EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005]

confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of

the writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by

REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B.
ROMANILLOS, respondent.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant

Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest
between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet
Respondent proceeded to represent the former.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasnt
controverted by the Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent
must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the
condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe penalty will
be imposed upon him.[5]

This is a Petition[1] for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for

allegedly representing conflicting interests and for using the title Judge
despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct
in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[2]
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a
case[3] against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that
Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses
Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and
Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a
school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre.
Petitioners Board of Directors terminated respondents services as counsel
and engaged another lawyer to represent the association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who
substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled San Jose Homeowners,
Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against
respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 4783.
In her Report[4] dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:
Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his
clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre case was adverse to the
Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board
member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents

The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint

with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and
diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity
beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which we noted in a
resolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals[6] and this Court[7] and
even moved for the execution of the decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation
of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged
deceitful conduct in using the title Judge although he was found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct.
Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondences
and billboards which was erected in several areas within the San Jose
Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
In his Comment and Explanation,[8] respondent claimed that he continued
to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March
8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second
disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a
rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated.
Concerning the title Judge, respondent stated that since the filing of the
instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name.
On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation.[9]
Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that
respondent did not violate the admonition because it referred to future

cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner
never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was
deceitful when he used the title Judge, thus creating a false impression
that he was an incumbent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully
recommends the following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the
Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of reprimand to a
maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is further
recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern
warning be given to Respondent in that should he violate his
undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future where the
Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the
title of Judge which would create an impression that he is still connected
to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the
Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondents violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING
that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall
be imposed against him.
Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI,
DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres.
Respondent was admonished yet he continued to represent DuranoRodriguez against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of
respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The
lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is
guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after

a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist

that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title Judge
violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any
misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services.
The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as
a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into
believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was
dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from
being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he
was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would
have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt
of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is
hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity
and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However,
respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds,
tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case.
Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from the
service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712
[1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case
could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that
the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an
administrative case renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and
fast rule.

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge

Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious misconduct which would have
warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the
pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply
for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent
with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the
FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which
herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.
SO ORDERED.[10]

The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with
prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled
agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is one of
such privileges.
We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is
reserved to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any
other official of the Republic, including those given the rank of Justice.
[11] By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to judges,
incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged
from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies only to the
aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to
those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as
respondent.
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with
conditions.[12] It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
law, but also known to possess good moral character.[13] Lawyers should
act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal
profession.[14]
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state
the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful
conduct have no place in the legal profession.[15]
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are
mindful that the power to disbar must always be exercised with great
caution, for only the most imperative reasons,[16] and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and as a member of the bar.[17]
This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the court and a
member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits
and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[18] In A.C. No. 4783, he
got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions,
respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra
fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue
disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws.
He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the
trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His
disbarment is consequently warranted.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in respondents record as a member of the Bar, and
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

A.M. No. P-06-2177

(Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
April 19, 2007
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE
BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT
IV,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar,
guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of

judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93.[1] We

ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000 for his transgression. The matter did
not end there, however. Because his malfeasance prima facie contravened
Canon 1, Rule 1.01[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we
ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer
and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in
compliance with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter
and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a government
lawyer.
In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely
remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He
maintained, however, that he kept the money in the courts safety vault
and never once used it for his own benefit.
Atty. Khos apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction,
although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to
remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the
mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a breach of
his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities[3] and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

Atty. Khos conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as
well. For this, he must be called to account. However, his candid and
repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to gain and the fact that
this is his first offense should temper his culpability considerably. Under the
circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful

conduct in violation of the Attorneys Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000 within ten days from
receipt of this resolution.

The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is

hereby DIRECTED to deduct from Atty. Khos accrued leave credits as a
former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern
Samar the fines imposed in this resolution and in the resolution dated June
27, 2006.

RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for these are a lawyers foremost duties.
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the
Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen,
a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out
of trouble with the law. As servants of the law and officers of the court,
lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining
the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy
of emulation.[4] This, in fact, is what a lawyers obligation to promote
respect for law and legal processes entails.

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from

engaging in unlawful conduct.[5] By definition, any act or omission
contrary to law is unlawful.[6] It does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although it is broad enough to include it.[7] Thus, the presence
of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6296

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. OLIVIA

VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondent.
November 22, 2005

which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent]

wanted to be put on record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .

x----------------------------------------x

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong

Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as
Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as
Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket added.)

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J.
Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP
provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant
had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had
entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled,
complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio
Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At
the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January
5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed
by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son,
Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the
response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer
inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants
retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered
that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo
Inos.
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting
documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the
conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos
Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what
complainant said in her complaint: [2]
5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject
matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito
Inos said that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made
alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to
the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter....
attached as Annex A
6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the
hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the
proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial
in favor of the complainant because only her statements were recorded for

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP

Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen
(15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be
considered as in default.[3]
The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents
answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring
respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4]
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint
was filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio
Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel
known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that
the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan
pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her
appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated
that the charge of complainant has been established by clear
preponderance of evidence and, on that basis, recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period
of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding
of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in
violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and
representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang

Pambarangay, provides:
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not
lawyers.
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal
appearance of the parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation
proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale
behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to
secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,[8] the
exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There
can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate
and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is
the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes
obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of lawyers
with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend
to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay
conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her
defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since
complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San
Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In
this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the
end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she
addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment
since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to
all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991
clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation process either before
the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this
case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between
the two parties.
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition
prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty
of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents
conduct
tended
to
undermine
the
laudable
purpose
of
the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was
when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against
her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the

amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section
415 of the Local Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission
of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there.
Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala
asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in
that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm
that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed
all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against
the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the
girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all
too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts
of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the
birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents
Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the
father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been
a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a
bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they mayproceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed
on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part

of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6491. January 31, 2005]
BENILDA M. MADDELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONGGALICINAO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Complainant Benilda Madella is a Clerk in the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, while respondent
Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court and ExOfficio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Their offices
are both housed at the Dumlao Hall of Justice within the Capital Compound
in Bayombong.
In an affidavit-complaint dated 7 February 2003, filed with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD No. 03-1060, the
complainant prays for the disbarment of the respondent for acts
unbecoming a public servant and a lawyer, grave misconduct and
slander.
On the basis of the same affidavit-complaint, the complainant filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an administrative complaint, which
was docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1554-P. The complaint was referred to

Executive Judge Jose Godofredo M. Naui of the RTC of Bambang, Nueva

Vizcaya, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In her affidavit-complaint, the complainant alleged that sometime in July
1999, she received the amount of P40,000 from the respondent by way of
a loan at an interest of 5% per month. In November 2001, since part of the
loan remained unpaid, the respondent went to complainants office and
took complainants cash gift check amounting to P5,000 in her absence
and without her knowledge. There, the respondent uttered unsavory and
humiliating words against her (the complainant). The respondent was
able to encash the check even without her endorsement and applied the
proceeds thereof to the interest of complainants loan. From January to
November 2002, the respondent, based on complainants promissory note,
had been collecting from the complainant an amount equivalent to onehalf of the face value of the checks she received as benefit from the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 10 December 2002, the respondent
went again to the office of the complainant and demanded one-half of the
value of the check representing a cash gift of P5,000. The complainant
refused, reasoning that it was a cash gift, not a JDF check and, therefore,
not covered by their agreement. Complainants refusal to part with the
amount angered the respondent, prompting the latter to raise her voice,
utter unsavory remarks against the complainant, and bang her fist on
top of the complainants table, causing the glass top of the table to break.
Several people witnessed this incident and heard the accusations hurled by
the respondent against the complainant with regard to her failure to pay
her debt.
To support her bid to have the respondent stripped of the privilege to
practice the noble profession of law, the complainant attached to her
affidavit-complaint a copy of a confidential letter-complaint of one
Benjamin Rilloraza dated 3 May 2001 addressed to Atty. Ma. Cristina
Layusa of the Office of the Bar Confidant, opposing the respondents
admission to the Bar in view of her acts of notarizing documents outside
the area of her commission. Mr. Rilloraza claimed that the respondent,
although not yet a lawyer, was issued a notarial commission for Kayapa or
(Kasibu), Nueva Vizcaya. However, the respondent notarized documents
in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, outside the area of her commission. To
prove his allegation, he attached to the said letter-complaint photocopies
of a Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle dated 31 January 2001 and an Affidavit
dated 3 May 2001, both indicating that they were notarized by the
respondent in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and that the respondents
commission as a Notary Public was for Bayombong. Mr. Rilloraza likewise
alleged that despite her husbands death, the respondent continued to
receive and encash for at least three months checks corresponding to her
husbands salaries as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of
Nueva Vizcaya. He also pointed out that the respondent even continued to
claim the higher allowable deductions as a married individual despite the
death of her husband.

The complainant also presented a Certification issued on 6 May 2003 by

Judge Jose B. Rosales of Branch 27, RTC, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in his
capacity as Executive Judge, stating that the respondent was never
appointed as a notary public for Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, during the
period from 1 January 1997 to December 2003.
For her part, the respondent denied that she is engaged in the business of
lending money, the truth of the matter being that the complainant
approached her sometime in November 1998 begging that she lend her
some money. She then informed the complainant that she knew of
somebody who had money. Out of pity and compassion, she agreed to be
the guarantor to facilitate her loan. To prove her claim, she presented an
affidavit of Mr. Josue B. Liclican dated 10 March 2003 stating that he is the
creditor of the complainant and that the respondent merely brokered the
loan agreement and acted as a guarantor in favor of the complainant. Mr.
Liclican also claimed that by reason of complainants failure to pay her
obligation after the lapse of more than four years, he tried to collect the
loan from the respondent, who acted as a guarantor.
As regards complainants allegation that she did not authorize the
respondent to obtain the cash gift in November 2001, the respondent
averred that she had a verbal agreement with the complainant authorizing
her to obtain the check. She also presented an authorization signed by the
complainant on 8 January 2002 authorizing the respondent to receive the
formers JDF checks and to apply half of the amount as installment
payment of her loan, with the obligation to return the other half to the
complainant. To refute the allegation that she continued to obtain the
checks of her deceased husband, the respondent presented a letter dated
2 May 1998 informing the OCA of the death of her husband on 3 April 1998
with a request to stop sending checks issued in his name. She likewise
presented her Income Tax Return (ITR) for 1998 filed on 11 January 1999,
which showed that she declared herself as head of the family and not as
a married individual. She forwarded the said ITR to the OCA on 10 March
1999, and informed the latter of her change of status for purposes of
taxation.
Anent the allegation that she notarized documents in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, outside of the area of her commission, the respondent explained
that she did it to accommodate the parties thereto, who were her relatives,
and that she did not derive profit from such act.
Respondents motion to suspend the proceedings in CAD No. 03-1060 in
view of the pendency of OCA IPI No. 03-1554 was denied.
On 20 February 2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted
her report and recommendation. She found that the respondent has
proved that she is not the creditor of the complainant and that she had
promptly informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Supreme Court
of the death of her husband, precluding any occasion where she could

unlawfully claim her husbands salary and avail herself of the higher
allowable tax deductions even after his death. However, Commissioner
Maala recommended that for the acts of notarizing outside the area of her
notarial commission and obtaining the JDF checks of the complainant from
the cash clerk in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 27-2001, the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-227 in CBD No. 03-1060, annulling and setting aside
Commissioner Maalas recommendation; dismissing the administrative
complaint against Atty. Galicinao with respect to the charge of violating a
Supreme Court Circular for collecting a loan for which she acted as a
guarantor; and imposing upon the respondent the penalty of reprimand for
her act of notarizing documents outside the area where she was
commissioned as a notary public.
We affirm the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the IBP dismissing
the administrative complaint against the respondent to the extent covered
by the complaint in A.M. No. P-04-1890, formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1554-P. It
must be pointed out that as an employee of the Judiciary and a member of
the Bar, the respondent is subject to our disciplinary authority. Under our
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on 1 October 2002, an
administrative case against a court official who is a lawyer, based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members
of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such
official both as a court official and as a member of the Bar. Thus, in our
Resolution of 20 September 2004 in A.M. No. P-04-1890, we severely
reprimanded the respondent for simple misconduct, with a warning that a
repetition of the same act in the future shall be dealt with more severely,
and we ordered her to replace the broken glass top with a new one.
Hence, the only remaining issue is respondents liability for her act of
notarizing documents outside the area of her commission as a notary
public. Although such act was not one of the grounds relied upon in
complainants affidavit-complaint, we cannot turn a blind eye thereto
considering respondents admission that she did such act. For that, as
correctly held by the IBP, the respondent must be disciplined. The penalty
of reprimand recommended by the IBP is, however, too light.
We have declared on several occasions, that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof (Nunga v. Viray,
A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 [1999]).

Thus, we are not satisfied with respondents explanation that she notarized
documents outside of the area of her notarial commission as a favor to her
relatives and for free. Whether the respondent derived profit from her act
of notarizing outside the area of her authority is of no moment. The fact
remains that she notarized outside the area of her commission.
Considering, however, that her misconduct as a notary public was
committed while she was not yet a lawyer, she could not be disciplinarily
dealt with as a lawyer. The penalty that should be meted to her should,
therefore, be as a notary public before she was admitted to the Bar. The
penalty of fine would be a sufficient sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors and hereby imposes on respondent ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONGGALICINAO a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for misconduct as a
notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
all the courts of the Philippines, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

GUERRERO vs. BIHIS (ORIGINAL SCRA)

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156310

July 31, 2008

XERXES A. ABADIANO, Petitioner,- versus- SPOUSES JESUS and
LOLITA MARTIR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 14, 2002 and its Resolution[2] dated November
21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679. The CA affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental[3] declaring
respondents as the owners of the property in question.
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of
possession[4] of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents against
Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner
Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.

Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on
November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and
Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461, however,
Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her
husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot
No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq
m denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Baares; (2)
10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David
Abadiano (grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m
denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando Baares. The partition
is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized
the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions
Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.[5]
On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the
execution of the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation
acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition.[6]
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15,
1962 and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over Lot No.
1318, still in the name of Inocentes Baares and Felicidad Villanueva.
Annotated at the back of the reconstituted title were the Agreement of
Partition and the Deed of Confirmation.[7]

On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Baares sold his share of the lot to his son,
Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211
(20461).[8]
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Baares filed before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition
praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the
Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between
him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211
(20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over
the property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court ordered the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares,
and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros
Occidental.[9]
Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No.
1318 and that no sale of the portion pertaining to Ramon and David
Abadiano ever took place.[10]

On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance
of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David
Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318C[11] to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of
sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary
Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription Doc. No. 64, Pag. No.
60, Book No. III, series of 1922. The sale was allegedly affirmed by David
Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939.[12]

Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court

alleging likewise that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their
share of the property to Victor Garde.[20]
After trial, the court issued a Decision[21] dated June 23, 1995, ruling in
favor of the spouses Martir, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir
as the true and legitimate owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan
Cadastre denominated as Lots 1318-B and 1318-C and ordering:

They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his
heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.[13] On
December 29, 1961, the heirs of Victor Garde sold their rights and interests
over Lot No. 1318-C[14] to Jose Garde, who immediately took possession
thereof. Jose Garde continuously planted sugarcane on the land until he
sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979.[15]

(1)
That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor
Xerxes Abadiano shall surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 to
the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental who is directed to partially
cancel said title and issue new Certificate of Title corresponding to Lots
1318-B and 1318-C in the names of the spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir;

After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant

sugarcane on the land. Sometime in March 1982, after respondent Jesus
Martir harvested the sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C,
defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon) allegedly entered the
property and cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and refused to
vacate despite demands to do so. The following year, defendants Roberto
Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the
sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C.[16] Further, the defendants also entered the
property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B,[17] which by
then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father,
Amando Baares.[18]

(3)

Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet

Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of
Negros Occidental.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[19] defendants denied that the subject
property was ever sold by Ramon and David Abadiano, and that,
consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from
Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, that
the subject land still belonged to the estate of Ramon and David Abadiano
and was never alienated. They alleged further that the act of spouses
Martir in planting sugarcane on the land was without Robertos consent;
that Roberto had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him reasonable
rental for the land but that they had persistently refused to do so; and that
sometime in March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an
agreement whereby the defendant continued to cultivate the remaining
stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the harvest of said
sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed any objection thereto.

(2)
That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the
plaintiffs the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos representing
the value of the sugarcanes of plaintiffs which defendants harvested and
milled with SONEDCO and;

To pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[22]
The trial court rejected therein defendants contention that the Compra Y
Venta was null and void because the co-owner, David Abadiano, did not
sign the same. It held that the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that
the sale by a co-owner of the entire property without the consent of the
other co-owners was not null and void but that only the rights of the coowner-seller are transferred, making the buyer a co-owner. The trial court
also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not annotated either on
the OCT or on the reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale was not
vitiated. The registration or annotation is required only to make the sale
valid as to third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that the Compra Y
Venta was valid between the parties, Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde.
The trial court also brushed aside the defendants contention that
the Compra Y Venta contained the same notarial inscription as the Deed of
Partition. It said that assuming this to be true, this may be considered an
error which did not nullify the Compra Y Venta; at most, the document
would be non-registrable but still valid.
On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by David
Abadiano was for the Deed of Partition and not for the Compra Y Venta, the
trial court agreed. It, however, interpreted the same to mean that David

Abadiano must not have authorized his brother to sell his share in Lot No.
1318-C. The effect was that David Abadiano continued to be one of the
registered owners of the property and his heirs stepped into his shoes upon
his death.
However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs (respondents) claim that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property for more than sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast,
the court found that defendants and intervenor, and their deceased
parents, had not been in possession of their share in the property. It held
that the defendants and intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail
of the many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish their
right over Lot No. 1318-C.

Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily

dismissed in a Resolution dated February 11, 1997 due to defendants
failure to pay the required docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless,
the records were retained for the appeal of Xerxes Abadiano, intervenor in
the trial court.

On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of

the RTC in toto.[23]
Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the following
arguments:

A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS
MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR OMISSION OF THE FACTS, IN DISREGARDING
THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED
OF SALE (COMPRA Y VENTA) IS A SPURIOUS DOCUMENT

B
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER
GUILTY OF LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND[24]
The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA
erred in ruling for the respondents. Accordingly, we reverse the assailed
Decision and Resolution.

It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and
generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and
conclusive on the Court. Further, it is not the Courts function under Rule
45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. The
jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited to
reviewing only errors of law. Unless the case falls under the recognized
exceptions, the rule shall not be disturbed.[25]
However, this Court has consistently recognized the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.[26]
In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a
misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence of evidence
which is contradicted by the records.

In appreciating the alleged Compra Y Venta presented by respondents, the

trial court concluded that [t]he parties have no quarrel on the existence of
a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano
for himself and as representative of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922]
in favor of Victor Garde.[27]

The trial court erred in its conclusion.

Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants repudiation of the
existence of the sale in their Answer with Counterclaim. They stated:
2. That defendants admit plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 4 that there
has been no particular designation of lot number (sic) for each of the coowner (sic) of Lot No. 1318 but specifically deny under oath the other
allegations thereof the truth being that the property referred to here as Lot
No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners thereof as shown
by the TCT No. 31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso;

3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the allegations in paragraph 5[28] and therefore specifically deny
the same under oath the truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David
Abadiano had not sold the land at bar to anyone and that consequently,
defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from the former; x x
x.[29] (emphasis supplied).

There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the
parcel of land in dispute. It is also a fact that the purported Compra Y
Venta was not annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before
the complaint was commenced, even though the deed was allegedly
executed in 1922.

Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the

Complaint. He alleged that the lot had never been sold or alienated and
the same still remains intact as the property of the Intervenor and his coowners by operation of law.[30]

Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents
anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, we
find it necessary to repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to
have resolved first the issue of the documents due execution and
authenticity, before determining its validity.

This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the trial, thus:

Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Q:
During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has
ever sold to any party his share on Lot No. 1318?

Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

A:

He has not sold his share.[31]

These statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the

document. While it is true that this Court had previously ruled that mere
denials would not have sufficed to impeach the document, in this case,
there was an effective specific denial as contemplated by law in
accordance with our ruling that defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or
that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the
answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On
the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due
execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.[32]

It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then
make so sweeping a conclusion in the face of such opposition. In light of
this challenge to the very existence of the Compra Y Venta, the trial court
should have first resolved the issue of the documents authenticity and due
execution before deciding on its validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even
discuss this issue.
We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the
case to the trial court for the determination of the purported Compra Y
Ventas authenticity and due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very
issue here and now in order to put an end to this protracted litigation.

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their
complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said
document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to
obtain a copy from that office but their request was refused. No other
evidence but these bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that
the original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or that
respondents due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated.[33]
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence
of the document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions
allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the

document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on

such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the
document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the
Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y
Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on the same day,
and both documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and
the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, Assuming this to be true, same
could be considered an error which did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale
or Compra Y Venta. At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but
valid document.[34]
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear
unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.[35]
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would
not have invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the same error
would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial
document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The
document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose
genuineness and due execution need not be proved.[36]
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and
genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioner.
Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in
the negative.
Under the Property Registration Decree,[37] no title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription
or
adverse
possession.[38] Indefeasibility
and
imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedings.
Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners
may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title is
registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system.[39]
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,
[40] the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession
of his registered property by reason of laches.[41]
Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice
to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the
assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the
inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the

property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of

society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which
otherwise could be a valid claim.[42]
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part
of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
[43]
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the
neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition
which may have arisen during the period in which there has been
neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties
will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing
injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed
or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save
one from the consequences of his own neglect.[44]
Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must
be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[45]
Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The
evidence on record does not support such finding.
Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in
the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs, especially
considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in
1982. According to petitioner, his father had told him that his (the fathers)
inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, Amando Baares who
knew likewise that the property was theirs.

Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified:

Q:
Before Amando Baares died, did you know that your father is a
part owner of Lot No. 1318?
A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:
And did you not complain to Amando Baares that your father is a
pert owner of that lot?
A:
No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and
when he dies, the property will go back to us.[46]

And herein petitioner testified:

A:
I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to take action to possess
the land which was then occupied before by our (sic) great uncle, Amando
Baares.
Q:
When was that, in what year, because we do not know when did
your uncle (sic) die?
A:
It was after the death of Amando Baares sometime in 1973 or
1974.

Atty. Garaygay
Q:
Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed
belonging (sic) to your father?
A:

The uncle of my father, Amando Baares, Sir.

Q:
As a matter of fact, before and after the war and during the lifetime
of Amando Baares, he was the one in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot
under the possession of Amando Baares was it under lease?
A:
As far as I can remember, my father told me that his inheritance
was with Amando Baares, his uncle.[47]

From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would
appear that they were unaware of any of respondents actions in relation to
the property until the death of their grandfather, Amando Baares. When
they did find out that respondents were occupying the land, they
immediately took action to occupy what they believed was still rightfully
theirs.

On this point, petitioner testified, thus:

Q:
When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your
inheritance from your late father?
A:

It was shortly after the death of Amando Baares.

Q:

Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B?

Q:
Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to claim
the inheritance?
A:
Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we
understand that our late parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously tried
to take action shortly after his death, so as not to antagonize our relatives.
Q:

What did you do in order to claim your inheritance?

A:
Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I
advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to go to Bacolod City to seek the
intercession of the Philippine Constabulary Commander in order to thresh
out the matter in a way that there will be no hostility or adverse reaction.
Q:

What other reactions did you take, if any?

A:
Well, I told my brother that they have a confrontation in the Office
of the PACLAP known as the Presidential Action Commission on Land
Problems.

Q:
Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what other action did you
personally take as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B?
A:
After that confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land
in question to farm it because it belongs to us.
Q:
With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any,
did you undertake?
A:
Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and
after it was approved by the Court, it was annotated at the back of the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 and we were given a co-owners
copy of the said title by the Register of Deeds.
xxxx
Q:
Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this
Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over Lot 1318-B?
A:

That was on July 17, 1976.

Q:

Was that before or after the plaintiffs have filed this present case?

A:

That was almost 6 or 7 years before this present case was filed.[48]

On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified:

Atty. Garaygay
Q:
Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318.
Prior to the death of your father, who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?
Witness
A:

What I know is it was Amando Baares.

Q:
You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was
Amando Baares who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
And until when did you know that Amando Baares has been in
possession of Lot No. 1318?
A:

Up to 1976 when he died.

Q:

After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot?

A:
I made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and
when I went to the said lot, it was vacant.
Q:

When was that?

A:

In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.[49]

That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Baares
to try and occupy the land is understandable. They had to be careful about
the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the family. Furthermore,
they knew that their parents revered Amando.[50]
The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as
such delay as would amount to laches, thus:
in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes
laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is
an important circumstance for consideration, a delay under such
circumstances not being so strictly regarded as where the parties are
strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied
between near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of
blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.[51]
In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on
the part of the petitioner.
When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15,
1962, no annotation therein was made of the Compra Y Venta or of the
Deed of Sale between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the
Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation by David Abadiano, and the sale
from Demetrio to Leopoldo Baares were annotated therein.[52] Neither
does the Deed of Sale of Demetrios share in favor of Leopoldo, executed in
1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone other than the parties
to the Deed of Partition.[53]
Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962
pursuant to an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of
Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even
at the time of the issuance of said TCT, there was no annotation of the
alleged sale to Victor Garde, which according to respondents took place in
1922.
If respondents contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued
in April 1962 in the name of Ramon and David Abadiano, but in the name
of Victor Garde or Jose Garde who by then had supposedly acquired the
property by virtue of the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Sale executed

on December 29, 1961.[54] As it is, neither respondents nor any of their

predecessors in interest participated in any of the proceedings for the
issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT. The petitioners
testimony on the matter is revealing:
Q:
Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings
of the reconstitution of title of Lot 1318 or any evidence as to the
participation of the plaintiffs in this Reconstitution Petition?
A:

Based on the existing records, they did not participate.

Q:
How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No.
(sic) did the plaintiffs participate therein?
A:

They did not also.

Q:
How about in the issuance of the new Transfer Certificate of Title,
did the plaintiffs participate therein?
A:

No, sir.[55]

Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to
Victor Garde was annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other
hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that petitioner and his co-heirs
took steps after Amandos death to assert their rights over the property.
[56]

In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney

in favor of Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or
represent them in any suit or action for recovery of possession or of
whatever kind or nature.[57] For their part, the heirs of Ramon Abadiano
executed a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over the part of Lot
No. 1318 pertaining to their predecessor.[58]
Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare
assertions to support their claim that they indeed had possession of the
land through their predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to
overcome the testimony that it was Amando Baares and not Victor
Garde who had possession of the property during the formers lifetime, or
that after Amandos death, the lot remained unoccupied.
In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as
would bar his claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is most
telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in possession of
the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for almost 60

years, have themselves failed within that long period to have the same
property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale annotated
on the title of the property.
Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that
respondents be made to pay actual damages of not less that P30,000.00
plus rentals on the property from the time of the latters occupation, moral
damages amounting toP100,000.00, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees.
The record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals
on the subject property from the time of Amando Baares death in 1976
until the time of the trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976
until 1985 wasP3,000.00 per hectare, while from 1985 until the time of his
testimony in 1994, the rental rate was P5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule
that the actual damages that may be awarded shall be based only on these
rates.[59]
Considering, however, that petitioners co-heirs (defendants Roberto
Abandiano, et al.) were able to enter the property and harvest the
sugarcane therein in 1981 and, thereafter, the land remained unoccupied,
the rent must be reckoned only from the time respondents actually
occupied the land until March 1981.
The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing
that the claiming party actually experienced emotional and mental
sufferings.[60] In this case, we find that petitioners testimony that he
suffered from sleepless nights from worrying about this case and
considering the great distance he had to travel from his home in Tacloban
to see the case through are enough bases to award him moral damages.
With the award of moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in
order.[61]
Attorneys fees are recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, or
when the court deems it just and equitable. The grant of attorneys fees
depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion
of the court.[62] Given the circumstances of this case, we grant the prayer
for attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51679 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
(1)
reversing the Decision of the Regional
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 1331;

Trial

Court

of

(2)
declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful
owners of Lot No. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan Cadastre, Negros Occidental;
and
(3)
ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals
at the rate of P3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time of actual
occupation of the land in 1976 until March 1981, moral damages in the
amount of P100,00.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00,
and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of
the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the
aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client
was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO,vs.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what
he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath
that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then
vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this

petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused
to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become
responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and
will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
"denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our
pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila
Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis
commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses
so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of
the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for
the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment
against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion,
but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said

motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both
motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966,
had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24,
1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiffappellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition
thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as
it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal)
does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the
appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading
entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the
applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant,
praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the
appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between
this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this
Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the
latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by
the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion,
the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila

Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion
to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was
issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of
promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24,
1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and
the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the
point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza
the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because
of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one
of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic
vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take
the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly
thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time.
Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered
expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment
by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already
adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with
the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to
withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his
certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word
came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he
had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on
his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and
that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative
act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for
contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty.

Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such
request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this
Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so
that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for
leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to
hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he
was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers
-no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm
and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St.
Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye,
and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say
to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there
is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy
own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them:
for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned
in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated,
compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and
has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but
mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular
case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word,
DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court
that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained
unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to
justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now
that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the
same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is
current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that
justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were
provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we
waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance
of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not
performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the
truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our
President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were
applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the
French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we
may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name'
or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy
name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses,
but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last
resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols,
that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this
Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of
our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members
of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is
not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain
of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are
quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of
rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away
with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for
denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know
the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his
efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most

petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to
have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency,
but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions forcertiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for
every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the
burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it,
is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions
will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing
reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from
time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on
their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is
to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for
refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive.
Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May
31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section
12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions"
within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions
for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate
review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if
this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is
not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by
the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a
thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of
Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in
the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying
away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it
traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions.
There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory
power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941,
Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant
must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general
by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such
notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon
all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to

Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case
the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil.
81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866;
and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless
the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no
way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion,
and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves
do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower
court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused
the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter
of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness,
he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the
posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that
there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most
circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to
express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes
to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to
differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but,
also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open
to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the
Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the
people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants,
must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on
one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the
administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to
inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks
especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an
entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously
assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the

strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen
and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic
society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the
traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the
errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with
detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays
bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex
Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and
judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and
who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a
rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be
rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting
and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the
courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the

expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act
or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous
to
be
entertained. ... .

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right.
No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a
scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him
to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657,
665).

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is

essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion
of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect
are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to
become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by

express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally
for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to
rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the

effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,

because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten,
40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment
That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is
others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so
as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched
in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant
parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor
immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court
of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared
that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of
appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a
court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed
the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction
of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false
and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting
out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which
accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject
to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove
that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the
leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to
belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the
general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California

affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular
assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a
judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to
enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity,
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest
courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15
Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In
the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the
better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge
who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit
against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my
name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases
involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law
allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such
dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in
dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of
men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a
lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public

interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should
have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and
the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity,
cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt
to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and
the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the
Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state
of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the
Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was
charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a
period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of
the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise
of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of
speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the
courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not
exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that
an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six
months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the
judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action,
the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension
from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the
statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse
caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the
profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the
discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of
justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his

duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has

improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges
to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged,
and
the
person
making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this
possible temporary observations
concluded, that, as my clients
expecting too much to look for a
residing here.

case, however, with patience, barring

more or less vituperative and finally
were foreigners, it might have been
decision in their favor against a widow

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of
propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or
by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court,
and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to
demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the
Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney
published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of
the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having
arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying
that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of
the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is
of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private

citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial

capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech
to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that
members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with
their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good
by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.
The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water
supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar
of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the
protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law
itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an
affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several
judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney
claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases
finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal
letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning
both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it
than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a
fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant
that
the
widow
got
no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright,
active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will
gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the

attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This
was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the
other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief
Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their
official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve
any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite
of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not
and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity
or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional
right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by
passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial
officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise
than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone,
he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a
libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p.
1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the
Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as
he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and
sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the
obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L.
Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or
spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism
of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we
think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized
in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in

actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for
his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person,"
said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts,
if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his
own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his
own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under
such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment
may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining
of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133
App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is
not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of
80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under
the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads
of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the
general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in
like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one,
and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect
much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote
and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused
had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him
[the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley,
7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo
237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36
Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's
suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which
he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had
paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's
unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge
constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the
judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper
articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate
language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is
to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute
with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the
loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross
moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign
from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence
of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or
publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby
tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian
of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of
unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the abovecited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been
disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford

enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the
denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and
constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights
of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is
capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the
statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the
parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the
Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one
Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper
a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence
the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members,"
and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put
an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court,"
which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy"
and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in
then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt,
despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of
free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or

comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court,
and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently
to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and
if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso
Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having
"repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's
misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr.
Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the

motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes
into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The
plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error
and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the
law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that
the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court
are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the
dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm
which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."

in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by
publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other

cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in
detail.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that

his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only
after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as
much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of

them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending
litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle
of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or
malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the
thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for
which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has
lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this
jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when,
inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented
with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which
upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the
settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar
Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the
validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the

courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication
which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in
them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind
of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way
be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt
exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is
the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held

liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is
here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we
have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his
fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power
the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of
the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of
no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the
purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the
rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law
those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in
the Bar. Thus

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an

inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence
is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts
and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this
court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to
exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a
representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So
much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it
becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one
of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the
exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen
above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to
an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now
proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and
actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely
potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no
statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however,
he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the
said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not
only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he
virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to
the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while
at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice."
And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of
his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public

indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an

explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the
Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and
oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the
scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more
important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of
gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed
to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from
criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the
Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court
must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving
to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our
authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the
members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a
total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of
our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges

as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with
the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as
such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be
the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives,
would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This
duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce
jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that
the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the
power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that
may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by
the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal
or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by
the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be
zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity
cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that

disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would

accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile
to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize
that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that
in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting
repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do
not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but
also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is
obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is
lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the
fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how
long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until
further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the
Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and
guidance.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,
MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.

versus

-ATTY.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This case stems from an administrative complaint[1] filed by Rolando

Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with
flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[2] Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts
constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure

to render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her

from complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel
Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC
changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).
[3]
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand
letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its
investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors
after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also
happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious
organization where complainant and his wife were also active members.
From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with
the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and
Precedents relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to
complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between him and respondent although no formal document
was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement[4] dated
January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did
not sign the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15%
contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to
Benefon,[5] a telecommunications company based in Finland. Complainant
found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means.
[6] Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter
from respondent[8] asking for the return and immediate settlement of the
funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When complainant
confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that
she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel
would know that she was doing something for them and assured
complainant that there was nothing to worry about.[9]
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information
regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against
complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant
that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),

[10] and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)[11] to resolve
complainants problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in
order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the investment
scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any
and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by
Multitel.[12]
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping
to be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and
gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by
respondent herself.[13]Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave
respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said amounts were all part of Precedents
collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the
companys properties.[15]
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several
messages from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short
messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to
the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was
arrested and that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels
failed investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest
warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him.
Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from
respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and
promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government
officials she can closely work with in order to clear complainants name.
[16] In two separate e-mail messages,[17] respondent again asked money
from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by complainants wife
while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth,
[18] and another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.[19]
Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal
problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in
the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the
latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories
stored in complainants house and inside a warehouse.[20] He also signed
a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.
[21]
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle
his legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another
lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via email, as follows:
Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do
it as your friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the
same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e.
your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were
provided you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing
to return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really
helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds
you received from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[]
quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through
me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every
centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account
opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust
given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco
Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have
no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In
this cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic)because it is the clients who
will be sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work
quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the
SEC. I have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will
sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his
connections. Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized
crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the
state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all
aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have
allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not,
we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to
Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as
attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to
work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children
who (sic) the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to
make the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want
that to happen. Things will be really easier on my side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you
hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust
me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we
are ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by
you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This
is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on your side.
Always pray though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!

Candy[22]
On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to
the country. On the eve of his departure from the United States,
respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him that he
has been cleared by the NBI and the BID.[23]
About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant
and
his
wife
and
told
them
that
she
has
already
accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to
give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent
allegedly told complainant that without his help, she would not have
earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted
respondents offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told
complainant that she would instead invest the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf
in a business venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent
that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily
expenses as he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but
she failed to fulfill her promise.[24]

Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that

she was able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold
departure order issued against complainant and narrated how she was
able to defend complainant in the said cases.[25]
By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading
him. Respondent would either refuse to return complainants call or would
abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons.
This went on for several months.[26] In one instance, when complainant
asked respondent for an update on the collection of Benefons obligation to
Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent
arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that she would read
Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance
and evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for
a full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the
latter.[27] Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated
December
20,
2004.[28] When
complainant found respondents
explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion
about the accounting.[29] Complainant repeated his request for an audited
financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will
be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.
[30] Respondent replied,[31] explaining that all the properties and cash
turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who
had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she
was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any
liability.[32] Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavitcomplaint[33] against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of
respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the
lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was
executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely
helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance
because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same
religious organization.[35]
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel
and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients
had against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the
settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted for.
[36] Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his
legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in
accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[37]

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent
noted that a complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same
grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence.
[38] Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the administrative case
must also be dismissed.
In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of
the electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBPs Commission
on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text
messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful
authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to
the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a
Report and Recommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-client relationship
was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence
of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that
respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when
she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a
full accounting of all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on
these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Recommendation[42] denying the motion and adopting the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good

taste[43] and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyerclient relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
clients case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given
to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[44] It behooves lawyers not only
to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged

to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the

administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have
described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.[46]
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with
demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of
a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the
assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly
accommodations,[47] precisely because at the time she was giving
assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.[48]
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by
arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was
ever forged between her and complainant.[49] This argument all the more
reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts
and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The
IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there
was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary
formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney;
the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession.[50] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent
should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services
of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties,
or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as
counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that
would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest.

client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflictof
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
[52]
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation,
initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and
properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant
that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the
properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But
simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her
clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything
to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself
admitted to complainant that without the latters help, she would not have
been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she
was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.[53] Clearly,
respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,[54] but also toyed with decency
and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever
complained of respondents unethical behavior.[55] This remark
indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure
in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that
proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated
and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon
referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter[56] even
if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of

interest, thus:

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and

recommendations of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent

interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of

Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other
gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers Oath, has been
rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP
membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of

Justices Witness Protection Program.[57] Convenient as it may be for

respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court
cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case
against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is
necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability
to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and
academic by respondents act of voluntarily terminating her membership in
the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership
in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[58] The conduct of a
lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or
to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court
were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate
ones membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer
first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to
further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the
present case.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Attorney
Maricel
Pascual-Lopez
is
hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging
in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

G.R. No. 95398 August 16, 1991

ON

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

Is the petitioner personally liable for the amout paid for the construction of
a public school building on the ground that the infrastructure contract is
null and void for want of one signature?
The facts are uncontroverted.

The contract was approved by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports Onofre D. Corpuz. The relevant parts of the contract are quoted
below:
That for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P488,000.00), Philippine Currency, the CONTRACTOR,
at his own proper cost and expense willfully and faithfully perform all
works, and unless otherwise provided, furnish all labor, materials,
equipment necessary for the construction and completion of Phase I of the
Home Technology Building for the Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of
Alangalang, Leyte to be completed in accordance with the plans and
specifications and all terms, conditions and instructions contained in the
general and special conditions of contract, as well as those contained in
the Notice to Bidders, Tenderers or Advertisement, Instruction to Bidders
Tenderers, Supplemental Specifications, Bond Articles, and other essential
related documents, which are made and acknowledged as Integral parts of
this Agreement, by reference and/or Incorporation, including the
permission of Administrative Order No. 81 of the President, dated January
17, 1964, ... (Rollo, p. 25)
While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter
dated November 8, 1983 addressed to Melchor, sought an additional
charge of P73,000 equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an
increase in the cost of labor and construction materials.

EN BANC

MARIO
R.
MELCHOR, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION
AUDIT, respondent.

On July 15, 1983, petitioner Mario R. Melchor, in his capacity as Vocational

School Administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang,
Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction
(hereinafter referred to as contractors for the construction of Phase I of the
home Technology Building of said school for the price of P488,000. Pablo
Narido, (thief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of availability of
funds to cover the construction cost. Narido, however, failed to sign as a
Witness to the contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter
of Instruction (LOI) No. 968.

In a letter dated November 17, 1983, the petitioner referred the

contractor's request for additional charge to the Regional Director, Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). The petitioner in said letter asked
for approval of the contractor's additional charge, pointing out that such
additional charge shall be taken from the 1984 non-infrastructure capital
outlay and part of the 1984 maintenance and operating expenses. The
petitioner, in a second Indorsement dated November 22, 1983, requested
the approval by the COA Regional Director in Tacloban City of the
contractor's request for adjustment of the cost of the contract.
In an Indorsement dated November 17, 1983, Servillano C. Dela Cruz,
Acting Assistant Regional Director ' MECS Regional Office No. VIII, Tacloban
City, approved the contractor's request for additional charge subject,
however, to the availability of funds and the imprimatur of the Resident

Auditor of the School. On its part, the COA Regional Office No. VIII, Tacloban
City, through Regional Director, Sopronio Flores, Jr., advanced the view that
"the approval of the police escalation rests on the Minister or head of the
agency concerned. Our participation in this regard shall be on the postaudit of transactions as emphasized under COA Circular No. 82195."

In a first Indorsement dated July 17, 1985, COA Regional Director of

Tacloban City, Cesar A. Damole denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Immediately, petitioner Melchor appealed to the COA
Head Office which dismissed his appeal for lack of merit. The COA Head
Office likewise denied the petitioner's requests for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, the contractor, anticipating that it could not meet the deadline
for the project, requested a series of extensions which the petitioner
granted. However, on April 10, 1984, the contractor gave up the project
mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things,
increased cost of construction materials and labor.

Hence, this petition.

At the time the contractor ceased working on the project, it had

accomplished only 61% of the construction work valued at P344,430.88.
However, as of September 13, 1984, the contractor had been paid the total
amount of P515,305.60. The excess paid on the value of the 61%
accomplishment costing approximately P172,003.26 represented the extra
work done by the contractor which was found necessary.

1) P344,430.80 representing 6l% of equivalent payment for the work

done by the contractor within the contract specifications, and

Consequently, the petitioner wrote a letter dated September 19, 1984 to

Ms. Gilda Ramos, COA Resident Auditor of the school, requesting the latter
to advise the former on whether to pursue condoning the contract or
institute a legal action for breach of contract against the contractor. In
turn, Ms. Ramos referred the matter to COA Regional Director in Tacloban
City, Cesar A. Damole who in a third Indorsement dated April 8, 1985,
directed Ms. Ramos to disallow the payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit
on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of
the chief accountant of the school as witness to it, as required under
Section 1 of LOI 968, for which reason the petitioner was made personally
liable for the amount paid to the contractor.
On May 3, 1985, the petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the Regional
Director, COA Regional Office No. VIII, Tacloban City, seeking
reconsideration of his directive to the Resident Auditor of the school to
disallow the payment of P515,305.60 to the contractor. The petitioner
sought reconsideration on the following grounds: a) the Certificate of
Availability of Funds signed by the chief accountant of the school, being an
integral part, of the contract, substantially complied with the requirement
of LOI 968 that the signature of said accountant must be affixed as witness
to the contract, b) the petitioner did not exceed his authority because the
contract was approved by the head of the agency concerned c) the
Resident Auditor of the school who had been furnished a copy of the
contract did not object to the contract because of that flaw; and d) the
petitioner religiously complied with the provisions of P.D. 1445 (otherwise
known as "The Government Auditing Code of the Phils."), specifically,
Sections 85 and 86 as to the requirements in the execution of a
government contract.

The sole issue of this Court's consideration is whether or not petitioner

Melchor should be held personally liable for the amount of P515,305.60
paid to the contractor. This P515,305.60 may be broken down into:

2) P172,003.206 representing payment for extra work orders, not

included in the contract specifications, which were incurred to make the
building structure strong.
The amounts of P344,430.80 and P172,003.26, when added together, do
not equal P515,305.60. The records do not explain the reason for the
discrepancy. At any rate, the contending parties do not question the
correctness of these amounts.
Respondent COA maintains that the contract entered into by the petitioner
with Cebu Diamond Construction is null and void since the chief accountant
did not affix his signature to the contract, in violate on of the requirements
of LOI 968.
Section 1 of LOI 968, dated December 17, 1979, provides:
1. All contracts for capital projects and for the supply of commodities and
services, including equipment, maintenance contracts., and other
agreements requiring payments which are chargeable to agency current
operating or capital expenditure funds, shall be signed by agency heads or
other duly authorized official only when there are available funds. The
Chief Accountant of the contracting agency shall sign such contracts as
witness and contracts without such witness hall be considered as null and
void.
According to COA, since there was no compliance with the above provision,
then the amount of P344,430.80 should be disallowed iii post-audit and the
petitioner should be personally able for said amount.
The petitioner reasons that the absence of the accountant's signature as
witness to the contract should not militate against its validity. He cites
Section 86 of PD 1445, which states:
Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract ... no contract
involving the expenditure of public fund by any government agency shall
be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the

agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the
obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that
the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal
year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification,
modification by the auditor concerned. The certificate, signed by the
proper accounting official and the, auditor who verified it, shall be attached
to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the sum so
certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other
purpose until the obligation of the government agency concerned under
the contract is fully extinguished.
Petitioner Melchor urges that the issuance by the chief accountant of a
"Certificate of Availability of Funds" compensates for the latter's nonsigning as a contract witness since under Section 86 of PD 1445, the
certificate is attached to and becomes an integral part of the contract. He
argues that there was, in effect, substantial compliance with the mandate
of LOI 968.
Moreover the petitioner contends that assuming arguendo that the
contract is null and void, he should still not be made personally
accountable for the amount paid to the contractor. He cites this Court's
resolution in Royal Trust Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
84202, November 22, 1988. In that case. despite the absence of a specific
covering appropriation as required under COA Resolution No. 86-58, the
contractor was allowed by the Court to be compensated on a quantum
meruit basis.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the contract
executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond Construction is enforceable
and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to personally pay for the
building already constructed.
LOI 968 and Sections 85 and 86 of PD 1445 implement and reinforce the
constitutional mandate that "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law" (Constitution, Article
VI, Section 29 [1]).
Under Sections 85 and 86 of PD 1445, before a government agency can
enter into a contract involving expenditure of government funds there
must be an appropriation for such expenditure and the proper accounting
official must certify that funds have been appropriated for the purpose.
Under LOI 968, the chief accountant of the government agency, as the
verifier of the availability of funds, must sign such contracts as witness.
The uniform intent of these provisions is to ensure that government
contracts are signed only when supported by available funds.
In the case before us, the chief accountant issued a certificate of
availability of funds but failed to sign the contract as witness. But since
Section 86 states that the certificate shall be attached to and become an

integral part of the proposed contract, then the failure of the chief
accountant to affix his signature to the contract was somehow made up by
his own certification which is the basic and more important validating
document. The contract moreover provided that "other essential related
documents xxx are made and acknowledged as integral parts of this
agreement, by reference and/or incorporation." This is not to say that the
heads of government offices or institutions should not read carefully the
fine print of official regulations governing contracts. However, under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, we agree with the petitioner's view
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in
the execution of the contract. He has not been charged under some
regulations governing negligence in not going over auditing and
accounting rules more carefully. But even assuming some kind of
administrative responsibility for not being more careful, he should not be
made to pay for a school building already constructed and serving an
urgent need in his province.
It is a rule of statutory construction that the court may consider the spirit
and reason of a statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
(People v. Manantan 5 SCRA 684 [1962]) For this Court to draw a narrow
and stringent application of LOI 968 would be to lose sight of the purpose
behind its enactment. The rationale for LOI 968, which is to ensure that
there are available funds to finance a proposed project, was already served
by the chief accountant's issuance of a certificate of fund availability.
Additionally, Section 2 of LOI 968 provides:
2. It shall be the responsibility of the Chief Accountant to verify the
availability of funds, as duly evidenced by programmed appropriations
released by the Ministry of Budget and received by the agency, from which
such contract shall be ultimately payable. His signature shall be considered
as constituting a certification to that effect. (Emphasis Supplied)
Since, under the above proviso, the accountant's signature shall have the
effect of a certification, then it may be inferred that the accountant's
certification, not his signature as a contract witness, is the more reliable
indicium of fund availability.
What further bolsters the contract's validity is the fact that the original
contract for P488,000 and the 15% price escalation of P73,000 bore the
approval of the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports as required by
COA Circular No. 83-101-J (dated June 8, 1983) and the Implementing Rules
of PD 1594. Under COA Circular 83-101-J, the Minister of Education, Culture
and Sports has the authority to approve infrastructure projects not
exceeding P2 Million. Under Section III, CIII of the Implementing Rules of PD
1594, the Minister is empowered to approve contract price escalation not
exceeding 18% of the original contract price.

Moreover, under COA Circular No. 76-34 dated July 15,1976, within 5 days
from receipt of a copy of the contract, the COA is required to call the
attention of management regarding defects or deficiencies of the contract
and suggest such corrective measures as are appropriate and warranted to
facilitate the process of the claim upon presentation. In this case,
respondent COA does not deny the petitioner's claim that it was furnished
copies of the contract, together with supporting documents, a few days
after approval thereof by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. If
the respondent had complied with this requirement, then the absence of
the accountant's signature as a witness to the contract could have been
remedied. COA was also negligent.
No less compelling than the foregoing reasons is the undisputed fact that
the construction of the Home Technology Building had long been
completed and that the building is now being utilized as part of the
Alangalang Industrial School. In People v. Purisima 86 SCRA 542 (1978), we
held that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of
which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences. In the present case we consider it highly inequitable to
compel the petitioner, who had substantially complied With the mandate of
LOI 968, to shoulder the construction cost of the building when it is not he,
but the government, which is reaping benefits from it.
The Court therefore rules that respondent COA erred in disallowing in audit
the amount of P344,430.88.
With respect to the remaining P12,003.26 paid by the petitioner to the
contractor for extra work done, the COA reasons that the extra work done.
being more than 25% of the escalated original contract price, was null and
void because no supplemental agreement was executed. The respondent
cites the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594 which provide:
5. A separate supplemental agreement may be entered into for all change
orders or extra work orders if the aggregate amount exceeds 25% of the
escalated original contract price. (III CI paragraphs 5;) (Emphasis supplied).
Under the facts of this case, we adjudge that respondent COA is not
without legal basis in disallowing the P172,003.26 payment for the extra
work orders. However, since the word "may" was used in the Decree then
the requirement of a supplemental agreement under all circumstances
may not always be mandatory. There is no need to go into any possible
exceptions because we find the rule applicable in this case.

Under COA Circular 83-101-J, supra, the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports has the authority to approve extra work orders or other variation
orders not exceeding 50% of the original contract price or P1 Million
whichever is less. In this case, there is no showing that the extra work
order was approved by the Minister.
Moreover, a variation order (which may take the form of a change order,
extra work or supplemental agreement) is a contract by itself and involves
the expenditure of public funds to cover the cost of the work called for
thereunder. (Fernandez, A Treatise on Government Contracts under
Philippine Law, 115-116 [1985]) As such, it is subject to the restrictions
imposed by Sections 85 and 86 of PD 1445 and LOI 968-COA Circular No.
80-122, dated January 15, 1980, likewise ensures that an extra work order
is approved only when supported by available funds. Again, the petitioner
has not presented proof of an appropriation to cover the extra work order.
For a failure to show the approval by the proper authority and to submit
the corresponding appropriation, We declare the contract for extra works
null and void. Section 87 of PD 1445 states:
Any contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the two
immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer or offices
entering into the contract shall be liable to the government or other
contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the
transaction had been wholly between private parties. (Emphasis supplied)
This does not mean, however, that the petitioner should be held personally
liable and automatically ordered to return to the government the full
amount of P172,003.26.
As previously discussed, it would be unjust to Order the petitioner to
shoulder the expenditure when the government had already received and
accepted benefits from the utilization of the building.
In Royal Trust Construction v. Commission on Audit, supra, cited by the
petitioner, the Court, in the interest of substantial justice and equity,
allowed payment to the contractor on a quantum meruit basis despite the
absence of a written contract and a covering appropriation.
In a more recent case, Dr. Rufino O. Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
89745, April 8, 1991, the Court directed payment to the contractor on a
quantum meruit basis despite the petitioner's failure to undertake a public
bidding. In that case, the Court held that "to deny payment to the
contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and
presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.
Where payment is based on quantum meruit the amount of recovery would
only be the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered regardless

of any agreement as to value. (Tantuico, State Audit Code of the Philippines

Annotated, 471 [1982])
Although the two cases mentioned above contemplated a situation where
it is the contractor who is seeking recovery, we find that the principle of
payment by quantum meruit likewise applies to this case where the
contractor had already been paid and the government is seeking
reimbursement from the public official who heads the school. If, after COA
determines the value of the extra works computed on the basis of quantum
meruitit finds that the petitioner made an excess or improper payment for
these extra works, then petitioner Melchor shall be liable only for such
excess payment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent COA

denominated as 11th Indorsement dated November 11, 1988 and its
resolution dated July 31, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent COA is directed to allow in post-audit the payment of
P344,430.80. Respondent COA is likewise directed to determine on
a quantum meruit basis the value of the extra works done, and after such
determination, to disallow in post-audit the excess payment, if any, made
by the petitioner to the contractor. The petitioner shall be personally liable
for any such excess payment.