Military Review

'1'11<' 1"'qf""sion,tI .Iou,'nal of th .. l'S ,\rmy

.July 19H2

Opl'l'ation ,Jonathan: The Rps('ul' at Entebbc . . . see page 2

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY

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Military
VOLUME LXII

JULY 1982

N07

CONTENTS

PAGE

OPERATION JONATHAN: THE RESCUE AT ENTEBBE

24

SURPRISE AND DECEPTION IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT: PART"

by Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh

36

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE 2D ARMORED DIVISION

by Major General Richard L. Prillaman, US Army

44

THE CAUSES OF WAR

by Captain A. Brent Merrill, US Air Force

53

THE NEW FM 100-5

by Ueutenant Colonel (P) Huba Wass de Czege, US Army, and
Ueutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army

71

LETTERS

77

REVIEWS

81

NEWS

89

BOOKS

the best from other journals

contemporary reading for the professional

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foreign. Address all mail to Military Review. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027. Telephone (913)
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CGSC LBL 5
15 DEC 79

Articles to Watch For:

Soviet Strategic Objectives in the 1980s
Lieutenant Colonel Robert F Collins. US Army

II
Ne Po Shablonu. Soviet Tactical Flexibility
lieutenant Colonel Richard S Kosevlch. US Army

II
The Continuing Evolution of the Soviet Ground Forces
Donald L Madill

.....

--------

Introduction
In the night darkness of 3-4 July 1976, international terrorism was dealt a
severe blow. The occasion was an Israeli force's rescue of more than 100 hostag~s being held in a seldom used airport terminal on the shores of Lake
Victoria at Entebbe, Uganda.
The crisis had begun almost a week earlier on Sunday, 27 June, when Air
France flight 139 en route from Tel Aviv via Athens to Paris was taken over by
skyjackers who identified themselves as members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. The plane was diverted to Libya for refueling and
traveled on to the Entebbe airport.
Once in Uganda, the terrorists demanded the release of 53 other terrorists
being held in Israel, France, Switzerland, Kenya and West Germany. Threats
included killing the passengers and blowing up the Air France plane i( de
mands were not met by the afternoon of Thursday, 1 July. At midweek, 47 of
the hostages were released.
Shortly before the terrorist deadline, the Israeli government expressed its
willingness to negotiate with the skyjackers. The deadline was postponed for
three days, and an additional 101 Air France passengers were released and
permitted to fly to Paris. Remaining were 93 hostages-mostly Israeli or with
Jewish-sounding names-and the 12 airline crew members.
Israeli forces had been placed on alert for possible use shortly after the plane
was hijacked. Preliminary plans for a rescue attempt were drawn up, individuals and units designated for a possible mission and exercises were conducted. As planning progressed, specific missions were assigned. One element
was to assault the old terminal and rescue the hostages. Others were to take
control of the new Entebbe terminal, the refueling area, the control tower,
safeguard the runway and constitute a reserve to be used if the Ugandan army
tried to mtervene.
As the second terrorist deadhne neared, the Israeli government decided that
a rescue must be attempted, even though the odds for success weresmall. The
long distance to be traveled by the rescue force, the situation to be encountered
at Entebbe and the terrorists' reaction to the attempt were only a few of the
uncertainties involved.
The result was a highly successful rescue. A single Israeli soldier was killed
in the action. He was Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan (Yoni) Netanyahu, the
commander of the unit responsible for assaulting the terminal and neutralizing the terrorists.
.
The following interview was conducted by Netanyahu's brother Benjamin,
in August 1976, shortly after the mission. The interview is with Yoni's deputy
commander who will remain unidentified for security reasons. Also, the names
of individuals mentioned, except those of general officers and high civilian
officials, are fictitious for the same reason.
This interview, which describes in detail the planning, preparations, training and the actual rescue from the perspective of one of the participating units,
appeared in Hebrew a year agJ in the Israeli daily Maariv. Its publication lin
Military Review on the sixth anniversary of the rescue marks its first appearance in English. The interview was made available to Military Review by
Professor Benzion Netanyahu, Yoni's father.
.

MILITARY REVIEW
Q. Can you describe preparations for
the raid?
A. Yes. During most of the week following the plane hijacking, we were busy
planning. Since Yoni was engaged during
the early part of the week in another important task, he appointed me as the
unit's representative in the planning
group at operations command.
As early as Sunday (27 June), when the
first news of the hijacking arrived, our
unit was put on alert. That day I happened to be duty officer, and I made sure
that everyone got ready and prepared
their gear. At 8 p.m., I was urgently summoned to an assembly point. We were
briefed there on the possibility that the
plane, then en route to Khartoum, might
change course and land in Lod, repeating
the "Sabena" incident ..
I briefed the men and practiced a few
things. Kuti,2 the chief of operations, and
the minister of defense" were there-the
whole entourage. Yoni was still in the
south.
Q. Was the situation not serious enough
for him to come up?
A. Yoni was busy with something very
important. The chances that the plane
would land at Lod were very slim. As for
the preparations, we did the maximum
we could in the unlikely event that it
would come.

from home (they had been discharged by

then) to bolster the top command. Otherwise, everything was fine.
Q. Did the men who were with you take
part in the mission later on?
A. Some of them. At the time, we were
on a fairly "normal" general alert.
Q. What else did Yoni say to you?

A. He checked off points. He asked

whether the equipment was there,
whether the men were deployed, and so
forth. I remember he said, "Prepare everything you can now, before it is too
late." I do not recall exactly what else he
said, but the principle was that we should
do what we could then so we would not be
pressed for time later on. We got into deployment status-for example, had briefings, prepared our gear, studied the plane
and the equipment, and so on. We then
returned to the unit. I was told to practice
the forces on storming the plane.
Yoni called me again in the morning
(Monday, 28 June) and asked what had
happened during the night. I told him
that we were still on alert, still waiting
for the terrorists, and that the unit was
ready to move. He said he would be there.
We decided then that I would remain at
the base and stay in touch with operations command while he ran the practice
exercises with the troops.

Q. Did you talk to Yoni?

A. We were in contact daily. He was

kept in the picture by operations command. They briefed him nonstop. He got
all the information, and, on the basis of
that information, he gave me instructions.
Later that Sunday, he asked"about the
readiness of the contingency force. I told
him that the officers were there and that I
was considering cal!ing Motti and Avi
4

Initial Plans
Q. Is this what happened?
A. Yes. Yoni came, drilled the forces
and returned to the unit at noon. We met
there. He reviewed once more the forces
and tasks associated with the takeover of
the plane. He changed a few things and
vetoed the participation of one of the

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
squads. He said he needed it for something else. After all, this alert could last a
few days. He made a number of other
change~ in the plan. He made sure that
all the loose ends were tied up. Then, he
went off on another task and left me responsible for those in the unit.

Q. Wha-t happened then?

A. At midnight on Monday (28 June), I
was urgently called to the general staff. A
special team under E. was planning an
operation to free the hostages. The plane
had landed in Uganda. E. called in representatives of all forces-for example, our
unit, air force, intelligence, navy-all
those who needed to be involved in this
type of planning. E. tossed out suggestions. He talked about assaulting from
the water-from Lake Victoria.
Q. Did you try to [orm an zntelhgence
picture?
A. Yes. We were shown photographs of
the Entebbe airport obtained from Solei
Boneh. Our former attache in Uganda
was at the meeting. He had been in Uganda for four years and knew the airport
well. A fellow who had been Idi Amin's
personal pilot was also there, as well as
others (l do not remember all of them L
They wanted to help, and we needed their
aid.
Q. What zdeas were developed?
A. We discussed the possibility of parachuting a force in to Lake Victoria. A
Hercules C130 would fly over and drop
the force and its boats in the middle of the
lake. The force would then make its way
in the boats and come ashore at the point
where the runway is only a few yards
from the water. The force would then raid
the old terminal and rescue the hostages.
There were other plans that were discussed
as well.

1982

Q. Was the plan which was later carried out also discussed at this meeting?
A. Yes, but no one took it seriously because we still were not thinking about an
all-out military raid. At that point, we
thought Uganda was an innocent country
and that the terrorists had landed there
because of fuel problems. The picture we
had was of poor Amin wanting to free the
hostages but concerned about having
trouble with the terrorists.
Q. And, therefore, the idea ~as to carry
out a mznimal raid?
A. To carry out a raid with a minimal
force. The force's mission was to kill the
terrorists and not be bothered about evacuation. That would take place later in a
conventional and orderly way-with an
EI Al plane. This idea was based on the
information we had at that time.
Q. How long dzd this planning go on?
A. Until Thursday (1 July). We
planned night and day. The general staff
kept Yoni informed, and we talked at
least two or three times a day.
The truth is that I was highly skeptical
about the whole matter, and I told Yoni
the chances were slim. He asked if he
should return from the south. I told him I
did not think it was necessary at that
time. M. and I were representi~g the unit
on the planning team, and no real action
seemed likely.

. Q. Was there any further information?

A. More intelligence accumulated.

The Shiflto a Full-Scale

Military Operation
Q. Did that change the picture?
A. I think it was only on Thursday
5

MILITARY REVIEW
morning (1 Julyl-but maybe as early as
Wednesday (30 Junel-that we realized
that the terrorists and Amin were in this
together. True, we knew about the presence of Ugandan soldiers and the problem
this could pose if we launched an operation. But we did not know there was full
cooperation.
On Thursday, as a result of the debriefing of released hostages in Paris,S it became clear that the whole thing had been
prearranged. We learned that four more
terrorists had arrived in Entebbe, that
the Ugandans had given them more
weapons, that Amin embraced one of the
terrorists he had known before and that
the Ugandan army helped them guard
the hostages, gave them food, and so on.
In brief, it became evident that we had to
deal with a terrorist group and an army.
Only then did we start to plan something
altogether different. Our previous plans
were not canceled, but we began to plan
an all-out military operation as well.
Q. How did this mihtary plan evolve?
A. The plan was simple. We talked
about landing in a few Hercules planes.
Several forces would provide cover at the
airport, and a force from our unit would
storm the old terminal.
Q. What did the air force thznk about
this?
A.The air force was busy checking'
things out and planning its own operation. In principle, air force personnel
thought it feasible, and, every once in a
while, they brought more accurate data.
Then, on Thursday noon (or afternoon) (1
July), the air force said, "We can make
it."

But the problem offueling was still unsolved. After reaching Entebbe, we would
have enough fuel for only a short flying
time. We were still faced with the prob-

lem of how to get back home. We could

refuel on the ground at Entebbe airport,
and, for this purpose, the air force would
have to bring along pumps and someone
who knew the airport.
We were now ready to go into detailed
operational planning on the ground. But
this was put off for the moment. However,
in the afternoon, Dan Shomron 6 came to
see us.
Q. This means that Shomron and Yoni
both arrived on Thursday?
A. Yes. When Shomron came, we
briefed him on the main idea (to land in a
few Hercules planes with cover forces
securing the runways and our unit storming the old terminal). Shomron talked
about a lot of transport-I think something like 10 Hercules planes and a lot of
armored personnel carriers (APes).

Q. A real army?
A. Yes. To come in masses. I told him,
"Listen, Dan, I was in Uganda; I am one
of those they kicked out. I know that
army. A few shots and the soldiers will
run to the Kenyan border. If we want to
protect the field from the Ugandan army,
we need a substantial number of men but
not many vehicles. We need vehICles to
get us from the unloading point to the old
terminal. In my qifnion, four planes and
a few vehicles W'ln do." In short, he
accepted this. The plan was more or less
summed up like that. Everything was
very general, without going into concrete
operational planning.
We went to see Kuti, and he said, "If
you can present the operation in one minute-fine. If not, let's go straight to the
minister of defense." He was told that one
minute would not be enough, so Shomron
and Yoni went with the chief of staff
straight to the minister of defense. I was
not present at this meeting.

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
Q. What time was it?
A. Afternoon. In the meeting, the
general plan we had worked out was presented. Kuti supported it, and the commander of the air force said that, as far as
his part went, it was feasible. The defense
minister approved the general outline of
the plan and ordered us to go on with the
preparations.
The task of freeing the hostages in the
old terminal was assigned to our unit,
under Yoni's command. It was also decided that Golani Brigade and paratroop
forces would give cover support in other
parts of the airfield. They were needed in
case the raid developed into a full-scale
battle with the Ugandan army. Shomron
was appointed general commander of the
ground forces. Kuti was to be the overall
commander of the operation, including
the flight to and from Entebbe and the
airborne command.
In the evening, YOllI returned. He went
straight to operations command, and we
met there around 10:30 p.m. I showed him
the material we had on the airfield, and
he methodically reviewed all the intelligence, including what had been learned
from the released hostages. I showed him
the general plan that we had formed. We
then set up a meeting with Shorn ron in
Ramat Gan.
Before we went there, Yoni ordered all
the unit's officers to assemble at the base
except for the staff officers whom he
wanted in the meeting with Shomron. On
the way to Ramat Gan, I filled him In on a
few more details I had remembered.
In our meeting with Shorn ron, he
agreed that we should start preparing a
schedule in preparation for the general
order the next day. It was then that the
ball was actually passed to us <Yoni's
unit) to plan the operation. This was
around midnight. From there, we returned to the unit.

1982

The last photograph taken of Yoni, a few weeks

before the Entebbe,raid

Q. Did you make more plans In the

unltr
A. Yes. It was then that we really
started working on the actual plan of the
operation-for example, the assault and
cover and the allocatIOn of. forces and
tasks.
Q. Who worked on thiS?
A. Yoni and 1. At one pOInt, E. came
and threw in a few Ideas. The unit's intelligence officer was also present. But,
when it came down to it, the planning was
ours.
Q. What did you know In terms of intelligence?
A. We knew most of the things needed.

MILITARY REVIEW
A few pieces of new information came in,
but the general layout was clear-we had
photographs. The nllmber of hostages was
more or less known, and their location inside the terminal building was clear. We
knew that outside the building there were
about 60 to 100 Ugandans and inside it
about seven to 10 terrorists. We had to
come up with an operational plan that
would provide the answer to this situation.
Now, the plan. The plan that we drafted
that night eventually became the final
plan, with one or two changes. We wanted
to take three Land Rovers (a type of jeep).
The idea of taking a Mercedes was mine,
even though it did not make that much
difference in the end. Since I was familiar
with the Ugandans and their army, I
knew that officers from the rank of company commander and up drove Mercedes.
"Mercedes" is a symbol in Uganda. If a
soldier sees a Mercedes, he snaps to attention before he even thinks.
We estimated that we would need about
30 soldiers. Although we did not know the
exact number of entrances to the old terminal, we knew there were about fourthree into the main terminal building,
and one or two into a small adjacent hall
which also contained several hostages or
terrorists. We figured we would need 20
men altogether for the ground floor of the
terminal building. Next, we would deal
with the second floor which had only
about 60 Ugandan soldiers. We would
need a few men to clear that floor.

needed close cover for two corners of the

building-for example, two more squads,
one of which was also supposed to guard
the vehicles. All this formed the main
force that was to take control of the old
terminal-an assault force and a close
cover force for the bUilding.
Q. About 30 men?
A. Thirty-four. But, besides that, we
needed peripheral protective forces of
APCs. We planned for them to be positioned along the possible approach routes,
taking into account the layout of the field
and the runways---about four or five locations in all. A few were to be at each
point. That made another force of about
30 men.
Q. Did Yoni command all these forces?
A. Yes. He commanded the assault
force, the close cover forces and the protective APC forces.
Q. What constituted Yoni's command
group?
A. Yoni, the radio officer, a doctor and
another officer.

Q. What happened next?

A. After allocating the forces, we went
into more detailed planning. We manned
the squads and their commanders. We
then decided which vehicles to take-four
armored vehicles in the peripheral protective force and three Land Rovers because
this kind of vehicle is common in the
Ugandan army.

Q. Was that enough?

A. It was a small force, but it would do
for 60 Ugandans. But there was one more
entrance leading to the second floor. We
needed another squad to cover that and to
guard the staircase to the second floor.
That way, nobody would surprise our men
after they had climbed upstairs. We also

Q. Did you talk about the Mercedes?

A. At first, we agreed on three Land
Rovers, but, during the planning, I came
up with the idea of changing one of the
Land Rovers to a Mercedes.

Q. What was the task for the APes?

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
A. They were supposed to come on the
second plane, not with us. Their mission
was to fan out in three locations on potential access routes to the old terminal and
prevent the enemy from firing on our
forces. That was. the general idea. We
then delved into methods, principles,
possible situations, equipment and
weapons-a complete checklist of all
equipment needed.

told Yoni that, at this point, we had better

get some sleep, and he agreed. Before
doing so, we decided that, at 7 a.m., Yoni
would issue a general order (a systematic
presentation of the forces, tasks and
methods). I made sure that everyone got
his equipment. At 7 a.m., Yoni gave the
order. He had come straight from home
where he had slept for an hour or an hour
and one-half.

Q. Could everybody fit inside the first

plane?
A. The first plane carried the storming
party with three light vehicles (the Mercedes and two Land Rovers) and a few
paratroopers. The APCs came on the
second plane. The main rescue party was
the small force which would arrive at the
old terminal in the three light vehicles.
The APC cover force was meant to come
right on its heels as quickly as possible.

Q. ThiS means Yoni got .home at

around 5 a.m.?
A. Something like that. He stayed at
home until 6:30 a.m. and returned. (Here,
I should add what I said in an interview
for the Israeli Defense Forces radio in
July 1976: "It turned out later that he had
remained alone in his office and continued to work on the plan. And, In fact,
when he presented the plan at 7 a.m. the
following morning, after sleeping at most
one or two hours, I saw how far he had
carried the work from where we left off.
There were points in the plan that we had
not considered which Yom had thought
through to the end. That morning, he presented the plan complete, perfect, down to
the last detail.")

Q. Were other preparations made that

night?
A. Yes. While we were planning, we
gave the officers and men preliminary
orders to gain time. We told them to equip
the vehicles, prepare their gear and get
organized for action. These actions were
carried out while we were planning.
Q. How long did you plan?
A. About two hours.
Q. So, that means you finished around
3 a.m. Friday morning (2 July).
A. More or less.

The Plan Is Improved

Q. Did you do anything else?

A. I was very tired. So was Yoni. After
. all, we had been through a hard week. I

1982

Q. Did you turn out a plan that. In the

end, was executed?
A. Yes. As I said, the original plan
(which we prepared that night before the
general order) and the final plan (with
which we set out .on the miSSIOn) were
alinost identical. I do not remember any
major changes.
Q. Did you give thought to the control
tower?
A. Not only to the control tower, but
we also thought of all the high places in
the vicinity. For example, the roof of the
old terminal. If a place like that IS occupied by soldiers, they can dominate you

MILITARY REVIEW
with superior fire. We decided that
Rueven, who was in charge of parking the
light vehicles (the Land Rovers and Mercedes), would cover the tower from his
place as much as he could.
Moti, who was responsible for peripheral security with the APCs. would cover
the tower and roofs from his location.
Compared to Reuven, he had a better firing angle. Reuven was positioned right
underneath the tower, and this limited
his effectiveness. He had to stand between the tower and the terminal-about
4 yards on each side-so there was no way
he could cover the roofs with fire. To be
able to shoot at the roof of the terminal,
he would have needed to be about 30 or 40
yards away. He could better deal with the
tower because it had windows, but even
that posed problems.
We designated Reuven's position not
because it was a good place from which to
give cover, but because it seemed hke the
natural place to park. We thought that
our vehicles should look "innocent" because their task was to bring the men to
the terminal. Imagine a Mercedes and
two Land Rovers, simulating a Ugandan
force, driving over and parking at a spot
that seems very reasonable, not too close
and not too far. If we did not encounter
anyone, that would seem the most logical
spot to park. And Mati's peripheral security forces would give effective cover to the
roofs.
Q. Where was Mati himself supposed to
be?
A. In front of the terminal-a place
from which he could view the front, the
roof !lnd the tower. He 'had APCa and
heavier weapons.

. Q. Were they supposed to land a few

minutes after you?
A. Between three. to five minutes.

10

Q. So, according to the plan, you would

not have any cover toward the roof durzng
the break-in?
A. That is right.

Q. Is that what, in fact, happened?

A. True. We knew in advance that it
would be a risk. It was not something unexpected. We decided to have "silent cover" for the roofs and to fire only if the
guards opened fire from there. In any
case, the plan was not to shoot unless we
were fired upon. Keep in mind that, in a
hostage rescue operatIOn of this kind. it is
essential to shoot as little as possible.
Preferably, the only force that opens fire
is the storming party itself.
Practice Runs lor the Raid
Q. Go on with the preparatIons.
A. Yoni's briefing at 7 a.m. was comprehensive and detailed the forces, tasks,
possible situations we might encounter,
things we needed to practice and included
a schedule. During the previous night,
while we were planning, the men had
built a full-scale model of the old terminal
out of canvas cloth and metal poles. We
decided to drill in stages-first loading
the vehicles into planes, then disembarking, firing III various positions from the
jeeps and APCs, executing a practice run
for the storming party and, fi nally, carrying out a combined exercise of all the
units' forces. All this preceded the general
exercise scheduled for Friday night,
which was to include the other units (men
from the Golani Brig"de "nd the p"r,,troops whose task was to light the runw"ys, secure the new terminal and act as
a reserve force in case the Ugandan army
rushed reinforcements to the field).
At that point, Yoni appointed me as his,

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
second in command. He said, "I will be in
the practice runs as much as I can. You
try to organize everything else." He then
started dashing back and forth between
the practice area at the base and the
general staff. At one point, I told him,
"Yoni, leave the unit and take care of the
brass. Leave us because things here look
as if they were working out." But he
would not give in. He came and inspected
each team, drilled them and made sure
everything was right, methodically and
thoroughly.

Q. How long did these drills last?

A. A few hours. Until 1 p.m.
Q. And during that time he managed to
visit the general staff?
A. Yes! At least twice! He would go,
come back and inspect. I guess he went to
see the chief of staff, the chief of operations and others. Around 1 p.m., the chief
of infantry and paratroops gave a general
order for all the commanders of the forces.
Right after that, we went back to the
drills, set up a final time schedule, inspected personal gear, equipped the Jeeps
and painted the Mercedes.
Q. Why did you have to paint it?
A. Because the Mercedes cars in Uganda are either black or green, and ours was
white. We painted it black and started
drilling with it as the lead vehicle.

Q. What type of automobzle was this?

A. Big, with three rows of seats. First,
we thought of fitting 11 men inside, but
we soon saw that only nine could make it.
It was Ii vehicle with which we were not
familiar. We drilled driving, stopping,
braking, firing and jumping out. Yoni and
the driver sat in front, two men and I sat
in the center, and four sat in the backnine altogether. We practiced until

1982

we felt we were in control of all possible

situations. In the late afternoon, Yoni discussed the general exercise, what it would
look like, and the lessons we needed to
draw from it. Once again, he went over
the forces and tasks.

Q. Was the general exercise held at

night?
A .. Yes. Yoni's advance briefing was
given around 6 p.m., maybe earlier. Time
was tight; we were constantly chasing after it. We first carried out a practice run
just for our unit. Then, we teamed up with
the other forces for the general exercise.

Q. What concluszons did you draw from

these exercises? Important things or just
odds and ends?
A. Since the intelligence was good and
the layout fairly clear, the operational
plan was straightforward. For example,
we kn~w we had to move with great speed
from the stopping point of the vehicles to
the entrances of the old terminal. Ifsomeone decided to blow up the hostages and
stood there with explosives at the ready,
It would be very hard to stop him. That is
why speed was of the essence! That is also
why we drilled several times jumping out
of the vehicle and running to our target.
Everyone knew his entrances; Yoni made
sure of this.
We practiced according to the schedule
we had set. After each exercise, we drew
lessons. There were still a few things that
were not right. For example, jumping out
of the vehicles and rushing into the entrances were done too slowly.
One Force Always Plunges Forward

Q. What about the posszbility of armed

interception?
11

MILITARY REVIEW
A. We considered it.

planes and taxiing to the takeoff point.

Q. Did you practice it?

Q. What was the distance from the

plane's unloading point to the old terminal
where the hostages were kept?
A. About a mile.

A. Yes. Since we assumed the Ugandans were standing guard, we decided

that the Mercedes in the lead would simply ignore the cordon of troops guarding
the building and push ahead, even if they
tried to stop it or shot at it. The object was
to pass through the guards. Ifwe stopped
to deal with them, there would be a
chance that we would be delayed for too
long. We said, "We storm ahead, no matter what happens! The Land Rovers behind us will knock them out, and, if the
APes make it in time, they will take care
of anything that is left." But one force was
to always plunge forward. It had to reach
the entrances and the hostages as rapidly
as possible. The nine men in the Mercedes
were a minimal force, but it was large
enough to handle the terrorists. This was
the basic idea.
We simulated interceptions accordingly. Two dummy solqiers made of barrels
and target boards were set up to act as
guards on the runway. We pretended that
they attempted to stop us (this is, in fact,
what happened during the actual operation). We stopped, Yoni shot one guard
with a pistol, and we drove on to the old
terminal, jumping out of the vehicles,
storming the terrorists and seizing control. We then practiced the handling of
wounded soldiers or hostages. We drilled
all these things in the unit.
In the general exercise (with the other
units), We practiced additional thingsboarding the planes, taxiing on the runway strip to the unloading point, disembarking with the vehicles, executing
our own mission, radioing the plane to
approach the terminal to a distance of300
meters (out of small arms range) to collect
the hostages and the wounded, and, finally, boarding the soldiers on the other

12

Q. Where were the Golani and paratroop forces in this exercise?

A. They were in their designated locations. We had a mockup of the Entebbe
airport. The location of the old terminal
was fixed, as was the unloading point.
Each force drilled independently, up to
the combined exercise with all the other
units.

Q. Didyou have any contact with them?

A. Only with the Golani force whose
job was to cover the plane when it came to
pick up the hostages and the wounded.
The force was also supposed to count the
hostages.

The Meeting With the Chief of Staff

Q. What happened when the general exercise was over?"

A. The chief of staff wanted to see
Yoni. I went with him. The chief of staff
asked for his opinion on the exercise and
our chances. I got the impression that
Yoni did not want to sound boastful because I am convinced he thought we could
do it. He said, "As far as the level of the
practice is concerned, I do not see any
problems. We need to improve the
approach here and there, the exit and the
assault, but, on the whole, it looks OK. As
far as the intelligence is concerned, this
operation will stand the test, not only in
execution but also in the level of risk."
The chief of staff asked him, "How
many of you are on the jeeps? It seems to

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
me you are very crowded there." Yoni
said, "We can manage." The chief of staff
said, "I think you need to remove a few
men froIjl each jeep." Yoni said, "We have
carried out several operations in the past
with this number." But the chief of staff
replied, "No, you need to remove a few; it
is too crowded. It will end in disaster."
They agreed to remove one man from
each jeep. That was the outcome of the
entire aiscussion.
Q. Did the chief of staff have any other
comments after the exercise?
A. No, nothing. There were no other
changes. He then said that he had to go
and convince the members of the government.
Q. When was this?
A. Around 11 p.m. (Friday night, 2
July).
Q. What happened then?
A. We went back to the unit. We had to
get all the vehicles to the departure airfield. We made last-minute equipment
checks on the vehicles. The Mercedes was
not in very good shape. We had to work on
it during the night, and, toward morning,
we sent it to the departure field.
Q. What did you talk about after the
final exercise?
A. We again went over the intelligence
and updated all the commanders with the
latest information. We reviewed possible
situations once more. For example, what
if we were identified before we got there?
What should we do with the hostages during the shooting? Should we evacuate
them or make them lie down? These were
questions involving the behavior of the
terrorists and the hostages.
We decided that every squad would
have a soldier with a loudspeaker who

19B2

would tell everyone to lie down as soon as

we stormed in. We also decided that, as
soon as we hit the terrorists; we would
comb forward. Further, until we made
sure that all the terrorists were killed, we
would not let any of the hostages out. This
was necessary to avoid a situation in
which someone opened fire while the hostages were standing up. This is complicated combat. When people lie down, they
do not get in the way, and that makes
things a lot simpler.

Q. What was the general feeling you

were working under? Did you believe that
the operation would be carried out?
A. There was a feeling, with some reservation, that it would be carried out and
that it would be successful. I should add
that we were under terrific time pressure,
one drill following another. Under these
conditions, you work without thinking
about anything except the business at
hand.
Briefings to the Officers
Q. Let us go back to ehe preparation
stage. Was another general order given?
A. Yoni gave a briefing to the officers.
Following the general exercise, we carried out specific practice runs for the various commanders in our force. Each commander gave a final briefing plus the
latest intelligence to his men, and that
wrapped things up.
Q. What happened on Friday night after you brought your equipment to the de
parture point?
A. We went to sleep. Yoni slept at
home; I stayed in the unit. We met on
Saturday morning (3 July). After the intelligence officer briefed us on a few more

13

MILITARY REVIEW
details that had come in during the night,
we passed on to an "officers' rap session"
(analysis of the various possibilities by
the unit's officers). We all got into Yoni's
room. He presented those situations
whicn he thought likely to occur. Each
such presentation was followed by questions from the force commanders. In the
light of these questions, we analyzed the
appropriate responses.

Q. Was there any friction or disagreement?

A. I do not remember anything sharp,
but here and there we had our differences
I remember that we planned this session
to last an hour, but it went well beyond
that. Around 11:30 a.m., Yoni had to
leave for a meeting with the chief of staff.
He asked me to stay with the men and
continue the analysis because he saw that
a few things were left open. I stayed for
another quarter of an hour to tie up loose
ends. Then, we all drove to the departure
area and met Yoni there. Yoni gathered
the officers, updated them with new facts
that had come in and gave a final briefing-just a few words. From there, we
went straight to the planes and flew to
Ophir (Sharm ai-Sheikh).

wanted him to come with us (he was in

the storming party). On the other hand, I
thought that, if he arrived at Entebbe in
this condition, it would have been better
ifhe had not come at all. I decided to take
someone else.

Q. What else happened in OphIr?

A. We ate in one of the hangars at the
airfield. Then, we gathered the men. I
briefed my own group, the one intended to
lead the storming party. Yoni gave a
briefing to our entire force-storming

Interim Stop at Ophir

Q. When did you take off for Ophir?

A. Around 3 p.m. The flight to Ophir
was tough. We thought, "Good God,
another 8 hours of this." We stuffed
ourselves with antivomit pills. At Ophir,
one of the soldiers felt sick and asked to
stay behind. We left him there.

Q. He feZt that bad?

A. He was lying on the ground retching. I had a problem. On the one hand, I
, 14

Figure I

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
party and cover forces.
Q. What did he say?
A. He repeated principles: what to do,
how to clo it, critical things to remember.
He also gave a few words of encouragement and stressed that everything depended on us. He wanted to make clear
that we were the main force, that everything fell on our shoulders.

The Flighllo Enlebbe

Q. How was the flzght to Entebbe?
A. From Ophir to Entebbe, we had a
good flight. Yoni and I sat in the Mercedes.

talked seriously. The preparations were

behind UB, and it was now time for action.
I remember that the plane started jolting
wildly because of turbulence. We were
asked to leave the Mercedes. I laid down
and fell asleep. I gather Yoni did too. <It
turned out later that Yoni went to the
cockpit.)
An hour before landing, we were
awakened. Yoni came to me. He was in
excellent spirits, shook my hand and said,
"Good luck!" I did not see it, but I was told
that he also went to most of the soldiers,
gave each one a pat on the back and a
handshake. About 20 minutes before
landing, we got into our seating positions
in the vehicles, facing the exit.

The Landing
Q. What did Yoni and you talk about
during the flIght?
A. He was in a jolly mood. The entire
week's tension was released. He had a
book in English with him.
Q. Which book?
A. Some war book about commandos.

Q. DId he talk about the book?

A. I do not remember his exact words
except that he joked, "IfI only had heroes
like that-these are real men!" I also remember he told me, "Listen, Ami (an
officer in the unit who was the driver of
the Mercedes) is a wonder. I really like
"
h1m.

Q. Did Yonz say that in his presence?

A. No, not in his presence. The two of
us were sitting inside the car while Ami
was up front fixing something. We saw
him through the windshield.

Q. What else did you talk about?

A. We kidded around more than we

1982

We landed, and the plane taxied to

the unloading point. We could see nothing
of the outside. The door of the plane
opened, and we saw the lights of the runway-they were still on. The paratroopers
who were with us jumped out. They were
supposed to secure the runway and place
a torch next to each light so that it would
remain lighted in case the Ugandans sh ut
off the field lights.
Q. Were you not takzng a rhance that
the runway would be lighted during the
first landing?
A. Since it was an active airport, we
assumed that the runway would be lighted during the first landing. This is precisely' what happened. The lights were
shut off later, just a few seconds before
the landing of the second plane.

Q. Were you able to orient yourselves after you got off the plane?
A. Yes. There was no problem.

15

MIlITARY REVIEW

Eliminating the Guards

Q. What did you see?
A. We saw the old terminal building
lighted up. Yoni turned around to make
sure that all the vehicles were following
and told them to stay close behind. We
then started driving in tandem toward
the terminal building. We drove at a modest speed-neither too fast nor too slowso as not to arouse suspicion. It was a
moonlit night. The space in front of the
terminal was well-lighted. We could see
at once if there were any guards. I spotted
two of them near the control tower. I said
to Yoni, "Look, two guards, over there."
We went into a state of preparedness.
Q. What did you do?
A. We took out our weapons and held
them in our hands. Two men on either
side gripped pistols.

Q. What distance were you from the

guards?
A. About 200 yards. We saw two figures against a lighted background. I could
not see if they had any weapons. Clearly,
the information about 60 to 100 Ugandan
guards was not realistic. If there had been
that many, we would have sliced through
them (as we planned). But here there.
were only two, and it seemed the right
thing to knock them out so that we could
continue without interference. One guard
disappeared; one remained. We approached
him on the right (Yoni's side). The
Ugandan aimed his rifle at us and
shouted aggressively. You should know
that they are very good guards. They do
not shoot, but they guard well. Now, he
stood there threateningly and tried to
stop us with his shouting. If you did not
know the Ugandans,. you might believe

16

that, if you did not stop, their next action

would be to shoot.
Q. That couldjust happen, could it not?
A. Yes, of course it could. Anything
could happen. Now, when you find yourself in a situation like this, you say, "OK,
if he shoots first, I am willing to take my
chances and then shoot him." But if you
pass him and he stays behind you, that
could be extremely unpleasant. Y oni
ordered his side to fire, and he and Oren
shot the guard.
The Ugandan twisted, obviously hit,
but did not fall. He was not killed. Then,
one of the men in the Land Rover behind
us opened fire with a Kalaschnikov rifle.
For the terrorists, this could have been a
warning signal. It was obvious that we
had to jump from the vehicles at once (so
as not to form a concentrated target) and
reach the terminal building as quickly as
possible. Yoni gave the command to jump
out. The moment I came out, the second
Ugandan (who reappeared) opened fire in
our direction. He fired three shots.
Q. What sort of weapon did he have?
A. Automatic. Maybe an FN. They
have these special FNs. He fired three inaccurate shots. I shot and hit him while
moving. I saw him falling as I continued
running forward. All of my force and Yoni
were together-he stuck with my force
which was to break in first.

Q. Were the Land Rovers behind you?

A. Yes, they were. Someone in one of
the Land Rovers shot the second Ugandan
and probably finished him off.
Q. How did the terminal look, and what
happened when you reached it?
A. When you reach the sidewalk alongside the building, and if you run close to
the wall, you reach the openings. On the

JulV

OPERATION JONATHAN

Entebbe Airport
Movement of Forces

Securing
Force for
New Terminal
and Runways
(Golani
Brigade
and
Paratroops)

New Terminal

Lake Vlctana

Figure 2

1982

17

MILITARY REVIEW
left, there are two entrances that lead to a
small hall with a staircase leading to the
second floor. Farther along the wall are
the entrances to the large hall where the
hostages were kept. By the time we
reached the large hall, Yaron's squad was
entering the small hall.
Only a few seconds passed from the moment we opened fire on the Ugandan
guards until we finished off the terrorists
and the Ugandans on the second floor.
This shows how quickly it all went.
Q. What was Yaron's story?
A. He encountered two or three Ugandans in the small hall. They were completely surprised and did not understand
what was going on. He finished them off,
rushed upstairs and started clearing one
room after another. He finished off about
11 or 12 Ugandans, and the rest ran
away. Amir, who covered the staircase
leading to the second floor, also killed two
or three Ugandans.

The Assault on the Terrorists

Q. Let us go back to the assault on the
main hall. Where was Yoni?
A. Right next to me. He ran alongside
me with his command group while I was
leading my force. As we ran, I spotted a
terrorist who came out of the hall. He
stood behind a ledge and assumed a firing
position. I shot at him.
Q. Who was it? The German?
A. I do not know. After I shot at him,
he went inside.
Q. Did you hit him?
A. No, I did not. I had a problem; my
clip was empty. In the original plan, Yoni
appointed Oren to run first. That is, he

18

was supposed to run with his squad ahead

of mine, and my squad' was to be followed
by Abner's squad. During the preparations, I asked Yoni to change the order so
that I would be in the lead and they would
follow me. He agreed. But now, as I said, I
had a problem. I wanted to lead the force,
but my clip was empty. I decided to
change clips quickly, started to do so, but
Yoni commanded, "Forward, forward," so
Abner passed me and David after him.
Q. Was there a delay?
A. Only a second. I changed clips; it
takes a second.
Q. It could be a crztical second.
A. Exactly. I felt uneasy, disturbed
about the whole thing. On one hand, you
want to be first. On the other, if you delay
to change clips, you miss the operation.
, The two of them passed me.

Q. When Yom shouted "Forward" did

he mean not to stop?
A. Right. They passed me, but I managed to change clips and overtake them.
The three of us stormed inside simultaneously-I on the left, Abner in the
middle and David on the right. Abner
shot the German woman who stood there.
I turned my head, saw another terrorist
and shot him. Right after that, I shot
another, and David shot a fourth terrorist.
Q. What did you see the moment you
entered?
A. The hall was completely lighted.
The hostages were all lying on the floor
sleeping. Some of them were covered with
blankets, and some were not. The terrorists were standing up.

Q. Did anybody change clips inside the

hall?

July

The Assault on the Old Terminal

....t..
.,' ....- - ----------- - - - ... ,.

,I" '-$'''''

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~~.

,'11 '
,

I
I
I

"0'"<.<:;

'-"

-0

~ ~

, !

Staircase to Second Floor

,
I

, I'

large Hall

VIP Hall

,,
I

"
,

,
,

r"S~
\1\.
v"I;~'1>

,'~\\~s

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_ttIf>

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.".'6
RO. . ,,*'
\..3(\
--~-:.- ...
#>

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... _ - - _ . .

-...... _--------------- ...

Q. Did the terrorists shoot?

A. The one on the right did. The moment we entered, he opened fire.

Q. Was he Arab or German?

A. I think he was German, but I am not
sure. He opened fire and hit the windows
behind us, but he did not endanger us. He
was hit right after that.

1982

._ ~of MIGs

- - . . Storming Party (Stage 1)

- - . . Securfng Force (Stage 2)
Terrorist
..... Ugandan

A. No, there was no need. You shoot

carefully-single, well-aimed shots;

Q.
A.
have
ings,

Destruction

~~
60

:If""to

How did the other terrorists behave?

It went so fast that they did not
time to react. Later, in the debriefone of the hostages said that the

Peruvian terrorist made a gesture of surprise as if to say "What is happening?

What is going on here?" The German
womAn and the woman next to her,
according to the hostages, were completely thunderstruck. They did not understand what was going on, and one of the
terrrorists said, "Oh, no, the Ugandans
have opened fire," or something like that,
as' if the Ugandans were the ones ca\1sing
them all the trouble. They did not grasp
that we were a force that had come from
Israel.

Q. There are stories that the German

ran inside and pointed his weapon toward
the hostages.

19

MILITARY REVIEW
A. The terrorist I shot at outside ran
inside, but I did not see him aim at the
hostages. Nor did I hear this in the debriefing of'the hostages later on.

stant, he saw someth~ng flash near the

waist of one of them and shouted "Grenade!" The squad took cover in the nearby
room, and the grenade exploded.

Q. How were some of the hostages hit?

A. In the cross fire.

Q. Did Oren hit the grenade when he

opened fire?
A. Either he hit it, or else the terrorist
took out the safety pin. In any case, something happened to activate that grenade.

Q. Did you see the volleys hitting the

hostages?
A. Not volleys! You fire selectively,
single rounds, and you take careful aim,
but still a few were hit.

Finishing Oil the Remaining Terrorists

Immediately after finishing off these
terrorists, we combed the hall. One of the
hostages came up to me and said, "You
got them all here, but there is one in the
next room." I heard shots from that direction and told him that we would take care
o[it.

Q. What happened in that room? Who

"took care" of it?
A. It was their VIP room. Actually,
there were a few rooms there. Oren's
squad threw in a few hand grenades, and
two European-dressed men came out.
Q. Did they hit them?
A. No. Oren was the one closest to
them. He thought they were hostages and
asked them, "Who are you? Who are
you?" They did not answer and continued
walking toward the exit. They passed
Oren and went past another of our soldiers while Oren was still asking them,
"Who are you? Who are you?" They kept
walking, but only when they reached a
third soldier did Oren realize that they
were terrorists. He immediately opened
fire, and the terrorists fell. At that in-

20

Q. You say the terrorists had no idea of

what was happening?
A. No. It was a complete surprise.
Even the terrorist who ran outside to see
what was happening (the one we shot at
and who ran back in) did not have time to
do anything.

Q. So, you achieved everything you

planned?
A. Exactly what we intended-complete surprise, storming through the entrances and the liquidation.

Q. DId you get the impression that the

hostages understood what was going on?
A. The hostages did not know what
was happening. They did not expect this,
you see. That is why they could not accurately describe later on what took place.
Q. One soldier was wounded?
A. Yes, at the far end of the building.
One squad was supposed to enter the corner room and also cover the corner of the
terminal. Oren told Doron, who headed
that squad, to enter the room. He tried to
open the door and found it locked. He
fired at the lock but still could not get in.
Then, he tried to slip a hand grenade
through the window, but the grenade hit
the wire mesh of the window and fell on
the ground outside. Doron shouted "Grenade!" but that did not help, and a few
soldiers caught some shrapnel.

July

OPERATION JONATHAN
(There was one more injury in another
part of the airport. Sergeant Surin Hershko, from the paratrooper force, was badly
wounded.'His force, whose task was to secure the new terminal area, had a single
encounter with a Ugandan policeman
who shot Surin.)

the standpoint of personal vulnerability,

his location was, of course, the ,most dangerous place for the commander because
he was in the center of the action.)

Yoni Is Hit

Q. What happened?
A. When I entered the hall, I still saw
him. After we finished off the terrorists, I
was told that Yoni was hit. But, a moment earlier, I thought I heard him on the
radio calling me. I answered him, but he
did not reply. I gave an order to comb the
building, and we did a quick first check. I
then went outside and saw him lying on
the ground. The doctor next to him waR
taking care of him. I notified the forces
that Yoni was hit and that I was assuming command. Then, we started with the
evacuatlOn. I went over to Yoni who lay at
the entrance. We began to treat the
wounded and to evacuate the hostages.
Simultaneously, I received reports from
the forces.

Q. What happened to Yoni? Where was

his squad supposed to be?
A. In both the practice runs and in the
operation itself, Yoni located himself and
his sq1l1d near the main entrance. He
wanted to be nearest the main action, In
full control of all the forces, so that, i::J.
case of any mishap, he could affect the
course of the battle.
Q. Did you have any dIscussions during the practice runs about where he was
supposed to be?
A. No. He chose that spot both In the
exercises and in the operation itself. He
stood right next to the entrance, about a
yard from the wall. tIn this connection, I
want to mention another excerpt from my
interview with the Israeli Defense Forces
radio in July 1976. One of the officers who
knew Yoni's courage came up to him in
the plane and told him, "Remember, you
are the commander of this entire operatilm, and you have got to keep a safe distance and not be too close to the storming
party." Yoni merely smiled, shook his
hand and told him that everything would
be OK.
But Yoni did not heed this advice. He
did not change what he had decided in the
plan and positioned himself in the place
which, from a commander's point of view,
was ideal. From there, he could see the
battle and influence it immediately. From

1982

Q. DId the control tower have a firzng

angle on that spot?
A. Yes, it did.

Q. So, they contInued takzng care of

YOn! at the spot in whIch he was hit?
A. Yes.

Q. Was there not a problem of inadequate protection from the control tower?
A. First, we had to give medical treatment. The Ugandans shot some rounds
every once in a'while.
Q. WIlD shot at the tower?
A. Initially, the squad next to it.

Q. But did they not have to shoot.

straight up?
A. I do not know exactly how they did
it, but they shot at the tower. There was
another squad that was supposed to shoot
21

MILITARY REVIEW
at the high points, and it also fired on the
tower. Two squads, therefore, returned
fire immediately.
We started organizing the evacuation
of the hostages, but then a few more
rounds were fired in our direction from
the tower. I ordered Motti to get closer
and open fire on it. He shot a few RPG
rockets and silenced the tower.
This was after Y oni's wounds had
been dressed. I ordered him put on a vehicle and taken to the plane. I then took
everyone out. 1 put the wounded hostages
on a vehicle that was driven quickly
to the plane. Using loudspeakers, we
told the remaining hostages to get up.
They formed a line and walked to the
plane.

Q. What was the distance between the

terminal and the plane?
A. About 100 to 150 yards.
Q. Did the plane come that close?
A. Yes. very close!

Q. Were you not afratd that someone

would shoot at you from the tower?
A. It was very ineffective fire. Besides.
Motti silenced the tower in those moments. After everyone went outside, I
brought in stretcher-bearers to take out
the hostages who had been killed. They
were put on Land Rovers and driven to
the plane. We then started evacuating
our forces.
Q. Did you see Yoni alive again?
A. No. From the moment they put him
on a stretcher and took him to the plane, I
did not see him.
Q. What about the MiGs?
A. While we were tackling the tower
and treating the wounded, Gil (an officer
in the unit) took care of the MiGs.

22

Q. Was this planned? Did somebody

talk about it?
A. It was clear that the Ugandans had
MiGs. We knew their position and number before we reached Entebbe. The chief
of staff told the chief of operations that he
should notify the forces to hit the MiGs
and destroy them.
Q. What happened?
A. The chief of operations decided to
relay an order from his airborne headquarters during the operation. He was
right. Why should he burden us with
more tasks? Our first problem was to free
the hostages. If everything went well, he
would tell us to hit the MiGs. And, in fact,
he did tell this to Shomron. Shomron received the order on the radio but told his
radio operator, "Do not bother me with
that right now."
Gil, who commanded the cover force in
the vicinity of the MiGs, saw them before
Shomron. He asked Motti (his direct superior) if he could hit the MiGs but
apparently did not receive an answer. He
again tried unsuccessfully to reach Motti
and, finally, decided on his own initiative
to hit the MiGs. He hit them all, and two
of them exploded.

The Evacuation
Q. Now, about the evacuation. Who
went on the first plane?
A. The first plane carried the casualties and the hostages. _
Q. Did all the hostages go inside it?
A. Yes, all of them.
Q. Including vehicles?
A. No, only people. The second plane
was our plane, that of the unit. I remem-

July

'"

OPERATION JONATHAN
ber thllt the first plane with the hostages
and casualties took off and disappeared.
We drove to our original unloading point,
got inside the plane and took off.

Q. Did you tell the soldiers too?

A. The officers told every'one in our
plane.

Q. What was the feelzng?

A. Hard. Such a successful operation
and to lose the commander! That is a
tough feeling.

Q. How many planes were there

altogether?
A. Four Hercules planes and one
Boeing that circled above and served as
an airborne command post.

Q. DId you find thIs feeling common to

all?
A. Of course, especially the young ones
who believe their commanders are immune and especially the commander of
the unit. When the unit commander is
killed, it is a double shock. It disturbs
their whole framework of thinking, their
inner compass.

Q. Who was zn it?

A. Major General Benny Peled, Kuti
and other staff officers. I am not so familiar with this.
Q. Where was Shomron?
A. In the first part of the operatIOn, he
was in the new terminal. In the second
part, he came to us after it was all over.
He came and asked me, "How are
things?" I reported to him briefly. That
was it; he did not bother us. He was OK
and did not interfere.

Q. When you boarded the plane, did

you know that Yoni had died?
A. No, we only found this out in
Kenya. There, we met E. We asked
whether he knew anything about Yoni.
He said he spoke to the doctor, and the
. doctor told him there were two men
wounded, but they were not seriously
wounded. Before takeoff from Kenya to
Israel, a doctor boarded our plane and told
our own doctor that Yoni had died. Our
doctor told me, and I called the officers
and told them.

Q. Did you sleep on the way back?

A. I did not sleep. I went to the cockpit
and stayed there until we reached Israel.
We landed in Tel-Noff, and there the
prime minister and the minister of defense greeted us.
Q. Did they know that Y oni had been
killed?
A. Yes, they knew.
Q. Did anybody talk about it or bring It
up?
A. Yanosh. 7 Yanosh came over to me.
He was sad, in a really bad state. He
asked me, "How did Yoni get killed?"
Like that, as ifhe was angry. I explained
to him briefly what happened and how
Yoni was killed.

NOTES
1 In 1972. 8 Sabena airplane was hIjaCked by Arab terronsts and
forced to land In lad (Tel AVIY) airport Israeli commandos stormed the
~prane

and freed the hOstages

2 Malor General VekUllel Adam
3 ShImon Peres.
4 Israeli construction firm which had worked on vanous construcllOn

1982

prOjects In Afnca, Includmg the Enlebbe airport

5 The terronsts had released the non-Israeli hostages
6 BrigadIer General Dan Shomrol1, ground commander for the Entab
be miSSion
7 Brlgacller General AVIgdor BenGal who knew Yom Irom the 1973
ArablsreellWar

23

Surprise
and
Deception

In

Soviet
Military
Thouglit
Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh

Last month in Part I, the authors provided an overview for

the study of Soviet use of surprise and deception in military
operationll and examined, in detail, the use of surprise. This
month, Part II focuses on the Soviet use of deception since,
from the Soviet standpoint, deception provides the princi.
pal means for achieving surprise. Four major categories of
Soviet deceptive practices are assessed in detail to provide
a more complete understanding of this concept's diverse
potential applications. These deceptive techniques include
concealment, imitation, demonstration maneuvers and dis
information. The article concludes with a review of several
significant deficiencies which appear to constrain the
Soviets' effective application of both surprise and decep
tion.

C.opyrlght 1982 by Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh.

24

July

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

MASKIROVKA DECEPTION

OST of the Soviet military writings on surprise which were consulted for this article discussed this principle in light of its relationship to the
practice of deception. Most accounts, in
fact, allotted considerable space and detail to this relationship. Deception
embraces a myriad of applications-from
basic camouflage for concealment and
"imitation" (decoys, and so on) to "demonstration" (deceptive) maneuvers and disinformation. Deceptior. from the Soviet
view, provides the actual means for
achieving surprise. As an important vehicle for realizing this objective, Soviet
military planners:
.... classify deception as an art and have
developed a doctrine called maskzrovka
which embraces a multitude of measures
to support deception in mzlltary operations. l
Maskirovka and vnezapnost' (surprise)
share an interdependent relationship in
Soviet military thought in which successful surprise is contingent upon successful
deception. Perhl'ps it is for this reason
that the practlce of deception is not included among the Soviet principles of
military art but, rather, is subsumed
under surprise because of the supportive
role it plays with regard to it.
But, regardless of how these two concepts are weighted, it is, nonetheless, evident that the interdependency between
surprise and deception is of substantial
consequence to Soviet military planners.
In short, failure to deceive the enemy may
portend failure to achieve surprise in
military actions at all levels of potential
a~plication.

This point of view is found in numerous

Soviet accounts on the subject. For instance, Soviet Colonel Iu. Ma!isov contends simply that "camouflage assures
the success of surprise." In another Soviet
work, which specifically treats tactical
maskirovka, a similar point is made:
"Tactical maskirovka has as its goal the
achievement of surprise .... "2 And, finally, Colonels A. A. Bulatov and V. G. Prozorov, in their excellent work Tactical
Surprise, also highlight the integral relationship between surprise and deception
when they comment that:
The most effectwe technical zmprovements and original decisions will not produce surprise and (thus) victory, if (our
forces) are not carefully concealed from
the enemy ... (for zf they are not) the
enemy will find the way and means to take
counteractions. 3 <Emphasis added.>
Maskirovka, as described by the Soviets
in the Soviet MIlztary EncyclopedIa, supports surprise by secretly:
... securzng mzlztary operations and the
routzne activity of troops, and (by) confusing the enemy with regard to the presence
and position of the forces, milztary complexes' their pOSitIOn, level of preparatIOn
and actIVity, as well as the plans of the
command structure.'
Moreover, maskirovka assures the
military readiness of the forces and increases their survivability.' As with the
application of surprise, maskzrovka may
be implemented at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
At the strategic level, maskirovka is to
be implemented through decisions made
by the Soviet Supreme Command. It includes a broad range of measures for clandestinely securing the preparation of
strategic operations and campaigns, as
well as for disorienting the enemy with

Part I of thiS article appeared In the June 1982 Military ReView,

1982

25

MILITARY REVIEW
regard to the actual intentions of Soviet
forces." It is also at this level that deceptive measures known as "disinformation"
or, sometimes, as umisinformation," are
likely to be orchestrated!
Operational maskirovka is to be implemented by commanders at the front,
army and theater levels and is used
to conceal the preparation of major operations. 8 Lieutenant General Va. Dashevskiy also points out that operational
maskirovka is an inseparable part of an
operational decision and requires coordination with commanders of adjacent
fronts based on a unified plan developed
and issued by the Soviet Supreme Command."
Finally, maskirovka is to be applied at
the tactical level by troop formations,
units or subunits, as well as at separate
military installations (presumably at
nuclear storage sites, fixed launch sites,
and so forth), to conceal battle preparations or the dispersal of weapons to the
field. lo
The contemporary Soviet view on maskirovka appears to have been substantially influenced by their experience during
World War II-both from mistakes encountered during the first period of the
war and, subsequently, from their more
careful, innovative application of masklrovka in the war's latter portion. Initial
German attacks against many of the.
Soviets' major strategic installations
(such as uncamouflaged air bases where a
significant portion of the Soviet air force
was concentrated), served ES a learning
experience for what failure in deception
could entail. l1
These abysmal losses signified that
plans to employ maskirovka had simply
not been implemented in a comprehensive or timely manner. As one US defense
analyst writes, although numerous Soviet
regulations existed that:

26

... dictated . .. commanders . .. to implement camouflage and concealment

measures without waiting for specIfic instructions ... , these regulations were
largely ignored.'2
However, as the war continued, the
USSR gradually came to excel in the use
of deception. Numerous examples are
cited by Soviet and US authors to illustrate this trend. The use of deceptive
practices played a major role in the successful defense of Moscow in 1941;'3 in
the 1945 Soviet campaign against
Manchuria;" and in the strategic surprise offensive against the Germans in
Byelorussia and the Ukraine during the
summer and fall of1944.'5 The last example, in particular, illustrates the Soviets'
increasingly adept use of a broad array of
deceptive measures to attain surprise and
warrants additional comment.
Plans for this campaign were held in
the closest of confidentiality, with all
orders communicated orally to the few
commanders aware of the plans. Extensive use was made of decoys and deceptive
maneuvers, and Soviet air defense activities were intensified to thwart German
aerial reconnaissance. Radio silence was
also strictly observed.
Evidence discussed by the American
military historian Paul Martell suggests
that these measures were extremely
successful in deceiving the Germans.
Although the ultimate goal of complete Soviet concealment was not fully
achieved (since the Germans were aware
of unusual Soviet activities as well as
being concerned over their own failure to
attain adequate reconnaissance data) the
initiation of the Soviet offensive was considered to be a surprise.
The Soviet experience in World War II
also illustrated that the successful practice of deception became increasingly
more complex due to the technical im-

July

SOVIET IYIILlTARY THOUGHT

provements in enemy air reconnaissance
and radio intelligence. 16 Thus, complete
concealment or deception became progressively more difficult to realize. Contemporary Soviet writings on this subject
illustrate that this problem continues to
be of significance today in Soviet efforts to
achieve effective maskirovka and, ultimately, surprise.
These concerns are treated consistently
throughout Soviet writings. For example,
Colonel V. Shchedrov, in his article
"Camouflaging Troops During Regrouping and Maneuver," acknowledges the
vital role which deception has played III
past wars. However, he goes on to say
that:
Under modern conditions Its role grows
even greater. The contemporary status and
future development of reconnaissance,
especially of such means as those for speczal photography, radar, magnetometrlc
means, heat seeking radar and apparatuses for passiue radar detection require
constant improvement of known methods
and means of camouflage and the creatlOn
of (additIOnal) effective methods and
means . ... 17
The proper application of "improved"
or new camouflage measures can thus
greatly enhance the survivability of
Soviet forces, and not only by concealing
troops in the field. It can also confuse the
enemy regarding Soviet intentions and
thereby cause the enemy to expend resources needlessly against "false" targets.
Colonel A. A. Beketov provides an excellent summation of this point. He writes:
In contemporary war, with the use of
nuclear weapons, the role of maskirovka
has grown significantly. The goaloriented application of deceptive measures may deceive the enemy with regard
to (our) force composition, their actual
location, and plans for utilization. As a
result, the enemy will not be able to pur-

1982

posefully conduct military actions and to

effectively utilize his own weapons. (Our)
forces, having skillfully applzed.maskirovka, will receive both moral and material
superiority over the enemy: (Our) actions
will be of a surprise nature, unexpected,
and will allow (us) to achieve victory with
less effort. 18 (Erttphasis added.)
Although Beketov's final words may
signify a Soviet belief that the purpose of
effective maskirovka is to reduce the total
amount of Soviet military strength required for achieving victory, they <;10 not
connote any "less effort" regarding maskzrovka itself. This is true precisely because of the nature of contemporary war.
First, the enemy possesses greater technological capabilities in reconnaissance
(as Shchedrov points ouo. Also, these
advanced capabilities are not as dependent as in the past on the presence of good
weather and daylight for reliable target
detection. Moreover, maskzrovka is more
difficult to achieve simply because of the
greater numbers of weapons, troops and
other equipment which now must be
concealed. 19 Finally, the abbreviated
amount of time available for planning
and preparing military maneuvers also
reduces the time available for implementing deceptive practices.
Nonetheless, an extensive expenditure
of energy and time is required for Soviet
forces to achieve effective maskzrovka
during contemporary warfare. Consequently, the USSR demands that Its com
manders strictly observe several basic
guidelines for the application of deceptive
practices to ensure that successful maskirovka is realized.
The first of these guidelines is the requirement for aktivnost' in maskirovka.
Implying the active application of deception, this guideline connotes "actionoriented" measures which degrade enemy
capabilities to assess accurately Soviet

27

MILITARY REVIEW
troop and weapon locations, defenses and
overall battle intentions. 20 Briefly stated,
the goal of aktivnost' is the creation of
confusion among the enemy, thereby
leading him to choose nonproductive
courses of action.
Second, Soviet military planners urge
that maskirovka be ubeditel'nyi or pravdopodobnyi (persuasive or plausible). The
primary thrust of this guideline is that
the application of deceptive measures
(camouflage, decoys, false troop or fire
concentrations) be fulfilled in a manner
that is, above all, convincing. 2 ! Hence, if
decoys are utilized, they must truly replicate the object which they are representing. In the case of camouflage for concealment, the type of camouflage selected
should ideally blend in with the natural
surroundings of the battlefield. 22
The third set of guidelines emphasized
by Soviet military planners stresses the
nepl'eryvnost' (continuity) and svoevremennost' (timeliness) of all deceptive
practices. 23 Efforts to conceal Soviet force
elements and their activities are to be
undertaken continuously and in a timely
fashion. "Gaps" in the maskirovka are regarded as breaches which threaten the
survivability of Soviet forces."4 The factors of continuity and timeliness also
underscore the need to practice camouflage measures from the moment hostilities commence to their termination-at
all levels of application.
The fourth and final guideline set forth
by Soviet planners is the requirement for
raznoobraznye (varied or diverse) applications of maskirovka. 25 This guideline
emphasizes the enemy's apparent ability
to discern stereotypical or repetitive
measures used to conceal or deceive. The
expressed concern is to avoid uncreativity
and redundancy in the use of masktrovka
so that it retains its inherent flexibility as
an "art" form.
28

Following this general discussion of

Soviet deceptive measures, what specifically does the art of maskirovka entail?
There are four broad categories of maskirovka which encompass a number of specific techniques aimed at hampering enemy
detection capabilities. These four categories include:
Camouflage measures-both "natural" and technical-used for purposes of
concealment (skrytte).
Imitation (imitatsiia) which includes
decoys, dummies and measures to deform
the shape or contours of specific installations, facilities or force groupings.
Demonstration <deceptive) maneuvers <demonstrativnye manevryl. .
Disinformation <dezin(ormatsiial.
The application of these basic types of
maskirovka may be either active or passive. Active applications "require im-

Soviet reconnaissance troops in the snow

wearing white clothing for concealment

July

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

mediate response and action from the
enemy" while the "passive mode usually
includes measures which do not serve to
evoke immediate enemy response or
actions."26

Concealment
Soviet maskirovka for the purpose of
concealment underwent extensive development throughout World War II. Its
contemporary application, though more
sophisticated than in the past, draws
heavily on these earlier versions. Camouflage for concealment is officially described as:
. . . the eliminatwn or lessening of troop
markings, weapon complex markzngs, and
their functions. This includes keeping secret the commanders' plans, uszng natural
geography by the troops as camouflage,
using natural coverings, applying technical means of camouflage, and dispersing
forces. 27
For troops in the field, these measures
include a broad array of diverse activities-some quite simple, others more
elaborate. In order to limit enemy detection at night, for instance, troop units are
warned about simple light discipline.
There are prohibitions against the use of
smoking materials, campfires and electric
lights except in specifically designated
areas where black-out or dim-out precautions have been taken. 28 Vehicle moveouts at night are to be conducted with the
utmost attention to black-out procedures.
These routine measures highlight a
consistent aspect of the Soviet view on
concealment: Nighttime conditions and
inclement weather are considered to be
valuable natural "masks."
The Soviets recognize that technological advances in reconnaissance capabilities have made nighttime (and poor
weather) target detection easier for the

1982

enemy. However, the fact remains that

these natural coverings still provide the
most natural and easiest techniques
available for achieving conce~lment.29
In short, Soviet military planners demand that units take maximum advantage of the best natural concealment
available. Additionally, nighttime (or
other low-visibility conditions) is recognized by the Soviets as an optimal time
for launching surprise operations. Thus,
there is an additional requirement to take
extra precautions for 'concea-ling operational preparations at night.
The Soviets also deceive the enemy by
simulating electrical power generators .
Or they may use corner, diapole and flat
reflectors to reflect the emission of enemy
radar, and thereby create interference
(evidenced as blips) on enemy radar display screens. 30 Shchedrov provides additional detail on the broad application of
reflectors in contemporary warfare. He
writes:
With the aid of corner reflectors it IS also
pOSSIble to camouflage against observation
such targets as bridges. dams, and other
road structures and, consequently, to prevent theIr destructwn by a nuclear strike
or by precision bombing byaircraft. 3 !
Other technical means for concealment
include optical measures such as smoke
screens or special paints which reduce
physical signatures or distort the contours of an object.32 Special troop outerwear may also be included in this cate
gQry. Moreover, a great number of camouflage coverings or masks are utilized by
Soviet forces. Vertical coverings are
erected to restrict the effectiveness of
enemy ground observation efforts, and
horizontal applications are used against
enemy aerial detection. 33
These concealment coverings may be
flat, convex or concave. They are applied
in the field in the form of screens, nets or

29

MILITARY REVIEW

Radar corner reflector

awnings over roads and equipment, along

march routes, and so forth. Examples of
some techniques are presented here.
All of these various measures are to be
easily portable and capable of rapid
assembly.3' High priority is attached,
above all, to the use of natural terrain
features whose exploitation does not require extensive preparation or expenditures oflabor. This point is emphasized by
one Soviet military author when he states
that:
Large forest tracts remain, as before,
effectwe natural cover concealIng the
regrouping and maneuver of troops .
. . . March routes can also be selected
along the edge of forests, ravines, and
other natural terrain features. Good natural cover which conceals the movement of
troops is provided by forests planted
alongside roads. 35
In choosing a site which possesses natural cover and concealment, Soviet military
planners also recognize the need to consider the site's dispersal properties. Rapid
force dispersal must be easily atteinable
from a site:
... march routes through forests must be

3D

selected in areas where there IS a well-developed network of lanes and roads which
would provide free maneuver for units and
divisIOns, and sWIft egress to safe areas In
case of forest fires or obstacles. 36
Concealment efforts are also undertaken to reduce the evidence of Soviet dispersal activities. To conceal dispersion,
Soviet camouflage experts stress that
veblcle movements should be permitted
"only along existing routes in order to
avoid the formation of new tracks on the
terrain."37

Other specific masklrovka techniques

wbich are employed by the Soviets for various purposes include: 38
Sound camouflage which is directed
against hostile acoustic reconnaissance
and is implemented by reducing the noise
level of operating vehicles and machinery
or by active acoustic simulations.
Heat camouflage which is directed
against heat ran~ing instruments and
otber enemy equipment capable of detecting thermal contrast objects.
Radar and radio camouflage which is
conducted to make the operation of hostile
radar and radio reconnaissance difficult or

JUly

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Camouflage covl"rs

impossible by establishing strict radar

and radio operating conditions, limiting
the operation of radio-electronic equipment and eliminating revealing signs
when utilizing these means. New Soviet
capabilities in this latter area include
radar jamming screens which simulate

1982

force dispositions-a technique of Soviet

radio electronic combat. 39

Imitation
The Soviet military also made extensive
use of so-called imitative maskirouka dur-

31

MILITARY REVIEW
ing World War 11,40 and it still views such
practices as valuable in deceiving potential adversaries. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines imitation as:
... the creation of fake or decoy positions
indicating dzspersed troops and weapons
systems with the help of radio-electronic
technologies, smoke, and other technical
means."
However, the rigors of high-technology
warfare have placed new demands on the
Soviet practice of imitation. Whereas decoys and dummies were designed to confuse the enemy visually in the past, the
application of these measures today must
also account for a much wider variety of
technical detection capabilities which will
be employed on the battlefield. Specifically, it is necessary:
... that dummy objectives (including
mock-ups) possess the physical properties
of the equipment being simulated . .. not
only having theu appropriate form, but also
being capable of reflecting any light, heat
and electromagnetzc energy which falls on
them, and also themselves creating heat
emissions, a magnetic field around themselves, etc. Otherwise, modern means ofreconnaissance will differentiate with relative ease between the true and false
targets."
It is with this concern in mind that the
Soviet military has developed realistic
simulations of personnel, tanks, armored
personnel carriers, mortars, trucks, artn:

lery, missiles, field kitchens, command

and control facilities', airfields, fuel storage depots, and so forth.' 3 Soviet commentary on these simulations is instructive:
A large camp or supply base can be
camouflaged as a town, a tank farm can be
camouflaged as apartment houses. while
individual military installations can be
camouflaged as rubble. smoldering ruins.
etc."
Demonstration Maneuvers
As with the two previous categories, the
modern Soviet practice of demonstration
maneuvers dates back to World War 11."
This type of maskirovka consists of:
... preplan ned demonstrations by actual
units which simulate force movements,
troop concentrations. and the conduct of
military and other related operations with
the aim of creating for the enemy a distorted concept of the commands' battle
intentions.'6
In implementing this type of action, the
Soviet military should be cognizant of
several potential problems or tradeoffs
associated with its use. First. and particularly at the operational or strategic levels,
demonstration maneuvers would likely
require relatively large numbers of personnel and equipment to simulate effectively false battlefield intentions.
Second. such demonstration forces
would have to maintain appropriate dis-

Decoy lank

32

July

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

tances from other troop formations involved in actual operations. If they fail to
do so, enemy strikes could effectively destroy both the demonstration group and its
adjacent combat units.
FinaIly, based on several mishaps noted
in the application of demonstration exercises during World War II, the Soviets
should be aware of the possibility of deficient coordination among the forces involved in conducting demonstration
maneuvers.47 The effectiveness of Soviet
demonstration operations would be vastly
diluted if neighboring friendly force units
were unaware of the ongoing deceptive
maneuvers and were thus unable to exploit their results.

Dlsinformation
Involving not only the Soviet military,
but also high-policy levels and intelligence forces, disinformation (or misinformation) is most frequently utilized in
conjunction with the other forms of maskirovka discussed above. To cite an. exSoviet KGB (Committee of State Security)
operative, disinformation:
... is not just lying for the sake of lying;
it is expected to serve as a subtle means of
inducing another government to do what
the Kremlin wants it to do or to frighten
and bluff a foreign government into inaction or into making a concession to the
USSR.48
The military application of disinformation has as its aim the redirection of enemy
reconnaissance activities away from "the
situation at hand" to false representations
of Soviet intentions at all levels of application. Successful redirection serves as a
foundation for the achievement of surprise. 49 This objective is realized by:
... disseminating false information by
way of technical means of communication,
by the press, through radio broadcasts,

1982

television, radio-electronic means, and

false documents. 5o
This form of deception requires the
utmost coordination throughout the entire
political-military establishment to be truly effective against an adversary.
Finally, in concluding this discussion of
the four major categories of deceptive activities, it should be understood that all
are considered to be integral components
of the Soviet art of maskirovka. Each is
most effective if applied in a coordinated
and disciplined manner. There is synergy
among the categories if they are selectively integrated to support military operations at any level of application required.
Moreover, a single type of maskirovka can
perform several functions, and hence the
"multipurpose" role of maskirovka should
be recognized by individual Soviet
commanders. 51
Despite the fact that Soviet military authors repeatedly emphasize the importance of maskirovka and the requirement
for its careful and disciplined application,
it appears that it is not practiced effectively during peacetime. Recent articles in the
Soviet military press discuss with gravity
a pervasive "lethargy" toward maskirovka
which is evidenced among Soviet forces.
Some commanders are apparently reluctant to train their troops in the art of deception, and thus they fail to fulfill training norms in this skill area. 52
Moreover, some forces which have received training in deception are criticized
for slovenly, careless applications. 53 Careless applications could create immense
problems for the forces involved. As a
Soviet World War II regulation on masklrovka states: "Maskirovka that is not fulfiIled completely is a waste of energy and
skills."54
However, these peacetime deficiencies
notwithstanding:
... it cannot be assumed that the rather

33

MILITARY REVIEW
than in the past. Coupled with the greater
importance assigned to these concepts is
an increasingly sophisticated Soviet technology for applying deception in warfare.
Paradoxically, greater techn{)logical
sophistication in enemy reconnaissance
capabilities would impinge upon successful application of these refined deceptive
techniques in a postulated future conflict.
Nevertheless, for the Soviets, surprise
and deception remain as decisive factors
for achieving military victory. An open
question is whether or not the Soviets can
actually achieve surprise and deception
in a future war. Their own evaluation of
problems in applying these concepts suggests that Soviet military planners themselves do not regard these applications as
an "easy" matter.
If anything, the reader is left with an
uneasy feeling regarding the contemporary Soviet use of surprise and deception.
Soviet views on these concepts are
grounded in historical experience which
serves as the basis for present-day guidelines in applying these measures. A system thus exists for achieving surprise and
deception. And, while certain deficiencies
mar the effective application of this system, these problems have not gone undetected and are openly discussed in the
Soviet military press. The central ques-'
tion which remains is how effective the
Soviets will be if they seek to surprise or
to deceive. And, as indicated in the introduction to Part I of this article, the
answer to that question will probably not
be readily available until after the fact.

casual attitude toward camouflage and

concealment displayed by some (Soviet)
commanders during peacetime would be
evident during combat operations. The
Soviets demonstrated in WW II the capability of conducting large-scale military operations concurrently with the employment
ofa multitude ofdeceptive practices including effective camouflage and concealment.
In any future war or period of tension the
Warsaw Pact must be credited with the
capability of implementing doctrinal
guidelines which require effective camouflage and concealment measures. 55
In short, stringent requirements for
practicing or conducting deception during
peacetime may be so time-consuming and
complex that it will not be implemented
effectively until a discernible threat is
present. Hence, Soviet peacetime efforts
in deception may be limited to measures
which can be easily implemented or readily applied. Should the Soviet military
leadership come to require "intensive" applications of deception as a prerequisite to
an offensive surprise attack, it is presumed that this evidenced "lethargy"
would be rapidly replaced by energetic
efforts to achieve effective deception.
CONCLUSIONS
The current Soviet military perspective
on the roles of surprise and deception in
warfare is that both concepts are now more
essential for achieving military victory

For more on deception, see Field Manual 902. Tactical Deception.-Editor.

NOTES
1 See the Executive Summary of Jack Mace. SOViet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Force Camouflage and Concealment TeChniques. (Unclassified),

Defense Intelligence Agency. Washington, 0 Co, 1978
2 A A.8ekalov,A.P Belokon endS G ChermashentSev,MesklfOv.
ka dSlsrvfl podrazdelanif sukhoputmkh vo/sk, Voennoe Izdalel'stvo Mlnls-

34

lerstva Oborony SSSR, Moscow, USSR, 1976, P 5

~ A A Bulatov and V G, Prozoro.... TaldJchaSKme vnezepnast', Vaen
noe Izdalel'stvo M!n!slerstva Oborony SSSR, Moscow. USSR, 1965, P 34
4 V A. Efimov and S. G Chermashentsev, "Maskirovka," Sovetsks/8
VoennaJa Entslk/opedli8, Voennoe Izdate!sl....o Mlnlslerslva Oborony

July

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

SSSR, Moscow, USSR, Volume 5, 1978, P 175
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid; see also lieutenant Colonel Kh Adam and lieutenant Cotonel
R. Gebel, "Military Camouflage," MiliUi.rwBsen, Number 9, 1970, and
Number 3,1971, pp 79 and 81
7 Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerri/fa Warlare,
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MICh,. 1963, P 21
8 Ehmov and Chermashentsev, op Cit, and Adam and Gebel, op Cit
9 Lieutenant General Ya. Dashe...skIY, "OrgantZlng and Executing
OperalJonal Camouflage, Concealment and DecepUon." Voyenno
Istonchesloy ZhurnaJ. Number 4, 1980, P 46 Transleted by JOint Publication Research Service, Number 98107, 24 July 1990, pp 4656.
10 ElimovandCharmashentse.... op clt,.AdamandGebel.op CIt ,see
also Colonel B Varenyshev, "Sredst'Oa masklrovkl," Voennye manila,
Number 10, 1979, P 28
11 Alexander Werth, RUSSia at Wer, /941-1945, E P Dutton & Co.
N.Y., 1964. P 141
12 Mace,op cit, P 33
13 Ibid
14 See, far an example of the Soviet view of surpnse dunng the ManchurianCampalgn, AA VaSllevsky. Routolthe KwantungArmy, supple
ment to Soviet Military ReVIew, Number 9. 1980, see atso V A. MatsulenkO, Opera!Jvn8l8 Masklrovka vOlsk (po opvtu velll{Qlotechastvennol
vomy), Vaennoe Izdater'stvo Mintslerslva Obornoy SSSR Moscow.
USSR, 1975, pJ) 171-72
15 Paul Martell, Strategic Surprise In the' 944 SOvlel Summer Fall
Campaign A Csse Study, ' History. Numbars, and War, Volume 2, Number 3. Fall 1978. pp 118-26
16 Ibid. p 126
17 Cotonel V Shchedrov, "Camouflaging Troops Durmg Regrouping
Bnd Maneuver." Voennava mYS/. June 1966. p 61
18 8eketov. 8etokon end Chermashentsev. op Cit, P 4
19 IbId
20 IbId, pp 910, and M I Tolochk:ov. MasKlrovlle na 'lome. Izdatel
stvo DOSAAF (Voluntary Society lor Cooperahon WJ\h the Army, Air
Force and Navy). Moscow. USSR, 1958, P 6
21 Beketav, Belokan and Chermashentse\!. op CIt. pp 1112. and
TOlochkov,op Cit. P 11
22 Ibid
23 Beketav, Belokon' and Chermashentsev op Cit. P 12. and Toloch
kov Of) Cit, P 17
24 BeketO\!. Betokon and Chermashentsev. op Cit
25 Varanyshev. Of) Cit. P 28. and Beketov Belokon and Cher

Jenme A. Stet-lenS ~s a semor sc~ent~st wah the

Defense Technology DWlSLOn of Booz, Allen &
Hamilton Inc., Bethesda, Maryland. She recelued
a bachelor's degree m Russ~an language from
Georgetown Univers~ty and tS currently completing her thesis for an MAin Russian area studies
from Georgetown Unwers~ty. Involved m analyses
of SovletlWarsaw Pact mllitary affairs for the past
four years, she lS currently respoTlSlble for assessments of theater nuclear force lssues and Sovlet!
Warsaw Pact ground force capabllzties

1982

meshenlsev,op Cit
26 Dashevskty,oP cft, , p 50.
27 Eflmov and Chermashentse... , op Cit, P 176
28 Mace, op CIt.. P 5
29 Bulatov and Prozorov, op cit, pp 36 37
30 Shchedrov,op cit, p 65: and Mace, op CIt. P 6
31 Shchedrov, op Cit
.,
32 Mace, op CIt. pp 9 and 24
33 Varenyshev.op CIt
34 Shchedrov.op Cit. P 68
35 Ibid. p 64
36 Ibid
37 Ibid,. P 68
'>
38 II should be noted tnat these lechnlques are nol unique 10 the
SaviellWarsaw Pad. meny, If not all, are utilized by the UntIed Stetes end
NATO See Adam and Gebel"op Cit, pp 8384, and Eflmov and Cher
mashentsev.op Cit

39 For a more detailed diSCUSSion olthls pam!, see SovletCemouflage

and Eledromc Warfere," Journal of Bectromc Defense. September
Odober 1980. p 23
40 Colonel tu Malisov, "MaskJlovktr-ae/o vazhoe, VoennVI Vestmk.
Nurnber 12. 1979. P 78 and Beketov. Belokon and Chermashentsev. op
CIt., p 7, lor IllustratIOns al thiS pOint,
41 Eflmov and Chermashenisev. O(J Cit
42 Shcl1edrov,op Cit, P 62
43 Mate,op CII. P 27
44 Adam and Gebel. op CIt, P 81
45 Refer to Totochkov, op Cit, P 50, and DaSl1evSk.1Y, op Cit p 48
46 Eflmov and Cherma&henlsev op Cit
47 DashevsklY,op Cit
48 For bnef diSCUSSions 01 the Soviet apphcatlon of dlslnformatlon
(miSinformation) In the political rnllJ\ary. econorn!c- and mlelhgence
spheres, see Orlov, op Cit, P 21. and LMlslav Bittman, The Decep
tlon Game Czechoslollak Inte/llgence ,n Soviet Political Warlare
Syracuse Umverslly Research CorporatIOn, Syracuse, NY, 1972
pp 20 21
49 Bulatov and Prozorov. op Cit p 42
50 Ibltt, and Ellmo ... and Chermashentsev. O(J Cit
51 Adam and Gebel, op Cit p 86
52 Mallsov,OP Cit, P 75
53 fCud
54 IbId, P 76
55 Mace. Of) Cit, P 34

Henry S. Marsh tS a semor assoctate wuh the

Defense Technology Diulszon of Booz, Allen &
HamtltonInc., Bethesda. Maryland He recewed a
bachelor's degree from Wisconsm State Unwersity
at Oshkosh and an M A. from OhlfJ. Unwerslty.
After serving as an Army mtellzgence officer, he
spent (ilJe years wlth a profess tonal serVlces firm as
dlT'E'ctor ofspecml studles m the mteillgence arena
He has d~rected a number of assessments of Warsaw Pact capabllzttes and mtenttons, as .well as
NATO Theater Nuclear Force Issues.

35

,Colnlnand
and
Control

In

the
2d Arlnored Division
Major General Richard L. Prillaman, US Army

Proper execution of command and control responsibilities

is vital to a unit's success on the battlefield. Methods of
accomplishing this task vary from unit to unit because of
differing conditions and styles of commanders. In this article, a division commander explains procedures used in his
command.

HIS article describes the procedures used in the 2d Armored

Division, Fort Hood, Texas, to exercise
command and control during field operations. Our system is unique. Although it
observes the basic principles expressed in
published doctrine, the application of
those principles is different from any I
have observed. Our system is a result of
the experiences and admitted prejudices I
have accumulated as an 83, G3, J3 and
C3 at battle group, division, corps, army
and combined command levels. They have

36

been validated in the 2d Armored Division in REFORGER 1980, four division

field training exercises and numerous
command post (CP) exercises.
My convictions can be briefly stated:
If a headquarters is to be efficient, it
must be small.
Just as there can be only one commander, there can be only one CP exercising control at anyone time.
If a commander is to be effective in a
crisis, he must limit the number of voices
he hears.

JulV

COMMAND AND CONTROL

If a commander wants his staff to
keep him informed, he should avoid prepared situation briefings and rely on unstructured, unscheduled discussions .
When a commander gives a subordinate a new or revised mission, he
should deliver or explain it orally, preferably face-to-face.
Each of these points requires some
elaboration, and, as we proceed, I will explain how each has been put into practice
in the 2d Armored Division.

Regarding Headquarters Growth

The concept that a headquarters should
be small is supported by everyone, right
up to the time he takes his own outfit to
the field. At that point, good intentions
fall victim to a variety of contrary pressures such as comfort, visitors' accommodations, a desire for briefing facilities
and the conviction of staff officers that
prestige is inversely proportional to the
distance from the flagpole Even a headquarters that starts small will grow like
Jack's beanstalk unless stern measures
are taken to retard its growth.
The first step, of course, is to analyze
carefully the functions that must be performed in the control of combat operations and to exile all others to the Siberia
of the division support area <DSA), but
that is only a start. Periodically, the commander and the chief of staff have to tour
the division main CP and banish those
who are exercising squatter's rights,
rather like the medieval practice of painting a cross on the doors of households
affiicted with the plague. The main CP
can also be made a less desirable residential area by frequent moves which tend to
break coffeepots and hair dryers and
which interrupt the supply of electricity

1982

for lights and heaters.

The division main CP in the 2d
Armored Division routinely includes the
chief of staff and secretary of the general
staff, the G2 section (minus), the G3 section (minus), the division tactical operations center support element from the
combat electronic warfare intelligence
battalion, the assistant division engineer,
the fire support element, the assistant division communications-electronics officer, the air liaison officer, the division airspace management element and the staff
weather officer.
The Gl and G4 share one van, ~nd military police are present as required for
security. The rest of the division staff is in
the DSA where they are housed and fed
by the division support command. The
assistant division commander (ADC)
usually operates out of the DSA, and my
sleeping van/office is nomadic; it could be
at either the mam CP or the tactical CPo
We separate the headquarters company
from the mam CP by at least 1 kilometer,
usually more. All personnel who work by
shift spend off-duty time and eat at the
headquarters:company, as do the military
police. The headquarters mess is split in
order to provide a small commanding
l4eneral's mess to feed those staff officers
who are, in effect, on duty 24 hours a day.
One mess tent, one general purpose
medium tent and three cooks compose the
commanding general's mess which normally feeds an A-C-A ration cycle.
. The signal company that supports the
dIvision headquarters is also located at
least 1 kilometer away, and it feeds and
houses all communicators. Like the personnel of headquarters company, these
soldiers walk to and from chow.
The organization of our tactical CP reflects our philosophy that the tactical CP
is really an alternate rather than a
supplementary CPo It is strictly a com-

37

MILITARY REVIEW
mand and control facility, and it exists
primarily to give the main CP a capability for frequent displacement, with the
emphasis on frequent. Our tactical CP is
limited to 40 personnel, including representatives from G3 and G2, the fire support element, the air liaison officer and
drivers, clerks and radio operators. The
G3 and I use the tactical CP as home base
when command and control is being exercised there. Hot chow is provided once or
twice a day by bringing it from the headquarters company mess in mermite cans.
One requirement is sometimes overlooked. The corps signal battalion must
provide a very-high-frequency multichannel shot to both the tactical CP and main
CP ifthe division is to stay in communication with higher and adjacent units while
it is displacing or when disaster causes
one or the other of its CPs to go off the air.
That is a difHcult bill for the corps signal
officer to fill because he always has more
customers than capability. The cheap
solution of making the tactical CP a satellite of the main CP with a division system
effectively prevents the main CP from
ever breaking down and moving. Of
course, the loss of the main CP effectively
eliminates the tactical CP as well.
The concept I have described does keep
our headquarters small and mobile. A
schematic is shown in the accompanying
figure, but I have not included the specific
details of people and equipment that compose the main CP and the tactical CP. Every division in the Army has a different
level offill in the required and authorized
columns of its Modification Table ofOrganization and Equipment.
However, I believe that our basic system will work for anybody because no one
is more poverty-stricken than we are, and
we are able to do what we must without
taking equipment from our subordinate
units. Of course, the outfit that insists on

38

duckboards, wooden platforms between

vans, portable latrines; and so forth, will
need lots of transportation and labor.

Only One CP May Issue Orders

Unity of command is a principle that
should apply to tactical systems as well as
to organizational models. Accordingly, we
have rejected the concept wherein the tactical CP handles today's battle while the
main CP plans for tomorrow's. That distinction is too vague for practical use, and
there are inevitable conflicts when orders
are issued by two separate sources.
Furthermore, I am not willing to delegate
to any subordinate the authority to make
independent decisions about today's battle because I am afraid the result would
be inconsistent with what I want to do
tomorrow.
So, I keep all decisionmaking in one
place-with me. There is, of course, a distinction between planning and the immediate control of operations in progress.
While only the division main CP has a
capability for planning, control can be exercised by either the main CP or the tactical CP, provided that only the commanderfdecisionmaker is available at the
site designated to be responsible for
issuing orders and receiving reports. Our
rule is that orders, as opposed to plans,
may be issued only by me personally or by
the CP which is in control, and we advise
everyone whenever control is transferred.

Deal With a Limited

Number 01 Subordinates
To say that a commander must limit
the number of voices he hears is another

July

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Forward Command Post

personntlstifflllil

Commafldrng General

G3
IOJ/04G3
I fire support element
I NoncommIssioned otheer
TruckdnverfradlClleleplloneofl,cer

Personnel stllffmg (maximum 40)

PersonnelSlalflng
Chtefof stafl
Of the

Secrrtary

G30flJcer
=
G2off,eer
F,re support ell'menl
AIr !Jalson olheel

general sta!l

G21J
G3(-1
DIVI!>lon tac\lcaf

X
X

opera\lon~

Signa! ~llpport
pol1(.e Iemenl

centertcombat

Mlhtar~

elerlron,c \'tartarE.' Intell'gence element

X
X

fire support element

Air halson oilicer
AS~lstant CIVls,on engineer
DIVf'ilon airspace management pJpmpnl

Asslslant dl\'<5<on communlcalJonsell'clrOlllCS oll'eel

Nucle.H biological chem<cal plrm!.'n!
DIvISion aVIation otl,eet
Staff wl'ather officer

GlIG<1
M!lItary pollel.' plafoon
Commandmg general mess

Personnel staffing
A~sl)!anl

dlVI>ion CO'11mal1df'

Cll-)
G4!-)

Adlulal!

ge~eral

S\JrgPO~

Stall ludge ad~ocall'

P'ovoslmarSha'
Chap1a<f)

G5
l~spectJr genNal
PllbucaUalsoil<ce'

1982

39

MILITARY REVIEW
way of saying that he has to use some of
his smart guys as filters to keep himself
from being buried under the enormous
weight of detailed actions and requirements that characterize a division. In
general, I handle tactical operations and
tactical plans, and I deal directly with the
G3 and subordinate and higher commanders in that arena. The chief of staff
oversees the planning that has to be done
to support the tactical scheme and deals
with the agencies outside the division
that have a role to play in supporting us.
In that regard, we have chosen not to
form an ad hoc planning cell to handle the
deep battle. This is not because we think
the deep battle is unimportant, but because we consider it too important to turn
over to a committee. Once I have given
guidance and set priorities, our planning
is done by the principal staff officers and
supervised by the chief personally.
Actually, that was the way it was done
before we ever started talking about the
deep battle. Except for the small element
of the G3 section th~t is receiving reports
and transmitting instructions, it is too
late for the staff to do anything about the
contest in progress. That one is in the
hands of those who launch bullets and
lead charges, and so the staff is trying to
anticipate the next requirement and prepare for it. The chief of staff pulls that
effort together and keeps it moving in the
direction the commander has set for him.
The ADC (we have only one at Fort
Hood since the other ADC is with the 2d
Armored Division (Forward) in Europe)
oversees the support that is provided from
within the division. He does not take over
the job of the division support command
commander. Rather, he cements the link
between the supporting and the supported at the DSA, the forward area support teams, the trains and wherever the
interface exists. The adjutant general, the

40

GI, the surgeon, the provost marshal and

the commanders of the separate battalions and companies will see him often.
The one thing he does not do is issue operations orders to combat units, ever, and
rarely does he deal directly with members
of the division staff except in asking for
information. The staff works for the chief.
Unity of command strikes again.
There is plenty of interplay among the
three broad categories of responsibility. I
cannot abrogate command responsibility
for any of them, but, if! keep the chief of
staff and the ADC properly informed ajl to
the game plan, they should be able to
keep us outfitted without my worrying
about the laundry schedule for socks.
A corollary to limiting the subordinates
to be dealt with directly is that the commander and the staff must restrict their
requests for information to that which is
needed to get the job done. As our communications capability has improved and
expanded, we have enlarged our demands
for data to a level that saturates the system. Whenever we find a new means of
data collection, we immediately devise
needs that it can fill. The result is a deluge of information that cannot be filtered,
analyzed or used. So, we adjust by ripping
off additional transport and staff officers
to store and record the input in case someone asks for it.
Deciding what is important is an art
rather than a science. But a judgment
must be made and tactical standing operating procedures revised to cut out every
recurring report that does not clearly
satisfy a genuine need at the level of command asking for it. A general rule of
thumb is that any information that does
not call for a definite action or reaction
(tactical decision, reordering of priorities,
requisition, request or report to higher
headquarters) is not essential and should
be eliminated.

July

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Keeping the Commander Informed

The conventional US Army solution to
the problem of keeping the commander
informed is the 1700 staff briefing. In my
opinion, there is no worse way to do it.
By their very nature, staff situation
briefings are designed to deceive-the
golden rules are to avoid anything that
will cause a question, and to say nothing
that might be critical or embarrassing.
The perfect briefing is one in which the
only utterances from the boss are "Be
seated, please," and "Thank you, let's go
to supper." An inordinate amount of staff
time is consumed in gathering and filtering the data that must fill ih the blanks
on the charts. If I were an enemy commander, I would always make my big
attacks at 1630, secure in the knowledge
that no American commander would be
informed until the evening briefing adjourned. Some commanders probably
would not hear about it until the next
evening, following the weather.
We try hard to avoid a routine, but a
loose pattern has evolved. I see the chief
of staff at least twice a day to exchange
information, ideas and plans, and the
same thing applies to the ADC who might
be living in the DSA rather than the division main CPo I usually eat breakfast
with the staff at the main CPo When
everyone has finished, we have a sort of
council of war in the mess tent, with
everyone describing the hottest issue on
his agenda for the day.
Since it is an open discussion rather
than a briefing, the real problems tend to
surface, and there is a chance for substantive guidance. The chief usually gets the
staff together again after the evening
meal, without my presence, and he gives
me a private report later in the evening. I

1982

am sure that the system we use leaves me

uninformed to some degree. But I like to
believe that I know all I neea to, particularly on matters that are 'time-sensitive,
and that I have the advice as well as the
information that the staff should provide
me.

Issue Orders Face-to-Face

My final tenet, which requires that initial orders be issued orally from commander to commander, is .just a way of
ensuring a thorough understanding of the
commander's intention throughout the
unit. No matter how gifted the G3, he
cannot describe the nuances of the commander's concept in the formal, stylized
process we use for issuing operations
orders. In that regard, when I issiie an
oral order, I try to avoid the use of any
term that has a definition in a military
text. While there is sound theory behind
the development of precise terminology,
the battlefield is not the place for an examination in Army semantics.
For example, instead of saying "Defend
along this line," I prefer to elaborate with,
"Do not allow the enemy to get south of
this line with anything larger than a company, and do not allow direct fire on this
road. You may give ground to the south of
this mountain temporarily, but you must
Etiect any force that gets there." The two
missions that require the most lengthy
explanations are "delay" and "screen."
Those jobs are very hard to do under the
best of circumstances, and they become
impossible if the doer does not grasp what
is demanded of him.
Along with a careful description of
what is desired, there should be an explanation of why. Only through an awareness of what the boss is trying to accom-

41

MILITARY REVIEW
plish can subordinates make intelligent
decisions that will support the purpose.
Eyeball-to-eyeball orders provide a
chance to sense if intentions are fully
understood. Accomplishing this well forward in the area of operation also gives
an opportunity for commanders to see the
ground together and to share views and
firsthand knowledge. That becomes especially important in the attack.
Too frequently, the tendency is to take
the goose egg assigned to the division by
higher headquarters and subdivide it into
a number of segments equal to the number of units making the attack. While
that process is fine for giving the attack a
direction, it does not do much for the subordinate who is trying to decide how
much or what part he should occupy. He
does not know just what will be accomplished by what he is to do.
lt would be much better to say, "Your
destination is here, and, in this area, I
want to have unrestricted use of this road
network, no enemy {)bservation of this
bridge, and I would like the ground surveillance radars to be able to see this
point. You do (do not) have to physically
tie in with Joe because .... " After an explanation of that kind, the assignment of
an objective is almost unnecessary, and,
as a matter of fact, I now use a limit of
advance as a control measure much more
frequently than I do an objective. The
subordinate is then free to choose the terrain that best satisfies the purpose.
Another advantage of an order issued
in that fashion is that it forces the division commander to think through the
whole scheme and come to his own conclusions about what is important to him.
Once that basic order is issued, the inevitable fragmentary orders make sense,
and the commander can be reasonably
confident that very brief instructions can
be understood and implemented in a way

42

that is consistent with. his overall plan.

Nevertheless, there should be continuous
dialogue between the director and the
directed, and we have a technique that is
a great help in making such dialogues
possible during periods when lots of
changes must be made.
There are times when neither the tactical CP nor the main CP has enough
mobility to satisfy my need for a clear
understanding of conditions and for immediate access to subordinate commanders. When the whole division is moving,
either forward or backward, I like to be
able to keep pace with it and be in a position to change direction, alter task organization, confer with commanders and, in
general, be in a position to make decisions
or give guidance promptly and personally. In order to do that, I pull one M577 out
of the tactical CP and take it forward. A
G3 representative, an officer from the fire
support element and a driver/radio operator constitute the crew, and command
and control is exercised from this forward
CP during critical times.
The G3 and I operate out of this facility
using either the jeep or the helicopter for
travel to subordinate commanders
whenever new orders or guidance must be
issued. By selective monitoring of subordinate radio nets, I can keep my finger
on the pulse of the division in a way that
is simply not possible at the division main
CP, and brigade commanders find it fairly
easy to let me know their needs. The
M577 is too austere to serve as a CP for
prolonged periods, but it is very useful
during times of crisis.

The Bottom Line: The Commander Commands

Way back when I was a company grade
officer attending the basic course at Fort

July

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Knox, Kentucky, and the advanced
course at Fort Benning, Georgia, I was
required to spend a lot of time studying
troop leading procedures for platoon leaders and company commanders. However,
when I tried to prepare myself for my
present job, I found precious little study
material that was useful. Nobody teaches
troop leading procedures for generals.
The Army's doctrinal literature is either
too broad and general to be useful, or it is
simply impractical and, like the "estimate of the situation" (which I have never
seen used in a division or corps), is simply
not used.
In the absence of doctrinal guidance,
each commander develops his own system
provided he is lucky and gets his headquarters to the field often enough to influence the process, and so all divisions and
corps do business in a different way. From
the purely operational viewpoint, that is
not necessarily bad because the commanders themselves are different, and their
organizations will be most efficient if they
are tailored to the boss's style and way of
doing business. The problems start when
the technicians try to design equipment
to fit our command and control needs.
They have no common basis for deciding
what those needs are, and their solutions sometimes solve the wrong problems.

~~,
~
,~

1982

In the case of the 2d Armored Division,

for example, we do not need a great deal
in the way of high-technology command,
control and communications gear, and we
probably would not use it much if we had
it (we would settle for better generators).
On the other hand, the fellow who follows
me may have an entirely different
approach and be inclined to fight his battles electronically. His solution may be
better than mine, but his problem will be
that, for years to come, his options will be
limited to what he can do with the existing inventory. One of the merits of the
system I have described in this article is
that it works well with what we have
now.
Our system of command and control in
the 2d Armored Division is different from
others mainly in its reliance on personal
contact and communication, and the
hardware, headquarters composition and
support systems have been tailored to
permit that sort of approach. Tactical
guidance comes from one source and is
not delegated to an ADC or to a special
assistant or staff group. Is it too personal,
and does it rely too much on one individual? Maybe, but, until commanders
are officially replaced by committees,
the guy with the fiddle should call the
tune.
~

Major General RIchard L. Pnllaman lS commander, 2d Armored DWlslon, Fort Hood, Texas
He recewed a B.S. from the Virginia MIlitary In-

stltute and is a graduate of the USACGSC and

the US Army War Coliege. Ass.gnments mclude
servmg as com,mander of the US Army Traimng

Center and Fort Jackson, Fort Jackson, South

Carolina. and as ass.stant ch.ef of staff. G3.
EIghth US Army. and assistant chief of staff. J3.
Umted NatlOns CommandlUS Forces, Korea.

43

CAUSES OF WAR
War is a phenomenon as old as organized society, but its
scope has become far greater in recent years. Man has mastered his environment so that he now has unprecedented
means to deliver destruction anywhere in the world. In an
attempt to explain the reason for this condition, it is first
necessary to recognize that there are many diverse points
of view with regard to the nature of war and its causes.
These views largely reflect the values or attitudes people
maintain concerning the legitimacy and usefulness of war.
These values, in turn, influence the likelihood of war occurring. Wars most often begin as a consequence of both primary and secondary causes; there is no single cause of war.
Secondary causes represent the immediatejustification for
war, such as entangling alliances, armament rivalries, and
so forth, but they do not answer the question: Why do these
problems and situations arise? The prime causes of war are
those factors which are most basic and from which stem all
other causes. In almost every case, the prime causes ire
classified as consequences of the human element. It is in
this arena that we find the most revealing insights and
prognostications.

AR is defined in Webster's Dictionary as the state or fact of

exerting violence or force against a state
or other politically organized body; especially, a contest by force between two or
more nations or states. Because of very
diverse points of view and controversy
with regard to the nature of war, the author hereafter will simply refer to war as
the condition which equally permits two
or more hostile states to carryon a conflict by armed force.
War is probably the most destructive
and depraved state of affairs that can or
does exist on earth. It is organized and
systematic killing accompanied by rapine, robbery and other forms of social degradation. It has grown increasingly deadly in recent centuries. According to one
study, if the prllsent growth rate of tenfold about every 50 years were to continue, wars, by around the end of this cen_tury, would kill the equivalent of the present popUlation of the globe. 1

The world has contracted, destructive

potential has expanded and science has
burgeoned. Partly as a consequence of
technological developments, and partly as
an independent result of political change,
the number of deaths from war has increased. War is, of course, a phenomenon
as old as organized society, but its scope
has become greater in recent years. There
have been fewer major wars in the last
couple of centuries, but those that have
occurred have involved far more people
than ever before. Man has mastered his
environment so that he has unprecedented means to deliver destruction anywhere.
As stated previously, there are many
different points of view about the nature
of war. Two views that the author finds
especially important and intriguing are:
War is a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means.
War is a breakdown of order.
The first view was formally proposed

45

MILITARY REVIEW
and emphasized by the German, Karl von
Clausewitz, during the 19th century.
However, it is unlikely that he was the
originator of this view. It has existed in
some form or another for many centuries,
and it persists in the writings of some
men today. Mao Tse-tung once said:
War is the continuation of politics. In
this sense, war is politics and war itself is
a political action ... politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with
bloodshed. 2
If one accepts this view, he will likely
equate the legitimacy of a government's
political actions to the legitimacy of war.
This could justify the use of force to sweep
away any obstacle beyond which politics
cannot proceed by the usual means.
The second view of war has been argued
by many legalists for centuries. War is
viewed as the consequence of a situation
in which legal sanctions are unable to
maintain an accepted system of law. 3
Warfare may represent the breakdown of
bargaining and a test of strength by the
last resort of acts which aim at extermination, destruction or unconditional
surrender."
John Locke observed that there are
only two ways of settling disputes between men-law or force-and, where
there is no law, force is the ultimate
arbiter. 5 If this view is accepted. it implies that one denies the legitimacy of
war as an institution, and it would tend to
discourage the justification of war to resolve conflicts.
War may also be viewed as a determined or voluntary act. The deterministic
point of view holds th'at every event can
be explained by natural laws. With a formula expressing the relationship of such
laws and with complete knowledge of the
,state of the universe at any moment, it,
therefore, would be possible to predict
what would happe~ in any part of the

46

universe at any future time.

The voluntaristic view holds that
embarkation upon war is an act of free
will, and its consequences change the
course of history. While no one denies
that antecedent conditions, social laws,
circumstances, tendencies and generalizations of experience exercise some influence, practical writers and jurists often
treat the initiation of war as, in large
measure, an act of choice by at least one of
the parties.
The author also accepts this view, that
man does have his agency to manipulate
physical and social laws to achieve a desired outcome. Man's greatest limitation
is his ignorance of these laws and their
functions. If all laws of nature were
known, man would not be a slave to them,
but, rather, he could be their master.

Causes
The phrase, "causes of war," has been
used in many senses by scientists, historians and publicists. This is because wars
arise as a result of changing relations of
numerous variables-technological. psychological, social and intellectual. There
is no single cause of war.
Causes of war may be viewed at many
levels depending on the principle being
examined. For the sake of this analysis,
the causes shall be divided into prime or
root causes and into secondary or immediate causes. The prime causes are those
factors which are most basic and from
which stem all other causes. No attempt
shall be made here to include and evaluate all sources of war. That would take
years and would still, in all likelihood, be
incomplete. Only an attempt to list a few
examples of secondary causes, and to
study some of the more important pri-

July

mary causes, shall be made.

Ten secondary causes are entangling
alliances, armament rivalries, colonial
rivalries, commercial or economic policies, concept of sovereignty or exertion of
"national rights," dynastic claims, unsettled controversies, aspirations for national unification, insulting communications
or ultimatums, and inadvertent behavior
or error.
After reviewing these secondary causes,
a question which must be asked is: Why
do these problems and situations arise? In
every case, the answer may be traced
back to something else-which is referred
to as a prime cause.
In almost every case, the prime causes
of war are classified as consequences of
the human element. Wars are ultimately
clashes not of armies, laws or even cultures, but of masses of individuals. Each
is a distinct personality whose behavior,
while affected by the command of a superior officer, by laws and by significant
symbols, is also affected by individual
heredity and individual experience. Upon
these individual elements rests the power
of social, legal and political superstructures.
War is the result of human capacity for
aggressive behavior, the socialization
process and "will." It is important to note
at this time that the capacity for aggressive behavior may be a necessary antecedent to war, but it is clearly not the sole
or effective cause. Although man has
potentialities for destructive aggression,
he also has tendencies toward affiliation
and cooperation. 6
A human desire to improve one's condition (wealth, power, social solidarity, and
so forth) may be one of the prime causes of
war. As a consequence of these desires
and. their frequent incompatibility, conflicts of interest are created, and these, in
turn, disrupt a state of equilibrium. Con-

1982

"In almost every case, the

prime causes of war are classified as consequences of the
human element. Wars are ultimately clashes not of armies,
laws or even cultures, but of
masses of individuals."
flict and hostilities would terminate only
with conquest or re-establishment of the
balance (in some cases, a balance of power) and would recur whenever the equilib- '
rium became seriously disturbed.
When incompatible desires for ~ealth,
territory or power are encountered, a
sense of being "blocked" may develop. The
blocks to growth may not be 0I1ly personal, but may relate to ethnic, religious, racial or national background. This condition usually results in a feeling of deprivation, frustration or alienation. 7
According to the Deprivation-Frustration
Hypothesis, this condition may lead to
some form of aggression ..
It is an interesting point to observe also
the role that the existing sources of power
may play in expediting one's desire to expand. If the means are available to exercise force, and other methods are impotent, then that power must somehow be
utilized. The greater the availability of
power, the more likely it will be used.
War and violence may also come from a
perceived danger to a group defending a
pattern of traditional values. This may
take many forms. For example. men and
governments can find themselves in
situations where they believe they must
fight or cease to exist, and so they fight
from necessity. A person may use violence
out of fear for his own safety under pressure from others who demand his services,
or men and governments may fight for an
ideology (doctrine of existential meaningfulness). This perceived danger may be
real or imaginary. In fact, the expectation
of war may, in itself, be a cause of war."
Every group maintains a set of core

47

MILITARY REVIEW
values which it perceives as essential.
These values may vary greatly from
group to group. The most common,
however, is survival of self and family.
Other values may include the preservation of liberty, expansion of ideology, religious freedom, and so forth.
According to traditional Christian doctrine, the use afforce to repress evil may be
justifiable under certain conditions, including the followzng:
I. The use afforce must have a reasonable chance of success.
2. If successful, it must offer a better
situation than the one that would prevail
.
in the absence of the use of force.
3. The force that is used must be proportional to the objectives being sought (or
evil being repressed). For this to be satisfied, peaceful means of redress must have
failed.
4. The force must be used with the intention of sparing noncombatants and
with a reasonable prospect of actually
doing SO.9
According to Communist doctrine, all
wars that are progressive are just, and all
wars that impede progress are unjust. A
progressive war is one which furthers the
Communist cause. lD
The defense of traditional values as a
prime cause of war also includes the possibility that wars may be considered consequences of the contacts of diverse cul~
tures. Behind the state is the nation. The
latter implies a group whose members
feel themselves a unit because of common
culture, customs, practices and responses,
and react spontaneously as a unit against
encroachments. In this case, wars could
be perceived as forms of social conflict
occurring spontaneously from group behavior patterns or from the effort ofleaders to preserve these patterns by intensifying loyalty to the symbols of the group
or extending the influence of preferred

48

symbols into new areas. l l

Conviction of the superiority of one's
own group and one's own position may result in the tendency to polarize, to
stereotype, to see differences in terms of
devils and angels; the readiness to hate
and to love, irrationally; projecting one's
own aggression onto the adversary; and
seeing the world from one's own ethnocentric viewpoint. These and many other
psychological mechanisms often appear to
make agreement or conflict resolution impossible.
However, if war is to be avoided, there
must be, at least to some extent, a meeting of minds, a readiness to agree on alternative solutions to critical problems, a
willingness to negotiate rationally. History is rich in its record of war, but it is
also rich in its record of wars avoided and
disputes settled through negotiations. 12
One of the obstacles to rational negotiation is the problem of stereotypes. These
may succinctly be defined as "pictures in
our heads." They are usually widely held;
they tend to remain relatively stable and
unresponsive to objective facts; and they
involve some degree of evaluation of the
groups concerned.
Stereotypes are generalizations, but
not all generalizations are stereotypes.
The special quality of the stereotype is
that it is based not on carefully collected
data but on hearsay, or on partial and incomplete experience, or on what "people"
have said. This certainly does not mean
that all stereotypes are always false, but,
rather, that they are accepted without
demonstrated fact. '3 It is very difficult to
avoid the stereotyping tendency because
of the obvious temptation to accept convenient shortcuts to generalizations. This
route is easier than engaging in the tiring
and complex task of acquiring the needed
information and reserving judgment until
all the information is collated.

July

Another means which may tend to create or reinforce national stereotypes' is

the language we speak, hear and read
which, through the use of common expressions with an ethnic referent, may
contribute to the tendency to attribute
specific characteristics to ethnic groups.
A corollary to this might include the use
of slang titles to subjugate people to a
subhuman category; this can reinforce
the conviction of the superiority of one's
own group. This is especially common in
hostile situations. Examples are: Gook,
Nip, Kraut, Hard Hat, Longhair, Pig,
Yankee, Red and so forth.
. To accept someone as less than human
can help justify "inhuman" treatment of
that individual. This may become an increasingly deteriorating situation. By
treating those in a group as they are
falsely perceived will cause them to begin
to act in that way which, in turn, reinforces the previous perception.
In addition to understanding stereotypes, it is well to know that human attitudes, particularly in the field of intergroup and international relations. are frequently based on irrational, subjective
factors. Stereotypes refer to what people
think or believe about certain groups, and
attitudes refer to human feeling and the
readiness to behave in certain ways. For
most people, the relationship between
attitudes and opinions is very close. The
possibility that one may have an incomplete understanding and an inaccurate or
irrational attitude is rarely conceded.
To understand the causes of the whole
attitude-opinion complex, it is important
to identify the various unconscious
mechanisms that influence human
thought processes. Some of the most important of these mechanisms are summarized here:
Rationalization-the tendency to interpret personal behavior in such a man-

1982

"A human desire to improve

one's condition (wealth, power,
social solidarity, aI1d so forth)
may be one of the prime causes
of war. As a consequence of
these desires and. their frequent
incompatibility, conflicts of
interest are created, and these,
in 'turn, disrupt a state of equilibrium."
ner as to make it seem just and reasonable.
Projection-attributing one's feelings and emotions to others, particularly
when things are going badly, thereby projecting the blame on someone else .
Displacement-a forbidden Impulse,
such as aggression, is overtly expressed
but against a substitute object.
Denial-an unpleasant experience is
assumed never to have occurred, or a
present dangerous situation dismissed as
nonexistent. (Results in forms of apathy
or fatalism.)
Repression-dismissal from con
sciousness of unsavory experiences and
retention of only the more successful
events.
Resistance-unconscious refusal to
interpret reactIOns correctly, an unwillingness to recognize the real motives that
activate people.
Isolation-enabling a person to hold
simultaneously two opposed and contradictory positions.
Undoing-a token act IS performed to
undo a wrong once done.
Identification-to see oneself as a
p~rt of the same reality or made of the
same substance.
Id versus ego-It is the id that seeks
instinctual gratification and which is not
subject to the laws of logic, nor to considerations of external reality. The ego can
evaluate the external situation and modify the pursuit of pleasure. It can control
id impulses and substitute reason for

49

MILITARY REVIEW
irrationality. (Freudian theory.)"
War and violence may also stem from
the desire to be a part of the flow of
events--to perform the heroic act, to seek
immortality or to be in tune with the "inevitable force of events." This all contributes to a meaningful explanation of life.
This may reduce a feeling of boredom or
restlessness and .may result in a certain
feeling of romanticism or importance.
In a world where old traditions and
values are constantly being warped or
destroyed, many individuals seek a new,
meaningful explanation oflife or attempt
to defend the old ways. The former, traditional pattern of values appears inadequate and unequal to the task of meeting
the modern world. To substitute for this
loss of existential meaning, men may
seek identity in political activity and
commitment to an all-explanatory world
view.!5 There must be a cause for which
one may fight and die if necessary.
There is perhaps no more reliable indication of a society's ripeness for a mass
movement (that is, war is one type) than
the prevalence of unrelieved boredom.
When people are bored, it is primarily
with their own selves that they are bored.
The consciousness of a barren, meaningless existence is the main fountainhead of
boredom. People who are not conscious of
their individual separateness, as is the
case with those who are members of a
compact group, are not accessible to boredom. The differentiated individual is free
of boredom only when he is engaged
either in creative work or some absorbing
occupation or when he is wholly engrossed in the struggle for existence.!6
It is united action and self-sacrifice
which give vigor to any mass movement.
This readiness to fight and to die "for the
cause" consists in separating the individual from his flesh-and-blood self-in
not allowing him to be his real self.

50

This can be achieved by the thorough

assimilation of the individual into a compact collective body; by endowing him
with an imaginary self; by implanting in
him a deprecating attitude toward the
present and riveting his interests on
things that are not yet; by interposing a
fact-proof screen between him and reality; and by preventing, through the injection of passions, the establishment of a
stable equilibrium between the individual and his self.l7 These mechanisms
may be self-initiated to satisfy the
psychological needs of men or may be
adopted through the socializing processes.
According to the social learning theory:
frequent engagement in aggression enhances the "habit strength" of aggressive
behavior and lowers the threshold for
aggression-that is, aggression is triggered more readily and more situations
are seen as calling for aggressive
responses.!S In simple terms, this means
that the historical tradition of war may
result in the acceptance of war as a way of
life. This is sometimes referred to as a violent culture. Studies indicate that distinctions in degree of aggressiveness can be
made between nations. These differences
are ascribed primarily to different cultural traditions.!9 War is more likely to occur
when it is viewed as a natural, normal
activity or where it replaces peace as the
dominant symbol in a society.
The right to go to war has been regarded for hundreds of years by many
writers and the heads of governments of
states not only as a lawful course of action
for a sovereign state, but indeed as one of
the characteristics of such an entity.20 International law did not prohibit war.
Rather, it viewed the institution as a
quite normal function of sovereign states.
War served two basic purposes in international society. It provided an effective
method of self-help to enforce a state's

July

rights in the absence of competent international' tribunals. And it supplied states

with a method of changing the rules of
international law and to adapt them to
changed conditions. In the underdeveloped state of international law, selfhelp and the war to defend national honor
had a real relationship to the survival of
states prior to the nuclear age.
In the late 19th century, two factors led
to the first serious attempts to bring
about limitations of war as a legal instrument and as a legally accepted method for
enforcing legal rights and changing the
rules of law. These were arrival of the
mass army and the continuing discoveries
of ever efficient weapons.
Today, it is generally accepted that
aggressive war is illegal and that war
may only be justified on the grounds of
self-defense. But grave problems of definition have arisen in connection with
attempts to define the terms "aggression"
and "self-defense."
The lag of adjusting procedures behmd
a change of conditions is viewed by some
as a general cause of war. The persistence
of this lag is due, in part, to the actual or
presumed service of war to human
groups. War has been thought to serve
sociological functions, to satisfy psychological drives, to be technologically useful
and to be legally rational. 2l
In addition to the general tendency for
change in procedures of political and legal
adjustment to lag behind economic and
cultural changes arising from technological progress, there is also a tendency for
the value systems to lag behind scientific
progress. Simply, this means that tl\.e
world is in such a state of constant transition that the institutions designed to regulate human affairs have not been able to
adapt fast enough to meet new demands.
Problems are accumulating faster than
they are solved. These may reach intoler-

1982

"To eliminate coniJict, as wen

as eliminating all the causes of
war, may be impossible. But
peace does not mean the absence
of conflicts among men: It does
not require men to become
angels or saints. Peace is simply
that state of affairs in which
men can settle their differences
by talk instead of by force."
able levels of strain and eventually cause
a breakdown of the existing order. The
same can be true with a man's culture.
With the monstrous weapons man
already has, humanity is in danger of
being trapped in this world by its moral
adolescence. Our knowledge of science has
clearly outstripped our capacIty to- control
it.
We have too many men of science; too
few men of God. We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon
on the Mount. Man is stumblmg blindly
through a spiritual darkness while toymg
with the precarious secrets of hfe and
death.
The world has achieved bnlhance without wisdom, power without conSClence.
Ours is a world of nuclear giants and
ethical infants. We know more about war
than we know about peace, more about
killmg tha.n we know about living. 22
Conclusion
War, springing from numerous factors
bedded in human society and human nature, is "natural," but it is not beyond human control. To eliminate conflict, as well
as eliminating ail the causes of war, may
be impossible. But peace does not mean
the absence of conflicts among men. It
does not require men to become angels or
saints. Peace is simply that state of

51

MILITARY REVIEW
affairs in which men can settle their differences by talk instead of by force.
To substitute talk for force requires institutions capable of supporting and augmenting the international negotiating
process. To settle human conflicts by law,
rather than by force, would require a government with power to make, apply and
enforce laws. Such a world government
has never existed in the history of mankind, and, considering the realities of the
present nation-state system, it is very
doubtful that it will exist in the near future. One can only hope that the need and
demand for a new world order and understanding among nations will be satisfied
before force becomes the ultimate arbiter,
adding perhaps the last chapter to human
history as we have known it.
Changes in the structure of institutions
may result in the suppression of international violence. B.ut, as the previous

analysis of war has shown, the prime

causes of war are more often noninstitutional in nature. Governments can restrict the intensity and frequency of violence, but seldom can they eliminate by
legislative decree the human values and
social-psychological factors contributing
to war.
New values and standards of behavior
work best when voluntarily self-imposed.
The elimination of war and its prime
causes is ultimately the responsibility of
every citizen of the world community. To
meet this responsibility requires the
adoption of an operational code of behavior which is both compatible to the
maintenance of peace and to individual
freedoms. Such a code was proposed more
than 2,000 years ago and and has long
been a part of the teachings of Confucianism and Christianity. It is known as the
"golden rule."
NOTES

In

1 Bruce M Russett, Tr9lfds

World PolitJcs, The Mt!cmiltan Co .
NY.1965.p13
2 Mao Tse-tung, Quotations From Chslf1nen Meo Tse-TtJng, Foreign

Language Press, Pekmg, PAC. 1966. P 58

3 QUincy Wrrght. A StUdy of War, UniverSity of ChIcago press, Chicago, 111,1964, P 110
4 H L. Nleburg, Pol/oeal VIolence, Sf. Manln's Press Inc, N Y 1969.
p79
5 MortImer J Adler, areat Ideas From the arBat Books, WaShington
Square Press Inc. NY, 1963. P 49

6 Otto Kllnaberg. The Humen Dimension In InternetJonaJ R91atJom;,

Holt. Rinehart & Winston Inc, NY, 1966. PP 13 and 15

7 Anderson, MaMan and Young, IssueS of Po/If/Cal Development.

Prentrce-Hallinc. Englewood Cliffs. N.J, 1967, pp 93-94
8 Khneberg. op. cit., p 9
9 Alain C Enthoven, deputy asSistant secretary Of defensa systems.
analYSIS for eight years
10 Mao Tse!Uhg. op cit, pp 59 and 63

11 Wrlghl.OP cit,pp111-12
12 Kllneberg.op cit. p 144
13 Ibid, pp 33-34, 36-as and 40
14 For a fuller Critique, see Auth Learned Munroe, Schools of
Psychoanalytic TholJght' An ExpOSItion Cnbque and Attempt at IntegratIon, Oryden Press, Hlnsdala, III , 1955
15 Anderson, Mehden and Young, op Cit" pp 93 and 95,
16 Henc Hofter, The True Believer, Harper & Aow Publishers Inc".
N.Y, 1966. P 53
17 Ibid, P SO
18 Harry Kaufman, AggrssSlon and Altruism. Holt, Rinehart & Winston
Inc, NY, 1970, p62
19 Ibid
20 Gerhard von Glehm, Law Among NatJons, Colller-Mecmlllen Canada Ltd .. Toronto. Onlano, Can, 1970, pp 517-1B and 525.
21 Wright. op. C/!.. p 353
22 General of the Army Omer N. Bradley, former Army Chief of Staff
and firSt chairman of the JOint Chiefs of Stafl.

Captain A. Brent Merrill, US A" Force, is an

asslstant professor of aerospace studies. Uniuers,ty of Cahfornm. Berkeley, teachmg a senwrleuel
course m American defense polr.cy.

He rece,ued a

B.s. in poht<eal science from the Unwersity of

Oregon and an M A. in international relations
from Crel{fhton Unwersity. His specialty is in the
area of offensive missile and space systems analysis.

52

'"
I.
.'-:;

"

.,

".

Jul,

The publication of a new Field Manual 100-5, Operations,

this summer seems sure to set off a fresh round of debates
on US doctrine. Controversy over the 1976 edition of the
manual still goes on inside and outside the service, and it is
likely that the Army's restatement ofits approach to operations and tactics will intensify these discussions. As this
re-evaluation gets underway, it is worthwhile to present the
rationale for change and the principal features of the new
manual as they are seen by two officers closely involved in
the revision.

The

New
FM 100-5
Lieutenant Colonel(P) Huba Wass de Czege, US Army
and Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army

The opinions and concluszons expressed herem

are solely those of the authors and do not neces"

Barily repreBent tlu! VIEWS of tlu! Department of tlu!

Army, llu! Department of Defense or any other
agency oftlu! US government.-Ed,tor.

Reasons lor Change

T
.

1982

HE basic question of why doctrine

was changed can be answered sim-

ply: Army commanders became convinced

as a'result of their field training and war
games that they would be unable to defeat the Soviets using the doctrine of
1976. These commanders believed that
they could beat the leading Soviet echelons using the "active defense" but that
the initial battles would render our units
ineffective while leaving Soviet follow-on
forces intact with complete freedom of action.
53

MILITARY REVIEW
The specific shortcomings of our defensive doctrine were widely recognized by
1978. Under the influence of the 1973
Middle East War and subsequent computer simulations, our defensive doctrine focused on defeating enemy echelons in sequence as they arrived in the main battle
area. This implied a shallow, linear defensive battle that did not conform with
the pattern of most modern operations.
Attrition of the enemy's committed
combat forces-those deployed to fight in
areas of the enemy's choosing-was to be
the means of winning. This meant pitting
the defender's smaller strength against
the enemy's main effort and relying on
firepower delivered from protected defensive positions to win the fight. It implied
forfeiting the advantages of maneuver
and completely yielding the initiative to
the attacker.
Doctrine tended to equate combat power with firepower and the supporting systems which multiplied the effects of fire.
The effects of maneuver and other intangible factors which have historically
decided battles were discounted. Relative
combat power was determined by an inventory of weapons present and a
comparison of their technical characteristics.
This approach satisfied systems
analysts and computers, but its effect on
tactics was deadening. Under its inflllence, tactics degenerated to a repetitive
process of fall-back-and-mass in front of
the enemy's main attack.
The process discouraged any use of the
offensive by the defender, played down
the human dimension of combat and left
the enemy's follow-on echelons complete
freedom to maneuver in depth around
strongly defended areas and join the battle in full strength at the time of their
choice.
The old Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Op-

54

erations, treated offensive operations very

briefly. It offered a set-piece view of these
operations which was heavily colored by
the manual's assumptions about the defense. Emphasis on the first battlewhich would be defensive-and the view
that a 6-to-1 advantage in systems was
required for offensive success discouraged
serious consideration of the attack.
Essentially, the 1976 manual repeated
what earlier versions had said about the
attack. Little was done to bring offensive
operations up to date. Perhaps this was
because the manual committed itself to
the proposition that the firepower of
smaller defending forces can prevent the
successful maneuver of larger attacking
forces.
Transitions and relationships between
types of operations were not developed.
Instead, the manual presented an unrealistically ordered picture of offensive
operations typical of some modern offensive failures but quite different from the
fluid, fast-moving attacks which have
succeeded in the recent past. Further, the
manual gave little consideration to anything beyond the defeat of first-echelon
defenses. The utility of using interdiction
and deep attack to isolate the forward defenses was not considered in any detail.
Other general shortcomings in the old
doctrine were its failure to balance firepower and maneuver, its concentration on
short-term small-unit tactics to the exclusion of longer large-unit operations, its
bias toward heavy force operations in
Europe and its view of nuclear and conventional wars as separate entities requiring wholly different approaches.
The 1976 manual had some strong
points too. It reoriented the Army on the
problems of war against a major power, it
familiarized US leaders with Soviet tactics and it made us consider problems
we had been able to ignore in Viet-

July

FM 100-5
nam-particularly the problems of air defense, electronic warfare, chemical defense, logistics and fighting outnumbered.
Fundamentally, however, the doctrine
of 1976 was a radical departure from the
Army's operational tradition. It underrated the key elements of depth, maneuver and initiative, and it paid insufficient
attention to the human element in battle.
These basic deficiencies and the demonstrated shortcomings of the doctrine in
the field prompted the revision ofFM 1005.
The AirLand Bailie
The AirLand Battle doctrine of the
1982 version of FM 100-5 is a more comprehensive and balanced view of modern
war. It ascribes equal importance to firepower and maneuver, includes other elements of military strength in its definition of combat power, offers a broader
view of offense and defense, distinguishes
between tactics and operational art, and
aims at worldwide applicability.
The doctrine does not separate nuclear
war from operations in a nuclearpotential environment. It stresses coordination of air and ground operations
more strongly than any US doctrine since
World War II. And, finally, it attempts to
put the Army ahead of the pace of technological change so that operational
needs can influence research and development more effectively. The significant
changes in the manual can be treated
under the headings of theory, geographical orientation, approach to nuclear and chemical operations, accommodation of technical change, operations
in depth, defensive operations and offensive doctrine.

1982

Theory
The theoretical content of the manual
is drawn from the lessons of history, the
writings of the great military theorists
and the Army's historic approach to
operations.! Examination of these sources
led to are-evaluation of the stress formerly placed on simple force ratios. The
manual now gives equal emphasis.to both
the tangible and intangible aspects of
combat. The human element-the soldier's training, courage and leadershipfigures more heavily than any other single element in the picture of battle in the
new operations manual.
The combat power that decides battles
is described as a combination of factors
that change over time, even during the
course of battle. It is not an absolute
equation. Training, leadership, morale
and psychological shock are as much a
part of combat power as the numbers of
units and weapons on the battlefield.
The operational concept of FM 100-5 is
the central idea of the manual. It stresses
the importance of the initiative, stating
that, in all operations, commanders wIll
attempt to throw the enemy off balance
with a powerful blow from an unexpected
direction and continue vigorous operations until the enemy is destroyed. Success in battle requires that initwtiue,
deptQ, agility and syncromzation characterize our thinking and our operations.
Units must fight to gain and retain the
initiatzue. Commanders must attack the
enemy in depth with fire and maneuver.
To do this, they must synchronize all of
the elements of combat power. Further,
they must develop the mental and operational agility necessary to shift forces
and fires to the point of enemy weakness
more rapidly than he can respond.

55

MILITARY REVIEW
An aphorism from Sun Tzu's treatise on
war summarizes the spirit of the AirLand
Battle succinctly: "Rapidity is the essence
of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected
routes and attack unguarded spots. "2
Battlefield application of the concept
requires a more specific set of guidelines.
Seven imperatives of modern combat
combine the operational concept and the
principles of war to provide general guidance for field commanders. The imperatives embody notions long familiar to the
US Army.
"Unity of effort" addresses the necessity to harness every force and capability to
attainment of the mission. Air, ground
and naval forces must cooperate fully.
Elements of the ground force must understand the overall objectives of operations
and know their own parts and those of
their neighbors if they are to fight effectively. This requires the use of mission
orders and the application of missionoriented tactics. The principles of objective, unity of command and economy of
force are the theoretical supports for this
imperative.
Directing friendly strength against
enemy weaknesses means looking for,
attacking and exploiting the enemy's soft
spots and vulnerabilities. The principles
of maneuver and surprise and the concept
of the indirect approach support this
imperative.
"Designate and sustain the main effort"
means that one unit within a force makes
the main effort and becomes the focal
point for combat, combat support and
combat service support efforts. Agility derives in part from the ability to shift this
main effort as appropriate during battle.
Objective, economy of force and mass are
the principles underlying this imperative.
"Sustaining the fight" implies combined arms cooperation, as well as those

56

supporting activities which are necessary

to maintain the tempo of battle.
"Move fast, strike hard, and finish
rapidly" expresses the need to act quickly
and violently to reach a decision and to
avoid becoming a" target for enemy
counterattack or counterfire.
The effective use of terrain and weather
is basic to successful operations. Skillful
use of these natural elements enhances
our combat power and reduces that of the
enemy.
"Protect the force" refers to a wide
range of actions inherent in successful
military operations. In its general form,
the imperative applies to activities as diverse as proper medical care and rear
area protection. The purpose of protecting
the force is to preserve a force's strength
so that maximum combat power will be
available at the decisive time and place
and throughout the course of a campaign.
To highlight the unique characteristics
of large-unit operations, the manual distinguishes operational art as a separate
level of war between the familiar divisions of military strategy and tactics.
Operational art deals with employment of'
corps and larger formations before and after battle. The disposition of corps and divisions, selection of objectives or directions of operations, and actions taken to
weaken or outmaneuver the enemy and
exploit tactical gains are all part of operational art. While the principles of war
are appropriate to all levels of war, applying them involves a different perspective for each.

Geographical Orientation
US Army doctrine cannot be theaterspecific; it must be adaptable to operations anywhere in the world. General Ed-.

July

FM 100-5
ward C. Meyer's remarK about "the most
important war for the US being in Europe
while the most likely wars are elsewhere"
is to the point here. We must be able to
fight effectively in either case. A doctrine
based solely on European requirements
would place us at a disadvantage when
called on to fight in another area.
Nuclear and Chemical Operations
The proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and the spread of the technology which
makes them potentially available to any
nation in the world, forces us to anticipate
operations in a nuclear environment.
Since chemical weapons are widely available and have been used in recent conflicts, it is also imperative that Army
forces plan and train to fight under chemical warfare conditions. Air Land Battle
doctrine calls for Army units to conduct
their operations so that nuclear fire support can be added or deleted as necessary.
Army units must also design their operations flexibly so that enemy initiation of
nuclear or chemical fires cannot by itself
decide the battle.
This presents us with an unavoidable
dilemma. While under purely conventional conditions concentration of forces is
necessary to win and extreme dispersion
risks defeat in detail, this same concentration vastly increases the risk of defeat
when the enemy has nuclear weapons.
Mobility, good operations security, and
precise timing of dispersion and concentration offset the risk of defeat by nuclear
fire and make possible the concentration
necessary to win. The actual planning and
control of such operations will obviously
require training of a very high order in
staffs and units. The manual does not offer
an easy answer to the problem, but it

1982

exposes it and offers considerati~ns for

overcoming it (Figure 1).
Accommodation 01 Technical Change
The final impetus for change in doctrine comes from the near-term introduction of new systems which increase our
mobility and firepower, as well as enhancing our command and control, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities. The Ml tank, M2 and M3 fighting
vehicles and the advanced attack helicopter are among the weapons in this group.
New sensors and longer range artillery
weapons are also influencing the way we
will fight. Air Land Battle doctrine integrates the capabilities of these new systems into its operational concept (Figure
2).

Just as importantly, it defines some of

the requirements of the Army for future
material development. As laser and
directed energy weapons appear and sensor capabilities improve, the doctrine of
1982 will ease their integration into the
force structure and facilitate transition to
doctrine being formulated for the year
2000.
Operations in Depth
One of the most widely publicized additions to doctrine has been the deep battle.
Whether attacking or defendmg, a timely
and well-executed deep attack against
enemy forces not yet in contact is an important element of operations. This is not
a new discovery. US, German and Israeli
campaign plans have historically made
use of long-range interdiction to gain
local battlefield advantages. 3

57

MILITARY REVIEW

Vulnerability Dilemma Under Conditions

of Conventional-Chemical-Nuclear Combat
High
risk

Low
risk

Dispersion

I~

~I
Shift between
these pomts as necessary

Concentration

Figure

The aim of the deep battle is to prevent

the enemy from massing and to create
opportunities for offensive action-"windows of opportunity"-that allow us to defeat him in detail. Corps is the focal point
for intelligence collection and distribution in the deep battle. However, deep
battle planning and execution are just as
important at division and lower levels.
The deep battle is based on a thorough
intelligence preparation of the battlefield,
the availability of timely intelligence
from organic and higher level intelligence
sources, the identification of high-value
targets and the synchronization of organic imd supporting attack means."

58

At the present time, our primary strike

assets for deep attack are air and artillery
interdiction. Conventional and unconventional military forces can also be used to
interdict enemy movement in depth. And,
while tactical electronic warfare systems
do not have the range to hit deep targets,
they can be of some use in freeing artillery units for use in the deep battle. Deception also plays a part in delaying, disrupting and diverting an enemy and frustrating his plans for commitment of follow-on forces.
Some may suggest that it would be
ideal to just destroy enemy following
forces with deep attack, but that is not

July

FM 100-5
possible with our currently limited assets.
What is possible is to delay, disrupt or
divert selected enemy forces by attacking
target ele,ments of that force or chokepoints in the terrain which will yield the
desired effect. But these efforts must be
directed toward a specific goal ifan actual
tactical or operational advantage is to be
obtained.
Generally, that goal is to create opportunities for decisive action by reducing
the enemy's closure rate and creating
periods of friendly superiority which permit us to gain or retain the initiative. If
we can prevent the enemy from reinforc-

ing his committed forces even temporarily, we may be able to defeat him piecemeal.
Commanders will fight the enemy in an
area of influence designated by the next
higher level of command. This area normally encompasses enemy forces whose
actions can affect the unit's close-in battle. Commanders simultaneously monitor
activity beyond and adjacent to their
areas of influence in what is called the
area of interest. The area ofinterellt is also
designated by the next higher commander and includes territory which contains
enemy units which are capable of affect-

A Substantial Step Toward Future Capabilities.

* ell (Command. Control. Communications and Intelligence)

Figure 2

1982

59

MILITARY REVIEW

Area of Influence and Area of Interest

ing future operations (Figure 3).

Deep attack can take several general
forms. The first is attack by fire to disrupt
enemy forces in depth and delay their
arrival in the battle area so that enemy
forces in con tact can be isola ted and defeated. Deception, offenl!,ive electronic
warfare, artillery fires and battlefield air
interdiction may all be used in this form
of deep attack (Figure 4).
The second form is to attack enemy

60

forces in depth with fire, thereby preventing them from intervening in the close-in
battle while we maneuver against the
flanks or rear of enemy forces in contact.
The object here may be to prevent enemy
forces in depth from interfering with a
friendly counterattack force rather than
simply to prevent them from reinforcing
committed enemy units (Figure 5).
The third form is more complex and
more difficult to achieve. It requires en-

July

FM 1005
gaging follow-on echelons with firepower
and maneuver forces while the close-in
battle is being fought. This prevents the
enemy fTom massing, deprives him of
momentum upon which he depends and
subjects his whole force to destruction.
This fonn of attack depends upon the impact of combined anns action to achieve
its effects. It will require close coordination between Anny air and ground maneuver forces, artillery, electronic warfare and Air Force battlefield air interdiction missions (Figure 6).
A fourth fonn of deep attack seeks to
destroy or neutralize a particular type of
enemy target which by its very nature
poses a threat or which by its elimination
provides an advantage. An example of the
first would be an enemy nuclear-capable

weapon system within range of the

friendly force. An example of the latter
would be the destruction of enemy bridging in a sector when the enemy is threatening a river crossing.
Key to the success of any of the fonns of
deep attack is to focus very narrowly on
the purpose to be achieved and to attack
elements of the target array which will
yield the highest payoff. The procedure
for doing this is called target value analysis in the new doctrine.
Offensive Operations

The changes in offensive doctrine are

primarily matters of emphasis. Major

Delay of Forces in Depth to Prevent Timely

Reinforcement of Enemy in Contact
Offense

Defense

V
xu-u
r'f7r\~0

i.nru-

\.\

~
;. f;j\
IJVU

\ &SU'I.1"

./
I

) til
I

'~

til

Figure 4

1982

61

MILITARY REVIEW

Delay of Forces in Depth to Allow

More Time to Complete a Maneuver
Offense

Defense

1
..... M......

"M./ Scallerable mines

offensive operations continue to be classified in one of these five forms:

A movement to contacL
A hasty attack.
A deliberate attack.
An exploitation.
A pursuit.
During their conduct, however, these
operations are generally less distinct
than the listing implies. Nor is their sequencing absolute since it is possible to go
from movement to contact on to a 'hasty
attack and directly into a pursuit. Maneu. ver units of all sizes must be prepared to
shift from one type action to another instantaneously. Thisrapid shifting of men-

62

tal and operational gears is essential to

retaining the initiative in battles where
we will rarely enjoy numerical superiority.
Air Land Battle doctrine stresses the
importance of exercising the initiative.
The initiative must be seized whenever
possible and retained for as long as possible if decisive results are to be obtained.
Speed, violence and flexibility in maneuver are also given greater emphasis in the
new manual's treatment of the attack.
The use of indirect approaches to attack
the enemy's existing weaknesses or create vulnerabilities is basic to offensive
doctrine. Economy-of-force measures may

July

FM 100-5
panding torrent described by B. H. Liddell Hart5-that is, it should move fast,
follow reconnaissance units or successful
probes through gaps in enemy defenses,
and shift its strength quickly to widen
penetrations and reinforce its successes.
The attacker tries to carry the battle deep
into the enemy rear to ..break down the
enemy's defenses before he can react.
Momentum takes on added significance
in this dynamic doctrine. The enemy
must never be permitted to recover from
the shock of the initial assault. never
given the time to identify the main effort
and. above all, never afforded the opportunity to mass his forces or supporting
fire against our main effort. To deny the
enemy this critical reaction time. we

be used to hold or fix the enemy's main

force while the main ,effort is directed at
his more vulnerable flanks or rear. De
ceiving the enemy as to the time, place
and magnitude of the attack is also criti
cal to achieving surprise and gaining or
keeping the initiative.
Successful offensive operations are
characterized by aggressive, violent execution. Subordinates must be permitted
to use their initiative in responding to the
rapidly changing situation. Shifting the
main effort to take advantage of fleeting
opportunities or to maintain momentum
is usually necessary to success, and leaders must move with their leading formations to direct offensive operations.
The attack should resemble the ex-

Delay of Forces in Depth to Cause Enemy's Defeat in

Detail in Preparation for a Decisive Offensive Thrust

Figure

1982

63

MILITARY REVIEW
must capitalize on opportunities and act
faster than he does.
An offensive effort is designed to produce the fastest possible attainment of
the commander's objective. All else supports that effort. Deep attacks, supporting
attacks, and the size, composition and
placement of reserves are all designed to
facilitate the success of the main attack.
Airborne, air assault, amphibious, or unconventional warfare operations can also
be used to contribute to the rapid success
of the main attack.
The "synchronization" of the operational concept extends beyond the disposition "
of maneuver forces in offensive operations. Conventional, nuclear and chemical fire support is used to protect flanks,
to attack deep targets and to support maneuver forces. Offensive air support must
be carefully planned to provide the proper
mix of close air support and battlefield air
interdiction needed for the specific operation. Enemy command posts, logistics installations, bridglls and defiles are frequently identified as "high-value" targets
for deep attack by air. Synchronization
also includes allocating the bulk of combat service support forces to support the
main attack.
Doctrinal emphasis on maneuver and
the offensive demands that we learn to
use terrain as effectively in the attack as
we do in the defense. We must seek attack
avenues which are indirect and support
rapid, concealed movement along their
entire length. We must stress the use of
obstacles to protect flanks and train to
avoid and breach enemy obstaeles. A good
avenue of approach should also permit
the deployment of combat support and
combat service support elements that are
supporting the attack. Alternate axes
.should be identified in advance, and plans
should be made to activate them by oral
order if movement on the primary route is

64

slowed. Momentum is the key requirement. The attacker cannot stop to make
plans in the middle of his operation (Figure 7).
When nuclear or chemical weapons are
used, maneuver schemes must consider
their effects. These weapons can sometimes allow small maneuver units to
accomplish missions which would otherwise require larger forces. Rubble, residual radiation and tree blow down from a
nuclear strike-friendly or enemy-may
cause the redirecting of an attacking
force.
Use of nuclear weapons makes massing
of forces particularly risky. Attacks will
have to be conducted by forces which
mass suddenly, penetrate rapidly and disperse quickly to avoid presenting a lucrative target. Sudden massing, violent
attack and quick dispersion have been
characteristic of successful large force
offensive actions since World War II.
However, the contemporary nuclearpotential battlefield makes such actions
even more critical to survival and victory.
Defensive Operations
The changes in defensive doctrine reflect the fact that no war has ever been
won by a passive or purely reactive defense. Although we are likely to begin the
next war on the defensive, our defensive
doctrine should have but one aim: to turn
the tables on an attacking enemy and
assume the initiative ourselves The character of the US defense will be an increased level of resistance and early,
opportunistic local counterattacks to halt
the enemy, followed by transition to the
offensive as soon as possible.
Air Land Battle doctrine describes the
defense as a mixture of static and dynam-

July

FM 100-5
ic elements-in reality, a combination of
offensive and defensive action. The commander's concept of defense is based on a
thorough analysis of the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and troops available
(METT)6. It can be visualized as a combination of static and dynamic elements
falling along the continuum between
wholly static and completely dynamic operations (Figure 8).
No single form or technique is prescribed by FM 100-5. Each defensive battle will be designed for the specific situation facing the unit. The commander will
conduct his defense in the depth of the
main battle area (MBA) or near the forward edge of the battle area (FEBAl de-

pending on his mission, his forces, the terrain and the overall concept for defense
specified by higher levels of command:
One-third or more ofa force's maneuver
strength may be held in reserve in the
defense. This figure is only a guideline,
not a requirement. The actual size of the
reserve will depend on the commander's
concept and the factors ofMETT. The doctrine gives preference to employing the
reserve to strike a decisive blow rather
than to restoring the FEBA or reinforcing
committed forces.
The covering force mission has been
broadened. Large covering forces may be
tasked with fighting defensive actions
forward of the FEBA, while lighter seeur-

Maneuver Using Terrain

--O-bj-:--ti-ve--)
C
--

Figure 7

1982

65

MILITARY REVIEW

Continuum of Defensive Techniques

Static
Terrain
Retention - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ .
Oriented

Dynamic
Force
Destruction by
Fire and
Maneuver
Oriented

Technique employed is determmed:

In general by MElT (mission. enemy. terrain and troops) available
In particular by:
Terrain-Defensibility and obstacle value
Troops available-Mobility and degree of armored protection
Figure 8

Why the AirLand Battle

~

Shortcomings of defensive doctrine:

Active Defense

Total effort against committed forces

Victory through attrition
Forfeiture of maneuver and initiative

Substitution of process for tactics

Discourage counterattacks

" - , , ...,

Minimized human dimension

Failed to engage follow-on echelons

--'\~

"',

.....

<;;)

~txlx~

Figure 9

66

July

FM 100-5
ity forces may be used in lieu of covering
forces. Such forces would only be requited
to give the MBA advance warning of the
enemy's approach. The role of the covering force or security force will derive from
the commander's overall plan.
Whatever the case, the covering force
will rarely withdraw on line. It will give
ground where it is forced to, often leaving
some elements forward. By remaining
forward, troops of the covering force prevent the enemy from applying pressure
all along the FEBA, allow the commander
to fight one MBA battle at a time and
offer opportunities to observe, interdict
and attack enemy flanks.
Doctrine also makes a clearer distinc-

tion between defense and delay now, and

it increases the emphasis on.the use of
strongpoints. The best way to express the
differences in old and new doctrines is
through a comparision of how they might
apply to a division defense. This example
from How to Fight FM 71-100, Armored

and Mechanized Division Operations,

illustrates that, under our former doctrine, the enemy was to be defeated by
concentrating firepower against the
enemy's main effort (Figure 9) ..
The AirLand Battle' doctrine leaves a
wider selection of options available to the"
commander. Shown in Figure 10 is a
mechanized infantry division deployed on
two likely avenues of approach against a

Mechanized Division
Phase
line
green

Phase
FEBA line
Blue white

5Z ____~----~~~~----~~--__

'--------DiPh;';;a:se:- XX
line
green

FEBA - Forward edge of the battle area

1982

Phase
line
gray

FEBA
Blue

Phase
line
white

Phase
line
red

Figure 10
67

MILITARY REVIEW
sion commander executes one of several
planned counterattacks. The arrival of
the enemy follow-on echelon has been delayed through use of deep attack means
available to the division. The division
commander launches a counterattack as
part of a coordinated plan to regain the
initiative. The covering force on the right
is strong enough to hold the enemy. An
attack with a four-battalion brigade not
only seals off the penetration but also
allows the commander to regain the initiative (Figure 12).
The new FM 100-5 has adopted Karl
von Clausewitz's philosophy for the de-

combined arms army attack. A heavy

covering force is used in this example.
The static element is represented by
strongpoints, and a substantial reserve is
used to playa dynamic role in the commander's scheme.
The commander's concept in this case
calls for limiting the enemy's access to the
MBA to' a single avenue and trapping
committed enemy forces in the defended
area with the reserve. Figure 11 shows an
enemy penetration in the 1st Brigade
area. Note that the strongpoint is still
occupied even though surrounded.
Under these circumstances, the divi-

Enemy Penetration
Mechanized Division
Phase
Phase
Phase
line
line
FEBA line
________.::g;.;re;.:,e:,:.n_
gray
Blue white
..
XX--~~~--~~~~---r
52
~ r('r

~{jjJJ.

~\~
~

(..

X --+";;;;;;;;;'--Qi~"':;:::..I!::' v v v

L. (..

r9~(

~~
(..

52

L--------------PPlh~a;.Se~XX--~P~ha-s-e-----F~E~BAA-~P~ha-s-e----~Ph~a~se---line
green
FEBA -

line
gray

Blue

line
white

line
red

Forward edge of the battle area

Figure 11

68

Jul~

FM 100-5

Counterattack
Phase
line
.._ - - - - - - _ _ _

FEBA

gray

XX---;~~--~~--r=~~

52

JJ,J

~1~

IQ")-'..,~
~'")"I

x
x

X--t-----:;~"U

52

L__--------~--XX--~----~~------~~--Phase
FEBA
Phase
FEBA - Forward edge of the battle area

line

line

gray

red

Figure 12

fense. "The ideal defense is a shield of

blows."7 It makes use of all available resources and avoids stereotyped patterns
by calling for bold, flexible, offensively
oriented defenses organized to meet the
requirements of METT.
FM 100-5 also emphasizes protection of
our rear areas from the threats of conventional and unconventional warfare operations. New doctrine stresses base defenses, an increased combat role for military police and the employment of major
combat units in the rear area when necessary. Effective rear area protection allows
the commander to sustain the main effort
ofhis operation while taking measures to
avoid, contain or defeat enemy forces in
. the rear area.

1982

Summary

The new elements of Air Land Battle

doctrine are different from our past practices. They differ precisely because our
former doctrine failed to address some
important issues adequately.
Despite these differences, the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 is essentially an evolutionary change to doctrine. It has retained many of the best features of the
1976 manual, recaptured many important elements from earlier doctrine and
added some vital new concepts to make
the Army's fighting doctrine reflect the
full capability of the force .

69

MILITARY REVIEW
NOTES
1 Specifically, Fjeld Manual 100-5, OperatIOns. draws haa....l!y on the

Milia Pass behInd the egyptian army In 1967 and Ihe air Interdiction of
German reserve roules during Third Army S breakthrough In Operation
Cobra, In earlier .....ars. actions In depth have otten bean critical to the

success of banles and campaigns The cavarry operations of Nathan

Bedford Forrest and Benjamin Anerson are pertlcularly nOleworthy
4 General Donn A Starry, "Extending the Batllefield," Military ReView, March 1981, pp 31-50 Lieutenant General Wj11lam R Richardson,
Wmnmg on the Extended Batllefield," Army. June 1981, pp 35 37 and
41-42
5 8, H Llddel1 Hart In J A English. A PerspectIVe on Infantry, Praeg
er Publishers, NY. 1981, pp 41-49
6 COlonel Clyde J Tate and Lieutenant Colonel L. 0 Holder New
Doctrme for the Defense," Military ReVIew, March 1981, pp 2-9
7 K.arl von Clausewltz. On War. translated by M Howard and P
Pare!. Pnnceton UniverSity Press. Princeton. N.J , 1976. P 357

Lleutenant Colonel (pj Huba Wass de Czege lS

with the Department of Tacts, USACGSC. He
received a B.S. from the US Military Academy
and an M P.A. from Harvard Unwers~ty. Previous assignments include serving as a ranger
battalzon adviser m the I Corps area and as a
company commander In the 173d Atrborne BTlgade, Vtetnam, and w,th the 9th Infantry DWI'
SlOn, Fort Lewls, Washmgton

LLeutenant Colonel L. D. Holder is commander

of the 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regl'
ment. Fort BILss. Texas. He received a B.A. from
Texas A & M UnwerSlty. an M.A. from Harvard
Unwerslty and is a graduate of the USACGSC.
He has serued as a doctrme writer wlth the Department of TactiCS, USACGSC HIS article
"Maneuver m the Deep Battle" appeared In the
May 1982 Military ReVIew.

wrillngs of Sun Tzu, Clausewltz. Fuller, LJddell Hart, Milesche end WII

loughby The Arnencan commanders whose operations were most closely examined were Sherman, Jackson, Lee. Palton, MacArthur and
Clarke
2 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by S 8 Griffith, OKford Umverslty Press. NY, 1963, P 134

3 Historical examples are numerous. They Include air and land mfer
diction operations In the modern period SUCh as Iha IsaraH closure of the

Trainer N.eects Stories. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command's quarterly magazine, Army Trainer, needs ideas, stories and

photos from 'Active and Reserve component units, The magazine

provides professional information and advice to soldiers serving as
trainer!!. Theprimary"audience includes training cadre in grades E5
through 03. Active and Reserve component units and individuals
Who Wish to submit ideas, stories, letters or photos should write:
. Army Trainer, P.O, Drawer A, Fort Eustis, VA 23604.The magazine's
editorial staff.~an be reached by calling AUTOVON 927-5475/5893
or commercial '(804) 878-5475/5893.

70

July

~ETTERS

Expert Speaks Out

More on Empire

I thought I knew everything about internal tactical operations center (TOC)

operations there is to know. That is noncommissioned officer (NCO) business.
However, the article, "The TOC: Backbone of Command and Control" (Military
Review, November 1981), was impressive
and taught me. I have two suggestions,
however, that I would like to pass on to
the authors.
First, the S3 track should have, as a
minimum, one radio frequency meter so
the operations NCO or radiotelephone
operator can quickly diagnose a radio
problem. Second, a voltage gauge should
be mounted between the radios and connected to the vehicle's electrical system to
measure accurately the generator or engine voltage output. We burn out far too
many radios because of too high or too low
voltage. The voltage gauge helps in setting the power for 28 volts which is necessary to "key" secure equipment and eliminates the guesswork for the Ml13 or
M577 driver when looking at the instrument panel.
Let me re-emphasize NCO-conducted
training in TOC setup/teardown drills.
This is as much a training requirement as
anything we do in the S2/S3 shop. The S3
who does not allow the NCOs to conduct
TOC drill training for themselves and the
troops is not shooting himself in the foot,
but in the head.
Lastly, on a personal note, send me a
subscription blank. Perhaps there will be
more articles of interest to senior NCOs.

Colin S. Gray's discussion in his article,

"Reflections on Empire: The Soviet Connection" (MIlitary Review, January 1982),
is a useful one primarily becau.se it may
contribute to our finally calling that
spade a spade. For too long, we in the
West have in our scholarly way permitted
the Soviets to win the war of words by
refusing to stoop to such ungentlemanly
tactics as ascribing to them the characteristics of liars and thugs that they clearly
have shown. Gray stops short of that,
scholar that he is, but his concept of an
"imperial Soviet Union" is a start in the
right direction.
I do have some quibbles, however, With
a few of Gray's conclusions and others of
his methods of expression. It was disturbing to see Soviet "expansionism" presented as a "largely defensive .urge" for,
or paranOla about, security. That may be
so, but that sort of language tends away
from the issue of aggressiveness--which
Gray even concludes is a useful one to
sidestep-and toward a less offensivesounding language that permits evasion
of the facts. We should not be sidestepping the issue of aggressi.yeness. Such
sidestepping In the 1930s brought much
grief to the world, as Western leaders
sid'estepped all over Europe to avoid
labeling Adolf Hitler's aggressiveness by
its true name.
The point is that it is important to use
the right words. In War and Remembrance, Herman Wouk discussed the "will
not to believe" when rumors spread of
Nazi atrocities. A "will not to believe"
that the Soviets are dangerous, aggressive imperialists pervades the West today, deriving from our use of imprecise,

MSgl Edmund L. Devereaux III,

Office 01 Ihe Army Adviser, Na/ional Guard Armory,
Dululh, Minnesota

19B>!

71

MILITARY REVIEW
evasive language. Soviet aggression is a
fact of post-World War II global politics.
To identify it as "expansionism" motivated by a "defensive urge" makes it
sound less threatening, makes it sound
almost reasonable and condonable, in
which case it is easier to put off dealing
with altogether-to sidestep, in fact.
It was also disturbing to read that "the
days of arbitrary terror are long past" in
the Soviet Union. What is long past is the
time that we in the West understood that
terror is always arbitrary and that it is
the fundamental pillar supporting the
edifice of Soviet power inside the Soviet
Union. The fact that it is not applied on a
Stalinist scale does not remove its reality
in Soviet life. The apparatus of terror remains, as do the ideology that justifies it,
the 'will to use it and the actual use of it.
We have to credit this fact if we are to
understand the nature of Soviet power.
Gray's article, apparently not crediting it,
concludes that Soviet legitimacy "reposes
in the awe in which its power ... is held
by its subjects." If Soviet subjects concern
themselves at all with the matter of their
government's legitimacy, any sense of it
they may feel more likely reposes in a
habit of acceptance than in any other
motivation.
But any realistic assessment of their
attitude toward their government would
hark back and consider the effects of the
demonstrated Soviet readiness to resort
to force and terror against its own. Soviet
subjects accede to Soviet rule because
they cannot do much about it. It is not
awe of Soviet power they feel, but fear.
This distinction is more than a merely
semantic one for the military planner of
psychological operations or for the assessor of morale in a Soviet military unit, for
troops inspired by awe would be more
easily defeated than troops inspired by a
pervading fear of their own authorities.
My final dismay with Gray's article
flttends his notion of "the essential fragility of the Soviet Empire." If we learn only
one thing from Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, it

72

had better be that "the Communist regime (in the USSR) has not been overthrown in 60 years, not because there has
not been any struggle against it from inside, not because people docilely surrendered to it, but because it is inhumanly
strong, in a way as yet unimaginable to
the West" (preface to the English translation of Volume III, Gulag Archipelago).
The Soviet system is not fragile, and it is
dangerous for us to think otherwise.
Thus, it seems to me that Gray misses
the major point when it comes to understanding the Soviet model of empire
which is that it is terror-based. The
strength of the modern, terror-based
empire derives, as Albert Speer pointed
out in Inside the Third Reich, from the
application of technology to the enforcement of obedience and from the mania for
secrecy within the system. These characteristics set such empires apart from the
old models, making them stronger internally and more dangerous externally.
In my view, Gray's article sells far
short the "inhuman strength" of Soviet
power and encourages us in such wishful
thinking as, for example, that we need
only win the first battle of a showdown
with the Soviets in order to win a war
with them. This kind of thinking makes
for happy endings to popular war novels,
but it can lead us to disaster if we allow it
to influence our military planning.
Capt R. A. Rail Jr., USA,
470th Military Intelligence Group,
Panama

Author Is Indignant

In what appears to be a singularly uninformed article, Captain (P) Kenneth

Allard in his "History, Technology and
the Structure of Command" (Mzlitary Reuiew, November 1981) refers to Major
General Otto L. Nelson's book, National
Security and the General Staff, as "still
the most comprehensive work available

Julv

LETTERS
on the evolution of the Army High Command and General Staff structure."
Allard would not have made such a
foolish statement if he had taken the
trouble to read my volume, From Root to
McNamara: Army Organization and
Administration, 1900-1963, published by
the Army's Center of Military History in
1975. This volume was designed, among
other things, to replace Nelson's sloppy
and distorted cut-and-paste job.
Allard is an example of the variation on
a theme by Santayana: "Those who misread the lessons of history are condemned
to repeat them." I have been studying and
writing professionally about the organization and management of the Army
staff for 20 years, and I cannot tell you
how wretchedly misleading I found nearly every word written by Nelson when I
went back to the National Archives and
started my own research. I found that
Nelson did not know what he was talking
about and neither does Allard.
James E. Hewes Jr. Ph.D.,
Staff Support Branch, Histories Division,
Center of Military History, Washington. D.C.
(Major Allard was offered the opportunity to respond

to Dr. Hewes' comments. Hzs reply follows.-Edaor)

Major Allard's Response

Despite the unfortunate tone of Dr.

Hewes' letter, he has not challenged any
of the substantive points covered by my
article, nor has he specified which "lessons of history" I may have misread or
what alternative conclusions might be
drawn from them. Instead, his objection
stems entirely from the single footnoted
sentence in wij.ich I praised the work of
one of the Army's own organizational
pioneers, Major General Otto L. Nelson.
Hewes' comments are thus marginal in
relation to my work. But is his attack on
Nelson justified? I think not and would
offer the following in rebuttal.
Unlike Hewes, Nelson did not have 20-

1982

odd years to plod through the archives in

relatively untroubled times .. National
Security and the General Staff (NS&GS)
was originally written in 1939 as Nelson's
doctoral dissertation at Harvard. Bootleg
copies of the typewritten manuscript were
eagerly read in Washington, and, like so
much of the intellectual capital of that
time, its ideas were immediately mobilized and sent off to war. Only when the
war had ended was Nelson able to draw
upon the lessons of that conflict and prepare his manuscript for publication.
NS&GS appeared in print in 1946,just in
time for the debates on the postwar defense establishment.
NS&GS was a book that made a difference to an Army that found its command
structure inadequate to meet wartime demands. In it, Nelson traced the historical
development of those structural problems
while bringing to bear the powerful insights of contemporary organizational
theory. This analytical technique is common enough today. Then, it was a daring
conceptual innovation, an organizational
primer for the management of global war.
As such, it was an invaluable intellectual
landmark for a generation of)military
men who sorely needed to link thought
and action.
Nelson's contribution also had a personal side which provided an acid test for
his ideas. Early in the war, he was transferred from the West Point faculty to the
War Department where he served as recorder to the reorganization panel headed
by Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney_ Nelson wrote most of the panel's final report. Thus, he was a dominant influence in engineering the most drastic
reform in the history of the General Staff,
one which was, moreover, a prerequisite
to its success throughout the war.
Finally, it should be noted that Hewes'
assessment of Nelson's work represents
an extreme position. In the generation
since NS&GS was written, other writers
have inevitably added their own perspectives, but there has been a consistent rec-

73

MILITARY REVIEW
ognition of Nelson's contribution to this
field, both as a scholar and as a soldier.
Consequently, I felt it proper to draw the
attention of your readers to this extraordinary man, and there is nothing in
Hewes' argument which would lead me to
change that opinion.
Maj C. Kenneth Allard, USA,
Armed Forces Staff College

Neutron Weapons
Although he mentioned their sensitivities, Colonel Daniel Gans in his two-part
article, "Neutron Weapons: Solution to a
Surprise Attack?" (Military Review,
January and February 1982), obviously
does not appreciate them. 1 am referring
to the position of most Europeans, military and civilian.
He states, "The ER [enhanced radiation] weapon is just 1\nother weapon ... "
and "What NATO needs is a new dialogue
so that all concerned can participate in
this vital debate' about our real warfighting options."
A leader only leads as long as the direction he takes is within the bounds that his
followers accept. This is particularly true
with sovereign nations. It is especially
true with NATO. If the United States
takes a position that is not likely to be
accepted by the nations of NATO, it reduces the US influence, and the United
States becomes less of a leader in the
alliance.
The Europeans add some elements to
Gans' scenario. They argue that, just after the "ripple across the corps sector" in
front of the Black Horse Regiment, a serious decision would be made in Moscow.
The Soviets could conclude that, if NATO
has begun to use its nuclear weapons,
they must eliminate the NATO nuclear
delivery means, particularly the most
.threatening ones. The only way of effectively doing this is with nuclear weapons.
The ER weapon.is not just another

74

weapon. It is not just another weapon because the Europeans do not view it as just
another weapon.
Col Samuel B. Gardner, USAF,
Arlington, Virginia

The dangers of ignoring the complex

political-military dimensions of NATO
nuclear strategy are made crystal clear in
Colonel Daniel Gans' two-part article,
"Neutron Weapons: Solution to a Surprise
Attack?" A defensive deus ex machina has
been sought by many alliance force planners since the 1950s. Unfortunately,
Gans' nuclear "free lunch" holds little
promise for NATO. Several criticisms
should be offered.
Even if the political analysis is unimpeachable, Gans' quantitative results are
inconclusive and noncompelling. Detailed
criticism of the specific model is impossible because the model was not formally
presented. But Gans presents remarkably
optimistic assumptions and then glosses
over the most difficult modeling problems. For example, assuming that the
Soviets will absorb a nuclear attack and
elect not to respond neglects both Soviet
capabilities and operational principles.
From a heuristic standpoint, Gans'
model assumes that his hypotheSIS is
true. Thus, "The Battle of the Black
Horse Regiment" loses any prescriptive
validity since Gans declines to test his
hypothesis against any but the most ideal
assumptions. To be fair, Gans asserts that
sensitivity analysis accounted for allied
casualties. But what parameters were adjusted? Some discussion of the worst case
might have been instructive.
Although a more transparent modeling technique would have been more
appropriate, the model itself is largely
irrelevant. Gans' political-military assumptions wish away the real problems
of tactical nuclear warfighting. The key
to Gans' strategy is instant escalation
with cannon artillery, and it is not clear
that such a policy would ever represent.

July

LETIERS
the best interests of the Federal Republic
of Germany, the United States or any
NATO member.
German defense officials have publicly
argued that battlefield nuclear weapons
should be used as a last resort, on a limited basis, to demonstrate resolve, but
under no circumstances in battlefield support. While worries about collateral damage may contribute to this attitude, the
high probability of a Soviet nuclear response--unanalyzed by Gans-is a realistic fear. Even if the Germans could be persuaded that a nuclear first strike is essential, cannon artillery would be the least
logical weapon to use since every nuclear
round would strike a West German
target.
To persuade the Germans to embrace
his strategy, Gans offers the inducements
of German forward observers and civil defense. The mechanism through which reliance on Germans as the "principal eyes
for the nuclear defense" will strengthen
German resolve to use the weapons is
never explained, and is certainly not selfevident. At worst, this scheme might provide the Soviets with a solid justification
for skipping a conventional phase and initiating a nuclear barrage against the
Federal Republic of Germany.
Nor is the Gans doctrine consistent
with US interests. Why should the United
States commit itself a priori to a nuclear
option that could end with a strategic exchange? The Soviets would gain a clear
understanding of NATO's defensive concept, and the United States would lose the
flexibility which has been a cornerstone
of NATO doctrine since the 1960s.
Even if the president would agree that
an explicitly nuclear defense is necessary
from the outset, why use cannon artillery? Gans would disperse 400 nuclear
weapons throughout the German countryside prior to Soviet attack with individual gun crews-usually led by staff
sergeants. In a footnote, Gans envisages
single howitzers operating within a 5.kilometer by 5-kilometer grid. How will
1982

the national command authority-or

even the battery commander-guarantee
that these weapons are fired 'only at the
appropriate time and target? Fifthcolumn activity, or outright capture,
could produce unattractive situations.
It seems far more reasonable to accept
Gregory Treverton's observation that the
president will insist on personally controlling every nuclear delivery. Perhaps
in a final, desperate effort, the president
could accept the loss of control inherent in
release to cannon units, but there is no
reason for him to use these weapons first
when other delivery means are available.
Even if every NATO nation agreed to
Gans' concept, there is no reason to believe that this consensus would survive a
Soviet invasion threat. The political and
military situation immediately preceding
hostilities will determine the commitment of each NATO nation to the use of
nuclear weapons, not any preannounced
. position. By irreversibly linking the defense of Europe to the first use of nuclear
weapons, Gans sets the stage for an acid
test of alliance cohesiveness which might
lead to the wartime disintegration of
NATO as individual nations scramble to
make their separate peace with the
USSR. Should the Soviets announce, for
example, that any allied nuclear operation would be considered license for unlimited operations within the theater-a
statement not inconsistent with Soviet
operational principle&-the European nations would confront a choice between
NATO's war plan and survival. Current
defensive doctrine, whatever its flaws,
does not pose those stark alternatives.
Gans' strategy will not work because it
ignores the fact that NATO must fight as
a coalition. The "major selling point" for
the strategy is that first use of enhanced
radiation weapons would deny the Soviets
"victory on tJ!i.e ground" and eliminate
any advantage of Soviet escalation. In
fact, Gans would permit the Soviets to
attend less to victory on the ground and to
concentrate on rupturing the framework

75

MILITARY REVIEW
of the alliance. He has simply placed the
cart before the horse in arguing that
NATO must convince its members to
embrace enhanced radiation weapons. As
Karl von Clausewitz warned, "Policy is
the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the
political is therefore the only thing which
is possible."

Y~ur March 1982 issue is your best

ever. It has a good mix of history and
theory, personnel and organizational articles. I was particularly interested in the
article, "Afghanistan: What Impact on
Soviet Tactics?," written by a group of
students at the US Army Sergeants Major
Academy. More of the same, please!

Capt John J. Midgley Jr., USA.

HafVard University

Mal Ruth E. Glaspey, USA.

Traverse City. Michigan

Pat on the Back

"

CORRECTION

.. ',.'''>;'\ ~
<"'.0'

In Dennis M. Gormley's article "Understanding Soviet MotivatiOnS fpt,' ",,' ,

Deploying Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," Septembe~:J~1',:' . '
page 33, the first sentence of paragraph two. left column; ShQ,f,lld':' , ,
read: "Contemporary doctrine does admit that war maybegih:d6n~
ventionally and that there may be some small amount of.lImited,'
nuciear use." not as published "Contemporary doctrine does not
admit that war may begin conventionally and thai there may be some '
small amount of limited nuciear use."
" ,

OCAR Wants Achievements. The Public Affairs Office, ,Offics':Of"

the Chief. Army Reserve (OCAR), wants to know about significanb4,m1Y
Reserve unit accomplishments during the first half of FiSCal .YEJllf;
1982. Unique individual and unit achievements in suc~ areas
training. mobilization planning. 'assistance to the
and athletic competition are of interest to OCAR. Co,st-19ffEICtI'~e
vations developed by units to overcome lack of facilities and
also desired.
'.,
"
This information will be reported to th~ ,Office of the
Public 'AffairSl.andmay .eventually bl'!~l,!,~Jld in public inf()fIllaqclI(l~illi
. and in speeches given by members 't;!t',the', Army
,and olher representatives of the QeP!lrtment.of,Tns"..mv,
, , It'lfO'rmatloh; shou,ld be limited to 20 wolids or less
,-.tQ~.\Qep~rjm~nfof the Army,. DAAR~.PA,
:,;.:Wa3~lnglon; .D.C. 20310. Questions or, mput
;;;::~~AUTPYON.e27:-8619 or commercial (202} ,

. cars

76

,:~;~,;.':

,.

July

~EVIEWS
Organ'izing for Counter-Terrorism

By Howard R. Simpson
Strategic Review, Winter 1982

To Americans, terrorism has traditionally seemed a remote, albeit terrible,

possibility. Finally admitting that Americans and US property are now vulnerable
to international terrorism, numerous government agencies are joining the wave of
counterterrorism proposals inundating
Washington.
Howard R. Simpson, who has served in
the US Foreign Service, the US information Agency, and as an Americ*n consul
general in France, is calling for the establishment of a full-time Counterterrorism
Office. While not discounting the value of
the proposed counterterrorism strategies,
he believes a centralized body of experienced civilian officials and military officers can deal far better with terrorism
than the tedious shotgun approach now in
vogue. The Counterterrorism Office
should have decision making authority
and the latitude to cut through nonessential red tape.
The strike force should likewise be a
permanent, unitary team of members of
the armed services with minimum representation from the civilian agencies involved, says Simpson. This unit must be
self-sustaining .and have its own integrated logistic and airlift capabilities.
Such a force could remain in a constant
rapid-deployment mode, whereas joint operations are too dangerous and involved
to coordinate on short notice as evidenced
by the abortive hostage rescue attempt in
Iran.
Effective intelligence is the backbone of
any good counterterrorist structure. Decisions and their execution must be based

1982

on the most current and reliable information available. The vocabulary of analysts
who specialize in the study of terrorists
and their activities discards words like
guaranteed and certain-replacing them
with terms such as anticipated and prob
able. It is not always possible to avert disaster, even under "ideal" conditIOns. As
the author says: "Countering terrorism is
a question of meeting a fluid crisis situation with as many odds as possible in your
favor."
Terrorist groups rely heavily on the elements of fear and psychological impact.
Terrorist acts, as random and Irrational
as they may appear, are calculated to
bring about some immediate or ultimate
goal. Because of this, Simpson believes
that the top priority of the counterterrorist planners should be the detailed study
of the psychological profiles and goals of
the terrorists. The strike force members
should be selected on the basis of aboveaverage intelligence, in addition to their
commando combat skills. The ability to
grasp more than the immediate tactical
situation can be vital.
.
Since terrorism is truly an mternation
al problem, Simpson stresses the need for
the United States to encourage international cooperation in combating it.
Admittedly, this will be difficult to
achieve since national interests and perspectives are not always aligned, but "the
value of shared intelligence data alone
justifies intensified effort."
Terrorism has taken the place of all-out
war, in many cases, as Ira minimuminvestment, low-loss strategy promising
high returns." To combat it more effectively, the White House may have to step
on some bureaucratic toes. However, in
the author's words: "Time is short and the'
next terrorist attack is always scheduled
for tomorrow."-PRD.

77

MILITARY REVIEW
Public Attitudes on Military
Power, 1981
By Alvin Richman
Public Opinion,
December 1981-January 1982

The American public's attitude toward

military power has shifted significantly
since the mid-1970s. According to recent
opinion polls, Americans are now more
willing to spend money to increase America's military power.
This change of attitude, says Alvin
Richman:
... has been due partly to fading
memories of the Vietnam experience ...
[andJ from a growing perception of superior Soviet military power and assertive use
of that power.
This should not be construed to indicate
that the American public is now more
willing to use military power to confront
the Soviets. Instead, Richman suggests:
A t present, the public is much readier to
build military power than to apply it,
evidently believing that possessing military strength in Itself deters threats to
national security.
Americans are dissatisfied with the
current state of US military preparedness. Recent polls indicate that a greater
proportion of Americans today believe the
Soviets are clearly ahead of the United
States in military power. This attitude
differs from the public's attitude in the
mid-1970s. Then, the proportion of Americans who believed the United States was
ahead militarily was about the same
number as those who believed the Soviets
were ahead. "Now," Richman says, "two
or three times as many [Americans] perceive the USSR ahead militarily as perceive the United States ahead."
The use of military power, however, has
become very selective. About half of the
Americans polled:
... favor sending troops to help defend
certain regions perceived to be vital to u.s.
interests-Western Europe, Japan, and

78

the Persian Gulf. But no more than a

quarter favor sending US troops in defense of Poland, Israel or South Korea.
According to Richman, American willingness or reluctance to intervene militarily depends on five specific factors.
These are:
(1) perceived importance to the United
States of the threatened country; (2)
serious7).ess of the threat perceived to be
facing that country (for example, being
threatened with attack versus actually
being attacked); (3) source of the threat
(for example, Soviet/Cuban expansion versus a strictly regional or internal conflict);
(4) perceived need for U.S. intervention in
order to save the situation; and (5) perceived likelihood of intervening successfully and avoiding 'another Vietnam.'
In general, however, the American
population remains more willing to send
supplies or noncombat military advisers
than combat advisers or US troops to
threatened regions.
The use of nuclear weapons in lieu of
sending US forces to help allies was questioned in recent polls conducted by Gallup
and NBC. The polls indicated Americans
are less willing to employ nuclear
weapons than to send US troops or supplies to help defend US allies. The public
was:
... predominantly opposed [toJ 'using
nuclear weapons' either (1) to thwart a
'conquest' of Western Europe by Soviet
conventional forces (49 percent opposed
versus 37 percent in favor) or (2) to counter
a 'limited nuclear attack' by the Soviet Union against a West European ally of the
United States (52 percent opposed versus
29 percent in favor).
In summary, Richman concludes that
Americans hope that increased US military strength alone can deter Soviet expansionism. But he adds:
... if this proves insufficient, the public
is willing to exercise force-short of using
nuclear weapons-to counter the Soviets
in situations perceived as vital to the United States.-SIK.
July

REVIEWS
Armed Confrontation Builds
in South Africa
By Lieutenant Commander Jonathan
Kapstein, US Naval Reserve
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
December 1981

South Africa continues under white

rule despite the fact that nonwhites constitute 80 percent of the population. The
apartheid policies of the government have
evoked criticism and reduced Western
support. Rising racial tensions portend a
bitter civil war, and the South African
leaders in Pretoria are making overtures
to the West in an effort to secure support
for the struggle. Reserve Lieutenant Commander Jonathan Kapstein, Business
Week's African bureau chief, says:
South Africa's foreign policy is based
on the simple-and simple-mindedassumption that the West's dependence on
South Africa's strateglc position and
strategic resources will outweigh wornes
over the future of the apartheid-minded
regime. The West, goes this analysis, has
no choice ultimately but to support the
administration in Pretoria.
As an incentive, Pretoria is dangling
the "carrot" of Simonstown, a former
Royal Navy base at the tip of the Cape of
Good Hope. The facilities there are being
modernized and enlarged in hopes that
the West will ask for its use in overseeing
the vital sea route around the cape. Moreover, the Soviet navy has established
several "friendly" anchorages in neighboring African ports. Of course, any Western naval agreement with South Africa
would carry an implicit stamp of approval
for its domestic policies.
Kapstein points out that the looming
civil war will likely "erupt in the cities
and along industrial arteries, not in the
rural bush." He tabs the exiled African
National Congress (ANC) as the probable
leader of the conflict. The ANC draws its
strength from urban, sophisticated
blacks, and it will promote industrial un-

1982

rest, street clashes and selective urban

terrorism to divide the white population
and gain international attentiQn.
The ANC is demanding the immediate
release of all political prisoners, full
rights and equal opportunity for nonwhites, more equitable sharing of national wealth and majority rule. Support for
the ANC comes from many sources., East
Germany and other East bloc countries
provide the major component of financial
and military support. Other money
sources include the Swedish government
and the World Council of Churches.
According to Kapstein, the South Africans have learned much from observing
the numerous guerrilla conflicts around
them, particularly the eight-year-long
Rhodesian war on their northern border.
South Africa is incorporating "applicable
Rhodesian lessons ... [and] white Rhodesian veterans into its armed forces." As a
preventive measure, the South African
policies of promoting rural tribal rivalries
and erecting legal barriers between
urban and rural blacks have defused any
mass uprisings.
Soutq Africa has instituted a reform
program, but it IS typically seen as too
little or too much by the blacks and
whites respectively. The military appears
more than capable of handling any insurgent conflict. The greater threat of a combined effort backed by a big power is Pretoria's main concern. Envisioning Africa
as a "big power testing ground" similar to
Vietnam is not a pleasant prospect.
The West, especially the United States,
is feeling the familiar squeeze. American
business interests join with the South
African government in calling for condemnation of the rebellion, while there is
a growing demand from many corners of
the world for action against the apartheid
government. Kapstein concludes:
The black position has {LXed on nothing
less than majority rule. White South Africa will give up everything but that. Since
there are no prospects to bridge the gap,
the field is sadly left to bloodshed.-PRD.

79

MILITARY REVIEW
Surprise
By Jose Sanchez Mendez

Air University Review,

November-December 1981

The element of surprise has decided the

outcome of countless battles and indeed
wars. History recounts the many sudden
and dramatic turns resulting from surprise, but there has been little formal
training in the curricula of military
schools. Lieutenant Colonel Jose Sanchez
Mendez of the Spanish air force dissects
the word surprise and proposes an "analytical foundation" for its study.
The three main spoken languages of
the Western World share a similar connotation which distinguishes the act of surprising or catching the enemy off guard
from the state of being surprised and induced to rfjact inappropriately. The author refers to these aspects as the "effect"
and "state" of surprise respectively. He
also breaks down the effect of surprise
into four distinct types: intellectual,
strategic, tactical and technological.
Intellectual surprise hinges on flexibility of military doctrine or dogma. The
ability to adapt to the ever-changing conditions influencing warfare is crucial.
Mendez cites the examples of the conservative French and British military
commands, circa 1940, that had shunned
the theories regarding the use of tanks,
armored vehicles and air power. Paradoxically, many of these postulates advanced by French and British theorists
were studied, improved upon and implemented by the Germans who put them to
good advantage in the early stages of
World War II.
Mendez refers to strategic surprise as:
... the effect achieved in forcing the
enemy to plan, direct, and execute his
strategic actions erroneously. Through
cunning and deception, by distorting the
truth, by blinding and befuddling enemy
. intelligence, by confounding it continually, one can induce the enemy to develop a

80

false appreciation of reality.

The Soviet Union has proved very
adept at this practice while enhancing its
world position.
Tactical surprises have often enabled
weaker forces to gain victory by blending
the wise use of available resources, prevailing conditions such as weather or
geographical considerations, and bold,
unexpected tactics. The author cites the
use of the railroad to transport Confederate reinforcements as the deciding tactical surprise at the First Battle of Bull
Run.
Technological surprise is achieved by
using new weapons which the enemy does
not expect. The technology can be developed or simply bought covertly by a
country. With the emphasis on intelligence-gathering relative to the technology of a potential enemy, the author
acknowledges that this type of surprise
has become difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, he believes that progress and man's
"spirit of conquest" will yield new surprises.
When one side fails to foresee possible
actions by an enemy, a state of surprise
exists. Such was the case in the Six-Day
War when Arab countries did not anticipate the devastating Israeli air strikes
which destroyed some 400 Arab aircraft
in one day and "effectively decided the
outcome of the war," Another example
was the inability of Western intelligence
to discern that the Shah's army would not
stand by him against the Khomeiniinspired revolution in Iran. There was a
plethora of information available from
many sources, but it was not interpreted
correctly.
It is clear that whether one wishes to be
an effective "surprisor" or seeks to avoid
becoming a "surprisee," he must have an
efficient intelligence system. In the author's words: "Surprise . . . can only be
countered by effective intelligence and intelligence gathering; and analysis must
encompass much more than mere numbers and technology."-PRD.

July

~EWS
UNITED STATES

ALL-AUTOMATIC LANDING

An FIB Hornet strike fighter (MR,

Feb 1982, p 84) recently made its first
fully automatic landing on a simulated
carrier-deck field at the Naval Air Test
Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.
This is believed to be the first time in
naval history that an aircraft flew to
touch down in Its initial automatic landing system test flight.
The Hornet is demonstrating its
suitability for carrier operations, including the aircraft's compatibility with
the fleet's automatic carrier landing
system (ACLS). The ACLS and
approach power compensator (A PC)
aboard the Hornet are in full command
of the aircraft's flight controls and

throttles during approach and landing.

The ACLS compensates for the motion of the carrier deck. timing the aircraft's approach and touch down to
the rOiling and pitching deck. Power
changes are made by the APC to keep
the aircraft at the proper speed for
landing.
Hornet operational training and
testing is under way with two squadrons based in California. Plans call
for McDonnell Douglas to deliver a
tolal of 1,377 aircraft to the Navy in
this program. Canada and Australia
also have selected the F18, with initial
deliveries late this year and in 1984
respectively.

The Mlhtary ReView, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff
College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the News section of this
publication, Items are pnnted as a service to the readers No official endorsement of the Views, oplOions
or factual statements IS Intended.-Edltor.

1982

81

MILITARY REVIEW

FIRST ALCM COMPLETED

The first production air-launched

cruise missile (ALCM) was recently
completed by Boeing Aerospace
Company, the contractor for the 705missile contract. The Fiscal Year 1980
and 1981 funding for the ALCMs totals
$318 million.
The ALCM, cornerstone of the nation's present air-launched segment of
the strategic triad, will be launched
from B52G bombers. The missile carries a nuclear warhead, has a range of
more than 1,500 miles and an onboard computer with terrain correlation guidance to give it great accuracy

82

over long distances. The ALCM is

capable of being launched from
beyond an enemy border and penetrating deep into hostile territory. The
missile can also be deployed on the
new BtB long-range bomber.
According to Boeing, the missile is
expected to become operational thiS
December. At that time, 16 B52s will
be equipped with 12 missiles each.
Initially, the B52 will carry the missiles
externally. The BtB is expected to
carry 14 ALCMs externally and eight
in its weapons bay.-Armed Forces
Journal International, 1982.

July

NEWS

NEW SAND-GRID ROADWAY

A new roadway system designed by

the Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi,
uses a gridded, sand confinement
system to solve the problem of moving
heavy vehicles across the desert and
beach.
Researchers discovered that a layer
of aluminum grid cells filled with sand
and topped by a sprayed-on coat of
emulsified asphalt creates a stable
roadway. During tests, the sand-grid
confinement system supported tan-

1982

dem-axel truck loads of 53,000

pounds for 10,000 passes with only
slight rutting. In unconfined sand, the
same truck made only 10 passes before becoming bogged down in 11inch ruts.
Originally, the system was designed
with honeycomb-type aluminum grids,
but now thinner, lighter plastic is being
evaluated. Trial sections of sand-grids
have been included in United Nations
road-building projects in Africa.-En-

gineer.

83

MILITARY REVIEW

AMRAAM CONTRACT AWARDED

The US Air Force has awarded a

contract for full-scale development of
the radar-guided Advanced MediumRange Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)
(MR, Feb 1982, p 85). The $421 million fixed-price contract was awarded
to Hughes Aircraft Company's Missile
Systems Group. The AMRAAM is designed to replace the AIM? Sparrow
currently in operation.

The new missile will provide an allenvironment missile capability for the
Air Force's F15 and F16 fighters, as
well as the Navy's F14s and F1Bs.
The AMRAfJ,M is scheduled to begin
flight tests In early 1984 and will enter
the defense inventory in 1986.Armed Forces Journal International,
1982.

The AMRAAM scores a direct hit on a fighter aircraft drone target

The missile Is launched

from an F16 (left)
escorted by a chase plane

The AMRAAM-Its low

smoke motor stili
burning-Is guided by an
on-board active radar
seeker toward the tall Of
the OF102 target

The missile, after making

a near dead ..center hit,

passes through the target

aircraft setting It aflame,
even though the missile
did not have a warhead

The QF102 falls In tlames

over White Sands MiSSile
Range, New Mexico,
where the test launch
took place

Hughes im:raft Company

84

July

NEWS

NO TAIL, CAN FLY

An experimental no-tall-rotor (NOTAR) aircraft with the potential to increase safety while reducing maintenance costs was successfully flown at
the Hughes Helicopter Flight Test
Facility, Carlsbad, California.
The NOT AR aircraft is a modified
OH6A helicopter incorporating a circulation control/Jet thruster tall boom
assembly that has replaced the tail
rotor in providing antitorque and directional control force for helicopter flight.
Total time logged in the two flights late
last year was 36 minutes. Tests conducted included hovering, sideward
flight and 90, 180, 270 and 360degree right and left turns. The test
. pilot reported that the handling qual-

1982

itles were similar to those of a standard OH6A helicopter with lower vibralion.
The NOT AR system offers a practical yet simple way to eliminate the
historic undesirabilities of a tail rotor
such as safety problems, aerodynamic inefficiencies, noise and maintenance costs. The NOTAR program IS
bemg carried out under a $2.2 million,' 24-month contract, awarded to
Hughes Helicopters Inc. by the US
Army Aviation Research and Development Command's Applied Technology
Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, and
the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Washington, D.C.

85

MILITARY REVIEW

COBRA JUDY BEING TESTED

Cobra Judy (MR, Jan 1982, p 76),
the world's largest ship-borne phasedarray radar, will soon scan the Pacific
skies.
Carried aboard the US naval ship
Observation Island, the US Air Force
radar recently ended several months'
testing in the eastern Atlantic. Using
Boston, Massachusetts, as a base,
sea trials were held off the New England coast. The sea-borne radar station was developed by the Air Force
Systems Command's Electronic Systems Division to gather data on ballistic missile test flights.
Cobra Judy detects and follows
targets more accurately than conven-

86

tional moving radars. Its radar beam is

steered electronically by computer in
precisely controlled patterns. Computers driving the radar are programed to
steer the beam, store and display the
data, and sort out and analyze the information collected as a missile is detected, identified and tracked.
Mounted on a revolving platform,
the 250-ton, four-story-high radar turret dominates the afterdeck of the
ship. The 35-foot-square turret has
one octagonal face tilted slightly inward. Ray1heon Company developed,
installed and will test the ship-borne
sensor.

July

NEWS

ISRAEL

NOSE FITlw'---'

E'OMEILE~rS---'

Main components of the TALf cluster bomb

CLUSTER BOMB DEVELOPED

Israel has developed a new cluster

bomb which will replace Its standard
iron bomb types in the antipersonnel
and light antimaterial roles. The new
bomb, designed by Rafael Armament
Development Authority, has been designated the TAL1.
The munition can be carried either
singly on a standard one-store bomb
rack pylon or as multiple munitions on
tandem, triple or multiple-ejection rack
type pylons. The preset delay time
fuze of the bomb is locked by a single
arming wire.
During weapon release and a short
period afterward, the carrier aircraft's
safety is ensured by the safe-and-arm
mechanism of the time fuze. After the
time-delay period of the fuze, the cas-

1982

ing splits open and the 279 bomblets

carried are centrifugally scattered by
the cluster's fast spin rate.
The bomblets are individually
armed by single arming wires that are
withdrawn from their casings by passage through the air. An evenly. distributed circular pattern is produced by
the bomblets on the target area. The
actual size of the pattern is governed
by the time-fuze setting. The maximum blast area produced is approximately 53,000 square meters. The
time-fuze setting and pattern size for
various target types is chosen from
bombing tables supplied with the
munition.--Jane's Defence Review,
1981.

87

MILITARY REVIEW

KIT DETECTS EXPLOSIVES

An explosive testing kit (ETK) that

detects and identifies explosives in a
matter of seconds has been developed by Rafael Armament Development Authority and the Israel
Police Force.
The micro-laboratory, which is composed of two reagent tubes and detection buttons for sampling, enables the
quick detection of suspects engaged
in the preparation, handling or carrying of explosive charges. In addition, it
aids in ascertaining explosive contamination of various surfaces such as
suitcases, door handles and car surfaces.

Equipped to distinguish between

explosive and nonexplosive materials,
the field-test kit is also capable of
identifying the two major classes of
explosives currently in use. The ETK
can differentiate between two groups
of explosives: TNT, tetryl, TNB, picric
acid and its salts; and dynamite, RDX,
PETN, cellulose nitrate and smokeless powder. Positive identification is
characterized by the appearance of
strong visible colors.
The ETK is now in operational use
in Israel. The field-test kit has already
proven effective in criminal and terrorist situations.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

AERIAL MISSILE TARGETS PURCHASED

The United Arab Emirates has

awarded a $15.4 million contract to
Beech Aircraft Corporation for the production of MQM107A aerial missile
targets (MR, Ju11981, P 84). The contract includes support hardware, logistic items and training.
The turbojet-powered, remotecontrolled targets will be used by defense forces to train crews of the surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries
. are scheduled to begin in 1983. The
targets will be of the latest version,
equipped with a TR/BO-2 engine
manufactured by Microturbo Corporation of France. With the increased
thrust of this new engine, the drone

88

will have a speed of 616 miles per

hour. Launched from the ground, the
missile is maneuverable to altitudes in
excess of 40,000 feet. The missile,
which is 16.8 feet long and weighs
1,075 pounds, is recGverable by
means of a two-stage parachute system.
This is the first sale of the drone.
missile targets in the Middle East,
according to the contractor. The drone
missile is currently being used by the
US Armed Forces. Beech has delivered more than 400 of the
MQM107A targets, in the Streaker
version, to the US Army and to foreign
nations.

July

~OOKS
MIxeD COMPANY: WomeR In the Modem Army by Helen
Rogan. 333 Pages. G.P. Putnam's Sons. N.Y. t981.

514.95.

In an attempt to cover all areas of the

complex topic, women in the Army, Helen
Rogan has spent some one and one-half
years researching her subject. Her work,
Mixed Company, includes an analysis of
integrated basic training, the now defunct Women's Army Corps (WAC),
women at West Point and women in combat. In dealing with these areas, she
touches upon the substantive and
peripheral issues relative to the question:
Do women make effective soldiers?
Rogan's most important point, and the
key issue as to how women are accepted
in the Army, is related to how effectiveness is defined by the male-dominated
service. Rogan defines effectiveness in
terms of how women will perform in combat. She clearly demonstrates that the
primary mission of the Army is combat
and that the Army must have combat soldiers.
Rogan then points out that, although
women have been involved in combattype situations, they have never, in
American history, been front-line combat
troops. Rogan states that, until women
are allowed into the combat branches,
their full acceptance into the Army will
be minimal. There will always be males
who will hold themselves superior because they have been in combat or can go
into combat.
On the negative side, Mixed Company's
worth is sometimes obscured by inaccuracy C ... Fort Hood ... near EI Paso ... "),
sensationalism (lesbians in the WAC) and
a limited number of sources (mostly enlisted females, almost no officers or
males). Oll balance, however, the book is

1982

one of the most complete and current

works on women in the Army. It is unfortunate that Helen Rogan did not try to
make her book more definitive by providing a concise statement of the problems
and possible solutions.
Certainly, a further development of the
Army personnel policy difficulties and
their possible resolutions need to be explored. Only in a piecemeal fashion has
the Army leadership attempted to deal
with such questions as pregnancy, deployability and fraternization. Now, the
Army is cutting back on the recruitment
of women until further studies can be
made. All this naturally leads to the questions: Is there a place for women in today's Army? If so, does the Army or society need to change?
Rogan has done an excellent job of presenting the questions, but, frustratingly
so, has failed to answer them. She has
presented and defined many of the issues.
The Army should take a hard look at her
presentation and try to find the solutions.
Capt Judith A. Lucken, USA,
Department of History, USMA
Capt Frederick G. Hitchcock, USA,
Department of History, USMA

SOVIET MILtTARY THINKING. Edited by Derek Leebaert 314

Pages. Allen & Unwin. Winchester. Mass 1981 $3795
clothbound $14 95 paperbound

Two contending schools of thought split

current Kremlinology. One camp views
Soviet leaders as calculating geopoliticians, pursuing policy goals with all the
rationality of a writer for Foreign Affairs.
The other peers into the hearts of Leonid

89

MILITARY REVIEW
I. Brezhnev and company, often only finding rather conventional ideological and
cultural stereotypes.
This polarization appalled Derek
Leebaert. Soviet Military Thinking, his
recent editorial project, seeks to meld
these two points of view into a more comprehensive portrait of the Soviet military
mind. He presents the results here in a
series of papers based on a wide variety of
diplomatic, governmental and academic
expertise.
To evaluate a collection of articles
usually proves perplexing at best. In the
case of Soviet Military Thinking, the intended diversity of authors exacerbates
this normal hindrance. Fortunately, the
first essays by Leebaert, Fritz Ermath
and Robert Bathhurst blend into a wellplanned methodological dialogue which
helps to orchestrate the following more
disparate studies.
The papers on strategic questions supply some fascinating insights on the subtle cultural variations and individual
security issues between East and West.
While both Stanley Sienkiewicz and
Raymond L. Garthoff tend to replicate
commonplaces of the \irms control genre
already familiar to the reader from such
sources as International Security, Michael
McGwire more than compensates with his
illuminating projections of future Soviet
naval capabilities and intentions.
The last three treatises arrive at some
highly evocative conclusions on the nature of the Soviet military Weltanschauung. Nathan Leites, Christopher
Jones and David Holloway examine their
own respective specialties of tactical doctrine, the Warsaw Pact and armaments
acquisitions. They explore these topics
from the Soviet side, within the cultural
and ideological milieu of the Russian
practitioner. The results of this fusion of
erudition and originality merit the most
attentive study.
The authors hope that the wide,ranging scope of their work will attract a
broad readership. Indeed, their publica-

90

tion provides far more than innovative

disquisitions on specialist questions. The
hypotheses-whether ultimately validated or not-offer a fruitful line of inquiry, particularly insofar as they uncover the direct link of Soviet military
thought to its very non-Western, intellectual tradition.
The failure to foresee the Russian arms
buildup of the last decade exemplifies the
potential costs of ignoring the very real
differences in Soviet and American attitudes toward war. From that standp(;int..
Soviet Military Thinking is by far the best
book available in recent memory. Accordingly, it should prove valuable for anyone
striving for a firm grasp of the conceptual
foundation of Soviet strategic and tactical
doctrine.
Steven D. Stlnemetz, Harvard University

NICARAGUA: The Land 01 Sandi no by Thomas W Walker,

137 Pages WeslVlew Press, Boulder, Colo. 1981 $20.00
clothbound $10.95 paperbound

Although this book is, in many ways, a

naive apology for the excesses and leftist
orientation of Nicaragua's Sandinist regime, it does offer a valuable historical
perspective of American involvement in
this Central American repUblic.
Dr. Thomas W. Walker traces Nicaragua's nearly 350 years under colonial
rule and 50-year flirtation with democracy which ended in 1893 when Jose Santos
Zelaya became the country's first dictator. In the first of many well-meaning,
but ultimately disastrous, interventions,
the United States precipitated Zelaya's
downfall. US Marines were called in
twice to support the faltering government. During its second occupation, the
United States built up the National
Guard then led by Anastasio Somoza. The
greatly strengthened National Guard defeated the guerrillas and made a martyr

July

BOOKS
of their leader, Augusto Cesar Sandino.
Sandinist moves immediately followirig
their victory over Somoza are not only
reminiscent of Cuba, but reflect specific
responses to the dictator's excesses.
Political power was consolidated through
the Sandinist National Liberation Front
(FSLN) and popular elections deferred to
deny residual elements a Bay of Pigs
opportunity. Banking'and insurance systems were nationalized to cope with the
war's aftermath and prevent any retUI"n
to economic exploitation. Strong ties were
established with Third World and socialist states as protection against feared US
hegemony.
Walker is prone to dismiss the widespread Cuban military and political presence as merely fraternal. He similarly regards FSLN emulation of Cuba's party
organization as a "grass-roots" phenomenon. This book, with all its shortcomings, provides timely background for
those concerned about current developments in El Salvador, Guatemala and
Costa Rica.
Col John W. Messer, USAR

REFLECTIONS ON THE CIVIL WAR by 8ruce Catton Edited

by John Leekley Introduction by E 8 Long. 246 Pages
Doubleday & Co . N Y 1981 $1595

This book on the Civil War, Bruce Catton's last, provides the reader with some
conversational afterthoughts on the major themes the author addressed in his
prior works. The narrative flows from
start to finish, giving the reader a quick,
easy to comprehend overview of the war,
Abraham Lincoln's policy and goals, the
strategic planning of Union and Confederate leaders, the political motivation
behind the Atlanta Campaign and the
attacks on Richmond, and the tactical
blunders at Gettysburg and Fredericksburg.
1982

But more than these large issues are

addressed in Catton's work. He built his
Reflections around a common soldier, Private John Geyser, who was sucked into
the maelstrom of national pride and fervor at the outbreak of the war. Geyser
entered as a 90-day volunteer, re-enlisted
for three years, recorded his view of the
war in pictures rather than words and left
them in a "sketchbook" which came into
Catton's hands.
The "sketchbook" is the heart of Catton's Reflections and the one new ingredient in the work. Through Catton's portrait of Geyser and his interpretations of
the records, the reader gains insight into
the day-to-day realities of war conducted
by Company D of the combat engineers.
Geyser's engineers moved the Army of
the Potomac through the quagmires of
northern Virginia. The book is well worth
owning if only to read Chapter 5, "There
Was a Young Soldier."
Published posthumously, the book has
some flaws not typical of Bruce Catton.
The Geyser "sketchbook" is located in the
center of the book, while Catton's excellent commentary on the sketches is
awkwardly placed at the end of the book.
There are no maps, footnotes or bibliography to identify the author's sources or references.
The reader who is unfamiliar with the
geography of the war would do well to
have a Civil War atlas handy. Ulysses S.
Grant's alcohol problem is dispatched
with two simple arguments: Lincoln, a
good judge of character, would never have
chosen a drunk for his commander in
chief, and the official records never show
the effects of Grant's drinking as a handicap to his performance of duty. The absence of notes makes the text easy to read,
but the serious researcher would question
such bold statements as " ... Lee ... to
whom Winfield Scott offered top command of the Union army."
Reflections on the Cwil War is well
worth reading. It has the limitation of not
being a detailed analysis, but that was not
91

MILITARY REVIEW
the author's intent. He was merely trying
to summarize the impact of the Civil War
on America after devoting a lifetime to its
study. Bruce Catton believed in America.
To him, the Civil War was the crucible of
redemption for a nation fragmented by social ills, sectional strife and Constitutional controversy. The nation was stymied in
1860. As painful as war was for the young
nation, it did redeem the vision of the
great democratic dream foreseen by the
founding fathers and moved the fractured
people "toward a destiny bigger than we
can understand."
Ch (Maj) William L. Hufham, USA, USACGSC

SUPPLYING WASHINGTON'S ARMY by Erna Risch. 470

Pages. Center 01 Military History. Washmgton. DC 1981.
$13.50

The Continental Army's logistic support during the American Revolution at

various times included the Quartermas
ter, Hospital, Commissary, Clothing and
Ordnance Departments. This book is
about the functioning of those aspects
of George Washington's army.
Many personnel rotated through highranking positions in these departments,
while the turnover in the lower positions
must have created an even greater problem. It seems clear that any position, civilian or military, with Army logistics
was a lousy job. Underlying all supply
activities was a lack of transportation
which compounded the logistic nightmare. Yet, in spite of the support, rather
than because of it, our Army did function
and had the necessary equipment at the
proper time to gain victory.
The author conveys the facts in such a
manner that the reader gains a real
appreciation ofthe subject. There is much
information, and the student will find
himself saying on more than a few occasions, "So that's how it worked." Through-

92

out the narrative, there is never a shot

fired or an assault made-strictly logistic
themes.
Washington took supply matters seriously, and they occupied a great deal of
his time. During the Yorktown Campaign, he acted as his own chief supply
officer which demonstrated his understanding of the direct connection between
adequate, timely support and victory.
The efforts of civilians, both voluntary
and forced, are covered in depth. Impressment of corps, wagons, clothes and horses
was common and usually caused bad feelings. At times, farmers refused to plant
crops, and millers did not produce because
their products would be taken for relatively worthless Continental money. In
1779, Washington commented that "a
wagon load of money will scarcely purchase a wagon load of provisions." Some
quartermasters actually hid from suppliers seeking payment.
Dr. Erna Risch, now retired, is the foremost authority on the Quartermaster
Corps, having published its history from
1775 through 1939 and also the quartermaster volume in the World War II
"Green Book Series." This current study
was completed after her retirement and is
a unique contribution to a more complete
understanding ofthe war. This referencetype book is necessary reading for those
who specialize in the Revolution.
Maj Lynn Sims, USAR, Consulting Faculty, USACGSC

THE FRENCH RIVIERA CAMPAIGN OF AUGUST 1944 by Alan

F Wilt. 208 Pages Southern Illinois University Press. Carbondale. III t981. $15.00.

The 37th anniversary of the Allied

landings in Southern France was marked
by the appearance of Alan F. Wilt's book,

The French Riviera Campaign of August

1944. It was not a minute too soon. While
unit histories and biographical accounts

July

BOOKS
abound, no definitive synthesis has b~
published thus far which adequately
brings into historical focus the causes,
conduct and effects of this campaign. At
long last, Wilt has produced such a book.
Almost half the book is devoted to a discussion of the strategic pros and cons concerning the desirability and timing of the
operation. As early as the Quebec Conference (August 1943), when the United
States first proposed such an operation, it
was opposed by the British chiefs of staff
and by Winston Churchill himself. While
the United States favored a landing in
Southern France, the British sought to
reinforce Italy.
Although the validity of the strategic
concept may still remain in doubt, there
is no question about the efficacy of the
planning and the tactical operations that
ensued. The leaders and forces involved
were veterans of Africa, Sicily and Italy.
In terms of miles advanced, enemy forces
killed and materiel captured, the tempo of
the Allied advance was unsurpassed on
the Western Front. Southern France remains today a model tactical operation of
its genre.
This book is particularly valuable for
its last chapter, "An Assessment." Here,
Wilt brings all the threads of the story
together. He attempts to answer the ques
tion, "Was the French Riviera Campaign
truly necessary?" Relying on British,
French and German sources, as well as
American, he cites George C. Marshall.
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Jacob L. Dev
ers, all of whom believed that it was
necessary, whereas Winston Churchill
and Chester Wilmot, among others, believed that it was not. "Did DRAGOON
accomplish what it was supposed to do?"
Here again, the evidence produces a
mixed bag, but the author concludes that
"while not decisive in winning the war ...
[it] was a highly significant operation."
In sum, DRAGOON served its basic
purpose, that of ridding Southern France
of German forces and opening up inajor
ports which were invaluable in reinforc-

1982

ing and sustaining the Allied forces in the

west. Wilt's book constitutes the most detailed, the most accurate and the most
objective account of the Allied landings in
Southern France published in English to
date. Because of its new insights, it is
must reading for military careerists and
military historians, and a welcome addition to our understanding of the nature
and strategic conduct of World War II.
Gen Theodore J. Conway, USA, Re/ired

SOVIET GENERALS RECALL WORLD WAR II. Edited by Igor

Vltukhln Translated by Anatol Kagan 411 Pages SphinX
Press. N Y 1981 $1595.

From the opening words on its dust

jacket, "Now for the first time .. ," this
book strikes a false note. Three chapters,
constituting nearly a fourth of this
anthology, appeared in English 10 years
ago in Memoirs of Marshal G. Zhukov.
There were also previous translations of
the chapters by Joseph Stalin, Admiral
Nikolai Kuznetsov and Marshal Kinll
Meretskov.
Worse yet, the present translation and
editing are sloppy and inaccurate. This
reviewer cross-checked the Zhukov chap
ters With both the previous Soviet translation, his Memoirs, and the Russian original, Vospomznanzya I Razmyshlenzya. In
nearly every case, the previous translation agreed with the origmal, and the
errors appear only in this new and superfhious translation.
The editor and translator are probably
Communist Party apparatchiki rather
than military men or historians. How else
could one explain mistaking twin-engin~
bombers for Stukas-among the most distinctive planes of World War II-or translating "tanks and SAUs" (Samakhodnaya
Artilleryskaya Ustanovka-self-propelled
artillery mounts) as "SAU tanks"? That
ignorance also explains another error:

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MILITARY REVIEW
crediting the Germans with "2,700 tanks"
for Operation Citadel in Kursk, when
more reliable Soviet sources state "2,700
tanks and SP assault guns."
Elsewhere, the errors appear to be
sheer carelessness. "Rifle divisions" is
translated "rifle regiments," "800,000"
fighters is rendered "8,000," 50 kilometers is converted to 9 "miles, and
numerous letters and words are omitted-in one case, at least one entire line is
missing.
Although much of the condensation of
Zhukov's Memoirs was undoubtedly to
conserve space, some of the omissions
may be significant. For example, several
pages of the Memoirs covering instances
when Stalin made mistakes are missing.
While most of the other chapters, written by men who held key posts during the
war, deal with broad strategy and largescale operations, Brezhnev's chapter on
the fighting at Novorossiysk in 1943.
when he was merely a colonel heading the
18th Army's Political Department, is
mainly an eyewitness battle account. It is
laced with anecdotes which Sam Goldwyn
would have envied: "some of the crew of a
landing craft bursting into patriotic song
as they approach the enemy shoreline
under heavy fire," "simple soldiers cutting their hands in order to sign a blood
oath at a crucial moment in the fighting,"
and so on.
Also in this chapter, there is rhetoric
like "the omnipotence of Communist
ideas" and "ready to shed his own blood
for the triumph of justice and socialism."
Brezhnev, that self-appointed marshal of
the Soviet Union, makes a point of telling
us, repeatedly, that he was "in the front
lines with the men, even manning a
machine gun on occasion." This chapter is
actually one of those "first time" translations, but it might better have remained
in oblivion.
The cliche, "not worth the paper it's
written on," is literally appropriate because this exceptionally inaccurate Soviet
book was actually P!inted in the United

94

States on good-quality paper. Those interested in the subject would be far better
rewarded by checking out of their libraries Zhukov's Memoirs, Seweryn Bialer's
Stalin and His Generals, or even General
Sergey M. Shtemenko's The Soviet General Staffat War. 1941-1945.
Allen F. Chew. USAF. ReI/red

MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM: A Comparallve Inslilulional

Analysis by Amos Perlmutter. 194 Pages. Yale UniverSity
Press. New Haven. Conn. 1981. $17.50.

This book is a thorough, scholarly examination of authoritarianism by a competent scholar. It is an important book for
the political scientist, scholar or earnest
student of world affairs. The casual reader may find that the concepts. terminology and scholarly disputations are difficult
to follow.
Amos Perlmutter begins his study with
a series of careful definitions and the construction of a framework for the analysis
of authoritarianism. He says that, in a
modern authoritarian state, there are
three major elements or sources of political power. The first element is the single
authoritarian party-for example, the
Nazi Party in Germany or the Communist Party in the USSR. The second major
element is the bureaucratic-military complex. The third element is the parallel
and auxiliary structures. These structures may be formed by the regime to consolidate and maintain power. Examples
are the Nazi SS and SA, the Red Guards,
and various paramilitary and police organizations.
Having established the framework,
Perlmutter then examines modern authoritarian regimes in terms of the
framework. He uses graphic representations as a complement to the written word
in order to compare and contrast the attributes of authoritarian regimes.

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BOOKS
During the course of his analysis, Perlmutter covers some interesting points. He
discusses the substantial difference between the Nazi system in Germany and
the fascist system in Italy which the layman or casual scholar may link together
as being essentially similar. He also includes an interesting discussion of the relationship between ideology and authoritarianism. He says:
I assert that while ideology plays a substantial role in the development of bolshevik and Nazi authoritarianism. it plays an
insignificant part in the evaluation of
military, corporate and praetorzan autocracies.
Perlmutter discusses the relationship
of authoritarianism to economic development. He says that all modern. authoritarian regimes. except Nazi Germany,
have been established in economically
underdeveloped societies with politically
unstable regimes.
Authoritarianism is a conspicuous
political fact of the 20th century. This
book fills a need for a carefully structured
analysis of the phenomenon.
Ralph W. Ekwall.
Directorate of Academic Operations, USACGSC

THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE: Passing the Torch by Edward

Doyle, Samuel Llpsman, Stephen Weiss and the Editors of
Boston Publishing Co. 206 Pages. Boston Publishmg Co .
Boston, Mass 1961. $12 95

The Boston Publishing Company and

these three talented authors have put
together a compelling account of the Vietnam conflict from the end of World War II
to the beginning of extensive US involvement in 1961. This is the second volume
of their series, The Vietnam Experience.
This volume describes Vietnam from the
surrender of the Japanese through
France's involvement and up to the entrance of the United States. Setting the

1982

Stage is the first volume in the series. The

third, unpublished, volume will detail US
military involvement.
.
Passing the Torch describes the political realities of the Indochinese region in a
manner that allows the reader to develop
an understanding of the conflict. The
reader gains some empathy for the plot of
the Vietnamese and the roles of Ho Chi
Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap, This
book is not a detailed military history
but, rather, an account of the return of
the French to Vietnam and France's loss
of the French-Indochinese War. World
events which bear on this historical scenario are related to activities in the region. The text provides an appreciation of
the French problems, some of which
would plague the Americans a decade later. This book would have been terrific
required reading for those officers planning US-Vietnamese strategy in the mid1960s.
This publication is a welcome contribution to the study of the Vietnam conflict.
It deals in history without becoming a detailed historical treatise. It clearly explains the military aspects of the situation without elaborate accounts of battles
or campaigns. This approach provides a
lucid understanding of the Vietminh, the
North Vietnamese Army, Ho Chi Minh
and the reasons for their actions.
The format is journalistic, reminding.
one of the Time-Life series books. The
photographs are excellent and support
the text, but they tend toward the sensational at times. Passing the T.orch is wellresearched and contains an excellent bibliography. The authors have managed to
paint a picture to aid the reader in developing his own conclusions and opinions. This book lays a good foundation for
the third volume.
Students of Vietnamese history, as well
as military officers, will want to read this
book. They will probably find no great
revelations in the work, but certainly will
appreciate the easy-flowing manner in
which the authors portray the period.

95

MILITARY REVIEW
Both those who fought in Vietnam and
those who are new to the service will find
that the understanding they gain will
help them analyze and assess US foreign
policy in the future. Passing the Torch is
not a direct criticism of US policy. However, it leaves the reader with a deeper
understanding of how and why the policy
came to be and gives enough information
to conclude why it turned sour.
Passing the Torch and its sister
volumes will, no doubt, leave their mark
among those books attempting to dissect
and analyze the Vietnam conflict.
Maj Thomas W. Mastaglio, USA, USACGSC

THE SECRET WAR IN MEXICO: Europe, the United States,

and the Mexican Revolution by Frredrich Katz. 658 Pages
University of Chicago Press. Chicago. III 1981 $3000

Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa are

historical names that are quite familiar
to the average American. The reputations
of Zapata and Vill'a and their historical
impact are known through the countless
movies portraying either their exploits or,
in the case of the movie Viva Zapata, the
life story of Zapata. The movie industry's
portrayal of Zapata and Villa's role in this
revolutionary process is generally one of
confusion and distortion.
The Secret War in Mex!co by Friedrich
Katz is a book which will aid immensely
in filling this intellectual and historic'
gap. His book is an exhaustive research,
as well as a scholarly presentation of the
Mexican Revolution's critical years, 191020.
The book is easily read despite the complex and confusing involvement of many

96

unfamiliar Mexican and foreign personalities. They are intertwined throughout

the work, but Katz does a fine job of taking a maze of international politics, economics and intrigue, and blending them
into an organized presentation. The 10year revolutionary period is analyzed
based on the Mexican leaders who held,
and attempted to hold, the leadership of
Mexico during these years. The influence
of the United States, Great Britain,
France, Germany and Japan on the revolutionary process and its lea<!ers is exhaustively discussed and analyzed in detail.
Although the United States had the
ultimate influence on the revolutionary
process, the Monroe Doctrine was severely challenged, especially by Great Britain
and Germany. Katz points out that war
between the United States and Mexico
was imminent throughout this period and
directly encouraged by Great Britain and
Germany. Woodrow Wilson's leadership
and influence, although often confused,
was instrumental in keeping the two nations at peace and enabling Mexico to continue on as an independent country free
from the domination offoreign powers, including the United States.
Katz expresses the opinion that only
World War I turned the American military minds away from recommending the
total occupation and eventual annexation
of all of Mexico. This discussion might be
a point of contention for US military
historians.
Katz's volume is easy reading, welldocumented and rewarding from the
standpoint of new knowledge for the
majority of readers. The scholar should
find it just as rewarding.
Col James F. Gawne, USAR

July