IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE

HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES, petitioners, vs. CESAR R. REYES,respondent.

G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000
FACTS: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated
in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia,
Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died
intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his
income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon
City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment
was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property was levied sold and eventually forfeited by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar
Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property upon payment of the
reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000. On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of
Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at
public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981.
Thereafter, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement settled the
accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. On May 10, 1989, Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for
issuance of letters of administration with the RTC praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate
of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional
opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased
as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase. The probate court subsequently
issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes .On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection
to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he
was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the probate court is proper.
HELD: YES. The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule extraneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory estate proceeding, the probate court may pass
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
The parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of
the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is
but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,

vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177099

June 8, 2011

FACTS: Eduardo filed with the RTC a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father
Joaquin Agtarap. Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements.
During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages:
1)
Lucia Garcia (Lucia) 3 children : Jesus, Milagros and Jose(survived by three children, namely, Gloria,
Joseph, and Teresa - respondents)
2)
Caridad Garcia (Caridad) 3 Children: Eduardo (Petitioner), Sebastian, and Mercedes
RTC: Appointed Eduardo as special administrator and issued an order of partition. It also declared that the real estate
properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia.
CA: Affirmed RTCs decision but provided for a different partition.
ISSUE: WON RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, can determine questions of ownership,
which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there
is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
Exceptions to the general rule:
1)
the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership
in a separate action.
2)
If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are iod is not
mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the
publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and retains such
until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the three-month period, this
delay will not deprive the probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's removal.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA

SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositorsappellants.
G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975
FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6
other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, Benjamina filed for the settlement
of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator. Thisd petition was oppsed by Roberta on the
ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the one appointed as
administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged partition was
invalid and ineffective. So the letters of administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue
don the same date. The oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an
amicable settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the properties of the decedent
with segregation for each marriage.
On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months from the
appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reconsideration alleging as ground that the court has no
jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyond the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals
certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the court lost jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the
appointment.
HELD: NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month perupon the
title thereto, but such determination provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve.
The foregoing rule however provides for an exception, that is: if the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of question to the probate
court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not ones prejudiced. In this case, not all parties,
not all heirs, gave their consent to the probate court.

BENITO BOLISAY and GENEROSA BUTED BOLISAY, petitioners,

-versusHON. LEONARDO S. ALCID in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, Branch in Laoag City, and ANGELA BUTED PASCUAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45494 August 31, 1978
FACTS: Petitioner Generosa Buted Bolisay and private respondent-administratrix Angela Buted Pascual are
sisters, the daughters of the deceased Luciana Abadilla whose intestate estate is being settled.
The subject property was in the name of petitioners. With the TCT lost by way of mortgage, petitioners
obtained a loan from GSIS. On the other hand, private respondent filed an action for the annulment of the
Deed of Slae executed by their deceased mother in favor of petitioners for alleged lack of consideration. A
compromise agreement was reached between the parties from the list of partitionable properties.
That notwithstanding, respondent administratrix filed an inventory of the properties comprising the estate
of Luciana and included therein the property here in controversy. Said inventory was approved without
opposition.
ISSUE: WON the subject property was properly included in the inventory as part of the estate of the
deceased.
HELD: NO. It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or regular, imposed by section 668 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his appointment a true inventory
of the real estate and an the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which come into his
possession or knowledge, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond. The court
which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power,
it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory.
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, the SC held that if a property covered by Torrens
title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in
the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered
as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title.
The property in issue should be excluded from the inventory of the subject estate, said order has no more
legal basis. The probate court's authority extends only over properties listed in the inventory, without
prejudice to any party adversely affected asserting or protecting his rights or interests in a separate
appropriate remedy.

FRANCISCO CUIZON, et al., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, et al. respondents.
G.R. No. L-51291 May 29, 1984
Facts:Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City he
distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene. On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of
Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all
surnamed Cuizon. Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same
year, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene
Cuizon. The latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated
to herself all the property of the decedent including the property in question. In the instant case, the property involved is not only
claimed by outside parties but it, was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the
vendees who are not party to the proceedings.
The petitioners therein sought to annul the order of the respondent court in a special proceeding which in effect ruled that
notwithstanding that the subject property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the administratrix of the intestate estate
involved in said proceeding had the right to collect the rentals of said property over the objection of the titled owners just because
it was included in the inventory of said estate and there was an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership thereof and
the estate was one of the parties therein. This Court viewed the petition as one seeking for a prima facie determination and not a
final resolution of the claim of ownership.
Issue: The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcelsof land already
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said
parcels have been included in the inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.
Held:It does not matter that respondent - administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the
other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has
been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere
incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In other words, in Our considered view, the
mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of
itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the property of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims
adverse title thereto.
To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership
recognized in the above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it
provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not even matter that the issue is raised after
approval of the inventory because "apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court."
(Francisco on the Rules of Court Vol. V-B, p. 99, citing Siy Chong Keng vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 494)
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered
by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of
the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court was clearly
without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief
with the intestate court.

JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v. HON. JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Respondent.

Romeo M. Mendoza for complainants.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.
FACTS: JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, is
charged with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to Special Proceedings for
settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.
Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. 2 days
after, respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Sometime later 2 parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco and his wife had been sold to
complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Consequently, counsel requested the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction
without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involving the properties, respondent Judge granted the motion.
Counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued in the
name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was able to register the titles in his name through fraud, and the signatures of
the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.
Respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement
of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in their name.
Complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of respondent Judge,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from implementing the
Order, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding against him.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition of complainants and set aside the Order of
respondent Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the intestate proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals was right in invalidating the Judges order?
HELD:YES. ". . . a probate court has no authority to decide questions of the ownership of property, real or
personal. The only purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit information or to secure evidence from the persons
suspected of having possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination there is good reason for believing that
the person so examined has property in possession belonging to the estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by
ordinary action, to recover the same.
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply provides that a person who is suspected of having in his
possession property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath on the matter.
Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership of such property.
Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land under administration and the consequent
cancellation of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a mere motion in the
probate proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction. To recover
the property, an independent action against the vendee must be instituted in the proper court.

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
156, respondents.
G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents
Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. He bequeathed cash,
personal and real properties, Edmond was named executor.
After Hilario died, the cash was distributed according to the will but Edmond did not take any action for the
probate of his fathers holographic will. It was Maria who filed for the probate of Hilarios will 4 years after
his death. Edmond opposed the petition. Subsequently, Edmond withdrew his opposition and the probate
court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned
upon the filing of a bond. Maria filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Maria prayed for the release of the rent payments to
the three grandchildren and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. This was
granted by the probate court.
The court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover
the expenses of administration and allowances for support of the testators three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in ordering the release of allowance to the grandchildren.
HELD: YES. It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to
the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or
gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on
the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to
sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO

PIJUAN, special
administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21917

November 29, 1966

FACTS: Carlos Gurrea and Manuela Ruiz Gurrea were married in Spain in 1932 they had a son named
Teodoro. In 1945, Carlos abandoned Manuela and lived in the Philippines with Rizalina Perez by whom he
had 2 children. In 1960, Manuela instituted a case against Carlos for support and the annulment of some
alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. In due course, said court
issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which was reduced by the
Court of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Manuela and their son, Teodoro. Manuela filed a
motion alleging that the aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been suspended upon
the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the Special Administrator, Pijuan, be ordered to continue
paying it pending the final determination of the case. This motion was denied.
Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court denying her petition for support, as well as
that denying its reconsideration. Both were predicated upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 188 of our
Civil Code the support of a surviving spouse constitutes, not an encumbrance upon the estate of the
decedent, but merely an advance from her share of said estate, and that Mrs. Gurrea is not entitled to such
advance, there being neither allegation nor proof that she had contributed any paraphernal property to said
estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership between her and the
deceased.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in not granting the motion for continuance of support.
HELD: YES. The lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the
status, nature or character of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator. Precisely,
however, on account of such lack of proof thereon, the court is bound by law to assume that the estate of the
deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which belongs
presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may
belong to her as one of the compulsory heirs, if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if
probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is
worth P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is clear to us that
the continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case No. 5820, is
fairly justified.