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PEOPLE V SAN DIEGO

In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the information
charged thedefendants, Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, AngelMendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and
Bienvenido Wijangco, asprincipals of the murder of Jesus Lapid with thequalifying circumstances
of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and withthe aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed men and craft or fraud.
The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants would be
consideredin the course of the regular trial instead of in a summaryproceeding.
In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecutionhad presented eight witnesses, the trial
court resolvedthe motions for bail granting the same despite theobjection of the prosecution on
the ground that it stillhad material witnesses to present.
The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 foreach defendant on the ground that the
evidence of guilt was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentesvery angry because in
his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he used contumacious languagefor
which he was forthwith cited for contempt.Fortunately, after the fiscal had submitted his
answerand explanation, the trial judge, in a forgiving mood, didnot punish him for contempt on
condition that thecontumacious words be deleted from his motion forreconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process- YES, HENCE THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS ARE NULL AND VOID
We are of the considered opinion that whether themotion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for acapital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding orin the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must begiven an opportunity to present, within a reasonabletime, all the
evidence that it may desire to introducebefore the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant specialcivil action, the prosecution should be
denied such anopportunity, there would be a violation of proceduraldue process, and the order of
the court granting bailshould be considered void on that ground.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offensesmust be exercised in the light of a summary
of theevidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be
capricious orwhimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusingbail must contain a summary
of the evidence for theprosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong.The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the fivedefendants are
defective in form and substance because they donot contain a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt
is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also
on this ground, be allowed to stand

LAVIDES VS CA G.R. 129670 February 1, 2000


FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for childabuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act
providing for strongerdeterrence and special protection against child abuse,exploitation and
discrimination, providing penalties for itsviolation, and other purposes). His arrest was made
without awarrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3,
1997, the parents of complainant LorelieSan Miguel reported to the police that their daughter,
then 16years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the
police received reports of petitioners activities.

When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt
and an underwear,where upon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant
and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information
for violation of Art.III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner.petitioner filed an
"Omnibus Motion (1) For JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate
Releaseof the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful WarrantlessArrest; and (3) In the
Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as aMatter
of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged.nine more informations for child abuse were filed
against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and bythree other minor
childrenNo bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separateapplications for bail in
the nine cases. TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He
is hereby granted the right to post bail in theamount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 forall the cases under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiverof appearance during the trial of these cases.He
shall and must always be present at thehearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able todo so, his bail bonds shall be automaticallycancelled
and forfeited, warrants for hisarrest shall be immediately issued and thecases shall proceed to
trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be madeonly after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdictionover the accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.Pending resolution of his motion,
he asked the trial court tosuspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed amotion
in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds bereduced to P40,000.00 for each case and
that the same be doneprior to his arraignment.
the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners motions toreduce bail bonds, to quash the
informations, and to suspendarraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during whichhe
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then orderedhim released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997
orderand the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trialconference was set on June 7,
1997.The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the
validity of condition (d) on the groundthat the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner
takesissue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16,
1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval
of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void andthat his arraignment was also
invalid because it was heldpursuant to such invalid condition.

ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.

HELD: CONDITION IS VOID. bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accusedmay be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if theinformation is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there wouldthen be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
secondplace, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely
by granting bail and ordering hispresence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment.Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of
bail is that "the accused shall appear before theproper court whenever so required by the court
or these Rules,"while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at thearraignment is
requiredto condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in
a position where he has to choosebetween (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
releaseon bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, hisarraignment cannot be held,
and (2) foregoing the filing of amotion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once
andthereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds

constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient
tocharge him with a crime and his right to bail.

The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive
his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is
inaccordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail underRule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure
of the accused to appear at thetrial without justification despite due notice to him or
hisbondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to bepresent on the date specified
in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution
authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certainstages
of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,whether of innocence or of guilt, (b)
during trial whenevernecessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgationof
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case theaccused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stagesof the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot
bewaived.IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OFPETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS
ALSO INVALID. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate fromthe
invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall bemade only after the arraignment." Even
without such a condition,the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the
condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid,his arraignment and the subsequent
proceedings against him are valid

BAYLON VS SISON
application for bail on offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua/life imprisonment
requires a hearing to give prosecution the chance to present evidence on the guilt of
the accused
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged
with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled
hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for
bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the
prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly
prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of
discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of
previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to
the accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting
bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing
was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition
thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a
well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the
accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail
before making an outright grant of this motion.A guided legal principle in the right to bail
includes:. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that
judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural
due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness.

COMENDADOR V DE VILLA
"military members exempted from the right to bail
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of
Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and
AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The
petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion
to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary
injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for
provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking
that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution.
Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court
stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among
military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right
to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this
rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may
result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty
giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the
decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

DUMLAO V COMELEC
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never
been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this
case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1)
the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising
the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.


The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone,
might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old
may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say
below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree
could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

PEOPLE V SANTOCILES
FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine years old.
The court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. However, during the
proceeding, accused-appellant was not represented by a member of the Bar. Hence, he filed a
Notice of Appeal and praying that the judgment against him be set aside on the ground that he
was denied of his right to be represented by a counsel which results to the denial of due process.
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's
counsel during the trial was not a member of the Bar, he was afforded due process since he was
given opportunity to be heard and records reveal that said person handled the case in a
professional and skillful manner.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person not member of the Philippine Bar may represent an accused in a
criminal proceeding.
HELD:NO.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may be convicted without a counsel, not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. A
person has the right to due process, he must be heard before being condemned - a part of
person's basic rights. The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in the Constitution (Art.
III,Secs. 12 & 14(2)], Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 1 of Rule 115), Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court (Sec. 1 of Rule 138)
The assailed judgment is Set Aside, and the case is hereby Remanded to the trial court for new
trial.

Other Facts
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9)
years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin,
Iloilo. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medicolegal officer who examined the victim. The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together its accessory penalty. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a
person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and
even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal,
however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who
discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further verification
with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.
i[5] Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to a new trial?
Held: This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the
bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented
by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly
be a denial of due process.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to
counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is
pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not a
mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE.

AMION V CHIONGSON
Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and
oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellants
opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty.
Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent
the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel.
This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many

postponement of the hearing.


Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the
case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of related
provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel"
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal
prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process
as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he
forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic
machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by
the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the
administration of justice.

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV COVERAGE


FACTS:
On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as Erap)
waselected as President of RP with GMA as his vicePresident. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps allegedinvolvement in jueteng and his
receiving jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social
groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. Andbecause of
the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000. Upon
itsresumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope
whichallegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret bank
account cutshort the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of
people in the streets of Manila.On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyoas President of the Philippines. On the same day,
petitioner issued a press statement that he was leavingMalacanang Palace for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he
signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he wasunable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, theVicePresident shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella
andSenate President Pimentel on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether or not petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that as of the issue of prejudicial publicity, this would not
apply to thepresent case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury
system, the judge, who is alearned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court alsosaid that petitioner did not present enough
evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influencedthe judge so as to render the
judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases againstpetitioner were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have nopermanent
effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less
withprosecution.

PEOPLE VS BERNAS

When the accused pleads guilty to the charge, both the trial judge and the defense counsel must observe the stringent requirements of
the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence in order to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. In the present case, the
defense counsel not only failed to protect the rights of his client; worse, he even advised him to plead guilty to the Information that had
failed to allege the essential elements of qualified rape. As a consequence, appellant was wrongly sentenced to death.

Facts:

For automatic review by this Court are two related Decisions, (A) Criminal Case No. L-1889 and (B) Criminal Cases Nos. L1893 and L-1896
o Criminal Case No. L-1889

Court is morally convinced that the accused Roberto Bernas is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape
o Criminal Case Nos. L-1893 to L-1896

Criminal Case No. L-1894 and in Criminal Case No. L-1895, respectively, the prosecution having failed to
establish sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused
Roberto Bernas is ACQUITTED of the crime as charged

In Criminal Case No. L-1893 and Criminal Case No. L-1896, the Court is morally convinced that the accused
Roberto Bernas is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Esperidion R. Solano charged appellant with rape in seven separate Informations. The latter
was acquitted under four Informations and convicted under the other three
o Crim Case No. L-188[9]

That on or about the [1st] day of July, 1996 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening in
Barangay Tible, Municipality of Sipocot, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who is the father of herein private complainant, with lewd and unchaste design, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Evelyn Bernas y Tolentino, his 12 year old daughter, and to her damage and
prejudice

Crim. Case No. L-1893

That on or about May 7, 1996, more or less 10:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Tible, Municipality of Sipocot, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his daughter Mary Jane Bernas y
Tolentino, a minor against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.

o Crim. Case No. L-1896


That on or about June 10, 1996, more or less 9:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Tible, Municipality of Sipocot, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his daughter Mary Jane Bernas y
Tolentino, a minor, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.

When arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence
After the prosecution rested its case, appellant -- through his counsel -- manifested that he did not want to present any
evidence and was submitting the case for decision, based on the evidence presented by the prosecution.
After being satisfied that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent, the RTC considered the cases submitted for decision
Thereafter, the prosecution moved to reopen the case, it reasoned that it had failed to present the Birth Certificate of the
victim, Evelyn Bernas, necessary to prove the minority of the victim
The court a quo granted the Motion to Reopen the case
In Criminal Cases Nos. L-1893 and L-1896, before the prosecution presented its evidence, appellant -- through his counsel -moved for the change of his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted
Appellant was thus re-arraigned, and he pleaded guilty to the criminal charges.
The trial court held that appellant, through force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of his two daughters: Evelyn (then 13
years old) on July 1, 1996 and May 7, 1996, and Marigen (then 15 years old) on June 10, 1996.
Hence, this automatic review before us

Issue: W/N court a-quo gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense and in failing to
conduct a searching inquiry as to whether the accused-appellant fully understood the consequences of his plea.

Held: Yes, decisions are set aside

Ratio:
There was an improvident plea of guilty due to an insufficient search inquiry
Appellant argues that the trial court improvidently accepted his pleas of guilt to capital offenses without first conducting a searching
inquiry on whether he had fully understood the consequences of his pleas. We agree. The Court observes that, indeed, sorely
insufficient was the manner in which the trial judge conducted the inquiry into the voluntariness of the change to a plea of guilt and of
appellants comprehension thereof.

From the foregoing (see stenographers notes), it is clear that the trial court did not satisfactorily conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the change of plea by appellant and into his full comprehension of it. Worse, the trial judge advised the accused that
[i]f we proceed with the trial, and if it is proven that you had committed the crime as charged, the penalty would be x x x death
sentences.

Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court mandates:


SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to a capital offense; reception of evidence. -- When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

People v. Aranzado
The Court reiterated the rules a trial court must observe when an accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense:
1
2
3

The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea
The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability
The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

Moreover, in Aranzado, the Court explained how the first requirement -- a searching inquiry -- should be conducted, as follows:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed
under a state of duress either by actual threats or physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background,
which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused [of] the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve
such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
bad promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should [h]e admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which
he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of significance.
It is clear that the court a quo failed to meet these exacting guidelines
First, the records do not show whether the defense counsel was asked a series of questions on whether he had explained the meaning
and the consequences of appellants change of plea. Second, no information was elicited by the trial court about the personality profile
of appellant that may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. Third, the trial court
erroneously told him that: [i]f we proceed with the trial, and if it is proven that you had committed the crime as charged, the penalty
would be x x x death sentences. This implied that it would be better for him not to proceed with the trial, because if it was going to be
proven that he committed the crimes charged, then the death penalty would surely be meted out to him. Finally, the RTC did not
require him to fully narrate the rape incidents or reenact the manner in which he had perpetrated the crimes.

The defense counsel was careless, if not outrightly incompetent, in protecting the rights of appellant.
First, he failed to object to the sufficiency of the Information in Criminal Case No. 1889 (this will be explained further below). Worse, he
advised the latter to plead guilty to an Information that did not sufficiently state all the elements of qualified rape. Second, despite the

initial Motion of the defense counsel to have a pretrial of the aforesaid cases, he later moved to waive this right after the hearing was
postponed several times.

The Information in Criminal Case No. L-1889 does not charge the heinous crime of rape
Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape as defined by law is alleged in the Information. More to the
point, it does not state that the rape was committed through force, violence, intimidation, threat or even through moral ascendancy. It
does not even allege that the carnal knowledge was without the consent or against the will of Evelyn. The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information

People v. Mendoza
It is well settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information.

The Court explained that the purpose of the information was to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him
so as to enable him to prepare a suitable defense. Equally important, he cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which
he is charged

In sum
Since the Information in Criminal Case No. L-1889 fails to allege the essential elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have
been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
would be violated. And yet, counsel advised him to plead guilty of qualified rape, and the trial court convicted him accordingly.

Because in its proceedings the RTC failed to observe the exacting guidelines on how to conduct a searching inquiry, and because the
defense counsel failed to protect the right of appellant to due process, we have no other choice but to remand the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings that would conform with what we have heretofore expressed

PEOPLE V FLORES

Issue: Whether the informations violates the constitutional right of Pedro Flores to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

PEOPLE V PARAZO

Facts: (As to how the complaint got to RTC, there is no info in the case. The facts just presented
evidence to show that Parazo deserves a re trial because he was sentenced to death without an
interpreter even though he is deaf and mentally retarded)
RTC decision: Parazo (28 years old) is guilty of rape (sentenced to death) and homicide
May 29, 1997-Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the
Court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true
would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.
February 10, 1998- the Court resolved to grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in
abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to

allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit
him (appellant) for examination by a physician of the Supreme Court.
The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is really
a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months,
and with low IQ of 60 only.
Parazos mother testified that he was born deaf and mute and she has no money for medical
lintervention. Barangay captain that Parazo was known as pipi since childhood. His school
teacher says he was never active in class and he never finished grade I. DSWD says that he was
a beneficiary of their projects relative to "Persons with Disability." During his early childhood, he
was an active participant of the project. As he grew older however, he did not anymore bother to
visit their office.
Issue: Whether he deserves a re trial for he was sentenced to death without the aid of a
language expert although he is deaf and mentally retarded.
Held: Yes he deserves re trial.
Based on the collateral information's (sic) gathered from persons who have known the patient
since childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and evidenced by the
psychological report, it is now established that Marlon Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound
Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right ear; (3) Mental Retardation, Mild.
Criteria for Mental Retardation as follows:
1. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning: an IQ. of approximately 70 or below on an
individually administered IQ. test.
2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person's
effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group) in
at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home-living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills,
work, leisure, health and safety).
3. Onset before age of 18.
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language
expert. He deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.

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