Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contributors
1
I INFLUENCES
2 Toward a Systems View of Development: An Appraisal of Lehrman's
Critique of Lorenz
1
13
15
25
129
141
149
Patrick Bateson
41
Gilbert Gottlieb
5 Gene, Organism and Environment:
A New Introduction
127
Deborah M. Gordon
Daniel S. Lehrman
4 A Developmental Psychobiological
Systems View: Early Formulation and
Current Status
H. Frederik Nijhout
Timothy D. Johnston
3
117
55
167
Peter H. Klopfer
IV RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT
AND EVOLUTION
175
177
Richard C. Lewontin
6 Gene, Organism and Environment
59
Richard C. Lewontin
II RETHINKING HEREDITY
67
Susan Oyama
16 Darwinism and Developmental
Systems
Paul E. Griffiths and Russell D. Gray
69
Eva M. Neumann-Held
8 Deconstructing the Gene and Reconstructing Molecular Developmental
Systems
85
Lenny Moss
9 The Systems of Inheritance
Eva Jablonka
99
195
219
William C. Wimsatt
18 Developmental Systems, Darwinian
Evolution, and the Unity of Science
239
Tim Ingold
the entire
edifice
- -of-Western
- thought and science dame1y, that between the "two worlds" of
humanity and nature. For this is what has given
us the overriding academic division of labor between those disciplines that deal, on the one
hand, with the human mincl and its manifold linguistic, social, and cultural products, and on the
other, with-the structures and composition of the
material world. And it also cleaves anthropology
itscl inTO its sociocultural and biophysical divisions, whose respective practitioners have less to
say to one another than they do to colleagues in
other disciplines on the same side of the academic
fenCe._ Social or cultural apthr22212gists would
rather read the work of historians, linguists, phi- , r
losophers, and literary critics; biological or phys
prefer to talk to colleagues in
other fields of biology or biomedicine.
I am not content to live with this situation. It
was, in part, the challenge of closing the gap between the arts and humanities on the one hand,
and the natural sciences on the other, that drew
me to anthropology in the first place, and I still
believe that no other discipline is in a better position to accomplish it. In this article, I present
a program for how this might be done. My argument, in a nutshell, hinges on a distinction
between two approaches to thinking about the
relations between those aspects of human existente that have conventionally been parceled out
between different disciplines (or, in the case of
anthropology, subdisciplines) for separate study.
For conveniente, I call these the complementarity and obviation approaches, respectively. The
first regards every aspect as a distinct, substantive
component of being. It admits that the study of
each component is bound to yield only a partial
account, but promises that by putting these accounts together it should be possible to produce a
synthetic account of the whole. These syntheses
are characteristically denoted by such hybrid
terms as biosocial, psychocultural, or even biopsychocultural. The obviation approach, by contrast,
256
Tim Ingold
but also how such ways of behaving are channeled, evaluated and made meaningful, and the
persons to whom they are directed categorized,
in terms of culturally specific, representational
schemata. An obviation approach to the study
of kinship, on the other hand, would begin by
recognizing that behavioral dispositions are neither_preconstituted genetically nor simply downloaded onto the passively receptive individual
from a superior source in society, but are rather
formed in and through a process of ontogenetic
develo_pment within a specific environmental context. Kinshipds about the ways in which others in
the environment contribute through their presence, their activities and the nurturance they
provideto thisprocess.' Thus, insofar as it concerns the growth of the organism-person within a
field of ongoing relations, kinship is indissolubly_
bdologjcal and social. But the biology pertains to
~tent, not_genetics;, and the social to the_
domain of tliyesfe-x-perreiiW)rather
rather
its cate-_
goricatrepresentation,
The contrast between the two approaches may
be illustrated by way of one other example. Bipedal locomotion, the capacity to walk on two
feet, is generally assumed to be one
marks of our species, and as such to form part of
an evolved human nature. Yet as we all know,
and as Mauss famously observed in his essay of
1934 on body techniques (Mauss 1979: 97-123),
people in different cultures are brought up to
walk in very different ways. These ways are
acquired, or as Mauss put it (p. 102), "there is no
`natural way' [of walking] for the adult." How
would a complementarity approach deal with
this? It would argue very much, in fact, as
Mauss did that although the body is innately
predisposed to walk, it is also educated by a received social tradition, transmitted orally or by
other means, consisting of certain ideal rules and
conventions that lay down standards of propriety, perhaps specific to age, sex or gender, that
walkers are enjoined to follow, and in terms of
which their performance is evaluated and interpreted. Thus, while the capacity to walk is a bio
258
Tim Ingold
anesthetized, as it might appear before the surgeon in the operating theatre, whereas the organism is a living being, situated and functioning in
its proper environment. But neither MerleauPonty nor those who have followed his lead mean
the body in this sense. They are rather referring
to "tlr_113dngbody ... with feelings, sensations,
perceptions and emotions" (Ots 1994: 116), or
what is known in German as Leib (as opposed to
Krper). Yet in their determination to treat the
leibly body as the subject of culture, anthropologists such as Jackson (1989: 119) .and Csordas
re
(99-0: 5) cannot avoid the implication that iheexists some kind of biological residuum that is
9.12jestively givenjndependently and in advance
of the cultural process. 2 Culture and biology remain as far apart as C7e-i, only the body has been
repositioned: formerly placed with the organism
on the side of biology, it has now reappeared with
the person on the side of culture. Hence the body
as subject is split off from the organism as object,
leaving the latter bodiless, reduced to an inchoate
mass of biological potential. The embodiment of
culture leads to nothing less than the disembodi-111ent of the organism!
It seems to me that the theoretical gains
brought by the paradigm of embodiment will be
more apparent than real, so long as we fail to
take one final, and crucial step, which is to recognize that the body is the human organism and_
thaLthec process of embodiment is one and the
same as the developMent of that organism in its"
environment. Once this step is taken, then oneor
other of the two terms, body and organism, becomes effectively redundant. Given the choice of
which term to retain, I would opt for the latter,
since it better conveys the sense of organized
process, of movement, connectivity, and relationality, that I take to be fundamental to life. Substituting life for mind, and organism for body, the
notion of a mindful body mayle replaced by that
of living organism, a substitution that has the
effect both of restoring human beings to their
proper place within the continuum of organic
life, and of laying the Cartesian dualism finally to
rest. Most social anthropologists, however, even
259
260
In brief, what is supposed to evolve is not the organism itself or its manifest capabilities of action,
but rather a formal design specification for the
organism known as the genotype. The evolution
Tim Ingold
environment, to make the subsequent development of the characteristic or capability in question a realistic possibility (Ingold 1996a). One
would otherwise have to suppose that human beings were genotypically endowed, at the dawn of
history, with the capacity to do everything that
they ever have done in the past, and ever will do
in the futurenot only walk and squat but also
swim, ride bicycles, drive cars, fly airplanes, carry
out scientific research, and so on (the list would
be endless).
What this means, in Aeneral terms, is that the
forms and capacities of human-- a-n-d -offi-e-r---organisms are attributable in the final analysis, not to
genetic inheritance._ but to the generativa poten
als of the developmenta 1 system (Oyama 1985),
ti
that is, the entire system of relations constituted
by the presence of the organism in a particular
environment. This is not to deny that every organism starts life withamong other things its
complement of DNA in the genome. Orthodox
evolutionary theory has it that this DNA encodes
the formal design specification. Because, however, there is no reading of the genetic code that
is not itself part of the process of development, it
is only within the context of the developmental
system that we can say what any particular gene
is for. It follows that there can be no specification
of the characteristics of an organism, no design,
that is independent of.the context of development, The genoty~ coas not exist And so
-too, in the case of human beings, there is no such
thing as "bipedal loconotion" apart from
manifold ways in which people actually learn towalkindfertcomus(Ingld195a).
Now if, as I have argued, organic form is a
property not of genes but of developmental systems, then to account for its evolution we have to
understand how such systems are constituted and
reconstituted over time. This conclusion has
three major implications. First, far from being a
tangential offshoot of the evolutionary process,
ontogenesis is the very crucible from which it unfolds. Second, because organisms, through their
activity, can influence the environmental condi-
261
Tim Ingold
262
..
-----------------c
A
Figure 19.1
263
-
ously misguided. We look in vain for the evolu-__ should be foremost in combating the pretensions
tionary origins of human capacities for the simple
of the origin-hunters. And they
reason that these capacities continue to evolve in
recognize that our humanity, far from having
the very historical unfolding of our
been set for all time as an evolutionary legacy
Of course, even an orthodox evolutionary thefrom our hunter-gatherer past, is something that
orist would have to admit that the evolution of
we continually have to work at and for which we
humankind did not exactly stop once history and
ourselves must bear the responsibility. There is,
culture were nderway. However the convenin short, no way of saying what a human being is
tional view, exemplified in Kroeber's diagram
apart from the manifold ways in which human
(figure 19.1) and reiterated by countless authors
beings become. "Modern humans" have not origever since, is that by comparison with the rate of
inated yet, and they never will.
historical change, this evolution has continued at
snll'spce, so that to all intents and purposes,
Landscape and Environment
contemporary human beings may be regarded as
not significantly different from their predecessors
This recognition that the forms of human being,
of the quer PalaeolithiC. 5 They are equipped
and the capacities they entail, are continually
with the same basic morphology, capacities and
evolving as life goes on, helps to put paid to
dispositions that, packaged in the genotype, have
another dichotomy which has been particularly
been passed on down the generations for tens of
troublesome for archaeology. This is between the
thousands of years. To be sure, the amount of
natural and the- artificial, and it lies at the source
genetic change in human populations over this
jkat archaeologists stud_y artifacis.
period may have been relatively small. MyccmNow the very notion of artifactimplies the worktention, however, is that in their dispositions and
tfig up some raw material to a finished forma`'
capacities, and to a certain extent even in their
Z111711D-onciing-ito a ireconceivemorphology,the humans of today are not at all
mmd of the tisa.u. Only once it has first been
theiluedecessorS. This is because these charmade, in this sense, can it be brought into play in
acteristics are not fix- ed genetically but emerge
the ordinary business O1"-lif,-
'of
within processes of development, and because the
which it is used. This_distinction between,
circumstances of dveloPment today, cumulaind using is fundamental to what I have
tivelyslibd -through previous human activity,
elsewhere (Ingold 1995b) called the "building
-
are very different from those of the past.
perspective": the idea that life goes on within
It is, I believe, a great mistake to populate the
structures that 1ivle--en- cOnstituted in advance,
past with people like ourselves, equipped with the
Tlhert-Ea-n these structures arising within the life
underlying capacities or potentials to do everyprocess itself. Adopting such a perspective, it is
thing we do today, such that history itself appears
easy to imagine that the forms of objects recovas nothing more than the teleological process of
ered from archaeological sites correspond to detheir progressive realization. Indeed the very nosigns that were originally in the heads of their
tion of an origin, defined as the point at which
one-time makers.
these capacities _became estblishecl, awaiting
However as Davidson and Noble (1993: 365)
their historical fulfilment, is part of an elaborate
have pointed out, it is a fallacy and one that is
ideological justification for the present order of
found very frequently in archaeological writing
things and, as such, but one aspect of the intense
to suppose that are ever finished in this
presentism of modern thought. In so far as the
sense. For one thing, their forms are not imposed
task of archaeology illuminate the past
bthe mind, but arise within the movement of
rather than legitimate the present, archaeologists
the aTnisan's engagementwith the material; for
264
Tim Ingold
265
morada
,-enfold, into their very formation and constitution, the lives and works of their inhabifants
(Ingold 1993b: 156-157). To appreciate what is
going on here, we need to adopt a different perspective, one that recognizes that thro-r-m-s peoPle make whether in their imagination
or oa the ground, arise within the current of their':'
volved activity, in the specific relational conlextS of their pr ctical engagement with their surroundinp^s. Building, in short, is encompassed_by_
dwelling,,making by use. I call this the `:23_
perspective" (Ingold 1995b).encarnada personficada
Alongside the relatively recent anthropological
recognition, discussed earlier, that the human intentional presence in the world is an embodied
presence, there has been a remarkable upsurge
of interest in the landscape. This is already proving to be a particularly fruitful area of collaboration between anthropologists and archaeologists
(for example, Bender 1993; Tilley 1994). Though
the precise meaning of "landscape," as that of
"body," continues to bthesubject of intense
controversy, there is a clear connection between
intenthe two concerns. For if persons
tional worlds, and if bodies inhabit landscapes,
then to reunite persons with their bodies is also to
restore their intentional worlds to the landscape.
But this raises a parallel problem, too. J-lowif
at all, are we to distinguish landscape from environment? Just as the body has come to be identified with the cultural subject, and the organism
with the residual biological object, so there-is
a temptation to treat the landscape as an intei."7"
subjectively constituted, existential space, WhiFe"reducingthvomaersubto
of formless materiality. In
this
vein,
Weiner
otorgamiento
(1991: 32) speaks of how the bestowal of place
absoluto puro
names intentionally transforms "a sheer physical
terrain into a pattern of historically experienced
and constituted space and time," thereby creating
"existential space out of a blank environment"
(my emphases).
Once again, the division between the sociocultural and the biophysical is reproduced rather
than dissolved. This, in my view, is a retrograde
step. Theenvironment
reducible than is their organic existence to_pure
ecu ar_sub_stnce. It is not merely physical, and it
is certainly not blank. For example, the ground I
walniii-ssurelY a part of my environment, but
in a physicalist description the ground, as such,
does not exist; there are only packed molecules of
carbon, nitrogen, silicon, and so on. As Reed hasj
eloquently put it, "it is the earth on which we
walk, and the soil in which we plant, that is rele
vant for us as perceiving and acting creatures; no
the molecules discovered by scientists" (Ree
1988: 111). TheUerivronm ent;ialtortLis not the
same as the physical world; that is to say, it is not
describable in terms of substance. Rather, the environment is the world as it exists and takes on
-meaning relation to the beings that inhabit it
5r
DsjirT97978):-Assucir, its forfiltrn- fiaS to-b-understoihamwyteundrs
the growth of organisms and persons, in terms of
the properties of dynamic self-organization of relational fields. But precisely because environment
does not stand as material substance to the immaterial forms of landscapebecause it tinder7
goesacntiulprfomanwith,d
around, its inhabitants=i- see no basis on which
the two terms, environment and landscape, may
be distingsshed.
Earlier, I suggested that the concept of the
"mindful body" should be replaced by that of
"living organism." But the formulation remained
incomplete, since neither the body nor the organism, however conceived, can exist in isolation.
We can now complete it with the proposition that
the mindful body in a landscape be replaced by
the living organism in its environment. And this,
to conclude, offers the basis for a real synthesis of
~my and anthropology. Instead of being
separated by contrived divisions between past
and present, or between artifacts and bodies, we
might say that where anthropology studies the
conditions of human living in the environmentor of what phenomenological philosophers call
archaeology studies the
formation of the environMe-ii-t of our
266
om Complementarity to Obviation
Tim Ingold
Perception
Why do people perceive the world in the particular ways that the do? Mainstream psycliolOgY
has Tong. regarded perception as atwo-step operJOri: in the first, sensory data are picked up
from the environment by means of the receptor
organs of the 12.25.1yi in the second these data
are processed by a range of devices in the mind,
to generate imago rfreresentations, internal
models of an external reality. This processing is
por lo general
known as cognition. By and large, psychologists
have been concerned to discover universals of
cognition, which are attributed to structures established in the course of human evolution.
Anthropologists, by contrast, have wanted to explain why people from different cultural backgrounds perceive the world in different ways.
They have done so by suggesting that humaricognized mndels are constructed on the basis_of .
or schemata-diat are acquired as part zrgams
of a tradition, and vary from one culture to ancaer. What people see will therefore be relative
ttheir particular framework for viewing the
world. At first glance, the universalistic claims
of psychology seem incompatible with the relativistic stance adopted by social anthropology.
But as several authors have pointed out (e.g.,
D'Andrade 1981; Sperber 1985; Bloch 1991),
the two perspectives are, in fact, perfectly complementary. For unless innate processing mechanisms are already in place, it would not be
possible for human beings to acquire the programs for constructing their culturally specific
representations from the data of experience.
I will spell out the logic of this argument later
on, because it bears on the issue of learning. My
present concern is with the way in which the approaches outlined aboye, both in psychology and
anthropology, reproduce the Cartesian duality of
mind and body, removing the former from the
267
contexts of human engagement with the environment while treating the latter as no more than
a kind of recording instrument, converting the
stimuli that impinge upon it into data to be
processed. One of the most powerful critiques of
siew has come from advocates of_ so-called
colo ical psychology who have drawn inspiration aboye all from the pioneering work of
Gibson on visual perception (Gibson 1979).
Ecological psychologists reject the informationprocessing view, with its implied separation of
the activity of the mind in the body from the reactivity of the body in the world, arguing instead
that perception is an aspect of functionirig of the
total system of relations constituted by the presence_o_f_the_organism-person in its environment.
et t
_ e rceivers, they argue, g,.92T9w
the world di rectly,bmoving_auhermntad
discoveriswhat it Iffords, rather than by repreriti.
se Eig-it in the mind. Thus meaningis not the
form that the mind contributes, by way of its acquired schemata, to the flux of raw sensory data,
bu is continually being generated within
the relational contexts of people's practical engagement with the world around them.
1-i - follos from this approach that if people
raised in different environments perceive different
things, this
h w- not because they are processing the _
same sensory data in terms of alternative repreTEEtionalschemata, but because they hayebeenVrned, through previous experience of carrying
OUT various kinds of practical tasks, involving
particular bodily movements and sensibilities, to
orient themselves to the environment and to at:
features in different ways. M odes oftendois
perception, in short, are a function of specific
ways of moving around of walking, of sitting
or-s-quatting, of tilting the head, of using implern
-ents, and so on, all of which contribute to what,
Bourdieu (1977: 87) would call a certain "body
hexis." And as we have already seen, these forms
of motility are not added to, or inscribed in, a
preformed human body, but are rather intrinsic
properties of the human organism itself, developmentally incorporated into it modus operandi
268
Tim Ingold
aIiven environmental
ous experience,
through practice and training in a particular encontext. Let me clarify the contrast by means of
vironment. Hence capaQ.ifies_ot perce.pLion
a simple analogy. Suppose I play a record of one
action, are 1--i-gitMer:innate nor acquired but
of Bach's suites for unaccompanied cello._
dergo continuous formation within proceses of
excdinglyompaterisngvdo
ontogenetic development. This result is clearly in
blank surface of the disc, but thefine with the conclusions to be drawn from an ob- -) the
mechanieal processes of rotation and amplifiviation approach to the relation between social
cationinvolved in the operation of the record
and biological phenomena. In their rejection, on
player could hardly be more simple. Now supthe one hand, of the Cartesian view of action as
pose I pick up my cello to perform the suite mythe bodily execution of innate or acquired proself. In this case, the music issues directly from
grams, and on the other hand, of the cognitivist
my own movement, a movement that involves the
view of perception as the operation of the mind
whole of my being indissolubly coupled with the
upon the deliverance of the senses, the obviation
instrument. Jhe process of playing a musical inapproach in anthropology and the ecological
strument like a cello is enormouslycomplex, and
approach in psychology fina common cause.
calls for embodied skills that take years to acBoth take the living-organism-in-its-environment,
as their point of departure. This is why (contra ,....quire. But whether the music exists at all as a
structure in the head or mental score, indepenBloch 1991) I believe that an anthropology that
dently of the activities of practice and perforsets out from this point has more to gain from an
mance, is a moot point. punto discutible
alliance with ecological psychology than from an
Now in introducing his distinction between
alliance with cognitive science.
complex structure and complex process metaphors, Rubin was actually concerned with the
Memory
psychological study of memory. His point was
that in mainstream cognitive psychology, it is
Another way of expressing the difference between
usual to regard memory as a kind of mental store,
cognitivist and ecological approaches is in terms
in which past experiences and received informaof a contrast suggested by Rubin (1988). One
tion are engraved and filed, as on the grooves and
may understand what is going on, he writes, in
bands of a record (or, to adopt a more contemterms of one or other of two alternative metaporary analogy, a computer disc). Remembering
phors. The first is a complex structure metaphor,
is then a rather simple process of searching or
the second a complex process metaphor. The
scanning, across a complexly structured cognitive
former, which is dominant in cognitive psycholarray. It is, moreover, a purely mental, inside-theogy, works by converting what is observed in
head operation. Once a particular memory is rethe world into a formal account, whether envistrieved, it may or may not be expressed in overt,
aged as a script, schema, grammar, program, or
algorithm, and then has that account copied into L bodily behavior. But every behavioral expression,
like every playing of a record, is no more than a
the mind so that the observed behavior can be
replica run off from a preexisting template. With
simply explained as the expression of this mental
a complex process model, by contrast, reman
blueprint. The latter, the dominan_ t metaphor
beringisitselr a skillecl, environmentallysituated
in ecological psychology, imputes little or no
activity. It is in playing the Bach suite that I restructured conient to the mind. Instead, behav- member it; the processes of remembering_and
ior is explained as the outcome of a complex
playing are one and the same. It follows that
process set in train by virtue of the immersion
every performance, far from being a replica, is ito f the practitioner, whose powers of perception
self an original movement in which the music is
and action have been fine-tuned through previ-
269
preferred the approach of skill (one of his examples was of strokes in tennis or cricket). However
as Connerton has pointed out (1989: 28), the cognitivist emphasis on lookingforstructures in the
mind, and the concomitant reduction of action to
a simpleprocess of mechan cal executiOnIilTeff
no conceptual space for the investigation of
bodily enskilment, or what he calrs "habit memory. " It is true that Mostso -cTarantliro-P-olOgiCal
work on memory has actually been about commemorationthe present reenactment of past
events in ritual practice, storytelling, writing, and
the like. And commemoration needs to be distinguished from memorization: the developmental
incorporation of specific competencies (such as
playing a musical instrument) through repeated
trials. While the relAtic/whetween memorization
and commemoration has yet to be fully unraveled
Se- essential point to recoL.(Ingold196b:203)7
without the nizesthaoc ur
other. To commemorate the music of Bach, for
example, it must be possible to perform it, one
cannot perform it without skill, and theslevelop:
mentofskilp rzaton(Ce
1989: 5). 9
Learning
This is the point at which to return to the psychological version of the complementarity thesis,
namely that the acquisition of culture is possible
thanks to innate mental processing devices. It is
perfectly true that if culture consisted of a corpus
of transmissible knowledge, or in the words of
Quinn and Holland (1987: 4), of "what [people]
must know in order to act as they do, make the
things they make, and interpret their experience
in the distinctive way they do," then the mind
would have to be pre-equipped with cognitive devices of some kind that would allow this knowledge to be reassembled inside every individual
head through a processing of the raw input of
sensory data. In other words, the programs or
schemata that enable people to construct their
culturally specific representations of the world,
270
Tim Ingold
271
reducir en esencia
Human
genotype
Evolved
architecture
Culturally
specific
capabilities
Figure 19.2
The two stages of cognitive development according to the complementarity model. In the first stage the human genotype interacts with the constant component of the environment to produce the universal mechanisms of the mind's
evolved architecture. In the second, this architecture operates on variable environmental inputs to produce culturally specific capabilities.
speech.
sical instrument, or to practice a sport like cricket or tennis, is a matter not of acquiring from
an environment representations that satisfy the
input conditions of preconstituted cognitive devices, but of the formation, within an environ:
expresada
ment,ofhcsaryulgionects,
along with attendant features of musculature and
anatomy, that underwrite the various skills involved. This conclusion is once again concordant
'with the- obviation approach developed earlier,
and it undermines one of the key ideas of the
complementarity thesisthat cultural learning is
like filling- universal, genetically specified container with culturally specific content. The notion
that culture is transmissible from one generation
to the next as a corpus of knowledge, independently of its application in the world, is untenable
for the simple reason that it rests on the impossibI precondition of a ready-made cognitive architecture. In facto I maintain nothing, is really
transmitted at all. The growth of knowledge in
the life history of a person is a result not of information transmission but of guided rediscovery,
where what each generation contributes to the
next are not rules and representations for the production of appropriate behavior but the specific
conditions of development under which successors, growing up in a social world, can build up
their own aptitudes and dispositions.
The process of learning by guided rediscovery
is most aptly conveyed by the notion of showing.
To show something to someone is to cause it to
be made present for that person, so that he or she
can apprehend it directly, whether by looking, listening, or feeling. Here the role of tlietutris
set up situations in which the novice is afforded
the possibility of such unmediated experience.
Pra
cenn-a- sTinainn of th kmd the novice is instructed to attend to this or that aspect of what
can be seen, touched or heard, so as to get the feel
of it for him- or herself. Learning in this sense is
tantamount to what Gibson (1979: 254) called an
"education of attention." Gibson's point, in line
with the principies of his ecological psychology,
was that we learn to perceive by a fine-tuning or
Tim Ingold
272
273
Tim Ingold
274
275
Numen
being
Figure 19.3
A schematic comparison of the complementarity and obviation approaches (after Ingold 1996c: 127). In the complementarity approach (upper diagram), every human being is, in part, a person in society and, in another part, an
organism in nature. In the obviation approach (lower diagram), the human being is a person-organism situated in
an environment of human and nonhuman others.
276
Tim Ingold
dividual members for them to use in their everyday lives, but are rather generated and sustained
within the contexts of people's engagements with
one another and with nonhuman components of
the environment. If this applies to knowledge in
general, in must apply to anthropological knowledge in particular. In the field, anthropologists
learn; in the classroom theyieaclUtriiidoes not
mean, however, that they are receiving knowledge in the first case and transmitting it in the
second. For in both, whether with local people or
with studerits, they collaborate in the dialogic
processes of its creation. 'tris thiciugh bringing
the two dialogues, in the field and the classroom,
into a productive interplay that anthropological
knowledge is generated. It follows that the dialogue in the classroom is as important, and as
integral to the anthropological project, as the
dialogue in the field. Belatedly, we have begun
to recognize the contribution that local collaborators-erstwhile "informants"-have made to
the advance of our subject. It is high time we recognized the contribution of students as well.
Notes
inwhcealv(Igod192:63-4).Any
divisions within this field of inquiry must be relative rather than absolute, depending on what is
selected as one's focus rather than on the a priori
separation of substantive, externally bounded
domains. I hope, in this chapter, to have given
some idea of how we might proceed with reconstructing the discipline along these lines.
I would like to end, however, with a word
about the teaching of anthropology. I have
shown that the forms of human knowledge are
not made by society, and handed down to its in-
them. Thus the circumstances of ontogenetic development, insofar as they affect genetic replication, may
exert an influence on evolution; conversely the evolved
genetic specification is supposed to establish a schedule
for development (Hinde 1991: 585).
5. As Kroeber wrote, "All evidence directs us to the
conviction that in recent periods civilization has raced
at a speed so far outstripping the pace of hereditary
evolution, that the latter has, if not actually standing
still, afforded all the seeming, relatively, of making no
progress" (1952: 51).
6. The "finished artifact fallacy" has its precise counterpart in standard notions of socialization or enculturation as the working up of human raw material into
finished forms, ready for entry into social life.
7. I am compelled here to use the neuter pronoun "it,"
with regard to persons, rather than "he/she," in recognition of the fact that gendering is itself an aspect of the
way in which relations are enfolded in the consciousness and identity of the self.
8. "What is very essential to the whole notion,"
Bartlett writes, is "that the organised mass results of
past changes of position and posture are actively doing
something all the time; are, so to speak, carried along
with us, complete, though developing from moment to
moment" (Bartlett 1932: 201). There are, I think, striking similarities between Bartlett's notion of schema and
Bourdieu's (1977) of habitus. Both terms suggest an active, dynamic organization of past experience, rather
than a passive, static framework for accommodating it.
9. Connerton prefers the notion of habit to that of
skill, arguing that as a habit becomes established,
"awareness retreats," leading ultimately to bodily automatisms (1989: 93-94). I do not think rt is right to
scribe themoyements of
57bitual in this sense In such skilled activity, awareness
does not retreat but becomes one with the movement itself. This movement, far from being automatic, carnes
its own immanent intentioriality(Merleau-Ponty 1962:
1107111).
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