Accordion Effect

What Is the Accordion Effect?
Author(s): Michael E. Bratman

Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 10, No. 1/2 (Jan., 2006), pp. 5-19
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115848 .
Accessed: 22/12/2013 08:40
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Ethics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
MICHAEL
WHAT
IS THE ACCORDION
13 September 2004; accepted
(Received
In "Action
ABSTRACT.
and Responsibility,"
idea
of
this
in his "Causing
critique,
L. A. Hart
and A. M. Honor?
is of
his
principle."
to be, on
Donald
KEY
In this essay
WORDS:
on
and
his
transitivity
Joel Feinberg
accordion
important
H.
of a much
view of
discussed
Actions,"
Voluntary
that Feinberg
labels
the "voluntary
intervention
on what
the accordion
is supposed
effect
by Feinberg
of this
idea
understanding
between
discussion
Feinberg's
the voluntary
intervention
principle.
of
and
intervention
influential
essay, "Action
a
to
natural
idea, one
there
1
in his
critique,
view of H.
labels
Joel
pp.
1970),
Doing
Prior
in G. E. M. Anscombe,
Donald
pp.
"Causing
L. A. Hart
the "voluntary
Feinberg,
119-151.
Davidson,
3-19. A focus
Essays
of this
of
ac
the
to which
he gave
Feinberg
pointed
"the accordion
discussion
effect."1 Feinberg's
interest on its own; but it is also of interest because
discussed
that
of
principle
label
his
and
John Atwell,
Donald
effect,
agency,
action,
causation,
L. A. Hart,
A. M. Honor?,
Keith
Lehrer,
responsibility,
voluntary
Joel
with
to an im
pointed
Feinberg's
interaction
the
critique
Joel Feinberg,
of causation,
Davidson,
In an
I reflect
between
differences
Davidson,
effect
and
cordion
13 September 2004)
he gave
the label "the accordion
effect."
discussion
Feinberg's
on its own, but it is also of interest
interest
because
of its interaction
with
H.
EFFECT?
to which
idea
portant
E. BRATMAN
intervention
on Actions
earlier
literature
was
its interaction
of a much
Princeton
ideas were
(Oxford: Blackwell
and Events
of
principle."2
and Deserving
(Princeton:
to Feinberg's
related
essay
Intention
this
Actions,"
Honor?
Voluntary
and A. M.
idea
the
of
is of
that Feinberg
In the present
Press,
University
famously
Publishers,
discussed
1959), and in
Clarendon
Press,
(Oxford:
1980),
on metaphysical
issues
of the indi
concerns.
to Feinberg's
viduation
of action,
that are not central
issues
2
Joel Feinberg,
and Deserving,
H. L.
where
discusses
152-186,
pp.
Doing
Feinberg
A. Hart
and A. M. Honor?,
in the Law
Causation
Clarendon
Press,
(Oxford:
1959).
The
intervention
is characterized
of a
voluntary
by Feinberg
principle
by way
from Hart
act or omission
and Honor?:
"the free,
deliberate
and informed
quotation
to produce
intended
the consequence
is in fact
which
of a human
being,
produced,
negatives
causal
connection"
(quoted
The Journal of Ethics (2006) 10: 5-19

DOI
in Feinberg,
Doing
and
Deserving,
? Springer 2006
10.1007/sl0892-005-4589-3

p.
153).
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
6
I want
essay
on what
to reflect
effect
the accordion
is supposed
by
discussion
to be, and on the interaction

between
Feinberg's
Feinberg
of the voluntary
effect and his critique
of the accordion
of Donald
This will also lead to a discussion
principle.
of and use of what he
understanding
to shed some
I hope
in these ways
human
are
that
agency
at
Davidson's
to be the accordion
takes
light
intersection
the
intervention
on
a web
of
about
two wonderful
these
of
effect.
issues
essays by Feinberg.
In "Action
is responsible
that:
"Smith
saying
notes
that sometimes
in
Feinberg
that
Xis
for X, we can mean
simply
Smith did or, in equivalent
the result of what
terms, that Smith did
and thereby caused X (the door's
(say, turned the knob)
something
to
that "Smith
did
calls
such a claim
Feinberg
opening)
happen."3
...
... and
an
to
ascription
happen"
of
thereby caused X
something
to Smith. Feinberg
then later goes on to note
causal
responsibility
to
of causal responsibility
that: "we can usually
replace any ascription
or
an
And
he
calls
this
of
agency
by
ascription
authorship."4
of causal
of an ascription
responsibility
by an
replacement
a person
form of
or authorship
"the accordion
this idea as follows:
ascription
of agency
goes on to formulate
We
can,
and more
if we
stead
caused X
thereby
of "Peter
opened
of
Ascriptions
causal
of
ascriptions
our
not
than
of
conception
language
obliges
an
to
action
one
include
He
of
its effects,
a relatively
us by providing
then
complex
Instead of saying that Peter did A (a relatively simple act)
word for the purpose.

and
our
inflate
wish,
often
effect."
in Y, we might
say something
to be
Paul
the door
causing
causal
then,
responsibility,
are
the form
of
startled,"
often
"Peter
"Peter
precisely
X-ed
startled
equivalent
Y";
in
Paul."
to
...
agency.5
as a matter
on whether,
of
an
us"
and
has
fact,
appropriate
language
"obliges
contingent
in the preceding
"startle"? The first sentence
for example,
causal verb
it is common.
may
suggest that this is not necessary,
though
quotation
Does
the
accordion
effect
depend
our
The details of this principle change a bit in the Second Edition of Causation in the
Law (1985) at p. 136 (and see note 23). These changes do not touch my present
however.
discussion,
respond
to Feinberg's
And
in this
earlier
Second
challenge.
Edition
That
Hart
said,
when
and Honor?
I refer
do
Law I will refer to the Second Edition.

3
4
5
Feinberg,
Doing
and Deserving,
and Deserving,
Feinberg,
Doing
and Deserving,
Feinberg,
Doing
130.
p.
p.
134.
p.
134.
not
to Causation

explicitly
in the
WHAT IS THE ACCORDION EFFECT?
the underlying
in contrast,
formulates
second sentence,
principle
a
Which
in a way that assumes
is
verb.
is it?
there
such
a case Feinberg
see the point
in his
discusses
consider
To
at
Actions:"
the
end
of
Voluntary
"Causing
"Rejoinder"
The
two young boys teasing a small child by causing him to giggle
I recently observed
uncontrollably.
ter quit or we'll
be
used
not
carry
one
Finally,
with
interchangeably
such a word
to the other
turned
to death."
him
laugh
in stock,
The
"causing
there being
and
"We'd
bet
(improperly):
a transitive
that could
verb
said
wanted
boy
another
but our
laugh";
demand
for it.6
to
little
language
does
that the agent of the teasing seems to be a

is
focus is on individual
agents. What
Feinberg's
joint
to
the
relevant
here
is
that
does,
agent
Feinberg,
according
important
no
to laugh; but there is in English
the act of causing another
perform
to
in
to
the
causal
that
verb
way
laugh"
"causing
corresponds
specific
to "causing
to be startled."
that "startle"
corresponds
Iwill
put aside here

agent, whereas
the point
effect
effect or not? If the accordion
- one
a
causal
verb
in
is
fact
relevant,
specific
requires
effect (at
to "startle"
then this is not a case of the accordion
analogous
does grant that the generic
But in this case Feinberg
least in English).
Is this a case of the accordion
that
causal
Using
there
the laughter.
the agent causes
apply:
a
we
from
transition
natural
do have
this generic
causal verb
that causes X" to saying "agent causes
"agent does something
verb
"causing
saying
X." Is this transition
X"
does
an instance
one
who
Well,
philosopher
who
is Davidson,
from Feinberg
as
a mark
the accordion
effect
of the accordion
has made
or not?
effect
use
substantial
of
this
the idea that "we may
explores
of agency."7
idea
take
to
What,
according
it require
that a specific
effect? Does
is the accordion
Davidson,
the inference
from
to the case, or is it only about
causal verb apply
to the claim that that
action causes an upshot
the fact that a person's
is: the latter. On Davidson's
that upshot? The answer
caused
person
"an
the
accordion
effect
of
formulation
agent causes what his actions
case
is seen by
the agent
in Feinberg's
Since
cause."8
laughter
6
7
Feinberg,
Donald
concerns
uation
Our
is with
of actions
concerns
responsibility,
8
Davidson,
and Deserving,
Doing
Davidson,
the
Essays
connection
p. 184.
on Actions
and
of
the accordion
effect
but these are matters

(see pp. 55-59),
are with
here
the truth
of various
not
with
directly
on Actions
Essays
the underlying
and Events,
p.
of Davidson's
p. 54. One
to issues about
the individ
Events,
we
can
statements
principles
53.
of
to one
put
about
individuation.

side
action
here.
and
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
as causing what his actions

cause - namely,
Feinberg
case is an instance of the accordion
effect as understood
laughter
this
by Davidson,
of a specific causal verb that applies.
from Davidson
that "an agent causes
Let us call this principle
cause" -principle
identifies
this as the
what his actions
Z>, Davidson
even
in the absence
associated
with the accordion
principle
use to which Davidson
wants
to put
note
that, while
- as
and
here,
remarks
Davidson
I have
that do
indeed
Feinberg's
understanding
This is clear when we
seems
-
effect.
I will
return
Here
this principle.
to think he is following
later to the
I want
to
Feinberg
indications
in Feinberg's
this reading
this is not, in the end,
support
of the accordion
effect.
noted
there
are
look at the remarks Feinberg

goes on to make,
to the rule that
about
"exceptions
can
to human
be
translated
into ascriptions
causal ascriptions
agency
I take it, this is the rule associated
of causal agency"9
where,
by
with the accordion
effect. Feinberg
cites two exceptions.
Here
Feinberg
in "Action
as a purely contingent
matter
in the language
that
is the first: "It may happen,

is no single
action
there
to a given
someone."
equivalent
"to laugh
the accordion
effect
causal
But
word
there is no verb
So, for example,
phrase."10
no
to
this is
the rule associated
with
exception
as understood
causal
verb
by Davidson.
in the language
The
has
specific
is couched
in terms
D, since that principle
causes
In
the
for
present case,
example,
"Agent
upshot."
cause laughter,
though we have no specific causal verb
appropriate,
principle
now
Turn
verbs
of
to Feinberg's
second exception.
are available
to tempt
action
substituted
for straightforward
sense. Substitution
commonly
one person,
whether
where
person
remark
though
[A] moved
to move'
of fact, that
is precisely
of an
absence
no impact on
of the generic
the agent does
to apply here.
In these cases
"transitive
be
us, but
they cannot
causal
idioms without
distortion
of
fails in cases of interpersonal
causation
or design,
causes
another
by accident
a
to act."11
A makes
In Feinberg's
that follows,
example
his finger. Feinberg
that causes B to wiggle
says that even
his finger, "we cannot
'A's remark causes B to move
say that
supposes
the finger himself. Here

is an instance,
then, where
'causing
In the case, then, Feinberg
is not the same as 'moving.'"12
that
9
Feinberg,
10
Feinberg,
11
Feinberg,
12
Feinberg,
Doing
Doing
Doing
Doing
and Deserving,
and Deserving,
and Deserving,
and Deserving,
p.
135.
p.
135.
p.
135.
p.
135.


that causes B to move
(i) A does something
and that
his finger;
(ii) A causes B to move
it
is not true that
but, nevertheless,
moves
A
B's
(iii)
finger.
his finger,
The transition from (i) to (ii) is an instance of principle D\ but it is

the failure in the transition to (iii) that is cited as a breakdown in the
it.
is understanding
effect, as Feinberg
I think it is clear,
is not understanding
then, that Feinberg
accordion
effect as the Davidsonian
idea that "an agent causes what
accordion
actions
cause." As Feinberg
understands
it, rather, the
the application
involves
of a specific causal verb. If A
that causes X, but there is no specific causal
verb
causing X, then even though A causes X, the case is an
accordion
the
his
effect
does
something
associated
with
to the
exception
in
contrast
with
And,
by Feinberg.
want
not
to
does
claim
that
the
Z>, Feinberg
principle
the accordion
effect is without
the claim is only
exceptions;
accordion
as understood
effect,
principle
underlying
that some
common
cases.
such principle
and important
captures
is the Feinbergian
here? Well,
it is pretty much
principle
What
what Feinberg
(after flirting with something closer to principle D)
it is: "Instead
of saying that Peter did A (a relatively

says
simple act)
and thereby caused X'm F, we might
of the form Teter
say something
X-Qd F;
to be
instead
of Teter
the door
Paul
causing
opened
startled Paul.'"
startled,' Teter
an agent acts and his act causes some
We can put it this way: When
a
in
is frequently
there
X,
F,
change,
something,
(though not always)
specific, transitive causal verb, Cx, associated
in F, such that it is true that the agent C^-ed
causal
verb
accordion
with
that upshot
causing
F When
there is such a
such that it is true that A C^-ed F, we have an instance of the

an agent will act in ways
effect. But sometimes
that result in
does not oblige with a specific

change X in F, and yet the language
causal verb that applies.
In these latter cases we do not have an instance
of the accordion
understands
it.
effect, as Feinberg
cases in which
F. Principle
Call
this principle
F concerns
"causal
to human agency" are "translated
into ascriptions
of causal
ascriptions
not claim there
agency" by way of a specific causal verb. Principle Fdoes
is always an appropriate
causal verb that applies;
is at
indeed, Feinberg
so.
to
a
not
insist
that
F
this
is
also
involves
pains
Principle
language
relativity
that
is absent
from principle
D.

10
E. BRATMAN
MICHAEL
I do not
claim
is not
principle D
effect.
accordion
Z>, only that

reject principle
with his understanding
of the
that Feinberg
would
associated
the principle
is discussing
Indeed, when Feinberg
on
not
when
he
is
and
agency,
focusing
to
of
causal
agency,
ascriptions
ascriptions
to human
those
principle D for granted:

Smith did" is equivalent
I want
The point
X"13
that "Xis
recall his remark

to "Smith
of what
the result
and thereby caused

sees the accordion
did something...
is that Feinberg
to make
causal ascriptions
from
the transition
to take
he seems
a transition
effect not in terms of principle D but, rather, as involving
in terms of a specific causal verb. We
to an ascription
of causal agency
accordion
effect if we make
do not have an instance of the Feinbergian
causes
an
a transition
to
of "agent
Indeed,
upshot."
ascription
simply
as
causal
that generic
remain with
verb, we remain,
sees
to
human
in
the
domain
of
"causal
it,
agency"
ascriptions
Feinberg
of causal agency."
of "ascriptions
rather than the domain
I do not say this is the most
natural
reading of talk of "ascriptions
seem to me
It does
I find it artificial.
of causal
indeed,
agency"
so
as we
long
13
Feinberg,
X"
Feinberg
who makes
to take
caused
I take it that in saying
"thereby
in his discussion
of the person
Again,
seems
causes
to move
his finger
another
Feinberg
"Dr. Ortho,
Here
is the full passage:
by making
equivalence.
cause Humphrey
the musculature
of the forearm,
about
may
for granted
this
remarks
learned
certain
to wiggle his finger. Even though it would be correct to say that Dr.
thoughtfully
remark
Ortho's
caused
ries"
as
accept
principle
as concerned
with
Z>? On
one
the
a "harm
whether
in the Law,
Causation
Honor?,
see these as two formulations
and
A
On
say
of
fact
to be
"action
has
where
cannot
say
that Dr.
Ortho
and
"attributive
hand,
they characterize
can be attributed
to the defendant's
inqui
action
caused
it" (Hart and
be said to have
properly
seem to
Second
p. 24). And
Edition,
they here
not
it
is
clear.
the same query,
completely
though
of
they move
to the
issue
easily from the issue of identifying

"B has
of whether
caused
the harm
are
not actions.
agents,
in the 1985 Second
added
and Honor?
Hart
in remarks
Edition,
hand,
the conduct
between
indeed be established
relation
of some sort may
or means
But the
of the victim....
and the death
the advice
who
supplies
the other
that
we
1985,
the cause"
ranked
not,"
finger,
can
he
Again, on p. 74 of the Second Edition

an
his
(Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, p. 135).Would Hart and
or whether
its consequence,
to move
Humphrey
moved the finger himself

Honor?
p. 130.
X.
caused
and Deserving,
Doing
is saying
that Smith
a remark
and thereby
"a causal
the person
that what
is here
more
something
had
accomplice
tenuous
either
is not
unearthed
is marked
'caused'
the
by the fact
or
the death
but
type of causal
relationship
not happily
that we would
say that the
to kill"
the prisoner
'caused'
(Second
central
without
the corresponding
pp. 42-43;
passage,
Edition,
in the Law,
at p. 40). Here
of Causation
Edition
they seem
causes.
causes with what
So here
himself
the accomplice
these
they
is in the First
remarks,
to contrast
seem
what
to pull
the conduct
back
from
principle D. In any case, inmy discussion below I consider the possibility that one of the
insights
we
should
glean
from Hart
and Honor?
involves
a challenge

to this principle.

to see "Jones
natural
11
as an ascription
laughter"
verb
in the absence
of a transitive
caused
her
to Jones even
agency
I think, agree. He would,
Davidson
someone."
would,
a transition
as
a
D
that
characterizes
principle
principle
of causal
"to
laugh
see
I think,
from causal
in terms
agency
that even though
in this way
accepts principle D, he does not see this principle
Feinberg
as a principle
to an ascription
of causal agency. This
about a transition
I think
does not see a generic
is because Feinberg
idiosyncratically,
as
causes
in
the domain
of an
of
yet
"agent
upshot"
ascription
in
limitation
talk
this
of
of causal
Or anyway,
agency.
ascription
sense of what
to make
the most
of causal agency
is needed
ascriptions
to human
ascriptions
"agent
of the generic
agency
causes
to ascriptions
But
upshot"
of causal
I think
says.
Feinberg
in
what Feinberg
This also helps us understand
goes on to say when,
notes
Hart
that
and
this paper, he turns to Hart and Honor?.
Feinberg
act 'negatives'
causal connection
Honor?
argue that "a fully voluntary
some
an
This
is the idea
earlier causal factor and
between
upshot."14
labels the "voluntary
in "Causing Voluntary
that Feinberg,
Actions,"
on
in which A's remark
his
intervention
example
Reflecting
principle."
seems to cause B to move
his finger, Feinberg
says that this idea from
Hart
and Honor?
is incorrect
insofar
as it denies
that B's
action
was
I take
it, that A's

and that this is
caused
Indeed, Feinberg
thinks,
by A's remark.15
of B's finger,
(his remark) causes the movement
to Hart and Honor?'s
also says that in the
view. But Feinberg
contrary
on the part of B
act
the
intervention
of
the
voluntary
example
For
him to think this,
the
extension
of
causal
"precludes
agency."16
even though he thinks that, despite
A causes B to
that intervention,
action
move
of causal
his finger, Feinberg must be thinking of the "extension
a
as
verb
in
this
the
causal
that
case,
agency"
requiring
specific
is
Since
this
transitive
verb "to move
supposed
something"
applies.
to be an exception
to the accordion
effect he is, again, understanding
effect in terms of principle F9 and not in terms simply of
the accordion
principle
D.
Again,
"Rejoinder,"
14
15
Feinberg,
Though,
the
closely
"first cause
us understand
in his
Feinberg's
reply
helps
to
to
Keith
Actions,"
Voluntary
"Causing
appended
this
also
and Deserving,
p. 135.
Doing
at this point
what
is challenged
strictly
speaking,
in "Causing
related
idea that,
Actions,"
Voluntary
next
sentence
I note
In my
principle"
(see below).
intervention
voluntary
16
Doing
Feinberg,
principle,
strictly
and Deserving,
p.
in the discussion
labels
Feinberg
to
the challenge
speaking.
135.

is
the
the
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
12
on Feinberg's
original paper.
to the voluntary
intervention
involves
in his original
paper
comments
Lehrer's
counter-examples
sketches
berg
lago
tells a "coldly
One
of the purported
that Fein
principle
someone
husband"
I will
call
his wife's
about
love
jealous
to kill Horner.
thereby to get the husband
hoping
indeed
and kill
does
shoot
the husband
After
due consideration,
even
as
free
and
The husband's
is
Horner.
deliberate,
though,
killing
a
sees it, caused by Iago's action. So this is, Feinberg
alleges,
Feinberg
"lago."17
affair with
Horner,
a principle
the
that precludes
from Hart
and Honor?
a
labels
"the
of fully voluntary
action,
principle
Feinberg
that
since we "might well
first cause principle."18
Further,
judge
was
cause
to
disclosure
of
the
facts
the
of Horner's
death
the
[Iago's]
a
violation
of
this is also, at least potentially,
cuckolded
husband"19
so
Or
intervention
the voluntary
argues.
Feinberg
principle.
of
violation
causation
replies:
foreclose
"it is quite clear that

... and to no
is unconvinced:
Lehrer
"I do
the death
one
to the husband
to be attributed
see how
not
the judgment
that
the
facts
the cause
case
the
of
of Horner's
of Horner
else."20
Feinberg
would
logically
was
death
is
[Iago's]
spilling the beans or that the death is to be attributed jointly to [lago

and
the husband]."21
17
But
is in Feinberg,
Doing
example
counter
of purported
examples.
at p.
177. As
Feinberg
"Rejoinder"
and Deserving,
p.
fifth purported
The
quartet
lines
general
of
qualification
in the Law
to
the
on
goes
Feinberg
Hart
notes,
and
concede
157.
It occurs
counter
in
that
as one
of
is in the
example
two
Honor?
acknowledge
[see Hart
principle
intervention
voluntary
to
and
claims
p. 75]. However,
Feinberg
Edition),
(Second
two categories.
of these
do not fit into either
that his counter-examples
18
this principle
152. Feinberg
describes
and Deserving,
p.
by
Feinberg,
Doing
where
and Honor?
of Hart
from an earlier
essay
they say that "a [free and
quoting
as itself caused"
in
action
is never
human
appears
(this quote
regarded
deliberate]
a
in
the
is
Causation
Hart
and
and
Law,
Honor?,
p.
Deserving,
Doing
152).
Feinberg,
Causation
Honor?,
from
the earlier
in this quotation
than
nuanced
suggested
we need
But
these are not matters
in the Second
42-43
Edition).
19
and
157.
p.
Doing
Deserving,
Feinberg,
20
D.
and D.
in W.
H.
Keith
Lehrer,
"Comments,"
Capit?n
bit more
pp.
and Explanation
Metaphysics
pp.
52-53.
Feinberg
primarily
Let me
note
that one
did not do justice to the point

in attributive
causal
the point,
concedes
Feinberg
even
and Honor?'s
principles
criticisms
in his original
and Honor?
(eds.),
Press,
were
1966),
discussion
interested
statements.
in explanatory
causal
Hart
his counter
examples
challenge
not
that
claims
interpreted
is that
that Hart
statements,
but
Merrill
of Pittsburgh
(Pittsburgh: University
of Lehrer's
essay
(see e.g.,
to discuss
here.
explicitly
as
principles
about
attributive
statements.
causal
21
Feinberg,
tributive
Doing
not
reading,
and Deserving,
a shared
agency
p.
183.
reading
Feinberg
presumably
of "jointly."

intends
a dis

that the death might
"causal
agency,"
supposing
a claim
be attributed
of
he
is only
no
make
13
to lago he is not making

to a "causal
pointing
sense if "lago caused

the
This concession
would
citation."22
death" were a claim of "causal agency." After
all, Feinberg
explicitly
that we might
correctly
judge that "the cause of Horner's
envisages
as we have seen, Feinberg
death was [Iago's] spilling the beans." And,
does
and
accept principle
so in this case
(though not in the same spirit as Davidson),

to "lago
caused
the death."
So
the inference
the
be thinking
that a claim of causal agency
requires
a
in
this
verb
causal
case,
say,
shooting
specific
application
is noting
that he
Horner
And Feinberg
or, perhaps,
killing Horner.
causes
even if
the
death
be
about
the
that
lago
might
right
possibility
must
Feinberg
of
no
does not
lago, after all, certainly
specific causal verb applies.
to say he kills Horner.
shoot Horner,
and many will find it strained
This does not mean
that, indeed, no such specific causal verb does
to Hart
and Honor?,
it only means
that Feinberg's
challenge
apply;
such
of this issue,
is seen by him as independent
if
indeed
there
is no such
also holds
that
though
Feinberg
to the
that applies,
the case
is an exception
causal
verb
specific
and his
reply
to Lehrer,
even
effect.
accordion
us step back a bit. Feinberg's

to the voluntary
main
challenge
If we
intervention
is
of
by way
counter-examples.
principle
purported
I
and
find
that
these
work
them
agree
myself
counter-examples
we
a
must
then
conclude
that sometimes
largely
persuasive
Let
voluntary
It does
intervention
not
voluntary
the casual
follow
intervention
not negative
relevant causal attributions.
that the existence
of a
however,
this,
or help block,
does not in some cases block,
does
from
attribution.
seems unwilling
to say this, however,
himself
since he
Feinberg
offers a substitute
for the voluntary
intervention
"the more
principle:
or not, the less likely
human behavior
is, whether
expectable
voluntary
it is to 'negative causal connection."22.
But we could acknowledge
the
of expectability
without
the voluntariness
of
significance
dismissing
an
as of no
to
at
intervention
all
relevant
causal
significance
attribution.
One way to read Lehrer
is to see him as suggesting
that at
acts
least in some cases along
these lines the fact that the husband
and deliberately
the judgment
that it is the
supports
fully voluntarily
causes
not
and
who
Horner's
death.
After
husband,
all, even
lago,
22
23
Feinberg,
Doing
Feinberg,
Doing
and Deserving,
and Deserving,
p.
184.
p.
166.

MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
14
that we will
grants
Feinberg
to the husband
and
not
sometimes
this causal
make
to
we
And
lago.24
this it can be at least
we
do
that when
suggesting
the fact that the husband's
relevant
acts
can
attribution
see
as
Lehrer
in part because
of
are voluntary
and deliberate
can reason
and the death. We
between
they intervene
Iago's acts
in this way even if we are convinced
that the voluntary
by Feinberg
a voluntary
errors
in
that
such
and
intervention
principle
supposing
the causal attribution.
intervention
deliberate
always blocks
and
Indeed,
Hart
and Honor?
point
to a very
general
for
ground
such
reasoning:
the
of
as distinct
for ourselves
and others
would
of respect
persons
as separate
not
if we could
think of ourselves
if not dissolved,
we make
to share
in the world.
If we had
the authorship
changes
sense
[Our]
weakened,
numerous
with
changes
as they did, we
acted
no longer
think
could
of whom
agents,
not have
been
prior
should
of
as
ourselves
separate
it could
be
said
had
that,
be much
authors
of
such
they
not
we
to bring
about
the change,
in the way we now do.25
authors
able
can agree with Feinberg

that his counter-examples
show that the
errs
in its generality,
while
still
intervention
voluntary
principle
a
in
Hart
and
these
remarks
from
Honor?,
potential
ground
seeing,
We
for
the
idea
the voluntariness
that
to a causal
matter
of an
can
intervention
sometimes
attribution.
of an intervention
Consider,
then, the idea that the voluntariness
can block or help block, not only the applicability
of a specific causal
himself
but also, in some cases, a
verb (which Feinberg
emphasizes),
causes upshot."
As I
of
the
causal attribution
by way
generic "Agent
criticism
with Feinberg's
have said, this is compatible
example-driven
since this criticism
is that this
of the voluntary
intervention
principle,
some
errs
extent
to
is
in
in its generality.
this idea
Indeed,
principle
causal
of the idea that certain
the spirit of Feinberg's
acceptance
are
on
that
violated
causal
verbs
conditions
process
by
impose
can
now
that
this
the
idea
is
sometimes
interventions
just
voluntary
causes upshot."
And
be true even for the generic causal verb "Agent
this
idea
principle
is also
only
accordion
Feinbergian
a specific causal
verb.
24
25
with
compatible
that
says
Doing
Feinberg,
Hart
and Honor?,
there
Feinberg's
principle
are common
cases
characterized
But
since principle
and Deserving,
Causation
p. 184.
in the Law
in terms
D
(Second
of
F,
since
involving
the application
of
and Honor?'s
is, like Hart
Edition),
that
pp.

lxxx-lxxxi.

a purportedly
intervention
voluntary
principle,
may be threatened
by this idea.
Consider
the following
of thoughts:
sequence
(1)
lago
(2) The
performs
(3) B
is a causal
(4) B
causes
performs
Horner's
action
voluntary
consequence
general
it
principle,
A.
action
voluntary
husband
15
B.
of A.
death.
(5) A causes Horner's death, (from (3), (4), and the transitivity of causality)
(6) lago causes Horner's death (from (1), (5), and principle D)
are
that there can

taking (1), (2), and (4) as given. If we suppose
to say that it is the husband,
be cases in which we would want
and not
causes
the death, where
should we
of
stop the chain
lago, who
We
in such
reasoning
cases?
the first cause principle would block (3); but Feinberg has
Well,
us good reason to reject that as a general principle.

we
Granted,
even
cause
to
not
the first
is
in
say that,
try
might
though
principle
true, this causal claim [namely, a version of (3)] fails whenever
general
given
we
cause the
think that the agent of the earlier act does not herself
we
a
later upshot
whenever
version
of
[that is,
reject
(6)]. But this
seems
as
a
to me
to
work
of our
unlikely
general
explanation
cases
to
that the
of voluntary
intervention,
say, in such
unwillingness
the later upshot.
It seems clear to me,
agent of the earlier act causes
not be clear to Hart

it would
and
(though
example,
probably
on
a
to
their
insist
divide
Honor?,
given
tendency
sharp
fairly
reasons and causes)
between
that Iago's remarks cause the husband's
of Horner.
What
remains
unclear
is whether
lago causes
shooting
we should say, instead,
Horner's
that the husband,
death or whether
for
and not lago, causes

the death.
the
is a fairly basic idea, one not
of causation
Again,
transitivity
be given up lightly; so there would
be a high price to pay if we were
try to stop the inference from (3) and (4) to (5). There
if we
pressure,
principle D
Davidson
do
not
want
to end
and not to accept

saw this clearly.
at
up
(6), to
form.
certainly
we
provided
Clifford's
Smith
won't
can
death'.
... could
conclude
go
from
There
be
said
that
'Jones's
is, then,
to qualify
seek
it in its present
In a footnote
he writes:
Suppose Jones intentionally causes Smith intentionally

We
to
to
Jones
shot Clifford
action
of course,
will,
to have
caused
caused
be
Clifford's
a conflict
Clifford's
to shoot Clifford
... Still
death,
if we
[principle
to
death'
deny
and at
that
the

both
same
to death.
is correct
D]
'Jones
caused
Jones
time
and
affirm
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
16
the
denial
We
could
of causality.
transitivity
the circumstances
that under
death
by
that
saying
under
however,
Jones
preserve
could
the circumstances
said
be
the
in the face of a
[principle
D]
to have
caused
Clifford's
transitivity
of
also
causality
breaks
down.26
So Davidson
that
suggests
nevertheless
we
the death,
if we are unwilling
defend
principle
to say that Jones
causes
on
the
up
by giving
move
a
to
and
in
that
the
causation
way
transitivity
blocking
the
of (5). But, as I have
of
version
said, abandoning
transitivity
is a high price to pay. So perhaps we should
seek a more
causation
to emphasize
D. And
the point
is that
version
of principle
qualified
of
we
could
do
this while
of
the
to these
be reason
upshot"
human
example-based
principle
of Feinberg
in the end,
do not,
require
not
to.
that Feinberg
does not consider
this possibility
because
causes
act causes upshot"
to "Agent
the move
from "Agent's
as remaining
to
within
the domain
of causal
ascription
It may
he sees
two papers
Feinberg's
and Feinberg's
principle,
F. The claims
that are most
to defend principle D in its full generality, and there may
Feinberg
well
both
intervention
voluntary
the accordion
effect,
rejection
of
version
central
onto
holding
be
to an ascription
rather than as a transition
of causal
agency,
to my mind,
feature
of
agency. This is the
idiosyncratic
Feinberg's
if we
earlier. But
take seriously
the
discussion
that I highlighted
is to ascribe causal
natural
idea that to say that lago caused
the death
does
seem, as it apparently
from the accordion
effect); and
to lago,
then principle D will
agency
to Feinberg,
trivial (though
different
from Hart
considerations
D
even
not
and Honor?
while
lead us
may
with
to seek
that
to qualify
the voluntary
Feinberg
agreeing
in its claims.
is overly general
principle
has also challenged
what
I am calling principle
John Atwell
D?1
sees that this principle
Atwell
is not the same as Feinberg's
accordion
a different
treatment
I have offered
of that accordion
effect (though
principle
intervention
effect than does Atwell).28 What

"sub-thesis,"
Feinberg's
26
27
Davidson,
28
As
I see
ficient
account
effect.
This
on Actions
Essays
John E. Atwell,
(1969), pp. 337-342.
and he argues
and Events,
"The Accordion
I call principle D Atwell

against
pp.
it by way
calls
of an example:
53-54n.
Effect Thesis," The Philosophical Quarterly
it, Atwell's
of Feinberg's
criticisms
accordion
effect
remarks
of Feinberg's
about
the exceptions
explicit
is a separate
from Atwell's
discussion
matter,
though,
called principle D.

19
do
not
to
the accordion
of what
take
suf
I have

"Brown
17
was
that
and had been for years. During
paralyzed,
partially
Mrs.
Brown
for
him.
with
cared
One
long trying period
faithfully
day,
a faint smile of
all the strength
he could muster,
Brown managed
was
so
have
Brown
it, Mrs.
but, as the fates would
gratitude;
and died."29
joy that she suffered a heart attack
to principle
Since the smiling caused
the death it follows,
Z),
according
that Mr.
caused Mrs.
death.
But to say this, says
Brown
Brown's
at
"a minimal
is to make
that Brown
is somehow
Atwell,
suggestion
overwhelmed
fault."30
with
is in no way
So we
Brown
Since
that Brown
the death.
caused
at fault, we should balk at saying

should not accept the "sub-thesis"
(that is, principle D).

While
whether
Atwell
credit for explicitly

the question
of
raising
counter
is true, I do not find his purported
I think we are used to saying "You caused
this
deserves
the "sub-thesis"
example
convincing.
very bad thing, but through no fault of your own, and this does not
mean
or at fault." This
can be the stuff of
you are a bad person
but tragedies happen.
tragedies;
I see it, it is when another

between
intervenes
agent voluntarily
and the upshot
that we sometimes
have the potential
for a
D
to say that the
violation
of principle
which
is not, of course,
to the
intervention
blocks
the causal
attribution
voluntary
always
As
the action
can
agent of the earlier action.31 We
Honor?
while
agreeing with Feinberg
errs
in its generality.
principle
These
to put
Davidson
For
considerations
the
wants
effect
to "take
this means
Davidson
that
this
lesson
from Hart
the voluntary
the use
interact with
accordion
learn
to which
and
intervention
Davidson
aims
he
understands
that
it). Recall
(as
as
a
effect
mark
of agency."
the accordion
D is a
that the applicability
of principle
of agency:
those "events
in the life of a person"32
whose
causal
are
so
to
to
the
attributed
and
conform
upshots
agent,
causally
are
of
actions
that
As
Davidson
the
idea
is
person.
says,
principle D,
mark
29
30
Atwell,
Atwell,
31
Atwell's
"The
Accordion
Effect
Thesis,"
"The
Accordion
Effect
Thesis,"
p. 341.
to a consideration
discussion
is
limited
p.
341.
and
"Action
Feinberg's
in
interventions
voluntary
I see it, it is in these
Actions."
As
issues
the impact
of
about
Voluntary
"Causing
to principle
interventions
that we find a more
D. This
voluntary
persuasive
challenge
a deeper
is part of my
of seeking
of the accordion
strategy
general
understanding
effect and related matters
with
interactions
the voluntary
intervention
by exploring
Responsibility."
He
does
not
address
the
discussion
of
of
and with
criticisms
of that principle.
principle
Feinberg's
32
on Actions
and Events,
Davidson,
p. 43.
Essays

MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
18
an event
to
is a case of agency
a
to person."33 Without
asking
this
in the end, we can say that to pursue
this is going to work
whether
or
use
we
not
the
idea
of
action
had
better
idea without
very
circularity
we
to
if
substitute
for
So
tried
relevant
mark
of
in
the
agency
agency.34
that "[I]t is a way of inquiring whether
its effects
ask whether we can attribute
principle D something roughly along the lines of principle

is no
If there
D'.
what
his
actions
relevant
intervention
voluntary
a certain
of
sort,
an
agent
causes
cause,
to appeal to this substitute

not be in a position
the very
mark of agency. This is because
in
the
substitute
the appeal,
built
into
principle,
to avoid
And
it may be that a concern
intervention.
we would
a non-circular
to get
principle
idea of agency
is
to voluntary
such circularity
to defend principle D
inclination
apparent
But ifwe give
in causation.35
for intransitivities
allowing
a
a
use
D
of
this
of
for
mark
substitute
as,
agency, we are
up
principle
support
helped
even if itmeant
Davidson's
33
on Actions
and Events,
p. 54
Essays
no
but yields
is "a mark
effect
of actions
that
the
accordion
does
say
on Actions
he
and Events,
of agency"
p. 60). So perhaps
Essays
(Davidson,
analysis
not for a "mark"
arise only
for an "analysis,"
of circularity
would
say that concerns
seem
to me
that Davidson's
to me
and
it does
this seems
But
of agency.
strained,
34
Davidson,
Davidson
use of the accordion

the very
idea of agency
effect argues
invoking
against
apparent
we understand
that effect.
in terms of which
of the principle
in the content
35
to
here difficult
considered
view
I find Davidson's
because
I only
say "may,"
note. Another
issue is just
in the previous
raised
been
issue has already
One
interpret.
was
concludes
the
to this use of the accordion
effect. He
Davidson
committed
how
section
in which
this paper
of
accordion
effect
is interesting
the way we
he has
focused
it shows
because
on
the accordion
that we
treat
effect
as follows:
"The
of actions
the consequences
events....
But
as a criterion
treat the consequences
of other
from
differently
cases
as satisfactory:
can hardly
for some
it works
be counted
[the accordion
effect]
an
a
as
action
action"
course
no
to
makes
clue
what
it
and
of
primitive
only,
gives
cases Davidson
has
on Actions
and Events,
p. 55). I am unsure which
(Davidson,
Essays
seem that he is here
but it does
for some cases only,"
he says this "works
on
to
of a "primitive"
mention.
The
idea
actions
he
the
goes
"primitive"
thinking
some other action. Apparent
one performs
not by performing
action
is that of an action
has a distinctive
are moving
of course,
one's hand
Davidson,
(and thereby...).
examples
to
but we do not need
and primitive
of actions
view about
the individuation
actions,
in mind
when
of
consider
these matters
the apparent
fact
here. What
that
an agent
is puzzling
causes
what
here,
I think,
her primitive
is why
actions
Davidson
cause
thinks
cannot
why a primitive action is an action (though of course it cannot explain why

primitive). But Iwill not try to sort this out here.

that
explain
it is

not obliged
in this way
as we have seen,
And,
Department
to defend
there may
19
an unqualified
version of principle
be good reason not to.36
D.
of Philosophy
University
Stanford
Stanford, CA 94305
USA
E-mail:
36
bratman@csli.stanford.edu
Thanks
to Scott Shapiro for helpful conversation
and to John Martin Fischer
a Fellow
on an earlier draft. This
I was
for helpful
comments
while
essay was written
at the Center
I am grateful
for Advanced
in Behavioral
Sciences.
for financial
Study
to the
I dedicate
this essay
W. Mellon
Foundation.
support
provided
by the Andrew
memory
of
Joel
Feinberg,
teacher
and
friend.


Accordion Effect

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Accordion Effect

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What Is the Accordion Effect?

Author(s): Michael E. Bratman

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

The Journal of Ethics (2006) 10: 5-19

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

to be, and on the interaction

Instead of saying that Peter did A (a relatively simple act)

word for the purpose.

Law I will refer to the Second Edition.

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

WHAT IS THE ACCORDION EFFECT?

two young boys teasing a small child by causing him to giggle

that the agent of the teasing seems to be a

put aside here

the idea that "we may

but these are matters

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

as causing what his actions

look at the remarks Feinberg

is the first: "It may happen,

the finger himself. Here

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

WHAT IS THE ACCORDION EFFECT?

The transition from (i) to (ii) is an instance of principle D\ but it is

(after flirting with something closer to principle D)

of saying that Peter did A (a relatively

such that it is true that A C^-ed F, we have an instance of the

does not oblige with a specific

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

Z>, only that

principle D for granted:

recall his remark

and thereby caused

easily from the issue of identifying

Again, on p. 74 of the Second Edition

(Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, p. 135).Would Hart and

moved the finger himself

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

WHAT IS THE ACCORDION EFFECT?

it, that A's

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

"it is quite clear that

spilling the beans or that the death is to be attributed jointly to [lago

did not do justice to the point

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

WHAT IS THE ACCORDION EFFECT?

to lago he is not making

sense if "lago caused

(though not in the same spirit as Davidson),

us step back a bit. Feinberg's

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

can agree with Feinberg

is, like Hart

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

WHAT IS THE ACCORDION EFFECT?

that there can

us good reason to reject that as a general principle.

not be clear to Hart

and not lago, causes

and not to accept

Suppose Jones intentionally causes Smith intentionally

This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:40:14 AM

to say that Jones

to defend principle D in its full generality, and there may