Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Q.C. appealed to the C.A. but it affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Its Motion
for Reconsideration was also denied.
Jan. 26, 2000 Q.C. petitioned the Supreme Court for review on certiorari
assailing the Oct. 18, 1999 decision of the C.A.
ISSUES :
1. Was the second negotiated contract null and void ab initio because its
execution was done in violation of existing laws, more particularly Sections
85, 86 and 87 of P.D. 1445 and Section 177(b) of B.P. 337?
2. Do subsequent acts of Q.C. petitioner constituted a ratification of the subject
negotiated contract notwithstanding the lack of appropriation?
RULING :
1. The very same P.D. 1445 which is the cornerstone of petitioners arguments
does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a
contract entered into by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of
the statute specifically provides: Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any
public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
other specific statutory authority. (underscoring ours)
Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an
appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other specific authority, i.e.,
section 84 of PD 1445. Thus, when a contract is entered into by a city mayor
pursuant to specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the
disbursement of funds from any public treasury or depository therefor. It can
thus be plainly seen that the law invoked by petitioner QUEZON City itself
provides that an appropriation law is not the only authority upon which public
funds shall be disbursed.
Furthermore, then Mayor Simon did not enter into the subject contract
without legal authority. He was so authorized under BP 337, the Local
Government Code of 1993. We note that while the subsequent Local
government Code of 1991, which took effect after the execution of the
subject contract, provides that the mayuaors representation must be upon
authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance,
there was no such qualification under the old code. `
Therefore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this regard. It is clear that the
second negotiated contract was entered in to Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.
pursuant to law or specific statutory authority as required by P.D. No. 1445.
There is also no merit in petitioners claim that there was no appropriation
therefor, for it is evident that even as early as April 4, 1991, funds which were
certified to as available had been allocated for use in the first few months
operation of the sanitary landfill. The problem arose only because the new
administration unjustifiably refused to abide by the stipulations in the second
negotiated contract. hence, petitioners arguments on this issue fail to
convince this Court that the second negotiated contract was null and void ab
initio for lack of prior appropriation or authority on the part of Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr.
2. When appellant City government after the construction by the appellee of
the dumpsite structure in accordance with the contract plans and
specifications started to dump garbage collected in the City and
consequently paid the appellee for the services rendered, such acts produce
and constitute a ratification and approval of the negotiated contract and
necessarily should imply its waiver of the right to assail the contracts
enforceability.
Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that there was constructive ratification
on the part of petitioner.
The records also reveal that petitioner issued Disbursement Vouchers of
various amounts covering the period between March 1, 1992 to April 30,
1992 for the services rendered by the Mud Regal Group Inc. to haul garbage
to the sanitary landfill. The said disbursement vouchers were passed in audit
and duly approved and paid by petitioner. These are facts and circumstances
on record which led the trial court, the appellate court and this Court to affirm
the conclusion that petitioner had actually ratified the subject contract.