Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lees
Review by: Walter L. Hixson
The Journal of American History, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Mar., 1998), pp. 1572-1573
Published by: Organization of American Historians
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1572
March1998
president
oftheFederalRepublicofGermany, Baden, and Bremenand in theAmericanmiliBros- tarycommandinBerlinbetween1945and 1949.
Dr.HansBooms,andthelateDr. Martin
oftheInstitute
forContemzat,thendirector
The value of this German edition of the
furZeitgeschichte)
in oMGus-Handbuch for scholarsand students
(Institut
porary
History
called"the alike is furtherenhancedbyan extensivebibMunich,all signedan agreement
Program
to Describeand liographyof monographicworks,articles,and
German-American
Since1945,OMGUS publisheddocumentsfromtheperiodand acReproduce
OMGUSRecords."
oracronym companyingextensivegeographicand persondesignation
hasbeentheuniversal
of the alityindexes.This is both an extremelythorGovernment
fortheOfficeof Military
and regionalmili- ough, highlyuseful referencehistoryof the
UnitedStates-the central
that period and its sourcesand an outstandingexoftheUnitedStatesArmy
taryauthorities
inpost- ample of solid achievementin cooperation
zonesofoccupation
ruledtheAmerican
from1945until1949.
warGermany
among German and Americanscholarsand
began archivists.
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agreement
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CharlesW. SydnorJr.
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cialfirst
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Park:Pennsylvania
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timea Communist
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arsinterested
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inthe Yugoslaviawouldprovidethe "wedge"that
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states
Hesse,Wiirttemberg-Washington
Book Reviews
1573
successes"
shejudges,wasoneofthe"greatest
ofthepostwar
containment
policy,
despitethe
thesituevidence
thatTitobenefited
mostfrom
ation even as he steadfastly
refusedto tilt
Washington's
way.
WalterL. Hixson
ofAkron
University
Akron,Ohio
ForEuropeorEmpire?FrenchColonialAmbitionsand theEuropeanArmyPlan. ByJasmine Aimaq. (Lund: Lund UniversityPress,
1996. 311 pp. ISBN 91-7966-371-0.)
In October1950,Franceproposedthecreation
of an integratedEuropean army,designedto
provide Europe with an adequate defense
against Sovietattackwhile blockingcreation
of a German national army.During the subsequent fouryears,however,the Frenchgovernment
neversoughttheparliamentary
ratificationoftheplan, despiteitshavingbeen hailed
inWashington,
Bonn,and otherEuropeancapitals as a cleversolution to Europe's defense
problem.Whydid theFrenchfailtopressahead
with theirown proposal?
Scholarshave speculatedthatFrancenever
supportedthe EuropeanDefenseCommunity
(EDC) but soughtto use it as a bargainingchip
to securemoreaid fromWashingtonforitswar
in Indochina.JasmineAimaq, going further
along thisline thananyprevioushistorian,arguesthatthisblackmaildiplomacywasexplicit
and intentional.The EDC, she argues, was
devised chieflyto increaseFrenchbargaining
power.During 1950-1954, Francedemanded
and receivedincreasedaid fromthe United
StatesbyusingthepromiseofEDC ratification
as an inducementto Washington.This effort
failedto produce a successfuloutcome to the
colonialwar,however,
and aftertheFrenchdefeatat Dien Bien Phu in 1954, theFrenchgovernmentquietlykilled offthe EDC in retaliAmericanmilitary
ationforinsufficient
support.
Thisargumentoversimplifies
a complicated
relationship.Certainly,the Frenchdiscovered
thattheAmericancommitment
to theEDC gave
them leveragewith Washington.But Aimaq
has givenverylittleattentionto thepolicydyon the
namicswithinthe Frenchgovernment
European rearmamentquestion. She assumes