Consti Last Session

G.R. No.
193459 February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN
PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN
(BAYAN);
MOTHER
MARY JOHN
MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS
(KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R.
GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and
JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,
Respondent-Intervenor.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition
for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House
of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth
Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or
on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and
spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn
Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the
impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.[3] who, by
Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business.[4]
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes
group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner with a resolution of
endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio,
Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. [6] On
even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,[7] the
Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who,
by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, [8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson
of the Committee on Rules, [9] instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary
General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary
Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, [10] which
was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day,
August 11, 2010.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.[11]
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found
both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been
referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th
Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the
September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to
accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the
notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies
of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the
two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal
of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of
substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the
truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach
could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice
directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. [13]
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13,
2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED
to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to
comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of
CONSTI LAST SESSION | 1
September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10
days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed
the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel)
filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010
which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on
October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of
October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day
period.
The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first
resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They
argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, [16] and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.[17]
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.[18] The
argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was
debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus,
they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
xxxx
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in
seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments
was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it
held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it
held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system
of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. [19] (citations omitted; italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[21]
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction,
using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The
Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed
a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its
functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which
would require corrective measures from the Court.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this
instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of
the sovereign will.[22]
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of
judicial review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that
when petitioner filed the present petition [23] on September 13, 2010, it had not gone
beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite
of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct,
adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. [25] In the present petition,
there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment
complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus
be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an

impeachable officer within a period of one year.
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue whether public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her
claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the oneyear bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.
Due process of law
Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr.
(Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father,
former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the
actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the
proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness
played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there
being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body
itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out
of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any
incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in
this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote
coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a
majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or
decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts
through a three-man body x x x. [28]
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and
merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints.[29]
Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no
grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent
in the charges that the Ombudsman filed . In addition to that[,] his father was
likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality,
in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant
him that benefit.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, does that mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the
Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality
that may be expected of him.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the
committee as in this case there were objections relative to the existence of the
implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the
effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which
makes it mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had
previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation
whereby with that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could
be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of
notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator.
[30]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in
finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias,
she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias,
however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per
se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones
prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of
justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of
the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon
petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion
of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady
without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five
state prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency
of form and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules,
however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the
impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form
and substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the
proceedings and related irregularities?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your
Honor, because it is only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form
and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be
asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the
other violations involved and that is (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment
procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5 [34] which denotes that
petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the opportunity to
file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in
form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for
reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints
is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of
form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the
Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35]
The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint
is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House
of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public
respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the
House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an
impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose,
absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for
comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the
Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing
that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, [36] and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.[37]
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section
3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. [38] In the
discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of
form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry
out the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment
Rules.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the
offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.] [39] Worse,
petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised,
upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve
matters of defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions
the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment
Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3,
2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th
Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of
general circulation.[40]
Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due
process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day
after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She
likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which
directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.
legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules

occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication
of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation.[42]
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood

that is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is
generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that
the restricted sense was to be used.[49]
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations[43] which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of
the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the
Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the
purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.
Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The
formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is
given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.
[44]
(emphasis supplied)
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory
difference in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times. [45] A number of those
instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating
from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional
offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and
publish, the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for
theireffectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however,
promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication.[46]
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing
Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates in the
presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its
canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, [47] it did not
require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the
canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take
on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication,

the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in
much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when
the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The
Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of
the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one
avenue for Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene. [50] (italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have
stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative
inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other single formal term in
the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being
published.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of
legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the
Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication,
the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance
on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither
have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the
Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical
term or a general sense of making known the issuances.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now
retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the
vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional
section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a
verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a
ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the
rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of
a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be
taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL
PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY
OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these otherprocedural requirements
could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not selfexecuting. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire
impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in
designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These

provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
[53]
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the
proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully
comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or
even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of
the publication requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on
impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment
proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it
proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet
the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective
implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power
of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
avowed purpose.Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to
pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. [54] In the present case, petitioner
fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the
rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the
people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.[55]
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not
considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and
effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint.
Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper
procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions[57] of the Impeachment
Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later
filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral
or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,
by the filing by at least one-third [61] of the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening
on July 26, 2010 of the 15 th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22,
2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public
respondent.
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondentintervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint
and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to
alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the
Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under
either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint
could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings Sections 16 [63] and 17[64] of Rule V
thereof clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term
initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant
records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs
statements[66] that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative
word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the
complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee
report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this, [67] for
certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the
term, as shown in the following exchanges.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate

means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. [59] The initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint
moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of
impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the
House under the 1935 Constitution.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no

second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment
complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici
curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial
action on the complaint.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only onefifth vote of the membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds
vote of the membership is required.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required

to initiate proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the

legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which
reads:
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs
of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow
one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by
an individual or an ordinary Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the
possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves
struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather
than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the
House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, whether we should not
allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions
we would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by
providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the
members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to
a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner
Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is
different from to convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the
Articles of Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself , because when we

impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my
understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner
Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner
Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the
filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on
Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite
examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution,
and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the
resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with
me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the
approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it
is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which
read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19
after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter i in impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole
section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles
of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are
mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my
amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.
[71]
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation,

Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint
must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action
that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the
material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of
referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be
the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that had already been
done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.
The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on
the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to
determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following
petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a
member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the
impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the
Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular
tense of the word complaint [74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution
goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its
enlarged and plural sense.[75]
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment
complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless
the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to
the
proper
committee
ignites
the
impeachment
proceeding. With
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks
light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be
ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and
illusory.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that
whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of
Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein
government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill
motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by
the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in
line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even
hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment
proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be
an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is
precisely intended to effectively weed out worms in high offices which could
otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual
complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an
almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed
aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the
House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment
complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the
Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding
within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment
proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any
public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of
Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint
has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment
proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings
prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas
disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in
the House[77] precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact,
petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole
and absolute control of the House of Representatives. [78] Conscious of the legal import
of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately
decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other
limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its
officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.
The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the
House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or
freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper
committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is
a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of
Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber
into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the
initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional
complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that
shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the
five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to
refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits
thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. [80] With respect to complaints for
impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show
that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already
been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it
becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment
proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of
three session days within which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment

proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint
for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter.
present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly
belated referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For
while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in
Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15 th Congress opened
from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of
August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the
complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period. [81]
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an
impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is
primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the
limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an
entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It
shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer
through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that
the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar,
should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public
respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the
complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House. [82] To
the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on
Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84]
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition

was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the
12thCongress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the
Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled
in Franciscothat dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief
Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to
accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a
court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta

movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a
case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded
on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the
renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial
Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants
and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point,
the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an
infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be
the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the courts.[85]
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when
the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a
further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.[86]
Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of
referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own
respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee
shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the
complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the
overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House
transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), [88] or the
Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the
recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs
roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year
bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in
unison under one proceeding.
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one
impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo
Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna
stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too
frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of]
legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that
reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to
protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment
but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment
proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the
same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.
[90]
(underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the
element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should
defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded
from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only
one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main
work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means
filing andreferral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment
by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a
maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment
complaint to the date of referral.
As pointed out during the oral arguments [91] by the counsel for respondentintervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable
officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding,
verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before bothering a
respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion
in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard
operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil
after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and
substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the
primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.
To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the
deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression.
Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and
other resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This
is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom
from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of
the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or
offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not
promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine
and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the
media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they
deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of
protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if
Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There
is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional
safeguard of one-year bar rule.
Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier
chastised.
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the
Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to
impeachment proceedings before the House.
Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of
additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its
mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.
First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section
16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or information
must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in
form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely
abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse
her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political
nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules;
impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent
public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that
an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of
impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal
Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in
defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an
exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as
non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political
process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the
complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an
impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on
Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes
groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case
falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal
from office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various
offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not
keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which
prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into
the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial
determination of which must be made by the House [93] which has yet to pass upon the
question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal
Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment
for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment. [94] It,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a
consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment
complaint against her within one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to
consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that [c]onsolidation depends on the
Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later
on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes
of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if,
indeed, we need to consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the
consolidation as merely contemplated.[96]
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a
consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it
would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]
Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two
impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a
legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her
proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of
Representatives
Committee
on
Justice,
are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE

SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified
the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the
charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
principal in eleven (11) informations for murder [2] before the Sandiganbayans Second
Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition andmandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent
the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 2304723057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary
proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat
(PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and
the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that
what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub
out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, [3] the Sandiganbayan allowed
them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was
charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a
and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or
PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principalaccused in the amended informations has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned
by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices
Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March
1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel
C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,

defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 [13]. The
law is entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently,
on
March
5,
1997,
the Sandiganbayan promulgated
a
Resolution[14] denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling
that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it,
but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting,
the Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already
done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest
has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by the unanimous
vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and
decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues
that:
a)
The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners
cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby
violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b)
Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again
made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely,
that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation
and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047
23057 to procedural due process
c)
The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines
the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed
upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before
the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if their case is tried before
the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they
could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings
in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question
and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously
within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional
memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused
therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249,
so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a

permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. [20] The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we
regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
(a)
Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known
as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
(b)
City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c)
Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d)
Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e)
Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
provision in Article XI, Section 4:
(f)
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
Section 4.
The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided
by law.
(g)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
[21]
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created

the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in
chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.
[27]
Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC.
4. Jurisdiction
The
Sandiganbayan
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
shall
exercise exclusive
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under

the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3)
Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC.
4. Jurisdiction
The
Sandiganbayan
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
shall
exercise exclusive
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a)
Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative
to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
(b)
City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
(f)
City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
x x
supplied)
x x x. (Emphasis
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
7975 provides:
(c)
Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d)
rank;
Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high
(e)
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(g)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3)
Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and

employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the
word accused appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A.
7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties
herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and
intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not
the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases since none of
the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of
Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court
except in certain cases, [29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to
R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder
which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing
provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of
R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office. The
phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under
said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the
original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of
the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right
to equal protection of the law [33] because its enactment was particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Balelengcases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the
law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1)
it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2)
it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has
not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes
real differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented,
whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress
to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, [37] it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7
placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as
them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases
involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to
all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any
court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by
the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to
nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative
hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee
involves the graft court of which one is the head of theSandiganbayan and the other a
member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it
decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on
what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those
officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the
matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the
legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67
million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word principal in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of
R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23
other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the
Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249
to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived
of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered
appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A.
8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage.[44]
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g)
deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. [46] R.A. 8249
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; [47] or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice. [49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of

Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7
R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction
over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which
they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is
incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several
times[50] considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in
nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
[51]
R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory
statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a
penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. [52] Moreover, the law did
not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. [53] It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.[54]
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of

that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which
court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, [61] and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme
Court to review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts,
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of
innocence has been convincingly overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject
provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of
the law that it defines theSandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is
to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if
it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law
because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title [57] is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. [58] Such rule is severally interpreted and
should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D.
1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.
[59]
The Congress, in employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its
powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative
body to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense
charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder
was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
[65]
This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is
the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[68]
L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO

ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained
in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon

City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO,
SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking
advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to
their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up of certain
acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the
complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every
fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to
him as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factual averments to show theintimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G.
DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP.
GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein
asaccessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by
among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused
arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague
on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above
alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of
the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one
of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as
alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the
shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories committed the offense in relation to office as
officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate connection
between the offense charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City
as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin
Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely
a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official duties.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed
in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies
that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify
the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court
and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, [73] not
the Sandiganbayan.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information
alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision
and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused
because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not
held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime,
thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and
then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege
that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented
by the prosecution at the trial.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby

sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayanis hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.
GR 140199-200. February 6, 2002]
FELICITO S. MACALINO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan to take cognizance of two criminal cases [2] against petitioner and his
wife Liwayway S. Tan, contending that he is not a public officer within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.[3]
On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, with the
approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against
petitioner and Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification of
official documents (Criminal Case No. 18022) and frustrated estafa through
falsification of mercantile documents (Criminal Case No. 19268), as follows:
subsequently accused FELICITO S. MACALINO likewise inserted into the letter of

PNCC to PNB Buendia Branch the words payable to Wacker Marketing to make it
appear that the demand drafts to be picked up by the designated messenger were
payable to Wacker Marketing when in truth and in fact the real payee was Bankers
Trust Company; and as a result of such acts of falsification, PNB Buendia issued 19
demand drafts for P50,000.00 each and another demand draft for P33,682.11, all,
payable to Wacker Marketing, which were subsequently delivered to accused Felicitor
S. Macalino and which accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter exchanged with PNB
Balanga Branch for 19 checks at P50,000.00 each and another for P33,682.11 and all of
which she later deposited into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker Marketing at
Philtrust Cubao, thereby causing pecuniary damage and prejudice to Philippine
National Construction Corporation in the amount of P983,682.11.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, August 24, 1992.[4]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19268
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18022

That on or about the 15th day of March, 1989 and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being
then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans
Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation with offices at EDSA
corner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, and hence, a public officer, while in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position, committing the
offense in relation to his office and conspiring and confederating with his spouse
LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine
National Construction Corporation in the following manner: in preparing the
application with the Philippine National Bank, Buendia Branch for the issuance of a
demand draft in the amount of NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO & 11/100 PESOS (P983,682.11), Philippine Currency, in
favor of Bankers Trust Company, accused FELICITO S. MACALINO superimposed
the name Wacker Marketing as payee to make it appear that the demand draft was
payable to it, when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well knew, it was the
Bankers Trust Company which was the real payee as indicated in Check Voucher No.
3-800-89 and PNB Check No. B236746 supporting said application for demand draft;
That on or about the 4th day of April, 1990, and subsequently thereafter, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then
the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans
Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, a government-controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner
Reliance St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and hence, a public officer, while in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position, committing the
offense in relation to his office, and conspiring and confederating with his spouse
LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine
National Construction Corporation in the following manner: after receiving Check
Voucher No. 04-422-90 covering the partial payment by PNCC of the sinking fund to
International Corporate Bank (Interbank) as well as Check No. 552312 for TWO
MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P2,250,000.00),
Philippine Currency, payable to Interbank for the purpose, accused FELICITO
S. MACALINO falsified PNB Check No. 552312 by altering the payee indicated
therein to make it appear that the aforesaid check was payable to Wacker Marketing
instead of Interbank and further falsified the schedule of check disbursements sent to
PNB Buendia by making it appear therein that the payee of Check No. 552312 was
Wacker Marketing when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well knew, it was
Interbank which was the real payee; accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter deposited
Check No. 552312 into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker Marketing at Philtrust
Cubao and Wacker Marketing subsequently issued Philtrust Check No. 148039
for P100,000.00 in favor of accused FELICITO S. MACALINO; which acts of
falsification performed by the accused would have defrauded the Philippine National
Construction Corporation of P2,250,000.00 had not PNB Buendia ordered the dishonor
of Check No. 552312 after noting the alteration/erasures thereon, thereby failing to
produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused.
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent
or temporary, whether in the unclassified or classified or exempted service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding
paragraph.
We agree.
To resolve the issue, we resort to the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, on the
Accountability of Public Officers, provides:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[5]
Manila, Philippines, May 28, 1993.
Upon arraignment on November 9, 1992, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Hence, trial proceeded.[6]
However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved
for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter.[7] The People of the Philippines opposed the motion.[8]
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly
on
complaints
filed
in
any
form
or
manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations x x x.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. x x x
Hence, this petition.[10]
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its instance, any public official or employee of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties. (underscoring supplied)
The Issue
Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The sole issue raised is whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public
officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters. (underscoring supplied)
On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioners

motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[9]
The Courts Ruling

Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
Petitioner contends that an employee of the PNCC is not a public officer as defined
under Republic Act No. 3019, as follows:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties -The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
Sec. 2. (a) xxx xxx xxx.

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and
impropriety in the performance of duties.
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general
law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within
the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within
the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.[11]
The cases[12] cited by respondent People of the Philippines are inapplicable because
they were decided under the provisions of the 1973 Constitution which included as
public officers, officials and employees of corporations owned and controlled by the
government though organized and existing under the general corporation law. The 1987
Constitution excluded such corporations.
The crimes charged against petitioner were committed in 1989 and 1990. [13] The
criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the institution of the
action.[14]
The Fallo
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS ASIDE the
order dated July 29, 1999 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18022 and
19268 and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the two (2) cases against petitioner and his
wife.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160675
June 16, 2006
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Sixteenth Division) and NICOMEDES ARMILLA,
DELIA BATASIN-IN, JAMES FUENTES, OSCAR GADOR, SANTOS
GUIGAYOMA, JR., CLARITO MIOZA, ERNESTO NARAJA, NELSON
OBESO,* SENEN SERIO, and MARTIN YASE,
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated October 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69313, which had declared that the Office of the Ombudsman
has no power to impose the penalty of suspension. According to the appellate court, its
power is limited only to the recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article
281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo
Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos
Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Mioza, Nelson Obeso, Senen Serio, Ernesto Naraja, and
Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City. The case was docketed as
OMB-VIS-CRIM-99-1227. The same criminal complaint was also treated by the
Office of the Ombudsman as an administrative complaint for abuse of authority and
misconduct. The administrative case was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044.
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the
parcel of land owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the
latter or their representative and despite the big NO TRESPASSING sign attached to
the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.
Except for Arregadas, who executed his own affidavit, Armilla, et al. executed a
joint counter-affidavit decrying the charge against them as malicious, unfounded and
untrue. By way of refutation, they alleged that they entered the Corominas landholding
pursuant to the Order dated September 14, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofCebu City, Branch 9 thereof, in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-17639
(entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Larrazabal, et al.), involving a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of title.
The said Order stated:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the Motion. The Court hereby orders the
relocation survey of the questioned lots and the Sudlon National Park based on the
technical description of the official government cadastral survey duly approved by the
Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Lands. Expenses for the relocation survey shall
be shouldered jointly by plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors. Reasonable notice of the
date/dates of relocation survey should be furnished the defendants through their
counsels and to this Court.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In compliance with the foregoing order, the DENR Regional Executive Director issued
Travel Order Nos. 99-10-19, 11-01, and 99-11-11 authorizing Armilla, et al. to
conduct relocation survey of the corners of Proclamation No. 56, S-36 and Lot No.
18454, Cad. 12 Ext.[3] Consequently, on October 25, 1999, Armilla, et al., as the
designated DENR Survey Team, together with two members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Cebu City Police Office, paid a courtesy call to the barangay captain of
Sudlon II to inform him that they would conduct a relocation survey of
the Sudlon National Park. However, the barangay captain was not around so the team
requested thebarangay secretary to relay the message to him.
The following day, the DENR Survey Team, the members of the PNP and
two barangay tanods of Sudlon II, Cebu City, commenced the relocation survey. The
team initially identified the Municipal Boundary Movement (MBM) No. 8, similar to
City Boundary Movement (CBM) 15, Cad. 12 Extension Cebu Cadastre, as the tie
point reference. Thereafter, with the use of the Electronic Distance Measuring (EDM)
and Theodolite, it was able to relocate the boundary of the Sudlon National Park in
accordance with the RTC Order in Civil Case No. CEB-17639, and to establish corners
17, 18, 19, and 20 within 15 days.
To establish and monument corners 20 and 21, the DENR Survey Team asked
permission from a person inside Lot No. 18466 to be allowed to put a stake inside the
said lot to serve as a traverse station. On
November 12, 1999, the team was able to
establish and monument corner 20 inside Lot No. 18466. On the other hand, it had
difficulty in establishing corner 21 because it fell on a very steep slope.
The DENR Survey Team then submitted its Report [4] dated November 25,
1999 together with the Sketch Plan and notified the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-17639
that the relocation survey of the lot subject thereof and the Sudlon National Park had
been completed and terminated.
Armilla, et al. concluded their joint counter-affidavit by vehemently denying the
charge that they, conspiring with each other, trespassed on the Corominas
property. They maintained that they were merely acting in the performance of their
official functions and complying with a court order. Moreover, they could not defy the
said court order and the travel orders, lest they be punished for contempt of court or
subjected to disciplinary action. They intimated that the sole reason that complainants
filed the charge against them was to prevent the DENR from filing a reversion case
against the owners of Lot No. 18466, a portion of which was ascertained to be within
the Sudlon National Park.[5]
For his part, Arregadas averred in his counter-affidavit that he was not part of the
DENR Survey Team tasked to relocate and monument the western boundary corners of
the Sudlon National Park. He met with the group briefly on October 25, 1999 but since
then, he had not returned nor had been physically present inside the said park or area
that he had allegedly trespassed on. Hence, the charge against him was baseless and
malicious.[6]
In the Resolution[7] dated August 31, 2001, Charina Navarro-Quijano, Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO) I of the Office of the Ombudsman, dismissed the criminal
complaint in OMB-VIS-CRIM-99-1227 for lack of probable cause. The said
resolution was recommended for approval by Virginia Palanca-Santiago, GIO III, and
approved by the Primo C. Miro, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
However, in the administrative case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044), the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the Decision[8] dated October 24, 2001, finding that, except for
Arregadas, the other named DENR employees are guilty of simple misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of suspension for one month. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby deemed that respondents, namely:

Nicomedes Rivera Ar[m]illa; Delia Batasin-in; James Magalona Fuentes; Oscar
Tatongoy Gador; Santos Guigayoma, Jr.; Clarito Umerez Minoza; Ernesto
Subingsubing Naraja; Nelson Obeso; Senen Calaurian Sereno; and, Martin Yococa
Yase are guilty of Simple Misconduct, and are hereby meted the penalty of suspension
for one month.
The complaint against Edmondo Ar[r]egadas is hereby dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.[9]
A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by Armilla, et al. but the same
was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in the Order[10] dated January 10, 2002.
Armilla, et al. thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in finding them guilty
of simple misconduct and imposing on them the penalty of one month
suspension. They alleged that they could not be guilty of simple misconduct
considering that they simply complied with a court order and directive of their
superiors for them to conduct a relocation survey of the Sudlon National Park. In
addition, they pointed out that the ownership of the Corominas family over a parcel of
land within the said park was still in issue; hence, no right of the said family had been
violated in conducting the court-ordered survey. Armilla, et al. also assailed the denial
of their motion for reconsideration on the ground that under Republic Act No. 6770
(RA 6770)[11] a decision imposing the penalty of not more than one month is final and
unappealable.
In its Decision dated October 30, 2003, the appellate court granted the petition of
Armilla, et al. It affirmed the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman that Armilla, et
al. were guilty of simple misconduct. However, it ruled that the Office of the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. Citing the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,
[12]
the appellate court declared that the Office of the Ombudsmans power is limited
only to therecommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. Accordingly, it has no power to impose the penalty of suspension on Armilla, et
al.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman dated October 24, 2001, as well as the Order
dated January 10, 2002 in OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044 is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman forthwith sought recourse to this Court.
The Petitioners Arguments
In support of its petition, the Office of the Ombudsman (the petitioner) alleges as
follows:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION)
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS DECISION DATED OCTOBER 30, 200[3] IN CA-G.R.
SP NO. 69313 WHEN IT AGREED IN THE FINDINGS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASE OMB-VISADM-99-1044, BUT NONETHELESS PROCEEDED TO REVERSE AND SET
ASIDE THE OMBUDSMAN DECISION THEREIN CITING ONLY THE OBITER
DICTUM IN THE CASE OF TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R.
NO. 129124, 15 MARCH 2002 (SECOND DIVISION) TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS NO AUTHORITY TODIRECTLY DISMISS
AN ERRING PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE FROM GOVERNMENT
SERVICE, CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:
(I) THE PASSING STATEMENT IN TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
G.R. NO. 129124, 15 MARCH 2002 HAS REMAINED AN OBITER
DICTUM WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THE STATUS OF A BINDING PRECEDENT;
(II) SEC. 13, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VESTS THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN NOT ONLY WITH THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS ON ERRING PUBLIC SERVANTS BUT ALSO
WITH
THE
POWER
TO
ENSURE
COMPLIANCE
WITH
ITS
RECOMMENDATION; FURTHER, IT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTENDMENT TO LEAVE TO THE LEGISLATURE THE PREROGATIVE TO
FURTHER DEFINE OR REINFORCE SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY;
(III) SECS. 13, 15(1) AND (3), 16, 19, 21, AND 25 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770
(THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) CLOTHE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN WITH ALL THE CONCOMITANT PREROGATIVES OF A POWER
TO DISCIPLINE, INCLUDING THE POWER TO ASSESS PENALTIES AND TO
CAUSE THE SAME TO BE MINISTERIALLY IMPLEMENTED BY THE
CONCERNED AGENCY, AND WHICH FULL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
POWER HAS TIME AND TIME AGAIN BEEN VALIDATED AND AFFIRMED BY
THE HONORABLE COURT;
(IV) THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS SIMILAR TO ITS PLENARY AND
UNQUALIFIED CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORY POWER, INCLUDES THE
LESSER POWER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF DULY-ISSUED JUDGMENTS; AND
(V) A GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM LEADS
TO PARALYZING CONFUSION, LEGAL CHAOS AND UNREASONABLE
ABSURDITIES, AS WELL AS TO THE ACCELERATION OF THE CRIPPLING
AND DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF INEFFICIENCY AND GRAFT AND
CORRUPTION.[14]
Petitioner assails the appellate courts reliance on Tapiador in declaring that the power
of the Office of the Ombudsman is limited only to the recommendation of the penalty
of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault. According to petitioner, the statement made by the
Court in Tapiador relating to the Office of the Ombudsmans lack of authority to
impose a penalty is mere obiter dictum.
Petitioner submits that apart from the powers and functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman enumerated in the Constitution, it expressly authorized Congress to grant
the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers. Pursuant to this constitutional fiat,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6770 vesting in the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary powers. Citing the pertinent provisions[15] in Republic Act
No. 6770, petitioner posits that it possesses the following powers: (1) [it] can, on its
own, investigate any apparent illegality, irregularity, impropriety, or inefficiency
committed by any public officer or employee not excepted from its disciplinary
authority; (2) it can and must act on administrative complaints against them; (3) it can
conduct administrative adjudication proceedings; (4) it can determine their guilt; (5) at
its discretion, it can fix the penalty in case of guilt; (6) it can order the head of the
office or agency to which the guilty public officer belongs to implement the penalty
imposed; and (7) it can ensure compliance with the implementation of the penalty it
fixed.[16]
By declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend, but cannot
directly impose, the penalty in administrative cases, the appellate court allegedly, in
effect, nullified and invalidated the provisions of Republic Act No. 6770 relating to its
administrative disciplinary powers. Stated in another manner, the appellate court has
allegedly deemed that the Office of the Ombudsman cannot make a determination of
guilt for an administrative offense; it cannot assess a penalty; and it cannot cause its
decisions to be implemented.
Petitioner stresses that the grant of administrative disciplinary authority to the

Office of the Ombudsman is not prohibited by, or inconsistent with, the
Constitution. It invokes the legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 to buttress its
claim that it was the intention of the lawmakers to provide for an independent
constitutional body that would serve as the protector of the people with real
powers.[17]
Petitioner opines that the statutory grant of disciplinary powers to the Office of the
Ombudsman complete in all its components including the determination of guilt,
assessment of commensurate penalty and compulsion on the head of agency concerned
to implement the same under pain of administrative sanctions was encouraged and
ushered in by the Constitution.[18] Further, its framers intended the Office of the
Ombudsman to exercise disciplinary authority as an indispensable and major rampart
in its operational effectiveness.
In this connection, petitioner reiterates that this disciplinary authority necessarily
includes the authority to determine the penalty in an administrative proceeding and
cause its implementation. Specifically, Section 13[19] of Republic Act No. 6770 states
that the Ombudsman has the authority to enforce administrative liability where the
evidence warrants. Section 15[20] provides, in the alternative, that the Ombudsman may
proceed administratively against an erring public officer and threatens with
administrative sanction the refusal of any officer, without just cause, to implement the
order of the Ombudsman imposing administrative penalties. Section 25[21] prescribes
the range of penalties that the Ombudsman may enforce against public officers it finds
administratively guilty. Finally, Section 27[22] pronounces as not susceptible to review
on appeal administrative penalties not higher than suspension for thirty (30) days or
fine not exceeding the salary for the same period.
Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution is also cited by petitioner. The said
provision reads that the Ombudsman has the authority to direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith. According to petitioner, the clause ensure compliance
therewith taken together with the term recommend connotes an element of
compulsion such that the latter does not merely signify to advise or to
prescribe. Rather, the clause ensure compliance therewith prescribes that the
Ombudsman procedurally pass on to the head of office concerned the imposition of the
penalty on the public officer at fault, and then compels said head to enforce the same
penalty. This element of compulsion, petitioner theorizes, was provided by the framers
of the Constitution in order to keep the Ombudsman from becoming a toothless tiger,
a eunuch or a scarecrow.[23]
It is petitioners submission that a contrary ruling, i.e., to limit its power only to
recommend the penalty in administrative disciplinary cases, would lead to legal and
practical absurdities. Among them, it would allegedly run counter to the fact that the
Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. Likewise, heads of
office,e.g., a municipal mayor, would have the authority to adopt or reject the
Ombudsmans decision, as if in review, when no such recourse is provided by law. The
problem of how the various administrative penalties that have already been enforced by
the Office of the Ombudsman would be treated was also raised.
In fine, petitioner maintains that it meted a just and commensurate disciplinary
penalty of one-month suspension on Armilla, et al. upon its finding that they were
guilty of simple misconduct. Such finding was arrived at by petitioner in the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority and only after proper adjudication
proceedings. The appellate court, in reversing this judgment on the sole ground that
petitioner has no authority to impose the penalty but merely to recommend it citing
the obiter dictum inTapiador, allegedly committed reversible error. Petitioner thus
urges this Court to reverse and set aside the assailed appellate courts decision and to
affirm the Office of the Ombudsmans authority to impose the penalty in OMB-VISADM-99-1044.
The Respondents Counter-Arguments
Armilla, et al. (the respondents) maintain that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
authority to impose administrative sanctions on erring public officials. It is their
position that subparagraph (8) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which states
that the Ombudsman shall perform such other functions or duties as may be provided
by law is circumscribed by subparagraph (3) thereof which enjoins the Ombudsman to
recommend the removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of public
officials found to be at fault.
According to respondents, subparagraph (8) of Section 13, Article XI is a catchall phrase intended to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman such other powers
necessary to discharge its function as the constitutional watchdog of the
government. However, the said provision does not include powers inconsistent with
those already enumerated. Hence, its recommendatory power to impose penalties in
subparagraph (3) of the same section necessarily forecloses the grant of the power to
actually impose the said penalties.
Refuting petitioners assertion that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
the Office of the Ombudsman to be more than a recommendatory institution,
respondents aver that the clear intent was to deny the Ombudsman punitive powers. In
support of this averment, respondents refer to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission where some members thereof said that the Ombudsman was to have
neither prosecutory nor punitive powers.
Respondents further submit that Republic Act No. 6770 withheld punitive
powers from the Office of the Ombudsman and merely authorized it to recommend or
suggest sanctions. They cite Section 15 thereof particularly subparagraph (3) thus:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of this Act; Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be ground for disciplinary action against said
officer;
Again refuting petitioners argument that the term recommend construed
together with the clause ensure compliance therewith imports an element of
compulsion and warrants direct imposition by the Office of the Ombudsman of the
penalties, respondents contend that to recommend necessarily excludes the power to
directly impose the penalty. Echoing the appellate courts ruling, respondents
invoke Tapiador in arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly impose on them the penalty of suspension for one month, but only to
recommend the said penalty. Accordingly, they pray that the petition be denied for
utter lack of merit.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to
recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, the
appellate court mainly relied on the following statement made by the Court
in Tapiador, thus:
x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the

Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the
public official concerned.[24]
Reliance by the appellate court on the foregoing statement is misplaced. As correctly
pointed out by petitioner, the foregoing statement is mere obiter dictum. In fact,
inLedesma v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court categorically pronounced that the
statement in Tapiador on the Ombudsmans power is, at best, merely an obiter
dictum and, as such, cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme
Court:
x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was
the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the
charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of
the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by
sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is
before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court
nor is it safe from judicial examination.[26]
Likewise in Ledesma, the Court rejected the argument that the power of the
Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned
against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which
directs the Office of the Ombudsman to recommend to the officer concerned the
removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or
employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term recommend, according to the Court, the
said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No.
6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
The Court further explained in Ledesma that the mandatory character of the
Ombudsmans order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the
action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the

Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer.
Consequently in Ledesma, the Court affirmed the appellate courts decision
which had, in turn, affirmed an order of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the
penalty of suspension on the erring public official.
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsmans
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of
the Constitution in this wise:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Section 13 thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1)
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
(2)
Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee
of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of
any government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse
or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3)
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official
or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
(4)
Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of
public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action;
(5)
Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in
the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents;
(6)
Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant
and with due prudence;
(7)
Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and
(8)
Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,[27] the Court recognized that the foregoing
enumeration is not exclusive and that the framers of the Constitution had given
Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional powers to the
Ombudsman. The observation of Commissioner Christian Monsod, quoted in Acop, is
apropos:
MR. MONSOD (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked at it in too
much of an absolutist position. The Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a
champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not against the President. On one
hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On the other hand, there is
the interpretation that he is a competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to
the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we
are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can
exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the
direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we
should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that
it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more
effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible
disability.[28]
Congress thus enacted Republic Act No. 6770 to provide for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. It substantially reiterates the
constitutional provisions relating to the Office of the Ombudsman. Further, Section 13
thereof restates the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman in this wise:
Sec. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
Section 15 thereof substantially reiterates Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. In
particular, subparagraph (3) of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770 restates Section
13(3), Article XI of the Constitution, quoted anew below:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of this Act:Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond
cavil. It is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. [29] In
conjunction therewith, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman
the authority to act on all administrative complaints:
Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1)
Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2)
Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4)
Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5)
Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
(6)
Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 25 thereof sets forth the penalties as follows:
Other provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, likewise, pertain to the exercise by the
Office of the Ombudsman of its administrative disciplinary authority. For example,
Section 19 states that Republic Act No. 6770 shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee x
x x, during his tenure of office. Section 21 defines the jurisdiction of its disciplinary
authority to include all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned, or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
Section 22[30] thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in the office allegedly committed by officials
removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
impeachment, if warranted. Such power, likewise, includes the investigation of private
persons who conspire with public officers and employees. Section 23[31] requires that
the administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be
in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. The Office
of the Ombudsman is, however, given the option to refer certain complaints to the
proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees.
Still in connection with their administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and
his deputies are expressly given the power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges in accordance with Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 6770:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman and his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Sec. 25. Penalties. (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No.
807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without
pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or
both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that
mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the
complaint or charges.
As referred to in the above provision, under Presidential Decree No. 807, [32] the
penalties that may be imposed by the disciplining authority in administrative
disciplinary cases are removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension
for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six months
salary, or reprimand.[33]
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides for the period of effectivity and finality
of the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1)
New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive
or decision;
(2)
Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing:Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be
final and unappealable.
[In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.][34]
that interpretation, Mr. President, is the question that one must always ask, if he wants
this institution of the Ombudsman to be effective, rather than simply be like the other
watchdogs the past administrations created. Then we believe, the Committee believes,
that we must give the Ombudsman the necessary teeth in order to implement its own
decision. We believe that this is fully in accord with the Filipino custom and tradition,
and based on our historical experience. Short of not giving the Ombudsman the
disciplining authority, I think we might as well kiss the system goodbye, because it will
be like the same watchdogs created in the past-toothless and inutile.[35]
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.
Senator Angara, by way of reply to the queries of Senator Neptali Gonzales, further
explained:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent
of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative
adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension
public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate
penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence,
and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
Senator Gonzales. All right. There are certain admissions and, however
reluctantly given, at least, let us go further because the Gentleman is invoking the
whole of Section 13. I might really be wrong, and I want to be corrected this early.
The explanation of Senator Edgardo Angara, one of the sponsors of Senate Bill
No. 534 which, as consolidated with House Bill No. 13646, became RA 6770, is
instructive:
Senator Laurel. Because, Mr. President, in the light of another section of the bill,
with respect to Section 13, disciplinary authority, first, the Ombudsman here is granted
the power of disciplining public officers and employees, while other bodies may not be
so authorized; second, the Constitution itself empowers the Office of the Ombudsman
merely to investigate and review; but the bill here authorizes the Ombudsman, and
grants the power of disciplining public officers and employees. It goes beyond the
constitutional provision.
Senator Angara. Well, if the Gentleman is through with his statement
Senator Laurel. Well, yes.
Senator Angara. I do not agree that this bill is going beyond what the Constitution
has prescribed for the Ombudsman; because, as I understand it, the constitutional
provision was construed in the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission and in
fact, left it to the Legislature to determine the powers and functions to be allocated to
the Ombudsman. It did not say or it did not prohibit the Legislature from granting
disciplinary power that we are now granting to the Ombudsman. But over and beyond
Now, under paragraph (2), it says:

Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of
the Government, or any subdivision thereof to perform and expedite
probably a ministerial act because it says:
any act or duty required by law or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.
There is neither a grant of disciplining authority, nor can we imply one from this
specific provision; only from this specific provision.
Senator Angara. My answer, again, Mr. President, is that one cannot derive that
broad, sweeping conclusion solely on the basis of this provision.
Senator Gonzales. There is none solely on this provision. Let us go to (3):
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault - There is a determination, that is, at fault, and this is very important,
-recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
Mr. President, the power here, even after a determination of fault, is merely to
recommend to the appropriate office or agency the imposition of administrative
sanctions, which, under this law, instead are to be imposed by the Ombudsman himself
or directly. Could not the Gentleman see a conflict between these two provisions, Mr.
President?
SO ORDERED.
Senator Angara. I do not see any conflict, Mr. President. As I said, the grant of
disciplinary power is something that the Constitution does not forbid.
Senator Gonzales. Well, we will take it differently.
Senator Angara. Again, the question is: Is it necessary to grant the Ombudsman
such a power in order to make it effective? That is a means necessary to the end, to
the objective.
Senator Gonzales. Is it, therefore, now another power?
Senator Angara. I submit that the means, that is, the disciplinary power, is
necessary to achieving that objective of making an effective Ombudsman.[36]
The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the
Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The
lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist watchman, not
merely a passive one.[37] And this intent was given validation by the Court in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,[38] where it stated that:
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model
whose function is merely to receive and process the peoples complaints against
corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector
of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and
employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions. x x x
At this point, it is noted that the Office of the Ombudsman and the appellate court
invariably found respondents guilty of simple misconduct. The Court affirms this
finding following the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative bodies are
accorded great respect by this Court.[39]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated October 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69313
isREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 24, 2001 of the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044 is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 125296 July 20, 2006

ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. and WENCESLAO L. MALABANAN, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE
OF
THE
OMBUDSMAN,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
(VISAYAS), ROSAURO F. TORRALBA* and CELESTINO BANDALA,**
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court addresses the issue of
whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman have
jurisdiction over petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former
officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), for violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019[1] (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
In
February
1989,
private
respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged petitioners before the
Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA 3019. In their complaint, private
respondents accused petitioners of using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for
Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services
in which they were shareholders.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and
(2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019.
In a resolution dated July 13, 1989,[2] the Deputy Ombudsman[3] denied petitioners
omnibus motion to dismiss.
On petitioners first argument, he ruled that, although PAL was originally organized as
a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government
through the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). [4] Therefore, it became a
government-owned
or
controlled
corporation
(GOCC)
as
enunciated
[5]
in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan.
On the second argument, the Deputy Ombudsman held that petitioners were public
officers within the definition of RA 3019, Section 2 (b). Under that provision, public
officers included elective, appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the Government.
The dispositive portion of the Deputy Ombudsmans order read:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit to [petitioners] OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS,
the same is hereby DENIED and petitioners are hereby ordered to submit their answer
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.[6]
Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman. There, they raised the same issues.
Treating the appeal as a motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman dismissed it on
February 22, 1996. He held that petitioners were officers of a GOCC, hence, he had
jurisdiction over them.[7] He also affirmed the Deputy Ombudsmans ruling
that Quimpo was applicable to petitioners case.
In this petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order, petitioners assail the orders dated July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996 of the
Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman, respectively. They claim that
public respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the investigation of the case against them although they were officers
of a private corporation and not public officers."[8]
In support of their petition, petitioners argue that: (1) the Ombudsmans
jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and these do not include PAL, a
private entity created under the general corporation law; (2) Quimpo does not apply to
the case at bar and (3) RA 3019 only concerns public officers, thus, they cannot be
investigated or prosecuted under that law.
We find merit in petitioners arguments and hold that public respondents do not have
the authority to prosecute them for violation of RA 3019.
JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER OCCS IS CONFINED ONLY
TO THOSE WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS
The 1987 Constitution states the powers and functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Specifically, Article XI, Section 13(2) provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
impropriety in the performance of duties. (italics supplied)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction
over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can
only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees of
government corporations. Therefore, although the government later on acquired the
controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an original
charter and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the
Ombudsman.
The term government-owned or controlled corporations in the 1973 Constitution

was qualified by the 1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters.[12]
In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission,[9] we ruled that the phrase with
original charter means chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations
organized under the Corporation Code. PAL, being originally a private corporation
seeded by private capital and created under the general corporation law, does not fall
within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of
the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or
prosecute petitioners.
PETITIONERS, AS THEN OFFICERS OF PAL, WERE NOT PUBLIC

OFFICERS
QUIMPO NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR

Quimpo[10] is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, Felicito Quimpo charged in
1984 two officers of PETROPHIL in the Tanodbayan(now Ombudsman) for violation
of RA 3019. These officers sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the Tanodbayan had no jurisdiction over them as officers/employees of a private
company. The Court declared that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over them because
PETROPHIL ceased to be a private entity when Philippine National Oil Corporation
(PNOC) acquired its shares.
In hindsight, although Quimpo appears, on first impression, relevant to this case (like
PETROPHIL, PALs shares were also acquired by the government), closer scrutiny
reveals that it is not actually on all fours with the facts here.
In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to perform functions related to
government programs and policies on oil. [11] The fact that the purpose in acquiring
PETROPHIL was for it to undertake governmental functions related to oil was decisive
in sustaining theTanodbayans jurisdiction over it. This was certainly not the case with
PAL. The records indicate that the government acquired the controlling interest in the
airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its unpaid loans in GSIS. No
governmental functions at all were involved.
Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was the
1973 Constitution which the Court relied on in concluding that the Tanodbayan had
jurisdiction over PETROPHILs accused officers. Particularly, the Court cited Article
XIII, Section 6:
SEC. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known
as the Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public
office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make
appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the
proper court or body. (italics supplied)
Neither the 1987 Constitution nor RA 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
defines who public officers are. Instead, its varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes[13] and jurisprudence.[14] Usually quoted in our decisions
is Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject. In the 2002 case of Laurel
v. Desierto,[15] the Court extensively quoted his exposition on the term public
officers:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an
office.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign functions of

government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position
is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment
or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either
legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.[16] (italics supplied)
From the foregoing, it can be reasonably inferred that public officers are those
endowed with the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial functions.
[17]
The explication of the term is also consistent with the Courts pronouncement
in Quimpo that, in the case of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed public
officers if their corporations are tasked to carry out governmental functions.
In any event, PAL has since reverted to private ownership and we find it pointless to
scrutinize the implications of a legal issue that technically no longer exists.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Deputy
Ombudsman (Visayas) and Office of the Ombudsman are restrained from proceeding
with the investigation or prosecution of the complaint against petitioners for violation
of RA 3019. Accordingly, their assailed orders of July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996,
respectively, are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
versus EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., respondents.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the majority except on the question of prescription with respect to
respondent Eduardo M. Conjuangco, Jr.
The primary issue in this case with respect to respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco is on
the question of whether the right of the State to prosecute the respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019[1] or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act has prescribed. Corollary to this issue are the questions a.
when the prescriptive period provided by law should begin to run; and
b. whether the prescriptive period should be tolled or interrupted when the

offender is outside the countrys jurisdiction.
The case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan[2] instructs us that, in resolving the issue of
prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered:
1.
the period of prescription for the offense charged;
2.
the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
3.
the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
The period of prescription for the offense charged

Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa Bilang 195 in 1982 and insofar as it applies
to the facts of this case, Section 11 of RA 3019 provided for a 10-year prescriptive
period for all offenses punishable under it.[3] Any criminal proceeding for violation of
RA 3019, initiated after the 10-year period, is barred and the State forfeits its power to
prosecute and penalize the offender.
The time the period of prescription starts to run
Since RA 3019 is a special penal law, the applicable law for the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2, Act No. 3326:[4]
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. [emphasis supplied].
Applied to the present case, the ponencia considers February 8, 1980 as the
point when the 10-year prescriptive period began to run, as it was at this time that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued to Unicom the Certificate of
Filing of the Amended Articles of Incorporation (AAOI), which reflected the
increase in Unicoms capitalization, as well as the conversion and classification of its
shares. The ponencia considered the filing of the AAOI with a public office as the
equivalent of the discovery of the crime because the document supposedly
evidencing the acts charged then became accessible to the public, thus providing it with
sufficient notice. Since ten years lapsed from the time the crime charged was deemed
discovered on February 8, 1980 up to time when the complaint was filed with the
Ombudsman on March 1, 1990, theponencia concluded that the criminal charge had
already prescribed and, therefore, it found the Ombudsmans dismissal of the complaint
proper.
I agree with the ponencias explanation, but only to the extent that the filing of
Unicoms AAOI with the SEC provided the public constructive notice of the increase
of its capitalization and the conversion of its shares. The disclosure of these facts in
the AAOI alone, however, did not establish or at least give reasonable notice to the
public of any undue injury to the government that constitutes the crime penalized
under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The gravamen of the crime penalized under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is
the undue injury caused to the government, which, in the present case is allegedly
the dilution of UCPBs investment in Unicoms shares of stock when Unicom
increased its capitalization from 10 million shares to 1 billion shares and converted the
shares into three difference classes. The undue injury could be discovered only upon
the filing, not of the AAOI on February 8, 1980 (which does not contain a listing of the
shareholders and the amount of their shareholdings), but of Unicoms General
Information Sheet (GIS) for 1980. Notably, the AAOI does not contain a listing of the
corporations shareholders and the amount of their shareholdings; [5] these are matters
properly reported and reflected instead in the corporations GIS a matter
the ponencia recognized when it declared that [c]hanges in shareholdings are reflected
in the GIS that corporations have been mandated to submit annually to the SEC.[6]
The alleged undue injury to the public through the dilution of United
Coconut Planters Banks (UCPBs) investment in Unicoms shares of stock would
thus be discovered only upon a review of Unicoms GIS for 1980 (the year when
the increase of capital stock was approved), whose filing does not necessarily coincide
with the filing of the AAOI. It was only at this point that the public could be deemed
to have constructive notice of the acts constituting the crime. Thus, the proper period
to reckon the running of the prescriptive period should be from the filing of
Unicoms GIS for 1980, which date would definitely be later than February 8, 1980.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides for two instances when the prescriptive period shall
begin to run from the date of the commission of the crime, and, if not known, from
the date of its discovery. Although the violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 appears to
have been consummated and completed by February 8, 1980, insofar as the public is
concerned, the crime could have only been discovered when Unicoms GIS for 1980
was filed. The public would have access to the documents bearing the pertinent facts
constituting the crime upon the filing of Unicoms GIS for 1980; only then could the
public have known of the undue injury caused to the government.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Bersamin states that the transaction subject of the
criminal charge was evidenced by the Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock filed on
September 17, 1979 and the AAOI filed on February 8, 1980, both of which are public
records under the SECs custody. Hence, he posits that the illegal transaction was
made known to the public as soon as these documents were filed, and the prescription
period began to run on those dates.
However, I find the Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock filed on September
17, 1979 immaterial because it does not pertain to the increase of capitalization of
September 18, 1979, which supposedly caused the dilution of UCPBs shares. From
1978 to 1979, Unicom increased its capitalization thrice: (1) in 1978, from 1 million
shares to 3 million shares with par value of P100 per share; (2) on September 4, 1979,
from 3 million to 10 million shares, without par value; and (3) on September 18, 1979,
from 10 million to 1 billion shares, divided into three classes. The Certificate of
Increase of Capital Stock dated September 17, 1979 only reflected the September 4,
1979 increase and did not document the assailed dilution of shares caused by the
September 18, 1979 increase.
the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February 1986
after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.
[Emphases ours.]
The ponencia sought to exempt the present case from the application of the principle
settled in Domingo by contending that the questioned transaction in the present case
does not involve the grant of behest loans that was the subject of Domingo and similar
cases.[8] To the ponencia, the grant of behest loans, by their nature, could be
concealed from the public eye[.] The investment questioned in the present case, on the
other hand, does not appear x x x to have been withheld from the curious x x x [since]
no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPBs investment in Unicom
during martial law at the Presidents or anyone elses instance. The ponencia also
observed that there was no allegation that the respondent members of the board of
directors of UCPB connived with Unicom to suppress public knowledge of the
investment.
I disagree.
Although by nature, a difference exists between the grant of behest loans and UCPBs
investments in Unicoms shares of stock, both transactions nonetheless involve
public funds (i.e., coconut levy funds) and are evidenced by public instruments and
records. Indeed, even if these transactions are of public record (hence, presumably of
public knowledge), the Court declared that the principle in Domingo should still apply:
the running of the prescriptive period should be computed from the presumed
discovery (i.e., after the February 1986 Revolution) of the crime and not from the day
of such commission.[9]
The lack of allegation that the members of the board of directors of UCPB
Jurisprudence has in fact set a much later date when to reckon the running of the
connived with Unicom to suppress public knowledge of the investment is rendered
prescriptive period of crimes punished under RA 3019, committed by the cohorts and
unnecessary by the fact that majority of the board of directors of UCPB also served as
cronies of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos during Martial Law. The
board of directors of Unicom during the relevant period:
circumstances prevailing at the time of the questioned transaction do not provide
UNICOM
reasonable opportunity for anyone curious and bold enough to assail the cronies
acts. The Court thus declared in Domingo v. Sandiganbayan[7] that
Board of Directors as of August 29, 1979
Board of Directors as of September 18, 1979
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have known
the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
1. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against
the government. The alleged anomalous transactions could only Juan
have Ponce Enrile
been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the original
respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to Maria
said Clara L. Lobregat
date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr.
transactions. Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from
2.
Juan Ponce Enrile
3.
Maria Clara L. Lobregat
4.
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr.

Jose C. Concepcion
5.
Jose C. Concepcion
Emmanuel M. Almeda
6.
Emmanuel M. Almeda
Inaki R. Mendezona
7.
Inaki R. Mendezona
Rolando P. Dela Cuesta
8.
Teodoro D. Regala
Hermenegildo C. Zayco
9.
Douglas Lu Ym
Narciso M. Pineda
10.
Sigfredo Veloso
Danilo S. Ursua
11.
Jaime Gandianga
The surrounding circumstances and the interlocking members of the board of directors
of the two corporations provide reasonable ground to presume the existence of
connivance. These factors make it likely that the questioned transaction was indeed
withheld from the curious or from those who were minded to know.
The time the prescriptive period was interrupted
A matter of significant consideration in the resolution of this case but has been
glaringly omitted from the discussion of the facts is the publicly-known fact [10] that
from 1986 to 1991, respondent Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was absent from Philippine
Archipelago.[11]
Notably, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326 is silent on the effect of the
offenders absence from the country on the running of the prescriptive period. The law
simply states that
Sec. 2. x x x
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The silence of the law, however, does not preclude the suppletory application of Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Article 91 of the RPC provides that [t]he term
of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago. The suppletory application of Article 91 of the RPC is authorized and
even mandatedunder Article 10 of the same Code, which states:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are
or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specifically provide the contrary. [Emphasis ours.]
The only instance when the application of the RPC to special penal laws (like RA
3019) is barred is when the special penal law itself should specifically provide the
contrary. The silence of Act No. 3326 and RA 3019, however, cannot be construed as
specifically providing terms contrary to Article 91 of the RPC.
The combined application of these provisions, therefore, dictates that the 10-year
period to file charges for violation of RA 3019 should not run when the offender
was absent from the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the offenders absence from the
countrys jurisdiction interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, and shall
begin to run again only upon his return.
Does the application of Article 91 of the RPC to violation of special penal laws
violate the rule that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused? I do not believe so.
As already mentioned, the suppletory application of Article 91 of the RPC is mandated
by the law itself. Indeed, the laws express command precludes the application of
statutory rules of construction, which are used only when the law is ambiguous.
[12]
Assuming there was an ambiguity, the liberal construction of penal laws in favor of
the accused is not the only factor in the interpretation of criminal laws:
A [liberal construction] should not be permitted to defeat the intent, policy, and purpose
of the statute. The court should consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the law, for [liberal construction] of a criminal statute does not mean
such construction as to deprive it of the meaning intended.[13]
More importantly, to literally construe Act No. 3326s silence on the effect of the
accuseds absence from our jurisdiction as not interrupting the running of the
prescriptive period is discriminatory and goes against public interest. I agree with
Justice Antonio T. Carpios explanation in his dissent in Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo:[14]
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution
by the simple expedient of escaping from the State's jurisdiction. x x x. An
accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State's jurisdiction.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction
unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the
detriment of the State's ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of
cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not encourage individuals facing
investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine
jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period.[15] [Emphases ours.]
Accordingly, the charge insofar as it involves respondent Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. was filed within the prescriptive period. He was absent from the
country from 1986 to 1991. Hence, the filing of the charge on March 1, 1990 was well
within the 10-year prescriptive period, even assuming it began to run on February 8,
1980.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-97-1247. May 14, 1997]

(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I.1 No. P-97-1247)
NARITA RABE, complainant, vs. DELSA M. FLORES, Interpreter III, RTC,
Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, respondent.
b) why she did not report said business interest in her sworn statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections,
and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for the years 1991, 1992,
1993, and 1994;
c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60)
days from her assumption into (sic) office; and
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In an administrative complaint for "Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee,
Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority" dated August 18,
1995, Complainant Narita Rabe,2 by counsel, charged Respondent Delsa M. Flores,
Interpreter III at the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, as follows:3
"(Mrs.) Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at
the extension of the Public Public (sic) Market when she is (sic) not a member of our
client's association and was never a party to Civil Case No. 89-23. She herself knows
(sic) that the stalls in the said area had already been awarded to our client's members
pursuant to the decision of the court on October 30, 1991. Worse, she took the law into
her hands when she destroyed the stall of our client and brought the materials to the
police station of Panabo, Davao."
After respondent filed her answer, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 17,
1996, absolving her of the charge. In the same resolution, however, the Court required
respondent to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for the
following:4
"x x x a) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty. Victor R.
Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court, that she started performing her duties as (an)
interpreter on May 16, 1991 when (1) according to a certification dated June 17, 1991
issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal Treasurer, Panabo Davao, she was employed
in the office of the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to
June 3, 1991 with her last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (2) she
took her oath of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17, 1991;
d) why she has indicated in her DTRs for August 1995 that she worked on August 1518, 21, 23-25 and 28-31 and for September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one
(21) working days when her Contract of Lease with the Municipal Government of
Panabo for the market stall in its Section 7 clearly states that she has to personally
conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled
as per its Section 13."
Respondent Flores, in a letter dated February 13, 1996, explains that, as stated in the
certification of Atty. Ginete, she assumed her job in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
IV, Panabo, Davao on May 16, 1991, in compliance with the directive from this Court
for her to start working on the said date. Respondent further states that "even prior to
said date (May 16, 1991)" she already reported to the court in order to familiarize
herself with the scope of her duties.5
Respondent Flores also admits that she had received from the municipality a salary for
the period May 16 1991 May 31, 1991, notwithstanding her transfer to the judiciary
on May 16, 1991. She submits, however, the following justification:6
"I admit that I received my last salary in the amount of One Thousand and 80/100
(P1,000.80) Pesos from the Local Government Unit from May 16-31, 1991 but farthest
from my mind is the intent to defraud the government. It was my desire all the time to
refund the amount the moment my salary is received from the Supreme Court,
unfortunately more often than not (the salary) is received three or four months after
assumption of office.
As we all know the month of May and June is the time we enroll our children in school
thus the money I got that month from the Local Government Unit came handy in
defraying registration expenses of my four children. The passage of time coupled with
some intervening events, made me oblivious of my obligation to refund the
money. However, when my attention was called on the day I received the copy of the
resolution, I took no time in refunding the same."
Respondent alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer Jose V. Avenido is

inaccurate because it was on January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment
Clerk I.7According to respondent, she took her oath on June 17, 1991, simply because
it was on that date that she received a copy of her oath form.8
Respondent avers that she did not divulge any business interest in her Sworn Statement
of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she
"was never engaged in business during said period although I had a stall in the
market."9
Respondent further avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on
August 15, 18, 21, 23 to 25 and 28, 31 and all the working days of September, 1995
"because in truth and in fact x x x (she) did hold office on those days." This was
because her contract of lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo was never
implemented as it became the subject of "Civil Case No. 95-53 -- Panabo Public
Market Vendors Assn. Inc. and Pag-ibig Ng Gulayan Ass. Inc. Vs. Municipality of
Panabo, et al., for Declaration of Nullity of Mun. Ord. No. XLV, Series of 1994."10
The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation. In its report, the OCA found respondent guilty of
dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and recommended that the
penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The Court finds that the report and
recommendation of the OCA is in accord with the evidence and the law. We hold the
explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. Respondent's misconduct is evident from the
records.
By her own admission, respondent had collected her salary from the Municipality of
Panabo for the period of May 16-31, 1991, when she was already working at the
RTC. She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal
government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon receipt
of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later. We
cannot countenance the same. Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty.
Her explanation, as observed earlier, is unsatisfactory. Her overriding need for money
from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of
her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. We
sympathize with respondent's sad plight of being the sole breadwinner of her family,
with her husband and parents to feed and children to send to school. This, however, is
not an acceptable excuse for her misconduct. If poverty and pressing financial need
could justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt long ago. A public
servant should never expect to become wealthy in government.
But there is really more to respondents' defense of poverty. If respondent was just
driven by dire pecuniary need, respondent should have returned the salary she had
obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary
from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's
Resolution dated January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or
failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation.
In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite,11 this Court
ruled that a sheriff who failed to issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him
for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really wanted to misappropriate the
said amount." Inevitably, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."12
We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should
conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free
from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the
discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. They are strictly
mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable
behavior so as not to outrage public decency.13
This Court, in JPDIO vs. Josephine Calaguas, Records Officer, OCC, MTCC, Angeles
City,14 held:
"The Court must reiterate that a public office is a public trust. A public servant is
expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and should
be made accountable to all those whom he serves."
Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the
State shall "maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption."15
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for
dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. 16 Accordingly, for respondent's
dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court
has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal.
Apart from the above finding, we also note the contradiction between the certification
issued by Municipal Treasurer Jose Avenido stating that respondent had worked as an
assessment clerk in his office up to June 3, 1991, and the certification of Clerk of Court
Victor Ginete stating that respondent started working as an interpreter on May 16,
1991. Although specifically asked by the Court to explain this contradiction,
respondent could only state that the certification of the treasurer is inaccurate because
she assumed her position as Assessment Clerk on January 25, 1990 and not on
February 1, 1990 as written in the said certification. Respondent, however, failed to
explain the gravamen of the inquiry, i.e., that she was certified to be still connected
with the Municipal Government of Panabo on June 3, 1991, notwithstanding her
assumption of her post in the Regional Trial Court as early as May 16, 1991. To the
mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is consistent with
her failure to satisfactorily explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she
was not entitled to. Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious design to hold two
positions at the same time.
Aside from dishonesty, however, respondent is also guilty of failure to perform her
legal obligation to disclose her business interests. Respondent herself admitted that she
"had a stall in the market." The Office of the Court Administrator also found that she
had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market
stall. That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest
which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Her
failure to do so exposes her to administrative sanction.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee
to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Section 11 of the same law
prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision
thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in
a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of
a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him."
In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she
herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713.
The respondent's claim that her contract of lease of a market stall was never
implemented because it became the subject of a civil case, fails to convince us. We
agree with the finding of the OCA on respondent's guilt for this separate offense. It is a
finding, which further supports its recommendation for respondent's dismissal, to wit: 17
"The case respondent is referring to was filed in 1995. This can be seen from the
number of the case which is 95-93. Earlier than the filing of the case, respondent was
already collecting rentals -- as early as February 22, 1991 -- from one Rodolfo Luay
who was operating a business without the necessary license.
Respondent should have, therefore, indicated in her 'Sworn Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections,
and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service' for the years 1991, 1992,
1993, 1994 and 1995 that she had a market stall in the Public market of Panabo, Davao.
She admits that she never indicated such in her sworn statements.
As this Office had earlier stated in its Memorandum dated November 10, 1995 filed in
connection with the instant complaint:
'Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a
fine not exceeding five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, or both. But even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against the offender, the offender can be dismissed from the
service if the violation is proven. Respondent 201 file speaks for itself.
Furthermore, respondent should have divested herself of her interest in said business
within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office. She has not. The penalty
for non-disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is the same."' (Citations
omitted.)
In her explanation, respondent maintains the position that she has no business interest,
implicitly contending that there is nothing to divulge or divest from. As discussed
above, respondent had a business interest. We do not find her administratively liable,
however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public
officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a
public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. 18 In the absence of
any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of
the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that
there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a
stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of a public
market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not
be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of
divulging it.
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa M. Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service
with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and
with PREJUDICE to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

193459 February 15, 2011

limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an

CONSTI LAST SESSION | 4

legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication,

legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These

The one-year bar rule

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no

MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required

MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself , because when we

(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation,

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta

CONSTI LAST SESSION | 14

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE

ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.

844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,

officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under

Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

CONSTI LAST SESSION | 17

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of

CONSTI LAST SESSION | 21

L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon

CONSTI LAST SESSION | 22

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby

CONSTI LAST SESSION | 23

FELICITO S. MACALINO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF

subsequently accused FELICITO S. MACALINO likewise inserted into the letter of

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18022

Manila, Philippines, May 28, 1993.

Hence, this petition.[10]

Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioners

The Courts Ruling

Sec. 2. (a) xxx xxx xxx.

G.R. No. 160675

June 16, 2006

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby deemed that respondents, namely:

(IV) THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE

Petitioner stresses that the grant of administrative disciplinary authority to the

x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the