How LO Can You Go

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FEATURE
Date Posted: 07-Dec-2001

International Defense Review
How LO can you go?

Low-observable and stealth aircraft have come a long way since Lockheed's Have Blue program,
but they still have room for improvement, writes
Bill Sweetman
As full-scale development of the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) begins, the Pentagon's
plan to field an air combat force composed mainly of low-observable (LO) aircraft is apparently
back on track.
In 1985, the US planned to achieve this objective by 2000, and, had plans in place at that time
been realized, the US would now have 800 stealth aircraft in service, including over 130 B-2
bombers and two wings of fully operational F-22s, with two more working up. In addition, half of
the US Navy's (USN's) carrier air wings would include attack squadrons with long-range, heavypayload A-12s, and more than 150 A-12s and F-22s would be rolling off production lines this year.
These goals were not achieved partly because operational LO aircraft have proven harder and
more expensive to develop and produce than was predicted, but mainly because the technology
matured just as the Soviet Union collapsed, heralding a decade in which major military aircraft
procurement ground to a halt and budgets were reduced. The JSF was conceived as a lower-cost
substitute for the A-12 and for many of the F-22s, but the definition of a tri-service aircraft and
the development of more affordable technology consumed the second half of the 1990s, and the
JSF will not be available until 2010.
The JSF will reflect changes in stealth technology and the way in which it is used. The most
important change - part of a trend reaching back to the earliest days of stealth technology - is that
LO is just one part of the survivability equation and not a panacea.
Early stealth advocates believed that their aircraft would be invisible, and virtually invulnerable to
air defenses, regardless of tactics. This belief was exploded by 'Red Team' operational analysis in
the late 1970s, leading to the development of computer-based mission-planning systems to
support the F-117 and B-2. These systems developed complex routes which would minimize the
attackers' exposure to known radars.
The logical next step, attempted at great cost and with modest success in the B-2 program, was
to provide the aircraft with a real-time system to detect, locate and identify emitters and estimate
their ability to detect the aircraft. Even so, the tactical concept behind the LO aircraft was similar
to that of a submarine: the stealth aircraft would operate alone, with a bare minimum of
emissions and no non-stealthy support aircraft in the area.
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Most operational stealth missions, however, have been supported by other assets. It has been
stated that all US Air Force (USAF) missions during 'Allied Force' (including F-117 and B-2 sorties)
were supported by EA-6B Prowler escort jammers, while F-117 missions in 'Desert Storm'
benefited from both jamming and the distraction caused by simultaneous attacks by other
weapons, including Tomahawk cruise missiles.
The USAF, which retired its dedicated defense-suppression aircraft (F-4G Wild Weasels) and escort
jammers (EF-111A Ravens) in the 1990s, now relies on F-16s and USN EA-6Bs to fill these roles.
Officially, the USAF considers that the B-2 is survivable "on the assumption that appropriate
mission planning, force packaging, and tactics are employed."
In 1991, a Lockheed engineer claimed that stealth would cause active jamming "to go the way of
the buggy-whip industry," but this has not happened. Stealth and active jamming from offboard
platforms work together, because an escort jammer can be effective over a much wider area if the
real echo that must be masked is smaller. This means that, for the foreseeable future, stealth
aircraft will operate as part of mixed forces.
The shooting down of an F-117 over Serbia in April 1999 sent ripples through the LO community.
The USAF has not revealed its final conclusions as to the cause of the incident, but a combination
of factors was probably to blame: support assets were not all in the right place at the right time;
the SA-3 site that hit the aircraft had not been properly located; F-117s had flown repeated
missions to the same targets over the same tracks; and the aircraft involved had just released a
weapon, potentially creating a momentarily strong radar return.
The loss of the F-117 confirmed that LO aircraft become much more vulnerable when surprise is
lost, even if the adversary uses rudimentary systems to cue defensive systems in the attacker's
likely flightpath. One consequence is that LO aircraft still cannot be used in daylight because of
the risk that a visual observation from the ground or the air will lead to an interception. According
to Air Combat Command chief, General John Jumper, "the greatest problem we have today with
the F-117 and the B-2... is that they can't protect themselves from air-to-air and visually directed
surface-to-air threats."
This was not intended to be a limitation on B-2 operations. The B-2, with a radar-based targeting
system that permits above-weather operations at higher altitudes, features a Pilot Alert System
based on a rearward-looking laser radar, which warns the pilot to change altitude if a visible
contrail forms behind the bomber. The bomber is also a small visual target, at least for other
aircraft - despite its size, its side profile is no larger than that of an F-15. Nevertheless, the huge
political and material cost of having a B-2 shot down precludes daylight operations.
Defensive weapons?
The first stealth aircraft were designed to carry only offensive weapons, but this is changing. A
pair of internally carried AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) has been
a basic element of the JSF requirement from the start of the program, and will allow the JSF to
counter hostile fighters beyond visual range. A JSF will not necessarily use its own radar to guide
the AMRAAMs: electronic surveillance measures (ESM) data, infrared (IR) search-and-track
information or a radar track from another JSF, out of range of the target, will suffice.
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Another shift in emphasis is that LO technology is now being combined with stand-off weapons,
whereas stealth was previously seen as an alternative to expensive long-range missiles. The
Lockheed Martin AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) has been specifically
designed for internal carriage on the B-2 and F-117.
The threats and targets against which stealth aircraft are intended to operate have also changed.
Former USAF chief of staff, General Ron Fogleman, in an interview published in early 2001,
commented that clandestine tests of Russian surface-to-air missiles were a surprise to the USAF.
"One of the side benefits of the end of the Cold War was our gaining access to foreign weapons,"
said Gen Fogleman. "We discovered that the SA-10s, -11s, and -12s are much better than we
thought." In the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, says Gen Fogleman, "we sent two carriers in and
watched the Chinese move their SA-10s up."
Despite the demise of the Soviet Union and the absence of a highly integrated air-defense system
(IADS) of the kind that had been installed in Central Europe, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) still
present a threat. Increasingly, stealth is seen as a way of permitting unrestricted air operations
over hostile territory at any time. One very important reason for the Bush administration's
endorsement of the JSF program was that, without a LO aircraft, the USN's carrier air wings would
have been increasingly incapable of operating in the face of an intensifying SAM threat.
The Raptor factor
The state-of-the-art in stealth aircraft is represented by the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. The F22 has been under development for so long that its capabilities, particularly in terms of stealth,
are often understated. "People go into the classified briefings as sceptics and come out as
converts," comments one source. Gen Fogleman says that the previous cutback in F-22 production
- from 448 to 339 aircraft, in the 1997 quadrennial defense review (QDR) - was a factor in his
premature resignation shortly after the QDR appeared.
"In the 'black world', the F-22 is a truly revolutionary airplane," Gen Fogleman said. "On the
surface, it looks conventional, like an F-15 with some stealth capabilities, but the combination of
stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics is a quantum jump. It will allow the US to cease
worrying about air superiority for the first 35 years of the century." Gen Fogleman added: "There
are only two revolutionary weapon systems in the entire DoD budget: the F-22 and the airborne
laser. There are no others." Or, as one F-22 program official puts it: "The enemy dies relaxed."
The F-22 started its in-flight radar cross-section (RCS) tests on 31 January 2001. Lockheed Martin
claims that the fighter will represent a considerable advance in 'affordable stealth', due to changes
in design philosophy, development processes and LO materials.
While the F-117 is almost entirely covered with radar-absorbent material (RAM), most of the F22's surface is covered with a conductive metallic coating which prevents radar energy from
penetrating the composite skin. The F-22 uses RAM around the edges of doors and control
surfaces, and radar-absorbent structure (RAS) on the body, wing and tail edges.
The fighter's IR signature has not been neglected. The entire airframe is painted with a Boeingdeveloped camouflage topcoat which suppresses IR. Moreover, according to F-22 critic, Colonel
Everest Riccioni (who does not identify his source), the F-22 uses fuel for active cooling of its
leading edges, at least at supersonic speeds. This would explain in part why the USAF has been
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developing heat-tolerant fuels, which can absorb more heat from the airframe and systems
without overheating and leaving undesirable residues in the fuel system. IR tests started last year
over Point Mugu, California, and showed that the F-22 will have a "low all-aspect IR signature
under sustained supersonic conditions", according to the USAF.
The IR search-and-track (IRST) system under development for the Eurofighter Typhoon has been
credited with a range of more than 100km against conventional targets such as Tornados and
MiG-29s. Detection ranges for the F-22 will presumably be much shorter.
Because of this multilayer, multispectral camouflage system, different F-22s at different points in
the flight-test program appear in different colour schemes. Avionics test-bed Raptor 04 made its
first flight with a patchwork of grey-painted RAS edges, yellow-primered skin, metallic coating and
sprayed-on RAM.
The F-22 LO development program exclusively used full-scale models, following problems in
earlier programs where data from subscale models proved unreliable as a predictor of full-scale
results. The RCS test program started with partial models, including an inlet, a radome and a dualengine afterbody model. This culminated in tests of a high-fidelity full-scale model, which started
in 1999. The model included a radar, all doors and even the first two stages of the engines, and
all control surfaces could be actuated by remote control.
To avoid the need to repair LO seals and coatings in the field, the F-22 has almost 300 specially
designed access points. These include quick-access panels, featuring positive locks, seals and
gaskets. Many service points are located inside the weapon bays, landing gear doors and other
openings. The goal is to ensure that 95% of all maintenance actions in a 30-day deployment can
be performed without removing material.
A new LO-related feature being tested for the F-22 is an underwing pod, a self-contained weapons
bay capable of holding two 450kg GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bombs. A
high-speed wind-tunnel model of the pod, which has dual weapon-bay doors and is carried on the
inboard underwing pylons, has been tested at the USAF's Arnold Engineering Development Center.
The pod allows the F-22 to carry six JDAMs, two AIM-120 AMRAAMs and two AIM-9s.
The Lockheed Martin JSF clearly shares many LO-related features with the F-22, with a chined
forebody shape and serpentine inlets which conceal the engine face from radar. The primary
differences are a lighter - but potentially less stealthy - round engine nozzle and a simpler inlet
design. The main technological focus is on further reducing LO maintenance requirements, to less
than 0.5 man hours per sortie.
Rather than using painted coatings, the JSF is expected to be covered with adhesive polymer
films. Tests have shown that the films can be repaired in an hour, removed with high-pressure
water jets, and replaced in 24h. The films potentially provide a continuous electromagnetic surface
over skin joints, reducing the need for serrations at joint lines.
Boeing's approach to stealth on the JSF design was rather different from Lockheed Martin's. Either
in its original form, or in its proposed production configuration with separate horizontal tails, this
reflects a view that "the primary objective was a complement to the F/A-18 and F-22, and that the
major threat was the IADS", according to the program's director of affordability, David Brower.
Three basic features reduced the Boeing design's RCS in critical directions, according to Brower: a
high degree of leading-edge sweep; an afterbody design with a two-dimensional exhaust smoothly
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blended into the rear of the vehicle; and side-mounted weapon bays so that the fighter could
release weapons on the side which is less exposed to a threat radar. According to Brower, the
rear-aspect RCS was particularly important, as "Unlike the F-22, we can't run away."
The Boeing design used a unique inlet which, like that of the F-117, concealed the engine face
without a long duct. The key was a variable-geometry radial blocker built into the inlet guide
vanes, which could be adjusted for minimum thrust losses in vertical flight or for minimum RCS in
the cruise.
Boeing's JSF was also intended to have a very low IR signature. In order to provide enough thrust
for vertical landing, Boeing's aircraft had an enlarged fan stage on its engine and a high engine
mass flow. Moreover, it had a great deal of thrust and low drag, and normally cruised at partial
power. The result was a cool exhaust, which mixed thoroughly in the long exhaust duct behind
the engine.
Selling stealth
Still an open question on the JSF program is the issue of exporting stealth technology. The
program office has consistently declined to say how US stealth technology, still considered highly
classified, can be protected when it is operated by non-US air forces, and no policy addressing this
issue has been established.
The idea of producing the JSF in a less-stealthy, export version appears to have been abandoned.
Stealth has a profound impact on mission planning and tactics, so a 'less stealthy' JSF variant
would require a complete, separate program of low-RCS demonstration and validation. Possibly
the most telling argument (one which, according to some JSF officials, has been voiced by US
theater commanders-in-chief) is that US and export JSFs could not be used interchangeably in
coalition forces.
If fully stealthy JSFs are to be exported, the US will have to relax the complex controls that cover
LO technology today. Although a major goal in the development of the JSF is to create LO
systems, such as coatings and seals, which require less maintenance, it will not be reduced to
zero: flight-line personnel will physically handle, remove and replace LO materials as a matter of
course.
Materials are not the whole story. The JSF cockpit displays will project 'threat circles' around
hostile radars. These are driven by computer software, hosted on the aircraft and on the desktop
mission-planning system, which can compute the detection range of a radar against the JSF in real
time. The threat circles are determined by two sensitive sets of data: a detailed model of the
fighter's RCS, and a database that reflects the latest assessments of potentially hostile radar
systems.
It may be the case, however, that the JSF does not represent the ultimate in LO technology. JSF
officials have stated that the goal of the JSF program is not to achieve a breakthrough in LO
performance, but to match the signatures of earlier aircraft (such as the F-22) while reducing
production and support costs.
At the same time, manufacturers and the US government have continuously updated their RCS
test facilities. They can now measure signatures as low as -70dB/m2- one ten-millionth of a
square meter, or the size of a grain of dust - and such figures are now being seriously discussed
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in scientific literature for whole vehicles. While today's aircraft (in the insect realm, between -30
and -40dB/m2) can be detected in the low tens of miles by the most powerful ground-based
surveillance radars, aircraft at this level will be almost invisible to radar.
Achieving such RCS levels will mean integrating a number of new technologies. The new aircraft
are almost certain to be tailless. All surfaces will be canted very steeply away from the horizontal,
particularly at the vehicle edges: such future vehicles are likely to resemble the Northrop
Grumman Pegasus demonstrator or the Lockheed Martin-Boeing RQ-3 DarkStar reconnaissance
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
As far as possible, external moving components will be eliminated: General Electric (GE), for
instance, has designed and tested 'fluidic' jet nozzles in which internal airflows are modulated to
change the effective area and vector angle of the exhaust, while the nozzle remains mechanically
fixed. A simpler yaw-only vectoring nozzle with no external moving parts was demonstrated in
1996 on the Boeing X-36 unmanned experimental aircraft. Thrust modulation and vectoring could
make it possible to lock aerodynamic control surfaces in place in normal flight, or even eliminate
them entirely.
Discrete moving parts and doors may be replaced by flexible surfaces. Boeing (and McDonnell
Douglas before it) has filed a large number of patents covering the use of flexible elastomer skins
for weapon bay doors, control surfaces and variable inlets. Highly integrated avionics systems will
be used to reduce the number of apertures in the aircraft surface, a process that has already
started in the move from the F-22 to the JSF.
If such RCS levels can be attained, IR and visual signatures may become dominant. Under a USAF
program, Northrop Grumman and GE have investigated an active cooling system that would
deliver air at 0 to 37.5C to the engine nozzles. This would require very heat-tolerant fuel, but
could virtually eliminate the heat signature from the engine nozzle.
Visual signature control has been explored under a number of programs since the 1960s - in fact,
an active visual camouflage system using counter-illumination was part of Lockheed's Have Blue
program, the first stealth aircraft to fly. Today, the Pentagon's list of militarily critical technologies
related to stealth includes "photochromic, thermochromic [and] electrochromic materials" and
discusses technologies that can reduce solar glint by 90%, along with visual contrast and the
optical cross section. Like advanced IR-suppression technologies, these come to the fore as RCS is
reduced and visual signatures hint at dominance.
UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) may be the first application of this ultra-LO
technology. As well as the notably stealthy-looking Boeing and Northrop Grumman UCAV designs,
another requirement - a high-altitude UAV capable of carrying the same payloads as the U-2 - has
been discussed quite extensively. The so-called U-X would be designed to loiter in a defended
area for up to 24h, and would therefore have to have extremely low radar and visual signatures
despite its size. "The challenge of LO becomes more severe the longer the time you spend in the
target area," observes one engineer. This history of stealth is clearly far from over.
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The Lockheed Martin F-117 stealth fighter is almost entirely covered in radar-absorbent material.
(Lockheed Martin)
0111594
The winning JSF variant, Lockheed Martin's X-35A. (Lockheed Martin)

0111595
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The tailpipe of the unsuccessful Boeing JSF competition variant, the X-32, showing it's integration
into the nacelle. The X-32 was to have a very low IR signature.Partly responsible for this was a
cool exhaust, which mixed thoroughly in the long exhaust duct behind the engine. (Bill Sweetman)
0111596
(Jane's)
0111597
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(Jane's)
0111598
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How LO Can You Go

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Date Posted: 07-Dec-2001

How LO can you go?

The winning JSF variant, Lockheed Martin's X-35A. (Lockheed Martin)

Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015

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