NLRC emphasized that the order of
execution made by the LA had reached finality and that petitioners
succeeding motions had been filed out of time. At the time this petition had
been filed on May 4, 1984, petitioner had been placed under rehabilitation
receivership.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the SEC can stay the execution of judgment against
petitioner?

RULING:
No. A stay of execution may be warranted by the fact that a petitioner
corporation has been placed under rehabilitation receivership. However,
the Sec issued an order approving the rehabilitation plan of petitioner and
placing it under liquidation pursuant to PD 902-A. Since receivership
proceedings have ceased and petitioners rehabilitation receiver and
liquidator, Ledesma, Saludo and Associates has been given the
imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Sec
has been rendered functus oficio. Petitioners monetary obligation to
private respondent is long overdue and thus cannot delay the satisfaction
of private respondents claim. However, due to events subsequent to the

filing of this petition, private respondent must present its claim with the
rehabilitation receiver and liquidator in the SEC, subject to the rules on
preference of credits.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (JURISDICTION; PROCEDURE)

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON
DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in
her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
G.R. No. 120319

October 6, 1995

FACTS:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and
the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE)arose an
arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company
has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion. At a
conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective
Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on
January 18, 1995.LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position
Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do
so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May
24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered
a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made
that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE:
Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of
all quasi-judicial entities?

RULING:
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi- judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the

Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree

No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph of
the third paragraph and subparagraph of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a
state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under
the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the afore quoted Sec. 9 of
B.P. 129. The fact that this functions and powers are provided for in the
Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since
he is a quasi- judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the
decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the
quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose
of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate
review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted
from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or
another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section
22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration
is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract
or submission, or if none be specified ,the Regional Trial Court for the
province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or
in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the
controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made,
apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and
the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or
corrected. In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary
arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for
certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved
to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals