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ARTICLE
Taylor
Defence
10.180/14702430
1470-2436
Original
4302004
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&
Studies
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Francis
(print)/0000-0000
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FDEF040305.sgm
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and supported him when the Minister for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair,
attempted to have Dowding removed as the head of Fighter Command,
writing:
Personally, I think he is one of the very best men you have got, and I
say this after having been in contact with him for about two years. I
have greatly admired the whole of his work in the Fighter Command,
and especially in resisting..the immense pressure to dissipate the
fighter strength during the great French battle. In fact, he has my full
confidence.3
The most important element of the political / military relationship between
Churchill and Dowding, was that Dowding was left alone to decide how
best to conduct the Battle of Britain.
British airpower doctrine in the interwar period was enshrined in
AP1300 which had been developed from Trenchardian theories of
airpower. It focused mainly on the perceived ability of strategic bombing to
shatter the will of the enemy by concentrating effect on the enemys industrial and economic infrastructure.4 Consequently, the emphasis on aircraft
production favoured the bomber force, since it was accepted that the
bomber would always get through.
However, in the face of the growing strength of the Luftwaffe and with
the recent British development of both radar and capable monoplane fighters, such as the Hurricane and Spitfire, it was realised that some defence
against bomber attack was not only possible, but essential. Therefore, there
was a fundamental shift in the balance of forces and aircraft production in
the late 1930s, which would prove to be decisive in the forthcoming Battle
of Britain. Dowding was instrumental in the development of the worlds
first fully integrated air defence system, which maximised the synergistic
benefits of the detection capabilities of the Chain Home radar network,
ground control procedures and the fighters capabilities. Again these were
capabilities, which the Germans did not appreciate either in their own
terms or in how they might themselves have benefited from this technology. So, if the British strengths were its political and military leadership,
clear purpose and the intelligent use of technological development, what
were the German failings that were to prove so devastating in the Battle of
Britain?
German Political Direction
In the few years prior to World War II, Hitler had made great overtures to
Britain in an effort to ensure that British military power, which the
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391
limited offensive against the Soviet Union, aimed at gaining German dominance of Eastern Europe. However, just as Germany was securing victory
in Western Europe against France, Russia annexed the Baltic States and the
Romanian province of Bessarabia.10 As a result of this, Hitler revised his
plans in the East and sought to deal a decisive blow to the Soviet Union. It
could be argued that Hitlers reaction to the Russian moves into the Baltic
States serves to demonstrate that he had no intention of attacking Britain,
but by coercing Britain with the threat of invasion, was merely attempting
to lull the Soviets into a false sense of security prior to his expanded operations in the East: Operation Barbarossa. However, this argument tends to
ignore the fact that Hitler was still unsure of how to keep Britain out of the
conflict. He appears to have been uncertain about how to bring about either
a military or a political settlement with Britain.11
In the few months leading up to the Battle of Britain, Hitler dithered;
he hoped that the British would return to the conference table but he also
realised that a successful invasion of Britain would be extremely difficult.
Despite the recent conquest of Norway the German Army was not well
suited to amphibious assaults either in terms of training, or in respect of its
equipment.12 There were no dedicated landing craft and the German Navy,
heavily depleted off Norway, had only 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers and
9 destroyers to escort the invasion fleet in the face of 5 battleships, 11 cruisers and 43 destroyers of the Royal Navy, which were positioned at either
end of the English Channel.13 Consequently, both the German Army and
the German Navy were lukewarm about invading Britain.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing the Germans was that Hitler was
both Head of State and head of the armed forces. Through his position in
the Nazi state, the Fhrer could be dictatorial in a way that Churchill never
was. Whereas Churchill was more amenable to the advice of his Chiefs of
Staff, Hitler had surrounded himself with sycophants who would not question his views; there was no balancing force in the German decisionmaking process. Following the successes in Poland, Scandinavia and
France, Hitler was persuaded by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering that
his Luftwaffe could smash the RAF and create the conditions for an
invasion of Britain. The failures in the German political leadership were
therefore twofold. First, Hitler prevaricated and gave no firm strategic leadership; he gave no political end-state to which operational plans could be
directed. Second, Hitler allowed himself to be duped by an over-confident,
sycophantic Goering into believing that the Luftwaffe, acting alone, could
defeat the British.
What this serves to demonstrate is that the leadership in Germany did
not appreciate the limitations of its own armed forces capabilities, or the
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resolve of the British, but more importantly, it did not have a clear aim.
Therefore, the seeds of potential defeat had been sowed. An examination of
German air doctrine, however, should provide an insight into what the
Luftwaffe might have expected to achieve and how it would accomplish its
goals in the Battle of Britain.
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394
D E F E NC E S TUD I E S
C ON TRIBUTIN G T O I T S OWN D EF EA T
395
campaign that the Luftwaffe would be called upon to conduct for the Battle
of Britain. In terms of undermining the will of the enemy, it draws from
Douhetian theory, but develops this notion further by identifying the
enemy military as the key to enemy resolve, again more Clausewitzian in
nature. What it does not reflect is the ability of airpower to conduct operations at all levels simultaneously and does not reflect the ability of airpower
to conduct operations for strategic effect. Where German air doctrine
differed from Douhets theory was that the Germans expected air defence
against their bomber force. It was for this reason that the Messerschmitt 110
escort fighter was developed.
13. Targeting in aerial war must take into account the enemys
centre of gravity. In the framework of operational possibility, the air
force has many missions, and will normally have enough forces to
carry out only some of them. Dividing up the force to carry out many
simultaneous missions is to be avoided, as are constant changes in
targeting. 32
This section of Regulation 16 is especially important. It introduces the
doctrinal concept of the centre of gravity, revealing once more its Clausewitzian pedigree. More importantly for the employment of airpower,
however, it introduces the issues of the competing nature of the many
missions to which airpower can contribute. The principles of economy of
effort, concentration of force and the selection and maintenance of the aim
are plainly articulated; each of these elements are still contained in current
air doctrine. 33
From the confusing political direction discussed earlier, it seems likely
that Hitler had, in fact, identified Russia as the strategic centre of gravity for
his aspirations in Europe and that was where his main focus rested, rather
than against Britain. However, perhaps this is a further indication that
neither Hitler, nor the German armed forces ever really intended to draw
Britain into the war in the first place. It also reinforces the notion that
invading Britain was not a serious proposition. The issue of centre of gravity will be analysed in more detail when discussing German planning.
From paragraphs 10 and 13 of Luftwaffe Regulation 16, it can be surmised
that the Luftwaffes plan to destroy the RAF was rooted in doctrine, and yet
such doctrinal leading of the target set does not sit well with the need to
identify the centre of gravity; theoretically, the strategic centre of gravity
might be attacked without the need to engage enemy air forces.
18. The battle against the enemy air force in enemy territory does
not stop when, during the course of the war, a period of air superiority
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assigned to flak batteries with a total of 7,873 air defence guns.41 However,
what is not generally appreciated is the significant advances in radar
technology that the Germans had achieved prior to World War II.
As early as 1936, the Luftwaffe had tested a prototype radar with a detection range of 80km.42 This was further developed and by 1938, an improved
version was fielded with a detection range of 120km.43 Perhaps what is more
remarkable is the fact that the Germans created a chain of coastal radar
defences in 193739, over the same period as the British deployed the
Chain Home radar system. But what the Luftwaffe had failed to do, was to
integrate this capability into a coherent defensive system which could
increase the effectiveness of the defensive fighters and flak batteries. Most
of the German air defence system was decentralised and based on the
defence of point targets, especially vital industries and military targets.
Some rudimentary steps were made to create a central air defence
command, but the core of the Luftwaffes air defence doctrine remained the
offensive campaign to defeat the enemy air force on the ground.44 Hitler
was confident of achieving a quick victory and never considered the possibility of enemy attacks against targets in Germany. Defence was, therefore,
relegated within the conceptual thinking of the Luftwaffes hierarchy. The
impact of this was that it was unable to appreciate the capability that had
been created by Dowding in Britain: the worlds first fully integrated air
defence system. This fundamental oversight goes some way to explaining
the inadequacies of German intelligence about the British defensive
capabilities, which will be discussed later.
In essence, German airpower doctrine championed by Wever was
sound and consistent with that being developed elsewhere (Britain and the
USA). It contained much which can be identified in current air doctrine
and should have provided a sound basis for the planning of a campaign
against Britain. The key point is that the Luftwaffe did not adhere to its
doctrine. Following Wevers death, the strategic elements of doctrine
appear to have been sidelined, partly due to experience gained in Spain,
which was more tactical in nature, and perhaps due to the exigencies of the
rapid provision of equipment.
Lessons from the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War represented the first opportunity for the newly
formed Luftwaffe to test its equipment and to develop new tactics. As
Corum explains, much of the Luftwaffes success from 19391942, and
some of its failures, can be traced to lessons that were learned, or not
learned, during the Spanish Civil War.45
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In the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, the Germans provided the
Nationalist forces with transport aircraft (Junkers 52) and a small detachment of fighter aircraft (Heinkel 51). Initially, these proved highly effective
and provided air superiority over the Straits of Gibraltar, enabling maritime
resupply of the Nationalist Army. By the summer of 1936, it appeared that
the Nationalist victory would be secured within a few months, and yet the
war continued for a further 21/2 years. The reason for this was that the
Russians, like the Germans and Italians, also sought to exert influence over
the region, and had deployed SB-2 bomber aircraft, I-15 and I-16 fighter
aircraft in support of the Republican Army, each of which was superior in
capability to the He-51. The Republicans wrested air superiority from the
Nationalist forces but ultimately a stalemate situation developed. The
German force in Spain, the Condor Legion, was gradually re-equipped
with a variety of more modern aircraft including the Heinkel 111 bomber
and the Messerschmitt 109 fighter.46
Besides the testing and development of new aircraft, the Condor Legion
developed new fighter tactics. Initially, the fighter tactics used reflected the
tactics of World War 1; the vic formation of three aircraft. Hauptman
Werner Moelders is acknowledged as being instrumental in the development of the Rotte (two aircraft formation) and the Schwarm (two Rotte
formations spread out in a finger-four formation).47 These tactics proved to
be highly flexible and enabled each pilot in the formation a greater degree
of freedom to scan the sky for enemy aircraft. In 1938 Moelders wrote a
tactics manual, which was adopted throughout the Luftwaffe.48 It was these
tactics which the Luftwaffe would use successfully in the Battle of Britain
against the RAF, which was still reliant on the rigid vic formation.
But Luftwaffe tactical developments were not confined to fighter tactics.
It became apparent that more aircraft were being lost in flying accidents
than in combat. Consequently, an intensive instrument and night flying
training programme was adopted which was superior to any training in
other air forces.49 This was facilitated partly by the German aircraft engineering industry, which had made great efforts to develop blind flying
instruments and a moderately sophisticated landing aid. Moreover, the
Luftwaffe developed the worlds first blind bombing navigation system codenamed Knickebein (dog leg) - in which radio pulses would guide
[an aircraft] to its target.50 For many pilots of the Luftwaffe, perhaps the
greatest tactical lesson to emerge from the Spanish Civil War was purely
that of operational experience, something which RAF pilots would lack at
the outset of World War II.
But what is the significance of these tactical lessons? The flexibility of
the loose Rotte formation enabled each fighter to bring its weapons to bear
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rather than two aircraft merely having to follow their leader. In essence this
would, initially, multiply the relative effectiveness of German fighters
compared to the RAF.
The bombers of the Condor Legion conducted interdiction sorties
against ports, railways, industrial complexes and airfields. However, the
Luftwaffes experience of Republican attacks against its airfields was that
limited damage was caused while the flak defences proved their effectiveness by shooting down 59 Republican aircraft.51 This calls into question the
wisdom of the Luftwaffes plans in the Battle of Britain for attacking the
RAFs airfields.
The nature of the Spanish Civil War dictated that the main effort was
the ground offensive and it was in support of this that the Luftwaffe developed its close air support (CAS) tactics. The key problem which the
Germans had to overcome, was that of communication between the land
forces and the supporting aircraft. Initially, ground signals were used, but
eventually a system was devised whereby a commander placed in a forward
observation position with a landline to the German airfield would then
relay messages to the aircraft via radio. This was a clumsy but effective
method of coordinating CAS and was only superseded when more reliable
radio communications could be established with the ground forces.52 This
was perhaps the first use of the forward air controller that would be recognised by modern air forces. The successful development of this system was
a major contributing factor to the development of Blitzkriegand goes some
way to explaining why some commentators have suggested that the
Luftwaffe was a tactical air force.
However, it is incorrect to assume that the Luftwaffe had ignored strategic bombing during the Spanish Civil War.53 On the contrary, the Luftwaffe
had learned some important lessons regarding the bombing of strategic
industrial targets and enemy cities. The nationalist leader, General Franco,
perhaps influenced by his Italian allys Douhetian doctrine, decided to use
bombers to demoralise the civilian population of Madrid and to break the
stalemate which had developed. The bombing of Madrid in November
1936 resulted in relatively light civilian casualties and did not break civilian
morale, but the appearance of new Russian fighters necessitated the escorting of the bomber force by large numbers of fighters, a lesson not wasted
on the Luftwaffe.54
As we have seen, during the interwar period, the German military developed doctrine for the strategic use of airpower. But more importantly, the
first tentative steps were made to put into effect that doctrine through technical developments in navigation and instrument flying. Although the Luftwaffe was aware of the need for strategic bombing, it was not able to deliver
C ONTRIBUTIN G T O I T S OWN D EF EA T
401
the equipment it needed in time the Heinkel 177 heavy bomber was a
technological disaster and was cancelled in favour of more readily available
medium bombers such as the He-111.55 As Bewley points out, the Luftwaffe, as developed by Goering in 1939, was the perfect instrument for
Blitzkrieg; for a longer campaign, however, it was not sufficient. 56 This
tends to support the assertion that the Luftwaffe was in essence a tactical air
force equipped largely for cooperation with the army and which, during the
Battle of Britain, was forced to fight a strategic air campaign for which it was
ill-prepared.57 Despite this, however, having gained valuable operational
experience and an insight into the ineffectiveness of terror bombing and
airfield attacks, the Luftwaffe should have been able to employ its doctrine
to produce a competent plan for the campaign against Britain.
German Planning
Planning must start with a clear aim, which articulates a well-defined endstate. The change from appeasement under Chamberlain to stout resolve
under Churchill indicates that the true strategic centre of gravity was the
British political leadership. The Luftwaffes plans focused on the ports and
supply lines implying that a long drawn-out conflict with Britain was
expected in which the strangulation of supplies would have an effect upon
the morale and warfighting capability of Britain. However, this does not sit
well with the Germans expectation of a quick, decisive battle to prepare for
the invasion of Britain. Significantly, there was no political direction giving
a strategic end-state which was to be achieved, so the identification of the
operational centre of gravity (the focus of military action) and its associated
critical vulnerabilities were not clearly recognised.
It is contended that the operational centre of gravity (the one thing that
had to be destroyed to enable a successful German invasion of Britain) was
the Royal Navys forces protecting the English Channel because they were
vastly superior to the German Navy and could prevent the German invasion. Fighter Command would have had to be defeated first to enable the
destruction of the Royal Navys assets from the air, and air superiority
would have been needed over the beach-head following the invasion.
Consequently, Fighter Command was a decisive point on the road to
defeating the operational centre of gravity; it was not an end in itself. The
formal planning process (now known as the Estimate) was not adequately
followed by Luftwaffe planners. Such a lack of adequate analysis can lead to
only one thing: a flawed plan.
From the analysis of the political direction to the Luftwaffe, it was identified that there was no clear political end-state with respect to Britain and
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D E F E NC E S TUD I E S
that this was compounded by an unwillingness among the military leadership to question the plans developed by Hitler. Moreover, Goering, buoyed
by his Luftwaffes recent successes in Poland, Scandinavia and France,
convinced Hitler that Britain could be defeated by the use of airpower
alone. The lack of clear political guidance resulted in a plan described by
Boog as being improvised strategically and tactically against an air defence
system that had been strengthened and refined over the proceeding 4
years.58
Despite the worsening relations between Britain and Germany in the
mid to late 1930s, it was not until 1938 that initial contingency planning was
conducted to investigate the feasibility of preventing Britain from intervening in a conflict in Western Europe. In autumn 1938, Luftwaffe Group
Command two produced a report which concluded that any air war with
Britain would be of nuisance value only and under no circumstances exercise any decisive effect on the course of a war.59 It was noted that only after
the introduction of a long-range heavy bomber, the He-177, could a
campaign against British industry be effective.60 However, this aircraft was
not due to enter service until 1942 and was ultimately cancelled anyway.
This lack of long-range capability would force the Luftwaffe planners to
constrain their activities to the south-eastern part of Britain, unless airfields
could be secured in Belgium and Holland. At first glance this might appear
to provide a reason for the invasion of these countries, however it belies the
fact that the greatest perceived threat to Germany in the West was from
France. That the Low Countries were invaded was as a consequence of the
plan to defeat France rather than any wish to provide airfields for the attack
on Britain.
Further evaluation by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff declared that there
was no possibility of success by attacking the British war economy;
although Britain relied on imports, the Western ports were beyond the
range of the Luftwaffes bombers. Perhaps more importantly, it was identified that because of the increasing strength of the air defences, no decision
could be hoped for by terror attacks on London. On the contrary, such
attacks [are] more likely to produce the opposite effect and undesirably
strengthen the national will to resist.61 Clearly, the lessons of Spain were
appreciated at the lower command levels, but, in keeping with its flawed
character, the Higher Command did not apprise the political hierarchy of
this issue. It was decided, therefore, that the British aircraft industry, ports
and harbour facilities would offer the best targets for attack, but with little
thought for the desired operational end-state.
Having received little guidance from the political leadership, the
Luftwaffe commanders might reasonably have expected some guidance
C ONTRIBUTIN G T O I T S OWN D EF EA T
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404
D E F E NC E S TUD I E S
only came together at the highest level (Hitler) because none of the many
German intelligence agencies was prepared to share information, and thus
power, with their internal competitors. Consequently, the Germans had no
organisational equivalent to the British Joint Intelligence Committee
which could coordinate intelligence efforts.68
Two intelligence organisations were superior to the Luftwaffe intelligence department: the Abwehr, commanded by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris
and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) under Heinrich Himmler.69 Both these agencies provided intelligence information for the armed forces. The Abwehr was
staffed by officers with little technical ability and the SD was preoccupied
with German internal affairs, often investigating the other German intelligence agencies. It is within this context that the Luftwaffe established its own
intelligence cell within the General Staff Headquarters, commanded by
Major Josef Beppo Schmid who had been recommended to Goering by
Jeschonnek.70 Schmid was shrewd, calculating and ambitious, but was more
interested in his own position than in the provision of useful intelligence.71
Although Schmid established some order of activities in the Luftwaffe
intelligence cell, he replaced those staff he considered a threat to his
personal progression with personnel of his own choosing individuals who
would not challenge his position.72 Consequently, the competency of
Schmids team was generally fairly poor. This would have far-reaching
implications for the provision of intelligence prior to and during the Battle
of Britain.
Schmid saw an opportunity to enhance his own standing by manoeuvring such that all sources from which air information was obtained
should come under his command, although he was never fully successful
in this ambition.73 It is indicative of Schmids sponsorship by Goering that
by 1939, his standing within the General Staff had risen such that he was
chairing intelligence meetings attended by Hans Jeschonnek, Field Marshal
Erhard Milch, the Secretary of State for Aviation and Ernst Udet, the Chief
of Luftwaffe Supply and Procurement.
Perhaps Schmids most enduring contribution to the Luftwaffes planning process for the invasion of Britain was the study he and his staff
produced of Britain, known as Study Blue. This study was based on a book
about British industry, which had been ordered directly from a London
bookshop, and on press cuttings from British newsarticles. However, this
information was supplemented by reconnaissance photographs collected
clandestinely from a modified civilian He-111C operated from Berlin on
route-proving flights.74
It was Schmids major failing that he underestimated the potential and
efficiency of the RAF, perhaps as a sop to Goering whom Schmid would
C ONTRIBUTIN G T O I T S OWN D EF EA T
405
not want to upset for fear of alienating his mentor. In his study of foreign
air forces, Schmid concluded that:
the English and French air fleets are still out of date. British air defence
is still weak..England will not be able to avoid a conflict with the
German Luftwaffe. German aircraft are superior in view of their
advantage in armament, armoured fuel tanks and flying instruments.
In Germany alone has an overall view been taken of air warfar.75
Schmid further calculated that the strength of RAF Fighter Command was
a mere 200 frontline nt fighters and that Bomber Command could muster
500 frontline bombers. His estimation of bomber numbers was not far
from the mark, there were in fact 536, the estimate of fighters was
woefully wide of the mark, there being 608.76 Clearly, the RAF was a more
capable and better-equipped opponent than German intelligence had
realised. It is within this context that Schmid issued his Proposal for the
Conduct of Air Warfare against Britain. Within the modern context, one
might say that this represented an intelligence-led Campaign Estimate
process. However, with the inaccuracy of the intelligence data on RAF
fighter numbers and capabilities, the plan was likely to be suspect. Schmid
wrote:
From Germanys point of view, Britain is the most dangerous of all
possible enemies. The war cannot be ended in a manner favourable to
us as long as Britain has not been mastered. France, on the other
hand, ranks in the second class for unlike Britain she would not be
capable of carrying on a war without her allies. Germanys war aim
must therefore be to strike at Britain with all available weapons,
particularly those of the navy and air force Furthermore, economic
assistance from the British and French colonial empires and from
neutrals, particularly the USA, and the encirclement of Germany,
must not be permitted to come fully into operation.77
The theme of his plan was the strangulation of Britains supply lines and
harbour facilities. Having assessed that Britains centre of gravity was its
reliance on imported food, fuel and raw materials, he advocated the simultaneous attack of ports, warships under construction/repair and secondary
ports as a lower priority. Significantly, Schmid noted the proximity of residential buildings to the ports, especially of London, asserting that this was
no reason not to attack these targets.78 This gives an insight into the targeting strategy that would eventually lead to the attack of London itself and
tends to question the notion of the German bombing of London being in
retaliation for British bombing of Berlin.
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408
D E F E NC E S TUD I E S
confused and incoherent. There was neither a clear political end-state with
respect to Britain nor coherent military tasks on which to make equipment
decisions or upon which to build a campaign plan. The German political
leadership did not know their enemy, nor did they have a clear idea of their
own intentions.
Yet, doctrinal development was sound and was in line with that being
developed in other nations although it included an element of tactical army
cooperation, which was certainly different from British doctrine of the
time. Following its experience in Spain, the Luftwaffe realised that terror
bombing and attacking airfields were not effective and yet, under the direction of Hitler and Goering, these tactics were still employed in the Battle of
Britain. Moreover, the tactical lessons of army cooperation learned by the
Luftwaffe in Spain tended to overshadow the further development of strategic airpower doctrine, which had been championed by Wever until his
death. The emphasis in German air doctrine on offensive action would
contribute to the Germans failing to develop their own integrated air
defence system and to not appreciating the significance of that developed by
Dowding in Britain. Again, they did not know their enemy. The German
Army and Navy had never realistically been in a position to conduct an
invasion of Britain. The German chances of a successful invasion were
summarised by the German Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann as follows: Had
the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF I am sure Hitler would have given the
order for the invasion to be launched - and the invasion would, in all probability, have been smashed.84
Goering was over-confident due to the successes in Poland, Scandinavia
and France and yet his ability as a commander was undoubtedly poor, his
having little understanding of the use of modern airpower. Moreover, the
German High Command organisation was predisposed to supporting the
decisions from Hitler and Goering, rather than taking its own decisions.
Therefore, planning was given no direction and, having failed to identify
the Royal Navys forces in the English Channel as the operational centre of
gravity, disparate and incoherent planning was conducted by several
Luftwaffe formations, with no clear aim.
The failings of the German intelligence system both mirrored and
contributed to a fatal over-confidence throughout the German High
Command. Given the National Socialist nature of the Luftwaffe and its
sycophantic leadership, it is unsurprising that Hitlers own opinion that
Britain was weak and would capitulate in the face of an invasion, would
influence Luftwaffe planning for the Battle of Britain. Whereas the delay
between the fall of France and the Battle of Britain was partly due to poor
weather, Cox sums up the situation well: the Luftwaffes planners seem to
C ONTRIBUTIN G T O I T S OWN D EF EA T
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20. Luftwaffe Regulation 16 in James Corum and Richard Muller, The Luftwaffes Way of War:
German Air Force Doctrine 19111945 (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing
1998) p.119 [hereafter LR16CM].
21. James Corum, The Luftwaffe and Lessons Learned in the Spanish Civil War in Sebastian
Cox and Peter Gray (eds.) Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo
(London: Frank Cass 2002) p.80.
22. Ibid.
23. Murray (note 2) p.10.
24. LR16CM (note 20) p.120.
25. Richard Overy, Goering (1984; London: Phoenix Press 2000) p.164.
26. Ibid. p.165.
27. Richard Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the German Air Force (New York: Arno
Press 1969) p.137.
28. Corum (note 5) p.27.
29. LR16CM (note 20) p.20.
30. Ibid.
31. Corum (note 5) p.25.
32. LR16CM (note 20) p.121.
33. British Air Power Doctrine AP 3000, 3rd edn. (Directorate of the Air Staff, MoD 1999)
p.1-2-9.
34. LR16CM (note 20) p.122.
35. LR16CM (note 20) p.124.
36. Murray (note 2) p.17.
37. LR16CM (note 20) p.125.
38. Ibid. p.141.
39. LR16CM (note 20) p.142.
40. Corum (note 5) p.240.
41. Ibid.
42. Corum (note 5) p.242.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid p.243.
45. Corum, Luftwaffe and Lessons Learned (note 21) p.66.
46. Ibid. p.68.
47. Ibid. p.70.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. p.71.
50. Murray (note 2) p.11.
51. Corum (note 21) p.73.
52. Ibid.
53. S. Mitcham, Men of the Luftwaffe (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1988) p.51.
54. Corum (note 21) p.79.
55. Murray (note 2) p.11.
56. Charles Bewley, Hermann Goering and the Third Reich (USA: Devin-Adair 1962) p.305.
57. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin (London: Hutchinson 1961)
p.409.
58. Horst Boog, The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain in Henry Probert and Sebastian Cox
(eds.), The Battle Rethought (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife 1991) p.19.
59. Karl Lee, The Battle of Britain in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jrgen Rohwer (eds.), Decisive
Battles of World War II: A German View, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (London: Andre
Deutsch 1965) p.76.
60. Corum (note 5) p.258.
61. Lee, The Battle of Britain (note 59) p.76.
62. Murray (note 2) p.10.
63. Boog, The Luftwaffe (note 58) p.19.
64. Ibid. p.20.
C ONTRIBUTIN G T O I T S OWN D EF EA T
411
65. Sebastian Cox, A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of
Britain, 1940 in Michael Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank
Cass 1990) p.438.
66. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin (note 57) p.101.
67. Paine, German Military Intelligence (note 15) p.13.
68. Cox , Comparative Analysis (note 65) p.426.
69. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin (note 57) p.101.
70. Ibid.
71. Horst Boog, German Air Intelligence in the Second World War in Handel, Intelligence (note
65) p.352.
72. Wood and Dempster (note 57) p.102.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. p.103.
75. Ibid. pp.1034.
76. Ibid. p.104.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. p.105.
79. Cox (note 65) p.427.
80. Murray (note 65) p.11.
81. Ibid.
82. Cox (note 65) p.437.
83. Murray (note 2) p.16.
84. Price, Myth and Legend (note 13) p.15.
85. Cox (note 65) p.438.
86. Ibid.