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FOREWORD
Foreword
This publication constitutes Volume 3 of Governance of Innovation Policy, a threevolume compilation of the proceedings of collaborative work in the MONIT project
(Monitoring and Implementing National Innovation Policies). This volume, Governance
of Innovation Systems: Case Studies in Cross-sectoral Policy, provides an overview of
analytical work on policy governance in OECD member countries participating in the
project. The policy areas under scrutiny are the information society, sustainable development and transport policy. The aim of these studies is to draw lessons for innovation
governance from policy areas with characteristics similar to those of the broader area of
emerging innovation policy. The chapters also serve as empirical support for Volume 1 in
the series: Governance of Innovation Systems: Synthesis Report.
The publication was prepared under the aegis of OECDs Committee for Science and
Technological Policy (CSTP) and its working party on Technology and Innovation Policy
(TIP). The report was edited by Svend Otto Reme who also co-ordinated the MONIT
project together with Mari Hjelt, Pim den Hertog, Patries Boekholt and Wolfgang Polt.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Executive Summary
Part 1.
11
Chapter 1.
13
Chapter 2.
35
Chapter 3.
65
Chapter 4.
93
Chapter 5.
115
Chapter 6.
145
Chapter 7.
169
Part 2.
171
Chapter 8.
Policy Integration:
The Case of Sustainable Development in Finland
191
Chapter 9.
221
Chapter 10.
245
Chapter 11.
271
Chapter 12.
297
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Mari Hjelt, Wolfgang Polt and Svend Otto Reme
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Learning from horizontal policy areas
Innovation policy has typically been seen as an extension of R&D policy involving a
number of instruments and policies that stimulate the innovation process, such as scienceindustry relationships, intellectual property rights, and industrial networks and clusters.
However, as economic development has become more dependent on innovation and as
growth patterns worldwide become more volatile and dynamic, innovation and growth
may need broader stimulus from governments than has generally been the case. Hence,
innovation policy may increasingly need to be redefined and expanded to encompass a
wider set of policy domains.
This raises at least two key issues. First, governments will need to develop capabilities for broader or more horizontal governance spanning ministerial and other
institutional boundaries. This requires learning from policy domains with such characteristics. The MONIT project therefore included the study of policies on the information
society and sustainable development as well as transport and regional policy.
Second, it raises the issue of the relationship between innovation policy and other
areas. These relationships may be supportive or unsupportive, creating challenges for
balancing the links between them. Governments will also need to learn more about
options and barriers to integrating diverse policy areas and thereby develop a policy
environment that is coherent and conducive to innovation in the economy.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In Chapter 3 Trond Einar Pedersen studies the Norwegian national plan for the
information society and argues that the current governance situation represents a delicate
policy dilemma. While overall economic policy takes a hands-off approach, with a lesser
role for state involvement, the current organisation of eNorway (the term for the national
policy) open possibilities for more hands-on implementation and co-ordination.
Chapter 4 contains an analysis by Paulina Ramirez, Murray Scott and Willie Golden
of Irelands information society policy and the missing linkages with innovation policy.
They argue that an important reason for the lack of coherence between the two policy
areas is the science-push character of Irelands present STI policy which makes coordination with other policy domains difficult.
In Chapter 5 Pim den Hertog and Hilde de Groot present the Dutch information
society, arguing that ICT has become an enabler of broad transformation processes in
both industry and the public domain. However, most actors see ICT simply as an enabler
in their primary processes and do not see a clear link to innovation. Thus, they do not
develop an information society/ICT policy with a view to increasing innovation or
developing a knowledge economy, and this impedes horizontal co-ordination.
In Chapter 6, Lena Tsipouri and Mona Papadakou study recent developments in
Greece against a backdrop of inflexible hierarchies, low competitiveness and incomplete
infrastructure. Innovation policy and information society policy had little in common, but
Greeces introduction of an information society initiative highlighted governance gaps,
and new governance structures were implemented to overcome the inherent weaknesses
in horizontal co-ordination. If successful, this initiative may help to modernise Greek
governance.
Chapter 7 by Kristina Larsen, Patrick Sandgren and Jennie Granat-Thorslund is an
analysis of the governance challenges in Sweden. It highlights the high degree of
decentralisation in the Swedish model which results in a high level of efficiency but also
illustrates a need to improve horizontal co-ordination in the context of handling more
substantial changes in policy agendas.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Chapter 10 is a study by Ilse Dries, Peter van Humbeek and Jan Larosse of the
linkages between policies for innovation and sustainable development. The focus is on
the policy response to the industrial lock-in of the Flemish innovation system in materialand energy-intensive production systems. The way out in system innovation demands a
long-term transition to a new, less resource-intensive and more knowledge-intensive
economy.
In Chapter 11, Brigitte mer-Rieder and Katy Whitelegg illustrate the barriers to
integration of innovation and sustainable development policies in Austria, and show that
this partly hinges on the fact that sustainability policy is not an established policy field
and that innovation policy is not recognised as an effective key driver for sustainable
development.
In Chapter 12 Katy Whitelegg shows that even in cases where two policy areas are
located in a single ministry, there are wide gaps between them. She highlights the
importance for policy integration of lack of understanding of neighbouring policies and
shows that perceived missions help to keep separate policies that might otherwise be
more integrated.
References
OECD (2002), Dynamising National Innovation Systems, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2005a), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 1: Synthesis Report, OECD,
Paris.
OECD (2005b), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation
Policy, OECD, Paris.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
11
Part 1
GOVERNANCE AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
Chapter 1
GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRIAN INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY:
PROGRESS WITHOUT STRATEGY?
Wolfgang Polt and Julia Schindler
Institute for Technology and Regional Policy, Joanneum Research Ltd., Austria
Against the background of developments of the past decade, this chapter takes a skeptical
view of the possibility of steering developments in sectors as divers as e-government, ebusiness, e-health, e-learning, etc., through a grand design and an overarching strategy.
It describes how Austria has twice failed to produce a general information society
strategy, but has nevertheless succeeded in promoting ICT diffusion and use in areas such
as e-government. Obstacles and failures in specific policy domains are discussed and
examples are provided for policy learning from both success and failures. Among various
ways of achieving policy coherence, some have also been quite successful. The study
suggests that with sufficiently strong communication channels, institutions and incentives
for self-organised co-operation and mutual policy learning, effective Austrian information
society policies can be achieved.
Introduction
Austrian information society policies in the past decade have been marked by a
discrepancy between the size and structure of the ICT-producing sector and the diffusion
and use of ICT in various sectors of economy and society (for an overview of recent
Austrian performance, see Schneider et al., 2004). The former has been according to
most indicators close to or even below the EU15 average. Investment in ICT is not very
high and the Austrian pattern of industrial specialisation is not very geared towards ICT,
although successful niche players in some fields have established themselves as highly
competitive in their respective markets. As a result, unlike other small open economies
such as Ireland or Finland, Austria did not profit from the new economy boom of the
1990s.
However, while Austria lagged in ICT diffusion in most fields in the 1980s, it later
caught up rapidly and even approached top rankings in some fields, e.g. early up-take and
high penetration rates of mobile telephony, broadband and wireless broadband access to
the Internet, and e-government. Even taking these positive developments into account,
however, the general perception is that there is still much room for better ICT use
throughout the economy and society.
In Austrian information society policy, there is at most a weak link between
horizontal science, technology and innovation (STI) policy and the relevant sectoral
policy (e.g. health, business, transport). Thus, the current policy challenge for information
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
13
in Austria. On this occasion, the Chancellor stated the need for political action and the
government declaration of November 1994 took up the topic of the information society.
Information society technologies and applications were just around the corner. Several
technologies were mature enough to enter the market. The government initiative was
declared to be of highest priority, and this created high expectations.
Subsequently, a first attempt was made to create a coherent strategic view on
information society policy. A number of working groups were created, involving a large
number of the most important stakeholders. These working groups produced recommendations for action and listed fields of potential policy challenges, which were made
public in a final report (Federal Chancellery, 1996). In March 1997 the report was
accepted. This was the first strategic document for information society policy in Austria,
but it never had the status of a White Paper as similar documents did in other countries.
No funding was specifically allocated for the strategy as a whole, and no central responsibility was defined to supervise and monitor the process. Mainly, it was left to the
respective actors in the various policy fields to use the document as a (non-binding)
guidepost. Ten years later, interviewees hardly remembered it as having led to increased
policy co-ordination or coherence. As a point of comparison, the Bavarian initiative
Bavaria Online, which was started at the same time, was allocated substantial financial
resources and was put into practice within a couple of months.
A main reason for the reluctance of government to actually use the document as a
means to formulate and implement an overarching strategy might have been that interests
of stakeholders were diverging: while some were asking for rapid liberalisation of the
telecommunications sector, powerful actors (public-sector trade unions) resisted change.
As a result, the telecommunications sector was liberalised at the last moment in Austria,
after all other EU countries. Moreover, the government did not pay enough attention at
the time to the challenges arising for governance when dealing with such cross-cutting
policy matters as the information society (whereas other countries had already established
special responsibilities and structures within government to deal with information society
matters in the form of information society envoys or secretaries).
On the other hand, while it failed to provide an umbrella for the coherent strategic
orientation of actors, the information society initiative mobilised the most important
players, some of which then started follow-up activities. A number of national and
regional Internet initiatives were started in 1994-95 (e.g. the Austrian Platform for Telematics Applications APTA), a specific programme, Technologies for the Information
Society, was started by the Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF), and e-government
initiatives were launched (e.g. the digitalisation of the public administration) or envisaged
(e.g. the creation of an electronic social security e-card).
It was only in 2000 that another initiative to formulate an overarching strategy for
information society matters emerged. The main impulse came from the EU in the form of
the European Commissions e-Europe initiative. The Austrian e-Austria in e-Europe
initiative was started as a large-scale effort to formulate an information society strategy.
Another important reason why the information society topic returned to the Austrian
policy agenda was the change of government in 2000. The Ministry for Public Services
and Sports established in 2000 led the e-Austria initiative and set up an information
society task force, Taskforce e-Austria. Its purpose was to propose aims and action lines
to strengthen Austrias position in the e-technology environment.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
15
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
E-government
Co-ordination bodies
Federal
Chancellery
Government
Ministry of
Transport,
Innovation and
Technology
WG
on
ICT
Ministry of
Education,
Science,
and the
Arts
E-government
E-government initiatives have been a significant driver of Austrian information
society policies, and, in the absence of a generally agreed overarching information society
strategy, act as a major driver for other policy fields. In this area, major institutional
changes have taken place in order to cope with information society matters.
The major institutional innovation in this realm was the creation, motivated by
government and the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, of the Chief Information
Office and chief information officer in August 2001. This was done partly to overcome
the shortcomings of the existing working groups for e-government issues, which worked
somewhat at cross-purposes, partly as a reaction to a controversial e-government benchmarking study.2 The expert group on benchmarking blamed the lack of an e-government
strategy for Austrias low ranking, and an e-Government Platform was created, along
with the chief information officer. Furthermore there has been institutionalised cooperation between the ministries, the federal government, the Lnder (federal states) and
the municipalities. Co-ordination between the federal government and the Lnder takes
place regularly through two working groups: one for technical and the other for legal
issues (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2 shows the dual structure of the technical and organisational strategic units,
which helps overcome the problems associated with allocation of e-government responsibility to IT representatives who emphasised the technical dimension and neglected the
organisational and political aspects.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
17
-E-Government Platform
Head: Federal Chancellor
Executive
Secretary
E-Cooperation Board
CIO
Political
level
ICT Board
Federal states
(Lnder)
Implementation
level
Federal
government
Cities
Technical
level
Municipalities
not know who was working on information society innovation issues in their ministry.
Clearly, there is a lack of transparency concerning responsibilities for information society
issues within ministries. The breadth and cross-sectoral properties of information society
matters make this difficult, but it is essential to improve transparency and awareness
within ministries.
19
Extensive research to define the target groups and the type of specific thematic
priorities.
Feasibility and support studies to analyse and better co-ordinate demand, target
groups and impact.
E-business
Explicit public measures to support ICT development and applications were taken as
early as the late 1970s.3 In the 1980s and early 1990s use of ICT for intra- and inter-firm
processes received little attention, except for electronic data exchange (EDI) between
organisations, which focused work on i) the development of standards, and ii) the spread
of underlying technologies, standards and applications. Data exchange, between firms
(the automobile industry was the pioneer user) and between banks and between firms and
public institutions, especially tax and customs authorities, constituted the dominant field
of application.
Until the mid-1990s the Ministry for Science and Research and the Ministry for
Public Economy and Transport had the main responsibilities for this area of information
society policy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour did not have an important
role. The only information society activity for which the Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Labour was exclusively responsible was representation of Austria in standardisation
institutes concerning EDI. It also had joint responsibility with the Ministry for Science
and Research for the IMPACT programme.
The beginning of information society discussions in 1994/95 and the establishment of
the information society working group led to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Labours greater involvement in information society policy. The Technologies for the
Information Society programme, carried out by the ITF, fell partly under the
responsibility of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, which initiated two focus areas for
the programme: EDI Business Austria and Multimedia Business Austria. The ministry
decided to focus on areas in which it already had some expertise. This also ensured that
the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour became a central player in information
society matters.
In 2000 the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour widened its coverage of
information society activities with the launching of the E-business in a New Economy
initiative, also in the context of the EUs e-Europe initiative. This was a full-fledged
strategy process involving a large number of stakeholders. A steering committee and
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development. Currently, there is only the FIT-IT programme, initiated by the Ministry for
Transport, Innovation and Technology, which aims at stimulating longer-term, more
advanced research in selected thematic areas (e.g. embedded systems).
Finally, ICT also figures prominently in other thematic technology programmes,
particularly in the transport sector, where a large programme on intelligent transport
systems and services comprises components on transport telematics, logistics, satellite
navigation, etc.
Especially for the thematically oriented R&D and diffusion-oriented programmes,
one could hope to find close co-ordination on the policy agenda of the information
society and innovation policy. However, there seems to be hardly any link: while this is
not surprising for the bottom-up projects, even dedicated programmes like the FIT-IT
programme has not so far incorporated information society topics into its portfolio. The
same is by and large true of the thematic programmes with other orientations, but with a
high ICT component, such as the transport-oriented research programmes. There is no coordination between departments of the same ministry to bring together transport policy,
information society policy and RTD policy. The main reason is that the transport policy
department and the innovation policy department see themselves as culturally very
different and with incompatible goals (e.g. securing/improving public transport vs.
fostering risky innovation projects).
Thus, the field in which information society policies and innovation policies might be
best linked is the one with the least developed institutional setting to do.
Agenda setting
This section focuses on agenda setting in information society innovation policy. How
do discussions, topics, measures, programmes and policy areas arise? Why are broad
strategic concepts developed from time to time? Are some methods less successful than
others? Does best practice exist? This studys findings on agenda setting processes in
Austrian information society innovation policy are presented below.
Issues arrive on the political agenda through a variety of channels. Many arise quite
spontaneously without going through a formal process. Therefore, the way in which a
topic appears is often not observed by the external observer.
Agenda setting is influenced by many factors: the distribution of formal responsibility, successful previous programmes, existing networks, dedicated persons, dominant
organisations, internal distribution of tasks and changes in the organisational structure,
general administrative reforms, (benchmarking) reports, presence in EU programmes and
policies.
In Austrian information society policy, the EU is an especially important factor in
strategic policy formulation. Both recent attempts to arrive at an overarching information
society strategy were based on EU initiatives. EU policies thus strongly affect Austrian
information society agendas. The EUs influence is not only due to political documents
(such as the Bangemann Report, the e-Europe Initiative), but also to thematic priorities in
the framework programmes, e.g. the e-Europe initiative and the IST programme. The EU
agenda is filtered through the local operational logic; for example, the IST is translated
into the Austrian FIT-IT programme. The importance of the EU in shaping national
politics is likely to increase further, especially with respect to infrastructure and
standards.
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The amount of co-ordination needed depends on the number and heterogeneity of the
players involved. Sometimes formal co-ordination is unnecessary and information
exchange is sufficient to avoid duplication and to create awareness. Co-ordination boards
can be decision-making bodies or can serve for information exchange purposes only.
Experience has shown that the establishment of a co-ordination board does not ensure
successful co-ordination. It is very important that co-ordination boards consist of
representatives with the knowledge and decision power to fulfil the aims of the board.
Co-ordination boards do not necessarily require high-ranking officials, but the members
need to be adequate for the purpose. Successful co-ordination requires adequate financial,
personal and managerial resources. Some co-ordination boards aim only to exchange
information; they are useful as long as the participants gain insight from attending the
meetings. This will be the case when the representatives are capable and willing to share
information that is relevant for the others. Co-ordination boards that do not fulfil their
purpose should be dissolved or their aims should be adapted to their capabilities. In order
to ensure the effectiveness of co-ordination boards, it is good to be open to changes in the
participants and to allow fresh insight to enter.
Stakeholders are often involved in co-ordination activities. Successful co-ordination
and co-operation require differentiating between stakeholders who are participants and
supporters of interests and those who are carriers of knowledge. This is more easily
achieved when the core competency has been described and there is a clear definition of
roles.
On the programme level, examples of successful co-operation and co-ordination were
found. This is facilitated when there is a clear definition of roles and the necessary
knowledge is available. The integration of different support channels under the e-Fit and
New Media for Teaching programmes are cases in which the combination of steering
committees, forums and external counsellors led to stability and good information
exchange.
Implementation
Much that has been said about co-ordination and coherence efforts is also true for the
implementation of measures, because coherence efforts are themselves part of implementation. A second observation is that the status of implementation has greatly changed
within the last ten years. Implementation has become a separate issue and numerous new
public management concepts have entered policy actions.
The strategy formulation exercises showed that concepts, lead documents and (global)
strategies that were not planned with a view to implementation risk ending with the
production of the final document, leaving open whether or not they will be implemented.
This is definitely not ideal, because good ideas may be wasted and because those who
took part do not see any returns to their efforts and lose interest or become frustrated.
Personnel and financial resources need to be allocated to implementation to achieve
good results. This is true for strategy concepts, and was also the case for the e-card. The
failure of the first attempt to introduce an e-card (for the health system) depended
significantly on the underestimation of the resources needed by the social security carrier
to carry out the desired plans.
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Policy learning
The analysis of learning processes and effects gives very ambiguous results, as in the
case of the two information society strategy formulation exercises. Although the first
exercise made clear that it is not sufficient to create a strategy document, but that efforts
must be made to implement the new ideas, the second information society strategy made
the same mistake. A final document was produced, but was not even circulated within the
department. Positive effects resulted from the exercise in that some of the brainstorming
activities led to new initiatives, but it is not possible to conclude that the second
information society strategy initiative had learned how to conduct a strategy exercise.
Examples of successful learning do however exist. Integrated learning processes were
used in a number of government support programmes, especially in IT research and
development support programmes. Explicit justification for measures, monitoring
throughout the duration of the measures and evaluation (which has nearly become a
standard measure) are clear evidence of this. This does not exclude the possibility that the
justification was carried out unsatisfactorily or that monitoring and evaluation results
were not utilised to create improvements. Learning processes, such as the evaluation of
particular measures and the establishment of information channels, still need to be
established or improved in all areas of information society policy. This is especially true
for the health sector.
Agenda setting
Agenda setting can take place as a formalised process or can be continuously adapted.
Agendas can be determined top down by high-ranking bodies or can arise through
suggestions and ideas, e.g. from interest groups. An important factor in shaping the
national agenda has been EU policies, which represent an orientation point for national
agendas and serve as a natural mechanism to align policies and provide ideas.
Localised information society policy strategies are useful for orientation and as
guidelines both for the organisation itself and for indicating how its activities differ from
those of other organisations. Global or overarching information society strategies are
theoretically useful for creating more coherence among policies, but face a much more
difficult task. Apart from the difficulty of devising and designing such a strategy, it faces
the risk of not being accepted by all stakeholders.
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Policy implementation
In order for concepts to become a reality, it is very important to carefully plan and
carry out the implementation. The quality and originality of concepts and programmes are
greatly affected not only by the content but also by the method of implementation. For the
implementation to be successful, adequate resources are necessary for:
Concepts, lead documents and (global) strategies that were not planned with respect
to their implementation have a great danger of remaining ineffective or having unplanned
(and undesired) effects. In the past, policy makers have tried to outsource the implementation of initiatives; however, public organisations need to retain some process
ownership. In order to formulate the outsourced duties, the contracting authority needs
some managerial and hierarchical competence. This is imperative for achieving the
intended results of an initiative.
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Policy learning
Integrated learning processes, such as policy evaluation and the establishment of
information and feedback channels, are necessary for successful policy learning. A
combination of local and higher-ranking policy learning must exist in a complex policy
area such as the information society. The establishment and provision of strategic intelligence, i.e. organised information provision, can be done through various instruments
(market studies, technology assessment, technology foresight, monitoring, evaluation).
To sum up, there is considerable room for increasing policy coherence in the field of
information society policy in Austria. At present, there appears to be at most a weak link
between information society policy and technology and innovation policy. On the other
hand, even in the absence of an overarching information society strategy, policy has
reacted to the challenges of the information society. This was often done in a localised
way, that is, with the borders of the respective administrative competences. In the various
sub-fields of information society policy, failures were found, but also different ways to
achieve policy coherence, some of which have succeeded quite well. It also emerged that
there might be limited need to co-ordinate everything and everybody in the form of a
grand strategy. The reasons why attempts have failed twice in the past are still in place.
If there were communication channels, institutions and incentives for co-operation that
are sufficiently strong to allow for self-organised co-operation and mutual policy
learning, Austrian information society policy would be successful.
Interview partners
Interviewees held responsibilities for information society matters in the following
institutions:
Federal Chancellery
E-Co-operation Board
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Telekom Austria AG
Siemens AG
Infineon Technologies AG
Education Highway Innovation Centre for Schools and New Technology GmbH
(Educational Server Upper Austria)
Notes
1.
For details of the approach, including the interview guidelines, see Ohler et al., 2004.
2.
Databank Consulting, eEurope 2005 Key Figures for Benchmarking EU 15, SIBIS, April 2003.
3.
ICT was already being funded earlier, but under different names.
4.
In some departments there have been reductions in personnel along with increased generosity regarding
resource transfers to third parties. Outsourcing of services requires search, communication, acceptance of
the service, appropriation on the part of the outsourcing side and specific resources. In an increasing
number of cases, not only the provision of a service is outsourced but also the tender, the choice of
outsourcing partners and the acceptance of the service.
5.
The Austrian case study forms part of a study by ESTO (2003) on Identifying factors of success and
failure in European IST-related national/regional developments.
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References
Austrian Council for Science and Technology Development (2002), Nationaler
Forschungs- und Innovationsplan, Vienna.
Austrian Federal Chancellory Bundeskanzleramt, Bundespressedienst (ed.) (1996),
Informationsgesellschaft. Endbericht der Arbeitsgruppe der sterreichischen
Bundesregierung, Vienna.
Austrian Federal Chancellery (1996), Informationsgesellschaft, Final Report of the
Working Group of the Austrian Federal Government, issued by Federal Chancellery,
Federal Press Service, Editor: E. Grossendorfer, Scientific Editor: N.G. Knoll, Vienna,
December.
BMWA (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour) (2001), Final Report of the
E-business in a New Economy Initiative, Vienna.
Boekholt, P. (2002), Towards Policy Integration in P. Boekholt (ed.), Innovation
Policy and Sustainable Development: Can Innovation Incentives Make a Difference?,
Contributions to a Six-Country Programme, Conference, Brussels, 28 February1 March 2002, pp. 141-146.
Boekholt, P. (ed.) (2002), Innovation Policy and Sustainable Development: Can
Innovation Incentives Make a Difference?, Contributions to a Six-Country
Programme, Conference, Brussels, 28 February-1 March.
Dachs B. et al. (2003), Identifying Factors of Success and Failure in European ISTrelated National/Regional Developments: Austrian Case Study, ESTO/arcs.
Databank Consulting (2003), eEurope 2005 Key Figures for Benchmarking, EU 15,
SIBIS.
e-Austria Taskforce (2001), e-Austria: Strategische Ziele und Aktionslinien fr die
sterreichische Bundesregierung, Empfehlungen an die Bundesregierung, Vienna.
European Commission (1994), Bangemann Report Europe and the Global Information
Society: Recommendations to the European Council, Brussels.
European Commission (2001), European Governance A White Paper, Brussels.
European Commission (2002), eEurope 2005: Eine Informationsgesellschaft fr alle,
Brussels.
European Commission (2004), Europa und die globale Informationsgesellschaft
Empfehlungen an den Europischen Rat, Brussels.
Ministry for Science and Transport Bundesministerium fr Wissenschaft und Verkehr
(1999), Grnbuch zur sterreichischen Forschungspolitik, Vienna,
http://www.bmbwk.gv.at/medienpool/3746/gruenbuch.pdf.
Ohler, F., W. Polt, A. Rammer, and J. Schindler (2003), Governance in der
sterreichischen Politik im Politikfeld Informationsgesellschaft Interviewleitfaden,
Vienna.
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Chapter 2
INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE AND
ITS LINKS TO INNOVATION POLICY IN FINLAND
Juha Oksanen
VTT Technology Studies
Development of the information society and science, technology and innovation (STI)
policy making are closely intertwined in Finland. Concerns about international
competitiveness and wealth creation in the global economy have been a driving force for
both. They also share decision-making and policy features and are based on a strong
commitment to and protection of consensus among major public and private stakeholders.
They sometimes differ in terms of the administrations and actors involved in policy
making.
The information society has been on the policy agenda since the mid-1990s and a number
of strategies and action plans have been drafted at the national, regional and local levels.
Their preparation has often involved actors from various administrative sectors as well as
stakeholders representing private companies and civic associations. However, leadership
and co-ordination in implementing information society activities have been lacking. In
particular, it has been argued that co-ordination of information society policies
horizontally across sectors and vertically between local, regional and state authorities is
insufficient. Improving co-ordination is one of the main goals of the new Information
Society Policy Programme and Information Society Council launched by the government
in autumn 2003.
Overall, Finlands STI policy making has been more concrete and more coherent than
policies promoting the development of the information society. Interestingly, the success
of STI policy making is partly based on a well-established division of labour in the
central government. In these areas, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Trade
and Industry, with agencies in their respective fields, have been the principal policymaking actors. Horizontal innovation policy, which crosses administrative boundaries,
poses new challenges to current STI policy making, which is still largely sectoral. The
question arises whether truly horizontal innovation policy can rely solely on values and
goals inherent in science and technology policy making or whether it must take into
account broader societal issues, goals and values.
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The nature of the issues on policy agenda is changing and there are an increasing
number of cross-cutting issues structured around client groups rather than
around functional policy areas (Peters, 1998).
In the face of such challenges, governments are looking for new, more collaborative
governance models that entail working through networks rather than hierarchies. This
requires a variety of co-operative arrangements involving actors from the public sector,
the private sector and civil society associations. Greater collaboration is needed not only
between government and its non-governmental partners, but also among ministries which
are managing policies in a more horizontal manner and are working with each other in
more co-ordinated ways.
This study has three major goals: i) to describe policies that support development of
the information society; ii) to map information society links with STI policies; and iii) to
analyse the opportunities and challenges of horizontal innovation policy from the viewpoint of the information society. To this end, the focus is on the paths followed in the
development of the information society, with special attention to (potential) links to STI
policies, on how the information society policy agenda is set in practice, on the degree to
which information society activities are co-ordinated horizontally across administrative
fields, and on the kinds of policy learning processes, if any, that can be identified in
Finnish information society policy.
The major focus is on policy making at the central government level. However,
reference is also made to policies and initiatives on regional and local levels, even though
they have not been reviewed as systematically as the central government. The case study
on the eTampere programme comes under the umbrella of the information society study,
but is reported separately. The decision to focus on the central government is due to the
number of information society projects and actions on local and regional levels: it is
estimated that in 2002 there were several hundred ongoing national projects on the
information society, but closer to 1 000 at the regional and local levels.1
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This chapter covers a wide range of empirical material and includes both primary and
secondary sources. The studies cover information society and STI policy issues. In order
to go beyond the surface of official descriptions of strategies provided in formal policy
documents and to get a better grasp of questions relevant to the MONIT project, three
case studies were selected for closer review, with the idea that they could illuminate
different aspects of potential connections between information society and innovation
policy. They are presented in Annex 2.A.
The next section discusses briefly the emergence of the notion of the information
society and outlines some major features. Attention then turns to the evolution of the
information society in Finland through a concise overview of its development since the
1970s. The following section presents the key actors, before describing, in the subsequent
section, the links between the development of the information society and STI policy. The
balance of the chapter gives a more detailed review of the different phases of the
information society policy-making cycle, from agenda setting to policy formulation and
co-ordination and then to evaluation.2 Within this heuristic framework, it is possible to
deal with specific aspects of policy making, such as policy coherence, vertical and
especially horizontal co-ordination across administrative sectors, and policy learning.
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e-democracy
Approach
Top-down
Bottom up
Actors
Nature of
communication
Vertical, one-directional
Horizontal, multi-directional
39
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In comparison, the other central actor in the STI policy arena, the Ministry of Trade
and Industry, has had a minor role in information society issues, especially if one looks
beyond innovation policy narrowly defined in terms of S&T policies alone. Within the
framework of the current governments Information Society Policy Programme, the
Ministry of Trade and Industry focuses its actions on developing electronic business and
electronic services for companies. In addition it seeks to promote content production and
strengthen resources for training, research and product development with these companies
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2003). In the field of technology policy, the Ministry of
Trade and Industry and particularly Tekes are the principal sources of public funding and
advice for technology development and innovation, including in the ICT field. Tekes has
actively participated in and promoted the development and application of ICT-based
solutions in different sectors of society. A notable example is its technology programmes
in the field of health care.6
In other state departments, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health have been responsible for prominent information society projects at
different stages. The Ministry of the Interior was already involved in early telecottage
pilot projects in the 1980s and early 1990s which aimed to lower the threshold for the use
of new information technologies (computers, etc.) in geographically peripheral locations
but later also in less favoured urban areas. More recently, it has been in charge of
promoting e-government at regional and municipal levels. The Ministry of the Interior
has responsibility for developing electronic services, network services and citizen
services to ensure their availability. In addition it promotes co-operation between the state
and municipalities for information management and helps to build up co-operation in
information management in regional administration.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the agencies within its administration
have centred their activities on the Finnish welfare cluster and the application of ICT in
social and welfare services and their provision, e.g. e-health solutions. In 1995, after the
publication of the first national information society strategy, the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health assigned a broad-based working group to draft a national strategy
regarding the application of information technology in health care and welfare. The
original strategy was reviewed and updated over 2000-02.
The Regional Satakunta Macropilot Project (1999-2001) is one of the largest and
best-known attempts to apply information technology to develop social welfare and
health-care services. Its aim was to support seamless linking of social and health-care
services provided by various organisations, with implementation based on a new type of
co-operation model which included both the municipalities responsible for the services
but also state administration and the private sector actors. The broader framework was
provided by the IT strategy of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health as well as the
national welfare cluster programme (see for example, Hnninen et al., 2001).
Figure 2.1 presents the ministries that have been most directly involved with
information society development in Finland over the time.
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Ministry of
KTM
Trade and
Industry
(KTM)
Ministry of
Transport
and
Communications
(LVM)
Ministry of
OM
Justice
(OM)
Ministry of
Education
(OPM)
Ministry of
SM
the Interior
(SM)
Ministry of Ministry of
VM
Social Affairs Finance
and Health
(VM)
(STM)
e-Government at
regional and local level
e-Government,
ICT in public sector
Legislation
ICT R&D
e-Business
e-Learning,
ICT skills for
citizens
e-Health
Telecom and
infrastructure
45
Innovation policy
Information society
e-democracy
Efficiency
Values
Style of decision making (policy)
Consensus-based
Consensus-based
Policy-makers
Researchers
Private firms if they see some
profit-making opportunities
Ordinary citizens
Policy makers, especially local
authorities
Researchers
Target group(s)
Firms/economic life
Firms/economic life
Civil society
Ordinary citizens
Governance
Marginal
Taking into account that there are significant differences in the composition of
players and different and even contradictory targets and values, it is not surprising that the
dialogue between innovation policy and e-democracy is less well established and
organised and one may even ask if it should be.
It can be maintained that in Finland STI policy making have been more concrete and
more coherent than policies promoting the development of the information society. The
cluster approach was mentioned in interviews as a good example of an innovation policy
initiative with strong links to horizontal thinking: there are distinct advantages to linking
and matching resources and know-how from different parts of society. In the S&T policy
arena, there has been systematic dialogue between private- and public-sector actors for a
long time. The division of labour within the central government closely follows sector
boundaries and the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, with
agencies in their respective fields, have been the principal actors in S&T policy making.
The S&T Policy Council, chaired by the prime minister, has had an important role in
bringing together major stakeholders, even if it is a limited and conventional group, from
the domain of STI policies.
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Agenda setting
Aspects of Finnish information society agenda setting process
From the policy cycle perspective the agenda-setting stage is one of the most
important aspects of the policy-making process. During this stage, issues, questions or
problems succeed or fail to reach the policy agenda. Those that reach policy agenda are
socially and politically constructed in interaction between people representing interested
parties and stakeholders from society as whole. Interaction in the agenda-setting phase
has a significant effect on how problems and opportunities requiring common action are
defined and what kind of meanings and values are attached to the issues.
According to Kingdon (1984), political streams have the main influence in the
agenda-setting process. The concept refers to the wider political environment, including
issues of changes of government and public opinion. Characteristic features of the
agenda-setting process are the coupling of problems and definitions, policies defined as
solutions to problems, and politics which refer to the political receptivity and acceptability of issues among interested parties and citizens at large. At the highest political
level, general elections and changes in the cabinet have a definite impact on the agendasetting process. In Finland, the political priorities for the coming cabinet period are set in
the government programme document between the parties of the coalition government.
Tiili (2004) notes that the government programme is based on many conflicting goals and
expectations, and this in practice tends to lead to a mix of strategic goals and operational
details.
Information society issues have explicitly been on the Finnish political and policy
agenda since the mid-1990s when the first national information society strategy was
outlined and published. The appearance of the information society on the political agenda
coincided with a number of substantial occurrences and transformations in Finnish
society as well as in the international political, economic and technological environment.
These events included, among others, the end of the cold-war period in the aftermath of
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakthrough of new communication technologies and the Internet. The latter, with their global repercussions, combined with a
severe recession in the Finnish economy and Finlands accession to European Union in
1995, can with hindsight be understood as a focusing event which opened a momentary
policy window for a major rethinking of national priorities and policies. This kind of
major agenda change may occur when policy streams converge simultaneously with the
opening of a policy window (Figure 2.2). Finlands experience demonstrates that in
agenda setting, timing and sheer chance are critical factors. As Lindquist (2001, p. 18)
notes: problems may worsen objectively, but without saleable solutions or leaders and a
public willing to embrace the cause, the problems are unlikely to receive more than
passing attention.
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A window of opportunity
Problem
Problemdefinitions
definitions
Alternative
solutions
Alternative
solutions
Political climate
Connections across streams
Converging
Diverging
Over the years many actors and organisations have taken part in the formulation of
the information society agenda. However, no principal, leading body to carry the process
and to take main responsibility for this policy domain has emerged. Also, the policymaking structures have stayed more or less constant over the last couple of decades. The
development of an information society policy space and of institutional arrangements has
taken place incrementally.
International trends and examples of information society activities have had an impact
on the agenda-setting process at national, regional and local levels. However, there is no
unanimous view about the significance of EU decisions and guidelines in this respect. In
critical comments EU directives and guidelines are seen as a hindrance that delays the
development of the information society, because they lag behind what has been already
done at the national level. On the other hand, common practices are seen as an advantage
for the member states, and the EU is a pivotal player which cannot be neglected in
national policy making in any policy domain. EU directives and legislation bind the
member states and it is not easy to tell where EU policies end and national policies start.
So far, Finlands position as a forerunner in ICT has made it more influential in
international ICT/information society agenda setting than what might be expected given
the countrys size.
The current Information Society Programme provides an interesting case from the
agenda-setting perspective. The ongoing public management reform which started in the
early 1990s was the main catalyst for the launch of four new policy programmes
(including the Information Society Policy Programme) following the general election in
2003. The new policy programme approach is part of the Programme Management
Reform which was the outcome of extensive analysis and reform work undertaken during
Prime Minister Lipponens second government (1999-2003).10 The government decided
to focus the main efforts of central government reform on the identified lack of
horizontality. According to a background review, a sector-driven administration tends to
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define problems and related cures and policy measures from the single-sector perspective
rather than to meet the actual needs of the citizens. The problem is less overlaps or turf
wars between ministries but an inherent feature of administration: many relevant issues
do not fit in a single sectors territory but instead fall in a sort of no-mans land. The
reform has had clear political backing from the beginning which has made it possible to
implement reforms largely as intended (Harrinvirta and Kekkonen, 2004).
The agenda-setting and preparation phase for the Information Society Policy
Programme was not, however, a purely consensual or conflict-free process. Internal
competition in the public administration materialised during the programme preparation
process. Ministries could not agree on where the main responsibility should lie for the
implementation of the new programme. In the end the Prime Ministers Office became
the base. It is also important to note that the programme did not come into existence only
because of the governments will. Interviewees pointed out that the need for a new
arrangement was also raised by stakeholders outside the public administration. The
Ministerial Group is considered to have a good chance to co-ordinate the activities of the
public administration in terms of information society issues.
Reflections
It is not clear whether a separate, well-structured information society policy exists in
Finland. Nevertheless, the information society has without a doubt appeared as an issue
on the political agenda. Overall, on the basis of policy documents and interviews it is
reasonable to argue that policies promoting the development of a Finnish information
society have been incremental, which is well in line with the findings of policy analysis
literature. For instance, Howlett (2002, p. 7) concludes, based on a study of four federal
policy sectors in Canada, that most policies made by governments are, for the most part
and most of the time, in some way a continuation of past policies and practices. In
Finnish information society strategies, continuity and temporal coherence are evident in
the focus of attention and even the identification of drivers for the development of the
information society over the last ten years.
In spite of the fact that information society issues have greater visibility on the
political agenda, it would be misleading to maintain that the information society evokes
or has evoked strong convictions among Finnish politicians. Indeed, the issue seems to be
peculiarly apolitical in the sense that no strong political controversies have emerged in
public debate about such issues as the goals, content or means of developing the
information society. In this sense, information society policy like innovation policy
apparently enjoys a broad consensus in Finlands major political parties.
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It has been maintained that the position of ministry staff has strengthened over time in
comparison to the status of the sectors minister. In particular, the highest ranking
officials in the departmental hierarchy have a significant role alongside the minister in
steering and monitoring activities within the administration. This trickle of power to
civil servants is sometimes seen as arising from the constantly increasing workload of
ministries and concomitant increase in staff. The cabinet period and the fortunes of the
government, of course, set limits on an individual ministers ability to exercise power. As
in every profession there is always a certain learning time before one masters the means
available. In this situation, the highest civil servants and ministry staff represent
continuity. In the context of the recent central administration reforms there have been
efforts to strengthen the role of individual ministers as strategists and opinion leaders in
their administrative sector. Critics of the reform have worried that strengthening the
strategic political leadership of ministries leads to short-termism and politicisation of
administration.
The recent adoption of a strategic management approach to government work has, in
Tiilis words (2004, p. 5), aimed to strengthen political leadership by focusing the goals
of government, and making sure that those are pursued consistently throughout the
administration. So-called frame budgeting has been one of the main tools for the
government to achieve the goals it sets in the government programme. There are however
concerns that the way that frame budgeting is implemented, at least so far, does not
support strategic management and cross-sector horizontal policy making. Budget frames
were originally intended to address socio-politically and economically important policy
fields but soon frames became a means to cut expenses and in practice this has led to a
situation in which frames are given to sectors, that is ministries, instead of policy fields
(Tiili, 2004, p. 8).
Another characteristic feature of Finlands institutional set-up that affects policy
formulation and co-ordination is the degree of autonomy of municipalities. At the subregional level, Finnish municipalities have substantial independence with regard to the
central government. The municipalities with extensive autonomy and the right to levy
taxes are in a position to decide on many issues. In contrast to many European countries,
Finlands regions have played a minor role politically, administratively and legally. There
has not been much opportunity for the regions to develop an autonomous political role,
because of the power of national and local bodies (Mennola, 1999). However, several
important changes affecting regional development and governance have taken place
during the past decade. Legislative changes have increased the importance of local
government in regional policy by delegating power from the central government to the
regions. Another key effect was the establishment of new regional governance structures.
Moreover, a programme-based regional policy has been introduced to co-ordinate the
actions of diverse regional organisations and players.
In some interviews the extent of self-government combined with the large number of
municipalities was cautiously criticised as hampering the development of the information
society. Also the current fragmentation of regional administration was thought to have a
negative effect on the governments Information Society Policy Programme: the coordination of information society initiatives requires identification and networking of
local and regional information society projects.
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development of the information society and related impacts, possibilities and threats;
following international information society developments and putting forward proposals
on Finlands policies; and assessing the Information Society Policy Programme and its
progress and reporting to the government on the state of the development of Finlands
information society.
At the time of its appointment in autumn 2003 there were strong expectations among
interested parties concerning the new Information Society Council. It was supposed to
provide guidelines for developing the information society, improve co-ordination of
information society activities, and help administrative sectors to take information society
issues into consideration in their policies. The Council is seen as a forum where different
sectors of the administration as well as Finnish businesses and other stakeholders meet.
On the other hand, its broad membership base means that it cannot be an operative body.
There seems to be some uncertainty about the prospects of success of the Information
Society Policy Programme. Some interviewees expressed concern that the programme is
under-resourced, which adversely affects its ability to support horizontal activities. It is
also asked whether the new programme is more than a repackaging exercise drawing
together, and in some cases renaming, existing information society projects of different
administrative sectors. The latter criticism may, of course, be levelled against most of the
so-called umbrella programmes that encompass a large number of (often ongoing)
projects.
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Annex 2.A
THE THREE CASE STUDIES OF THE FINNISH MONIT
INFORMATION SOCIETY STUDY
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Notes
1.
The Report of the Information Society Advisory Board to the Finnish Government, 11 December 2002
(only in Finnish).
2.
Arguably, describing the policy cycle by dividing it into four neat phases provides an excessively linear
view of policy making. In the policy cycle framework, policy-making problems are defined as
essentially problems of co-ordination, or, in other terms, of collective action. In line with the rational
choice institutionalism, politics is conceived as the process of selecting optimal solutions to collective
problems (Frankel and Hjbjerg, 2004). In the real world, policy making tends to be a much messier
process. Nonetheless, the model provides a useful outline for analysis, so long as its restrictions are kept
in mind.
3.
In a recent column a civil servant of the Ministry of Communication and Transportation argued that
information society policy does not really exist. As he put it there are only good and bad societal
policies: good policy takes into account the opportunities and threats of information technology, a bad
one overlooks them (Harri Pursiainen: Tietoyhteiskuntapolitiikkaa lukutaidottomille, published in
Tietoviikko, 22 April 2004). Another interesting notion was advanced by the Director of the Information
Society Policy Programme in her column, The Year of Attitude Changes, in which she comments on
the public debate about the information society. She suggests that the debate has recently taken a new
form and information society terminology is being called into question. She welcomes this development
and notes that when the programme was launched, the staff of the Office of the Information Society
Policy Programme set as a goal that at the end of programme there would no longer be any need to speak
about the information society as a separate (policy) concept (Katrina Harjuhahto-Madetoja: Asennemuutosten vuosi).
4.
5.
The governments programme is a strategy document in which the new government defines the focus
areas for the coming mandate period. The official definition to be found at the Finnish governments
Web site states that the Government Programme is an Action Plan agreed by the parties represented in
the government. The government must without delay submit its programme to Parliament in the form of
a statement. The Prime Minister co-ordinates the implementation of the Government Programme.
6.
Tekes has been involved in development of health-care technologies since the 1990s. It currently runs a
FinnWell technology programme (2004-09) the objective of which is to improve the quality and
profitability of health care, and to promote business activities and export in the field. FinnWell was
preceded by the iWell technology programme (2000-03).
7.
Titles of the latest tri-annual reviews of the Science and Technology Policy Council are revealing in this
respect: Finland: A Knowledge-based Society (1996); The Challenge of Knowledge and Know-how
(2000); and Knowledge, Innovation and Internationalisation (2003).
8.
According to the document in many respects, the construction of the information society relates to the
development of the national innovation system and thereby also to the terms of reference of the Science
and Technology Policy Council. The Councils subcommittees have dealt with relevant issues. In
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publishing this opinion, the Council wishes to support the development of the information society and to
draw attention to questions which it thinks essential in this development work.
9.
See for example Report of the Information Society Advisory Board to the Finnish Government on
20 June 2001.
10.
The Finnish government commissioned three international experts to assess which areas most urgently
required reforms. The report submitted by Geert Bouckaert, Derry Ormond and Guy Peters (A Potential
Governance Agenda for Finland, 2000) formed the basis for the subsequent programmes.
11.
However, the validity of this Finnish model as a basis for co-operation has recently been questioned. In
the Information Society Councils first report, published in February 2005, the sub-section on working
life notes that, contrary to popular belief, Finnish actors in business, research, development and education tend to work independently and genuine cross-boundary collaborative working habits are rare. The
sub-section recommends the establishment of cross-sector forums that would draw together people from
different backgrounds and branches in order to facilitate creation of new knowledge and know-how.
12.
In publications in English the term FINEID rather than HST is used to refer to a project on electronic
identification of a person. Here, the Finnish acronym is used for the project and the term FINEID is
reserved for the certificate issued by the Population Register Centre.
13.
For instance, the Finnish Bank Associations identification service for authentication of online
transactions which is based on user code and password lists. In 2003 Kela (the National Social Security
Institution) together with the Finnish Tax Administration and the Labour Administration signed a mutual
agreement on co-operation on electronic services and on a common approach for identification when
using these services. In practice, the consortium relies on two methods through which the customer can
identify him/herself in a service transaction either by using the Population Register Centres
identification service developed in the context of the HST project or the Finnish banks Tupas service.
14.
A number of key documents were commissioned by the Ministry of Finance within which the Public
Management Department has responsibility for public management reforms in central government. New
models for the reforming central government was outlined in a report published 2001 (Sirpa Kekkonen:
Hallituksen yhteisen poliittisen johtamisen vahvistaminen - keinona ohjelmajohtaminen. Valtiovarainministerin selvityksi 2001). Later in the same year the Ministry of Finance launched a Council of
States simulation project for programme management. The results of the simulation project were published in autumn 2002 (Ohjelmajohtaminen valtioneuvostossa. Uusi menettely ja uudet asiakirjat.
Valtiovarainministeri, tyryhmn muistio 2002).
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References
Bouckaert, G., D. Ormond and G. Peters (2000), A Potential Governance Agenda for
Finland, Research Reports 8, Ministry of Finance, Helsinki.
Burstein, P. (1991), Policy Domains: Organization, Culture, and Policy Outcomes, in
W.R. Scott and J. Blake (eds.), Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 17, Annual Reviews,
Inc., Palo Alto, California.
Edler, J., S. Kuhlmann and R. Smits (eds.) (2003), New Governance for Innovation: The
Need for Horizontal and Systemic Policy Coordination -- Report on a Workshop,
Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Papers, Innovation System and Policy Analysis, No.
2/2003, Karlsruhe, June.
OECD (2004), OECD E-Government Studies: Finland, OECD, Paris.
Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (Sitra) (1998), Quality of Life,
Knowledge and Competitiveness: Premises and Objectives for Strategic Development
of the Finnish Information Society, Sitra, Helsinki.
Frankel, C. and E. Hjbjerg (2004), The Transnational Governance of the Internal
Market: The Case of a Private Product Policy, paper prepared for the Pan-European
Conference on EU Politics, Bologna, Italy, 24-26 June.
Government Programme (2003), Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanens
Government, 24 June. http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/pdf/en/39357.pdf
Hnninen, E., M. Koivunen and P. Paaso (2001), Well-being through Information
Technology: Adoption and Embedding of Good Practices and Technological
Solutions, Publications of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Helsinki.
Harjuhahto-Madetoja, K. (2004), Asennemuutosten vuosi, Web column, Information
Society Programme, December, www.tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma.fi
Harrinvirta, M. and S. Kekkonen (2004), Evaluating Effectiveness of the Horizontal
Policy Programmes of the Finnish Government A Novelty or an Attempt Once
Again, EGPA 2004 annual conference Four Months After: Administering the New
Europe, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 1-4 September.
Howlett, M. (2002), Do Networks Matter? Linking Policy Network Structure to Policy
Outcomes: Evidence from Four Canadian Policy Sectors, 1990-2000, Canadian
Journal of Political Science 35:2, June, 235-267.
Huuhtanen, H. (2001), Tietoyhteiskuntaa rakentamassa, TIEKE, Tietoyhteiskunnan
kehittmiskeskus, Helsinki.
Information Society Advisory Board (2002), Report to the Finnish Government,
11 December.
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Chapter 3
INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY CO-ORDINATION:
A MOULD FOR INNOVATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN NORWAY?
Trond Einar Pedersen
NIFU STEP, Oslo, Norway
Introduction
The interrelation between information society policy, innovation policy and economic
policy receives attention in horizontal policy-making initiatives, at the European as well
as the national level. The aim of this study of Norwegian information society policy is to
contribute to the policy learning process between policy domains by exploring some of
the central conditions under which information society policy evolves. The main lesson
from this study is that Norwegian information society policy making may prove to be a
relevant example of good practice for the development of a comprehensive Norwegian
innovation policy. Norwegian information society policy documents are up to date in
terms of vision, strategy and targets. The policy mix and policy co-ordination, operated
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by the centrally located co-ordinating body, is a good example of how to organise policy
making, implementation and co-ordination for an extremely wide-ranging policy domain.
Information society policy often faces a dilemma. The bureaucratic capability to coordinate information society policy may be present, and the ministries in charge of sectororiented policy measures are often willing to make consensus-based, co-ordinated, crossministerial policy, but the overall political signals prescribe a hands-off approach. In
other words, high quality policy implementation and co-ordination require hands-on
policy processes. Such policy implementation calls for an overview and requires general
and specialised competence in the staff of the co-ordinating body.
This chapter builds on a study of Norwegian information society policy and aims at
addressing the issues introduced above. It studies the dilemmas arising out of the
interface between horizontal policy, co-ordination and institutional factors, on the one
hand, and a macroeconomic context and market-orientated policy stance, on the other.
The study combines information about the co-ordination of the implementation of a
specific policy area with general information about how the co-ordinating body operates.
Both parts are based on information from interviews with policy actors and from studies
of policy documents. Particular use is made of an evaluation of the Norwegian broadband
roll-out scheme, HYKOM, in 1999-2003.1 HYKOM is one of the main instruments
for ensuring that widespread broadband roll-out meets national targets concerning
infrastructure and Internet access.
The following section describes Norwegian information society policy today and its
historical development. Next, the policy reference points and links between other policy
domains and information technology (IT) policy are presented. The final two sections
address co-ordination and present conclusions and implications for innovation policy
development.
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policy area and there are dedicated co-ordinators responsible for each area, in addition to
the top co-ordinating body. Each policy area is operated by means of overall targets.
Concrete policy making for each area involves a package of measures, in which flagship
(prioritised) projects are defined. Below the nicely designed surface and fluency of
eNorways visions, strategies and targets, there exists a multitude (more than 100) of
policy initiatives, programmes and schemes. The portfolio of policy tools is a heterogeneous mix of large, comprehensive and financially independent policy programmes and
smaller, more specific policy initiatives, processes and schemes. The large programmes
have often subcontracted operative and co-ordinating organisations, with the relevant
sectoral ministry as co-ordinating actor. The co-ordinating body of eNorway does not
have hands-on managerial or governing functions, but represents an additional coordinating level that currently seems to fulfil objectives relating to strategic coherence.
The co-ordinating body has relatively little influence on agenda setting, prioritisation,
implementation and policy learning in the large policy schemes. The smaller policy
initiatives, processes and schemes are typically operated and co-ordinated hands-on by
the co-ordinating body. Co-ordination implies a multitude of types of interaction and a
multitude of forms of communication (for example, interdepartmental processes,
processes of legal change and standardisation, forums and arenas for dialogue and
collaboration between industry and stakeholders, etc.). The paper-based co-ordination and
marketing activities of eNorway represent a relatively large part of the work of the coordinating body. Box 3.1 presents the action plan in more detail.
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Attractive contents.
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independent initiatives emerged at the ministerial level, pointing in the direction of an IT
plan. The initiatives were quite different, but may be seen as an emerging network of
ministerial interests in IT. The network was dominated by the professional experts and
individuals with specific interests in technology, often at a peripheral location. It was
above all the view that information technology was a key technology that was similar
across ministries. Initiatives and contributions from each ministry were naturally
specified as themes corresponding to their area of responsibility, but a 1983 green paper
about telematics reflects the tendency towards horizontal policy thinking by suggesting
concrete policy initiatives across several ministries.
The committee behind the green paper put strong emphasis on the role of the
Norwegian telecommunication monopolist Televerket. It suggested strengthening its
internal research activity and boosting collaboration between Televerket, industrial actors
and other research institutes. Moreover, it emphasised rapid expansion of infrastructure
and investment in services that could improve the competitiveness of Norwegian industry. Televerket was to play the role of driver. Worth mentioning is the committees
recommendation that investment in and acquisition of technological solutions should not
necessarily take a cost-based view. The committee suggested that (more expensive)
solutions could be preferred if the socio-economic effects were expected to be higher.
Education policy related to information technology was also strongly emphasised. On the
one hand, modern information technology tools and solutions were to be used to improve
the efficiency of education. On the other hand, education was seen as crucial in order to
exploit the opportunities afforded by R&D in the field.
In the period between the 1983 green paper on telematics and the launch of the IT
plan in 1986-87, two different political directions were visible in the inter-ministerial
processes that led to consensus about the plan. Strong political forces pulled in the
direction of emphasising IT policy as (a tool for) industrial development. This policy
interest was brought forward by representatives of industry, technology and technological
research and backed by the Ministry of Industry. Exploitation and acquisition of IT in
existing industries was a topic for this side, but the development of a new and emerging
IT industry was emphasised even more as the solution to Norwegian industrial challenges. In the mid-1980s this kind of political interest, involving industry modernisation,
had as its counterpart a notion of IT as a more comprehensive driving force in the
information society. The interest in modernisation of industry took concrete form as a
committee proposal (a proposal from the so-called Kuvs committee) that was to give
input into work on a national IT plan. The political interests that supported a broader view
of diffusion and exploitation of IT existed above all in other ministries. The message from
this side came from an advisory board consisting of senior public servants, which was
established by the government with a mandate to protect objectives and values other than
those related to industry and commercial life. In compliance with the boards mandate,
called Datapolitisk Rd, it commented in particular that the proposal from the Kuvs
committee could be characterised more as a programme for Norwegian industry and
commerce than a comprehensive national IT programme. Rather than national objectives
within economic variables and productivity, Datapolitisk Rd was of the opinion that
several issues were missing, in particular:
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In other words, the variety of ministerial suggestions, which were reflected in the
committees statement, included education at lower levels, use of IT in the public
sector/administration, and IT and regional policy measures. Despite the differing views,
the Ministry of Industry saw it as its responsibility to gather together the different
interests in an effort to propose a national IT plan that could build on consensus with the
governments political signals and objectives. In practice, this meant that the Ministry of
Industry understood that all interests expressed by ministries and other stakeholders had
to be taken into consideration in the proposal for a national IT plan. A couple of
important points can be made from this brief description of Norwegian IT policy in the
making during the 1980s:
The result was that all actors could agree on five main areas for an IT action plan:
1. Education, vocational training, universities and colleges, in-service training.
2. Equipment for education and research.
3. Knowledge production and accumulation: research (basic and applied) in central
and specialised areas.
4. Product development: measures supporting industry, grants for R&D and innovation.
5. Technology acquisition and diffusion: demonstration projects, productivity programmes, IT in the public sector.
The proposal was built on the consensus achieved and common understanding at the
ministerial level that IT has societal effects and implications (an information society
perspective) that go beyond potential industrial development. However, observers have
pointed out that policy making at the ministerial level made the mistake of including both
the information society perspective and the industrial development perspective. Looking
to the 1990s, IT policy went in the direction of detailed and comprehensive policy
implementation based on inclusion of both aspects. Even though the lessons from this
extremely wide-ranging and comprehensive policy making are mixed, it seems reasonable
to see the consensus-making efforts at the ministerial level in the 1980s as a prerequisite
for the fact that hardly any interests or policy domains were excluded.
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The role of the Finance Ministry
In the balance of power of the 1980s the Finance Ministry clearly played a
consolidating role in relation to existing sectoral budget allocations. Having less interest
in the policy dimensions of IT in terms of the societal effects, and more interest in
keeping the overall national budget in balance, the Finance Ministry demanded that every
new proposed policy initiative should be financed by the existing budgetary limits of the
relevant ministry. In the consensus-seeking processes, the Finance Ministry can be
characterised as a hindrance to be overcome in order to realise the plans that were made.
The historical dynamics between ministerial consensus and departmentalisation in strong
ministries with specialised sector interests are discussed below.
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Reduced proximity.
In this way, the top policy level presented its views. An inter-ministerial consensus
was presented, and the formulation (and implementation) of concrete action was handed
over to those who knew how to do it. However, one could argue that it was disappointing
that such a comprehensive policy document contained little more than general overall
aims. To the extent that the document had a strategic method, it seemed to be the
principle of addition. The report was mainly a summary of everything that had to do with
IT in the mid-1990s. Difficult choices, decisions about direction, prioritisation and
content, were basically lacking. And, above all, no co-ordinating body with concrete
responsibility was set up.
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replaced by a conservative government coalition. Moreover, the same period of time has
been characterised by minority governments, and this too encourages the orientation
towards consensus. Although commentators argue that a policy change towards marketbased policy thinking and policy making certainly involved the last social-democratic
governments because of the trend towards globalisation and deregulation that started in
the 1980s and 1990s, the conservative-dominated government (2001) undertook radical
policy change more explicitly than the preceding social-democratic governments. It is
increasingly evident that the current Norwegian government is strongly in favour of
letting the market rule.
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Co-ordination of eNorway
The characteristics of eNorway 2005 as a policy action plan
The eNorway action plan and its co-ordinating body is an innovative organisational
operation aimed at making ICT policy co-ordinated and coherent. Compared to the
history of ICT policy in the Norwegian context, which indicated a lack of credible
visionary perspectives and aims, the eNorway action plan provides a hierarchy of targets
and objectives related to five policy areas and a corresponding set of policy schemes and
initiatives. It is visionary as well as concrete in its formulation of policy tools. The policy
cycle contains large, comprehensive, complex policy schemes that are outsourced (from
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the eNorway co-ordinating body), and it contains an array of policy initiatives, processes
and smaller schemes that are operated by the co-ordinating body itself.
The eNorway co-ordinating body has as its aim to motivate and orchestrate
information society policy as a whole. With the exception of legal competence and
knowledge and skills related to the functioning of the political and bureaucratic system, it
does not have specialised competence to handle sector-specific policy domains, and the
large and comprehensive schemes seem to live a life of their own without specific
influence or co-ordination from eNorway. The responsible co-ordinating authority for the
large and complex schemes, which often is the relevant sector-specific ministry, is
responsible for operation, implementation and policy learning related to these large
schemes.
Policy initiatives and smaller schemes are by and large co-ordinated by the coordinating body, even though there are cases in which sector-specific ministries are the
most important co-ordinators. Co-ordination implies the establishment of communication
platforms, physical and electronic interfaces and routines between stakeholders and the
co-ordinating body. From the side of the co-ordinating body it requires the design of
measures for interaction between stakeholders that affect existing, traditional systems,
technologies and solutions. It implies a pedagogic effort that engages stakeholders and
participants in the opening of doors to digital solutions and corresponding network
requirements. The emergence of the information society encounters a range of
impediments in the existing structures and solutions of society. It is eNorways role is to
co-ordinate the necessary changes in conditions. In many ways one can argue that the
portfolio of policy initiatives and the smaller policy schemes that depend on networkbuilding activities, taken together, are similar to one of the larger policy schemes that are
outsourced.
The eNorway2005 action plan was until mid-2004 managed by the department of IT
policy in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. From mid-2004 the department of IT policy
(the co-ordinating body of eNorway) and responsibility for and management of eNorway
is under the new Ministry of Modernisation. This places the co-ordination of the
Norwegian governments IT policy or information society policy7 within the Ministry of
Modernisation and in close liaison with other government ministries with different areas
of responsibility. The close liaison between eNorway and the ministries and communication between them take a variety of forms depending on the policy domain and the
type of policy scheme in question. In other words, the intensity of communication and
collaboration between the eNorway co-ordinating body and the sector-specific ministry as
co-ordinating body, depends on the kind of policy scheme being operated. The following
discussion identifies two general types of collaboration pattern, roughly corresponding to
the two types of policy schemes described above.
In policy domains dominated by large complex schemes with separate budgets
(e.g. HYKOM and ICT in Norwegian education), which are mainly supervised and coordinated by sector-specific ministries, eNorway plays a defensive, relatively marginal
role, at least concerning the activities under the scheme. This does not mean that the coordinating body does not participate in liaison committees between the actors (eNorway,
sector-specific ministries, implementing actors and stakeholders). On the contrary, for
policy schemes and domains that are outsourced and co-ordinated by sector-specific
ministries, networking functions and the exercise of influence by the co-ordinating body
are by and large done through participation in liaison committees that deal with overall
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Downstream and upstream co-ordination in the policy cycle
The mandate of the co-ordinating body is limited to political and bureaucratic
processes in Norway and in relation to the EU system. Its main task is to implement,
follow up and develop the action plan. As pointed out above, for the variety of policy
schemes and initiatives that include comprehensive areas, the co-ordinating body can
only fulfil its objectives by running different types of co-ordinating activities.
In the context of the MONIT project, the study of the information society explores the
subtleties in the distribution of responsibility among actors for the formulation, coordination and implementation of policy, and for evaluation, policy learning and reformulation of policy. For the policy schemes and initiatives that have to be co-ordinated,
two types of co-ordination tasks can be identified. On the one hand, there is the coordination of implementing activities. This requires what can be called a downstream
policy exercise or policy execution. On the other hand, there are development and
evaluation activities that require what can be called upstream policy learning capabilities. Both types of activities are necessary components of a policy system that aims at
development, at staying attuned to political preferences, and at maintaining a long-term
perspective and a flexible but continuous drive towards the overall objectives.
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For upstream co-ordination, i.e. the influence on the dimensions of policy analysis
and evaluation, the co-ordinating body appears to be an important marketing tool for
large, outsourced schemes. eNorway places large-scale Norwegian policy measures
within the wider aims of information society policy. Moreover it has a currently low but
potentially strong influence on policy learning. Documentation of the co-ordinating
bodys ability to co-ordinate and influence policy analysis and evaluate the large outsourced schemes is weak, because it is recently established and has undergone only a
couple of evaluations. There is no information available on eNorways policy learning
since the evaluation of one part of ICT in Norwegian education and the evaluation of
HYKOM, the broadband roll-out scheme.
For agenda setting, prioritisation and implementation and the co-ordinating bodys
influence on type 2 policy schemes, it appears to be relatively strong, because the coordinating body actively runs most of these policy processes. Its influence on the
marketing function and policy learning for type 2 schemes is strong, as it can follow these
policy processes and schemes closely.
Norwegian Parliament
Norwegian Government
Ministerial level
The ministries as co-ordinating and implementing bodies
Implementation level
Ministries, government agencies, outsourced agencies, commercial and public actors and stakeholders
The key player at the policy level is the co-ordinating body in the Ministry of
Modernisation. The responsibility for eNorway 2005 was transferred from the Ministry of
Trade and Industry to the Ministry of Modernisation, and the Ministry of Trade and
Industry now co-ordinates e-commerce. The other key players include the ministries
involved as responsible participants and/or co-ordinating actors in specific areas of
implementation of the action plan. In a few cases other public institutions play key roles
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(the Norwegian Research Council is an important stakeholder in certain policy domains
for example). In addition to the Ministry of Modernisation, which is active in most areas
because of its overall responsibility as co-ordinator, the involved actors include the
following ministries with designated co-ordination tasks:
The Ministry of Labour and Government Administration has designated tasks for
regulation, electronic signatures, skills, and public sector policy.
The Ministry of Justice and the Police has designated tasks for regulation policy.
The Ministry of Education and Research and the Research Council have designated tasks for research, security and education policy.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications has designated tasks for electronic communication policy.
The Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Ministry of Children and
Family Affairs have designated tasks for content policy.
Implementing institutions below the ministerial level also play an important role in
this policy system. Implementation of policy is the most important task. At the end of the
day the co-ordinating body depends crucially on the implementing institutions ability to
reach the defined eNorway objectives.
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The work of the IT committee of deputy ministers has various functions for eNorway
and different levels of utility for the different ministries. The participating deputy
ministers engagement in the work of the committee partly reflects their individual
engagement, and partly reflects the tasks, schemes and status of each ministrys role in
and contribution to IT policy and eNorway as a whole. This means that some deputy
ministers may use the committee work to actively influence issues and processes that are
important for their ministries interests. Other deputy ministers may use the committee
work to stay up-to-date on issues of importance for their ministrys share of eNorway.
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intention for it to be orchestrator, organiser and driving force. These terms refer directly
to the targets in each of the sub-areas within the five main areas of effort described above.
An interesting question related to the defined targets and the possibility of
successfully fulfilling them has to do with wording and formulation. The wording of the
overall targets as well as the sub-targets in each area is relatively general. The positive
aspect is that this type of formulation is more visionary than precise target formulations.
Moreover, it is easy to make rough estimates of whether or not the targets are reached.
The negative side is that the relative lack of precision may make it difficult to use such
targets as they may imply more varied policy solutions. Consequently, estimates of
fulfilment are difficult to quantify and may become politicised. A foreseeable result is
political disagreement about whether or not targets are reached.11
With relatively vague target formulations, co-ordination implies activities that range
from no influence to strong influence (by the co-ordinating body). Rephrased, the coordinating body may fulfil its objectives by any type of co-ordination. It can be argued
that this may be necessary. The information society policy system involves very different
areas of effort, policy instruments and schemes, which consequently imply very different
implementation settings in which actors and stakeholders take different positions and
have dissimilar bargaining power and possibilities to influence the processes.
While broad target formulations may be acceptable at the overall eNorway level, one
would expect more specific formulations at the level of particular policy schemes. It is
not the case for HYKOM. The evaluation report states that the formal and overall
targets in HYKOM are complex and not stringently operationalised. In the light of the
different types of policy guidance, commands and control that have had effect during the
process (for example annual political signals about priority areas from the government
and ministries), targets have changed and been prioritised differently. In the case of
broadband implementation, the ambition of the political level has been to enable and
obtain development in public enterprises and institutions, a stronger focus on user needs,
and a stronger focus on efficiency and productivity gains in administration and services
through the use of applications and services based on broadband technology. Thus, if
public enterprises did not have a broadband connection, HYKOM was to contribute to
such a connection. If there was no access to (no supply of) infrastructure to which the
enterprises could attach, demand from enterprises should stimulate investment in
broadband infrastructure. The supply of broadband solutions and the development of
applications is supposed to be ensured by commercial actors. Moreover, it has been an
important intention to support ICT competence and industrial development related to
broadband services and broadband-based services across the country, in particular in the
periphery.
Given its complex mandate and overall targets, HYKOM is an instrument with
much wider implications than what is intuitively captured by the notion broadband rollout. HYKOM can be seen as a scheme for the modernisation of the Norwegian public
sector, for industrial development, for regional development and for upgrading competence related to broadband applications in the knowledge society. HYKOM grew out of
concrete target formulations about Internet access and applications and IT policy at the
turn of the century, but, as with ICT policy in general, the scheme has developed into a
multi-sector policy instrument with targets that correspond to national targets for horizontal innovation policy.
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The evaluation of the HYKOM scheme concludes that it has functioned well in
some cases and less well in others. The scheme has addressed a range of aspects linked to
broadband acquisition and application: infrastructure investments, competence flow,
acquisition and application, development in and between institutions, production of
content, stimulation of demand, competition and planning. Although to have national
penetration rates among the best in the world is a declared objective of the overall
eNorway framework, the main idea in the HYKOM scheme has been to stimulate
institutions that mainly want to work on their own development. As a scheme for
boosting broadband penetration across the nation, it seems to be lacking mechanisms that
ensure access in the periphery. HYKOM has worked well at one end of the market, but
has not been able to operate efficiently where the market has not already invested in
infrastructure. With a stronger influence from regional authorities (channelled through
eNorway as co-ordinating body) HYKOM could probably have developed into a
programme that strongly supported broadband investments and access in peripheral areas
that lack possibilities for connection.
In fact, HYKOM has focused on positive results from planned and ongoing
development processes in the institutions that took part. It would appear that the political
signals from the government and the ministries that finance HYKOM limit the use of
public money and engagement. This implies that it is appropriate to release public money
when market mechanisms have ensured access to the technology. On the contrary, it is
not politically acceptable to let policy schemes fiddle with the market through public
investment in infrastructure.
There is much more to the story of broadband implementation in the Norwegian
context. The evaluation of HYKOM indicates that the policy of letting the market,
i.e. the actors with ownership and control of infrastructure investment and co-ordination
in the municipalities, take care of fulfilling broadband penetration targets in rural areas
implies at least an acceptance that Norway will not be among the best broadband nations
by 2005. If this is so, what role does the co-ordinating body play? It remains to be seen in
the process of policy learning.
Dimensions of interaction
Competence
Competence in the co-ordinating body certainly sets the conditions for interaction
with other co-ordinating actors and with actors with operative responsibility and tasks in
implementation processes. It is a task of the co-ordinating body to give other ministries
support for their sectoral IT policy areas. Considering the broad scope and open-ended
nature of eNorway there is evidently a need for a broad competence base in the coordinating body to be able to co-ordinate the different parts. The question is the extent to
which the co-ordinating body should have in-depth competence for each implementation
area or each policy instrument. It is easy to say that its staff should have specialised
competence in all of the professions and technology areas covered in eNorways
programmes and schemes. Realistically it is impossible.
An orchestra conductor, for example, needs to have a minimum of insight into the
properties of the different instruments and how they work together, but need not be able
to play all instruments. In the same manner, the co-ordinating body has to have a minimum of knowledge and competence about the different policy areas, corresponding
implementation instruments and underlying technologies, and their current and potential
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interaction. However, it largely lacks the deep competence base on each implementation
area and on specific technologies for the concrete and detailed management of a specific
policy instrument. This does not mean that the co-ordinating body cannot be competent
enough to control specific technology or policy areas in order to identify a misfit between
the political principles that underpin policy instruments and the concrete possibility of
reaching declared targets. Moreover it does not mean that the co-ordinating body cannot
become competent to make decisions that can set a standard. This last point implies for
example choosing one technology platform or solution in a technology area that is in
urgent need of standardisation in order to become a public good. It can in fact be argued
that centralised administration of specific policy instruments is not useful in an
organisation that is focused on maintaining an overview and co-ordinating different
policy areas into a coherent whole.
The most important tasks of the co-ordinating body include keeping an up-to-date
view of the overall policy portfolio of eNorway, and identifying, following up and coordinating measures across areas with sector-specific characteristics. This means that the
co-ordinating body intervenes in and co-ordinates the different policy areas and
instruments. Moreover, it has a particular responsibility to intercept political signals and
is responsible for co-ordinating and influencing legislative changes in relation to changes
made necessary by eNorway. Intercepting political signals requires a considerable effort
to stay up to date on political processes at different levels, because of the need to adapt
eNorway to continuous changes in technology, society and political priorities. With the
department of IT policys scarce resources and relatively small staff of fewer than
20 persons, this is a demanding task in view of the comprehensive scope of eNorway and
the number of activity areas and tasks.
The co-ordinating body operates more or less like an orchestra conductor, with at
least one exception. Specialised legal competence can be considered as a type of
competence that is needed across many of the policy areas operated by eNorway. This
area is covered by the two or three employees with a law degree. In general they take care
the need for changes in the law or regulations in order to implement policy. They work as
legal advisors both in general and on specific issues, and they interact with regulatory and
juridical units in other parts of the Norwegian political system. This includes for example
taking the initiative and following up the process of making a new law that takes into
account new formal and legal aspects of e-mail, e-signatures and e-commerce. In concrete
terms it implies collaboration between the co-ordinating body and the relevant ministries,
in this case the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, responsible for content policy,
and the Ministry of Justice.
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considers the market the best selection mechanism appears to work against this. In
addition, the same ideology generally influences policy domains affected by standardisation.
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Co-ordination and policy schemes of different complexity
Activities towards the end of the 1980s ensured that ICT policy was seen as a broad
policy area that included basically what is contained in eNorway today: a policy domain
for creating value in industry, efficiency and quality in the public sector, and involvement
and identity. The IT committee of deputy ministers may be seen as the current political
institutionalisation of high-level cross-ministerial consensus and collaboration. However,
the culture that makes it possible to reach consensus on the overall ICT policy has not
hindered the parallel existence of strong sector-specific interests that have shaped subareas of ICT policy. The 1990s have seen the flourishing of ICT policy schemes, some of
which are very complex, some of them less so. This section looks at how co-ordination
routines seem to relate to different levels of complexity in policy schemes.
A complex scheme is here defined as large enough to necessitate separate
administration (it cannot be run and managed by the co-ordinating agency, for example)
and it needs its own steering committee. A complex programme has a mandate and
targets that cross sector-specific interests and policy areas. Examples are HYKOM, the
scheme for broadband roll-out, and ICT in education. Such programmes by and large take
on lives of their own, in the sense that the co-ordinating agency has no specific influence
on their operation. This often relates to the establishment of the programme, which often
predates eNorway and its co-ordinating body. As described above, the portfolio of ICT
policy schemes and programmes was initially drawn together by the co-ordinating body
into a coherent whole. eNorway is by and large not the force behind the large ICT policy
programmes. Instead, a number of large existing policy programmes gave substance and a
flying start to the eNorway framework. The co-ordinating body has not been actively
involved in policy programmes established before eNorway was launched.
For example, co-ordination of HYKOM by the co-ordinating agency has not
implied making use of the technical competence and technical understanding of
broadband infrastructure or broadband applications. The operation of HYKOM has
been subcontracted to the Norwegian Research Council, which has experience, routines
and administrative resources to grant money based on external applications.
Results from these large policy programmes are reported back to the co-ordinating
body. Realising that the co-ordinating body cannot take on a role in the operation and
concrete co-ordination of this type of programme, the co-ordinating agency should
nonetheless be able to monitor and influence the overall effect of a programme, with
reference to how it meets targets under the umbrella of eNorway.
In contrast to the lack of interaction between the co-ordinating agency and large
policy programmes, the agency often plays operative roles in more specific eNorway
initiatives and policy processes. In the portfolio of policy initiatives, the co-ordinating
agency is the leading actor in a range of cases. Typical activities in this category include
sector-specific or technology-specific efforts such as the diffusion and application of
geographical data and information, challenges related to changes in legislation and
standardisation, adjustment of Norwegian regulations to EU directives, and a range of
network processes, e.g. related to changes of attitude with respect to e-commerce, esecurity, e-content, etc.
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Influence on policy learning in outsourced policy schemes
However, eNorway may have greater influence on policy learning in large, complex,
outsourced policy schemes, for which it works as a marketing tool. Moreover, it is the coordinating bodys task to communicate with the operative units of programmes about
issues of cross-sectoral importance. It is more important for the co-ordinating body to
monitor and revise eNorway through evaluations and changes in programmes than to coordinate implementation concretely. Because the co-ordinating body does not have the
qualifications to exercise concrete co-ordination of implementation, it can exercise its
influence with reference to how well large outsourced schemes work towards the overall
targets of eNorway. More than any other national actor dealing with IT policy, the coordinating body is in a position to capture political signals, evaluation results and
important stakeholders needs. It can work towards policy analysis by considering carefully and accurately the specific national targets related to each policy scheme and relate
the results to political processes in the EU and globally. It can influence and adjust the
effects and target area of the policy schemes.
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that the different policy initiatives, schemes and programmes address and attempt to reach
the overall targets of eNorway. For example, co-ordination of broadband diffusion could
have included signals that HYKOM did not sufficiently address broadband infrastructure in rural areas. In this case fundamental policy principles from the centreconservative government made this impossible, although policy learning processes are
likely to show that rural areas have to be favoured in one way or another if broadband
access targets are to be reached. Again, in working towards standardisation of an
electronic signature, there has been space for a relatively early statement about preferred
solution from the co-ordinating body.
Grande (2001) argues that the tendency towards increased complexity has a negative
impact on states capacity to implement policies successfully and that such capacity is
being eroded. In that perspective the the eNorway policy system would appear to have
such features. Moreover, the assumption would be that not only eNorway but also
horizontal innovation policy, if it is developed, are complex and comprehensive policy
systems that have weaknesses but also potential strengths in their co-ordination
mechanisms. How do the observations and findings in this chapter shed light on these
assumptions?
The Norwegian information society policy certainly has the comprehensiveness and
complexity that Grande refers to. The strategic level and wording of the eNorway action
plan have been emphasised, and the plan is certainly broad enough to be included in the
recently launched Norwegian horizontal innovation policy. Even at the level of specific
policy schemes, target formulations correspond to innovation policy targets as they
appear in the national innovation policy. Moreover, the co-ordinating body exercises coordination by means of a multitude of processes and arenas of dialogue and collaboration
for the two types of policy schemes.
Given this complexity and the challenge of fine-tuning the degree of influence and
adjusting the co-ordination process to the different policy schemes and processes, the
Norwegian information society policy is certainly experiencing the strategic policy
dilemma that Grande (2001, p. 916) describes:
Policy strategies which have been feasible within the existing institutional structures
turned out to be under-complex and, hence, inadequate to improve industrial
competitiveness in the IT sector; however, more adequate comprehensive innovation
policy strategies tended to be over-complex and overstrained the states institutional
capability, in particular its capacity for horizontal and vertical policy co-ordination.
Looking ahead, and in relation to the three options Grande presents for providing a
way out of the policy dilemma, how can co-ordination of Norwegian information society
policy improve its performance? The first option is to concentrate and centralise the
competencies and resources in the institutional setting of co-ordination. The Norwegian
co-ordinating body has juridical, political and bureaucratic competence and skills, and is
probably more concentrated and centralised than in other OECD countries. An even more
concentrated and centralised co-ordinating body would have to be far larger and would
require restructuring the specialised competence that is currently located in the sectorspecific ministries. It would probably also require moving competence that is currently
located in powerful government agencies and in subcontracted organisations that operate
specific policy schemes to the co-ordinating body.
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The second option, to decentralise policy, goes in the opposite direction and may be
more promising. Norwegian information society policy is not currently very
decentralised. The large, complex policy schemes are outsourced from the co-ordinating
body, but local and regional governments are probably not as involved and influential as
co-ordinating actors as they might be. Nevertheless, local governments have a good deal
of freedom for their technology investments, as seen in HYKOM. However, the local
and regional levels in Norway are relatively small compared to regions in larger European
countries. They are arguably far from being able to be core actors in implementation,
because of lack of resources and competence.
The third option is to adopt a policy strategy that is better suited to the countrys
institutional framework. This may be what has happened for Norwegian information
society policy. Discussing this option, Grande distinguishes between deliberate
strategies, i.e. plans intentionally designed and implemented, and emergent strategies,
i.e. an unintended order emerging from activities of individual actors or organisations,
referred to here as stakeholders. Deliberate strategies emphasise the implementation of
pre-set goals. Emergent strategies emphasise results as the product of a process. The two
types of schemes described in this chapter as typical of eNorway roughly correspond to
the deliberate strategy (the large complex schemes) and to the emergent strategy (the
smaller ones).
The potential for improvement would appear to require a policy learning process by
the Norwegian government and the co-ordinating body and consideration of a reallocation
and reorganisation of the policy tasks in the current policy cycle (policy portfolio) into
one of the two types of strategies. Certain policy tasks (for example standardisation) that
currently are run and managed as a policy process/emergent strategy by the co-ordinating
agency could be improved if defined as deliberate strategy. This requires stricter decision
making and co-ordination according to the defined aim. Another example implies greater
awareness that schemes defined as deliberate strategies, i.e. with clearly specified aims,
need to be implemented in accordance with their aims. The example emphasised in this
chapter is the broadband roll-out scheme and the lack of effect in peripheral areas,
whereas it is the overall objective of the government to ensure broadband infrastructure in
all parts of Norway. In this case, and perhaps across policy making in generic technology
domains, the political principle of the conservative government, which can be summarised as a market orientation and no desire to disturb the market by means of direct
public investment, represents a counteracting principle and a challenge to co-ordination.
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Notes
1.
SINTEF STEP Report 02-2004, Bredt band i tynn trd? Evaluering av HYKOM, by Hkon Finne,
Anders Ekeland and Yngve Seierstad Stokke.
2.
Den norske IT-veien. Bit for bit, Rapport fra Statssekretrutvalget for IT, January 1996.
3.
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/action_plan/index_en.htm
4.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry was in charge of eNorway until summer 2004.
5.
6.
The eNorway Web site is www.enorge.org and the eNorway 2005 strategy document can be found at
http://odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/03/eNorw040.pdf
7.
This text uses the terms IT policy, ICT policy and information society policy. The concepts are roughly
equivalent, even though information society policy is certainly broader and IT policy may be more
specific.
8.
9.
The Ministries of Trade and Industry, Administration, Transport, Church Affairs, Education and Research, Culture and Finance.
10.
Den norske IT-veien. Bit for bit, Rapport fra Statssekretrutvalget for IT, 1996
11.
The evaluation of the HYKOM scheme contains a discussion of the wording in relation to targets in
broadband roll-out in Norway. The authors make a point of the fact that access to is used instead of
connection to broadband infrastructure and services. It is an example that indicates the problem with
vague or inaccurate targets.
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Evaluering av HYKOM, SINTEF STEP report 02-2004.
Grande, E. (2001), The Erosion of State Capacity and the European Innovation Policy
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OECD (2002), Dynamising National Innovation Systems, OECD, Paris.
Statssekretrutvalget for IT (1996), Den norske IT-veien: Bit for bit, January.
Technopolis Group (2002), The Governance of Research and Innovation: An
International Comparative Study, December.
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Chapter 4
INNOVATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:
POLICY COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND
Paulina Ramirez, Murray Scott and Willie Golden
Centre for Innovation and Structural Change (CISC)
National University of Ireland, Galway
Recent discussions on the need for a new generation of innovation policy point to the
need for greater integration between innovation and other policy domains. The challenge
is how to establish national systems of policy governance which lead to greater horizontal
co-ordination and coherence between innovation and other policy fields. To improve
understanding of the issues raised by cross-departmental policy governance, this chapter
presents the results of a study on the policy-making process for the information society, a
policy area that requires co-ordination across many government departments and
agencies. It also looks at the linkages and coherence between the information society and
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. It is found that though the information
society agenda crosses departmental boundaries, Irelands information society policy is
mainly developed and implemented along traditional departmental lines. While interdepartmental co-operation takes place on concrete issues it does not occur when a longerterm, continuous commitment is required. No evidence was found of horizontal policy
co-ordination between the areas of the information society and STI. An important reason
for the lack of coherence between the two policy areas is the science-push character of
Irelands present STI policy which makes co-ordination with other policy domains
difficult. A broader innovation policy is needed before effective linkages can be made
between STI and other policy fields. The link between innovation and other policy areas
might better be made by innovation champions within the policy system whose task
would be to identify synergies between policy areas and with the authority and resources
to implement cross-departmental initiatives.
Introduction
This chapter reports the findings of a study on policy governance in the area of the
information society and the extent of horizontal linkages and coherence between the
information society and science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. The research
was undertaken in the context of recent discussions on the need for a new generation a
third generation of innovation policy that would integrate STI with other policy
domains (EU, 2003; OECD, 2002). The challenge is how to establish national systems of
policy governance which lead to greater horizontal co-ordination and coherence between
innovation and other policy fields.
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The premise for the present study is that the development of a third generation of
innovation policy would gain from greater understanding of how the policy-making
process is governed in an area that requires co-ordination across many government
departments and agencies. One such policy area is the information society. At the same
time the study made it possible to identify characteristics of the policy governance system
that supported or hindered the development of horizontal linkages and policy coherence
between the information society and STI. The study focuses on the governance of the
policy cycle defined in three broad stages, namely: i) agenda setting, policy formulation
and prioritisation; ii) policy implementation and co-ordination; and iii) policy evaluation
and learning.
National systems of policy governance are contingent on countries history, traditions
and culture as well as the formal mechanisms of the policy-making process. Irelands
history of industrialisation and the recent decade of exceptional economic growth have
been major influences behind perceptions of the main policy challenges for the
information society and STI and have played an important role in shaping the governance
system in both policy areas. The next section presents the context of Irelands recent
development, the background to the two policy areas and the main STI policy bodies. The
following section sets out the information society policy structures before turning to the
governance of the information society policy cycle. Then, the links between the
information society and STI policy are discussed. A final section draws the main conclusions of the study.
INNOVATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: POLICY COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND
for the European market (Sweeney, 1999). The 1990s also saw important FDI growth in
ICT-intensive internationally traded services with the establishment of pan-European call
centres in a number of services areas. It was the success of the internationally traded
service industries which led Frfas, the policy advisory body of the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, to identify ICT-intensive services as a key sector for
future economic growth, and it was also central to the singling out of the information
society as a distinct policy area from the mid-1990s (Frfas, 1996). Another major
development of the 1990s was the emergence of a number of indigenous software firms
built around product innovation.
In spite of the recent successes in terms of employment and export growth, policy
circles have consistently voiced concerns about two aspects of Irelands pattern of
development over the years. The first is the failure to build an internationally competitive
indigenous sector (Frfas, 1996; Culliton Report, 1992; Telesis Consultancy Group,
1982). In fact, outside the recent successes of the Irish software sector, one feature of
Irelands FDI-led economic development model has been the emergence of a dual
economy characterised by a very productive but weakly embedded foreign-owned sector
and an underperforming and uncompetitive Irish-owned sector.
The second, and related, feature of Irelands economic development has been the
weakness of the countrys national innovation system (NIS) (see Box 4.1). A recent
report by the Inter-departmental Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation
acknowledged that R&D activity in Ireland (both the public and the business sectors)
lagged behind that of leading countries (IDC Steering Group, 2004). Of special concern
was the fact that, in the business sector, performance lagged in terms of number of firms
with sufficient minimum scale of R&D activities and with sustainable absorptive capacity
for scientific and technological advances. This reflects the fact that, while innovative
activities of MNCs are central to Irelands NIS, most of these firms undertake the bulk of
their R&D investment elsewhere. At the same time indigenous industry does little in the
way of innovation. Another factor to note is the highly concentrated nature of R&D in
terms of industrial sectors. As Box 4.1 shows, the weight of the ICT industry in the
countrys NIS has made this sector an influential stakeholder in the countrys STI policy.
Box 4.1. Some characteristics of Irelands NIS
In 2001, business expenditure on R&D in Ireland was 0.9% of GNP compared to an EU
average of 1.25%.
Approximately two-thirds of R&D carried out in Ireland is performed by MNCs. The
majority of is accounted for by 19 firms.
One-third of Irish-owned industry (about 1 000 firms) have some expenditure on R&D.
Most of this investment is very small.
Approximately 70% of MNC R&D investment in Ireland is in computers, electronics and
software.
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Policy background: the shift towards an information and knowledge economy
The rise of the information society as a distinct area of policy and recent developments in the field of STI date from the late 1990s. The origins of both policy initiatives
are rooted in increasing concerns in Irish policy circles about the sustainability of the
economic model that underpinned the success of the Celtic Tiger. The need to make a
transition towards a higher-value information or knowledge economy as an alternative to
the previous low-cost-location model of international competition began to gather
momentum from the mid- to late 1990s and underlies recent information society and STI
policy initiatives.
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creation of an innovative indigenous sector through the emergence of clusters of internationally competitive high-technology Irish-owned firms.
The major commitment of resources for science and technology spending in the
National Development Plan 2000-2006 represents a new departure towards strengthening
the innovative capabilities of Irish society. It is important to note, however, that the recent
STI policy model is far closer to first-generation science-push models than to the secondgeneration innovation policies associated with the NIS concept of the 1990s. One
consequence is that the present emphasis on science and technology has gone hand in
hand with a scaling back of non-R&D innovation measures (Cogan, 2002). This could
have serious implications for the majority of Irish-owned industry that still requires
assistance to monitor, adopt and adapt technology. Moreover there seems to be little
awareness among policy makers of the role of demand-led innovation policies based on
interaction between users and producers. As will be argued later in this chapter, the
science-push character of present STI policy makes it difficult to develop horizontal
linkages or create policy coherence with other policy fields.
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Figure 4.1. Departments and agencies involved in STI policy
Government of Ireland
Higher Education
Authority
IRCSET
Office of Science
and Technology
IRCHSS
Frfas
Science
Foundation
Ireland (SFI)
Enterprise
Ireland (EI)
Industrial
Development
Agency (IDA)
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Government department/agency
Main event
Document
1996
Frfas
Department of An Taoiseach
1997
An Interdepartmental Implementation
Group on the Information Society
established to propose implementation
strategy for the information society.
1997
Independent
1998
An Interdepartmental Implementation
Group on the information society
1999
Department of An Taoiseach
1999
Department of An Taoiseach
1999
2001
Department of An Taoiseach
2001
Independent
2002
Department of An Taoiseach
ISPU
2005
ISPU
Dissolution of ISPU.
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The Minister of State. The minister has responsibility for the co-ordination of
the information society agenda across all government departments.
The Cabinet Committee on the Information Society. This is the main political
body driving implementation of the information society agenda. Its role is to take
a high-level political view of information society policy. It brings together
ministers with responsibility for policy areas set out in the revised government
action plan, New Connection (2002). The Committee is chaired by An Taoiseach
and is convened by the Minister of State.
The Information Society Policy Unit (ISPU). This unit, based at the Department
of An Taoiseach, has overall responsibility for developing, monitoring, coordinating and driving the implementation of the information society agenda. The
ISPU also has functional responsibilities for e-government and the eCabinet
Initiative. The ISPU, in conjunction with the Department of Finance, also has the
task of evaluating submissions to the Information Society Fund.
Figure 4.2 shows the high-level information society policy structure, the role of the
committees and the frequency of meetings. According to the government the new
arrangements were:
designed to deliver a more coherent overall approach, at the highest levels of
government, to formulation and implementation of policy on a wide range of
issues that increasingly cut across traditional departmental boundaries between
departments and agencies and between central and local government (New
Connections, 2002).
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High Level
Political
High Level
Administration
Taoiseach
Minister of IS (convenor)
10 Departments
EStrategies
Secretaries General
10 Departments
Assistant Secretaries
Detail implementation issues
Conflict resolution
Ad hoc groups
Department of Taoiseach
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One result of this agenda-setting structure is that the different strands of information
society policy have, in essence, been developed and implemented by individual
government departments and agencies along traditional departmental lines. Though all
departments report to the ISPU the progress being made in their respective areas of
responsibility, interviews indicate that the ISPU engages little in the formulation of
information society policies outside the area of e-government. This departmentalisation of
the information society agenda, with measures conceived, designed and implemented
following the established rationale of existing departments, limits the possibility for
developing a more integrated approach to information society policy. The lack of a
general roadmap providing a unifying framework for the constituent elements of the
information society adds to the fragmented nature of the policy-making process.
A second important issue related to this agenda-setting structure arises from the dual
role of the Department of An Taoiseach and the ISPU as both overall co-ordinators of
information society policy and bodies with responsibility for e-government. Along with
the information society, the Department of An Taoiseach also has political responsibility
for the modernisation of the public sector. E-government fits very well with the agenda
for transforming the public sector and both agendas cross all government departments. It
is clear from interviews that the e-government agenda, in conjunction with the
modernisation of public services, had become the primary focus of attention of the ISPU.
While this has given the ISPU leverage to push the e-government agenda forward, it has
also meant that both the ISPU and the high-level information society policy structures
(Figure 4.2) are mainly identified with e-government rather than overall information
society policy co-ordination.
How policies for the information society are conceived, developed and prioritised
within departments is not clear. In the interviews undertaken for this study policy makers
played down the role of the European Union (EU) in the formulation of information
society policy. However, because of membership in the EU, at least some areas of Irish
information society policy (for example e-business) are guided by policy decisions made
at the European level. Within departments and agencies, much of the initiative for
specific information society policy measures is left to the heads of e-units (e.g. the ebusiness units within the DETE and Enterprise Ireland) who have responsibility for
developing concrete policies. At this level, the process of designing policy and setting
priorities seems to be relatively haphazard and contingent, subject to a number of
immediate pressures. Important factors that influence the formulation of information
society policy here include: the availability of funds for specific policy initiatives, the
amount of resources in terms of people and time dedicated to that policy area, the
pressures from well organised stakeholders as well as the particular motivations of the
individuals in charge of that policy area.
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Table 4.2. Summary of main characteristics of the governance of the information society policy cycle
An arrow indicates that the initiative was carried through to the next period
Important features of policy
governance
Agenda setting
Policy document
Government level
Interdepartmental Implementation
Group on the Information Society
identifies main policy areas.
Departmental level
Body responsible:
1st ISC
2nd ISC
Telecommunications
infrastructure
e-business
e-government
R&D
Lifelong learning
e-inclusion
Interdepartmental co-ordination
takes place over specific issues but
fails when longer term commitment
is required.
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Table 4.2. Summary of main characteristics of the governance of the information society policy cycle
(continued)
An arrow indicates that the initiative was carried through to the next period
Important features of policy
governance
Policy evaluation and
learning
Government level
Departmental level
Department of An Taoiseach
monitors and appraises progress on
specific actions set out in Action
Plan
Departmental level
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meaning of the information society. One of the issues the ISC was discussing at the time
of this study was the role of the information society in Irelands transition towards a
knowledge-based society (see for example ISC, 2002).
The ISC has produced a number of reports for consideration by the Assistant
Secretaries Implementation Group. It is unclear to what extent the deliberations of the
ISC influence policy. Some members of the ISC interviewed for this project indicated
that the ISC was not a powerful stakeholder in the information society policy-making
process. It is also clear that some interest groups represented in the ISC are more
influential than others. For example, the large MNCs operating in Ireland have a far more
powerful voice than the smaller indigenous firms and certainly more influence than
consumer groups.
Since much of the information society agenda is being developed and implemented at
the level of individual government departments, agencies or units, a less official way for
stakeholders to influence the development of information society policy is through their
contacts and relationships (both formal and informal) with relevant government bodies. It
is clear from the interviews that powerful interest groups, such as MNCs with large
investments in Ireland, have access to ministers and senior civil servants and have exerted
their influence to shape particular aspects of the information society policy agenda.
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central information officer (CIO) with responsibility for developing the technology
strategy within the public sector and second, the establishment of a new body the Office
of Innovative Government to oversee the introduction of process change in government
departments.3
Box 4.2. The developing agenda in e-government
One of the central developments in agenda setting for the information society was the
introduction of strategies for the implementation of e-government. The initial objective of this
agenda was to provide integrated public services on line, facilitated by the introduction of
centralised, Internet-enabled technology. The initial policy focus, contained in the 1999 action
plan, encouraged the development of front-end online access to services, but gave little
emphasis to re-organising back-end processes.
The first action plan spearheaded the drive to make better use of the Internet for information
dissemination and introduced the concept of a portal as the possible architecture of a public
service access interface. Towards the end of 2000 the Reach agency was officially established
to implement e-government strategy. The Reach agency adopted the concept of a portal-based
public service broker (PSB) as a technical solution to providing a front-end interface for
services.
Two main problems emerged in the implementation process however: technical issues in
providing services through the PSB and organisational obstacles hampering the necessary
managerial and work-process changes. As a result of a lack of technical development and
compatibility, very few local authorities are technically able to receive and fully process forms
submitted electronically by citizens. Furthermore, local authority IT managers acknowledge
that local authority managers were resistant to initiatives that required changes to existing
power structures and displayed aversion to committing funds to experimental projects.
As a result of these barriers to implementation, policy focus has recently shifted from a reliance
on the Internet to provide a mechanism of co-ordination, to prioritise the reorganisation of
business processes in government. The focus of previous modernisation policies had
encouraged individual departments to use IT to gain process improvements; the e-government
agenda differed in that it further demanded interdepartmental integration, thus creating a need
for a more comprehensive approach to process change. The ISPU and the Department of An
Taoiseach have indicated that the development of e-government policy will highlight the need
for innovative improvements to government processes and better co-ordination between
government departments and agencies. Information technology will play an enabling but not
central role in this strategy.
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The difficulties of horizontal policy co-ordination even within the same government
departments should not be underestimated. One example is the DETE and the work of the
two industrial development agencies (the IDA and EI) under the aegis of Frfas. A close
working relationship exists between these three bodies, and strategy is shared at the
senior level. However, at the operational level, the extent of policy coherence and coordination often depends on the specific project. Recently for example, the three agencies
took the decision to focus attention on the development of policies for the digital content
industry. However, from this shared overall strategy, the IDA and EI picked different
flavours. The result is that the two agencies are focusing their efforts on different sectors
of the content industry, with an ensuing loss of opportunities for synergies. In this case
the lack of policy coherence is not a product of the lack of horizontal co-ordination
between agencies but a reflection of different needs in the two (foreign-owned and
indigenous) sectors of industry. This example indicates that in some instances a lack of
policy coherence reflects different stages of development, different needs and/or time
horizons. In such situations, the achievement of policy coherence across or even within
government departments may not only not be possible but may not even be desirable.
The organisational arrangements discussed above represent the more or less formal
co-ordination structures of the policy system. Informal networks, however, are just as
important. Ireland is a small country in which social networks are often the mechanisms
for information exchange and contact both inside and outside government. Interviews
carried out for this study confirm that much of the contact between departments and
agencies and between the policy making system and stakeholders is in fact informal.
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responsible for the development of indigenous industry, for example, there is widespread
questioning of the relevance of STI for this part of the economy. It can be argued that the
basis for their scepticism is the science-push character of Irelands present STI initiatives
which have mainly focused on the university research system. This focus has made it
difficult for policy makers outside this system to see the relevance of innovation policy to
their fields of operation. At the same time, the adoption of a science-push model has
meant that there is little awareness in policy circles of the importance of demand-led
innovation policies (see Box 4.3).
There are however important areas for which the concerns of the information society
fit well with those of enterprise development and innovation policy. For example, one of
the priority areas of Frfas and Enterprise Ireland is the development of an indigenous
digital content industry (see the ITS 2007 of Enterprise Ireland, 2000). Today, this policy
area is being developed with no involvement from, or link with, the policy bodies
developing the information society agenda. This has meant that in at least the area of
government procurement, where policies for the information society could have had a
powerful impact on innovation, opportunities have been lost (see Box 4.3).
At present, the only formal link between the ISPU and the departments responsible
for innovation policy (mainly the DETE and DES) is high-level policy-making bodies
such as the Cabinet Committee on the Information Society and the e-Strategies and
Assistant Secretaries groups. Interviews for this study indicate that possible synergies
between information society and STI policy have not been discussed at this level. It is
also the case, however, that even government departments and agencies that do have a
clear mandate in the areas of both innovation and the information society (for example
the DETE and EI) seldom link these two fields in the design and development of policies.
The e-business units at the DETE and EI, for example, have not included innovation as
part of their e-business best-practice recommendations for indigenous SMEs on the
grounds that such firms do not have the capability to innovate. The point to stress here is
that even when there are no institutional obstacles for horizontal policy co-ordination, the
integration of the two policy areas is hindered by the character of Irelands present STI
policy.
In discussing horizontal co-ordination and coherence between policy fields, one
should not underestimate the complexity of the various agendas that are simultaneously
pursued by individual government departments and agencies. These agendas frequently
require difficult trade-offs and there are often synergies with other policy fields. In these
circumstances linkages with innovation policy will only develop to the extent that policy
makers understand where innovation presents a way forward for the challenges they face.
This issue relates to the understanding of the role of innovation rather than the existence
of co-ordinating mechanisms. In Ireland, creating awareness of the role that innovation
can play in different policy areas is a precondition for the development of horizontal
policy co-ordinating mechanisms. Rather than formal co-ordinating structures, the link
between innovation and other policy areas can better be made by individuals well placed
within the system who can see where synergies between policy areas exist. This argues in
favour of the creation of an innovation champion, that is, an individual, or group of
individuals, within the policy system whose task is to identify synergies between
innovation and other policy areas and with the authority and resources to get departments
to work together on a longer-term basis.
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Conclusion
The purpose of studying the policy governance processes in the area of the
information society was to see what lessons could be learned for the development of
horizontal linkages and policy coherence in the area of STI. The first point to note is that,
even in the case of the information society, a policy area that crosses all government
departments, the establishment of horizontal linkages between departments and agencies
represents a major challenge to traditional ways of organising the policy making-process.
While the Department of An Taoiseach, has taken overall responsibility for the
information society agenda, the development of information society policies has taken
place along traditional departmental lines with little interdepartmental co-ordination. The
departmentalisation of the information society agenda, with policies conceived and
implemented following the established rationale of existing departments, has placed
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limits on the potential for the development of a more integrated approach even within this
one policy area.
The second point relates to the difficulties in getting government departments to work
together on a longer-term or continuous basis. In the case of the information society, the
high-level interdepartmental policy structures established to push forward the
implementation of the Action Plans could have become catalysts for initiatives requiring
longer-term (or continuous) horizontal policy co-ordination. These bodies, however, have
played a more limited role, becoming associated mainly with the area of e-government. It
is likely that giving the small ISPU responsibility for e-government as well as the coordination of the information society agenda detracted from its role as overall policy coordinator. As a result, where policy co-ordination between departments and agencies has
been needed, the main mechanism for cross-departmental collaboration has been ad hoc
interdepartmental groups and working committees. While these committees seem to have
been effective in co-ordinating cross-departmental collaboration on specific issues, they
cannot ensure overall long-term policy cohesion.
The study shows that policies for the information society and STI are conceived and
implemented totally independently. Yet, important benefits could be gained by linking
these two policy areas. The fact that STI has only really begun to crystallise as a major
policy area since the late 1990s is a factor explaining the lack of horizontal co-ordination
between the two policy fields. Moreover, the importance of STI policy for Irelands
future development has as yet not been fully understood or accepted within Irish policy
circles. More importantly, however, obstacles for policy coherence arise from the nature
of present STI policies. One of the difficulties for creating linkages and coherence
between policies for the information society and innovation is the fact that Irelands
present STI agenda is more akin to first-generation science-push models than to the
broader innovation system approach identified with second-generation innovation policy.
One implication is that for many in the policy-making system, the relevance of innovation
policy to the information society is not at all clear. This is true even for the departments
most closely associated with the innovation agenda. In the case of Ireland, therefore, a
broader innovation policy is needed before coherence and effective linkages can be
achieved between the two policy fields. Moreover given the complexity of the two policy
fields, the creation of an innovation champion within the policy system with the authority
and resources to encourage cross-departmental initiatives could play an important role in
establishing horizontal co-ordination and policy coherence between the information
society and STI.
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Annex 4.A
Research methodology
This study was based on a detailed review of policy documents in the areas of the
information society and STI over the last ten years, as well as semi-structured interviews
with representatives from a number of policy-making bodies in the areas both of the
information society and STI. The interviews were conducted in the early months of 2004
and included people at various levels of seniority in both policy-making areas. For both
the information society and STI, however, policy makers from the most senior levels
were interviewed.
Organisations interviewed
Information Society Policy Unit (ISPU)
Information Society Commission (ISC)
Enterprise Ireland (EI)
Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment (DETE)
Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Frfas
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI)
Irish Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (ICSTI)
Irish Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (IRCSET)
Higher Education Authority (HEA)
Irish Software Association (ISA)
Notes
1.
Government investment in STI increased from EUR 0.5 billion during the period of the previous
National Development Plan (1994-99) to EUR 2.5 billion in the current National Development Plan.
2.
Up to the end of 2001, EUR 109 million had been made available to support approximately 150 projects
across government departments and agencies.
3.
At the time of interview the ISPU was still formulating the roles and locations of both the CIO and the
Office of Innovative Government.
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INNOVATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: POLICY COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND
References
Cogan, J. (2003), Building a System of Innovation: Reflections on the Irish Experience,
mimeo, Science Policy Research Centre, UCD.
Cogan, J. and J. McDevitt (2002), Review of Irish Industry-oriented R&D and
Innovation Policies: The Link between Low R&D Performance and Poor Technology
Absorptive Capacity, report to Frfas for ICSTI Commission on RTD Policy
Framework.
Culliton Report (1992), A Time for Change, The Industrial Policy Review Group.
Department of the Taoiseach (1999), Implementing the Information Society in Ireland:
An Action Plan.
Department of the Taoiseach (2002), New Connections: A Strategy to Realise the
Potential of the Information Society, Government Action Plan.
Enterprise Ireland (2000), ITS 2007: Opportunities for Irelands High-Technology
Internationally Traded Services (ITS) Sector to 2007.
European Union (2003), Innovation Tomorrow.
Frfas (1996), Shaping Our Future: A Strategy for Enterprise in Ireland in the 21st
Century.
Frfas (2002), A Strategy for the Digital Content Industry in Ireland.
Hilliard, R. and R. Green (2005), Governance and Institutional Change in Ireland, in
OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in
Innovation Policy.
IDC Steering Group (2004), Building Irelands Knowledge Economy: The Irish Action
Plan for Promoting Investment in R&D to 2010, Report to the Inter Departmental
Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation.
Information Society Commission (2002), Building a Knowledge Society: Report to
Government.
Information Society Steering Committee (ISSC) (1996), Information Society Ireland:
Strategy for Action.
Lundvall, B.A. and S. Borras, (1997), The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications
for Innovation Policy, Directorate-General Science, Research and Development, EU.
OECD (2002), Dynamising National Innovation Systems, OECD, Paris.
Sweeney, P. (1999), The Celtic Tiger: Irelands Continuing Economic Miracle, Oak Tree
Press, Dublin.
Telesis Consultancy Group (1982), A Review of Irish Industrial Policy.
Trauth, E. (2000), The Culture of an Information Economy: Influences and Impacts in the
Republic of Ireland, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Chapter 5
HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION OF INNOVATION POLICIES:
INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS1
Pim den Hertog and Hilde de Groot
Dialogic, the Netherlands
This chapter analyses Dutch policies relating to the information society and information
and communications technologies (ICT) at the central government level. It addresses
processes of agenda setting, policy co-ordination and evaluation. As in most other
countries, information society/ICT policies in the Netherlands have gradually become
broader in scope. ICT has enabled broad transformation of processes in both industry and
public domains. However, not all actors develop an information society/ICT policy
agenda to increase innovation or develop the knowledge economy. Most see ICT as an
enabler in their primary processes without any clear link to innovation. Although much
energy is invested in formulating an integrated ICT/information society strategy, the
ministries most involved have a good deal of autonomy in shaping and implementing
their information society/ICT policy. This leads to the question of whether it would be too
complex to formulate an overall ICT/information society strategy. This chapter concludes
that interdepartmental practices do not as yet allow for a further broadening of information society/ICT policy making. However, new co-ordination and governance mechanisms are under discussion and experiments with some new governance mechanisms are
under way.
Introduction
A broad and complex policy area2
In the Netherlands as in most developed countries the past two decades have seen the
introduction first of ICT policies and then, from the early 1990s, information society
policies. Over time these policies have increased in both scope and complexity, making it
sometimes difficult to see where specific information society/ICT policy ends and more
sectoral policies begin. The most recent (central) government-wide ICT White Paper
makes the central goal of ICT policy to address major economic and societal issues with
the help of ICT. It notes that ICT not only can improve productivity levels, but also
facilitate new forms of co-operation and increase the quality of (public) services
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004). It states that in both private and public domains
there is a need for new combinations of actors and services, new organisational concepts
and new business models.
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There have been a variety of policies, schemes and initiatives over the years. While
there have been isolated successes, the complexity of the task has made it difficult to
facilitate the development and use of the potential of ICT throughout the economy and
society. The complexity is associated with the following factors:
ICT policy is not an isolated policy area, but an aspect of a great many policy
areas. This raises questions regarding the design of ICT policies. How does
innovation policy relate to ICT policy? To what extent can there be separate ICT
and broadband policies? How do policies for public government envisage ICT?
As a result, ICT policies most likely involve considerable inter- (and intra-)
departmental co-ordination. This requires a clear overall ICT policy strategy and
the ability to use other policy areas to achieve policy goals.
Both politicians and ICT policy makers experience this complexity on a daily
basis. They are involved in changing existing regulations, in developing and
applying broad and more focused policy plans, and in taking stock of best
practices and benchmarking initiatives. In most countries (and indeed at the EU
and other levels) attempts are made to derive an overall information society/ICT
policy agenda or action plan, by selecting new priorities and revising existing
policies. Increasingly, information society/ICT dossiers require the co-operation
of various ministries, as emphasis shifts to using ICT and facilitating innovation
in all domains. Beyond interdepartmental co-ordination and coherence in STI
policies, new interdepartmental coalitions seem needed in specific sectors. Some
countries have in fact chosen to co-ordinate information society/ICT policies at
the highest political levels.
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Are there processes of policy learning and evaluation that can be identified in
information society/ICT policy aimed at furthering innovation government-wide?
The case study reported here was restricted in scale and scope. One limitation is
restriction of the coverage to information society/ICT policy initiated at the central
government level. Another is that the principal focus is on the link between information
society/ICT policy and innovation in an attempt to see how the former has worked to
raise the innovativeness of the Dutch economy and society. The discussion is therefore
biased towards policy initiatives in which the Ministry of Economic Affairs plays a
dominant role. Finally, attention is given to processes of agenda setting and policy
formulation, emphasising horizontalisation, policy learning and interdepartmental coordination.
Figure 5.1. Phases in a simple policy cycle and aspects addressed in this contribution
Agenda setting
Evaluation
Aspects:
Co-ordination
Policy coherence
Horizontalisation
Policy learning
Policy formulation
and
implementation
The chapter is organised as follows. First, there is a brief historical overview of how
information society/ICT policy has developed since 1970 and the main characteristics of
the formal organisation of information society/ICT policy are described. The discussion
then turns to the setting of the information society/ICT policy agenda and some insight is
provided into the policy formulation process, the co-ordination mechanisms used and
how horizontal co-ordination takes place in practice. Then, the policy evaluation phase is
discussed and some observations regarding policy learning are made. Finally, some
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concluding remarks are made and some of the findings are linked to the overall innovation governance discussion.
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In 1998 the National Action Programme (NAP) was rebalanced. The position of the
Netherlands vis--vis the other EU member states was evaluated and new priorities were
set. In the second half of the 1990s a multitude of government initiatives were taken. At
that point in time, sectoral action programmes defining sectoral ICT policies were published. The impact of ICT in all sorts of domains was increasingly under consideration.
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Box 5.1. Some ICT/information society policy initiatives taken in 1999-2003 (continued)
The Ministry of Economic Affairs (actually a department within the Ministry of Transport,
Public Works and Water Management that was soon merged with the Ministry of Economic
Affairs) initiated a smartcity, Kenniswijk, in the Eindhoven region. Started in 2001 Kenniswijk
has developed into a national test bed for consumers in the area of computers, (mobile)
communications and the Internet. For the experiment organised as a public-private venture
the government reserved EUR 45 million in funds over a five-year period, equally divided
between infrastructure and development of innovative services. At the end of 2003/early 2004
the initiative was evaluated and major changes were made, including opening up the scheme for
developing innovative services to applicants from all over the country and focusing the services
to be developed much more on societal areas such as health, education, mobility and security.
As of March 2005 almost 100 services are under development in Kenniswijk and 48 services
have been completed.
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Characteristics
1970- 94:
Development of ICT
policy as a separate
policy area
ICT policy largely part of and originating from science and technology policy.
Focus merely on ICT research and ICT infrastructures and at the end increasingly
on regulatory framework, normalisation and certification.
Gradual shift from predominantly supply-oriented towards diffusion and demandoriented ICT policies.
Privatisation and liberalisation of telecoms feature high on the policy agenda at the
end of this phase.
1994-99:
Broadening of ICT
policies into
information society
policies
A Government-wide ICT
Agenda: Better Performance
with ICT (2004)
1999-2003:
Integrated and coordinated
information
society/ICT policies
2004 onwards:
Using ICT and the
development of a
government-wide
ICT agenda
1. For a definition of the narrowly defined ICT core industries, see OECD (2002), which defines the ICT core industries as a combination of manufacturing and services industries that capture, transmit and display data and information electronically (pp. 81-83). In
a recently published study comparing UK and Dutch ICT policies, a similar broad definition of ICT policies was provided. ICT
policies concern the development and generation of new information and communication technologies, and their diffusion and application across all types of activity, from manufacturing, public services to leisure and education (Molas-Gallart et al., 2003, p. 18).
Source: den Hertog et al. (2005).
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Formal organisation of central government ICT/information society policy
In the Netherlands no single ministry is responsible for ICT policy. The major White
Papers are signed by various ministers and various ministries may lead depending on the
theme (Figure 5.2). However, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is primarily responsible
for co-ordinating ICT policy at the central governmental level. This is evident in the
government-wide ICT agenda published in 2004.
Over the years the lead or most proactive ministries have varied, and the broadening
of issues is reflected in the actors involved at the central government level. In the first
phase the leaders were the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW, science
policy) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ, firm-oriented policies). The Ministry
of Traffic, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) played a role in the whole
process of the privatisation and regulation of telecoms. However, the department
responsible for this matter was recently merged with the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Since the early 1990s the Ministry of Justice (JUS) has played an important role in setting
the legal framework for ICT, but never a dominant role. With the increased importance of
ICT for government operations, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
(BZK) successfully claimed and actually played a more dominant role. The role of OCW
has increased since the mid-1990s, less in terms of co-ordination than in terms of
spending on ICT skills and ICT use in education. In practice, the three core ministries are
the OCW, EZ and BZK. Not coincidently, these are the only ministries with separate ICT
directorates. The simplified version of the distribution of responsibilities among these
ministries for the various themes is given in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2. Distribution of some ICT themes over the five ministries (most) involved in
information society/ICT policy
V&W
EZ
OCW
BZK
JUS
Knowledge and
innovation
Legislation
e-learning
Access and capabilities
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The recent ICT White Paper, A Government-wide ICT Agenda, does not fully answer
the question of how to deal jointly with ICT challenges in various domains. It notes that
institutional reforms and redesign of work procedures are needed to make better use of
ICT. This implies that the distribution of tasks and responsibilities for ICT within the
central government needs to be reconsidered. The new White Paper notes that to attack
societal issues, the BZK and the EZ will attempt jointly to see what possibilities exist to
improve efficiency and efficacy through the application of ICT (through chance or
opportunity cards). However, it is also mentioned that the responsibility for solving
societal issues, as mentioned in the coalition agreement or working programme of the
current coalition, resides with the sectoral ministry in charge and its partners in society
(2004, p. 19). When it concerns others, government may suggest coalitions to learn to
appreciate better use of ICT. How this will be realised and the appropriate governance
structures are not mentioned (see below for further discussion of this issue).
The pattern is similar for policy implementation, i.e. it is typically a responsibility of
individual ministries. The policy plans in the White Papers are translated into more
specific action programmes, plans and projects. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has
launched an action plan on broadband, BZK published a programme on how to organise
government, Modernising Government (2003), in which ICT is only an enabler. In some
case an individual ad hoc advisory commission is set up to propose a practical strategy on
how to deal with certain topics. For some overarching policy programmes, co-ordinating
platforms (interdepartmental working groups) are created in which the ministries most
involved are represented. There are co-ordinating platforms or committees for ICT and
administrative costs, streamlining of base data, and public key infrastructure (PKI).
Finally it should be remarked that the various ministries operate through various services.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs uses its innovation centres (Syntens) to implement its
ICT policies aimed at SMEs, and the telecoms regulator (Opta) supervises the operation
of the various players in the telecom market. BZK has created a separate body that coordinates and manages large programmes in the area of e-government and has a position
between pure implementation and policy design (ICTU). OCW has created Kennisnet to
implement its ICT policies in education. Thus, at the level of policy design and policy
implementation, various departmental approaches and practices dominate a more coordinated approach.
Agenda setting
Some characteristics of the information society/ICT agenda setting process
In public administration studies a distinction is made between a policy agenda, a
political agenda and a public agenda. The agenda-setting process concerns the ways in
which a certain topic is put on the policy agenda. Some topics are triggered mostly by
external parties (i.e. the public agenda leads), others are initiated internally i.e. by
politicians and policy makers (the policy agenda leads) (van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1996,
p. 182) In the case of the information society/ICT agenda, the agenda-setting process is
not very clear-cut for various reasons:
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Sometimes coincidence plays a more important role than some actors would like
to admit. A study tour or visit of officials of the responsible minister may for
example play a role in setting the agenda.
Some of characteristics of the internal and external processes of agenda setting that
can be observed in the Netherlands are described in more detail below.
As coalition governments are the norm in the Netherlands, the coalition agreement is
an important element of the agenda-setting process. All sorts of interested parties try to
influence those in charge of forming a new cabinet, and the agreement in fact defines the
political priorities. These priorities set in motion a new policy cycle in which a new
budget reflects the new priorities, and a policy White Paper is generally produced that
either reaffirms existing policies with some new emphasis (mostly the case) or announces
new policies or initiatives. Although the length of the policy cycle may differ, a four-year
rhythm is the norm. The White Paper is generally followed by more detailed policy
programmes and actions plans or practical projects.
An important part of the wheeling and dealing takes place between policy makers of
the various ministries that jointly compose and write the White Papers. The ministries
bring their respective building blocks, and along as these are recognised as belonging to
one ministry and one jurisdiction, they are integrated quite easily (the individual
ministries can use their separate budgets). Discussion mostly focuses on new policy
initiatives (that have not been assigned to a specific ministry) or on interdepartmental
programmes. In the latest ICT White Paper, it is stated that funds are put aside on the
departmental budgets for internal application of ICT and for ICT activities in the sector
under the ministrys responsibility. NAP funds (a relatively small interdepartmental
programme) are available for new ventures or new themes as long as there is no
regular budget available. The formulation leaves room for interpretation and further
negotiations among ministries. Encouraging such actions may contribute to better use of
ICT for the most urgent societal problems. NAP seems to be less important as a
mechanism for interdepartmental co-ordination. Not only is the budget limited, but
ministries have some sort of drawing rights and propose projects that cannot be funded
through the regular budget. So far, ministries intervene little in other ministries selection
of projects.
A new ICT White Paper replicated in the more detailed programmes and actions
plans that are, in some case, formulated by more than one ministry takes on a more
formal character when the final drafts are discussed in the committee in which high-level
officials approve (or refuse) the results of the work of the interdepartmental writing
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Academia and related organisations are important external actors, and are relatively
well organised (NOW, VSNU, TNO). They mostly influence the ICT research agenda.
Recently, academia, organisations active in applied research and the ICT industry have
teamed up in the ICT forum to advise on the ICT research agenda; in the near future they
will bear responsibility in the regieorgaan ICT for organising the ICT research function.
Figure 5.3. Kingdon garbage can model of agenda setting in public policy
This model seems to reflect the Dutch situation. At few moments in the life of a
policy dossier can radical changes be made, as it is the exception rather than the rule to
find a set of problems (the public agenda), politics (the political agenda) and policy (the
policy agenda) aligned so that the agenda can be radically redefined. In practice the
political momentum is generally decisive. When there is a new government and a new
budget and leading politicians are prepared to make a change that is supported by various
external actors (who make practical proposals that are more or less aligned) more radical
changes can be made. Benchmarking exercises increasingly play a role. Both politicians
and policy makers are sensitive to bad ratings in international comparisons and this may
increase their readiness to change an agenda. In the mid-1990s, for example, it was clear
that something should be done about the slow rate of ICT start-ups and the initiative to
establish ICT twinning centres materialised quite easily. In 1999/2000, in the wake of
excitement over the Internet and ICT, extra money was made available for facilitating
ICT/Internet development; ICT policy directed at SMEs still benefits, as detailed plans on
how to spend the money were drawn up in subsequent years. In the period between such
windows of opportunity the overall budget remains quite stable. Currently, as budgetcutting is the norm and ICT has lost some of its political appeal it is harder to put ICT
high on the political agenda, let alone increase the budget for ICT policy.
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governments policy agenda. Its main disadvantages is that it tends to diminish the
importance of the local environment, which is generally closer to user needs, and it faces
difficulties at the implementation stage when the agencies and departments in charge may
resist the perceived imposition of policy practices... The adequacy of a centralising or
decentralising approach will depend on the policy area and the stage of policy
formulation. In general, policy definition is likely to benefit from central co-ordination
and the clear definition of policy objectives. The pursuit of policy consensus is likely, at
best, to slow down the policy-making process and, at worst result in muddled policy
objectives. Yet to force a centralising top-down process on policy-making implementation is likely to encounter resistance from those in charge of implementing the policy, and
may run counter to the political traditions and practices of countries with a diffuse
distribution of political power. Bottom-up approaches will usually be better suited to the
implementation stages of an ICT policy.
Dutch information society/ICT policies can possibly be best characterised as follows:
Processes of policy making and translating these into practical programmes are
rather slow.
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The ITPS report notes a related trait that is possibly as harmful: hesitancy and loss of
policy coherence. They observe that in seeking as broad a consensus as possible, policy
making and implementation often became hesitant. This is clearly visible in the halfhearted attempts to liberalise the market, steering between maintaining a favourable
position for the incumbent while ensuring non-discriminatory access for new entrants.
The result was an ambiguous policy that in the end satisfied no one. Significantly, the
excessive emphasis on the allocation of responsibilities to the appropriate decisionmaking level has resulted in the loss of policy coherence. (Molas-Gallart et al., 2003,
p. 26)
It seems as if government is well aware of the fact that new co-ordination and
governance mechanisms are needed. More vision, steering and clear-cut choices may be
what is needed most. This could also imply giving up autonomy. Molas-Gallart et al.
remark that the Netherlands recognise that policies have to be co-ordinated horizontally
across different ministries and departments. Yet, they are facing difficulties to put in
place effective horizontal structures as ministries and departments have resisted attempts
to remove their control over ICT policy (2003, p. 12). The 2004 ICT White Paper, A
government-wide ICT agenda: Performing better with ICT, already signals the need for a
more integrated approach. At the same time it notes that better performance using ICT
coincides quite often with institutional adaptations and redesigned working processes (see
Box 5.3). Within government, government leads, whereas in areas where other parties
lead, government may facilitate the forming of coalitions to show organisations and firms
the advantages of better use of ICT. At the same time the White Paper does not propose
many institutional adaptations. It announces that the advisory ICT forum will become a
platform (regieorgaan ICT) that disposes of discretionary power regarding Dutch ICT
research. It also promises that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of the
Interior will jointly screen a number of areas that might benefit from more targeted use of
ICT (2004, p. 19). It does not spell out how this can be organised and to what degree it
might contribute to a new sort of interdepartmental coalition to work on the ICT issue in
various societal areas.
Another example showing that government is struggling with how co-ordination and
governance regarding ICT needs to be shaped is the ad hoc advisory committee on ICT
and government that published the report, Citizen and Government in the Information
Society: The need for institutional innovation (2001). In this report, the committee
presents its vision of the information society and the relationship between the government
and citizens. The Committee argued that in order to strengthen the role of government in
the information society, government had to find new ways of working. Non-hierarchical
approaches should be promoted especially in the field of ICT with its high level of
complexity, its socio-economic pervasiveness and the impossibility to lead the
information revolution. The changing role of government should therefore be based on
the principles of mediation, facilitation and process management. (Molas-Gallart et al.,
2003, p. 138)
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So far an overall ICT policy strategy is missing. It currently is too much an accretion of the
needs and wishes of individual ministries and the associated budgets. In fact ICT policy
and later information society/ICT policy were never managed top-down in an integrated
way. At the level of policy programmes and White Papers, a layer of interdepartmental coordination exists, but it overlays various departmental bodies and programmes of quite
autonomous ICT/information society policies that are still articulated to a limited degree in
the form of concrete, measurable goals.1 There are some positive signs, such as the recent
foundation of a interdepartmental working group on electronic services and identification
(CEDI).
In the ICT realm, a number of external ad hoc committees have been used over the years.
Some made a real impact, others just caused a temporary ripple. One can question the
extensive use made of this instrument and the resulting committee culture.2
A real evaluation culture with swift adaptation of policy if needed and more policy
learning is not yet widely accepted. The last integral or meta-evaluation of ICT policy
appears to have been performed at the end of the 1980s. There are a number of changes
under way such as the overall move towards more accountability, reformulation of the
overall ICT policy plan, and the overall trend towards monitoring and evaluation.
The same position paper discusses the balance between policy strategy and policy implementation. It is questioned whether a complete and inclusive ICT strategy can be formulated. A
plea is made for more pragmatic, faster and hence lighter forms of strategy formulation with
clear policy goals and a clear focus on removing the major barriers to large-scale implementation of ICT in industry and, from a public policy perspective, in societal sectors. In policy
implementation, the demand side needs to put forward its needs more strongly. This requires
policy makers to use a more varied arsenal of policy tools in addition to financing, and act as
regulator, owner and supplier, governor, facilitator of learning environments and experiments,
knowledge broker and system director.
___________
1. One could also argue that ICT seems to be gradually more integrated into the various sectoral policies because
it has become too important to be shared completely with other ministries. Possibly the momentum for more coordination in information society/ICT policy is already behind us.
2. Without judging the quality of the advice given, quite a number of ad hoc committees were established in the
last few years. In the e-government realm, they include the Commission Cerfontaine (on ICT and the City),
Commission Snellen (on modernising the local administration), Commission Docters van Leeuwen (on ICT and
government). There were several temporary advisory commissions on ICT and innovation/research, for
example: the Commission Risseeuw (on the social and economic return on ICT investments), Commission Le
Pair (on ICT research) and the Broadband Expert Group (public broadband strategy) among others.
Source: den Hertog et al. (2005), pp. 18-20.
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However, there are also developments that work against NAP as an effective coordination mechanism. As indicated, most information society/ICT budgets are still run
by the individual ministries that are responsible for certain dossiers. Only a small fraction
of programmes and projects is funded through NAP. Further, the interdepartmental
character of a programme or project is not one of the selection critera. In fact, the various
ministries have some sort of drawing rights regarding the NAP budget. They are
relatively free to put forward proposals and are not very critical of other ministries
proposals. Thus, departmentalisation continues even in an interdepartmental programme.
Therefore NAP can be perceived, more cynically, as a fall-back option if policy makers
or politicians fail to fund initiatives completely through regular departmental budgets.
Finally, interdepartmental co-ordination through NAP is sometimes overruled by a higher
level, i.e. CWTI (see above).
Over the years various ad hoc advisory commissions headed by mostly reputable persons
have studied and advised on various ICT-related topics.
These commissions may help in the process of agenda setting and policy formulation.
As they are official commissions, the government is obliged to react officially on the
advice they provide. This may lead to a parliamentary debate on the results. However,
such commissions may also delay decision making, can result in advice that sets no
obligations on government and can on some occasions be a way to shift to another body
the task of formulating policy options or to get rid of ideas that appear threatening.
A new development in innovation governance gives external advisors more
permanent tasks or some discretionary power to actually do something. The establishment
of the innovation platform chaired by the prime minister is an example. In addition to the
prime minister and the ministers of OCW and EZ, 15 representatives of the knowledge
infrastructure and industry provide advice on all knowledge economy topics. To some
degree, the agenda of these high-level platforms steers the political and policy process.
While the government has no obligation other than to take the advice seriously, the
advisors are gradually almost getting discretionary power.
This development can be seen in information society/ICT policy as well. The recently
announced establishment of a public-private broadband expertise centre is one example.
The announcement in the recent government-wide ICT agenda (2004) that not only will
the ICT forum advise on the organisation of ICT research, but will also partly steer it is
very interesting. For this purpose, the ICT forum is reshaped into an ICT co-ordination
platform (regieorgaan ICT) that is still composed mostly of independent outsiders but
will decide on the organisation of ICT research in the Netherlands.
The transformation of the ICT forum into regieorgaan ICT was announced in 2004,
and reference was made to experience gained in the Action Programme Genomics in
which this new governance model was introduced for the first time (Boekholt and
Mckibbin, 2004). The regieorgaan ICT was established jointly by the Ministry of EZ and
the Ministry of OCW. There is no overall regieorgaan for the whole information
society/ICT domain; the regieorgaan ICT is restricted to ICT research. It will have
formal responsibility for co-ordinating ICT research (e.g. by establishing programmes),
which should increase the efficacy and efficiency of ICT research.17 This will most likely
involve a streamlining of existing instruments used to finance ICT research. Another
possibility is the creation of (virtual) network institutes with built-in incentives to prevent
overlap and achieve the necessary co-operation. It is not likely that the regieorgaan ICT
will distribute funding on the basis of the criteria it formulates. It is more likely to bring
together actors to define a joint long-term work plan and make the coalition responsible
for the funds and execution of their plan.
The regieorgaan ICT cannot be compared with the NAP steering group as it operates
at some distance from the ministries, includes members from industry and academia, and
has a specific focus (ICT research). As in the case of the innovation platform, it means
greater involvement of industry and academia in policy formulation and funding. How
this will take shape and to what degree insiders who are neither politicians nor policy
makers will be allowed to decide and take responsibility for spending public funds
remains to be seen.
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Some observations regarding the use of benchmarking, experiments and evaluation
There is a general society-wide trend towards evaluation and accountability, not least
in industry where recent administrative scandals have further strengthened the trend
towards corporate governance. In the public domain a similar trend towards new forms of
management (new public management) and related forms of accountability have surfaced.
Politicians and policy makers have greater interest in benchmarking, policy experiments,
monitoring and evaluation. In an EU setting an open method of co-ordination is in
vogue, and the combination of ambitious goals and benchmarking should gradually lead
to more coherence and mutual policy learning. In the Netherlands, the elements of new
public management have been introduced as well. An operation named VBTB led to the
formulation of clearly stated policy goals and the formulation of quantifiable indicators, a
trend that is visible in science and innovation policies as well. In innovation policy the
evaluation function was restructured and there is a trend towards mid-term and ex ante
evaluation as well as more quantitative evaluation.18 In science policy government tries to
steer in a less detailed manner.
As noted in the latest international ICT benchmark (2002), the use of monitoring and
benchmarking in ICT has increased. At the European level, eEurope, Eurostat, EITO and
many individual studies undertake much comparative analysis. At the global level, such
studies are provided by the OECD, universities, market research and consultancy firms.
In the Netherlands there is a separate ICT in education monitor (progress report twice a
year) and the Social and Cultural Planning Office presents international comparative
research on the role of ICT in society. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has, as part of
the Dutch Digital Delta initiative, invested in international benchmarking studies and
funds benchmarking publications like Networks in Figures (2004) (mostly for telecoms)
and The Digital Economy (2001), published by Statistics Netherlands.19 The most recent
ICT White Paper stresses the importance of measuring performance in ICT and verifying
improved performance (2004, p. 2).
Monitoring and benchmarking have developed quickly. However, these documents
are at the same time seen as policy-poor, as benchmarking and monitoring are poorly
linked to policy and the results of policy making, i.e. monitoring and benchmarking are
not coupled with policy evaluation.20 Benchmarking and monitoring are mostly used not
for evaluation purposes or to analyse the impact of information society/ICT policies
which would require more advanced evaluation but to analyse the position vis--vis
competing countries and to motivate adaptations to or intensify policy efforts that are
presented in separate policy documents. Processes of policy design, monitoring and
benchmarking and, where available, policy evaluation are taking place separately. MolasGallert et al. remark that: In the Netherlands general monitoring revolves around a
structured international benchmarking exercise. The degree to which measurable
benchmark indicators that could be attributed to specific policy initiatives is far from
clear and has not been formally explored. Yet, a good benchmark performance is still
taken as an indicator of robust and adequate policy outcomes. (Evaluation must often deal
with difficult problems like the attribution of impacts to a specific initiative, the ways to
identify the additionality of a policy [i.e. identify the effects that would not have taken
place in the absence of a policy), and the timing of the evaluation. There are different
methods and techniques to deal with these issues). (2003, p. 27)
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Learning not only occurs through monitoring, benchmarking and policy evaluation,
but may also be the result of experiments. For the information society and ICT, the
importance of (learning from) experiments has been stressed. However, there is no
culture of systematically evaluating experiments and evaluating them in real time so as to
make changes when needed. If experiments are used, it must be possible for them to
succeed. Otherwise, positive aspects are stressed more than the points for which learning
is possible. Further, there is not yet a culture of real-time evaluation and swift adaptation
that would speed up learning processes. It was pointed out in several interviews that
experiments are not always treated as continuous and interactive learning trajectories. If
problems arise during the experiments, adaptations are only made after the formal
evaluation or mid-term review. Finally, if an experiment or a new approach is successful,
it may be copied quite easily, without always questioning whether it is the best solution or
effective in terms of investing in learning.21
More general integrated or meta-evaluation of Dutch information society/ICT policy
is lacking, for example at the level of NAP or DDD. Evaluations take place at the level of
individual measures and programmes and most ministries have their own approaches to
evaluation. This implies that policy learning also mostly takes place at this level. In
general much more energy is invested in agenda setting, consultation and policy
formulation than in evaluation. Molas-Gallart et al. (2003) mention that neither the
Netherlands nor the UK has been found to follow a systematic approach to ICT policy
evaluation. In both countries there was an element of centrally co-ordinated monitoring,
and, in addition ministries and agencies carried out their own evaluations, mostly on an
ad hoc basis. More often evaluation and policy assessment will be conducted on an ad
hoc, as needed basis. In the Netherlands a strong emphasis on policy analysis can be
seen as part of the consensus-driven approach to policy formation. The Dutch study has
shown that exhaustive policy consultation results in comprehensive documentation on
policy definition. These documents will often include different forms of policy
evaluation, whether implicitly or explicitly (2003, pp. 27, 28).
When evaluations are performed, cost-benefit analyses or quantitative indicators
dominate, and wider societal effects or process-like evaluations receive relatively less
attention.22 It was remarked for example that individual policy programmes were
evaluated, but not the whole policy process (and hence possibilities for policy learning
were missed). It is mostly when a small project group of officials starts working on a new
White Paper that reflection on current policies and the policy package as a whole takes
place.
There is still quite some ground to cover in terms of policy evaluation in information
society/ICT policy. The possibilities for policy learning are not fully utilised. Of course
the various stages at which information society/ICT policy was broadened can be
perceived as the result of subsequent (mostly implicit) processes of policy learning, but
these changes are to an important degree also defined by political developments, not least
the EU information society/ICT policies that increasingly set the scene.
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Concluding remarks
This section links the various aspects of governance in Dutch ICT/information society
policy examined above to the wider innovation governance discussion through some
general concluding remarks. These focus on the need to link various policy levels more
explicitly in terms of temporal coherence, vertical coherence, horizontal coherence, the
issue of policy laboratories and policy learning between policy fields, and the new role
of outsiders in policy formulation and policy implementation.
Temporal coherence
One may argue that policy coherence is one of the results of governance. Temporal
coherence is concerned with co-ordination over time. In Dutch information society/ICT
policy, although there may be quite some policy turbulence over time, budgets and
programmes are generally fixed and responsibilities are respected, so that policy changes
are evolutionary rather than revolutionary.23 If a new overall strategy or action plan is
presented, the budget mostly is a repackaging of existing budgets (which are now
allocated differently or more specifically) plus some new money. This seems to be in
line with the garbage can model elaborated by Kingdon (see above). There are few
moments in the lifetime of a policy dossier at which radical changes can be made. It is the
exception rather than the rule that problems (or the public agenda), politics (political
agenda) and policy (policy agenda) are aligned and offer a window of opportunity to
radically redefine the agenda. This observation seems to hold for Dutch innovation policy
as well. In general, one can dispute how much adaptation and change is beneficial.
Sometimes long-term stability, predictability, simplicity (and less so adaptation) may be
preferable to short-term adaptability, constant changes and new forms of governance and
instrumentation.
Vertical coherence
Vertical coherence is about co-ordination of policy formulation and policy
implementation. In the Netherlands, policy-making processes are extremely important but
relatively slow. Strategy formulation (and consensus seeking) involves a lengthy process
of consultation and discussion in which many actors participate (without ensuring a truly
integrated approach). Co-ordination and co-operation are mostly considered when it is
more or less compulsory because other ministries have clear responsibility in a particular
area. It is less perceived as a way of organising matters more conveniently or as a way to
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speed up policy implementation. At the same time, the practical day-to-day knowledge
derived from implementing all sorts of policy schemes is not always used optimally
because of the gap between policy design or developing policy strategies and policy
implementation. Increasing the quality of innovation governance in the Dutch situation
may require the introduction of lighter (hence faster) ways of strategy building that
leave more leeway for sectoral ICT strategies combined with empowered sectoral ICT
(implementing) organisations.
Even more fundamentally, one might wonder if some topics are simply too big and
too complex to formulate an integrated, coherent policy strategy. This consumes a lot of
energy and time, while not necessarily guaranteeing a superior approach. If
departmentalisation is endemic, it might be more productive to accept the fact that an
integrated information society/ICT strategy does not exist and to invest in more
decentralised experiments and hence start processes of policy learning as quickly as
possible. Put differently, some topics may be too important to many policy actors and the
co-ordination costs may outweigh the cost of choosing other strategies. In such cases the
momentum for heavier forms of (vertical) co-ordination is already lost.
Horizontal coherence
Horizontal coherence is about the co-ordination of various policy strands. In
innovation policy this is traditionally about the co-ordination of science, technology and
industry policies. But for third-generation innovation policies it is increasingly about coordinating mainstream STI policies with sectoral policies. Ultimately, horizontal
innovation policies mean that policy initiatives and instruments deriving from various
domains (in practice from ministries) are co-ordinated, strengthen each other and address
wider societal issues through well-co-ordinated policies deriving from various policy
domains. The need is evident in information society/ICT policies as well as in innovation
policy.
A (horizontally) coherent policy requires a basic understanding of who does what
(transparency) and a clear distribution of responsibilities. Over the years transparency in
Dutch information society/ICT policy has increased, mainly owing to the mapping and
streamlining of activities since the late 1990s. As observed above, responsibilities are
spread over many actors and possibilities for enforcing policy are limited, and this
negatively affects policy coherence. Ministries optimise information society/ICT policies
mainly at the level of individual ministries, as cross-departmental initiatives are laborious
and require the sort of exchanges that most policy makers are not used to (or willing to
enter into). Interdepartmental co-ordination takes place when a new overall information
society/ICT White Paper is being formulated, an important window of opportunity for
change. An important part of the wheeling and dealing takes place between policy makers
in the various ministries that compose and write the White Papers. The ministries mostly
bring their own interests, and interdepartmental co-ordination takes place when issues
obviously exceed the responsibility of one ministry (and co-ordination is almost
compulsory). In practice there is only a small layer of interdepartmental information
society/ICT policy on top of a broad base of mainly departmentalised information
society/ICT policies. At the same time, the information society/ICT policy agenda has
broadened from a science-technology agenda to an agenda that addresses societal and
governmental transformation, and horizontalisation of content is accomplished almost
along the way. However, horizontalisation in organisational terms is much slower. In the
processes of agenda setting, policy formulation and evaluation, individual ministries
rather than integrated programmes dominate.
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To achieve the needed horizontal coherence requires putting a premium on
interdepartmental projects where these are needed most. Old-style hierarchies are not
designed for horizontal communication and more mechanisms are needed to deal with
these, not through interdepartmental programmes with departmental drawing rights, but
through interdepartmental budgets that can enforce breakthroughs on key dossiers. This
might even take the form of interdepartmental project teams and dedicated project
directors with power to act. What is important is that interdepartmental vehicles have
enough responsibility or room to manoeuvre to function and execute their tasks well.
Another option might be to designate ICT project ministers or state secretaries for
example for ICT in health or e-government. In Dutch information society/ICT policies,
the need for institutional adaptation and redesign has been noted. In the 2004 ICT White
Paper the need for institutional reforms and redesign of working procedures was noted
as a prerequisite for better use of ICT. Although the regieorgaan ICT is a good example
of renewal in innovation governance, other new forms of governance are needed.
More generally, the goal of increasing the quality of innovation governance requires
new forms of horizontal and mostly interdepartmental co-ordination. In this context, the
government policy to rotate top officials over the ministries (on average a new position
every five years) might have been one of the best decisions to facilitate future
interdepartmental governance.
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences
to steer and streamline research in ICT is a remarkable innovation in governance of ICT.
It will be interesting to see how this new form of governance takes shape and to what
degree insiders who are neither politicians nor policy makers will be allowed to decide
and take responsibility for spending public money. In mainstream innovation policy the
creation of the innovation platform is another example of the new way of involving
ousiders in the policy process. Are these signs that traditional forms of policy coordination have failed and that coherent policy strategies or new forms of governance
need to be welcomed?
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Notes
1.
This is an abridged and partly updated version of H. de Groot and P. den Hertog (2004), Innovation
Governance in the Netherlands as illustrated by Information Society/ICT Policies, case study carried out
within the framework of the Dutch OECD MONIT studies on innovation governance, Dialogic, Utrecht.
2.
3.
The phrase pervasive technology was introduced by Freeman in the early 1980s. In the economic
literature, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) further developed the notion as general purpose
technology.
4.
The Bangemann Report on the Information Superhighway in the early 1990s triggered the publication of
the Action Plan Information Superhighways in the Netherlands (and similar initiatives in other EU
countries). The more recent eEurope 2002 and eEurope 2005 action plans have certainly led to a further
Europeanisation of Dutch information society/ICT policies. R&D policies regarding ICT cannot be made
without taking into account developments such as the 7th Framework Programme, the European
Technology Platforms (ETPs) and discussions on an European Research Council. Many ICT applications
and standards require at least European scale, and EU regulation, action programmes and best practices
in fact steer national agendas.
5.
As during the Dutch EU presidency. The Ministry of Economic Affairs presented a major study by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) entitled Rethinking the European ICT Agenda. Ten ICT breakthroughs
for reaching Lisbon goals. In the EU Telecom Council in December 2004 six new elements were placed
on the European ICT agenda, namely: an excellent ICT sector and innovative businesses; ICT for
Citizens and ICT skills; ICT for public services; content and development of products and services;
development of networks; and trust and security. The fight against spam was tabled.
6.
Similar conclusions are drawn in Molas-Gallart et al. (2003) who performed a highly interesting review
of ICT policy in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom when evaluating the Swedish national ITpolicy for the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS). They observe for example that an
increasing number of countries are adopting similar national ICT policies. This trend towards ICT policy
convergence has been given impetus by the promotion of free trade and competition in global ICT
markets. However, there are a number of countervailing pressures working against convergence, which
may lead countries to follow their own distinctive national ICT policy paths. National policies are
constrained or facilitated by a range of national conditions, such as social and legal norms, the size of the
ICT sector and the pool of ICT knowledge. (p. 22)
7.
These are (tele)communications infrastructure; know-how and innovation; access and skills; regulatory
issues; and ICT in the public sector.
8.
In CWTI and hence in RWTI the separate policy areas of science policy, technology policy and
information policy were merged.
9.
10.
Kingdons model is actually a revised version of the Garbage Can Model originally developed by Cohen
et al. (1972).
11.
12.
Molas-Gallart et al. (2003, p. 155) mention for example that: attempts have been made to organise the
public procurement is such a way that its procedures could be monitored from a central direction unit.
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Until now, their efforts have been blocked by the individual claims from several ministries about
independent policy making in this area. Among the various ministries involved in ICT matters, there is
no central co-ordinator of standardisation policies and practices in the public sector. In theory, the
Ministry of Interior is responsible, but in practice it has been so far unable to execute leadership in the
adoption of XML and open source software.
13.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
started this initiative (1994). In 1996 the Ministry of Justice and in 1997 the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment were also active in this interdepartmental programme.
14.
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and possibly the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing, and
the Environment will take part in NAP in addition to the ministries mentioned earlier.
15.
Some meso-tests were part of these benchmarking exercises in which a number of industries or societal
themes were internationally benchmarked. In fact these studies can be seen as forerunners of a further
broadening of information society/ICT policy towards more government-wide information society/ICT
policy.
16.
See the innovation governance study on the TNO (den Hertog, 2004).
17.
Substantial ICES/KIS or BSIK funding has been allocated and although it would have been logical to
have the various information society/ICT-related projects co-ordinated by the regieorgaan ICT this has
not been done.
18.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs performed the MAIT study (Monitoring and Assessing the Impact of
the Economic Affairs Technology Instruments) in which the benefits of individual technology schemes
were assessed.
19.
Not surprisingly, one of the action points in the most recent information society/ICT White Paper is to
structure the various quantitative publications on networks and communication sectors and to aim at a
more unambiguous benchmarking of the Dutch ICT position and what this implies for the economy and
society (2004, p. 42).
20.
There is of course a real measurement problem regarding information society/ICT as no proper set of
statistical indicators is available. Those that are available have a considerable time lag, making them less
useful in a rapidly evolving area.
21.
It is not always questioned whether a similar set-up or tool would succeed in a different environment.
This may be phrased as the danger of a tool-push approach, which is as real in ICT as in innovation
policy.
22.
Molas-Gallart et al. observe that in both countries [the United Kingdom and the Netherlands] policy
evaluation remains a challenge. There is no broadly accepted methodology, and the focus on the
collection of measurable indicators appears to be made at the expense of tackling the thornier issues of
impact assessment, like the attribution of observed changes to specific policy actions, and the
identification of the additional effect of such actions (2003, p. 29).
23.
This may also lead to a broad array of policy goals and instruments if the dead wood in the policy
portfolio is not cut. A recently published position paper related to the next ICT government-wide White
Paper (in 2005) includes a reflection on governance and temporal coherence in the ICT innovation
system. One suggestion for improving governance in ICT was to critically review policy initiatives (and
associated organisations) in existence for more than three years. The idea was that policy interventions
should in principal be temporary and policy efforts should concentrate on the issues that are perceived as
most urgent by (potential) ICT users. It was argued that the usefulness and necessity of standing ICT
policies should be reviewed systematically (den Hertog et al., 2005, pp. 34-35).
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References
Advisory Commission, Belgendoenhetbeter.nl (2003), Een kwestie van uitvoering.
Vernieuwingsagenda voor de presterende overheid, The Hague.
Advisory Commission on Citizens and Government in the Information Society (2001),
Citizens and Government in the Information Society: The Need for Institutional
Innovation, The Hague.
Boekholt, P. and S. McKibbin (2004), The Netherlands Genomics Initiative, mini-case
study as part of the Dutch contribution to the OECD MONIT study, Technopolis,
Amsterdam.
Bresnahan, T.F. and M. Trajtenberg (1995), General Purpose Technologies: Engines of
Growth?, Journal of Econometrics (65), 1, 83-108.
Broadband Expert Group (2002), Nederland Breedbandland. Aanbevelingen aan het
Kabinet van de nationale breedband expert groep, Broadband Expert Group, The
Hague.
Brynjolfsson, E. and L. Hitt (2000), Beyond Computation: Information Technology,
Organizational Transformation and Business Performance, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol 14, no. 4, p. 23-48.
Cohen, M., J. March and J. Olsen (1972), A Garbage Can Model of Organizational
Choice, Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 1-25.
EITO (2003), European Information Technology Observatory 2003, EITO, Frankfurt.
van de Graaf, H. and R. Hoppe (1996), Beleid en politiek. Een inleiding tot de
beleidswetenschap en de beleidskunde, Coutinho, Bussum, derde druk.
de Groot, H. and P. den Hertog (2004), Innovation Governance in the Netherlands as
illustrated by Information Society/ICT-policies, case study within the framework of
the Dutch OECD MONIT studies on innovation governance, Dialogic, Utrecht.
den Hertog, P. (2004), Innovation Governance and TNO, case study within the
framework of the Dutch OECD MONIT studies on innovation governance, Dialogic,
Utrecht.
den Hertog, P., C. Holland and S. Maltha (2005), Naar een vernieuwde, probleemgerichte
en vraaggestuurde ICT-agenda, Dialogic, Utrecht.
den Hertog, P. and G. Fahrenkrog (1993), IT Adoption: Can Policy Help? Experiences
and Trends in Five EC Member States, discussion paper, TNO-STB, Apeldoorn.
ICT Forum (2003), Innovation through ICT, ICT Forum, The Hague.
Kingdon, J.W. (1995), Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd edition, Longman.
Molas-Gallart, J., P. Tang, S. Flowers, W. Hulsink, A. Davies, W. Gooijer and J. Spaapen
(2003), A Review of the ICT Policy in the Netherlands and the UK. A Study for the
Evaluation of the Swedish National IT Policy, ITPS, Swedish Institute for Growth
Policy Studies, stersund.
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Chapter 6
INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE IN GREECE:
ONE SWALLOW DOES NOT MAKE A SUMMER
Lena Tsipouri
Associate Professor, University of Athens, Centre of Financial Studies
Mona Papadakou
Research Fellow, University of Athens, Centre of Financial Studies
In Greece, information society policy started in the 1970s. The first two decades focused
on the development of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures
and preparation for the liberalisation of the telecommunications market. Only in the mid1990s did the information society concept enter the policy agenda and in the early 2000s
the first integrated strategy was implemented in the form of an Operational Programme
(OPIS) co-financed by the EU. A wide gap with other OECD countries made intervention
an urgent matter, with a target not directly related to innovation policy. The two policies
are not linked in any phases of the policy cycle and the policy making responsibility
belongs to different ministries. Moreover, the Greek governance system does not provide
for horizontal co-ordination of policies, except in the case of formal co-ordination for the
allocation of funds in order to avoid overlaps.
For the information society it is necessary to involve all government agencies and society
as a whole, and the Greek public governance system was quite unprepared for such a
demanding task. New governance structures had to be invented to overcome the lack of
horizontal co-ordination mechanisms and modern governance tools. Information society
governance in Greece is thus a special case for indicating how good governance practices
can be introduced in a public sector dominated by inflexible hierarchies. The information
society experiment, if successful, could trigger changes throughout the public governance
system. Yet the results of this effort are still unclear. Delays in promoting actions and in
absorption of the dedicated budget show that, besides strong political will and the introduction of innovative governance tools, the system cannot move faster than its internal
potential will allow.
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Reducing the gap between Greece and EU partners in the use of advanced
information technology infrastructure within the next ten years.
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Promotion of electronic transactions with the public sector so that the majority of
services could be ensured remotely within the next 15 years.
To achieve these goals, the document suggested a series of actions such as development of core national infrastructure, establishment of information cells that offer citizens easy access to information, creation of an independent information society authority
to supervise and guarantee constitutional rights in the information era, the creation of a
permanent Information Society Committee in the Greek Parliament, the creation of
information networks for enterprises, opening of the public sector to electronic communication with citizens, and pilot applications with a social welfare orientation. The document offered the basic guidelines for the national information society strategy as a
response to the Bangeman Report and international developments in ICT. Many of these
actions are more or less completed, while others are being implemented or reviewed on
the basis of current needs and developments.
The document influenced the introduction of information society actions in the
second CFS for enhancing ICT infrastructure that would at a later stage support applications. The design was included in the sectoral operational programmes and was viewed
as a means to improve ministerial performance rather than as an overall policy. In that
sense the strategic document did not meet its target. Three relevant operational programmes explicitly adopted information society improvement actions as indicated in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Selected information society actions in the second CSF
Operational
programme
Ministry
Selected project
Sectoral budget
(EUR millions)
Telecommunications
Transport and
Communications
378.6
Industry
Development
346.3
Modernisation of
public service
Public
Administration
Kleisthenis
(Modernisation of public administration: integrated
information systems and training)
261.2
Research and
technology
National Defence
146.7
Co-ordination was neither desired nor imposed, and the result was duplication, overlapping and gaps. Yet, despite the failure of co-ordinated implementation in the 1994-99
programming period, telecommunications infrastructure improved considerably and
reached satisfactory levels for the first time, while mobile telephony grew rapidly. Under
the second CSF, the most important programmes again mainly addressed hardware and
software in telecommunications and government: Communication Post, which included
telecommunications infrastructure, and Modernisation of the Public Service, a series of
information society applications for all ministries and public or publicly supervised
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agencies. The former had higher absorption and was considered more successful overall
than the latter. In addition, most sectoral programmes included elements of information
society applications in: transport infrastructure (automation); human resources (computers in schools and universities); manufacturing services (EDS, support of professional
organisations); energy-natural gas (automation); health (infrastructure in hospitals and
telemedicine); and R&D (grants for research and promotion of the academic data
transmission network).
In spite of the absence of co-ordination, some ministries undertook ambitious
projects, while others stuck to the purchasing of hardware. Results were mixed. The most
successful broad application under the second CSF was TAXISnet, which offered the
possibility of electronic submission and clearance, first of access to certification, then
VAT and finally tax revenue declarations (see Box 6.1). The service was reviewed and
accepted as a European best practice model in 60 out of 282 proposals submitted in the
framework of the monitoring of the eEurope actions.
Limited absorption, Greeces continuing last-place ranking in all information society
indicators and increasingly perceived needs, combined with an active commitment at the
prime ministers level to reverse the situation urged a reorganisation of the planning and
implementation processes in view of the third CSF.
Box 6.1. TAXISnet
The TAXISnet electronic services offered by the General Secretariat for Information Systems
were launched in May 2000 and aim at raising the quality of dealings between taxpayers and
the tax authorities. The purpose in developing them was to create suitable infrastructure and
gradually introduce new electronic services for taxpayers. Today, the complete Taxation
Information System (TAXIS) covers all taxpayers and all financial transactions, and was
honoured by the European Union with the best practice award at the e-government
conference held in Brussels in November 2001 under the title From Policy to Practice. In
March 2004 the service was presented to the general public enriched with further functions
relating to filling in and printing the basic income tax declaration form.
The response of the market to the new services was unexpectedly good. To date more than one
million users have registered to use online services offered by the system, and the Web site is
continuously expanding in order to meet increased needs for presentation and operability of the
new applications.
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Reduction of time to market (from the adoption of the idea until the procurement
and service received), which is now over a year. The present target is 6-8 months.
Comparisons with other member states on the speed of public procurement are
necessary to create reasonable benchmarks.
Reduction of the number of public calls for tender, which too often delay the
process and sometimes altogether cancel it or make it obsolete.
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Training of the client public services so that at the end of the period the
companys services are no longer needed and it becomes a provider of more
specialised services.
A broad number of other actors or committees were formed to assist in the implementation of the new philosophy:
The sectoral e-business forum and the health forum, which encourage debate and
information.
Working groups, like the one for disabled persons to improve access to egovernment, and a working group on broadband, to assure full exploitation of
current technical knowledge and compatibility among regional initiatives.
The IT Observatory.
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IS activity
1992
IS policy
Liberalisation in
progress
1998
Mobile telephony
IMP-Informatics
Rapid growth in
ICT sector
1984
No policy
Slowdown in IT sector
Digitisation of public
telecom network
Expansion in telecom
services
Catching up in ICTs
diffusion
2001
Development of basic
infrastructures
Development of telecom
infrastructure
OPIS
1984
1989
1994
2000
IMP
1st CSF
2nd CSF
3rd CSF
1995
First document on IS
(no follow-up)
1999
First white paper on
IS
(follow-up in OPIS)
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In terms of timing, it required over a year to raise awareness and explain the
principles and processes to the ministries concerned as well as to the regional authorities.
This was not a smooth process, partly because during this period many gaps were
identified in the original strategies and partly because of serious conflicts of power and
interest. Several organisations tried to ensure the necessary funds to manage
autonomously (both at the national and regional level), while others did not dispose of the
necessary planning skills. The OPIS Secretariat was very firm in its central role of coordination in order to assure quality and avoid past mistakes. Despite a limited track
record of co-ordination among Greek authorities after the first year, the co-ordination
process was smoothed out and started functioning.
At the same time, it was clear that most of the programmes lacked the necessary indepth knowledge and did not adequately reflect either their choices or their plan of
implementation. Thus a decision was taken to launch a call for business plans (which
would include a snapshot of the current situation, strategic priorities and action plans for
each sector and region). Central funds from the Secretariats Technical Assistance were
used to make up for the lack of planning skills in the public administration through the
use of external consultants. A special committee was appointed in each case to monitor
and formally approve the plan. The 31 business plans were launched in summer 2001 and
were expected to be finished by December 2001 but very few met the deadline and the
quality varied considerably.
Following approval of the business plans, their evaluation and a public consultation
process, the co-ordinated policy took final form. Budgets were earmarked and the priority
areas were broken down according to four themes rather than on the basis of ministerial
autonomy.
The systematic planning process helped the information society to absorb a higher
share of funds than initially imagined (Table 6.2).
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2 839.1
Public funding
2 269.6
EU funding
1 702.2
ERDF
1 266.0
ESF
436.2
567.4
Private funding
569.5
The strategic priorities are is four areas: education and culture, citizens and quality of
life, development and employment, and communications. A fifth area is technical assistance. The thematic priorities constitute a unique organisational structure that envisaged
inter-ministerial thematic co-ordination:
Education and culture address equipment and training in the educational sector
and the enhancement of digital content in an effort to modernise the Greek
educational system, and to use new technologies for the promotion of cultural
heritage. The ministries involved are Education, Labour and Culture.
Citizens and quality of life is a critical area for the use of ICT in order to
improve public services, which are notoriously inefficient. It includes all public
service sectors, including health, transport and the environment. This priority area
is primarily a responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public
Administration, but all levels of public service are included.
Finally, communications is a topic related to market liberalisation, telecommunications infrastructure in peripheral regions and universal access for citizens. From
the administrative point of view, the Ministry of Transport and Communications
supervises the area.
Within the context of these broad areas of 21 measures one can distinguish three
types, plus three measures addressing technical assistance: two are very big and ambitious
(over EUR 350 million), ten have funding between EUR 100 million and EUR 200 million, and the remaining nine are smaller. The technical assistance measures are designed
like all corresponding measures in the CSF.
the Cabinet level did not imbue it with the power originally hoped for. However, the
consultation process at least succeeded in achieving broad coverage of all institutional
and regulatory aspects in a single document.
The business plan milestones combined with their formal evaluation and a
ministerial/regional level consultation process could also have triggered an effective,
high-impact implementation process. The extensive public consultation process was an
important step to ensure that the process would not become a technocratic exercise but
would combine technical skills with public awareness and political responsibility.
Although the process was well designed, consultants often failed to deliver the required
quality (which they were paid for). Lessons learned from more advanced countries were
not exploited in the business plans. Besides, the public consultation that followed the
formal presentation of the business plans turned out to be less interactive and value
adding than originally hoped.
The idea of co-responsibility proved that two decision-making centres were one too
many. While it helped during the first steps it created too many tensions and delays
afterwards.
The sound process design thus triggered considerable delays that led to complaints.
Figure 6.2 shows how time-consuming the good planning process was, not because a
good planning process is necessarily time-consuming but because it risks being so in a
system that does not tolerate change. The planning delays led to politically unacceptable
absorption delays.4
The lesson to be drawn is that in a notoriously slow and inefficient administration,
one can be ambitious and try to change behaviour. Yet, to succeed, it is important to use
very tight, hands-on management and decide, from the beginning, when and how to apply
sanctions.
The Information Society Monitoring Committee, which is broadly representative of Greek and EU actors and carries responsibility for design and
programme strategy.
The Payments Authority, which provides matching funds and controls the
legality of payments decided by the OPIS Managing Authority, which has full
financial responsibility and executive power and is responsible for the programming and evaluation of any action in the OPIS.
The flow of actions and responsibilities is the typical process followed for the entire
CSF. So at least financial co-ordination is effective.
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Crash and Mini Crash Programmes to cope with the rigid procedures and lack of
skills that led to significant delays compared to the rest of the CSF.
By the term implementation is meant the detailed description of the nature, the aims
and the content of actions to be financed in the chosen areas and measures of the OPIS,
the publication of calls, the evaluation of the proposals and the supervision and
acceptance of the final outcome, including the budgetary flows between central managing
authorities and final beneficiaries.
The rules for project implementation were clear but rigid and time-consuming. An
effort by top politicians to simplify them was unsuccessful. At the same time the lack of
incentives for the timely execution of projects resulted in more emphasis on processes
rather than on attaining substantial objectives. Needless to say, no sanctions were
foreseen for long and unjustified delays. Furthermore, there was a lack of links between
funding and institutional policy initiatives. Last but not least, the delays attributed to the
long design phase led to very little focus on evaluation and learning in the
implementation phase, which is described in detail below.
Role of stakeholders
Awareness raising aimed at greater involvement of a large number of stakeholders as
well as society as a whole was among the imperatives of the third CSF. Special funding
was provided for technical assistance under the category Publicity Actions. In this
context, a number of forums and working groups were established to bring together
experts and actors specialised in the different areas of action foreseen in OPIS. The Ebusiness Forum is one of the most active in the area of diffusion of ICTs in the business
sector, mainly to SMEs. The forum has included representatives from academia and
business federations. For the promotion of broadband applications, there is a working
group on broadband technologies, mainly as an advisory group to the Managing
Authority, which assists in designing actions based on these services. Other groups, more
specific in scope, have emerged (Geographic Integrated Systems, Task-Force Hellas Grid,
Task-Force on e-accessibility) but they have limited influence.
The main stakeholder that needs to be involved is the business sector, which lags
considerably behind the OECD average in terms of investment and performance. The
Greek ICT sector is dominated by the telecommunications sub-sector (EITO, 2005),
which accounts for 65% of the turnover in this sector and 5.2% of GDP. Per capita
expenditure on telecommunication services remains below the EU average (EUR 433 in
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2004, based on data from Eurostat, 2005). The telecommunication business consists of
about 250 enterprises with general licences, while 48 enterprises have special
telecommunications licences. Mobile telephony is by far the most competent of the ICTs.
The four providers share a market that serves more than 80% of the Greek population,
and competition is relatively strong with a market almost equally shared among the three
providers with the longest history in the sector. As far as third-generation mobile
telephony is concerned, three licences have been granted. Because the
telecommunications sector and mobile telephony are market-led, policy intervention is
limited to regulation and companies from this segment are not very interested in shaping
policy.
Information technologys share of GDP is low, and annual per capita expenditure on
information technologies in 2004 was about EUR 149. On the supply side, the Greek
information technology market is still, with few exemptions, driven by ad hoc
participation in international projects and public procurement. There are very few nonSMEs and none plays an international role, the biggest expand only into the Balkan
market. A temporary dynamic performance, which spilled over from international
developments and Greek stock market conditions, ended after the financial crisis of 2000.
The dominant activity of the sector is commercial (imports of hardware), which is
responsible for 40% of the sectors turnover, while the market for software and other
information technology services is relatively limited.
The sector is represented by the Federation of Hellenic Information Technology and
Communications Enterprises (SEPE) and the Association of Information Technology
Companies of Northern Greece (SEPVE). The structure of the sector explains why the
interests expressed by the federations are limited to interventions to increase and speed up
the implementation of support schemes. While they are invited to participate in
monitoring committees and various forums their interest is almost exclusively funding,
not investing resources to create a coherent strategy to promote the sector. In general
public-private consultation and partnership mainly involve formalities rather than indepth prioritisation consistent with the real needs of the market and the society. The
business sector as user exerts even less influence. The programme envisages sensitising
SMEs and microfirms to Internet-related technologies and applications; this type of
company does not have collective representation.
The academic community plays a crucial role both formally and informally, the latter
because of the role of academics in politics and the administration.6 Formally, universities
are involved in project implementation, R&D funding and consulting processes (in the
context of technical assistance) at both the national and the regional levels. University
teams play an isolated role and do not express the common interests of the academic
sector. Academics as individual experts are often found in implementation committees,
defining new projects and opening up new areas, but with some confusion about the
limits of their role.
The effort to involve the broader community through open consultations has not
shown any sign of significantly increased participation. Actions have focused on
publications (leaflets, brochures, etc.), limited Web surveys and press announcements, but
there is no evidence on the success of these efforts. At the regional level, the participation
of the social actors has varied.
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the most delayed. Internal co-ordination in the competent ministries was not more
efficient than horizontal co-ordination.
As in the past, certain actors who were in a position to promote their own projects did
so, while others were left behind. However, an overall impetus has been given, which is
reflected in the opportunity for more active actors to submit specific pilots. For instance,
there is a pilot project of one municipality (Voula) that tries to address the many layers of
government. The municipality has to be linked and receive input and standards from the
public administration in terms of forms, guidelines and standards. At the same time, the
mayor supervises municipal services (operating and accountable at the local level, such as
municipal libraries, polls, local social services) or national services operating locally (tax
service, police, health, public education) but also offers access to information and other
services to the local constituencies (professionals, shops, clubs and associations). The
need to design a local system that meets (currently emerging) national standards and
financial instruments, and at the same time covers local needs and enhances public
awareness and participation, is a multi-level task, that is not easy to design and implement. The pilot took place ahead of a big, very ambitious, much delayed similar project,
aimed at modernising the whole of the public sector.
Education and skills represent a particularly challenging and complicated case, in
which horizontal co-ordination was limited to bilateral agreements on individual
programmes despite an effort to put everything under the same umbrella. The Ministry of
Education and Religious Affairs was among the first to use EU regional development
resources in the early 1990s. The development of network infrastructures in tertiary and
secondary education is one such initiative. In terms of curriculum development, the
introduction of technology-oriented courses in secondary education was a large step
towards increasing the computer literacy of Greek youth. Moreover, the ministry tried to
respond to the market pull with the creation of new university departments on informatics
and telecommunications. With an established long-term strategy, experience on information
society policies and a precise action plan, the Ministry of Education had better response
during the co-ordination of actions in the context of OPIS and the best absorption rates
for dedicated funds.
When the third CSF started, there were marked weaknesses in primary schools, and
less so in secondary schools, but the university system was well endowed not only with
computers but also with high-speed Internet access. The target was to achieve computerisation and 100% access plus implementation of a massive programme of training (of
teachers and pupils) plus the infrastructure for e-learning (mainly in institutions of higher
education). A major problem for the purchase of equipment was the central tendering
process, which was systematically opposed by the excluded bidders, who delayed the
process. A decision was taken to decentralise the public procurement process and schools
now tender individually. Although there is the issue of the potential economies of a
central call for tenders compared to smaller decentralised calls, the efficiency of the new
process gains in speed. In this trade-off between speed and cost, the decision to increase
efficiency at higher cost seems absolutely reasonable, even brave, after all these years of
stagnation. An additional benefit of this decision also facilitates local economic support.
At the same time a programme of massive training for 75 000 primary and secondary
school teachers was prepared for 2002-03, which included the use of information
technology in the learning process. A good balance has been achieved as there is a special
measure addressing content and educational tools. E-learning and digital software are the
major targets of this measure. School equipment had the highest absorption and it was on
this criterion that the effort was considered a major success. However, a variety of critical
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EU-induced policies. The only regions that made an attempt to adopt a policy
framework were those receiving specific grants from the EU. The region of
Central Macedonia was the only one with a thorough regional plan for the
information society.
Project-based developments. In some regions research or other groups undertook specific projects, reacting to ad hoc opportunities rather than as part of a
regional strategy. The common denominator in these regions is one or two key
programmes and smaller projects at the initiative of specific teams. These projects
attracted national or EU funding, created skills, and promoted awareness raising
in certain populations but were not part of a regional strategy.
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The divergences are considerable. In this context the sectoral and regional distribution
of funds during implementation was a major challenge. The market mechanism drives
resources towards income-generating activities and market failure helps to increase rather
than eliminate the digital divide. In addition government failure is very likely to occur,
since regional administrations lack the skills that would allow them to plan and
implement effectively technologies they do not master. The Greek national authorities
had to make major strategic choices, and this resulted in a mixed approach: the centre
decided on the platforms and launched calls for common elements to avoid duplication of
efforts and broader calls were then launched, which included both national and regional
funding to serve local needs. The quality of the regional business plans proved utterly
insufficient to support this phase and new consultants had to be hired.
A special measure (2.4) was used to mobilise regional actors and to create new ICTs,
and there was a generalised measure for regional geographical information systems (GIS)
and innovative actions. For these two targets, funds had to be distributed to seven areas:
education, culture and tourism, public governance and information, health, environment,
transport and SMEs. The selection of the areas was based on eEurope, which also gave
the directions for the regional business plans. The national authorities finally promised
matching funds of EUR 7 million (approximately EUR 1 million for each action under
measure 2.4) per region (independently of the size or maturity of the region), while the
rest were to be provided by the OPIS.
Since the basic guidelines had been set, the next step was the prioritisation and
specification of the actions according to regional needs and co-ordination so as to proceed
to the publication of calls. In order to overcome or to avoid delays, the Special Secretariat
for the Information Society decided to adopt a more flexible and effective co-ordination
process between OPIS and the regional managing authorities and undertook the following
actions.
It set up a Co-ordination and Consulting Committee (SESY) in each of the 13 Greek
regions. Their main task was to act as an informal intermediary between regional and
national managing authorities, increase awareness and thus the participation of regional
actors, as well as to provide advice to both sides on issues related to regional information
society actions and on actions with strong regional orientation (e.g. broadband networks).
The second step was the co-ordination of regional and regionally distributed national
funds in the context of the Mini-Crash 2003 programme. The main aim of this programme was to speed up the adoption of information society programmes and projects, as
well as to eliminate double or over- or under-funding of certain regional actions. For the
elaboration of this programme the co-operation of the following actors was necessary: the
regional managing authorities, which elaborate and submit requests to the OPIS
Managing Authority regarding their proposals, the OPIS Managing Authority, which
assesses the regional proposals, and finally the SESYs, in their advisory function.
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Culture
E-Govt
Health
GIS*
SMEs**
Total
1 200 000
1 450 000
4 150 000
2 000 000
2 400 000
2 125 000
13 325 000
Attica
1 000 000
2 800 000
1 900 000
1 300 000
4 000 000
11 000 000
North Aegean
1 430 000
1 800 000
3 570 000
1 700 000
1 500 000
1 000 000
11 000 000
Western Greece
1 430 000
1 560 000
2 520 000
1 096 000
1 104 000
3 280 000
10 990 000
Western Macedonia
1 310 000
690 000
4 204 400
665 000
4 000 000
1 000 000
11 869 400
940 000
3 630 000
3 270 000
780 000
400 000
900 000
9 920 000
Ipeiros
2 200 000
1 500 000
1 900 000
1 500 000
2 500 000
2 500 000
12 100 000
Central Macedonia
1 400 000
800 000
7 400 000
400 000
5 900 000
15 900 000
Ionian Islands
Crete
1 400 000
800 000
4 200 000
1 000 000
3 000 000
1 200 000
11 600 000
South Aegean
4 450 000
1 850 000
4 100 000
2 200 000
2 200 000
1 700 000
16 500 000
Peloponnese
1 600 000
1 300 000
3 350 000
1 450 000
300 000
3 000 000
11 000 000
Continental Greece
2 000 000
1 718 500
2 750 000
1 200 000
1 583 000
1 748 500
11 000 000
Thessaly
1 500 000
1 000 000
1 000 000
1 300 000
3 400 000
3 730 000
11 930 000
TOTAL
21 860 000
20 898 500
44 314 400
14 891 000
24 087 000
32 083 500
This category finally included applications of GIS in transport and environment so the two areas were merged.
**
In the actions concerning SMEs there is provision for additional private funding according to the De minimis rule.
The implementation of the programme raised the need for a second round of coordination actions, this time to increase interest among potential beneficiaries and
financing organisations, as well as to avoid duplication of support work. The OPIS
Managing Authority assigned this role to the SESYs, while centrally arranging awareness-raising activities for all regions. Initially, it was planned to publish calls only for
regions with the necessary level of maturity. At first, education was the only area of
action characterised as nationally mature. However, the scheme was abandoned as further
delays were detected in the implementation process and all areas followed suit, with the
necessary technical support from the centre.
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Another important aspect which the managing authorities tried to address was the
exploitation of economies of scale in implementation by promoting horizontal actions
where necessary. These actions included the development of integrated Internet platforms
and software for regional projects with common elements or rationale. This model was
applied for culture, tourism, e-government and GIS applications.
The initial target was mobilisation (publication of calls) for all actions foreseen in the
Information Society Mini-Crash 2003 by the end of 2003. This target proved to be quite
ambitious. The implementation process achieved a publication of calls for 44.5% of the
Mini-Crash by the end of 2003; 52% from OPIS, and 38% from regional programmes.
The speed of mobilisation varies significantly among regions as well as among actions.
The main reason is the lack of experience, the rigorous decision making between centre
and regions, the difficulties in co-ordination between ministries, and the trade-off
between speed and exploitation of economies of scale and scope for the implementation
of certain actions.
In terms of policy learning one may suggest that while the regional level matters
enormously for the creation of external economies, the lack of economic and governance
maturity can become prohibitive in terms of the effectiveness of regional planning. To
support the regions, national authorities need to take the political decision to make a
special effort to mobilise limited resources. In terms of immediate opportunity costs, this
creates administrative bottlenecks, but it is likely to pay off in the longer term. The
current provisions and institutional set-up hamper rapid implementation, even when
political agreement has been reached. Effective external support (in the form of SESYs or
otherwise) is necessary. The more skilled the people involved and the more informal their
role, the better the result.
Conclusion
Information society and innovation policy
Designing a catching-up information society strategy in Greece became particularly
urgent and difficult as the digital divide increased. Innovation governance was inefficient
and all efforts to modernise were hampered by an inefficient administration, lack of coordination and reluctant stakeholders. Since innovation policy was not particularly
successful and because of the urgency of the matter for the information society, it was
decided to create an autonomous structure totally distinct from innovation governance.
Innovation and information society policies were placed under different ministries
without established links or provisions for horizontal co-ordination between them. The
information society policy agenda makes no direct reference to the needs of the national
innovation system and its priorities were inspired mainly by the EU information society
action plans (eEurope 2002 and 2005) rather than by an internal policy debate. The two
policies meet only on the implementation level as a few actions financed by OPIS are
directly related to the objectives of the Ministry of Development and are implemented by
its secretariat.7 At this level there is only a form of financial co-ordination between the
two managing authorities.
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Hence, in the implementation phase, good governance and high ambitions ran out of
steam. New actors, created to respond to the modern governance approach, replicated the
traditional attitudes of the public sector. Delays could not be made up for, possibly
because the political backing was not strong enough to overcome resistance, and there
was neither a single, undisputed decision-making centre nor clear cross-ministerial
authorities. The boundaries between stakeholder involvement and the decision authority
blurred and neither role was clear or well performed. Management, implementation and
assessment (the three pillars) were never really integrated. So, while individual projects
succeeded in the implementation phase, the same had been true in the past, before the
good planning process.
The Greek case raises some crucial questions: does a good but failed planning process
leave the system better or worse off than no good planning process? Does learning occur
and pave the way for better future governance or does an isolated, excellent experiment
lead to the conclusion that such endeavours should be avoided? What would be necessary
to allow the good start to achieve better tangible results at the end of the process?
The answers to these questions are difficult and cannot be generalised since good
practices applied elsewhere did not lead to the same good results. Possibly a good process
is one that makes the system move as fast as it can afford to; if faster it can create more
harm than good. The crucial issue is whether or not an ambitious design is able to
transform the internal potential, increasing the systems responsiveness to modern needs.
Changing the potential may be translated into changing the culture in the public
governance system. The case of the information society showed that the political vision
failed to diffuse throughout the political system. Thus, human capital considerations also
need to be taken into account. Better skills and a deeper knowledge of the policy
objectives, along with the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, could increase the
commitment of the actors involved in the policy making process to achieve better results.
Besides, political determination for change needs time and support all the way, in
particular through the difficult phases of resistance to change. In order to change
governance structures and make a difference in the long term, it is important to decide
from the very beginning how long politicians are prepared to wait for results. They will
not be immediate, as the Greek experience clearly shows. Quality should be given priority
over absorption. Redesign at each stage is important and has to accompany learning and
co-evolution. Otherwise the system slides back to its informal rules.
The lesson learned from this ambitious experiment is that design of the information
society took a first-movers risk and that the Greek system did not tolerate change. One
swallow did not make a summer. But learning by doing is an arduous process. The next
swallow will (hopefully) have an easier task.
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Annex 6.A
The operational programme for the information society
Information society
Operational programme
Policy actors
Budget
(EUR)
421 033 333
Ministry of Culture
40 869 406
60 000 000
96 000 000
2.6 Information and communication technologies (ICTs) for health and care
2.7 Training and structural measures for health and care
2.8 Smart transports
9 257 333
90 869 406
Ministry of Development
Ministry of Tourism
Ministry of Agriculture Development and
Food
97 347 028
Ministry of Development
Ministry of Agriculture Development and
Food
Ministry of Development
81 347 028
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Policy actors
4. Communications
Budget
(EUR)
569 233 333
4.1 Development of mechanisms for the implementation of the institutional Ministry of Transport and Communications
framework and the competitiveness enforcement
National Telecommunications and Post
Commission
85 869 406
5. Technical assistance
7 600 000
67 787 728
25 333 333
21 742 399
20 711 996
Total
Notes
1.
2.
At that stage the subsidiarity principle had not been adopted, and the Commission played a more handson role.
3.
eEurope is the EU initiative to enhance the information society in Europe, using an open method of coordination through benchmarking in ten main areas of action: European youth into the digital age, faster
Internet for researchers/students, awareness raising, participation in the knowledge-based economy,
government on line, health on line, European digital content, working in the knowledge-based economy,
accelerating e-commerce, cheaper faster Internet, secure networks and smart cards, intelligent transport
systems and infrastructure.
4.
The third CSF rules stipulate that delays in funding of more than two years compared to their original
plan are lost.
5.
6.
All secretaries and many political appointments in the various agencies mentioned above were people
who were directly or indirectly employed in universities before/after their involvement in information
society governance.
7.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
References
European Information Technology Observatory (EITO) (2005), ICT Markets 2005.
Eurostat (2005), Structural Indicators, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int.
GSRT (2003), Towards a Knowledge-Based Economy: Prospects and Roles,
discussion document, Ministry of Development, General Secretariat for Research and
Technology, November.
Tsipouri, L. and M. Papadakou (2005), Profiling and Assessing Innovation Governance
in Greece: Do Increased Funding and the Modernization of Governance Co-evolve?,
in OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in
Innovation Policy, OECD, Paris.
Papakonstantinou, G. (2004) Innovation in Greece, the Information Society Case, 5th
MONIT Workshop, Innovation Governance: Towards a Synthesis, Athens,
4-5 October.Working Group on the Information Society (1999), Regional
Development Plan on Information Society, discussion document (in Greek), May.
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Chapter 7
TOWARDS THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:
THE CASE OF SWEDEN
Kristina Larsen, Patrik Sandgren and Jennie Granat-Thorslund
VINNOVA
Sweden has had an explicit information technology (IT) policy for about 40 years. The
development of Swedish IT policy has been closely connected to the search for internal
efficiency in the public sector, as well as the promotion of innovation and economic
development. Responsibility for the implementation of IT policy is currently divided
among several actors, including a nationally appointed strategy group. This wide
distribution of responsibility has resulted in insufficient horizontal co-ordination and suboptimisation, as much of the real co-ordination of IT policy has taken place through
informal networks. To achieve better co-ordination of Swedish IT policy, there is a need
for more incentives for actors as well as a clearer demand for active co-ordination from
the government level. Another important feature of better co-ordination would be the
establishment of a common language, as current semantic differences have proven to be
an obstacle.
Introduction
This chapter focuses on co-ordination in the sector of information technology (IT)
and how IT policy is co-ordinated in Sweden. It is based upon a case study and the object
has been to use this study in order to search for critical issues in horizontal co-ordination.
The case study is based on interviews within the government administration,
interviews at the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA) and written
material. Of particular interest is a recently completed evaluation of the Swedish IT
policy.
IT and IT policy
IT policy making is to a large extent about the use of IT, and rules and regulations
related to usage. Although IT policy is a recognised policy area in Sweden, there is no
clear definition of what the area includes or excludes. There is also an ongoing discussion
concerning whether IT policy is a policy area in its own right, or simply a limited issue
embedded in various other areas. However, this chapter is based on the assumption that it
is possible to define Swedish IT policy in terms of a policy area with certain processes,
actors and objectives.
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In the 1960s, there was a political consensus about the ambition to modernise society
by utilising computers. Computerisation was seen as a general value-enhancing tool. In
1969 a new organisation for the national register and taxation system and county
computer centres was suggested and established.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Swedish IT policy shifted focus to some extent, as
attention turned to matters of industrial policy (innovation policy) and how public
authorities should handle the growing information loads.2 At the same time the risks of IT
surveillance also became a matter of political concern. Especially during the 1970s, as
personal registers were digitised, public discussion centred around the issue of privacy.
The debate faded in the 1980s as the fear of big brother seemed to have been
exaggerated. Instead, the innovation policy issue of fostering a domestic electronic
industry became an important issue along with an initiative to computerise schools.
In the middle of the 1980s, a new government bill presented an overall vision of IT in
the near future based mainly on software (machine code) and integrated and merged into
everything (ubiquitous computing). This foreseen development renewed concerns about
privacy. In addition plans to support the development of a domestic microelectronic and
IT industry drew a great deal of attention.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Swedish IT policy has been very much influenced
by the international IT agenda, mainly the American National Information Infrastructure
initiative (NII) and the European Bangemann Report.3 This has also affected public
debate.
171
Parliament decides on legislation and bills, evaluates government work in different policy areas and commissions the government to do research on selected
topics.
The government prepares proposals, is responsible for producing bills commissioned by the parliament, commissions studies on selected topics, formulates
goals, gives commissions to government agencies and formulates instructions for
government agencies.
County councils are governed by elected clerks, have the main responsibility for
medical services and have their own budgets based on income taxes and state
funding.
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IT policy actors
The government
In accordance with bill 1999/2000:86, An Information Society for All, the Ministry
of Industry, Employment and Communication (MIEC) is responsible for co-ordination of
general issues within IT policy. However, IT issues that directly concern specific areas
such as health care, environment, education, defence, government administration, etc., are
handled by separate ministries and their national agencies. IT policy in government
administration and agencies is for instance the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance
while the Ministry of Education and Science handles scientific development in Sweden.
This includes responsibility for such things as computerisation of public schools and
R&D investments in IT. Another example is the Ministry of Defence, which invests a
substantial amount of money in the development of IT surveillance systems and applications.
A rather large amount of IT policy work is performed by agencies and other actors on
behalf of the government. This is especially the case in the agenda-setting phase (the
process of choosing the issues to be included on the agenda) and the evaluation phase of
the policy process.
Government agencies
Agency responsibilities are regulated at different levels. There is a general description
of the long-term agency mission. These assignments are presented in special letters with
directives that are revised annually (by the government). Agencies with long-term
missions relevant to IT policies are the Swedish Agency for Public Management (Statskontoret) and the Swedish National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS), but VINNOVA,
ITPS, ISA and NUTEK also play important roles.
The Swedish Agency for Public Management12 provides support to the government
and government offices. One of its tasks is to modernise the public administration with
the use of IT. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the agency and the policy, which
may be described as internal IT policy.
A number of agencies under the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications have duties in the IT field:
The National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS)14 is the supervisory authority for
electronic communications, and carries out several tasks in the IT field.
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The Swedish Business Development Agency (NUTEK)15 has the task of promoting sustainable growth nationwide by providing funding, information and
guidance. Among other things NUTEK provides support for IT implementation in
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS)16 is responsible for
policy intelligence, evaluations and IT statistics. The institute conducts policy
intelligence studies to help policymakers develop viable growth policies and was
recently commissioned by the government to publish a comprehensive evaluation
of Swedish IT policy (also available in English).
Special committees
In June 2003 the Delegation on Public E-services for the development of electronic
services in the public sector was formed. The task of the delegation is to create a base for
increased co-operation between the state, county councils and municipalities regarding
electronic services. Another ambition is to establish new methods of collaboration among
the three parties.18
In addition, a strategy group was established in the summer of 2003.19 It belongs
organisationally to the government offices. A decision has also been taken to establish an
e-agency with the task to work on standardisation and norms for information exchange
between public agencies.
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IT companies
Large Swedish IT companies influence policy making more directly than the industry
associations. Government clerks regularly meet with representatives from these
companies. Occasionally industry representatives are invited to take part in work groups,
but many times they approach the government clerks in order to discuss pressing issues.
Media
Newspapers and other media channels are extremely receptive to news about IT,
largely because of the economic importance of Ericsson. There are currently a handful of
newspapers, such as Computer Sweden and Ny Teknik, with a particular focus on the IT
sector, and most of the big influential newspapers, such as Svenska Dagbladet and
Dagens Industri, have special sections devoted to the development of the IT sector.24
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To generate opinion and create a debate about the future of IT this includes
conveying to the public that IT can be a catalyst for innovation and growth.
The group is expected to contribute a holistic perspective and formulate goals that can
be evaluated. Another issue is to raise awareness of the need for IT statistics in order to
follow and evaluate development in different policy sectors. Its task also includes:
Dialogues with state secretaries. The strategy group is to keep state secretaries in
different ministries continuously informed about IT projects and activities.
Since a new national IT bill will be presented in 2005, the main issue for the IT policy
strategy group in the short run is to collect and present proposals and recommendations
that can be used as input in the formulation of the new bill. All IT policy projects, related
actions and information released by the group will be available on a Web site. A
collection of examples will also be used to highlight and stimulate the diffusion of best
practice.
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High-level co-ordination
High-level co-ordination in Sweden is in this context defined as co-ordination
between ministers, and concerns first and foremost agenda setting. Co-ordination between
ministers is influenced and complicated by the fact that it involves the distribution of
financial resources. In reality this means that co-ordination per se is seldom an option, if
there are no clear incentives, such as the potential loss of control over resources. Coordination within the government is crucial to all parts of the policy process, although
agenda setting and adjustments of the agenda are the most time-consuming.
Co-ordination among government clerks is facilitated by a formal system called
delning (sharing), which invites all concerned divisions (in different ministries) to give
their opinion or to provide information on specific issues. In IT policy, this is a wellfunctioning mechanism as long as financial issues can be resolved. Implementation of IT
policy has a tendency to involve large investments and extensive consumption of
resources, a problem when resources are scarce.
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Concluding remarks
While a national evaluation has been conducted in the area of IT policy, where both
stated improvements and goals have been critically analysed and examined, no such thing
exist in the area of innovation policy. When it comes to innovation policy, evaluations are
primarily conducted at the agency level. In the long run, this might hamper the learning
mechanisms at the national level, since important knowledge may be prevented from
achieving wider distribution and an impact on national policy. The two policy areas are
still kept separated and lessons from IT policy are not transmitted to the innovation policy
field on a systematic basis. From a policy perspective, this is an obstacle to integration
between innovation policy and other policy.
In Swedish innovation strategy, IT is treated as one of several focus areas. IT is
important for innovation, but an innovation perspective can also spur IT. When it comes
to IT policy, policy makers need to be aware of the fact that the innovation system
perspective is a good analytical framework in the search for weaknesses and obstacles.
The use of the innovation systems perspective within IT policy could radically catalyse
the discovery of important new aspects and possibilities.
Conclusions
Coherence in policy making
Effectiveness
As operational decisions in Sweden are taken at a comparatively low organisational
level, there is a general need for a broader and better understanding of policy issues.
Decisions that require understanding and awareness from more than one political agenda,
which is the case when trying to achieve synergies between innovation policy and IT
policy, can be a serious source of conflict. In order to avoid such problems, the need for
co-ordinated information is high.
Efficiency
The current decentralised Swedish model can be considered as quite efficient in
individual sectors, at least when it comes to agenda setting and implementation. However,
decentralisation requires awareness and knowledge of the political agendas on many
levels. A question to be raised is whether the system is able to handle changes in these
various agendas efficiently. This is likely to depend very much on the specific policy
maker and the culture in which he or she operates. This makes the system vulnerable as it
might create serious delays in the ability to take united action.
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Notes
1.
2.
The discussion was influenced by futuristic visions presented in Japan and France which focused on the
consequences of a more technological society, and how structures and relations would be altered as a
result of new computers (Hall and Lfgren, 2004).
3.
The central theme of the reports was that better communication networks would give people access to
valuable information, a prerequisite for economic growth and prosperity.
4.
For more information on the IT Commission and an analysis of IT policy focus during this period, see
Santesson-Wilson (2003) (in Swedish).
5.
There were also a number of committees with regional responsibility for IT policy (Hall and Lfgren,
2004).
6.
7.
8.
The first committee report, Broadband for Nationwide Growth was presented 1999. Several investigations and evaluations have been carried out since and a new one has recently been commissioned to the
National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS).
9.
VinniTel was originally initiated by the county administrative board of Stockholm under the title:
Development programme for the IT/telecom sector viewed in the light of the given notice from
Ericsson (Utvecklingsprogram fr IT/Telekomsektorn mot bakgrund av Ericsson-varsel) (Ericsson,
2002).
10.
The first project was implemented during 1998-2001 under the responsibility of the Royal Swedish
Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA), the Swedish National Board for Industrial and Technical
Development (NUTEK) (now superseded by VINNOVA), the Swedish Foundation for Strategic
Research and the Federation of Swedish Industries and had an overall budget of some EUR 3.7 million.
The second project was implemented during 2003-04, and was partly an update of the first technology
foresight project with an overall budget of some EUR 1.5 million. Both projects were conducted in close
co-operation with the government, companies, public agencies and other interested parties. For more
information, see Teknisk framsyn (2004).
11.
12.
13.
ISA: www.isa.se
14.
PTS: www.pts.se
15.
NUTEK: www.nutek.se
16.
PTS: www.itps.se
17.
VINNOVA: www.vinnova.se
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18.
19.
20.
21.
Teknikfretagen: www.teknikforetagen.se
22.
23.
IVA: www.iva.se
24.
25.
Kingdon (1984) defines policy entrepreneurs as people willing to invest resources in return for future
policies in their favour.
26.
Regeringskansliet, Regeringens IT-politiska strategigrupp, status report, June 2004. Official Web site:
www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2495/m/wai
27.
For information about the IT Commission, see IT-kommissionen, Vlkommen till IT-kommissionen,
www.itkommissionen.se/index-2.html
28.
ITPS, En lrande IT-politik fr tillvxt och vlfrd (A Learning ICT Policy for Growth and Welfare,
ITPS final report on its assignment of evaluating Swedish ICT policy),
www.itps.se/pdf/A2003_015_en.pdf
29.
This concerns for example the magnitude/level and focus of public (state) engagement and the
distribution of responsibility between government, government agencies and between county councils
and the state.
30.
31.
Of 4.3 million Swedish households, nearly 1.6 million have taken advantage of the offer. This can also
be seen in the statistics showing the increase in the number of personal computers per capita in Sweden.
In 2003, more than 80% of the Swedish population had access to a computer at home (SIKA, 2004).
32.
The Ministry for Research and Education is responsible for the Swedish research policy, which is related
to innovation policy. Communication and co-ordination between the MIEC and the Ministry for
Research and Education is an important issue, but is not discussed in this chapter.
33.
The Swedish model is based on small ministries and, in terms of employees, larger agencies.
34.
The Director General of VINNOVA is part of the government group that treats these questions.
35.
36.
For example: A Future IT Infrastructure for Sweden, An Information Society for All and
Information Technology Wings to Human Ability. [Swedish titles: Informationsteknologin Vingar
t mnniskans frmga (SOU 1994:18); Framtidssker IT-infrastruktur fr Sverige (SOU 1999:134);
Ett informationssamhlle fr alla (Prop. 1999/2000:86)].
For more information and further reports, see the IT Commissions official Web page:
www.itkommissionen.se.
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References
Government bills (Propositions)
1963: Computer bill addressing internal IT policy (Proposition 1963:85)
1985: Computer policy (Proposition 1984/85:220)
1994: Education and research (1993/94:177)
1996: Measures to broaden and develop the utilisation of IT (Prop. 1995/96:125)
1998: Public administration in the service of the citizens (Prop 1997/98:136)
2000: An information society for all (Prop. 1999/2000:86)
2001: Research and renewal (Prop. 2000/2001:3).
2002: R&D within the innovation system (Prop. 2001/02:2)
2003: Law on electronic communication (prop. 2002/03:110).
Interviews
We have conducted interviews with three senior clerks at the Ministry for Industry,
Employment and Communication, and two at VINNOVA.
General references
Ericsson, P. et al. (2002), VinniTel, VINNOVA, Stockholm.
European Commission, European Scoreboard of Innovation 2003,
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/scoreboard2003/index.html
Hall, P. and K. Lfgren (2004), The Rise and Decline of a Visionary Policy: An
Analysis of Swedish ICT Policy, unpublished paper, Malm University, School of
Technology and Society.
ITPS, A Learning ICT Policy for Growth and Welfare,
www.itps.se/pdf/A2003_015_en.pdf
ITPS, IT-politikens ansvarsfrdelning och styrning,
www.itps.se/publikationer/Publ_IT_utvardering.htm
ITPS, Underlag till IT-utvrdering,
www.itps.se/publikationer/Publ_IT_utvardering.htm
Johansson, M., Smart, Fast and Beautiful: On Rhetoric of Technology and Computing
Discourse in Sweden, 1955-1995,
www.ep.liu.se/diss/arts_science/1997/164/index.html
Kingdon, J. (1984), Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Little Brown, Boston.
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Part 2
GOVERNANCE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
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Chapter 8
POLICY INTEGRATION:
THE CASE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND
Mari Hjelt, Sanna Ahvenharju, Mikko Halonen and Mikko Syrjnen
This chapter describes a study of Finnish sustainable development that took place in two
stages. First a broad review of the national sustainable development strategy was performed, and several sectoral policy domains were analysed to identify processes for
integrating or discussing the integration of sustainable development issues in sectoral
policies. The second stage consisted of three case studies with a strong environmental
policy focus as a way to analyse the interaction of innovation policy and sustainable
development policy. In both stages, a similar framework was used to describe policy
processes related to agenda setting, design and implementation of policy measures and
policy learning.
In spite of the challenges for expanding science and technology policy to a broader
innovation policy, such broadening is necessary from the sustainable development point
of view. The biggest challenges are at the level of agenda setting. There is a need to
strengthen mechanisms for setting priorities and for anticipating and handling conflicts.
There is also a need to increase the participation of different stakeholders in the priority
setting processes. Special attention should be paid to long-term foresight work to explore
future opportunities. At the level of design and implementation, such expansion requires
new types of policy measures. To produce them, the knowledge base and the multidisciplinarity of innovation policy actors should be increased. Innovation policy needs to
design and test new types of actions. Generally, the roles of policy learning and policy
advice will increase. In this area the study revealed relatively few strong and formal coordination and co-operation efforts. There is a need to strengthen critical, evaluative,
objective, forward-looking and cross-cutting policy-oriented research that addresses
sustainable development themes.
Introduction
The term sustainable development has entered common language to describe a
general guiding principle for promoting societal development without increasing the
environmental burden.1 To achieve sustainable development requires a holistic, futureoriented approach to development, taking into account the interdependence of various
environmental, economic and societal issues. However, despite the broad definition and
the aim to integrate all three pillars of sustainable development into policy discussion,
policy interaction and integration remain a major challenge. For example, in the environmental policy domain, often seen as spearheading the sustainable development debate, the
focus is still largely on the ecological dimension.
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defined policy domains. Second, the case studies focus on two sectoral policy domains,
S&T and environmental policy, both of which are traditionally vertically organised.
Figure 8.1. Horizontal and vertical dimensions of different policy domains
Innovation policy
Horizontal dimension
Governmental responsibility
for sustainable development
Verticaldimension
Science and technology policy
Sustainable
development
policy
Verticaldimension
Environmental policy
Second, whether horizontal innovation policy encompassing sustainable development principles exists (existence of horizontal innovation policy).
There are several complementary approaches to analysing these interactions. First, the
role of innovation both technologies and other sources of change in providing
solutions to the sustainable development challenges can be analysed. For example, one
might examine the role of technologies in providing solutions to climate change
challenges or the negative role of new innovations in increasing energy demand. R&D
processes in companies and research institutes have been the subject of several studies
aimed at understanding the processes needed to find such solutions. Second, the drivers of
these innovations can be analysed in order to understand the role of different policy
measures in innovation. For example, energy taxation has a big role in creating new
markets for technologies that do not affect climate. Third, the means taken by innovation
policy S&T policy to solve sustainable development challenges can be analysed. For
example, one might look at the extent to which technology policy makers have
participated in the drafting of the national climate change strategy. For all three areas
much research material is available (e.g. Technopolis, 2004; Boekholt, 2002; Hilden et
al., 2002; Markusson, 2001; Loikkanen and Hongisto, 2000). MONIT has particularly
focused on the third research area, studying interaction, horizontal co-ordination and
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Innovations
Provide
solutions
Create new
problems
Stimulation
Economic
Policy measures
Horizontal co-ordination
Social
Environmental
Regulation, stimulation
Environmental
policy
Other policies
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It is clear from the Finnish study that the concept of coherence is multifaceted and
that analysis of the interaction among policies starts from a variety of positions.
Furthermore, it was a question whether there is only one way to ensure policy coherence.
There are instances in which the internal coherence of innovation policy may suffer from
strong integration with other policies. To analyse the different dimensions of integration,
three case studies were chosen; they are described in more detail below. Furthermore, no
explicit criteria were used to evaluate the policy processes. Instead, a structured
framework for monitoring the policy processes was used.
Agenda
setting
Design
National
National
strategy
strategy
Strategic
Strategic
intelligence
intelligence
Policy
learning
Sector
Sector
policies
policies
Policy
Policy
evaluation
evaluation
Implementation
Implementation
strategies
strategies
Performance
Performance
evaluation
evaluation
Instrument
Instrument
set
set--up
up
Impact
Impact
evaluation
evaluation
Evaluation
Implementation
The overall process consists of eight interactive stages (inner circle in Figure 8.3)
which can be distributed among five overall phases:7 agenda setting, design, implementation, evaluation and policy learning (pictured counter-clockwise in the figure):
Agenda setting covers the processes needed to define the policy objectives. This
includes both national strategy and sectoral strategies. This part of the policy
cycle is strongly influenced by different interest groups and is based on the results
of policy needs analysis. It also includes understanding why certain issues are on
the political agenda and how they got there. This part also includes processes
involved and decisions made to set up national organisational structures.
Design covers the part of the policy cycle in which the issues on the policy
agenda are formulated into concrete initiatives, programmes or policies. This
involves an assessment of the situation and of the needs and development of
concrete actions.
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The implementation part of the policy cycle refers to the implementation of the
policy measures developed in the previous phase. It is important to see this as a
separate phase as the experience of implementation is often very different from
that of designing initiatives, owing to contextual changes and practical trade-offs.
Policy learning covers all the research, analysis and interaction processes that
together enable strategic understanding of the development requirements of the
policy system. Policy learning is defined as all those processes by which policy
systems generate and incorporate knowledge and understanding about: i) the
underlying causes and conditions of policies and initiatives; and ii) the effects of
policy and initiatives. This knowledge is derived throughout the policy cycle and
policy learning provides feed-back to all stages.
This policy cycle framework does not provide a tool either to evaluate the processes
or suggest actions. However, by focusing on governance issues in particular on the
status of policy co-ordination and integration it allows for deriving recommendations
for developing the systemic coherence and capabilities needed to advance integration.
Some generic observations can also be made on the conditions for successful integration
of innovation and sustainable development. By structuring observations in this manner,
the approach is generic and applicable to any policy domain.
Need to handle political and societal issues that are high on the political
agenda. Such issues are prone to political conflict but cannot be solved in a single
sectoral policy domain. Often the objectives of different policy domains may be
in conflict. To look more closely at one such issue, case study 1 looks at the
process of formulating Finlands national climate strategy.
Need to create new business opportunities that enhance sustainable development. The most obvious and the most often highlighted reason for the need for
co-ordination between innovation policy and sustainable development policy is
that innovations that promote sustainable development can help new businesses to
emerge. Interaction in this area is a clear win-win opportunity for the policy
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Need to understand policy actions that affect the innovation framework but
are not high on the political agenda. Certain policy issues that affect innovation
and are relevant to innovation policy are not high on the political agenda of any
policy domain. The regulatory framework is an example, and it often attracts little
attention. The revision of the Finnish Environmental Protection Act was taken as
case study 3 to represent regulatory change.
These three situations are examined separately, as optimising the outcome may
require different tools. From the innovation policy point of view, one of the challenges is
to recognise when innovation policy should be more proactive, although it is also a
challenge to recognise whether this may be undesirable (and why) in some contexts. It
should be recognised that the three case studies and the conclusions drawn do not
constitute a comprehensive view of all of the types of situations that policy domains
confront.
Box 8.1. Finlands three case studies on sustainable development
Case study 1: The National Climate Strategy (NCS)
This case study concentrated on the formation of the Finnish climate strategy and the elaboration of the
national climate change programme in the wake of the Kyoto Protocol. The first international commitments
on climate change date back to the early 1990s, and the foundation for international and national responses
was formulated in the Kyoto Protocol. The case study covers the preparation of the Finnish climate strategy
from 1999 until its adoption in 2001. Hence, the impact of climate change and the implementation of the
Finnish strategy were not studied.
As part of the burden-sharing package among EU member states, Finland committed itself in 1999 to
stabilise its emissions to the 1990 level of approximately 76.5 million CO2 tons during the first commitment
period of the Protocol. To comply with this commitment, the Finnish government appointed in spring 1999
an inter-ministerial working group, the Kyoto Group, to prepare a national action plan.
The National Climate Strategy (NCS) was elaborated and based on sectoral programmes put together by the
Ministries of Trade and Industry (MTI), Environment (MoE), Agriculture and Forestry and Transport and
Communications which indicated how their sectors might contribute to the required greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission reductions. The ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs were also involved but did not produce
sector-specific climate programmes.
The ministries offered several studies in support of their work on the sectoral programmes. Based on the
sectoral programmes and available research, a common background report for the NCS was elaborated by a
network of administrative representatives from the above six ministries (the so-called Kyoto Network).
The MTI was responsible for integrating the sectoral programmes into the background report, in cooperation with the other ministries. The Kyoto Group, consisting of the respective ministers and chaired by
the MTI, was responsible for preparing the NCS, which was approved by the government in 2001.
(continued)
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The ultimate goal is to integrate sustainable development thinking in all government actions across all policy domains. Isolation of sustainable development
issues in a separate, clearly defined policy would hamper integration and remove
individual actors and organisations responsibility to take sustainable development as a guiding principle.
However, views that true attempts should be made to make sustainable development a
more clearly defined policy domain were expressed using the following arguments:
Thus, there appears to be a consensus that sustainable development as such does not
require any clear structures for policy co-ordination but that more attention should be paid
to achieve integration across existing policy domains and to strengthen the co-ordination
mechanisms.
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Agenda setting
During the first phase of the study, interviewees at different ministries were asked
about their perception of the connections between sustainable development and
innovation policies. Almost all immediately pointed to the practical technological
solutions and the measures used, for example by Tekes, to promote R&D. Technologies
were seen as potential and positive solutions to sustainable development problems. In
general, technology policy measures and aims were felt not to hamper sustainable
development objectives and were a positive contribution. However, interviewees (persons
responsible for sustainable development issues in different sectoral domains across
government) consistently felt was that there is no connection between innovation and
sustainable development discussions at the level of setting policy objectives and
developing common guidelines. Overall, Finnish S&T policy was seen as very passive
towards sustainable development challenges at the agenda-setting level. Thus, from the
sustainable development point of view, there appears to be no active horizontal innovation policy.
In terms of observations on vertical coherence in incorporating sustainable development issues in the S&T policy domain, there is an internal and external consensus that
innovation policy performs correctly. Particularly at the implementation level, measures
and activities are seen as sufficient. There are some signs of over-optimism or even
complacency, as environmental or broader sustainable development issues have been
referred to less frequently in strategic S&T policy documents in the last years (Kivimaa
and Mickwitz, 2005). Many of the positive remarks were directed towards actions by
Tekes, an agency with a special role in the Finnish innovation system. Tekes is relatively
strong and independent and has a role in both designing and implementing many
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S&T policy actions, some observations from the climate change case study are presented
in Box 8.4.
Box 8.4. Technology and the preparation of the national climate strategy (case study 1)
During the preparation of the national climate strategy, the role of technology and innovation was recognised
as central. The strategy states that: Technology is the central measure, with which greenhouse gas emissions
can be reduced or even achieve the removal of already emitted gases, and technological solutions can be used
to achieve long-term, permanent changes (NCS, 2001). Furthermore, the strategy emphasises the role of
R&D investments in all areas of the NCS. However, at the level of concrete actions, the role of S&T policy
measures remained limited. This is in part explained by the framework conditions set for the process. The
strategy focus was strictly limited to the first Kyoto commitment period 2008-12 and led to the following,
jointly agreed practical limitations:
During the first commitment period, market expansion of existing GHG mitigation technologies were to
take place through existing market mechanisms. The basic assumption was that the market situation
would not change markedly.
During the first commitment period, no major technological breakthroughs were predicted. The development of energy technologies was seen as a long-term process, and no new major changes were expected
in the short term.
Thus, the role of R&D resources was generally acknowledged but considered more relevant during the
implementation phase and to be incorporated into the actions of Tekes, for example. The inclusion of more
comprehensive innovation policies, covering issues related to the demand side, new ways of consumption,
sustainable transport, IT, etc., could have expanded the strategy framework from a primarily energyproduction focus. These measures were seen to require international, Europe-wide measures and actions to
promote market development beyond the national strategy. While the inclusion of these issues would have
given innovation policy a more significant role and expanded the measures available to prepare an optimal
national strategy, it would also have extended the focus to cover more societal and longer-term questions.
In 2004, in connection with the updating of the national climate strategy, more active policy discussion on
preparation for the post-Kyoto period started and S&T policy actors showed interest in including new
technology perspectives and mitigation approaches. One key driver is that new market opportunities related to
climate change mitigation are currently better acknowledged.
The interviews indicated that S&T policy actors remained rather passive. The technology policy domain could
have taken a stronger role in activating discussion of alternative futures and policy scenarios beyond the first
commitment period as part of the NCS process. The opening of the time horizon beyond 2010 by an
independent innovation policy actor could have led to fruitful debate on possible, realistic innovation-related
policy measures. Focusing S&T policy on the implementation phase may mean that some win-win
opportunities are lost. However, there were practical reasons to limit the complicated process to the urgent
needs of the first implementation period. An expansion of the NCS process would have led to problems in
reaching the internationally agreed deadline. Follow-up actions have shown a more forward-looking attitude
and stronger technology policy involvement.
Differences in the drivers of policy development should also be recognised. Climate change strategy is closely
linked to international agreements whereas the main driver for national technology policy is national interest.
At the implementation level, however, the measures and actions of technology policy and national climate
policy point in the same direction. A concrete example is Tekes long-term work to promote technologies that
do not harm the climate (Tekes, 2003). The framework for fruitful joint co-operation exists and one cannot
see any potential conflict.
It is clear that the NCS process created important networks, bringing together different administrative sectors
and other stakeholders. A basis for more active co-operation between environmental policy and innovation
policy domains was also created and may lead to true joint actions. During the implementation of identified
GHG mitigation measures and when identifying additional measures for reaching the required further
emission reductions, successful policies are likely to require better integration of the environmental and
innovation policy domains. Even if the main focus has moved towards implementation, co-operation and coordination at the agenda-setting and strategy level (including strategy revisions and updates) should be
strengthened.
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whereas environmental policy aims to spread innovations. Thus, both technology push
and technology pull can be catalysed through policy measures. The increasing need to
shape and change demand in order to achieve sustainable development and to create
systemic and social innovations requires more active design of joint actions.
However, the tools used by different policy domains differ, and this creates a major
bottleneck that still prevents the most efficient co-operation. Environmental policy
focuses particularly on legislation and regulation, whereas the main tool for S&T policy
is allocation of resources for R&D. The challenge is to take the approaches of both policy
domains into account in a balanced manner when designing the measures. Research
supports the view that regulation works best and reaches its objectives when operating in
combination with other forces, such as customer demand (see Hilden et al., 2002). When
these forces work together, changes in technology can be transferred rapidly for practical
use. This implies that innovation policy makers need to be aware of the regulatory
framework and to be involved in the process of preparing the legislation.
Based on the case study results, the following themes requiring further attention to
improve horizontal co-ordination are discussed in more detail:
S&T policy measures and their implications for environmental policy measures.
The capabilities of other policy domains to use the expertise and strengths of the
S&T policy domain.
S&T policy measures and their implications for environmental policy measures
As noted earlier, S&T policy focuses on creating a favourable environment for the
emergence of innovations and new businesses. There is a wealth of studies on the impact
of public R&D funding on industrial competitiveness.9 There is also evidence from
different countries that competitiveness and promotion of sustainable development are
positively correlated. Finland has for years been at the top of international benchmarking
exercises measuring competitiveness and sustainable development. However, there are
very few studies on the precise environmental impacts of S&T policy measures.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that new, environmentally friendly innovations do
not get to the market without supporting measures in other policy fields that help open up
new markets. However, allocation of R&D resources contributes significantly to
promoting sustainable development. Over the years, Tekes has estimated that around 15%
of its R&D funding has been targeted to applications that directly promote environmental
sustainability. In addition, other public R&D funding sources promote research and other
activities that promote sustainable development. The conclusion from the case studies
was that the implications and results of these S&T policy activities are only taken into
account in other policy domains to a very small degree. The priority setting achieved
through the allocation of R&D resources can have far-reaching, long-term consequences.
However, as discussed earlier, this prioritisation takes place at the implementation level
by the funding organisations instead of as a result of high-level top-down policy control.
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The ability of other policy domains to use the expertise and strengths of the S&T
policy domain
One observation from the case studies is that the proximity of S&T policy actors to
industry and their understanding of industry needs is an asset that could be better utilised
in implementing measures in other policy domains. Ministry-level actions in the
environmental policy domain are not at the right level to stimulate and catalyse
environmental R&D in the industry sector, as was apparent in the cluster programme case
study. The environmental cluster programme started from the assumption that the MoE is
as able as agencies at the implementation level to design and execute an R&D
programme. In practice, the resources and the time necessary to develop communication
channels to industry and establish steering mechanisms were underestimated. A reason
for low industry interest in the environmental cluster programme might also have been
that the environmental policy authorities were not seen as a neutral source of funds.
Industry sees S&T policy as neutral and co-operation is based on well-founded mutual
trust. Greater priority for societal objectives may in the long run lead to a similar problem
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in the innovation policy domain. If the neutral, objective and trustworthy status of
innovation policy is lost, industrys interest in participating and using public R&D
resources may diminish.
Box 8.5. Innovation policy participation in the Environmental Protection Act and
best available techniques (case study 3)
In the preparation of the EPA, technological or innovation questions did not generally receive
attention and participation of S&T policy actors was low. The main connection to technology
issues took place in defining and interpreting BAT at both the European and the national levels.
At both levels, the conclusion was that the BAT defined in the European process provides
information for local decisions, but does not provide guidance on actual technological choices
or direct emission limits. Hence, the authorities define emission limits but not the technological
choice based on BAT. Clearly this makes great demands on local application of BAT.
All interviewees felt that BAT is a good basis for regulation. It takes into account environmental, technological and economic aspects and is thus in line with the different dimensions of
sustainable development. Furthermore, the preparation of BAT is based on information
exchange, not on regulation. In practice, industry representatives have actively participated and
made a major contribution to the Finnish BAT preparation work. According to some
interviewees, the role of industry has been much more significant in Finland than in most other
EU countries. Industry representatives have brought knowledge and resources that the
authorities and civil servants lack. The National Technical Working Groups have operated
openly and allowed parties to gain a deeper common understanding of how BAT principles can
be applied.
A number of studies were commissioned to support Finnish arguments and views in the
preparation of the BAT reference documents (BREFs). The comments addressed to the
European level had to be sufficiently motivated and supported by empirical evidence. It is
acknowledged that participation in the preparation has had an impact on the competitiveness of
Finnish industry. It is also considered that sufficient resources have been allocated for the work;
typically industry has covered half of the cost. The resources have also made it possible to
distribute BAT information widely. The financing of these activities was organised through the
environmental cluster programme, which also involved the MTI and technology policy actors.
Tekes financed some of the early studies, but later withdrew, as the projects were considered
information gathering exercises rather than R&D.
Although the innovation policy actors MTI and Tekes have had representatives in the
different working groups and are interested in the BAT work, they have only played a minor
role. Industry outperforms policy on technological issues and the role of promoting
technological knowledge, and this role was effectively left to industry. On the other hand,
innovation policy makers might have taken a bigger role, acting as a neutral partner in seeking
the best technological knowledge.
Stakeholder involvement
A critical remark made during the interviews was that, aside from industry, there is
little stakeholder participation in S&T policy design processes. Improvement in this area
is crucial if innovation policy objectives expand and there is a need to design measures to
reach objectives with broader societal impacts. In addition to R&D actors, industry and
research organisations, NGOs, other public sectors actors, community and city representatives as well as the general public could contribute.
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First, the programmes aimed to support knowledge creation and enhancement of industrial
clusters across traditional boundaries (Hernesniemi, 1995; STPC, 1996). Thus, the objective of the environmental cluster programme was to support the creation of an environmental cluster. During the programme period, there was a clear move towards such a
cluster. Although industry participation was low, the programme and its nature as a horizontal co-operative measure raised awareness and general knowledge of opportunities. The
high level of visibility in the business and research communities would not have been
achieved without horizontal co-operation and S&T policy involvement.
Second, the cluster programmes were seen as tools to test and develop new horizontal
governance practices. An example is the allocation of research funding via co-funding and
joint decision making in the environmental cluster programme. All decisions were made
based on consensus and long discussions involving both environmental and S&T policy
actors. Through practical work, practices were improved and better joint co-ordination was
named as one of the biggest impacts of the programme.
Third, strengthening the national knowledge base also requires truly multidisciplinary
research. The programmes funding and projects were seen as a means of strengthening this
cross-cutting knowledge. The programmes multidisciplinary research in cross-cutting
areas was one of the programmes main strengths.
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The following themes in the area of evaluation and policy learning emerged during
the study:
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Table 8.1. Summary of the main recommendations for future innovation policy
Vertical coherence
(absorption of horizontal sustainable development
principles within a sectoral domain)
Agenda setting
Horizontal coherence
(interaction and co-ordination among
sectoral policies)
Design and
implementation of
policy measures
Policy learning
Generally, the role of policy learning and the role of policy advice will increase. In
this area, the study demonstrated relatively few strong, formal co-ordination and cooperation efforts. There are well-functioning informal mechanisms for exchanging
information and experience, but more formal mechanisms are needed to strengthen
learning across policy domains. A potential bottleneck is that research close to the needs
of the policy makers is, in most cases, organised according to the sectoral division of
policy domains and receives part of its budgetary funds directly from individual
ministries. This leads to a situation in which research results may not be considered
neutral or objective. Sectoral organisation of research may also hamper opportunities to
increase knowledge about synergies among policy measures in different sectors. There is
a need to strengthen policy-oriented research that would be critical, evaluative, objective,
forward-looking and would cut across different policy domains and sustainable development themes.
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Notes
1.
The concept in its current form emerged from a series of meetings and reports during the 1970s and
1980s. In 1987, the UN-sponsored Brundtland Commission released a report, Our Common Future,
which emphasised that economic development cannot stop, but must change to fit within the planets
ecological limits. It also popularised the term sustainable development, defining it as development that
meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
This study does not attempt to give a final definition for the concept, but aims to show the interpretations
that different policy domains have used in order to follow the general principle.
2.
The case study does not include the analysis of Finnish S&T policy. As a part of the MONIT work, a
separate case study was carried out on Finnish innovation policy.
3.
Policy domain refers to a general policy pertaining to overall national strategic goals and/or all sectoral
policies including policy objectives, related organisations and their actions and processes.
4.
The discussion of sustainable development can be very easily expanded to cover issues such as
information society, health care and others. This would have expanded the Finnish case study beyond
comparability with other MONIT sustainable development case studies. Thus, the study focuses on
environmental policy more than on a very broad sustainable development discussion.
5.
For example, in the last review of the Finnish National Science and Technology Policy Council, the
dominant new strategic demand was to stimulate social innovations, see STPC (2003).
6.
A similar approach is used in many other MONIT case studies as well as used in the literature
(e.g. Mickwitz and Kivimaa, 2005). Different types of policy cycle frameworks reflect in principle the
same processes. The key feature is the need to acknowledge that the process is complex, with multiple
interactions between the different parts, rather than a linear process.
7.
Naturally, the boundaries between the parts are often vague. Also, different organisations may cover
different parts of the cycle depending on the policy issue to be dealt with.
8.
For example, Tekes technology programmes would have offered good material for case studies on S&T
policy implementation but were purposely left out. Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2005) have used the
technology programmes as case study material to study the environmental policy integration in Finnish
technology policies.
9.
For example, in 2002, Tekes published an extensive report summarising research assessing the impact of
public R&D funding on society.
10.
For example, Tekes and MTI jointly fund the Research Programme for Advanced Technology Policy
(ProACT) which focuses on research that can be used for the needs of technology policy (see
http://proact.ktm.fi).
11.
A recent example of a broad evaluation that more clearly focused on development of actions and
programmes was that of the environmental programme of the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications which covered all transport-related organisations within the transport policy domain (Hjelt
et al., 2005).
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Hilden, M., J. Lepola, P. Mickwitz, A. Mulders, M. Palosaari, J. Simil, S. Sjblom and
E. Vedung (2002), Evaluation of Environmental Policy Instruments: A Case Study of
the Finnish Pulp & Paper and Chemical Industries, Monographs of the Boreal
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Hjelt, M., V. Valovirta, Y. Gilbert and A. Pathan (2005), Evaluation of Environmental
Management Systems within the Administrative Sector of the Finnish Ministry of
Transport and Communications English Summary, Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications Publications.
Heinonen, S., P. Kasanen and M. Walls (2002), Ekotehokas yhteiskunta
Ympristklusterin kolmannen ohjelmakaudne esiselvitysraportti (Ecoefficient
Society: Preliminary Study of the Third Phase of the Environmental Cluster
Programme, in Finnish), Ministry of Environment, 598, Helsinki.
Hernesniemi, H., M. Lammi and P. Yl-Anttila (1995), Kansallinen kilpailukyky ja
teollinen tulevaisuus (The Competitive Advantage and the Future of Finnish
Industry, in Finnish), ETLA and Sitra, Helsinki.
Honkasalo, A. (2000), Eco-efficiency, Entrepreneurship and Co-operaton: The Finnish
Envrionmental Cluster Programme, in Innovation and the Environment, OECD,
Paris.
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Rouhinen, S. (2002), Finnish Sustainable Development: Long Line Shortly (in Finnish),
in Maailmanpyr 2/2002.
Ruud, A. and O.M. Larsen (2004), Coherence of Environmental and Innovation Policies:
A Green Innovation Policy in Norway?, ProSus Report 05/04, ProSus, University of
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Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland (STPC) (1996), Finland: A
Knowledge-based Society, Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland
Review, Helsinki.
Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland (STPC) (2003), Knowledge,
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Technopolis (2004), Policy Instruments for Sustainable Innovation, report prepared for
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Tekes (2003), Technology Programmes and Climate Change The Role of Tekes
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Chapter 9
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION:
HOW WILL WE RECOGNISE IT WHEN WE SEE IT?
THE CASE OF GREEN INNOVATION POLICY IN NORWAY1
William M. Lafferty, Audun Ruud and Olav Mosvold Larsen
Programme for Research and Documentation for a Sustainable Society (ProSus),
Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway
Taking the definition of environmental policy integration (EPI) and benchmarks proposed
by Lafferty (2004) as a point of departure, this chapter outlines an approach that allows
for an evaluation of EPI with respect to green innovation policies in Norway. EPI has
both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension refers to crosssectoral strategies for environmental protection, and the vertical dimension to a
greening of sectoral policies. A constitutional mandate, an overarching strategy for the
sectoral domain, a national action plan and a responsible executive body are proposed as
baseline requirements for achieving (and assessing) horizontal, cross-sectoral integration
of environmental goals. With regard to the vertical dimension, the combination of a sectoral strategy for change and an action plan are the proposed key initiatives.
Using the benchmarks as evaluation criteria, the chapter discusses the degree of integration of Norwegian innovation policy and environmental policy. The discussion is
illustrated with efforts undertaken by the government, the Ministry of Environment and
the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The paper presents a fourfold perspective on stylized modes of combining environmental
concerns and innovation. The modes are delineated along two dimensions: i) whether the
integration is steered by processual/instrumental or substantive norms and values;
and ii) whether the goal of integration is related to a simple decoupling of economic and
social drivers from environmental degradation, or is also related to an active recoupling
of drivers to ensure more sustainable production and consumption. The findings indicate
that vertical environmental policy integration is actively promoted in Norway, but that
specific and direct efforts in the direction of green innovation are practically non-existent.
The same holds true for the horizontal dimension. This does not necessarily mean that
green innovations are not being promoted in Norway. But the integration effects that are
being made are not the result of an active and goal-directed policy. There is, therefore, a
clear potential for achieving a more effective implementation of green innovation in
Norway.
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presented and illustrated with efforts undertaken by the government, the Ministry of
Environment and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The findings indicate that vertical environmental policy integration is promoted, but
specific and direct efforts to promote green innovation are very limited, if they exist at all.
On the horizontal dimension little can be documented. This does not necessarily indicate
that green innovations are not promoted. However, efforts undertaken by the public
sector, the Norwegian government and particularly the two ministries studied confirm
that there is a large potential for strengthening public policy integration for the promotion
of green innovation in Norway.
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of international market competition. The first Action Plan for Innovation in Europe was
adopted in 1996 (CEC, 1996); and the second Innovate for a Competitive Europe
was, as of November 2004, being circulated by the Commission for comments and
amendments (CEC, 2004a). The current review and revision of the action plan takes place
within the context of the Lisbon Strategy.4
The major thrust of the OECD work has been promotion and monitoring of
innovation as an aspect of research and development, but the OECD has also focused
strongly on innovation in the context of innovation systems (documented notably in
OECD, 2002). Most importantly for the present discussion, however, is the work done by
the OECD on innovation and the environment and technology and environment.5
Despite efforts at conceptual clarification and monitoring, it is safe to say that there
currently exists considerable confusion and disagreement as to what innovation is all
about. And as with all such essentially contested concepts (Gallie, 1956; Lafferty and
Langhelle, 1999, Chapter 1) the only way one can gain semantic closure is to either
aim for a consensus among all users, or stipulate specific instrumental criteria for applying
and interpreting the idea. Relying on the latter approach, the notion of innovation
employed here refers primarily to change that enhances competitive advantage within and
among firms. Such advantage can be measured in terms of increased market shares, gross
earnings, profit margins, number of patents, etc. It will be argued, moreover, that this is
the ultimate test of whether or not innovation actually is achieved
The relationship between innovation and the environment has recently received very
specific treatment by the EU Commission, not only with respect to environmental
protection, but more pointedly in connection with the promotion of sustainable development. On the first point, there has gradually emerged as an instrumental complement to
the expansion and generalisation of the innovation mandate an emphasis on the need for
greater coherence and integration within and across sectors. This is clearly expressed
in the most recent communication on innovation by the EU Commission (CEC, 2003).
This line is then followed up in the second-generation draft action plan currently
circulating (CEC, 2004a). The draft expresses a need for institutional mechanisms to
integrate innovation policy at both the national and regional levels.
As for the goal of integrating innovation and the environment, the policy signals are
much more perfunctory and diffuse. The issue was given very little attention in the initial
phases of innovation policy development. Neither the Green Paper on Innovation nor
the First Action Plan (Innovation for Growth and Employment) had anything
significant to say on the relationship.6 More important, however, is the fact that the
second-generation draft plan currently circulating says even less. There are only two hints
of what the environment could mean for innovation policy: i) environmental regulation
can be either a hinder or a help for innovation; and ii) there are positive market
opportunities for greater innovation in the environmental technology and services sector.7
The reticence of the Commission on the innovation-environment link may, however,
be partially explained by a direct reference in the draft action plan to the recently adopted
separate action plan on environmental technology. Entitled Stimulating Technologies for
Sustainable Development: An Environmental Technologies Action Plan for the European
Union (ETAP), this plan adopted in January 2004 (CEC, 2004b) moves the
innovation-environment discourse in a totally different direction. Just as the innovation
action plan seems to be exclusively drafted to accommodate the Lisbon process, the
ETAP is solidly anchored in the Gothenburg process. Still, an effort to promote an
integration of innovation and environmental policy is explicitly stated:
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Report is that continued economic growth is necessary, but that the quality or nature of
growth can be changed. This is most succinctly expressed in the second so-called key
concept of the WCED definition of sustainable development: the idea of limitations
imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environments ability to
meet present and future needs (WCED, 1987, p. 43).8 The decoupling of non-sustainable
patterns of social change in this context necessarily implies a search for recoupling for
sustainable development. Environmental protective measures must be promoted in a way
that triggers modified and even new value-added activities and economic growth patterns.
This can be achieved through incremental changes in existing patterns of consumption
and production, but can also involve a need for more radical discontinuous change.
Moving from a decoupling orientation towards recoupling for sustainable development
requires highly creative architectural innovations in both technical and non-technical
governance systems.
The content of economic growth in production and consumption must be altered in
such a way that it is recoupled with environmental concerns and imperatives. This implies
(for example) technical efforts in the field of dematerialisation and decarbonisation.
Services can increasingly be substituted for the production of material goods, and
renewable energy sources can be substituted for fossil fuels. Such efforts must, however,
be actively pursued and supported by appropriate governing structures, and it is within
this policy space that the relationship between innovation and sustainable development
concerns becomes crucial. Within the normative-functional framework of sustainable
development, innovation must be green and greening must be innovative.
This perspective provides a rationale for assessing the relationship between sustainable development and innovation with respect to instrumental standards of
governance what are here referred to as processual norms. How can policy integration
between the two goals be achieved as a governing process? This chapter argues that a
need for instrumental standards of policy integration must be supplemented by substantive standards. It is not enough, in this view, to evaluate the mechanisms of
sustainable development governance as process alone. Integration must also be evaluated
in terms of outputs (policies) and outcomes (products).9
While the distinction between process and outputs/outcomes is relatively
straightforward, the difference between the latter two requires some elaboration. Vedung
(1997) identifies outputs with specific initiatives (policy instruments) designed to
achieve sub-goals of an overall programme; outcomes are seen as the actual effects of
policy on target groups. The difference can be well illustrated for the present discussion
by looking at another key notion of the sustainable development discourse: ecoefficiency. Both the OECD and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD) have identified eco-efficiency as a principal standard for decoupling. It is also
a standard which succinctly reflects the second key concept of the Brundtland definition,
indicating the prescription of the WCED to change the quality (nature, mode) of
economic growth.
Ruud (2004) has demonstrated, however, that eco-efficiency must be viewed in a
more complex light. As generally understood (and increasingly practised), the idea
emerges as a necessary but not sufficient criterion for achieving sustainable
development. An emphasis on relative gains through isolated technological improvements
does not, for example, always result in absolute gains for the environment and development. A distinction between eco-efficiency and eco-effectiveness is thus advisable.
Whereas the former focuses on technological improvements within a relatively narrow
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Goal of integration
Processual norms
Substantive norms
Decoupling
Environmental protection:
Major emphasis on end-of-pipe regulation and
prevention of pollution.
Ecological communalism:
Major emphasis on limiting growth. Reliance on
self-sustaining life-styles and communal values.
Recoupling
Ecological modernisation:
Major emphasis on improving eco-efficiency of
existing sectoral practices through win-win
solutions. Plays down zero-sum conflicts of interests
and trade-offs.
Sustainable development:
Major emphasis on achieving overall ecoeffectiveness in a global context. Assigns
principled priority to maintaining and enhancing
natural life-support systems.
* In the present context, steering is done by government actors. While the overall effectiveness of implementation will
depend on governance, the ultimate responsibility for achieving EPI as a first-order principle to implement and
institutionalise the idea of sustainable development (Lenschow, 2002. pp. 6-7) is the responsibility of governments. It is
national governments that are bound by the international and regional agreements promoting both sustainable development
and innovation.
Environmental protection. This normative mode places major emphasis on endof-pipe regulation and prevention of pollution. In this mode innovation may be
perceived as ameliorative environmental technology.
Sustainable development. This mode places major emphasis on achieving overall eco-effectiveness in a global context. It assigns principled priority to
maintaining and enhancing natural life-support systems. In this mode innovation
may be perceived as a radical transformation of the quality of economic growth.
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First, the two dimensions capture significant aspects of the latent trade-offs implicit in
the parallel developments of sustainable development policy and innovation policy in
Europe. Both policy tracks attribute great importance to the values and goals pursued by
each, and both declare a clear need for better policy integration. As it now stands,
however, there has been virtually no open discussion as to the relative importance of the
two tracks. Differentiation along the principal axis from environmental protection to
sustainable development provides a value hierarchy that is in line with the
constitutional situation in the EU. In other words, the goal of sustainable development has
a stronger principled status than the goal of innovation. This is manifest in two ways:
i) both sustainable development in general and environmental policy integration in
particular have stronger legal status in the EU treaties; and ii) whereas sustainable
development is the overarching value/goal of the Gothenburg strategy, innovation is only
one aspect of the Lisbon strategy, and it is an aspect on a par with sustainability in the
Lisbon process.10
Second, the framework clearly reflects through the differentiation between
processual and substantive norms a fundamental aspect of policy implementation
research. Equally important is the fact that the same distinction is manifest in EU policy
discourses themselves, where (particularly in the different action plans), goals and
initiatives reflecting means and ends are indiscriminately mixed. What the
framework clearly indicates, however, is that changes in process do not necessarily result
in changes in substantive outcomes; and that positive changes in substantive outcomes
can be achieved without pursuing the processes designated.
Third, there exists an implied, but inadequately expressed, presumption that
decoupling involves recoupling. It is important to explain the implications of not only
disconnecting drivers from pressures on natural resources and eco-systems, but also of
finding ways (or not) to achieve surplus-generating development. The importance of such
a distinction is particularly clear with respect to ETAP, where it is, on the one hand, often
assumed that end-of-pipe initiatives require no compensatory growth-maintaining
initiatives; or, on the other, that achieving eco-efficiency is the same as achieving ecoeffectiveness.
Finally, there are interesting implications in the framework for relativising the
meaning and value of innovation. Most importantly, an understanding of the potential of
innovation provides a very different context for understanding and promoting innovation
as a policy goal. Instead of viewing any kind of innovation as potentially positive for
value-creating competition, the framework points out that innovation can serve ends other
than increased economic growth through increased market/profit shares.
Innovation in the mode of environmental protection referred to in Table 9.1 can
contribute significantly to decoupling, without being commercially competitive. Innovation can also contribute to apparent ecological modernisation, without contributing to
sustainable development (owing to reduced eco-effectiveness and rebound effects);
and innovation can contribute to ecological communalism by developing life styles,
learning mechanisms and organisational forms that seem to point backwards rather than
forwards in terms of economic growth and development. Ecological communalism and
ecological modernisation are perceived by various stakeholders as the most progressive
way to promote sustainable development. Apparently there are different approaches and
perspectives on how to integrate environmental concerns and innovation. Some primarily
see the goal of integration as recoupling economic patterns in more eco-efficient ways,
while other are more concerned with substantive norms and limitation of growth patterns.
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As an initial indication of what VEPI entails, Lafferty (2004) mention the following
interdependent check-list of operational mechanisms:11
A sectoral strategy for change, putting forth the basic principles and goals for
the sector.
An action plan to implement the strategy, with stipulated priorities, targets, timetables, policy instruments and designated responsible actors.
A green budget for the integration and funding of the action plan.
A constitutional mandate providing provisions for the special status of environmental/sustainable-development rights and goals.
An overarching strategy for the sectoral domain, with clearly enunciated goals
and operational principles, and a political mandate with direct backing from the
chief executive authority.
A national action plan with both overarching and sectoral targets, indicators and
time-tables.
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A communications plan stipulating sectoral responsibility for achieving overarching goals, and outlining how intra-sectoral communications are to be structured and made transparent.
An independent auditor with responsibility for monitoring and assessing implementation at both governmental and sectoral levels, and for proposing revisions in
subsequent generations of strategies and action plans.
specific decision-making situations, are crucial issues in the design and execution of
governance for sustainable development.12
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An overarching strategy for the sectoral domain, with clearly enunciated goals
and operational principles, and a political mandate with direct backing from the
chief executive authority. Norway has never adopted a national overarching
strategy for green innovation. In 2002, however, Norway adopted a relatively
short, relatively vague and highly controversial National Strategy for Sustainable
Development. The strategy was hastily prepared for the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg (Lafferty et al., 2004a). It
actually mentions innovation a couple of times, but never systematically. Further,
the strategy makes mention of environmental technologies and technological
innovation and states that Norway will play an active role in developing
environmentally friendlier technology through research (MoFA, 2002, p. 35).
However, this is not further specified and no goals are mentioned.
A national action plan with both overarching and sectoral targets, indicators and
timetables. There is no document or plan especially dedicated to green innovation. Innovation is hardly mentioned in environmental policy documents and
environmental issues are hardly mentioned in innovation policy documents. The
Action Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (HIP) published in autumn
2004 does not consider environmental issues at all. This is interesting because in
the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21), published two
weeks earlier, it is stated that the HIP is consistent with NA21 (White Paper 1
(2003-04), p. 195). In NA21 the challenge of decoupling is explicitly emphasised,
but in the HIP there are no references to either decoupling or recoupling. Within
the field of environmental politics, eight policy priority areas with strategic
objectives and operational national targets are agreed upon. In NA21 seven
central policy areas13 are identified. None is related to innovation, however.
Consequently, a national action plan with targets, indicators and timetables for
green innovation does not exist in Norway.
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A communications plan stipulating sectoral responsibility for achieving overarching goals, and outlining how intra-sectoral communications are to be structured and made transparent. No communications plan exists.
An independent auditor with responsibility for monitoring and assessing implementation at both governmental and sectoral levels, and for proposing revisions in
subsequent generations of strategies and action plans. No independent auditor
exists.
The HIP is not very innovative; in terms of being an action plan, it is not very
comprehensive. This is the case, at least, for green innovation. Ruud and Larsen (2004)
document that the HIP contains virtually no references to environmental concerns and
does not take ecological thresholds or the Earths carrying capacity into account. NA21
indirectly emphasises that sustainable economic development must include a green
innovation policy. It is stated that the HIP is consistent with NA21, but as mentioned
above, the HIP does not refer to environmental issues. In conclusion, horizontal coordination of environmental and innovation policies is virtually nonexistent. There is no
such thing as a national green innovation policy in Norway, but perhaps the situation is
more promising in specific sectoral domains.
235
A sectoral strategy for green innovation, putting forth the sectors basic principles and goals. Neither MoE nor MoTI has published a sectoral strategy for green
innovation, but environmental technology is mentioned as one of three central
aims of MoTIs environmental policy in the EPSB for 2004: To contribute to the
development and use of environmentally friendly technology, products and
services (MoTI Parliamentary Bill 1 (2003-04), pp. 41-42). However, except for
research initiatives financed by the Research Council of Norway (RCN), no
specific efforts to realise this aim are presented.
An action plan to implement the strategy, with stipulated priorities, targets, timetables, policy instruments, and designated responsible actors. A sectoral green
innovation action plan is not in place in MoE or MoTI. Except for the references
to RCN in MoTIs EPSB no efforts on green innovation are proposed or referred
to in MoEs SEAP and EPSB or in MoTis SEAP.
A budget for the integration and funding of the green innovation action plan.
There is no action plan, hence there is no budget.
A monitoring programme for overseeing the implementation process, its impacts and target results, including specified cycles for monitoring reports and
revisions of the sectoral strategy and action plan. No monitoring programme
exists (and there is not much to report on).
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Conclusion
Taking the definition of environmental policy integration and the benchmarks
proposed by Lafferty (2004) as a point of departure, this chapter has discussed green
innovation policies in Norway. The general conclusion is that the integration of
environmental and innovation policies is very weak. The implementation of both the
Action Plan for Sustainable Development and the Action Plan for a Comprehensive
Innovation Policy is poorly reflected in the EPI benchmarks.
There are, however, some green innovation policy initiatives in Norway. The possibility of pursuing change in terms of strengthened public governance for green innovation
without the formal structure of a strategic plan is of course possible. Though such ad hoc
approaches are very fragile in the sectoral departments where they must continuously
compete with the dominant interests of more traditional sectoral policy making they
constitute a point of departure. And green innovation both technical and non-technical
is being promoted by a variety of actors within the business community.
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Notes
1.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions
of Global Environmental Change: Greening of Policies Interlinkages and Policy Integration.
2.
The Presidencys Priorities are available on the Web site of the Dutch EU Presidency: www.eu2004.nl
(accessed 12 November 2004). The relevant section is Environment, pp. 16-17.
3.
4.
There are several EU Web sites devoted to different aspects of innovation, but the concept has its own
portal, so that it can be navigated from www.cordis.lu/innovation/ (accessed 8 February 2005). The site
is well co-ordinated and highly informative.
5.
OECD (2001b, Chapter 6) is a key source for the position adopted here.
6.
The Green Paper makes sporadic references to the environment, touching, for example, on environmental
regulations as reasons for innovation, or, more obliquely, the potential for innovation within the
environmental protection sector. Mention is made of a pilot project (Growth and Environment) set up
at the request of the European Parliament which provided loan guarantees for projects with beneficial
effects for the environment (CEC, 1995, p. 30).
The First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe had even less to say on the issue. Here there is only a
single mention of a possible innovation-environment link but it is a mention that points towards things
to come. In a brief concluding reference to a need for fleshing out the plan in relation to various
priority sectors or fields, it is stated that: Situations vary widely according to the country, the sector
and the technology. The action plan will therefore need to be adapted to certain fields or sectors
designated as priorities. These might include environmental protection and sustainable development, the
services sector, rural development, aspects related to demand and consumers, the audio-visual sector and
better exploitation of space and dual-use technology. (CEC, 1996. p. 9) It is this signal that is strongly
reflected in the current draft action plan, and, most specifically, in the separate Environmental
Technologies Action Plan (ETAP) of 2004 (CEC, 2004b).
7.
It should also be mentioned here that the draft action plan now circulating makes it absolutely clear that
the major purpose of innovation in the European Union is to close the gap between the United States
and Europe in levels and rates of economic performance. Anyone looking for less commercial signals as
to the purpose of innovation will look in vain.
8.
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept
of needs, in particular the essential needs of the worlds poor, to which overriding priority should be
given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the
environments ability to meet present and future needs (WCED, 1987, p. 43).
9.
For the distinction between outputs and outcomes, see Vedung (1997); and for the differentiation
between process, policy and products, see Lafferty (2001, pp. 268-301). Nilsson and Persson
(2003) have adopted a similar approach to that proposed here.
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It must be underlined, however, that this refers to the principled status and not necessarily the actual
political interpretation.
11.
The list reflects general models of policy implementation (see, for example, Sabatier, 1999; Parsons,
1995; and Hill 1997), as well as more recent publications on policy integration and de-coupling (OECD,
2001a, Chapter 3; and OECD, 2001b, Chapter 4; Wilkinson, 1998; IEEP, 2001, Chapter 4; EEA 2001,
Chapter 4; Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 2000). It also reflects more specific evaluations and project
reports (such as Hertin et al., 2001, Fergusson et al., 2001, and Kraemer, 2001). See also the
comprehensive state-of-the-art overviews of EPI by Persson (2004) and the European Environment
Agency (EEA, 2004), and the stocktaking of the Cardiff process by the European Commission (CEC,
2004c).
12.
The conceptual imagery and terminology are inspired by Immanuel Kants work on pure and
practical reason (Kemp, 1968, Chapter 1). Within a context of procedural democracy (Dahl, 1997), it
is presumed that a trump regulatory principle would be judiciously applied in accord with the
conditions and guidelines of a canon of judgment for sustainable development decision making. The
precautionary principle (as elaborated, for example, by ORiordan et al., 2001) would be a necessary
part of the canon.
13.
14.
15.
More information on the NEMS/SEAP and the EPSB is available in Lafferty et al. (2004a).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
The Norwegian term is Teknologirdet. For further details see www.teknologiradet.no/ (accessed 8 January 2005).
22.
NOK 973.25 million in 2004 and NOK 997.2 million in 2005 (MoTI Parliamentary Bill 1 (2004-05),
p. 150).
23.
The program provides grants to develop small bio-fuel plants and machinery to make chips for the plants.
24.
This can be interpreted as an expression of the environmental policy paradigm of ecological modernisation. See e.g. Mol (1996) and Reitan (2001).
25.
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Chapter 10
LINKING INNOVATION POLICY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
IN FLANDERS
Ilse Dries, Jan Larosse and Peter Van Humbeeck
This chapter describes the policy response to the Flemish innovation systems excessive
dependence on material- and energy-intensive production systems. The solution would
require a long-term transition to a less resource-intensive and more knowledge-intensive
economy. However, the governance of both sustainable development and innovation
policy is still dominated by a sectoral logic in institutional behaviour and policy
development that is a bottleneck for integrated policy development. There is not yet an
integrated governance structure to implement a framework for sustainable development.
Moreover, innovation is not at the top of policy agendas elsewhere in the system. Until
recently in fact there has been little interaction between sustainable development and
innovation. The Environmental Technology Platform (MIP), established by the Flemish
government, can be a decisive institutional lever for changing the governance structure in
order to manage the transition more effectively, in particular by achieving greater coherence between supply (stimulating excellence in research and innovation) and demand
(procurement policies, etc.). MIP has the potential to foster the development of visions
and co-operation among different actors in the innovation system. Whether this will
happen depends on conditions that remain to be fulfilled.
Introduction
Context
Innovation policy and sustainable development policy are relatively new policy
domains. They share characteristics such as complex subject matter, heterogeneous
actors, a horizontal approach and weak institutionalisation. They exemplify many of the
challenges for managing complexity in modern societies in general, as well as a changed
context for policy efforts to build for the future.
Innovation policy evolved from a linear technology-push strategy, which assumes that
economic performance follows research performance, into a system approach which
recognises the innovation process as an interactive process in which interconnected actors
and institutions engage in the production, diffusion and use of knowledge. At national
level, this interactive innovation process provides the elements and relationships that
constitute a countrys national innovation system (NIS).
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here as sets of rules, processes and practices. They not only include organisations, which
are often called institutions, but also all formal or informal rules, processes and practices
that exist within society.
Figure 10.1. The policy cycle and the issue of public governance
Interactions
Networks
Information
Institutions
Agenda setting
Ideologies
Policy evaluation
Policy preparation
Knowledge
Policy cycle
Values
Policy formulation
Policy implementation
Capabilities
Procedures
Incentives
Instruments
Regulations
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Flanders
Government
Administration
(ministries)
ICDO
(Interdepartmental Commission)
Stakeholders
Public
Federal
government
Scientists
GMO
(Departmental Commission)
Government
Administration
FRDO
(Federal Council for SD)
Public inquiry
Env
plan
Federal
plan
for SD
(5 years)
years)
(5
Public
Federal government
Flemish
government
Federal report on SD
(2 years)
Public inquiry
Env plan
(5 years)
Env plan
(5 years)
Flemish government
MIRA
(Flemish Environmental Agency)
Scientists
(5 years)
Draft Env plan
(5 years) Draft Env program
(1 year)
Federal government
Follow up report
(1 year)
GMO
(Departmental Commission)
MIRA
(Flemish Environmental Agency)
Env program
(1 year)
Env program
(1 year)
Env reports
1-2-5 years
Env reports
1-2 -5 years
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Knowledge management
Flanders has no framework for long-term strategic convergence. There is an emerging
use of scenario analysis and foresight in Flanders (administration of planning and
statistics, ViwTA, VRWB, universities), scientific policy support points have been established at universities and departmental policy units are under way (BBB), and advisory
councils like SERV and MiNa sometimes fulfil a think-tank function. New innovation
projects like transition management (sustainable building and living) and foresight (rural
areas) are initiated by the environmental policy domain. Also, instruments like MIRA
(environmental reporting and foresight) play an important role. But generally, instruments
for strategic intelligence to support decision processes are not well developed. Initiatives
involving foresight, back-casting and other explorative techniques for policy development
are scattered and not well linked to the policy cycle. Forums for sharing experience and
knowledge are nearly inexistent.
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Innovation
Policy
Environmental
Policy
Innovation
Policy
Transition
Management
Environmental
Policy
Separate worlds
Decoupling Factor 10
Networking
Transition management
Integration agenda
Evaluation of innovation impacts of
environmental policy instruments
Development of environmental
regulations favouring innovation
Strengthening existing
innovation support schemes
Institutional underpinning
MIP
Governance for linking environmental and innovation policies
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1.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Paul Zeeuwts to this section.
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Figure 10.4. Structure of the Innovation Platform for Environmental Technologies (MIP)
Innovation policy
Environmental policy
Energy policy
Advisory Group
Other policies
Steering Committee
Federal level
Action Plan
European Union
Demand-driven policies
Working Group 1:
Public procurement
WG 2: regulations
Favouring innovation
WG 3: New financial
instruments
Supply-driven policies
Existing Innovation
Support schemes:
R&D companies
SME -programme
Strategic Basic
Research Technical
High schools
Cluster support +
Ecoscan
User
Group 1
User
Group 2
Bringing existing
technology to a
commercial stage
User
Group x
New
knowledge
development
Along with these general policy objectives, a new Pole of Excellence on Environmental Technologies was created, located in VITO but involving university and other
research capabilities. This pole of excellence will deal with two kinds of projects: first,
projects bringing existing knowledge to the commercialisation stage and second, projects
developing new basic knowledge. Priorities will be demand-driven, based on technological and commercial potential and taking into account the need for publicly supported
knowledge development. The Steering Committee of the Innovation Platform will decide
on priorities, acting as a board.
Thematic working groups will deal with these issues. They will mainly be composed
of members of the relevant administration, (semi) public companies and relevant firms.
Assessment of MIP
To assess Flemish experience and developments requires once again attention to the
same factors of good governance as for sustainable development political leadership,
institutional mechanisms, transparency, and strategic intelligence.
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Institutional mechanisms
At the outset, the only tools for co-ordinating environmental and innovation policies
in the MIP are the action plan and the participation of different ministries in the Steering
Committee and in working groups. Clear procedures for decision making are lacking, and
there is no clear political commitment concerning budget support, personnel and capacity
building.
There is not a single best instrument or programme for promoting environmental
technological innovation. A mix of strategies is needed to develop an eco-efficient market
economy with good conditions for eco-innovations. Good governance requires a wide
portfolio of policies. Economic instruments are important but not sufficient. One also
needs innovation- and knowledge-oriented policies. Such a policy mix is very time- and
context-dependent and should be attuned to the demands of specific clusters in cooperation with the innovation actors. The portfolio of policy instruments should cover the
whole trajectory of the innovation and diffusion process and focus on a combined push
and pull approach. Market- or demand-side programmes can promote the application of
new technologies and stimulate wider application of proven technologies, all within a
strategic context of well-defined specialisation.
The basic propositions of MIP are sound and innovative. Its efforts will concentrate
on well-defined target areas. There is a clear commitment, not only to strengthen the
classical policy instruments of research and innovation policy for the purpose of
environmental innovation, but also to complement them with new instruments targeting
the demand side of environmental technologies and to work across the traditional borders
of environmental and innovation policy. However, one should be cautious to limit the
scope of MIPs work to the three potential instruments put forward (smart technology
procurement, modification of regulations for innovation and introduction of new financial
instruments).
Strategic intelligence
To reach the ambitious goals of MIP requires strategic intelligence. This involves
analytical instruments such as foresight, scenario analysis, benchmarking, cost-benefit
analysis, monitoring, technology assessment, etc., and competencies in process management, participative methods for consultation and co-ordination, policy instruments and
policy mix, system innovation and transition management, etc., in order to create a
common mindset, provide a common framework of reference, rationalise the decision
processes and help to implement the important choices that will have to be made. Little
attention has been given to these new types of instruments for strategic intelligence.
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Recent developments
Political
leadership
Institutional
mechanisms
Knowledge
management
Federal: PODO
Flanders: emerging use of scenario
analysis and foresight at APS, ViwTA,
VRWB; establishment of university
policy support points, departmental
policy units in BBB, transition
management .
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The Flemish and federal governments have a strong tradition of working with
advisory councils and public enquiries. These are necessary but insufficient components of a full-fledged open policy development process. More effort to
enhance the transparency of the policy process is necessary to allow more interaction between administrations and more stakeholder involvement. At present,
there are several experiments with participatory approaches, but these are often
separate, small-scale initiatives. For Flanders, the priority is probably not to install a
Flemish Council for Sustainable Development, not because there are several wellestablished advisory boards/councils, and the space and resources for yet an
additional council is limited, but because such a council would again institutionalise consultation practices, tend to monopolise stakeholder involvement and
hinder new participants and innovative consultation methods. The priority should
therefore be to integrate sustainable development thinking in each and every
advisory council, and more importantly, to ensure more efficient and effective
participation of citizens, stakeholders and advisory councils in important policy
decisions. Here progress is slow both in Flanders and at federal level.
Combining positive points of the federal and Flemish situations, and giving more
attention to integration, it should be possible to develop and carry out strong and coherent
national and regional strategies for sustainable development. The different elements of
governance need mutually reinforcing dynamics between government levels in Belgium
and between administrative levels in Flanders. The recent collaboration between
environmental policy and innovation policy in Flanders indicates a possible way to
advance the integration agenda.
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Create a network with all relevant partners; develop integration and interaction
models to stimulate innovation as a common learning process.
Develop joint measures and projects that take advantage of synergies between
environmental and innovative strategies.
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Set distinctive innovation objectives (together with the innovation policy domain)
in transition programmes.
Better integrate and co-ordinate the different instruments and estimate their
impact on innovation.
Take existing platforms, e.g. for covenants, as a starting point to build trust in
more far-reaching changes.
Promote an integrated approach to the value chain (life cycle analysis, ecodesign).
Extend the policy toolbox with new, promising environmental instruments such
as innovation waivers and environmental technology verification programmes.
Increase the use of environmental criteria in policies and programmes that support
technology development. Sustainable development or global responsibility has to
be an explicit selection criterion on the same level as the technical and financial
aspects of project evaluation by IWT.
Target a much greater share of resources explicitly to environmental sustainability in experiments of transition to new technology trajectories in which
Flanders has comparative advantages (e.g. in energy technology as announced in
the Policy Agreement).
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Develop joint measures and projects with the relevant policy domains (environment, energy).
The new Innovation Platform for Environmental Technology can bring together
several aspects of these recommendations. It could become a powerful instrument for
assessing where societal needs and technological capacities might be brought together to
achieve breakthroughs in sustainability. It can also bring together strategic actors to
develop new innovation chains. It can become an instrument for fostering the development of visions and co-operation among different actors in relevant innovation systems.
However, several key aspects of governance need to be improved during implementation
of the MIP (Table 10.2):
Table 10.2. Summary of recommendations for improving the governance of MIP
Governance
component
Importance
Assessment of MIP
Recommendations
Political support
and leadership
Institutional
mechanisms:
Policy portfolio and
policy mix
Integration
Interactive
policymaking and
transparency
Strategic
intelligence
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Although there is some political commitment, the rollout of the MIP will depend
a lot on the understanding, support and political will of the new government to
implement its goals and working principles.
Interactive policy making is taking place through the Steering Committee but
only a few business organisations are participating. Involvement of other stakeholders will be organised through an advisory group whose composition and
functions are unclear. At the moment, transparency seems to be lacking. The MIP
does not seem to be using new models of interaction such as networking.
It would merit consideration to underpin the MIP with a strong secretariat or task
force, to tap into available information, knowledge and competence and create an
institutional memory by pooling experience in an organised information network.
The government should institutionalise learning by requiring assessment,
evaluation and adaptation as a regular feature of the policy process. A knowledge
centre or expert group within the government administration should be created to
give methodological advice and to assist departments and agencies on a strategic
level with integration of policies, implementation of governance tools and
building of strategic intelligence. It should also promote initiatives to strengthen
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Finally, MIP seems to be missing a clear focus on programmes for system innovation. This is also a necessary and important dimension of strategic intelligence
concerned with transition management. Also, learning should be an important
objective in its own right. MIP should stimulate experiments and support highrisk projects with high social/environmental benefit. The balance of support to
incremental innovation in mature technologies and innovation for new breakthroughs can only be found in a concrete analysis of the technology trajectories
from the point of view of their overall contribution to sustainable development.
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References
Bollen, A. and P. Van Humbeeck (2000), Sociaal-economische analyse van de Vlaamse
milieu-industrie, Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen, Brussels.
De Jonge, W. (2003), Voorraadbeheer binnen de milieugebruiksruimten duurzame
ontwikkeling en systeeminnovatie, RUG, CDO, Ghent.
Dries, I. (2003), Duurzame ontwikkeling in Vlaanderen en Belgi, mimeo.
European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise (2002) Innovation Tomorrow.
Innovation Policy and the Regulatory Framework: Making Innovation an Integral Part
of the Broader Structural Agenda, Innovation Papers No. 28, Brussels.
European Commission (2004), Stimulating Technologies for Sustainable Development:
An Environmental Technologies Action Plan (ETAP) for the European Union,
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,
COM(2004) 38 final.
Jansen, J.L.A. (1994), The Environment: Towards a Sustainable Future, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Kemp, R. (2002), An Integrated Policy for Innovation for the Environment, in
P. Boekholt (ed.) Innovation Policy and Sustainable Development: Can Public
Innovation Incentives Make a Difference? Contributions to a Six-Country
Programme, IWT Studies No. 40, Brussels.
Kemp, R., M. Munch Andersen and M. Butter (2004), Strategies for Eco-innovation,
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Larosse, J. (2002), Transition Management as an Instrument for Leadership and
Coaching in Systemic Transformations, mimeo.
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Profile of the Fleminsh Innovation System, in OECD (2005), Governance of
Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy.
OECD (2004), Improving Policy Coherence and Integration for Sustainable
Development: A Checklist.
OECD (2004), Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions, Summary Paper.
Rennings, K., R. Kemp, M. Bartolomeo, J. Hemmelskamp and D. Hitchens (2003),
Blueprints for an Integration of Science, Technology and Environmental Policy,
STRATA Project (Strategic Analysis of Specific Political Issues).
Rotmans, J., R. Kemp and M.B.A. van Asselt (2001), Transition Management: A
Promising Perspective, in M. Decker (ed.), Interdisciplinarity in Technology
Assessment: Implementation and its Chances and Limits, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
165-197.
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MOVING OUT OF THE NICHE: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA
Chapter 11
MOVING OUT OF THE NICHE:
INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
INNOVATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA
Brigitte mer-Rieder
Department of Regional Studies, ARC Systems Research GmbH, Seibersdorf, Austria
Katy Whitelegg
Department of Technology Policy, ARC Systems Research GmbH, Seibersdorf, Austria
This chapter discusses links between sustainable development and innovation policy in
Austria. It looks at the way in which the two policy areas interact and the kind of
mechanisms that facilitate communication between them. Following an overview of
sustainability policy and the actors involved in its implementation, the chapter focuses on
two case studies that play an important role in policy co-ordination between the two
areas, based on an assessment of key documents and a series of interviews with policy
makers and experts. The first case study concentrates on the research, technology and
development (RTD) programmes in the area of sustainable technologies and the second
focuses on the Austrian Sustainability Strategy as a policy co-ordination mechanism. The
two case studies are assessed as part of the attempt to understand better the way in which
innovation policy and sustainability policy interact. Although the two case studies are
very different, they give useful insight into barriers and problems at the interface of the
two policy areas.
Introduction
Over the last decade, policy makers in many European countries have concluded that
the current segregated approach to policy making is no longer adequate to address the
complexity of the issues they face. Segregated policy areas cause a number of problems
for policy making. Not only do policies from neighbouring policy areas overlap, uncoordinated policies may even pursue contradictory aims. Another problem occurs when
cross-cutting areas that do not traditionally belong to a single policy area are not adequately
addressed by any ministry and no responsibility is taken for them.
The trend towards increasing coherence and co-ordination in the policy-making
process has been most pronounced in areas of policy making that are inherently crosscutting. In areas such as sustainable development or science and technology policy there
has been strong pressure to develop more appropriate co-ordination measures. A number
of recent studies and workshops have supported the search for coherence in the area of
innovation policy (Edler et al., 2003; Boekholt and Arnold, 2002; Arnold and Boekholt,
2003; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002). Although there is no such thing as a model of optimal
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policy coherence, the authors agree that there are ways of conceptualising policy making
for innovation policy that can improve the overall functioning of the system.
The problems inherent in politico-administrative systems in general and innovation in
particular in most OECD countries are characterised by Edler et al. (2003, p. 5) as:
A high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political administration, and low inter-departmental exchange and co-operation.
A high level of segregation not only creates closed policy arenas in ministries and
departments. The same way of thinking is often transposed to institutions such as universities and consultants that work closely for and with departments. Policy fields create
their own arenas which leave little space for input from sources other than those that are
close to them. Integration is made more difficult by the narrowness of the policy areas.
This phenomenon has also been observed in innovation policy, especially when it is
designed and implemented by different ministries and/or agencies.
Coherence and co-ordination are not goals in themselves, but tools. Depending on the
policy field and the constellation of actors, different mechanisms can be used to increase
the ability of the system to think in terms of the whole. These are based on the increased
need to manage interfaces, to embed innovation policies in the broader socio-economic
context and to increase learning and experimenting. The role of the state becomes that of
moderator and enabler, allowing different parts of the system to communicate more
effectively. This in turn supports collective decision making and implementation of policies and encourages learning within the system (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002, p. 48).
To reduce overlaps and gaps between policy areas, an increasing number of governance
mechanisms have emerged to fill the co-ordination gap (Glynn et al., 2003, p. 5). Many of
these new mechanisms take the form of councils, commissions or platforms that bring
policy makers from different ministries together with non-policy specialists to discuss
issues and formulate common policies and procedures. These bodies provide a useful
basis for discussion and also improve the chances that initiatives in one policy area do not
conflict with goals in another and that policies are co-ordinated. They do not, however,
replace the policy process; policy decisions still remain with the ministries. The extent to
which decisions taken in such forums must be implemented or taken into account by
individual ministries differs from country to country and according to the subject matter.
Although these bodies are increasingly seen as one of the best mechanisms for integrating
policy fields, this greatly depends on how they are set up and the powers they are given.
Not all such councils support policy integration attempts and some contribute to the
further fragmentation of policy-making structures (Edler et al., 2003, p. 19).
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development process was under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for
Environment, Youth and Family Affairs. In 1995, the NUP was published and adopted by
the federal government. The aim was to integrate environmental policy into all levels of
policy making. For that purpose, goals and about 470 measures for seven sectors were
worked out. The sectors were: energy, industry and trade; traffic and transport;
agriculture, forestry and water resources; tourism and recreation industry; resource
management; and consumption and consumer behaviour.
The NUP was an important step in Austrian sustainability policy, since it contained
quality and environmental protection goals to reduce emissions of harmful substances and
to treat natural resources with care. They are based on the perception that the carrying
capacity of the Earth is limited and that global circular flows of matter must not be
influenced irreversibly. Thus, the NUP corresponds to the concept of sustainable development. The NUP became quite popular in Austria owing to accompanying activities such
as an exhibition called the sustainability nature trail which was shown not only in
Vienna but also in the provinces, the preparation of a CD-Rom which constituted a virtual
visit of the exhibition, and the publication of a so-called Youth Environmental Plan
(JUP) which was set up as a complementary initiative to allow Austrias youth to
participate in national environmental policy.
A further development of the NUP is the Austrian national sustainability strategy
which was published in April 2002. Its international roots go back to Agenda 211 which
was adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
in 1992; a paragraph in Chapter 8 requires the preparation of sustainability strategies to
adjust national economic, social and environmental policies. At the Rio+5 Conference in
New York in 1997, the demand was more insistent, and 2002 was decided as the time
horizon. Finally, the European Council in Gothenburg 2001 was an important initiating
event, as the draft of the European sustainability strategy was discussed. Several member
states of the European Union then started to develop national sustainability strategies.
The Austrian national sustainability strategy was prepared under the responsibility of
the Federal Ministry for Environment, renamed the Federal Ministry for Agriculture,
Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW). It is a commitment by the
federal government to sustainable development. It contains four comprehensive fields of
action which are composed of five key objectives for sustainable development. Each key
objective consists of a description of the challenge, goals and first steps. At the end of
each field of action five to eight indicators are described.2.
The strategy document mainly describes intentions; quantifiable targets with a date of
implementation are not very concrete. Nevertheless, many experts think that, in general,
the value of strategic political documents lies less in the documents than in the activation
of discussion and implementation processes based on the documents. This is confirmed in
the strategy document, which announced the intention to design the strategy as a
learning strategy (Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development, p. 109f.). This
means that the structure and the process will be further developed according to needs that
appear during the implementation process. This process and its assessment by several
interviewees are described below.
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Innovation policy
Innovation policy is comprised of a large number of actors on both the strategic and
the implementation level whose responsibilities are not clearly defined and often
overlapping. Evaluations have frequently referred to fragmentation as one of the barriers
to the design and implementation of a coherent innovation policy in Austria. A recent
evaluation (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003) of the two main research funds in Austria, the
Austrian Industrial Research Fund (FFF) and the Austria Science Fund (FWF) concluded
that:
Overly fragmented policy delivery limits opportunities for building scale and for
learning about policy delivery and about policies themselves.
The funding system is hard to understand and is therefore a problem both for
those who have to live with it and in terms of connecting it to developments in
European R&D funding and performance.
With many small agencies, it is hard to build critical mass and especially hard to
afford the needed investment in capabilities for analysis and strategy development
(strategic intelligence).
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Innovation and Technology (BMVIT), the Ministry for Education, Science and Culture
(BMBWK) and the Ministry of Finance (BMF).
The main research funding agencies in Austria are, as mentioned above, the FFF and
the FWF; the FFF concentrates on the private sector and the FWF on basic research. The
funds support bottom-up or non-programme research activities. Although funding
through strategic thematic programmes has increased in recent years, there are still few
thematic programmes and the bottom-up approach is preferred. Having said this, some
recently established programmes have been less of a strategic nature and more a bundling
of individual research projects contracted by a ministry in a particular field. These often
do not have the same quality criteria that the funds require (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003).
Other agencies include the Austria Wirtschaftsservice, the Division for ScienceIndustry Co-operation within the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), the
Christian Doppler Gesellschaft, the Austrian Space Agency, the Ludwig Boltzmann
Gesellschaft and the Anniversary Fund of the Austrian National Bank. Each has a budget
to pursue its own goals, whether these are the Kplus centres (science-industry cooperation) or an individual area or type of research such as space (ASA).
In addition to the agencies with their own budgets, other organisations manage thematic programmes on behalf of the ministries. Some of these organisations specialise in
programme management and have less competence on the content side while others have
expertise in a particular field. The management consultant Trust Consult is an example of
the first type of organisation and has provided the BMVIT with the management for the
programme line Factory of Tomorrow. An example of the second type is provided by the
GUT (the Austrian Society for Environment and Technology), a well-known player on
the Austrian sustainability scene. It manages the programme line Building of Tomorrow
for the BMVIT. The contracts for programme management are given for the duration of
the programme and are put out to tender again if the programme is continued. There is
little exchange of experience between the management of the individual programmes and
many different actors are involved in one programme period. This practice mirrors the
general fragmentation in innovation policy discussed above.
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important activities is the yearly award show Trigos, which is designed to give companies an incentive to include CSR in their business strategy and to support public
awareness for CSR.
Apart from these two initiatives at national level, many important actors work on
sustainability-oriented activities at the regional level. It is a characteristic of the Austrian
sustainability policy-making structure that the regional level plays an even more active
role than the national level. Some of the nine provinces strongly support sustainable
development by giving responsibility to relevant institutions in their administration
structure or by establishing sustainability consulting organisations outside the administration and giving them financial support. These organisations and institutions have been
initiating activities in the field of sustainable economy (e.g. Economy Initiative in Styria
or the EcoBusinessPlan in Vienna), in the field of sustainable social development
(e.g. Social Capital in Vorarlberg) or in supporting and facilitating local Agenda 21
processes in their municipalities. The federal commitment to sustainability is also evident
in the fact that three provinces Upper Austria, Lower Austria and Styria are preparing
or have already published their regional sustainability strategies.
The main actors in the provinces are well connected through the sustainability coordinators conference which supports exchange of experience among the provinces.4 It is
based on a declaration for the further development of environmental policy in Austria that
was adopted by the speakers for environmental affairs of the provinces and the Minister
for Environment in 1999. This declaration agreed upon an alignment of the future
environmental policy with the concept of sustainability. At the annual conference of the
speakers for environmental affairs in 2000, the establishment of an experts conference
between the sustainability co-ordinators of the provinces and the national level was
decided. Since then, sustainability co-ordinators meet twice a year to exchange
experience and to develop and implement common strategies.
At the local level, there are some 200 local Agenda 21 processes. The local authority
enters into a dialogue with its citizens, local organisations and enterprises to discuss how
to obtain or improve quality of life in their living space. It is a new form of participatory
work to develop and implement ideas and projects for a better future. It is important that
all three dimensions of the sustainability concept are considered and that none is
neglected in favour of the others. Local Agenda 21 processes usually follow several
phases: development of a common guiding vision, guiding targets, measures and
implementation. In many cases, the provincial administration provides financial support
to the municipalities and connects it to quality assurance. The municipality has to commit
itself to engage only well-educated and experienced process facilitators.
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The most important new addition to the innovation policy scene has been the Council
for Science and Technology Development. It was established in August 2000 to advise
the government, ministries and federal states on all matters concerning Austrian
technology policy. The Council consists of eight members, four chosen by the BMVIT
and four by the BMBWK. As well as advising on ad hoc issues, the Council is charged
with developing long-term strategic plans for Austrian technology policy. Most recently it
was responsible for reviewing the special funds (a total of EUR 508 million). These were
not part of the normal science and technology funding and different ministries applied for
funding of their initiatives. The Council reviewed and ratified each application according
to a set of criteria focused mainly on the leverage effect for private-sector involvement. In
addition, the Council tried to build a picture of all of the proposed initiatives and to look
for overlaps and cases in which clearer definitions would be useful.
The involvement of the Council in distributing the special funds should not be
underestimated. Previously, the ministries distributed such funding on their own without
any external checks and balances. The Council brought a higher degree of transparency
and standards to the formulation of individual programmes and initiatives, not simply by
increasing the need for evaluation. On another level, the Council has begun to encourage
interaction between the ministries and the programmes involved in sustainable
development research. The FORNE initiative is an example and is described below.
However, these recent developments also have negative aspects. Competition among
programmes has increased, as the Council decides among them. Its decisions are not based
on long-term strategic planning but on which programmes most impress the Council
members. It is questionable whether increased competition among ministries will also
lead to increased co-operation.
Policy co-ordination in the field of sustainable development is mainly informal, and
there are few formal institutions. Two interesting examples are described below. The
first, the Business Unit Sustainable Development, co-ordinates the tasks of all departments within a ministry. The second, the Committee for a Sustainable Austria, coordinates the contributions of all ministries to the national sustainability strategy.
The Business Unit Sustainable Development was established as a unit covering all
departments of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water
Management (BMLFUW). It is composed of representatives from all departments, the
chairman and the bureau of the minister. Its main tasks are integration of sustainability in
all of the ministrys policy fields through common planning and co-ordination of
upcoming activities and thematic aims. This assures the coherence of the ministrys work.
It functions as an in-house think tank and as a communication and co-ordination platform for sustainable development, and it develops a common strategy for the ministrys
sustainability issues which is agreed with all departments. A special task of the business
unit is to harmonise all sustainability-related fields in the ministry in order to implement
the national sustainability strategy.
The Business Unit Sustainable Development is one of three business units in the
BMLFUW. It aims to develop a planning culture for a time horizon longer than one year,
so that specific topics can be worked on strategically. The visionary, identity-founding
aspect is important. This business unit gives consideration to the fact that sustainable
development is not a single discipline but an umbrella. The integration of sustainable
development in all environmental policy fields may be a first step towards its integration
in other ministries and policy fields like economics or transport. So far, no similar units
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exist in other ministries. One interviewee suggested that it might be a good institution to
copy, but that that sustainability is not a core concern in other ministries.
The Committee for a Sustainable Austria was established in 2002 as the main
driving force to implement the national sustainability strategy. It consists of two to four
delegates of each ministry, of representatives from social partners and of five sustainability experts from the provinces. Its main task is the preparation of work programmes to
implement the national sustainability strategy. These programmes are published every
two years. The committee members collect projects and measures that are under the
responsibility of their organisations and assign them to the 20 guiding targets of the
strategy. These projects and measures are consolidated in a draft of the work programme
that is presented to the Council of Ministers and then published. As the work programmes
for 2003 and 2004 show, they serve to inventory projects and measures according to the
strategys 20 guiding targets. The second main task of the committee is to inform the
federal government about the implementation of the strategy by preparing and publishing
progress reports. The first progress report was published in June 2004; the next is planned
for 2006. The committee may be the most important horizontal policy co-ordination body
in the Austrian sustainability policy field and is described in detail below.
Co-ordination initiatives
This section describes individual initiatives and actions that play a role in supporting
co-ordination of innovation and sustainable development policy. Two different types of
initiatives should be mentioned in this context. First, there are initiatives that aim to
increase co-ordination either within one policy area or between different policy areas.
These are especially common in the area of sustainable development or in specific
sectoral policy areas that cover more than one ministry or division. An example is the
Austrian Forestry Dialog which aims to bring together all actors in the forestry sector.
Second, there are initiatives at the interface between two policy areas, but not designed
primarily with co-ordination in mind, such as the RTD programme Sustainable
Technologies.
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commissioned moderator who supported the search for consensus and decisions; and a
scientific editorial staff that wrote intermediate results and the document itself.
Between August and October 2001, a written survey was sent to 200 scientists to
explore the necessary aspects of the strategy. The very low return of 20 answers can be
interpreted as little interest in the strategy. The answers could be divided in three groups
(Martinuzzi and Kopp, 2002, p. 10):
Criticism of the preparation process of the strategy (doubt about the sense and
gravity of the strategy; too little time for responding; insufficient involvement of
science).
Unspecific praise (for single statements in the Green Paper or for the initiative to
develop a strategy in general).
An Internet discussion platform was equally disappointing. A section of the Web site
www.nachhaltigkeit.at provided information about the strategy development process and
invited visitors to post comments. Although statistics show that about 1 000 persons
visited the Web site, only 20 contributions were posted. It is difficult to know why this
initiative was not more successful. Possibilities are a belief that responses would not be
taken into account, fear of documenting ones position, or lack of interest in active
participation.
The third participation initiative was the so-called plenum. It consisted of about 50
representatives from ministries, social partners, federal governments and non-governmental organisations who were nominated by their organisations. The plenum met four
times and discussed the aim, course of action and quality criteria of the strategy, the
contents and fields of action, suggestions for the guiding targets of the strategy, and the
proposed text of the final version of the strategy. Unlike the other two initiatives, the
plenum was relatively successful and efficient with a well-structured working process.
The main reasons for its success were a good atmosphere and the expertise and
possibilities for negotiation among the plenum members.
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support for a dialogue between science and practical experience. The programme, which
ran for ten years, ended in mid-2003.
A follow up programme called EcoForesightAustria was presented to the Council for
Science and Technology Development in autumn 2001 for ratification. At the Council
meeting of 9 April 2002, the Council decided not to fund the programme and
recommended that the programme be integrated in appropriate activities of the BMLFUW
(Council for Research and Technological Development, 2002). However, this turned out
not to be feasible as a considerable proportion of the BMLFUW research funds are
allocated to its own research and the testing institutes it is required by law to maintain. In
addition, the contents of the EcoForesightAustria were quite different from BMLFUW
activities.
For a few years, research on sustainable development, apart from the BMVITs
technology programmes (see below), was not funded. Only when the Council realised
that it needed to put this type of research back on the agenda did sustainable development
research stand another chance of receiving funding. This the Council did by organising a
strategy process to create a new programme. It organised workshops and working groups
to design a new programme. The final result was Provision which started in late 2004
and is scheduled to run for ten years. The programme will be divided into three phases,
two programme phases and a synthesis phase. The first call for proposals was announced
in September/October 2004. The programme has seven main areas of focus: risk
assessment, sustainable living, integrated welfare, environmental balance, adaptable
space, global responsibility and sustainable mediation.
In addition to the content-specific focus areas, the programme also aims to address a
number of horizontal research goals including increasing international co-operation,
improving co-operation between science and industry, increasing the participation of
women in science, improving career prospects for young scientists, establishing continuous co-operation between research and education.
The BMVITs Technologies for Sustainable Development is the main programme
supporting sustainable technologies in Austria. It was established in 1999 and has three
sub-programmes: Building of Tomorrow, Energy Systems of Tomorrow, and Factory of
Tomorrow. Its main aims are to create new economic opportunities, increase the
economical use of natural resources, consolidate Austrias position in the field of technology and create positive effects on the economy and on employment. According to the
programme documents, this can be achieved by strengthening R&D competencies, encouraging interdisciplinarity and networking, and increasing the diffusion and application
of R&D results. This programme is the subject of one of the case studies and will be dealt
with further below.
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BMVIT and aims to increase coherence between their RTD programmes. In addition,
FORNE seeks further coherence of the activities of the ministries with the Austrian
Sustainable Development Strategy. The framework programme produced in 2004 sets out
methodological and strategic fundamentals and details the working practices. In one part
it sets out the different types of research needed to answer the questions raised by the
transition to sustainable development. In another part of the framework programme
Austrias strengths in the area of research for sustainable development are portrayed both
on a national and international level.
The establishment of FORNE has led to increased co-operation between programmes,
better co-ordination of programmes, and discussions on new research methods for
sustainable development. The ministries have also been able to exchange experience and
co-ordinate co-operation with other national programmes and with the EU Framework
Programme. In addition, the FORNE initiative not only gave the ministries the opportunity to exchange experience, but also to make this type of research more visible. It is no
longer possible to obtain special funds without a clear strategy of how the programmes of
the different ministries fit together. However, environmental research has not been one of
the Councils top priorities and it took the Council a while to recognise its importance.
One reason for the neglect was the Councils composition. None of its members came
from this area of research so that there was little understanding of the area and no one to
further its aims.
Selected cases
This section looks at two activities in which concrete interaction between sustainable
development and innovation policy can be observed. These activities have been selected
for three reasons. First, they represent arguably the most important interfaces between
these two policy areas in Austria. Second, both are activities with a concrete need for
interaction. Third, the two case studies represent very different types of co-ordination
mechanisms. The Austrian Sustainable Development Strategy was designed to coordinate different sectoral policies under a horizontal sustainable development strategy.
The Programme Technologies for Sustainable Development was established and is
managed by the innovation division of the BMVIT. It is not a specific co-ordination
mechanism, but a policy initiative that requires the interaction of the two different policy
areas.
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Steering group. The group takes responsibility for both the preparation of the
strategy document and its implementation. It consists of four delegates from the
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management.
It designs the setting of strategic points in the implementation process, supports
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the committee and forum in their work, and creates the framework conditions for
preparing the strategy documents in time.
The implementation process has been in place for two years. There is criticism related
for example to the fact that the Federal Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment
and Water Management not the Federal Chancellor is responsible for co-ordination.
This is assessed differently by those involved. Some, especially those from environmentrelated fields, favour this assignment and argue that progress in implementation depends
more on the personal dedication of the responsible minister or individuals in the
ministries than on formal jurisdiction. Others say that the assignment inhibits equitable
dialogue between the three dimensions of sustainability because the environmental
dimension is overemphasised. Another consequence of the assignment is that the Ministry
of Environment remains in its role as an institution which adds environmental aspects
retrospectively to concepts and proposals instead of supporting the integration of the
environmental dimension from the outset.
Nevertheless, the work processes are viewed as transparent and clearly structured by
those involved. The implementation process is seen as a highly useful effort that brings
together different actors. By defining it as a learning strategy, the necessary flexibility for
adaptation during the implementation process for example, corrections concerning the
focus of future tasks is ensured.
In June 2002, the Committee for a Sustainable Austria was constituted. It consists of
delegates from all ministries, from lobbying institutions and four representatives from the
Sustainability Co-ordinators Conference. It therefore ensures the linkage of institutions
that are important for implementation of the strategy as well as the exchange of
information on the fields of action defined in the strategy document. The committee
ensures that sustainability issues are institutionalised as a priority in the administration
and that the idea of an integrated view of ecological, economical and societal challenges
is widely recognised (BMLFUW, 2003, p. 7).
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their organisations, the results of which have made some committee members cautious.
Other interviewees, however, praise the implementation process as well-structured and
democratic, offering an opportunity for ministries that do not focus on sustainability to
become familiar with it or to look at their activities in this light. The committees value
lies especially in a more formal awareness building for sustainability than previously
existed in Austria.
As mentioned, co-ordination sometimes take a long time because decisions have to be
postponed while members collect their ministrys official opinion. Another difficulty is
due to the complexity of the sustainability concept. Some topics to be agreed on are new
both to some committee members and to their ministries. This puts an additional burden
on the committee, its members and the ministries concerned.
During the committees first period, in which committee members collected the
sustainability-oriented projects and measures of all ministries, resulted in a good
overview of initiatives on the national level. The result, a list of 200 measures or projects,
was also criticised as a conglomeration of any and all initiatives that could be viewed as
concerned with sustainability. About a quarter had been defined before the sustainability
strategy was published. The value of the list was that the individual measures had not
been considered in light of sustainability and that the list had not been regarded as a
whole. Thus, this work can be viewed essentially as a learning and awareness-building
process.
In the committees second period, ten working groups were established to examine
the contents of the projects and measures in depth. The groups consisted not only of
committee members but also of members of the Forum for a Sustainable Austria. Each
group focused on a specific topic, developed a common understanding of it, and
suggested two or three concrete ideas for projects which had to concern at least two
ministries; suggestions relevant to the competence of a single ministry were not accepted.
At the end of this phase, 20 to 30 project ideas were developed. Some were chosen for
implementation and are now at different stages of advancement.
A problem for implementation is the lack of any budget for projects and measures
agreed on by the committee members. Most interviewed committee members find this a
significant barrier. Projects that fall within the scope of the strategy can only be initiated
if expenses can be covered from other budgets. Some committee members would like to
see all ministries dedicate a specific percentage of their budgets to implementation
activities. The budget could be used to initiate projects on which the committee members
agree.
The quality of the committees work depends on various factors. First of all, the
dedication of the committee members plays an important role. Since the strategy goals are
not binding and no clear political instructions exist, progress depends on individual
goodwill and on the conviction of those involved. At the same time, the strategy process
is an opportunity for delegates who are very interested in sustainable development but do
not have the authority to set priorities in this field in their organisations. Strategy
implementation activities provide them the opportunity to engage more actively in these
issues.
The attitude of committee members also plays a decisive role. Members are
nominated not by the co-ordinator of the sustainability strategy, the Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, but by their organisations.
As a result, they represent their ministries and not simply their own expertise. Some
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interviewees criticised this method of choosing the committee members because it does
not (sufficiently) take the individual conviction of the committee members into account.
A great deficiency of Austrias sustainability policy is the lack of debate in political
forums. One interviewee noted the discrepancy between the diversity of sustainability
activities and the lack of debate in parliament, for example. Moreover, the activities of the
committee and sustainability activities as a whole are a relatively closed policy field
within the environmental policy field and have little effect on other policy fields. The
effectiveness of sustainability policy is therefore limited. This is a real weakness in
Austria, in particular compared with countries like Germany, the Netherlands or
Scandinavia where sustainability issues have already entered political forums.
There is little horizontal policy co-ordination through the work of the Committee for a
Sustainable Austria because the administration works on the basis of bureaucratic logic
and interests. As one of the interviewees explained, the administrative structure can be
compared to many relatively autonomous little boxes. This structure, which has
developed over decades, leads to an efficient day-to-day routine but does not encourage
strategic renewal. This presents a structural problem for dealing with horizontal issues.
Moreover, from the view of ministry delegates, co-operation not only offers opportunities, there is also the danger of losing responsibility in a particular field and becoming
redundant. For this reason, horizontal co-ordination requires high-level commitment as
well as strong will to implementation.
After two years of work, some committee members have seen signs of fatigue in the
group. For example, more and more of the nominated members no longer participate in
the meetings but send a colleague. In addition, the work on concrete project ideas requires
patience and persistence. It is a challenge for the steering group to cope with this situation
and to find how to ensure the groups dynamism over time.
Conclusions
The major difficulty discovered during the study of links between innovation and
sustainability policy is a lack of commitment to sustainability by politicians and by
individuals in the ministries. This is not only due to individual conviction, but also to the
political system and the way it works. Whereas the horizon for policy goals, measures
and their implementation is an election period (four years in Austria), sustainability goals
are more long-term. Politicians do not have incentives to work on more long-term visions
and measures because they will not be rewarded for it. Some interviewees argue that the
political system itself needs innovation to deal with sustainability.
Another general difficulty emerging from the case study is that there is not yet a
clearly defined objective for a sustainable innovation policy. There is no common
understanding of what sustainable innovation is or should be. In Austrian sustainability
circles, it is widely thought that sustainability needs not only technological innovations
and changes in the economic system, but also and especially institutional, social and
system innovations. Interviewees considered that sustainability requires society as a
whole to recognise this in view of current and forthcoming challenges and to act
accordingly when decisions are to be taken in enterprises, in political institutions and in
households. To limit the scope of this broad approach would mean limiting the scope of
the search for sustainable solutions.
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A further consequence of the problem of definition is the difficulty, even the impossibility, of defining clear, quantitative political targets for sustainable innovation. But
policy making requires target definition, the development of appropriate measures and
commitment to reaching the targets. While it was easy to define targets for end-of-pipe
environmental technologies, which could be expressed in reductions of harmful substances per time scale, this is not possible for sustainable innovation policy. Since the
goals and objectives of sustainable innovation policy are open, ways to achieve these
goals need also to be open. The main problem is that every sustainable innovation can
only be a single solution in a specific context. Policy in the sense of something that is
generally valid is therefore difficult. Policy formulation for sustainable innovation
strongly depends on the special context and framework.
Policy formulation and implementation of the Austrian Sustainability Strategy require
activities that largely result from the initiative of those involved since the strategy goals
are not binding. One interviewee stated that the strategy is a good basis and reference for
engaging in sustainability issues but the success of the strategy depends on the will of the
actors. Furthermore, it needs not only the engagement of the ministries, but also that of all
institutions and societal groups. Within the Committee for a Sustainable Austria,
members institutional background is a deciding factor. Some committee members have
more scope than others to bring the strategy into their organisation.
The approximation to what sustainable innovation could be requires a search process
that involves people from all societal systems. The role of policy in this process is more
to facilitate than to provide knowledge content. In the words of one interviewee, policy
should mainly undertake to enable a participatory search process for sustainable
innovations and provide the necessary preconditions. In this way, sustainable innovation
policy means the organisation of the public framework so that renewal processes become
possible.
Programme overview
The main aim of the programme is to support research and development of future
technologies and solutions in order to create new opportunities for an eco-efficient
economy and to ensure quality of life for future generations. The programme builds on
three pillars: the integration of ecological and social systems, securing the presence of
businesses in the long term and increasing the quality of R&D. Figure 11.1 shows how
the different pillars are to be integrated focusing on R&D as the interface. The
programme seeks to ensure Austrias position in specific fields of technology, to create
positive effects on the economy and on employment, while focusing on the economical
use of natural resources.
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Figure 11.1. Technologies for sustainable development: programme aims
Increasing competitiveness
Integration in ecological
and social systems
Securing business
location in the long-term
Increasing resource
efficiency
Increasing scientific
competencies
Increased use of
renewable resources
Increasing innovation
potential
Use-oriented systems
solutions
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The ex ante evaluation of the key actions from the Sustainable Technologies
Programme
The ex ante evaluation of the Technologies for Sustainable Development programme
(Ohler and Knoflacher, 2000) reviewed the six key actions. Each was evaluated
independently based on suggestions made for the action and its contribution to the whole
programme. The evaluation considered content, organisation and economic aspects. It
was based on criteria such as efficiency and transparency in programme implementation,
clarity in development of aims and ability to test whether aims have been reached,
inclusion of interdisciplinarity and the relationship between technological and socioeconomic factors, the relevance of expected results for the overall aims of the programme, ability to implement the action and expected results, and the use of synergies
with other key actions and other programmes.
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The evaluation was very critical of the six key action lines and suggested that many
aspects should be reconsidered. The evaluation asked why, although other types of
innovation are referred to, technological innovation is stressed. It did not see a
justification for the technological emphasis. Many of the criticisms were still referred to
in interviews related to this project, in particular the links to other policy areas and the
technological focus of the programme.
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Conclusions
The programme Technologies for Sustainable Development is the only initiative in
Austria that focuses solely on the integration of innovation and sustainability. It is
perceived as successful by the BMVIT which runs the programme and by many of the
actors involved in sustainable technologies. However, the programme remains a niche
programme and concrete links to other initiatives are not apparent. It is also heavily
focused on technology development. This is a product of the Austrian separation of
responsibilities between ministries. The BMBWK runs the programme on the more
societal and behavioural aspects which are not addressed by the BMVIT. There have been
very few co-ordinated activities in the past and only a few very specific ones are planned
for the future.
There have been recent attempts to co-ordinate research for sustainable development,
and all ministries pursuing research in this area have joined forces to design a framework
for research activities. However, although a very useful exercise, the framework does not
strengthen links with policies or strategies in other areas. The programme does not
support concrete policies in innovation or sustainable development.
The way in which the programme was designed and established underlines this point.
It was designed through a bottom-up process and with considerable contact with
researchers. This led to a programme that was very much in tune with the research
agendas of people in the field, but with little strategic input concerning the future
direction of the programme in terms of supporting other policy initiatives.
The way in which the programme was set up and the narrowness of the focus is not
only due to the specificities of this policy area. Many other programmes in Austria follow
this pattern and co-operation is generally difficult on an aggregate level. Co-operation is
also not encouraged by the system and recent activities of the Council for Science and
Technological Development have done more to increase competition than to further cooperation.
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Assessment
This section looks at the extent to which there is horizontal policy integration between
innovation and sustainability policy in Austria. It is based on an analysis of the two case
studies according to the following stages in the policy cycle:
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The case study of the RTD programmes clearly shows that policy initiatives are
developed on their own and are the responsibility of individual ministries, with few
connections to other policy areas. In a similar way, the Austrian sustainability strategy
was prepared under the responsibility of a single ministry, the BMLFUW. Representatives of other ministries participated through the so-called plenum but it met only
four times and some interviewees doubted the seriousness of the offer to discuss the
issues.
Conclusions
Investigation of the links between the sustainable development and innovation policy
revealed three main constraints which seem to be pivotal points for strategies to improve
policy co-ordination:
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Lack of common understanding about sustainable innovation and sustainable innovation policy. There is a need is to initiate a broad discussion about the
question of what sustainable innovation is, why it is important and what a
sustainable innovation policy needs. In the minds of interviewees, sustainable
innovation is broader than new products and services and the main challenge for
all groups in society is to develop and implement new ideas to support sustainable
development. Interviewees also interpret sustainable innovation policy more
broadly than, for example, financial support for specific technologies like solar
energy. If policy is understood as the solution of common, public and general
problems, sustainable innovation policy has to set conditions under which people
will be innovative independently of where they act. According to the interviews,
sustainable innovation policy is the design of a public framework that allows
innovation processes. Until discussion of the meaning of sustainable innovation
and sustainable innovation policy takes place, the question of how to organise cooperation will be secondary.
Differences in the acceptance and embedding of innovation and sustainability in the political system. Innovation and sustainable development are
embedded differently in ministries. While innovation is an explicit part of the
BMVIT and well accepted, sustainable development today is not an explicit
policy area but part of environmental policy and located within the BMLFUW.
Sustainability is not taken as seriously as innovation as a political task. It lacks
attractiveness owing to its prescriptive character (you should do) on the one
hand and its abstractness and complexity on the other. Politicians have little
incentive to work on sustainable development and to give financial support to
sustainability-oriented projects. A sustainable innovation policy requires accepting sustainability as an important and trend-setting policy issue and making
this manifest in political structures.
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behaviour in the two policy fields, it is hardly surprising that the links between the two
are few and far between. Apart from very specific initiatives, there is little recognition of
the importance of linking the two policy fields. However, as both policy areas move out
of their niches and see their role as more interactive, there is the potential for greater cooperation. Innovation can become more important as a key driver for developing sustainability policy and sustainability policy can gain more acceptance in innovation policy.
Notes
1.
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm.
2.
www.nachhaltigkeit.at/strategie/pdf/strategie020709_en.pdf.
3.
http://csr.m3plus.net/website/output.php.
4.
www.nachhaltigkeit.at/netzwerke.php3?koord_netz.html.
5.
www.nachhaltigkeit.at/strategie/pdf/EU_nachstrat_en.pdf.
6.
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/ec/00200-r1.d1.pdf.
7.
K-net are competence networks that aim to support industrial research and technology transfer.
They have a strong focus on SMEs.
References
Arnold, E. and P. Boekholt (2003), Evaluation of the Austrian Industrial Research
Promotion Fund (FFF) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): Synthesis Report,
Technopolis, Brighton.
Boekholt, P. and E. Arnold (2002), The Governance of Research and Innovation. An
International Comparative Study, Country Reports. Technopolis, Amsterdam.
Bruck, M. and S. Gasser (1996), ITF Programmanagement Energietechnik
Evaluierungsgutachten, Vienna.
Bundesministerium fr Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft (2003),
200 Manahmen fr ein nachhaltiges sterreich. Das Arbeitsprogramm 2003 zur
Umsetzung der sterreichischen Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Vienna.
Bundesministerium fr Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (2004), Zwischenbilanz
2004, Impulsprogramm Nachhaltig Wirtschaften, Vienna.
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Council for Research and Technological Development (2001), Recommendation of
27 June 2001, http://www.rat-fte.at/files/empf_020409_sondermittel5.pdf
Edler, J., S. Kuhlmann and R. Smits (2003), New Governance for Innovation. The Need
for Horizontal and Systemic Policy Co-ordination, Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Papers,
Innovation System and Policy Analysis, No. 2/2003, Institute Systems and Innovation
Research, Karlsruhe.
European Commission (2004), National Sustainable Development Strategies in the
European Union: A First Analysis by the European Commission, Commission staff
working document, Brussels.
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (2002),
A Sustainable Future for Austria, The Austrian Strategy for Sustainable
Development, Vienna.
Glynn, S., P. Cunningham and K. Flanagan (2003), Typifying Scientific Advisory
Structures and Scientific Advice Production Methodologies (TSAS), PREST,
Manchester.
Lang, R.W., T. Jud and M. Paula (1999), Konzept Impulsprogramm Nachhaltig
Wirtschaften, BMWV, Vienna.
Martinuzzi, A. and U. Kopp (2002), Die Erstellung der sterreichischen
Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie. Process Review and Lessons Learnt, Diskussionspapier
02/2002 der Schriftenreihe des Forschungsschwerpunkts Nachhaltigkeit und
Umweltmanagement, Wirtschaftsuniversitt Wien.
http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/nstrat_review.pdf
Ohler, F. and M. Knoflacher (2000), Evaluierung des Impulsprogramms Nachhaltig
Wirtschaften, OEFZS-Bericht-S-0059, Seibersdorf.
Paula, M., C. Smoliner and B. Tiefenthaler (2004), FORschung fr Nachhaltige
Entwicklung. FORNE Rahmenstrategie 2004 plus, BMBWK, BMLFUW, BMVIT,
Vienna.
Smits, R. and S. Kuhlmann (2002), Strengthening Interfaces in Innovation Systems:
Rationale, Concepts and (New) Instruments, report for the EC STRATA Workshop
New Challenges and New Responses for S&T Policies in Europe, Brussels,
22-23 April.
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common Future,
Oxford University Press.
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Chapter 12
PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING:
LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA
Katy Whitelegg
This chapter examines the links between transport and innovation policy in Austria. It is
based on key documents in the two areas and a series of interviews with policy makers
and experts. It looks at the way in which the two policy areas interact in Austria and the
kinds of mechanisms that exist to facilitate communication between them.
Following an overview of the main documents in the field of transport policy and an
assessment of their approach to innovation, two case studies are described in detail. They
help to understand how innovation policy and transport policy interact. The first case
study concentrates on RTD programmes on transport technologies and the second on the
transport telematics framework programme. Although the two case studies are very
different, it is possible to gain a good overview of the barriers and problems that exist at
the interface of the two policy areas.
Introduction
Over the last decade policy makers in many European countries have reached the
conclusion that the current segregated approach to policy making is no longer adequate to
address the complexity of the issues they face. The segregation of policy areas causes a
number of problems for policy making. It not only leads to overlapping policies, it may
even lead to policies that pursue contradictory aims. In addition, cross-cutting areas,
which do not traditionally belong to a defined policy area, may not be adequately
addressed by any ministry so that no responsibility is taken for the issues.
The trend towards greater coherence and co-ordination in the policy making process
has been most pronounced in areas that are inherently cross-cutting. In areas such as
sustainable development and science and technology the pressure to develop more
appropriate co-ordination measures has been greater. A number of recent studies and
workshops have supported the search for better coherence in the area of innovation policy
(Edler et al., 2003, Boekholt et al., 2002, Arnold and Boekholt, 2003, Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002). Although there is no such thing as a model of optimal policy coherence, it is
possible to conceptualise policy making for innovation policy so as to increase the overall
functioning of the system.
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The problems inherent in politico-administrative systems in general and innovation in
particular in most OECD countries are characterised by Edler et al. (2003) as:
A high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political administration, and little interdepartmental exchange and co-operation.
The high degree of segregation leads not only to closed policy arenas in ministries
and departments but also in universities and among consultants. There is little opportunity
for input from other sources and integration is made more difficult by the narrowness of
the policy areas. This phenomenon is observed in innovation policy, especially when
designed and implemented by different ministries and/or agencies. Innovation policies
should be more focused around knowledge and less around the narrowly focused
priorities of individual ministries.
Coherence and co-ordination are not goals in themselves but tools. Depending on the
policy field and the actors involved, various mechanisms can be used to increase the
ability of the system to think in terms of the whole. They are based on the increased need
to manage interfaces, to embed innovation policies in the broader socio-economic context
and to increase learning and experimentation. The state becomes a moderator and enabler
that helps different parts of the system to communicate more effectively. This in turn
supports collective decision making and implementation of policies and encourages
learning within the system (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002).
To alleviate overlaps and gaps between policy areas, an increasing number of governance mechanisms have emerged (Glynn et al., 2002). Many of these take the form of
councils, commissions or platforms which bring together individual policy makers from
various ministries and non-policy specialists to discuss issues and formulate common
policies and procedures. These bodies provide a useful basis for discussion and also
improve the chances that initiatives in one policy area do not conflict with those in
another and that policies are co-ordinated. They do not, however, replace the policy
process. Policy decisions still remain within the ministries. The extent to which decisions
taken in such forums have to be implemented or taken into account by ministries differs
from country to country and according to the subject matter. Although these bodies are
increasingly seen as one of the best mechanisms for integrating policy fields, this greatly
depends on how they are set up and the powers they are given. Not all such councils
support policy integration and some contribute to the further fragmentation of policymaking structures (Edler et al., 2003).
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Mechanisms specifically designed for horizontal areas of policy making are only one
small aspect of the complex bilateral interactions that exist between individual policy
areas. Recently, attention has turned to the way individual policy areas interact. Special
focus has been given to innovation policy, not just as a horizontal policy area, but as a
policy area with specific relationships with other policy areas. There is no single bestpractice model for defining what co-ordination and coherence between policy areas
should look like. Countries and policy areas differ and require co-ordination mechanisms
tailored to suit their specific needs.
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Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan
The Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (BMVIT, 2002)1 aims to develop
a strategy for how the road and railway network should evolve by 2015. Its main focus is
on the structure of the network. In addition to the road infrastructure, it also includes a
strategy for developing other modes of transport, including rail and waterway transport on
the Danube. It is the first successful attempt to create an Austrian federal transport
infrastructure plan. The design process began in March 2002 and lasted nine months. It
was based on a new approach to decision making and consensus building. It concentrated
on building a consensus on the infrastructure projects to be financed among the main
actors involved in planning and providing transport infrastructure. Non-infrastructure
aspects of transport planning were not addressed. Safety, soft policies, legal aspects and
financial support are mentioned, but not detailed as they are dealt with through other
activities. The process involved the BMVIT, the Austrian federal states, representatives
of the main transport carriers and other individual stakeholders. The academic
community, the media and other stakeholders were informed about the process through a
general transport plan platform.
According to Rosinak and Snizek (2003) the key strategic aims of the plan are:
To ensure efficient and appropriate extension of the existing network. step-bystep modernisation.
The process was organised in a series of stages. All of the stakeholders (see above)
defined their individual priorities. The BMVIT then organised the suggestions according
to federal priorities and the states replied with comments. In parallel, the financial
requirements were calculated according to the time horizon.
The federal priorities are based on infrastructure networks of national and international importance. They aim to link important Austrian nodes with each other and with
other European nodes of importance for Austria. The Austrian nodes and the corridors
were ranked according to their importance on a number of criteria. These included criteria
for nodes: relevance for freight, for passenger transport and evidence of bottlenecks; and
criteria for corridors: spatial integration of nodes, capacity, potential contribution to
network, and efficiency (investment compared to use). The process consolidated 270
projects costing EUR 45 000 million into a series of infrastructure investment packages to
be implemented in the near future worth EUR 17 100 million.
1.
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Reduce transport: this should take place through balanced spatial development
and increasing the quality of life in cities to reduce urban sprawl, through more
efficient use of transport and reduction of empty journeys by employing new
technologies and through use of producer pays principle in pricing.
Earliest possible implementation of new technologies: introduction of legislation to support innovation in areas such as noise and pollution prevention,
support for the introduction of electric vehicles, implementation of technologies
to increase road safety and traffic monitoring.
True costs in transport: the internalisation of external costs and the introduction
of the producer pays principle. True costs in transport include: measuring the
external costs of accidents, environmental degradation, etc., taking external costs
into account in taxes, charging and pricing and employing the polluter pays
principle, whereby regional and social differences should be taken into account.
Reducing the impact of transit traffic: This includes a review of the relevance
of transport activity on the international level and the implementation of the
polluter pays principle. More extensive international rail and waterway networks
and a long-term transit agreement with the EU based on environmental protection
and acceptance by the local population.
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Environmentally and socially acceptable organisation of transport in conurbations: Use of planning tools to decrease traffic in urban areas, create
incentives to use public transport including traffic calming and restrictive parking
initiatives, road pricing and prioritising trams and buses over private transport.
Although the ten guidelines outlined above are relatively broad and can be said to
form the basis of an integrated transport policy, they were never translated into practice.
The plan set out impressive aims and is often referred to, but it was not implemented in a
clear and structured manner.
These two documents are the only official documents that outline transport policy in
Austria. As one is entirely devoted to infrastructure planning and the other is quite old, it
would appear that transport policy is not presented in documents in Austria. In fact,
policy making takes place more informally in smaller policy arenas. Overall, this
approach has worked very well, whence the lack of other attempts to define an integrated
transport policy.
There are few explicit links to innovation policy in the two documents. The Austrian
General Transport Plan mentions the need to develop and implement new technologies at
several points (logistics, transfer of freight from road to rail, public transport, etc.), but
goes into no detail. The Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan explicitly states
that other documents deal with transport policy and that it only addresses infrastructure
planning.
Innovation policy
Innovation policy is comprised of a large number of actors on both the strategic and
the implementation level whose responsibilities are not clearly defined and often
overlapping. Evaluations have frequently referred to fragmentation as one of the barriers
to the design and implementation of a coherent innovation policy in Austria. A recent
evaluation (Arnold et al., 2004) of the two main research funds in Austria, the Austrian
Industrial Research Fund (FFF) and the Austria Science Fund (FWF) concluded that
fragmented policy delivery limits the opportunities for building scale and for learning
both about policy delivery and about policies themselves. It makes the funding system
hard to understand, and this is a problem both for those who have to live in it and for
connecting it to developments in European R&D funding and performance. Moreover, as
there are many small agencies, it is hard to build critical mass and especially hard to
afford the needed investment in capabilities for analysis and strategy development
(strategic intelligence). Finally, there is a wide diversity of governance practice and
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therefore unclear interfaces between the ministries (as principals) and the agencies (as
agents). In some cases, ministries maintain different governance styles for different
activities in their relationship with a single agency. Furthermore, the responsibilities and
the organisation of actors within the policy field also change frequently, often within a
single legislative period. The current minister of the BMVIT, Hubert Gorbach, is the fifth
to take office during the coalition between the Austrian Freedom Party and the Austrian
Peoples Party which began early in 2000.
A mapping of actors and responsibilities directly involved in the design and
implementation of innovation policy can be divided into ministries, research funds and
programme management organisations. Four ministries are involved in innovation policy
issues: the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Employment (BMWA), the Ministry for
Transport Innovation and Technology (BMVIT), the Ministry for Education, Research
and Culture (BMBWK) and the Ministry of Finance (BMF).
The main research funding agencies in Austria are the FFF which concentrates on the
private sector and the FWF which concentrates on basic research. The funds support
bottom-up or non-programmed research. Although funding through strategic thematic
programmes has increased in recent years, there are few thematic programmes and the
bottom-up approach is preferred. Other agencies include the Austrian Wirtschaft
Service, the Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft (TIG), the Christian Doppler Gesellschaft,
the Austrian Space Agency, the Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft and the Anniversary
Fund of the Austrian National Bank. In addition to the agencies budgets, other organisations manage and administer the thematic programmes on behalf of the ministries.
Some of these organisations specialise in programme management and have less
competence on the content side while others have expertise in a particular field.
The most important new addition to the innovation policy scene has been the Council
for Science and Technology Development. The Council was established in August 2000
to advise the government, ministries and federal states on all matters concerning Austrian
technology policy. The Council consists of eight members, four chosen by the BMVIT
and four by the BMBWK. Most recently the Council was responsible for reviewing the
special funds worth a total of EUR 508 million. The special funds were not part of the
normal science and technology funding and ministries applied for their own initiatives.
The Council reviewed and ratified each application according to a set of criteria that
focused mainly on the leverage effect for private sector involvement. In addition, the
Council also tried to build up a picture of all initiatives and to look for overlaps and cases
where clearer definition would be useful.
Transport policy
Austrian transport policy is the responsibility of the BMVIT. The ministry remit
covers all modes of transport and the overall coherence of transport policy. Within the
ministry two separate departments deal with the transport agenda, the department for
infrastructure and the department for co-ordination. The department for infrastructure
covers the individual transport modes and has groups for the individual modes: roads,
railways, air and waterways, and the transport inspectorate. Each group is further divided
into units that focus on legal, technical or sectoral issues. The co-ordination department is
responsible for co-ordinating and integrating transport policy across the different modes
and has three divisions: Co-ordination of Infrastructure Policy, International Networks
and the General Transport Plan and Combined Transport. This is a relatively new
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structure. Before a coalition was formed between the Peoples Party and the Freedom
Party in 2000, transport policy was spread across different ministries.
Institutional linkages
On an institutional level there are potentially strong links between innovation and
transport policy. Both policy areas are under the responsibility of the BMVIT. Figure
12.1 shows the relevant departments and units within the BMVIT.
Figure 12.1. Departments within the BMVIT with direct responsibility for innovation and transport policy
Department I:
Co-ordination
Corporate
services
Department II:
Infrastructure
Co-ordination
EU Affairs
Roads
Rail
Air-Water
Telecom-Post
K3:
Co-ordination
innovation policy
Innovation
Division
However, according to most interviewees, the links stop here. Although both policy
areas are covered by the same ministry, co-operation between the two has not increased
very much and physical proximity has not significantly contributed to integrated policy
making. A variety of reasons were given for the difficulties perceived in co-ordinating the
two policy areas. They included:
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Misperceptions (which often have greater weight than the reality) about the way
in which the other department approaches change and innovation.
Lack of trust and fear of responsibilities being taken away if co-operation takes
place and other units build up competencies in the area.
It is well recognised that more co-ordination is needed but there is little knowledge
about how this should take place. Sometimes the organisations internal logic is not
conducive to co-ordination. It is not known what co-ordination will imply and whether it
will entail more in terms of loss of competence than gain in terms of co-operation. The
current situation is a complex network of ad hoc and personal co-ordination and cooperation activities.
Co-ordination arrangements
Policy areas interact, whether as part of a co-ordinated process or on a more ad hoc
basis depends on the structures and the need for interaction. The integration of transport
policy and innovation policy in Austria provides an example of close physical proximity
but little co-ordination on the formal level. Higher levels of interaction are found on the
informal level where personal connections play an important role. There are few typical
arrangements for interaction in the policy area; actors are rearranged for each new issue
with a greater or lesser degree of integration.
This section looks at two activities that involve concrete interaction between transport
policy and innovation policy. The activities were selected for two reasons. First, they
represent arguably the most important interfaces between these two policy areas; second,
both activities require interaction. RTD activities in the area of transport technologies
have a long, but not entirely friction-free, tradition of interaction between the two policy
areas. The Telematics Framework Programme is a more recent initiative to overcome
some of the shortcomings in the interaction between different policy areas.
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unit that focuses on transport technologies and designs and develops transport technology
programmes. The focus in this division is on innovative (both technological and
organisational) solutions to transport problems.
It is more difficult to gain an overview of other transport-related RTD funding
activities. Transport-focused research and development initiatives are also funded by
other ministries and agencies, but on a smaller scale and often on an individual project
level. In many cases, the focus on transport is often a consideration that is secondary
either to the type of funding mechanism or the focal issue of the individual ministry.
Other funding mechanisms that also encompass transport issues include the Austrian
Science Fund (FWF) which funds basic research projects based on their academic merit.
Such projects can cover transport issues as the FWF does not set funding targets. Another
is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment which supports networking
activities between academia and business in competence centres. One centre concentrates
on vehicle acoustics.
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MOVE
The MOVE Programme: Impulse Programme for Mobility and Transport Technologies (1999-2003) (www.movenet.at) was established by the BMVIT (previously
BMWV) to address the strategic goals of Austrian transport policy on the one hand and
the innovation potential of the Austrian economy on the other hand (Grassegger, 1998).
The programme intended to support innovation in the transport sector that would lead to a
more efficient, environmentally friendly and intermodal transport system. Following an
analysis of the challenges and barriers, it was decided to focus on increasing the
attractiveness of public transport and optimising intermodal public and freight transport.
The programme aimed to act as a moderator to stimulate interaction between different
transport modes and to provide strategic impulses to decrease barriers to system
innovations. The programme consisted of three programmes that addressed the individual
thematic lines of the programmes aims: Take V, Logistics Austria Plus and Innovative
Mobility Services.
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Programme actors and their responsibilities
Programme design and development
The BMVIT has overall responsibility for the development and implementation of the
transport technology programmes. The Unit for Mobility and Transport Technologies,
which is part of the Innovation Division in the Directorate for Innovation and Telecommunication, is directly responsible for the programmes and for the strategic development
of transport technologies. The Innovation Division has responsibility for science and
technology funding and science and technology infrastructure. It includes units that
oversee research initiatives in the areas of air and space, information and communication
technologies, nanotechnology, transport technologies, and energy and environmental
technologies.
Programme management
The day-to-day management of the programmes is not performed by the ministry, but
is carried out by an external programme management agency. In the case of the transport
technology programmes, each programme line is managed by a different programme
management organisation. These are selected through a competitive tendering process
based on criteria such as previous programme management expertise and knowledge of
RTD actors. In some cases, project management is chosen in part on the basis of its
competence in the field of transport technologies; in others, programme management is
carried out by an organisation specialised in programme management. Recent programmes have involved an additional actor, as administrative management has been
separated from financial management. Financial control is carried out by the Austrian
Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF).
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The design model described above can be observed in the development of all three
transport technology programmes. It was first used during the development of the
Transport Technologies Programme which was initially conceived to develop the stateowned industrial sector. It aimed to enhance internal R&D co-operation in Austrian
Industries AG (AI). Once this need had been defined on the policy level, the definition of
individual programme lines and topics took place through a bottom-up process involving
sector-relevant participants. This happened first within AI, then with AI and the BB,
and then with private sector companies, mostly in the construction sector. The outcome of
the process was a focus on noise reduction as an area with a high degree of synergy
among the partners (Ohler and Jrg, 1998). The 1998 evaluation of the ITF Transport
Technologies Programme (1992-97) (Ohler et al., 1998) further details the development
of the individual umbrellas within the programme. These were also developed through a
bottom-up process in which industrial companies proposed projects. The authors of the
evaluation concluded that strategic priorities were not given first priority but that Early
involvement of potential participants in the envisaged programme worked to some extent
as a substitute for a more systematic and broader analysis of problems and needs.
Programme goals had not been defined beforehand in order to use them as a guideline for
approaching the most appropriate stakeholders but evolved during the first brainstorming
session. The evaluation further concluded, in its analysis of the low-noise rail
programme, that these considerations suggest that there was in fact a much larger
problem of innovation deficit in the Austrian railways cluster than could be addressed by
focusing on noise reduction. In the ideal case, this would have been revealed by analysis.
(Ohler et al., 1998)
The development of the two subsequent programmes, MOVE and IV2S, proceeded
along similar lines. The policy need was defined at the top and individual programme
lines were developed with the help of stakeholders from industry and the research field
from the bottom up. These were then developed into strategy concepts that summarised
the content of the programmes (Geyer, 2001).
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research-related or very applied (e.g. infrastructure installations, demonstration
activities, etc.) owing to their high relevance for transport policy. Other sources could
be resources from the transport divisions.
The Council was also unsure about the areas of competence for transport policy and
innovation policy within the BMVIT and did not want to fund activities that were not
research-related. In the Councils Recommendation of 20 November 2001 (Rat fr
Forschung und Technologieentwicklung, 2001b), however, the Council agreed to fund the
proposed programme. It came to two conclusions: first, that the comprehensive transport
plan would not be completed for some time and that the decision on the programmes
could not wait; second, that the co-ordination of transport policy and transport technologies could not be achieved in such a short space of time and that the programme
would be financed out of the special funds or would not be carried out.
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Another potential conflict is more subtle but no less important. It is the policy areas
perceptions of each other and how this affects their willingness to co-operate and learn
from each other. The two policy areas have fundamentally different attitudes to
innovation and its benefits. The transport divisions, such as rail, which deal with large
and complex systems, are more sceptical of the benefits. They are suspicious of the
Innovation Divisions motives for pursuing new technologies and caricature it as jumping
onto every new bandwagon with no thought for the impact on large systems. In the other
direction, the transport divisions are depicted as being anti-innovation, traditional and set
in their ways.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
311
Programme lines
MOVE:
current programmes
ITF
Logistics
Logistik Austria
Plus
Innovative mobility
services
Pilotprogramm
Donau
Combined freight
transport
Combined road, rail and
ship freight transport
Transport technology
programme
Urban passenger
transport
1999-2003
BMVIT
BMVIT
BMVIT
BMVIT
BMVIT
BMVIT
ERP funds
ERP funds
EVA
FAA Holding
(from December 2002)
Trust Consult
Trust Consult
Herry/Rosinak
BMVIT Technologiepolitik
and
-programme, Abt. V/A/7
BMVIT
BMVIT
Administrative
management
Via Donau
Energieverwertungsagentur E.V.A.
Content advice
ERP
ERP
ERP
ERP
ERP
FFF
FFF
FFF
Financial
management
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
1992-1997
1999-2002
2001-2005
1999-2003
2003-2006
2003-2006
Rail technologies
Transport telematics
2003-2006
Automotive suppliers
Thematic focus
TAKE-V
I2
Programme
Table 13.4. Costs and benefits matrix for the advanced turbine system
312 PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING: LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA
Assessment and evaluation. This part involves an assessment of the current and
expected use of telematic applications in Austria. The data will be assessed
according to the overarching themes and user requirements. Data collection
includes analysing different systems and areas of application.
Implementation plan. This part aims to develop a unified country-wide basis for
planning in the area of telematics implementation in order to ensure a common
approach across all modes of transport and areas of implementation in Austria. It
deals with broader organisational and legal framework conditions.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
313
314 PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING: LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA
Design process
The transport telematics framework programme is an attempt to design a comprehensive strategy across all transport modes and areas of implementation. The process
should not just produce a strategy on paper, but should include the commitment of all
stakeholders from both the public and private sectors. They will then be responsible for
implementing the strategy. For this reason the process involves a wide range of actors
from senior policy makers through to field specialists.
Assessment
It should be stressed that the development of this plan is not a simple process and that
it has required the commitment of a wide range of actors, including high-level policy
makers, the heads of the transport operators and highly motivated individuals who have
continued to contribute to the process. The results so far look positive and the process
seems to be working. However, the plan can only be called successful if it is also
implemented.
Assessment
This section looks at the extent to which horizontal policy integration of between
innovation and transport policy in Austria exists. This assessment is based on an analysis
of the two case studies based on the following stages in the policy cycle:
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
Setting directions
There are no strategic policy documents in the area of transport policy. The infrastructure plan cannot be considered an overall strategic policy document, as it only deals
with one small, if albeit significant, area of transport policy. This is often considered due
to strong localised policy areas with their own agendas. As a result, more top-down
strategic planning documents are difficult to establish and even more difficult to
implement. Co-ordination of the various areas of transport policy making is mainly
informal and based on relationships between individual policy makers with a certain
profile in the policy area. The lack of a strategic transport planning document means that
each policy area in transport policy is free to pursue its own goals.
Direction setting at the highest level is not often done in collaboration with different
policy areas. The initial impetus for a strategy or an instrument usually comes from one
policy field. This was the case for both case studies in the transport field. This is also a
result of the fact that the process through which initiatives evolve is ad hoc and not very
structured. Initiatives often depend on an opening for a specific issue and not on strategic
need for a certain policy instrument.
Policy learning
The establishment of the Telematics Framework Programme is a signal that learning
is taking place in the policy system. This programme has addressed several of the main
problems and barriers that exist between transport and innovation policy. First, it
addressed the issue of process ownership and moved the process out of the ministry. By
doing this, it decreased the threat of losing responsibility to another division, which is
perceived as one of the main obstacles to policy co-ordination. Second, it has developed
2.
The General Transport Infrastructure Plan was also developed with the help of an external moderator.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
315
316 PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING: LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA
long-term strategic aims for a policy area that has the potential not to remain a theoretical
exercise. However, it is still too early to assess the programme, as it is still in the
conception phase. Its effectiveness will be tested when it can be seen whether individual
actors use the programme as a basis for decision making.
On another level, the Council for Science and Technological Development is forcing
parts of the innovation policy system to step back and consider gaps and overlaps within
the system. It is able to take a wider perspective and to pinpoint weaknesses. It was able
to do this when it examined all of the RTD programmes submitted for funding by the
special funds. Many of the programmes were rejected at first because they were not coordinated with similar programmes in the same area. However, although the Council was
able to pinpoint system failures, individual actors had little time to remedy the situation
and it is not clear whether there is a long-term effect on the system.
Having looked at the level of coherence and co-ordination between the two policy
areas in the different phases of the policy making process, the following section
summarises the main barriers to policy integration. It shows that although the cases vary
considerably depending on their success in attempting to co-ordinate policy areas, the
barriers in both cases are remarkably similar.
The lack of clear structures and competencies increases mistrust and encourages
each part of the system to try and strengthen its own area. There is too little
openness and interest in what others are doing.
A lack of strategic planning documents. The fact that there are no policy documents outlining the role of transport technologies in an integrated transport
strategy inhibits the integration of policy areas.
Lack of formal processes. Although informal processes function well then cannot
always replace formal ones.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
Success factors
Policy niches are well informed about their specific area and connected to the
actors in the area.
There is a high level of informal networking and information flows that keep one
part of the system informed about the other.
Policy makers are in touch with what is going on in their area and able to make
informed decisions.
Conclusions
This report has touched on a wide range of issues concerning overall policy making in
Austria, on the organisation of transport and innovation policy and on interaction between
the two policy areas. It has thrown up a number of questions that would warrant further
investigation.
The pros and cons of long-term strategic policy documents that provide a framework
in which individual policy areas and units can work are difficult to judge. It is not clear
whether a strategic transport policy document which contains a clear link to innovation
and the role innovation should play in supporting overall transport goals would help.
First, it is not clear whether it would be possible to develop such a document in such a
way that all actors are involved and feel that they own the process. Second, it is not at all
clear that if such a document were produced it would be followed. Several attempts in
ICT policy to create such documents have failed to have the intended impact.
In addition to a belief in strategic policy documents, there is a tendency to think that
coherence in policy making means integration and that combining ministries or agencies
is a way of ensuring they work more efficiently and effectively. The experience of the
past four years in the BMVIT, where transport and innovation have been under the same
roof, has shown that mere organisational proximity is not enough to overcome the
barriers. There is no right amount of integration and coherence in a system. It is a case of
finding out what does not work and where the system fails and finding appropriate
mechanisms to fix it. Looking further into what policy coherence and co-ordination mean
in the Austrian context would be an interesting study that would benefit both from a
deeper understanding of the countrys patchwork style of policy making and from looking
at how other countries deal with the transport/innovation interface.
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
317
318 PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING: LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA
References
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GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY ISBN-92-64-03571-0 OECD 2006
319
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