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Contributing to its Own


Defeat: The Luftwaffe and
the Battle of Britain
Wing Commander M. P. Barley RAF
Published online: 25 Nov 2006.

To cite this article: Wing Commander M. P. Barley RAF (2004) Contributing to


its Own Defeat: The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain, Defence Studies, 4:3,
387-411, DOI: 10.1080/1470243042000344812
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1470243042000344812

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ARTICLE

Contributing to its Own Defeat: The


Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain
W I N G C OM MAND E R M . P . BARL EY , RAF
Much of the study of the Battle of Britain has concentrated on the military
leadership, the conduct of the battle itself and the equipment used, focusing
predominantly on the British standpoint; little has been written about the
German perspective on this important air battle, except perhaps by James
Corum, from whom much information has been gathered. This article
seeks to redress this imbalance by analysing those aspects of Germanys
behaviour that contributed to its ultimate defeat over the skies of Southeast
England. Contrary to the popular British perception that this was a close
battle, which was won against all the odds by a small force of determined
British fighter pilots, it is contended that the Luftwaffe was never in a position where it was likely to gain the upper hand. In no way is it intended to
diminish the part played by the aircrew of either side, more to provide an
historical basis for understanding the wider implications of the German
preparations for the battle against Britain. It will be shown that the German
political leadership was indecisive, lacking the will to fight Britain and,
therefore, failed to provide the German military with a coherent political
end-state that could underpin the military planning process. It will be
demonstrated that the Luftwaffe planning process was incoherent, muddled
and further, that the impact of the Luftwaffe leadership and German air
intelligence on preparations for war was to have a disastrous effect. As a
consequence of these failures, the Germans neglected two key principles of
war: first, know your enemy and yourself, but more importantly, select and
maintain your aim.
The article does not dwell on the British aspect of the Battle of Britain,
but gives only a very brief overview of the interaction of the British political
and military leadership, and British airpower doctrine. The Luftwaffes
chnological development so as to provide a useful backdrop for the detailed
analysis of the German failings that contributed to their losing the Battle of

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Taylor
Defence
10.180/14702430
1470-2436
Original
4302004
00000Autumn
&
Studies
Article
Francis
(print)/0000-0000
2004
Ltd
(online)
FDEF040305.sgm
and
Francis
Ltd

Wg Cdr M. P. Barley, RAF, Advanced Command and Staff Course.

Defence Studies, Vol. 4, No.3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 387411


ISSN 1470-2436 print: ISSN 1743-9698 online
DOI: 10.1080/1470243042000344812 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

Britain. This is accomplished by examining the influence of the German


political leadership and then analysing key aspects of German air doctrine
that were developed during the interwar year. The Luftwaffes experiences
in the Spanish Civil War are examined to ascertain how they affected the
way in which the Luftwaffe fought the Battle of Britain, while matters associated with Luftwaffe planning and the impact of intelligence on both the
planning efforts and the conduct of the campaign are also assessed.

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British Perspective of the Battle of Britain


Political manoeuvring by Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister from 1937 to 1940, had attempted to ensure peace in our time. The
impression that this gave to the German political leadership was one of
weakness and an unwillingness to be drawn into a conflict in mainland
Europe. However, having agreed with Poland to guarantee her sovereignty, Britain found herself at war with Germany in September 1939. In
May 1940, Chamberlain was replaced as Prime Minister by Winston
Churchill and this change of leadership was to prove crucial for the
defence of Britain. Although the early part of the war had seen only
limited engagements (the so-called Phoney War), Churchill was defiant in
the face of Germanys aggression and resolved to fight for survival. This is
perhaps best captured in his speech of 4 June 1940 in which he rouses the
nation with the timeless words: We shall fight on the beaches; we shall
never surrender. 1
Churchill provided clear political leadership, he surrounded himself
with a very capable team of political and military advisers with whom he
developed a close working relationship. However, Churchill was not averse
to argument over an issue. Although he would argue his case forcefully,
those who disagreed with him would receive a fair hearing, and if he were
persuaded of the wisdom of an alternative course of action, he would
concede the argument.2
With regards to the use of airpower, Churchills first major argument
was with Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding (Commander-in-Chief,
Fighter Command) of the Royal Air Force (RAF) who opposed the sending
of fighter aircraft to reinforce those squadrons already fighting in defence
of France. Fortunately for Britain, Dowding won the argument and the
strength of Fighter Command was maintained in Britain.
What this demonstrates is a healthy balance between the political and
military leadership, which generally results in logical decisions based on
input from expert advice. The situation in Germany, as we shall discover,
was somewhat different. Churchill was clearly impressed with Dowding

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389

and supported him when the Minister for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair,
attempted to have Dowding removed as the head of Fighter Command,
writing:

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Personally, I think he is one of the very best men you have got, and I
say this after having been in contact with him for about two years. I
have greatly admired the whole of his work in the Fighter Command,
and especially in resisting..the immense pressure to dissipate the
fighter strength during the great French battle. In fact, he has my full
confidence.3
The most important element of the political / military relationship between
Churchill and Dowding, was that Dowding was left alone to decide how
best to conduct the Battle of Britain.
British airpower doctrine in the interwar period was enshrined in
AP1300 which had been developed from Trenchardian theories of
airpower. It focused mainly on the perceived ability of strategic bombing to
shatter the will of the enemy by concentrating effect on the enemys industrial and economic infrastructure.4 Consequently, the emphasis on aircraft
production favoured the bomber force, since it was accepted that the
bomber would always get through.
However, in the face of the growing strength of the Luftwaffe and with
the recent British development of both radar and capable monoplane fighters, such as the Hurricane and Spitfire, it was realised that some defence
against bomber attack was not only possible, but essential. Therefore, there
was a fundamental shift in the balance of forces and aircraft production in
the late 1930s, which would prove to be decisive in the forthcoming Battle
of Britain. Dowding was instrumental in the development of the worlds
first fully integrated air defence system, which maximised the synergistic
benefits of the detection capabilities of the Chain Home radar network,
ground control procedures and the fighters capabilities. Again these were
capabilities, which the Germans did not appreciate either in their own
terms or in how they might themselves have benefited from this technology. So, if the British strengths were its political and military leadership,
clear purpose and the intelligent use of technological development, what
were the German failings that were to prove so devastating in the Battle of
Britain?
German Political Direction
In the few years prior to World War II, Hitler had made great overtures to
Britain in an effort to ensure that British military power, which the

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D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

Germans judged to be considerable, should not interfere with German


plans in Eastern and Central Europe, leading ultimately to Neville Chamberlains infamous peace in our time speech.
In the interwar period, the Germans believed that their greatest threats
were from Poland in the East and France in the West.5 Consequently,
German planners always expected to have to fight on two fronts. Wargames
in the late 1920s and early 1930s showed poor prospects for a German
victory in such circumstances. If the chances of defeating the French Air
Force were considered remote, they would be worse if Britain were drawn
into the conflict. From as early as 1935, Hitler had recognised this potential
situation.6 He had hoped that his respect for British imperial interests
would be rewarded by Britain who would tolerate Germanys excursions
into Eastern Europe.
The impact upon the Luftwaffe of Hitlers ambivalent attitude towards
Britain was some confusion over the tactical and technical orientation that
the Luftwaffe should adopt. This was exacerbated by the lack of clear military
tasks for which planning could take place. Consequently, the Luftwaffe
embarked upon an equipment programme which concentrated on aircraft
that could be delivered quickly, rather than those which might provide the
best military capability should an attack on Britain be necessary.7
Hitler appears to have taken little interest in the aerial campaign against
Britain, returning to his comfort zone of land operations, and this contributed to the lack of coherency in the planning and execution of the campaign
by the Luftwaffe. However, what is more important is that Hitler actually
had little understanding of a strategic plan which could neutralise Britain
and force her to sue for peace. As John Ray points out, He never demonstrated wide awareness of the value of either air fleets or navies;
subsequently the waters of the Channel proved too great an obstacle for his
land-based military thinking. The crossing of an unpredictable and boisterous sea was too much for his vision, which therefore travelled elsewhere
across the map-table [Russia], allowing the impetus of attack on Britain to
be lost. 8 But was this lack of impetus really a result of Hitlers inability to
understand the problem, or was it that he actually did not want a conflict
with Britain and was using the threat of invasion as a coercive attempt to
neutralise Britain?
Although from 1939 onwards, the British fully expected a German invasion, within the German High Command, the issue was far less certain.
Hitler held three meetings in July 1940 to discuss not the desirability of
attacking Britain, but the feasibility of doing so.9 This tends to reinforce the
notion that Hitler was still unsure of how to treat Britain. At the same time,
initial contingency planning by the German Army had concentrated on a

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391

limited offensive against the Soviet Union, aimed at gaining German dominance of Eastern Europe. However, just as Germany was securing victory
in Western Europe against France, Russia annexed the Baltic States and the
Romanian province of Bessarabia.10 As a result of this, Hitler revised his
plans in the East and sought to deal a decisive blow to the Soviet Union. It
could be argued that Hitlers reaction to the Russian moves into the Baltic
States serves to demonstrate that he had no intention of attacking Britain,
but by coercing Britain with the threat of invasion, was merely attempting
to lull the Soviets into a false sense of security prior to his expanded operations in the East: Operation Barbarossa. However, this argument tends to
ignore the fact that Hitler was still unsure of how to keep Britain out of the
conflict. He appears to have been uncertain about how to bring about either
a military or a political settlement with Britain.11
In the few months leading up to the Battle of Britain, Hitler dithered;
he hoped that the British would return to the conference table but he also
realised that a successful invasion of Britain would be extremely difficult.
Despite the recent conquest of Norway the German Army was not well
suited to amphibious assaults either in terms of training, or in respect of its
equipment.12 There were no dedicated landing craft and the German Navy,
heavily depleted off Norway, had only 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers and
9 destroyers to escort the invasion fleet in the face of 5 battleships, 11 cruisers and 43 destroyers of the Royal Navy, which were positioned at either
end of the English Channel.13 Consequently, both the German Army and
the German Navy were lukewarm about invading Britain.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing the Germans was that Hitler was
both Head of State and head of the armed forces. Through his position in
the Nazi state, the Fhrer could be dictatorial in a way that Churchill never
was. Whereas Churchill was more amenable to the advice of his Chiefs of
Staff, Hitler had surrounded himself with sycophants who would not question his views; there was no balancing force in the German decisionmaking process. Following the successes in Poland, Scandinavia and
France, Hitler was persuaded by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering that
his Luftwaffe could smash the RAF and create the conditions for an
invasion of Britain. The failures in the German political leadership were
therefore twofold. First, Hitler prevaricated and gave no firm strategic leadership; he gave no political end-state to which operational plans could be
directed. Second, Hitler allowed himself to be duped by an over-confident,
sycophantic Goering into believing that the Luftwaffe, acting alone, could
defeat the British.
What this serves to demonstrate is that the leadership in Germany did
not appreciate the limitations of its own armed forces capabilities, or the

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D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

resolve of the British, but more importantly, it did not have a clear aim.
Therefore, the seeds of potential defeat had been sowed. An examination of
German air doctrine, however, should provide an insight into what the
Luftwaffe might have expected to achieve and how it would accomplish its
goals in the Battle of Britain.

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German Air Doctrine


Much of the development of Luftwaffe doctrine in early 1930s can be
attributed to the leadership of Major General Walter Wever, Chief of the Air
Command Office. While he expressed a preference for strategic bombing
as the primary use of air forces, perhaps his greatest contribution to Luftwaffe
doctrine was his encouragement of its wider study.16 Following his death in
a June 1936 flying accident, few changes were made to the strategic airpower
doctrine of the Luftwaffe. Experience in Spain, however, led to the development of Army cooperation tactics; lessons regarding the strategic use of
airpower, identified in Spain, would be ignored in the Battle of Britain.
Despite Wevers leadership, initial airpower development in Germany
was conducted by officers who had little practical experience of air operations, as Germany had been denied an air force in the Versailles Treaty. The
doctrine that was developed relied heavily on the study of foreign air-war
theory publications, including General Giulio Douhets seminal 1921
work, The Command of the Air.17 It was realised that airpower could carry the
war immediately to the innermost political, moral, economic, and military
sources of a states strength.18 Wever believed, however, that the Luftwaffe
should support both the Army and the Navy and should not conduct its
own war.19 This had serious implications for the institutional ability of the
Luftwaffe to create a strategic air campaign that was not in direct support of
the Army or Navy and goes some way to explaining the problems the
Germans were to experience in their campaign planning for the attack on
Britain. The regulation on air warfare (Air Regulation 16) issued in 1936
was based largely on Wevers ideas.
The following are extracts from Air Regulation 16, which illustrate the
nature of German airpower doctrine that formed the basis of planning for
the Battle of Britain. Though they give an insight of the campaign that
should have been planned, their greatest utility is in identifying weaknesses
in the leadership, strategic and operational planning capabilities and the
conduct of the Battle of Britain from the German perspective.
2. From the start of the conflict, the air forces bring the war to the
enemy. Aerial assault affects the fighting power of the enemy and the
foundations of the enemy peoples will to resist. 20

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393

This is Douhetian in nature, a central theme being the weakening of the


enemy populations resolve; it is no surprise that Douhets book was translated into German during the interwar period. However, having conducted
terror bombing of Madrid in the Spanish Civil War, the Luftwaffe carried
out an audit of the civil defence measures adopted by the defending Republican forces to protect the civilians in Madrid from aerial bombing.21 It
concluded that the provision of air raid shelters had two distinct affects
upon the civilian population: first it did indeed provide a high degree of
protection from all but a direct hit and second, it served to maintain the
morale of the populace. In short, the experience in Spain had upheld the
usefulness of strategic attack against industries and transportation centres
but had also provided strong evidence that terror bombing was unlikely to
seriously demoralise a population provided with adequate civil-defence
shelters and training.22
Despite having concluded that terror bombing would not be effective,
Hitler, supported by Goering and Major General Hans Jeschonnek, the
Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, would later direct the Luftwaffe to bomb
London, rather than continue with attacks on the RAF airfields. The inability to learn this important lesson was caused to some extent by the very
nature of the German High Command that Hitler had created; he had
surrounded himself with sycophants and it was incapable of making critical
strategic and planning decisions on its own.
6. Only one who fully understands the demands of aerial warfare
can be an air force leader. True leadership demonstrates trust and
gives the troops an irresistible power to achieve goals that seem
unreachable. 24
How well does Goering fit in with this requirement? Goering was keenly
interested in historical heroes who were both military and political leaders, such as Charlemagne and Napoleon. From this he developed a need
for military distinction, which he viewed above all other as the epitome of
the national socialist ideal. As Richard Overy points out, Goerings role
as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe served a number of different
purposes at the same time. It provided the [Nazi] Party with a direct role
in military affairs, through building up what was popularly regarded as
the Nazi Service [the Luftwaffe]; it provided the means of circumventing
the traditional military leadership and reducing its influence on strategy;
and it gave the Nazis an opportunity of parading the union between the
Party and military life. 25 Through these roles, Goering had a dramatic
effect upon the strategic planning process in the lead-up to the Battle of
Britain.

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Suchenwirth provides a useful description of the impact of Goerings


character on the Luftwaffe: As far as the Luftwaffe was concerned, there were
two aspects of Goerings character which were destined to play a major role
in bringing about the collapse of Germanys air forces. The first was his
inner compulsion to take everything personally, just as he refused to
submit to authority, except that of Hitler himself, and his refusal to
acknowledge any obligation unless it was likely to be useful to him in his
desire to dominate or unless it fulfilled a personal need. He was unable to
face sobering or sceptical reports dealing with actual facts and situations. In
consequence of his desire to hear only what was favourable, he often
refused to face reality, and in the end he really believed that his Luftwaffe
was an invincible force, whose commitment was alone capable of deciding
the outcome of the war. The second aspect of Goerings nature which
proved so disastrous for the Luftwaffe was his growing tendency to make a
distinction between himself and his colleagues by demanding uncompromising devotion to duty from them, while his own zeal in this respect was
no more than a pretence. 27
Thus, compared to Dowdings leadership of Fighter Command, Goering was more of a liability to the Luftwaffe. Goering did not try to shape
German air doctrine and was surprisingly ignorant about modern
airpower, but he still interfered at the tactical level, often reducing the effectiveness of his own forces.
9. The mission of the armed forces in war is to break down the will
of the enemy. The will of the nation finds its greatest embodiment in
its armed forces. Thus, [destruction of] the enemy armed forces is
therefore the primary goal in war. 29
The derivation of this element of German air doctrine is clear; it is pure
Clausewitz. However, since Clausewitz provides merely the principle and
not advice on the means to achieve the desired end (the proverbial cookbook), the focus on the enemys armed forces must be viewed within the
context of the following section of Regulation 16:
10. The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals by commanding the war in the air within the framework of combined operations.
By battling the enemy air force, the enemy armed forces are weakened and, at the same time, our own armed forces, our people, and
our homeland are protected. 30
Crucially, this paragraph reinforces Wevers view that the Luftwaffe should
operate in concert with Land and Maritime forces, thereby fostering a reliance on joint planning, rather than the independent planning of an air

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campaign that the Luftwaffe would be called upon to conduct for the Battle
of Britain. In terms of undermining the will of the enemy, it draws from
Douhetian theory, but develops this notion further by identifying the
enemy military as the key to enemy resolve, again more Clausewitzian in
nature. What it does not reflect is the ability of airpower to conduct operations at all levels simultaneously and does not reflect the ability of airpower
to conduct operations for strategic effect. Where German air doctrine
differed from Douhets theory was that the Germans expected air defence
against their bomber force. It was for this reason that the Messerschmitt 110
escort fighter was developed.
13. Targeting in aerial war must take into account the enemys
centre of gravity. In the framework of operational possibility, the air
force has many missions, and will normally have enough forces to
carry out only some of them. Dividing up the force to carry out many
simultaneous missions is to be avoided, as are constant changes in
targeting. 32
This section of Regulation 16 is especially important. It introduces the
doctrinal concept of the centre of gravity, revealing once more its Clausewitzian pedigree. More importantly for the employment of airpower,
however, it introduces the issues of the competing nature of the many
missions to which airpower can contribute. The principles of economy of
effort, concentration of force and the selection and maintenance of the aim
are plainly articulated; each of these elements are still contained in current
air doctrine. 33
From the confusing political direction discussed earlier, it seems likely
that Hitler had, in fact, identified Russia as the strategic centre of gravity for
his aspirations in Europe and that was where his main focus rested, rather
than against Britain. However, perhaps this is a further indication that
neither Hitler, nor the German armed forces ever really intended to draw
Britain into the war in the first place. It also reinforces the notion that
invading Britain was not a serious proposition. The issue of centre of gravity will be analysed in more detail when discussing German planning.
From paragraphs 10 and 13 of Luftwaffe Regulation 16, it can be surmised
that the Luftwaffes plan to destroy the RAF was rooted in doctrine, and yet
such doctrinal leading of the target set does not sit well with the need to
identify the centre of gravity; theoretically, the strategic centre of gravity
might be attacked without the need to engage enemy air forces.
18. The battle against the enemy air force in enemy territory does
not stop when, during the course of the war, a period of air superiority

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is gained. During such a period of air superiority, one should reckon


with the possibility that the enemy may rebuild his strength by
replacements or technological improvements. By such means, the
enemy can quickly regain his effectiveness in the air if given a respite
from attack. 34
This paragraph calls into question the decision to change from attacking the
RAF and in particular, the sector stations, and focusing on the bombing of
London. Was this a failure of intelligence? Did the Luftwaffe believe that the
RAF had been beaten? If this is the case, according to its own doctrine, it
should have maintained the offensive against the RAF to ensure that it
could not be rejuvenated.
34. An essential factor is knowing ones own intention. 35
It is not obvious that the Luftwaffe had identified a clear operational endstate when it set about the aerial campaign over Britain. Luftflotten 2 and 3
each produced different plans for the campaign and received no guidance
from Goering who ultimately followed neither plan, providing only ad hoc
direction which actually restricted the capabilities of his fighter force.36
48. Careful analysis of all intelligence on the enemy, as well as a
correct appreciation of the enemys objectives and his method of war
is necessary to overcome the enemy. 37
The shortcomings of the Luftwaffes intelligence section will be discussed in
detail in a separate section. What is significant here is that despite this
doctrinal direction, the Germans still lacked understanding of contemporary British airpower doctrine. That the RAF embarked upon an offensive
against German cities is in keeping with the British doctrine of 1940. The
doctrine which Trenchard developed, encapsulated within AP1300, called
for the attack of industrial targets with the aim of demoralising the workforce and, by association, demoralising the population as a whole. Consequently, the RAFs bombing of Berlin was a rational expression of British
airpower doctrine and not merely a direct result of the German bombing of
London. Major Josef Beppo Schmid, the head of Luftwaffe Intelligence and
his team failed to make accurate assessments of British capabilities or intentions. They failed to understand how the British would employ airpower;
they did not know their enemy. Moreover, they failed to appreciate that war
in the air is part of a dynamic contest.
186. Attacks against cities made for the purpose of inducing terror
in the civilian populace are to be avoided on principle. If the enemy
should initiate terror attacks against defenceless and open cities,

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however, then retaliation attacks may be the only means of stopping


the enemy from continuing this brutal method of aerial warfare. The
timing of retaliation attack depends upon the timing of the enemy
terror attack. In every case, the attack must clearly be recognised as a
retaliation.38
187. The retaliation attack requires exact knowledge and understanding of the thought patterns and moral attitudes of the enemy
population. Selection of the wrong time, combined with a poor estimate of the desired effect upon the enemy, can in some circumstances
result in an increase in the enemys will to resist, rather than a reduction of that will. In general, the retaliatory attack will have a greater
effect if the population has been demoralized by defeat at the front. 39
The doctrinal direction regarding terror bombing of civilians is clear; it is
to be avoided and may not create the intended reaction. That terror bombing was tried by the Luftwaffe in Spain was to some extent due to the specific
nature of that campaign and the Germans support for the Nationalist
forces of General Francisco Franco. However, one of the two Luftwaffe
plans drawn up before the Battle of Britain identified the civilian population of London as a key target. That it was subsequently attacked has often
been put down to Hitlers retaliation for British bombing of Berlin.
However, this ignores the fact that it was planned much earlier than that
and, more importantly, German bombing of London preceded Hitlers
speech promising retaliation against London by over a week. It is
contended that the switch from bombing the RAF sector stations to bombing London had more to do with failed intelligence and a flawed plan than
with retaliation.
Much of the preceding doctrine relates to offensive action, but what was
the doctrinal position of Germanys air defences? By studying the development of Germanys air defence doctrine and capability, an understanding of
the Germans appreciation of the British radar defence capability can be
assessed. The Luftwaffe had realised the need for an adequate air defence
capability as early as 1936. This was further reinforced by the experience of
the Condor Legion in Spain. In 1937 and 1938, the Luftwaffe shifted the
emphasis of aircraft production from bombers to fighters such that production plans for 1938 called for the delivery of 335 fighters per month but only
282 bombers.40
Although fighter tactics were developed throughout the late 1930s, the
German air defence system still relied heavily on anti-aircraft artillery
(flak). Again, the German experience in Spain had demonstrated the effectiveness of flak. As a result, by 1939, the Luftwaffe had 100,000 personnel

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assigned to flak batteries with a total of 7,873 air defence guns.41 However,
what is not generally appreciated is the significant advances in radar
technology that the Germans had achieved prior to World War II.
As early as 1936, the Luftwaffe had tested a prototype radar with a detection range of 80km.42 This was further developed and by 1938, an improved
version was fielded with a detection range of 120km.43 Perhaps what is more
remarkable is the fact that the Germans created a chain of coastal radar
defences in 193739, over the same period as the British deployed the
Chain Home radar system. But what the Luftwaffe had failed to do, was to
integrate this capability into a coherent defensive system which could
increase the effectiveness of the defensive fighters and flak batteries. Most
of the German air defence system was decentralised and based on the
defence of point targets, especially vital industries and military targets.
Some rudimentary steps were made to create a central air defence
command, but the core of the Luftwaffes air defence doctrine remained the
offensive campaign to defeat the enemy air force on the ground.44 Hitler
was confident of achieving a quick victory and never considered the possibility of enemy attacks against targets in Germany. Defence was, therefore,
relegated within the conceptual thinking of the Luftwaffes hierarchy. The
impact of this was that it was unable to appreciate the capability that had
been created by Dowding in Britain: the worlds first fully integrated air
defence system. This fundamental oversight goes some way to explaining
the inadequacies of German intelligence about the British defensive
capabilities, which will be discussed later.
In essence, German airpower doctrine championed by Wever was
sound and consistent with that being developed elsewhere (Britain and the
USA). It contained much which can be identified in current air doctrine
and should have provided a sound basis for the planning of a campaign
against Britain. The key point is that the Luftwaffe did not adhere to its
doctrine. Following Wevers death, the strategic elements of doctrine
appear to have been sidelined, partly due to experience gained in Spain,
which was more tactical in nature, and perhaps due to the exigencies of the
rapid provision of equipment.
Lessons from the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War represented the first opportunity for the newly
formed Luftwaffe to test its equipment and to develop new tactics. As
Corum explains, much of the Luftwaffes success from 19391942, and
some of its failures, can be traced to lessons that were learned, or not
learned, during the Spanish Civil War.45

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In the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, the Germans provided the
Nationalist forces with transport aircraft (Junkers 52) and a small detachment of fighter aircraft (Heinkel 51). Initially, these proved highly effective
and provided air superiority over the Straits of Gibraltar, enabling maritime
resupply of the Nationalist Army. By the summer of 1936, it appeared that
the Nationalist victory would be secured within a few months, and yet the
war continued for a further 21/2 years. The reason for this was that the
Russians, like the Germans and Italians, also sought to exert influence over
the region, and had deployed SB-2 bomber aircraft, I-15 and I-16 fighter
aircraft in support of the Republican Army, each of which was superior in
capability to the He-51. The Republicans wrested air superiority from the
Nationalist forces but ultimately a stalemate situation developed. The
German force in Spain, the Condor Legion, was gradually re-equipped
with a variety of more modern aircraft including the Heinkel 111 bomber
and the Messerschmitt 109 fighter.46
Besides the testing and development of new aircraft, the Condor Legion
developed new fighter tactics. Initially, the fighter tactics used reflected the
tactics of World War 1; the vic formation of three aircraft. Hauptman
Werner Moelders is acknowledged as being instrumental in the development of the Rotte (two aircraft formation) and the Schwarm (two Rotte
formations spread out in a finger-four formation).47 These tactics proved to
be highly flexible and enabled each pilot in the formation a greater degree
of freedom to scan the sky for enemy aircraft. In 1938 Moelders wrote a
tactics manual, which was adopted throughout the Luftwaffe.48 It was these
tactics which the Luftwaffe would use successfully in the Battle of Britain
against the RAF, which was still reliant on the rigid vic formation.
But Luftwaffe tactical developments were not confined to fighter tactics.
It became apparent that more aircraft were being lost in flying accidents
than in combat. Consequently, an intensive instrument and night flying
training programme was adopted which was superior to any training in
other air forces.49 This was facilitated partly by the German aircraft engineering industry, which had made great efforts to develop blind flying
instruments and a moderately sophisticated landing aid. Moreover, the
Luftwaffe developed the worlds first blind bombing navigation system codenamed Knickebein (dog leg) - in which radio pulses would guide
[an aircraft] to its target.50 For many pilots of the Luftwaffe, perhaps the
greatest tactical lesson to emerge from the Spanish Civil War was purely
that of operational experience, something which RAF pilots would lack at
the outset of World War II.
But what is the significance of these tactical lessons? The flexibility of
the loose Rotte formation enabled each fighter to bring its weapons to bear

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rather than two aircraft merely having to follow their leader. In essence this
would, initially, multiply the relative effectiveness of German fighters
compared to the RAF.
The bombers of the Condor Legion conducted interdiction sorties
against ports, railways, industrial complexes and airfields. However, the
Luftwaffes experience of Republican attacks against its airfields was that
limited damage was caused while the flak defences proved their effectiveness by shooting down 59 Republican aircraft.51 This calls into question the
wisdom of the Luftwaffes plans in the Battle of Britain for attacking the
RAFs airfields.
The nature of the Spanish Civil War dictated that the main effort was
the ground offensive and it was in support of this that the Luftwaffe developed its close air support (CAS) tactics. The key problem which the
Germans had to overcome, was that of communication between the land
forces and the supporting aircraft. Initially, ground signals were used, but
eventually a system was devised whereby a commander placed in a forward
observation position with a landline to the German airfield would then
relay messages to the aircraft via radio. This was a clumsy but effective
method of coordinating CAS and was only superseded when more reliable
radio communications could be established with the ground forces.52 This
was perhaps the first use of the forward air controller that would be recognised by modern air forces. The successful development of this system was
a major contributing factor to the development of Blitzkriegand goes some
way to explaining why some commentators have suggested that the
Luftwaffe was a tactical air force.
However, it is incorrect to assume that the Luftwaffe had ignored strategic bombing during the Spanish Civil War.53 On the contrary, the Luftwaffe
had learned some important lessons regarding the bombing of strategic
industrial targets and enemy cities. The nationalist leader, General Franco,
perhaps influenced by his Italian allys Douhetian doctrine, decided to use
bombers to demoralise the civilian population of Madrid and to break the
stalemate which had developed. The bombing of Madrid in November
1936 resulted in relatively light civilian casualties and did not break civilian
morale, but the appearance of new Russian fighters necessitated the escorting of the bomber force by large numbers of fighters, a lesson not wasted
on the Luftwaffe.54
As we have seen, during the interwar period, the German military developed doctrine for the strategic use of airpower. But more importantly, the
first tentative steps were made to put into effect that doctrine through technical developments in navigation and instrument flying. Although the Luftwaffe was aware of the need for strategic bombing, it was not able to deliver

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the equipment it needed in time the Heinkel 177 heavy bomber was a
technological disaster and was cancelled in favour of more readily available
medium bombers such as the He-111.55 As Bewley points out, the Luftwaffe, as developed by Goering in 1939, was the perfect instrument for
Blitzkrieg; for a longer campaign, however, it was not sufficient. 56 This
tends to support the assertion that the Luftwaffe was in essence a tactical air
force equipped largely for cooperation with the army and which, during the
Battle of Britain, was forced to fight a strategic air campaign for which it was
ill-prepared.57 Despite this, however, having gained valuable operational
experience and an insight into the ineffectiveness of terror bombing and
airfield attacks, the Luftwaffe should have been able to employ its doctrine
to produce a competent plan for the campaign against Britain.
German Planning
Planning must start with a clear aim, which articulates a well-defined endstate. The change from appeasement under Chamberlain to stout resolve
under Churchill indicates that the true strategic centre of gravity was the
British political leadership. The Luftwaffes plans focused on the ports and
supply lines implying that a long drawn-out conflict with Britain was
expected in which the strangulation of supplies would have an effect upon
the morale and warfighting capability of Britain. However, this does not sit
well with the Germans expectation of a quick, decisive battle to prepare for
the invasion of Britain. Significantly, there was no political direction giving
a strategic end-state which was to be achieved, so the identification of the
operational centre of gravity (the focus of military action) and its associated
critical vulnerabilities were not clearly recognised.
It is contended that the operational centre of gravity (the one thing that
had to be destroyed to enable a successful German invasion of Britain) was
the Royal Navys forces protecting the English Channel because they were
vastly superior to the German Navy and could prevent the German invasion. Fighter Command would have had to be defeated first to enable the
destruction of the Royal Navys assets from the air, and air superiority
would have been needed over the beach-head following the invasion.
Consequently, Fighter Command was a decisive point on the road to
defeating the operational centre of gravity; it was not an end in itself. The
formal planning process (now known as the Estimate) was not adequately
followed by Luftwaffe planners. Such a lack of adequate analysis can lead to
only one thing: a flawed plan.
From the analysis of the political direction to the Luftwaffe, it was identified that there was no clear political end-state with respect to Britain and

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that this was compounded by an unwillingness among the military leadership to question the plans developed by Hitler. Moreover, Goering, buoyed
by his Luftwaffes recent successes in Poland, Scandinavia and France,
convinced Hitler that Britain could be defeated by the use of airpower
alone. The lack of clear political guidance resulted in a plan described by
Boog as being improvised strategically and tactically against an air defence
system that had been strengthened and refined over the proceeding 4
years.58
Despite the worsening relations between Britain and Germany in the
mid to late 1930s, it was not until 1938 that initial contingency planning was
conducted to investigate the feasibility of preventing Britain from intervening in a conflict in Western Europe. In autumn 1938, Luftwaffe Group
Command two produced a report which concluded that any air war with
Britain would be of nuisance value only and under no circumstances exercise any decisive effect on the course of a war.59 It was noted that only after
the introduction of a long-range heavy bomber, the He-177, could a
campaign against British industry be effective.60 However, this aircraft was
not due to enter service until 1942 and was ultimately cancelled anyway.
This lack of long-range capability would force the Luftwaffe planners to
constrain their activities to the south-eastern part of Britain, unless airfields
could be secured in Belgium and Holland. At first glance this might appear
to provide a reason for the invasion of these countries, however it belies the
fact that the greatest perceived threat to Germany in the West was from
France. That the Low Countries were invaded was as a consequence of the
plan to defeat France rather than any wish to provide airfields for the attack
on Britain.
Further evaluation by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff declared that there
was no possibility of success by attacking the British war economy;
although Britain relied on imports, the Western ports were beyond the
range of the Luftwaffes bombers. Perhaps more importantly, it was identified that because of the increasing strength of the air defences, no decision
could be hoped for by terror attacks on London. On the contrary, such
attacks [are] more likely to produce the opposite effect and undesirably
strengthen the national will to resist.61 Clearly, the lessons of Spain were
appreciated at the lower command levels, but, in keeping with its flawed
character, the Higher Command did not apprise the political hierarchy of
this issue. It was decided, therefore, that the British aircraft industry, ports
and harbour facilities would offer the best targets for attack, but with little
thought for the desired operational end-state.
Having received little guidance from the political leadership, the
Luftwaffe commanders might reasonably have expected some guidance

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from their Commander-in-Chief, Goering; none was forthcoming. There


was a practical reason for Goerings apparent ambivalence following the
victory against France. The Luftwaffe had lost 30 per cent of its bombers, 30
per cent of its twin-engine fighters and 15 per cent of its single-engine
fighters in the battle for France and needed time to recuperate.62 However,
this also allowed the RAF to recover and restore its frontline strength. It was
not until 21 July 1940 that the newly elevated Reichsmarschall Goering
personally met his commanders to discuss the problem of how to gain air
superiority over England, the essential prerequisite for an invasion. He gave
only general guidelines for a variety of targets to be attacked in addition to
achieving the primary objective of gaining air superiority.
On 30 July 1940, Hitler directed Goering to prepare immediately for the
great air battle of the Luftwaffe against England.63 Goering tasked the
commanders of both Luftflotte 2 (Kesselring) and Luftflotte 3 (Sperrle) with
devising plans to create the conditions necessary for the invasion of Britain.
The consequence of this dual tasking was that two incoherent plans were
created which concentrated on differing target sets. While Luftflotte 2 aimed
to achieve air superiority by destroying the British aero-industry, providing
close air support to the invading army, destroying harbours and ports to
deny re-supply, Luftflotte 3 intended to attack industrial targets in Greater
London and to draw British fighters into the air where it was confident that
it would achieve a quick and decisive victory.64
What was lacking from both plans was a clear understanding of the
enemys and their own capabilities and the importance of the Royal Navy.
The outcome of this confused planning process was that the Luftwaffe
never appears to have decided the aim it was pursuing. Its attacks seem to
have been aimed variously at defeating Fighter Command and attaining air
superiority to facilitate the invasion; defeating the whole of the RAF and
destroying the aircraft industry simultaneously, with the same object; the
strategic bombardment of cities to break morale and force Fighter
Command to commit all its resources to defending one vital target
London.65 Thus an incoherent and flawed planning process contributed
significantly to the ultimate German defeat in the Battle of Britain. A major
factor in this disorganised planning process was German air intelligence.
German Air Intelligence
The German intelligence system of the late 1930s was characterised by
disorganisation, duplication, competition and inefficiency.66 Poor officers
and personal jealousy would ensure that there would be a lack of cooperation between the various agencies.67 Intelligence from different sources

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only came together at the highest level (Hitler) because none of the many
German intelligence agencies was prepared to share information, and thus
power, with their internal competitors. Consequently, the Germans had no
organisational equivalent to the British Joint Intelligence Committee
which could coordinate intelligence efforts.68
Two intelligence organisations were superior to the Luftwaffe intelligence department: the Abwehr, commanded by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris
and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) under Heinrich Himmler.69 Both these agencies provided intelligence information for the armed forces. The Abwehr was
staffed by officers with little technical ability and the SD was preoccupied
with German internal affairs, often investigating the other German intelligence agencies. It is within this context that the Luftwaffe established its own
intelligence cell within the General Staff Headquarters, commanded by
Major Josef Beppo Schmid who had been recommended to Goering by
Jeschonnek.70 Schmid was shrewd, calculating and ambitious, but was more
interested in his own position than in the provision of useful intelligence.71
Although Schmid established some order of activities in the Luftwaffe
intelligence cell, he replaced those staff he considered a threat to his
personal progression with personnel of his own choosing individuals who
would not challenge his position.72 Consequently, the competency of
Schmids team was generally fairly poor. This would have far-reaching
implications for the provision of intelligence prior to and during the Battle
of Britain.
Schmid saw an opportunity to enhance his own standing by manoeuvring such that all sources from which air information was obtained
should come under his command, although he was never fully successful
in this ambition.73 It is indicative of Schmids sponsorship by Goering that
by 1939, his standing within the General Staff had risen such that he was
chairing intelligence meetings attended by Hans Jeschonnek, Field Marshal
Erhard Milch, the Secretary of State for Aviation and Ernst Udet, the Chief
of Luftwaffe Supply and Procurement.
Perhaps Schmids most enduring contribution to the Luftwaffes planning process for the invasion of Britain was the study he and his staff
produced of Britain, known as Study Blue. This study was based on a book
about British industry, which had been ordered directly from a London
bookshop, and on press cuttings from British newsarticles. However, this
information was supplemented by reconnaissance photographs collected
clandestinely from a modified civilian He-111C operated from Berlin on
route-proving flights.74
It was Schmids major failing that he underestimated the potential and
efficiency of the RAF, perhaps as a sop to Goering whom Schmid would

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not want to upset for fear of alienating his mentor. In his study of foreign
air forces, Schmid concluded that:

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the English and French air fleets are still out of date. British air defence
is still weak..England will not be able to avoid a conflict with the
German Luftwaffe. German aircraft are superior in view of their
advantage in armament, armoured fuel tanks and flying instruments.
In Germany alone has an overall view been taken of air warfar.75
Schmid further calculated that the strength of RAF Fighter Command was
a mere 200 frontline nt fighters and that Bomber Command could muster
500 frontline bombers. His estimation of bomber numbers was not far
from the mark, there were in fact 536, the estimate of fighters was
woefully wide of the mark, there being 608.76 Clearly, the RAF was a more
capable and better-equipped opponent than German intelligence had
realised. It is within this context that Schmid issued his Proposal for the
Conduct of Air Warfare against Britain. Within the modern context, one
might say that this represented an intelligence-led Campaign Estimate
process. However, with the inaccuracy of the intelligence data on RAF
fighter numbers and capabilities, the plan was likely to be suspect. Schmid
wrote:
From Germanys point of view, Britain is the most dangerous of all
possible enemies. The war cannot be ended in a manner favourable to
us as long as Britain has not been mastered. France, on the other
hand, ranks in the second class for unlike Britain she would not be
capable of carrying on a war without her allies. Germanys war aim
must therefore be to strike at Britain with all available weapons,
particularly those of the navy and air force Furthermore, economic
assistance from the British and French colonial empires and from
neutrals, particularly the USA, and the encirclement of Germany,
must not be permitted to come fully into operation.77
The theme of his plan was the strangulation of Britains supply lines and
harbour facilities. Having assessed that Britains centre of gravity was its
reliance on imported food, fuel and raw materials, he advocated the simultaneous attack of ports, warships under construction/repair and secondary
ports as a lower priority. Significantly, Schmid noted the proximity of residential buildings to the ports, especially of London, asserting that this was
no reason not to attack these targets.78 This gives an insight into the targeting strategy that would eventually lead to the attack of London itself and
tends to question the notion of the German bombing of London being in
retaliation for British bombing of Berlin.

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Following the fall of France, Schmids assessment of the French Air


Force was proved correct. Consequently, the Luftwaffe intelligence units
confidence in its assessment of British capabilities and vulnerabilities was
reinforced. However, they had made several important miscalculations,
which would affect the outcome of the battle. First and foremost, they
failed to recognise the importance of the Chain Home radar system despite
having radar capabilities of their own. What the Germans failed to realise
was the potential of radar, in that they did not integrate it into an air defence
system. It is perhaps a reflection of the nature of the Luftwaffes experiences
in Spain and its role in supporting ground offensive operations that this
capability was overlooked.
Their understanding was further hampered by the fact that ten separate
agencies in Germany were involved in analysing radar capabilities, none of
which shared their information.79 Consequently, what was missing from
the intelligence assessment of the Chain Home radar system was exactly
that: it was a system. According to Schmid, the British were:
inflexible in [their] organisation and strategy. As [fighter] formations
are rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium level
suffers mainly from being controlled in most cases by officers no
longer accustomed to flying. Command at low level is generally
energetic but lacks tactical skill.80
Though it could be argued that RAF fighter tactics at the beginning of the
Battle of Britain were rigid and inflexible, this could really only be applied
to the vic formation flown, rather than the manner in which fighters were
directed to the battle. Schmids assessment is interesting as it suggests a failing of the RAF in that its commanders lacked recent flying experience.
Compare this with the fact that many of the Luftwaffe commanders were
drawn from the German Army and were not professional aviators at all
(Kesselring was an ex-artilleryman, Goering had not flown since the early
1920s) and this comment can be put into perspective. Although, it is fair to
say that German frontline pilots had gained valuable operational experience
in Spain, which the British pilots had not. Schmid concluded his report as
follows:
the Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the RAF as regards strength,
equipment, training, command, and location of bases. In the event of
an intensification of air warfare, the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, will be
in a position in every respect to achieve a decisive effect this year if the
time for the start of large-scale operations is set early enough to allow
advantage to be taken of the months with relatively favourable
weather conditions [July to the beginning of October].81

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Within this context of an over-assessment of German capabilities and RAF


weaknesses, the Luftwaffe drafted its plans for the invasion of Britain. Intelligence assessments during the battle itself were no better than earlier
predictions; unlike the British intelligence services, the Germans did not
learn from their mistakes.82 Relying purely on post-flight reports from
aircrew, the Luftwaffes intelligence cell struggled to draw any useful conclusions as to how the RAF was conducting its defence.
Consequently, there was little chance of specific weaknesses being identified which could be exploited as the following intelligence summary from
August 1940 shows:
As British fighters are controlled from the ground by radio-telephones, their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and are
thereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration the
probability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently,
the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at short
notice is not to be expected. A massed German attack on a target can
therefore count on the same conditions of light fighter opposition as
in attacks on widely scattered targets. It can, indeed, be assumed that
considerable confusion in the defensive networks will be unavoidable
during mass attacks, and that the effectiveness of the defences may
thereby be reduced.83
This misunderstanding on the part of the Germans serves to illustrate
further the lack of comprehension of the use of radar within an integrated
defence system. That German aircrew, especially the fighter pilots, were
not predisposed to using radios may account for the German notion that a
force so reliant on radio communication must be inferior to themselves.
The themes that run throughout the German intelligence effort prior to,
and during, the Battle of Britain are those of failing to understand the
enemy and over-stating German capabilities through over-confidence and
a personal need on the part of Schmid to impress Goering. Moreover, the
planning effort of the Intelligence staff was not focused and did not identify
a single aim.
Conclusion
Contrary to the popular British belief that the Battle of Britain was a closerun fight, German failings before and during the battle conspired to ensure
that they would not win; the Germans contributed to their own defeat in
several ways. There was little political direction due to the lack of a will to
engage in a conflict with Britain, and that which was forthcoming was

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confused and incoherent. There was neither a clear political end-state with
respect to Britain nor coherent military tasks on which to make equipment
decisions or upon which to build a campaign plan. The German political
leadership did not know their enemy, nor did they have a clear idea of their
own intentions.
Yet, doctrinal development was sound and was in line with that being
developed in other nations although it included an element of tactical army
cooperation, which was certainly different from British doctrine of the
time. Following its experience in Spain, the Luftwaffe realised that terror
bombing and attacking airfields were not effective and yet, under the direction of Hitler and Goering, these tactics were still employed in the Battle of
Britain. Moreover, the tactical lessons of army cooperation learned by the
Luftwaffe in Spain tended to overshadow the further development of strategic airpower doctrine, which had been championed by Wever until his
death. The emphasis in German air doctrine on offensive action would
contribute to the Germans failing to develop their own integrated air
defence system and to not appreciating the significance of that developed by
Dowding in Britain. Again, they did not know their enemy. The German
Army and Navy had never realistically been in a position to conduct an
invasion of Britain. The German chances of a successful invasion were
summarised by the German Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann as follows: Had
the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF I am sure Hitler would have given the
order for the invasion to be launched - and the invasion would, in all probability, have been smashed.84
Goering was over-confident due to the successes in Poland, Scandinavia
and France and yet his ability as a commander was undoubtedly poor, his
having little understanding of the use of modern airpower. Moreover, the
German High Command organisation was predisposed to supporting the
decisions from Hitler and Goering, rather than taking its own decisions.
Therefore, planning was given no direction and, having failed to identify
the Royal Navys forces in the English Channel as the operational centre of
gravity, disparate and incoherent planning was conducted by several
Luftwaffe formations, with no clear aim.
The failings of the German intelligence system both mirrored and
contributed to a fatal over-confidence throughout the German High
Command. Given the National Socialist nature of the Luftwaffe and its
sycophantic leadership, it is unsurprising that Hitlers own opinion that
Britain was weak and would capitulate in the face of an invasion, would
influence Luftwaffe planning for the Battle of Britain. Whereas the delay
between the fall of France and the Battle of Britain was partly due to poor
weather, Cox sums up the situation well: the Luftwaffes planners seem to

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have lacked all sense of urgency, continuing with a series of planning


conferences to settle aspects which should have been confirmed during the
long interim after victory in France, particularly as the first outline orders
were issued a month before the real offensive opened. 85
Thus, indecision and over-confidence by the political and military hierarchy combined with poor intelligence contributed to the incoherent
planning of a campaign which failed to follow the key war principles: select
and maintain the aim, and know your enemy and yourself. It is not clear
that the Luftwaffe had ever decided upon an operational end-state against
which its actions could be directed. But this is not surprising given that
there was no clear political end-state either.
The outcome of these failures was a campaign that meandered between
various objectives and target sets, enabling the RAFs Fighter Command to
maintain the advantage, even when most stretched by resource issues.
Thanks to their own failings, it might be said that the Germans placed
themselves in a position where winning the Battle of Britain was impossible
from the outset.
NOTES
1. Winston Churchill, The Retreat from Flanders speech before the House of Commons, 4 June
1940. Sourced from www.churchillonline.org.uk/speeches, accessed 7 March 2004.
2. Williamson Murray, The Battle of Britain: How Did The Few Win?, The Quarterly
Journal of Military History 2/4 (Summer 1990) p.12.
3. Ibid.
4. Philip Meilinger, Air Warfare An Historical Perspective, The Royal Air Force Air Power
Review 6/3 (Autumn 2003) p.3.
5. James Corum, The Development of Strategic Air War Concepts in Inter-war Germany,
19191939, Air Power History 44/4 (Winter 1997) p.23.
6. Klaus Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegeman and Hans Umbreit, Germany and the Second
World War, Vol.2, translated by Dean McMurray and Ewald Osers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1991) p.41.
7. Ibid. p.42.
8. John Ray, The Battle of Britain New Perspectives (1994; London: Arms & Armour Press 1996)
p.43.
9. Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain - The Myth and the Reality (New York: W.W. Norton
2000) p.24.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. p.25.
12. Murray, How Did the Few Win? (note 2) p.10.
13. Alfred Price, Myth and Legend, Aeroplane Monthly (Nov. 1997) p.14.
14. Ray, New Perspectives (note 8) p.43.
15. Lauran Paine, German Military Intelligence in World War 2 The Abwehr (New York: Military
Heritage Press 1984) p.96.
16. Corum, The Development of Strategic Air War Concepts (note 5) p.135.
17. Maier, Germany in the Second World War (note 6) p.34.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. p.35.

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20. Luftwaffe Regulation 16 in James Corum and Richard Muller, The Luftwaffes Way of War:
German Air Force Doctrine 19111945 (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing
1998) p.119 [hereafter LR16CM].
21. James Corum, The Luftwaffe and Lessons Learned in the Spanish Civil War in Sebastian
Cox and Peter Gray (eds.) Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo
(London: Frank Cass 2002) p.80.
22. Ibid.
23. Murray (note 2) p.10.
24. LR16CM (note 20) p.120.
25. Richard Overy, Goering (1984; London: Phoenix Press 2000) p.164.
26. Ibid. p.165.
27. Richard Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the German Air Force (New York: Arno
Press 1969) p.137.
28. Corum (note 5) p.27.
29. LR16CM (note 20) p.20.
30. Ibid.
31. Corum (note 5) p.25.
32. LR16CM (note 20) p.121.
33. British Air Power Doctrine AP 3000, 3rd edn. (Directorate of the Air Staff, MoD 1999)
p.1-2-9.
34. LR16CM (note 20) p.122.
35. LR16CM (note 20) p.124.
36. Murray (note 2) p.17.
37. LR16CM (note 20) p.125.
38. Ibid. p.141.
39. LR16CM (note 20) p.142.
40. Corum (note 5) p.240.
41. Ibid.
42. Corum (note 5) p.242.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid p.243.
45. Corum, Luftwaffe and Lessons Learned (note 21) p.66.
46. Ibid. p.68.
47. Ibid. p.70.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. p.71.
50. Murray (note 2) p.11.
51. Corum (note 21) p.73.
52. Ibid.
53. S. Mitcham, Men of the Luftwaffe (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1988) p.51.
54. Corum (note 21) p.79.
55. Murray (note 2) p.11.
56. Charles Bewley, Hermann Goering and the Third Reich (USA: Devin-Adair 1962) p.305.
57. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin (London: Hutchinson 1961)
p.409.
58. Horst Boog, The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain in Henry Probert and Sebastian Cox
(eds.), The Battle Rethought (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife 1991) p.19.
59. Karl Lee, The Battle of Britain in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jrgen Rohwer (eds.), Decisive
Battles of World War II: A German View, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (London: Andre
Deutsch 1965) p.76.
60. Corum (note 5) p.258.
61. Lee, The Battle of Britain (note 59) p.76.
62. Murray (note 2) p.10.
63. Boog, The Luftwaffe (note 58) p.19.
64. Ibid. p.20.

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65. Sebastian Cox, A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of
Britain, 1940 in Michael Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank
Cass 1990) p.438.
66. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin (note 57) p.101.
67. Paine, German Military Intelligence (note 15) p.13.
68. Cox , Comparative Analysis (note 65) p.426.
69. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin (note 57) p.101.
70. Ibid.
71. Horst Boog, German Air Intelligence in the Second World War in Handel, Intelligence (note
65) p.352.
72. Wood and Dempster (note 57) p.102.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. p.103.
75. Ibid. pp.1034.
76. Ibid. p.104.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. p.105.
79. Cox (note 65) p.427.
80. Murray (note 65) p.11.
81. Ibid.
82. Cox (note 65) p.437.
83. Murray (note 2) p.16.
84. Price, Myth and Legend (note 13) p.15.
85. Cox (note 65) p.438.
86. Ibid.

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