Weiqi vs Chess: The thin red line between smart and subtle power

Gian Luca Atzori

Game theory is a tool increasingly popular in psychology, sociology, politic and even in business.
Games are what on which kids, and so human beings, begin to face reality and have a feedback from it.
The art of a game brings a reflection of a particular society, history or culture. The game of chess was born
thousands of years ago in India and has been practiced mainly by intellectuals of the major Indo-European
civilization, which contributed in the development of the actual western culture. On the other hand, in
China, Korea and Japan the ancient game practiced by intellectuals was the game of weiqi. In China, it
was considered a classic art, like calligraphy (shu), painting (hua) and the practice of guqin (). Several
scholars and politicians, such as Henry Kissinger and Scott Boorman, found parallelism between
chess/weiqi and the political culture of Western/Eastern countries. Although no game can explain the
endless twists of international politics, they turn out to be a simplification of reality that can help us to
better understand the evolution of the current geopolitical landscape and the strategy of a rising China.
The game of weiqi (also known as "Go" or "the game of encirclement") has a history of over 4000
years. It is said that the legendary Emperor Yao has invented it before Xia dynasty in order to instruct his
playboy son Danzhu. This game is pure expression of Chinese pragmatism and millions of players now
enjoy it around the world. Kissinger defines it this way:
Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the
Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage. () If
chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign.1
In fact, unlike chess, the aim of the game is not the total victory and the decisive disposal, destruction
or weakening of the opponent. The aim is a protracted construction of an encirclement by the occupation
of much space as possible on the board, through the progressive positioning and opposition of black and
white pawns, which recall the culture of yin and yang. Chess is a destructive and tactical game and its goal
is the total victory on the opponent. Weiqi is instead a constructive game based on pure strategy where
self-improvement come first. In fact, if hard power is the nature of chess, soft power is the nature of wieqi.
However, if today the concept of smart power advocated by previous US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton recall a mix of both soft and hard powers, the strategy of China can be defined as subtle power, a
mix of three minimalist axioms: non-confrontation, non-interference and readiness for paradigm
change.2 The only strategy of chess is to kill the opponents king and there are different techniques to
achieve this goal. The strategies of weiqi are numerous and they are more indirect compared to chess,
avoiding a confrontational opposition. The indirect confrontation is indeed a feature of both Chinese
politics and culture.
In an interview, Dr. David Lai3 said, Weiqi is a living reflection of Chinese culture its strategy,
thought, philosophy and operational tactics. One can almost read The Art of War and then play it on the
board.4 The reference to Sunzis The Art of War is not causal. The famous words of master Sun are still
an inspiration after thousands of years: "to fight and conquer in all battles is not supreme excellence;
supreme excellence consist in breaking the enemys resistance without fighting." 5 These kinds of
paradoxes are recurrent in Chinese philosophy. As for Sunzi it is possible to win a war without fighting,
for Laozi it is possible to govern and live without acting, or teaching without even speaking: The sage
relying on actionless activity (wu wei) carries on wordless teaching." 6 The ability to manage these
1

Henry Kissinger, On China, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 29-31.
David Gosset, Smart, soft and subtle, China Daily, June 1, 2011, p. 46.
3
Dr. David Lai is a Research Professor of Asian Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War
College (USAWC).
4
Micheal Posner, Weiqi: the game that holds Chinas key to world domination, The Globe and Mail, June 10, 2011,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/munk-debates/weiqi-the-game-that-holds-chinas-key-to-worlddomination/article598664/
5
Sun Tzu (trans. by Lionel Giles), The Art of War, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002), p. 48.
6
Arthur Waley, The Way and its power: Lao Tzus Tao Te Ching and its place in Chinese thought, (New York: Grove Press,
1958), p. 143.

Weiqi vs Chess: The thin red li e betwee s art a d subtle power | Gian Luca Atzori

paradoxes requires considerable intellectual and emotional capabilities. In a world of growing

interdependence, this strategy of non-confrontational opposition is crucial. It is no coincidence that China
has achieved such a prestigious position on the global stage without any international military intervention.
For Sunzi military intervention is the last resort, there is no better approach to persuade your enemy than
to be invincible, and falling into direct confrontation and military action is merely a way to reiterate what
politics has failed to show.
There are many real-world applications of these principles from the long Chinese Civil War, to more
delicate and actual events as the Middle Kingdom's policy towards Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Chinese
interests in Afghanistan and Africa, or the recent change of foreign policy acted by the government of Xi
Jinping and Li Keqiang. Those are just a few examples. In 1969, Scott Boorman published his book The
Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy, which analyze
revolutionary strategies of Mao during the Civil war and the War in Vietnam under the lens of weiqi. In
1938, in his important essay Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan, Mao wrote:
Thus, there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by
our own--rather like the game of wei-ch'i. Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the
capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla
base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of "dominating
the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed.7
The Maoist strategy recalls weiqi in several aspects. For instance: the struggle is voluntary protracted
for many years and in the early stages the most valuable areas are the periphery, while chess power derives
from the occupation of the center of the board and seeks a fast victory. The control of the majority of the
territory rather than specific locations determine victory and areas of comparable size/value are
interchangeable. Simultaneous deployments of a larger number of smaller units are more effective than a
smaller number of more powerful units, because in weiqi all pawns have the same value. However, for
Mao, the revolution was most likely turn out to be a very measured combination of chess and weiqi,
because he was aiming to the total victory and destruction of their opponent: Japan and Nationalists.
Today the weiqi strategy is more calculated. The strategy of one nation, two system of Deng about Hong
Kong is a perfect example. China reconquered Hong Kong without even a bullet shot or a direct
confrontation, but with a protracted campaign, ready to make an agreement that last 50 years just to have it
back. Taiwan similarly is a good example. Chinese diplomacy and investments in Australia made
Camberras officials publicly say, though allied to the United States, it would not be an automatic partner
when it came to Taiwan.8 The same could be said about Chinese interests in Africa, Dr. Lai stated that:
You can make an argument that Chinese moves in Africa, South America and Eastern Europe can
eventually come together to promote its grand strategy.9
The war in Afghanistan is an excellent food for thought as well, and seems to recall an old saying in
Chinese bureaucracy: Wars between the barbarians are auspicious for China.10 In fact, while the US
are significantly weakened by the war and are preparing for the withdrawal of troops, China is already
preparing a post-war policy. This is because, for China, Afghanistan is not only an excellent source of
natural and mineral resources and a great hall to ensure its interests in Pakistan while competing against
India, but also a matter of national security, given the possible influence of the Taliban in the already
problematic Muslim Chinese province of Xinjiang.
Finally, the change of foreign policy strategy implemented by the Chinese government is unprecedented in
the history of the People Republic. The taoguangyanghui (Keeping a Low Profile) policy of Deng
Xiaoping has been replaced by the fenfayouwei (Striving for Achievements) policy of Xi Jinping. Yan

Shawn Conners, ed. Collected writings of Chairman Mao: Volume 2 Guerrilla Warfare, (El Paso, TX: EL Paso Norte Press,
2009), p. 175.
8
Posner, Weiqi: the game that holds Chinas key to world domination.
9
Ibid.
10
Kissinger, On China, p. 27.
7

Weiqi vs Chess: The thin red li e betwee s art a d subtle power | Gian Luca Atzori

Xuetong 11 underlines how this policy of openness has reduced ambiguities and puzzlements of other
countries about international relations with China, leading to improved economic and political relations
with the US, the EU and many other countries around the globe. 12 Through this policy, China has
significantly increased its relations with international partners aiming for, as posited by Yan, making
friends rather than only making money.13 This type of policy fully recall a game of weiqi at geopolitical
and global stages. In one of his speech, Xi Jinping said, Surrounding area is strategically extremely
important to our country in terms of geography, natural environment and mutual relations. 14 In this
process of "conquest of space" and "encirclement", huge Chinese SEOs are playing an important role as
well.15
However, despite the success of this strategic policy, there are many doubts about its long-term efficacy,
which derived from the possible side effects that an encirclement based on a non-confrontation and noninterference strategy could cause. Doubts relative, for instance, to the sustainability of the unprofitable
economic growth of SEOs and political challenge of neo-Leninist elitism.16 Other factors can hail from the
increasing threat of fundamentalist terrorism and security issues; the hegemonic confrontation with US and
international obligations; the Chinese relations with unstable governments or dictatorship around the world,
or even the process of liberalization and democratization of which China can be affected. China has
adapted itself to Western contexts more often than the US or EU to Eastern cultures. The Communist party
is the thin red line17 between the two games: if two countries are playing different games, if the whole
world plays the game of chess, could China, when its power will be really at risk, break in and force a new
game and new rules? Will be more convenient for China to adapt itself again and try to win the game by
seeking a checkmate or this time will be the west having to learn new rules?
In 2002, psychological studies (PET and fMRI studies) have been made on the game of chess and weiqi.
In addition to having caught a glimpse of increased brain activity and a natural prevention of Alzheimer
disease in elder weiqi players, 18 seems that when playing weiqi the brain tends to lateralize (even if
modestly) to the right lobe of the brain (the holistic side) while it tends to lateralize to the left brain (the
analytical side) when playing chess.19 A game is more creative and strategic when the other one is more
analytical and tactical. One is constructive and the other one is destructive. For the same theory of yin
yang, seems that chess and weiqi are a perfect example of complementarity of opposites. They turned
out to be both carriers of two different cultures and civilizations between East and West, and both
fundamental in the field of foreign policy. Their meeting seems to be an important opportunity for mutual
improvement. Perhaps it is time that our leaders prepare their game boards and discover the greatness of
both games.
Gian Luca Atzori

2014280091

11

Yan Xuetong is Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of The
Chinese Journal of International Politics (Oxford University Press).
12
Yan Xuetong, From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving For Achievements, The Chinese Journal of International Politics,
Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153-184.
13
Ibid. p. 166.
14
Ibid. p. 167.
15
James McGregor, No ancient wisdom, no followers: the challenge of Chinese authoritarian Capitalism (Westport, CT:
Prospecta Press, 2012), p. 3.
16
Minxin Pei, The dark side of Chinas rise, Foreign Policy, (March-April 2006), pp. 32-40.
17
The thin red line is an epic war film and novel, a fictionalized version of the Battle of Mount Austen in the Pacific Theatre of
WWII between US allies and Japanese Empire. The titles comes from Kiplings poem Tommy (Barrack-Room Ballads) based
on the action of a British soldier during the Battle of Balaklava (Crimean War 1854) called The thin red line from the red
British uniforms and the thinly spread military unit firmly holding against attack. It is now an English figure of speech and a
military metaphor.
18
Joe Varghese et al., Leisure activities and the risk of dementia in the elderly, The New England Journal of Medicine, June 19,
2003, pp. 2508-16.
19
Chen Xiangchuan et al., A functional MRI study of high-level cognition: II. The game of GO, Cognitive Brain Research,
Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 32-37.