1NC v.

CM Lin-Umar

Of

T
The aff is not topical because ocean development is limited to
development in the ocean
A. Interpretation-Ocean is the single continuous body of salt water
Science Dictionary 2 The American Heritage Science Dictionary Copyright
2002. Published by Houghton Mifflin.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ocean
ocean ('shn) Pronunciation Key The continuous body of salt water that covers 72
percent of the Earth's surface. The average salinity of ocean water is approximately three percent.
The deepest known area of the ocean, at 11,034 m (36,192 ft) is the Mariana Trench , located in the western
Pacific Ocean. Any of the principal divisions of this body of water, including the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and
Arctic Oceans. Our Living Language : The word ocean refers to one of the Earth's four distinct, large areas of salt

The word can also mean the entire network

of water that covers almost three quarters of our planet. It comes from the Greek
Okeanos, a river believed to circle the globe. The word sea can also mean the vast ocean
water, the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, and Arctic Oceans.

covering most of the world. But it more commonly refers to large landlocked or almost landlocked salty waters
smaller than the great oceans, such as the Mediterranean Sea or the Bering Sea. Sailors have long referred to all
the world's waters as the seven seas. Although the origin of this phrase is not known for certain, many people
believe it referred to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the
Caspian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, which were the waters of primary interest to Europeans before Columbus.

B. Violationthe plan ofers incentives for all algae biofuel

production, which will occur in ponds and closed systems not
just the ocean
Bracemort 13- their author (Kelsi Bracmort, who completed her PhD at Purdue in 2004,
worked for the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service in Washington DC, and now works for the
Congressional Research Service (CRS). As a policy analyst for agricultural conservation and natural resources
policy, Kelsis portfolio includes biomass energy (including cellulosic biofuels and anaerobic digestion) and noncarbon dioxide greenhouse gases. Algaes Potential as a Transportation Biofuelfas.org1 April 2013-http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42122.pdf, accessed 7-22-14 bh@ddi)
Algae undergoes four major processes in its conversion to biofuel: cultivation, harvest, processing, and biofuel/bio

Algae cultivation may be photoautotrophic (algae requiring

light to grow) or heterotrophic (algae grown without light and requiring a carbon
source such as sugar to grow). 13 Photoautotrophic cultivation can occur in an 12 For
product conversion (see Figure 3).

more information on the chemical composition of algae, see Table 6-1 in Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, Renewable Biological Systems for Alternative Sustainable Energy Production , 1997,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7241e/w7241e00.htm#Contents. 13 Algae cultivation methods described here are for
microalgae and cyanobacteria. Macroalgae requires unique cultivation strategies such as offshore, near-shore, or op
en pond facilities. This report does not address another cultivation methodmixotrophic cultivation which combines
photoautotrophic and heterotrophic cultivation methods. Algaes Potential as a Transportation Biofuel Congressional
Research Service 5 open pond or in a closed system (e.g., a photobioreactor; see Figure 4 ).
Each has advantages and challenges. 14 Open pond cultivation is generally cheaper and simpler to build, but is
subject to weather conditions, contamination, and more water consumption. Cultivation conditions may be better
controlled in a closed system, but there are scalability concerns, and closed systems historically have been more
expensive than open ponds. Heterotrophic cultivation occurs in a fermentation tank and can use inexpensive
lignocellulosic sugars for algae growth, which could lead to competition for feedstocks with other biofuel
technologies.

C. Their interpretation is unreasonable for debate

1. Limits the plan unlimits by allowing any af that could be
done on the ocean AS WELL AS anywhere elsethis is
unreasonable because everything afects the ocean
Timmons 12 Bob Timmons, Artist - Author Speaker, the Artist for the Ocean
October 21, 2012 Ocean Guardians
the-ocean-bob-timmons/

http://oceanguardians.com.au/artist-for-

Everything is connected and everything affects the ocean in the end since its
majority of the planets surface and subsurface.

2. Extra Topicality this allows no risk inclusion of non-topical

provisions, which is an unreasonable burden on the negative
D. T is a voter for clash and well-prepared debatin

Security K
Apocalyptic representations of climate change are an ineffective rhetorical
strategy that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy
Hulme (Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Director of the
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research) 6
(Mike, Chaotic world of climate truth, 4 November,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6115644.stm)
The language of catastrophe is not the language of science. It will not be visible in next year's
global assessment from the world authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). To state that climate change will be "catastrophic" hides a cascade of value-laden
assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science. Is any amount of
climate change catastrophic? Catastrophic for whom, for where, and by when? What index is
being used to measure the catastrophe? The language of fear and terror operates as an

ever-weakening vehicle for effective communication or inducement for

behavioural change. This has been seen in other areas of public health risk. Empirical
work in relation to climate change communication and public perception shows
that it operates here too. Framing climate change as an issue which evokes fear
and personal stress becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. By "sexing it up" we
exacerbate, through psychological amplifiers, the very risks we are trying to ward off. The
careless (or conspiratorial?) translation of concern about Saddam Hussein's putative military
threat into the case for WMD has had major geopolitical repercussions. We need to make sure
the agents and agencies in our society which would seek to amplify climate change risks do not
lead us down a similar counter-productive pathway. The IPCC scenarios of future climate
change - warming somewhere between 1.4 and 5.8 Celsius by 2100 - are significant
enough without invoking catastrophe and chaos as unguided weapons with which
forlornly to threaten society into behavioural change. I believe climate change is real, must be
faced and action taken. But the discourse of catastrophe is in danger of

tipping society onto a negative, depressive and reactionary

trajectory.

If they do succeed at mobilizing action, apocalyptic representations of

climate change lead to regional interventions and arms races
Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) 8
(Micahel, The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security ISA Convention
Paper)
In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase
in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads
to all-round exceptionalism in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards security
experts (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security
organizations such as more use of arms, force and violence will gain in importance in the discourse on what to do.
A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally

a
political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation
became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military
means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political
conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change
could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs
of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment

might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and

police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change

as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global
North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them
from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global
South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a
justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major
powers, thus leading to arms races. This kind of reaction to climate change would be
counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is
expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas
emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the
level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global
income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2C by 2050) and adaptation
are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher
military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy

areas are in competition for scarce resources.

The alternative is to do nothing and reject their obsession with

preserving organized life
Klein 13 (Richard, prof emeritus in the Dept of Romance Studies @ Cornell
University, Climate Change Through The Lens Of Nuclear Criticism, Diacritics, Vol
41.3, 2013, pgs 82-87)//mm

If after climate catastrophe organized society were somehow able, after many years, to
reconstitute itself in another ecology, what will have been lost? With the destruction of the
archive would be lost all the institutions that depend in part or entirely on its existencelike law or mathematics,
history or philosophy. But the most vulnerable (not necessarily the most precious) institution of all is literature,
which has no real referent and which depends as an institution exclusively on the archive for existence.

Science

might revive or perhaps archeology, to the extent that their referents are material things in the world.
Poetry, song, and epic might once again be emitted . But that institution we call literature, which,
for our purposes, began sometime at the end of the seventeenth century in Europe, with its conventions, its reading
public, its critics and merchants, editors and printers, with all the effects of intersexuality, I mean intertexuality,

The fiction of climate catastrophe

invites what Frances Ferguson called the nuclear sublime. She demonstrates that to speak in
the future perfect about the termination of organized existence fulfills the conditions
with which Kant, in the third Critique, defines the sublime aesthetic experience. It is a
mode of speech that is imagined, in a fiction, to be posthumousas if one could see
ones past from some perspective beyond the grave, a past life to which one is
present only as a spectatora ghost , as it were, viewing its past life. Its what Kant
evokes describing the walker in the Alps who turns a corner and suddenly confronts an
immense abyss. The first moment of his experience is one of awe and terror before the
enormity of the void, a first negative moment of nonpleasure, in which death looms. But in a
second time, when the walker sees that he is safe on the edge, he can enjoy the
spectacle of seeming infinite nothingness that opens at his feet before his astonished eyes. That second
moment brings a feeling of what Kant calls aes thetic wellbeing, an immense pleasure of
confronting the greatest forces, the vastest distances in the universe, and surviving, quite
deliciously, unharmed. Nothing protects better from death than having died . That is
why the posthumous perspective of the sublime is so enticing . Ferguson reminds us that
that its history makes possibleall that could never be revived.

Schiller says that suicide is the highest form of the sublime, for it requires that you imagine yourself dead.5 Nothing

more perfectly illustrates the illusion of the nuclear sublime than the posthumous perspective presup posed by the

The
ultimate catastrophe is therefore a fiction, but it nevertheless is one that has very
material consequences in the present. That is what distinguished it from fables that are mere
inventions. It is a necessary postulation in order to recognize the symptoms and dangers
of climate change, and that recognition, however muted politically, is already at work in the
phantasms and dreams of people today , all over the worldfrom the population of Beijing to
Islanders in the Pacific, to the shores of New Jersey, the coasts of Australia, the plains of Africa, etc. In our
unconscious the worst may have already happened. And yet whenever we try
to imagine what lies beyond our own death , or beyond the human species, after the ultimate
apocalyptic disaster, we assume the condition of ghosts , between life and death,
able to view in retrospective the world from which we are absent . That explains why
it may be always an error, and the sign of an error, to speak apocalyptically about
climate changes in tones of sublime terror and delicious awe. Indeed, if
engagement in the politics of climate change doesnt feel funny, even
ridiculousstruggling to save the whole of organized life you are taking
yourself too seriously. Dwelling on the tragedy that awaits us, you have been
seduced into the error of the nuclear sublime. And whenever you hear a
climate change speaker adopt some lurid, mournful, or pious tone, you should ask
yourself, since its standpoint is in a fiction of posthumous existence, where exactly is the speaker
actually standing? And what profit is to be gained in standing there? The dolorous tones of the
nuclear sublime, when they are heard in the language of climate change, are the
sign that a buck is being made.
cheery slogan of the Gaia Liberation Fronts Church of Euthanasia: Save the planet, kill yourself.6

Cap K
Algae biofuels sanction overconsumption and reproduce
neoliberalism theyre science fiction used to deflect
environmental criticism and reduced consumption
Smith 10 (Charles Hugh Smith, writes the Of Two Minds which includes topics on
finance and sustainability; The Overlapping Crises of Neoliberal Global Capitalism;
http://www.oftwominds.com/blogsept10/crises-capitalism09-10.html; September 7,
2010)
4. Resource depletion. Though many are drawn to appealing fantasies of endless oil
(abiotic or otherwise), breeder nuclear reactors burning plutonium, etc., the
awkward reality is that the world does not contain enough oil, gas, lithium, uranium,
etc. etc. for another 1.5 billion middle-class consumers, never mind an additional 3
billion. Capitalism is based on the idea that The Invisible Hand of self-interest will
drive markets to benefit all participants. This means that when one resource
becomes scarce and thus costly, then an alternative will be found, manufactured or
exploited. This has played out satisfactorily in the procession from wood to whale oil
to coal to oil and natural gas, but the concept that no real substitute is available
runs counter to capitalist ideals. The notion that there will only be shortages and no
substitutions seamlessly appearing via the magic of free markets is alien. Like the
person falling from a tall cliff, the fact that they we haven't slammed into any hard
limit yet provides a false faith in the magic of the markets to provide a technological
alternative. Thus mini-nuclear reactors, algae-based fuels, and various other
exciting schemes are routinely trotted out as the "source of unlimited energy in the
near future," always with the implicit faith that the process can be scaled up from
the laboratory to a global scale with only modest difficulties. The idea that these
grand concepts cannot be scaled up cheaply or quickly due to physics or other
severe limitations of Nature is anathema to a faith in the unconquerable power of
human ingenuity and open markets. Maybe algae will scale up from a few thousand
gallons a month to billions of gallons a day, or solar energy can be converted to
hydrogen, which will then power the planet's 600 million vehicles via fuel cells; but
the market has no way to price the possibility than essential resources will enter
permanent depletion declines and that no cheap, scalable substitute exists. 5. The
market is intrinsically incapable of pricing extinction and other social/shared costs of
global production and consumption. As I often note, the last wild tuna will fetch a
handsome price when it's auctioned off in the Tokyo Fish Market. Was the value of a
wild species calculated by the market? No. the "market" has no mechanism for
pricing in the "value" of a species, or of the social costs of poisoned air and water-the Commons we all depend on. It also is intrinsically incapable of pricing control of
resources or assets; the free market presumes that an unfilled demand will be met
by someone, somewhere. That ignores the potential for political control of assets
and resources which are immune to market pricing. Risk, future value, control--all of
these critical elements are reduced to a "futures bid" which has no inputs for the
value of a wild species, the "value" of clean air, the costs of polluted air borne by
the tax-paying citizenry, the difficult-to-assess cost of a floating "island" of plastic
garbage in the Pacific 2,000 kilometers in diameter, etc.

This single-focus commodity thinking ensures resource

conflict, environmental collapse, and structural violence
Harvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and
Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of
Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171)//ddi
To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative
decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity.
Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes,
things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be
traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate
guidean ethicfor all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets
some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie
is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling
of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be
legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is
broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there
are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale.
In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a
curious penchant to pursue corruption as if it is easily distinguishable from the
normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The
commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as
rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and
uniqueness (of works or art, for example)these all amount to putting a price on
things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often
disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events
and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive
the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example).
Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and
greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much
of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contractmarriage, for
example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a
sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives
partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives
typically blame liberals, Hollywood, or even postmodernists for what they see as
the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate
capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all
manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who
continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term
commitments in their endless pursuit of profit. But there are far more serious
issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular
ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the shortterm contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of
constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl
Polanyi pointed out, are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity
description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious. While capitalism cannot

function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge

the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous
passages, puts it this way: To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the
fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount
and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the
alleged commodity labour power cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately,
or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be
the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of mans labour power the
system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity
man attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions,
human beings would perish from the efects of social exposure; they would
die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and
starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes
defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food
and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing
power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of
money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive
society.18 The damage wrought through the floods and droughts of fictitious
capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or
even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyis final point. But his theses on
labour and land deserve further elaboration. Individuals enter the labour market as
persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and
socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics
(such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills
(sometimes referred to as human cap- ital) and tastes (sometime referred to as
cultural capital), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions,
hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere
factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers
require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility,
docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract,
and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to
maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the
labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and
distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or
covertly, in ways that redound to the employers advantage. Conversely, workers
may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access
to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and,
through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to
regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely
construct- ing that protective covering of cultural institutions of which Polanyi
speaks. Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that
embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against
labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class
institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if
necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social
welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render
large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital

over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker
then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a
customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher
abolished it in universities, for example). A personal responsibility system (how apt
Dengs language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care,
protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the
state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead.
Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability
of financial products embedded in risky financial markets. The second prong of
attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the
labour market. While too much can be made of the race to the bottom to find the
cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital
permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is
constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These
barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily
exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example,
Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly
shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to
which they are exposed. Under neoliberalization, the figure of the disposable
worker emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling
conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the
sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant
young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: unbearably long
hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually
abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all.20 In
Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singaporebased Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows: We are regularly insulted, as a matter
of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of
which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in
the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory
overtime, sometimesespecially if there is an urgent order to be delivereduntil
nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra
200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside
it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the
workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly
women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home
from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21 Similar
tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Koreanoperated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand.
The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death
on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese
businessman who ran a textile warehouse in which 61 workers, locked in the
building, died in a fire received a lenient two-year suspended sentence because
he had showed repentance and cooperated in the aftermath of the fire.22
Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of
degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of
neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically

undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/
marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything
in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of womens liberation
from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through
degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from
respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most
lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved).
The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly
negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries
of the Soviet bloc the loss of womens rights through neoliberalization has been
nothing short of catastrophic. So how, then, do disposable workerswomen in
particular survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets
and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often
debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave
them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour
markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right
to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of
patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate
the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist
consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and
beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions
beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way
of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. I shop therefore I
am and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudosatisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who
have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive
informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the worlds
disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people
condemned to live on less than $2 a day , the taunting world of capitalist
consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the selfcongratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization,
privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From
impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and
the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the
financial burdens of the poor.24

Alternative text: the judge should vote negative to endorse an

ethic of social flesh
An ethic of social flesh foregrounds embodied
interdependence, substituting an ecological view of
relationships for the afs commodity thinking only the
alternative can produce ethical institutional decisionmaking
Beasley & Bacchi 7

(Chris, Prof. of Politics @ University of Adelaide, Carol, Prof. Emeritus @ University of

Adelaide, Envisaging a new politics for an ethical future: Beyond trust, care and
generosity -- towards an ethic of `social flesh', Feminist Theory, 2007 8: 279)

The political vocabulary of social flesh has significant implications for democratic visions. Because it
conceptualizes citizens as socially embodied as interconnected mutually reliant flesh in a more
thoroughgoing sense than the languages of trust, care, responsibility and generosity, it resists accounts of political
change as making transactions between the less fortunate and more privileged ,
more trusting, more caring, more responsible or more generous. Social flesh is political metaphor in which
fleshly sociality is profoundly levelling. As a result, it challenges meliorist reforms
that aim to protect the vulnerable from the worst effects of social inequality , including
the current distribution of wealth. A political ethic of embodied intersubjectivity requires us to
consider fleshly interconnection as the basis of a democratic sociality, demanding a
rather more far-reaching reassessment of national and international institutional
arrangements than political vocabularies that rest upon extending altruism. Relatedly,
it provides a new basis for thinking about the sorts of institutional arrangements necessary to acknowledge social fleshly existence,
opening up the scope of what counts as relevant (Shildrick, 2001: 238). For example, it allows a challenge to current
conceptualizations that construct attention to the private sphere as compensatory rather than as necessary (Beasley and Bacchi,
2000: 350). We intend to pursue the relationship between social flesh and democratic governance in future papers. Conclusion In
this paper we focus on various vocabularies of social interconnection intended to offer a challenge to the ethos of atomistic
individualism associated with neo-liberalism and develop a new ethical ideal called social flesh. Despite significant differences in

trust and care writers conceive the

social reform of atomistic individualism they claim to address in terms of a presumed
moral or ethical deficiency within the disposition of individuals . Hence, they reinstate the
conception of the independent active self in certain ways. Moreover, there is a disturbing
commonality within all these accounts: an ongoing conception of asymmetrical power
relations between strong and weak , carers and cared for, altruistic and needy. While
the several vocabularies canvassed in this paper, we note that most of the

widely used terms like trust and care clearly remain vocabularies around which social debate may be mobilized, and hence are not
to be dismissed (see Pocock, 2006), we suggest that there are important reasons for questioning their limits and their claims to offer
progressive alternative understandings of social life. In this setting, we offer the concept of social flesh as a way forward in
rethinking the complex nature of the interaction between subjectivity, embodiment, intimacy, social institutions and social
interconnection. Social flesh generalizes the insight that trusting/caring/ altruistic practices already take place on an ongoing basis
to insist that the broad, complex sustenance of life that characterizes embodied subjectivity and intersubjective existence be

As an ethico-political starting point, social flesh highlights human

embodied interdependence. By drawing attention to shared embodied reliance ,
mutual reliance, of people across the globe on social space, infrastructure and resources,
it offers a decided challenge to neo-liberal conceptions of the autonomous self
and removes the social distance and always already given distinction between
strong and weak. There is no sense here of givers and receivers ; rather we are all
recognized as receivers of socially generated goods and services . Social flesh also
marks our diversity, challenging the privileging of normative over other bodies. Finally,
because social flesh necessarily inhabits a specific geographical space,
environmentalist efforts to preserve that space take on increased salience (Macken, 2004:
25). By these means, the grounds are created for defending a politics beyond assisting the less fortunate. Social flesh,
therefore, refuses the residues of noblesse oblige that still appear to linger in emphasis
upon vulnerability and altruism within the apparently reformist ethical ideals of
trust/respect, care, responsibility and even generosity . In so doing it puts into
question the social privilege that produces inequitable vulnerability and
the associated need for altruism. Vital debates about appropriate distribution
acknowledged.

of social goods, environmental politics, professional and institutional power and

democratic processes are reopened.

Mexico CP
Text: The United States federal government should
substantially increase financing for advanced biofuels in
Mexico.

Solves all the case internal links better:

Sugar and cellulosic ethanol had huge potential to ofset fossil
fuels and shift corn back food only US FDI to Mexico solves
McDonald 9 JD and MBA @ U Mississippi, LLM in International Legal
Studies @ American

(Jeff, Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster
Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the
United States, ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)
Mexican agricultural resources are scant

Additionally,
in comparison to its North
American counterparts.113 In fact, only 12% of Mexicos land is considered arable, with less than 3% of that land
being irrigated.114 Agriculturally, the country has been slow to modernize, failing to take advantage of the
ethanol movement and other technological advancements such as genetically modified crops.115 Further,

state operated granaries and distribution networks are withering, and

agriculture cooperatives may be key to the survival of Mexican agriculture.116 Regardless, the future of
Mexican agriculture depends on advances in irrigation, agricultural
infrastructure, and mechanization, and these advances will likely only
result

from foreign direct investment . IV. A Possible Solution? A. Cooperative

Advances in Agriculture and Infrastructure The devastation of Mexican agriculture postNAFTA, while problematic, may have been an inevitable development.117 The resulting downfall of the

Mexican ejido, while initially displacing Mexican farm workers and further weakening Mexican agricultural
production, might be viewed as a market correction demanding efficient production and modernization while
providing a better economic quality of life for rural

Mexicans.118 However,

because the Mexican

economy may not be able to survive such a correction, the

country might benefit from the help of its Northern neighbor . U.S.
assistance should consist of both direct aid and investment

in Mexico,

and

concurrent changes in domestic agricultural practices and subsidization. Under comparative trade theory, the
U.S. should become Mexicos supplier of basic grains, and Mexico should supply most, if not all, of U.S. fruits and
vegetables.119 However, special consideration should be given to the socio-economic conditions of the rural
Mexican farmer, and Mexican producers of traditional varieties of maize must be protected from market
intrusion.120 Part of any agreement must be an inherent interest in mutual socio-cultural preservation. In trade,
nations must recognize the higher responsibility to protect vulnerable aspects of one anothers culture and
heritage. As this analysis will demonstrate, the effects of protecting Mexican farmers of white corn will be marginal

to

U.S. yellow corn farmers as inflated demand for U.S. corn will

be eliminated, and

any income

lost in the Mexican market will be recouped by environmental credits, and the
harvesting of biomass for domestic biofuel production. Notwithstanding the
need to protect this sector of Mexican agriculture, recent land reforms in Mexico has
given rise to increased U.S. interest in contract farming and marketing
arrangements. 121 Permitting U.S. firms to operate on Mexican
agricultural lands, and invest in its development, will likely enhance Mexican
agricultural efficiency, productivity, and profitability, while
facilitating land ownership for the Mexican farmer . With Mexican
sugar production becoming ever-important in the establishment of a North American biofuel
industry, FDI from the United States should focus on the supply and
development of agricultural technology, the engineering of biofuel production
facilities, and the infrastructure necessary to transport ethanol
throughout both countries, and to points of export.

Wastewater DA
Wastewater algae cultivation causes massive bloomsprefer
scientific studies over industry speculation
Ma et al., 6/6/2014
(Xiaochen Maa, b, Wenguang Zhoua, Zongqiang Fua, Yanling Chenga, Min Mina,
Yuhuan Liua, Yunkai Zhanga, Paul Chena, Roger Ruana, , a Center for Biorefining,
and Bioproducts and Biosystems Engineering Department, University of Minnesota,
1390 Eckles Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA b Institute of Microbiology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, A3 Datun Rd., Chaoyang District, Beijing 100101, China,
Bioresource Technology, Effect of wastewater-borne bacteria on algal growth and
nutrients removal in wastewater-based algae cultivation system, June 6 th 2014,
SciVerse ScienceDirect, accessed 7-24-14 bh@ddi)
This result is partially different from other reports which claimed that high algal cell concentration would inhibit the
bacterial growth completely probably due to different microbial community (Xavier Mayali, 2002), while synergistic

There are several reasons that wastewater-borne

bacteria and algae may have a symbiotic relationship. First, bacteria could supply sufficient
carbon dioxide which is required for algal bloom during fast growth stage. Under favorable conditions, bacteria
could deliver large amount of CO2 in a supersaturated state (Kuentzel, 1969). From our previous study, the
microalgae strain used in this study could grow well in organic-rich wastewater with mixotrophic
mode to achieve high biomass concentration and high lipid content simultaneously (Zhou et al., 2012b).
The CO2 generated by bacteria would favor the algal growth and bloom which could
relationship was observed in this study (Fig. 2).

explain why algal growth did not have a visible lag phase at the initial stage during the cultivation. Second, bacteria
participated in the nutrients and pollutants degradation process and transformed complex substrates to small
organic acid molecules and ammonium which could be easily used by algae (Zhang et al., 2012). In addition, the
generation of large amount of CO2 led to maximum concentration of CO2 presented at the surfaces of algal and
bacterial cells. When these cells are in close proximity, this CO2 rich environment is a favorable condition for algal
growth. Algae could utilize incomplete metabolic products released by the bacteria, and similarly the bacteria may
benefit from vitamins and growth factors leached from algal cells (Humenik and Hanna, 1971).

Algal blooms kill marine biodiversity and result in ocean

deadzones
Anderson and McCarthy, 2012
(Donald M. Anderson1 and Shannon McCarthy2 1Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, Woods Hole MA 02543 2 Middle East Desalination Research Center,
Muscat, Oman, Middle East Desalination Research Center, Red Tides and Harmful
Algal Blooms: Impacts on Desalination Operations, February 8-9, 2012,
http://www.medrc.org/download/Habs_and_desaliantion_workshop_report_final.pdf,
accessed 7-24-14 bh @ddi)
the threat from harmful algal
blooms (HABs). HABs, commonly called red tides, are blooms of algae (microscopic (phytoplankton) and macroscopic (seaweeds) that
cause harm in many ways. Traditionally, these impacts have affected human and ecosystem health, fisheries, tourism, and coastal
aesthetics. For example, HABs have caused mass mortalities of fish and marine mammals, and
have sickened and killed humans through consumption of contaminated seafood or
through recreational exposure. Non-toxic HABs also cause many problems, typically through
biomass effects such as the decay of dense blooms, leading to oxygen depletion and mass
Desalination plants face many operational challenges. One that has emerged in recent years is

mortalities of marine organisms. The threat from HABs to desalination plants is not new, but is
growing in scale and significance , due to the expansion of both HABs and desalination plants
globally. Recent events (e.g., Richlen et al. 2010) highlighted the vulnerability of traditional plant designs to blooms, and emphasized how little we
know about important processes such as toxin removal during treatment or the best methods for removing algal biomass and extracellular products during
pretreatment. Likewise, design features of plants, including the location and nature of intakes need to account for the types of bloom events and species
that might occur in a given region.

These dead zones collapse ocean biodiversity

Carlisle 2K
[Elizabeth Carlisle 2000 The Gulf of Mexico Dead Zone and Red Tides, The Louisiana
Environment, http://www.tulane.edu/~bfleury/envirobio/enviroweb/DeadZone.htm]

As the fresh, nutrient-enriched water from the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers
spread across the Gulf waters, favorable conditions are created for the production of
massive phytoplankton blooms. A bloom is defined as an increased abundance of a species above
background numbers in a specific geographic region. Incoming nutrients stimulate growth of
phytoplankton at the surface, providing food for unicellular animals. Planktonic remains
and fecal matter from these organisms fall to the ocean floor, where they are eaten by bacteria, which consume

Hypoxic waters appear normal on the

surface, but on the bottom, they are covered with dead and distressed animal, and
in extreme cases, layers of stinking, sulfur-oxidizing bacteria, which cause the sediment
in these areas to turn black. These hypoxic conditions cause food chain
alterations, loss of biodiversity, and high aquatic species mortality.
excessive amounts of oxygen, creating eutrophic conditions.

Loss of marine biodiversity causes extinction cross apply

Crist and Queally from the 1AC
Rivers (writer for the Helium Network)September 19 , 2012(Christyl, Loss of Biodiversity
th

Means Loss of Human Life, Sciences 360, http://www.sciences360.com/index.php/loss-of-biodiversitymeans-loss-of-human-life-2409/)

The loss of biodiversity means the loss of all life supported by inter-connected
dynamics which supply air, water and nutrients. Biodiversity is in effect, everything evolved
on earth that is not mere mineral or inanimate chemical. In school, many students have
learned about the food chain, or even the great chain of being. The chain theory,
however, is obsolete and has been replaced by the new comprehension that all life
complements other life. Life exists in a web of interconnected bits. It is not just the
survival of fittest, but the interaction of everything that lives and dies which creates
the carbon cycle, the hydrology cycle, the replenishment of the soil and the
restoration, daily and ongoing, of the water and air that support life upon earth.
Without insects, pollinators, and seed depositors, there is no way to propagate or continue sustainable
populations of plants and animals, no less human beings. For example, cattle when fed on grasslands
do not rely upon the monoculture of artificially fertilized corn. Grazing cattle do not add concentrated
methane, or deteriorate landscapes. In their naturally evolved context, cattle replenish and support
biodiversity. In the factory farm, they are yet another aberration that adds to the loss of biodiversity.
Another simple way to look at it, it to see that which evolved in nature arrived at the present system of
life on earth that in circle of life fashion, continues to ensure life on earth. As humans developed

agriculture, then cities and factories, biodiversity began to decline. Most megafauna (large animals) were hunted to extinction eons ago. Pollution, garbage, waste,
deforestation, mining and much more human activity, notably burning of fossil fuels,

threatens current remaining biodiversity, and, so too, the future of life. This bleak
future is avoidable, as described by E.O. Wilson, in his book, the Future of Life. Also since modern
times, those things brought about by humans that threaten biodiversity can all be reduced to the idea
of waste. Annihilation of the American Bison for example, shows how one missing creature virtually
extinguished native American ways of life. In nature, there is no waste. All debris and death

gives rise to life. The idea of garbage, toxins, waste, plastic and contaminants
threatens all biodiversity because artificial waste, in huge quantity, cannot be
digested by nature. The great Pacific garbage patch, a plastic floating Texas size
mess, kills marine animals and birds because they have no natural ability to digest,
or disentangle from plastic trash. Glass would be a simple technology to protect such life, but
few people care because they do not know loss of biodiversity threatens human life, too.

Case

Food Advantage
1. Alt causes to global food insecurity lack of infrastructure
and natural resources, political stability and lack of market
integration
FAO et al., 2013
(UN Food and Agriculture Organization, IFAD, and WFP, The State of
Food Insecurity in the World: The multiple dimensions of food security,
Rome 2013 Annual Report,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf, accessed 7-25-14
bh@ddi)
Progress in reducing hunger reflects country and regional specificities in terms of
economic conditions, infrastructure, the organization of food production, the
presence of social provisions and political and institutional stability. In Western Asia,
the worsening undernourishment trend appears to be mostly related to food price inflation
and political instability. In Northern Africa, where progress has been slow, the same factors
are relevant. Lack of natural resources, especially good-quality cropland and
renewable water resources, also limit the regions food production potential.
Meeting the food needs of these regions rapidly growing populations has been
possible only through importing large quantities of cereals. Some of these cereal imports are
financed by petroleum exports; simply put, these regions export hydrocarbons and import carbohydrates to ensure
their food security. Both food and energy are made more affordable domestically through large, untargeted
subsidies. The regions dependency on food imports and oil exports make them susceptible to price swings on world
commodity markets. The most precarious food security situations arise in countries where proceeds from
hydrocarbon exports have slowed or stalled, food subsidies are circumscribed by growing fiscal deficits or civil
unrest has disrupted domestic food chains. While at the global level there has been an overall reduction in the
number of undernourished between 199092 and 201113 (Figure 4), different rates of progress across regions
have led to changes in the distribution of undernourished people in the world. Most of the worlds undernourished
people are still to be found in Southern Asia, closely followed by sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Asia. The regional
share has declined most in Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the
Caribbean and in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Meanwhile, the share has increased in Southern Asia, in sub-

Many countries have experienced higher

economic growth over the last few years, a key reason for progress in hunger
reduction. Still, growth does not reach its potential, owing to structural constraints.
Arguably the most important is the often woefully inadequate infrastructure that
plagues vast areas of rural Africa. Much improved communication and broader
access to information technology may, to some extent, have helped overcome
traditional infrastructure constraints, and promoted market integration. Also encouraging
Saharan Africa and in Western Asia and Northern Africa.

is the pick-up in agricultural productivity growth, buttressed by increased public investment, incentives generated
by higher food prices and renewed interest of private investors in agriculture. In some countries,

remittance

inflows from migrants have helped spur domestic growth . Remittances have increased
smallscale investment, which was particularly beneficial to growth where food production and distribution still rely
on smallscale and local networks. This holds in particular for sub- Saharan African countries, where a combination of
higher crop yields and increased livestock production have led to a reduction of undernourishment.

2. Food insecurity is extremely complex and depends on a

litany of market and non-market factors the af doesnt resolve
reject this contrived advantage
Johnson, CFR Deputy Editor, 2013
(Toni, Council on Foreign Relations, Food Price Volatility and
Insecurity, January 16, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/food-security/foodprice-volatility-insecurity/p16662, accessed 7-25-14 bh)
Grain Stocks.

Increased use of grains to meet the demand for meat and biofuels has largely
contributed to a major increase in cereals demand (PDF), writes Brian D. Wright at the
International Food and Agriculture Trade Policy Council. Grain reserves--carryover supplies that can
provide a cushion for market fluctuations and seen as an indicator of market
tightness--have declined significantly, falling from a roughly 110-day supply before 2000 to a 64-day supply in
2007-2008. Global stocks are expected to continue to fall in 2013, with corn stocks predicted to fall to a nine-year
low. Wright notes

that low stocks contribute to the kind of price shocks seen in 2008 and

2010-2011. Researchers from the FAO note that "ample and highly liquid commercial stocks held by major
international suppliers appear a necessary and sufficient condition to instill confidence in world markets and to
lessen the probability of future bouts of extreme global volatility" (PDF). However, other analysts have dismissed

The growth of the middle class

in developing countries has increased demand for food generally and for meat in particular,
placing greater pressure on grain consumption. Meat, dairy, and oils (PDF) are expected to
stocks as an important factor in higher prices (PDF). Population Trends.

rise from about 20 percent of current calorie intake in developing countries to nearly 30 percent in the next forty
years. Livestock feed currently represents about 55 percent of consumption (PDF) of coarse grains (corn, sorghum,

growth in meat consumption harms

overall food security, since the production of one serving of meat takes more land,
water, and energy than the production of a serving of corn or rice. Growing
urbanization, particularly in the developing world, contributes to lifestyles that
include higher consumption of meat and commercial food s (PDF). As more people leave rural
areas for cities, a lack of investment in modernized farm equipment and irrigation
techniques increases the burden on developing-world farmers , precisely as they
dwindle in number and need to increase production capacity. Commodities Markets. Similar to the
debate over oil prices, non-sector participants--like pensions and hedge funds--in the agricultural
markets are considered by some to be a driver of price volatility . Critics argue that such
and barley), according to the FAO. A number of experts say the

speculation should be curbed, because food access is ultimately a humanitarian issue. Others say market
speculators are reacting to uncertainty rather than driving it. " Speculators

make money out of

understanding and providing insurance against volatility," writes Brookings' Homi
Kharas. "The volatility inherent in the food marketplace causes speculation, not the
other way around." Still, a June 2011 report from Oxfam says that is it possible excessive speculation can
temporarily amplify volatility (PDF) and contribute to food price bubbles. Many experts have said one way to lower
uncertainty caused by commodities' trading is to increase markets' transparency and get countries to accurately
report food stocks. Since commodities are pegged to the dollar, the currency-exchange rate volatility seen in recent
years also has had an impact on food prices. Weather and Climate Change.

Disasters such as drought

and flooding can cause catastrophic damage to crops. A string of recent bad weather in 2010,
2011, and 2012 and related disasters such as wildfires in some of the world's biggest food exporters have helped

Severe droughts in the summer of 2012 across the U.S. Midwest and
Eastern Europe in parts of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have also pushed prices even
higher. July saw a month-over-month increase of 25 percent in corn and wheat prices and 10 percent in overall
food commodities, figures that could go higher in 2013. Climate change is forecast to spur more
raise prices to record levels.

crop-damaging weather events (PDF) and impact water supplies and the availability of arable land,
especially in the developing world. Countries in South Asia and parts of Africa, some of which have the
world's fast growing populations, could lose more than 5 percent of their growing season , the
FAO forecasts, placing an estimated 370 million people in jeopardy due to diminished food security. These regions
already contain large populations considered chronically hungry. Experts say policies and technologies to adapt
crops to climate change and increase water supplies will be needed. Trade policy. Most crops do not cross national

prices and
export controls can disproportionately impact import-dependent countries . "[F]ood
price inflation is not simply the result of supply and demand," says a June 2011
boundaries; few have international trade rates higher than 20 percent of what is grown. However,

Oxfam report (PDF). "[A] more globalized food system equals a more interdependent one too--which makes the
system vulnerable to zero-sum games when governments or other key players succumb to panic or herd
behaviors." According to the UN's World Food Program, over forty countries in 2008 imposed some form of export
ban in an effort to increase domestic food security. Many economists say hoarding, particularly in some riceproducing countries, exacerbated the 2008 food-price crisis. Following a 2010 drought and wildfires, Russia limited
exports of wheat and wheat prices more than doubled, according to the World Bank.

3. 80% of the hungry work in agriculturereduced food prices

dont help them, but high food prices can give them an
opportunity to sell more food
La Vina et al., World Resources Institute, 2006
(Antonio, Lindsey Fransen, Paul Faeth, Yuko Kurachi, World Resources
Institute, REFORMING AGRICULTUREAL SUBSIDIES: No Regrets
Policies for Livelihoods and the Environment, 2006,
http://pdf.wri.org/reforming_ag_subsidies.pdf, accessed 7.28.14
bh@dd)
Poverty, agriculture, environment, and trade are fundamentally linkedphysically,
the
connections are most obvious in developing countries and countries with economies in
transition, where poverty frequently coincides with the predominance of agriculture in
the economy (La Vina and Fransen 2006). Nearly three billion people live on less than US$2 a
day, most of them in the developing world. Among them, over one billion people live in extreme
ecologically, socio-economically, and ultimately at the policy level. While these linkages exist in all countries,

poverty, surviving on less than US$1 a day (World Bank 2001). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
estimates that there were 842 million undernourished people in the world in 1999-2001, with 798 million living in

Worldwide, almost 80
percent of the hungry live in rural areas and depend on agriculture as their source
of livelihood (Clay 2004). The Millennium Projects Task Force on Hunger breaks down this figure, stating that
about half of the worlds undernourished are small farmers , 20 percent are landless rural
developing countries and 34 million in countries with economies in transition (FAO 2004).

dwellers, 10 percent are pastoralists and fishermen, and the remaining 20 percent are urban dwellers (Mayrand et
al. 2005). Substantial reductions in poverty and hunger among the farming population would have implications for

historically, [a]ll reported rapid reductions in

widespread poverty started with livelihoods being enhanced through agricultural
transformation (DFID 2002). Additionally, in many developing countries agriculture is a primary source of
developing countries national economies. In fact,

foreign exchange earnings (UNDP 2003). While increased agricultural production is an important component of
poverty alleviation, it also has implications for the environment. Agriculture is probably the single most powerful
influence on environmental quality in most developing countries (Scherr 1999), where it accounts for most land
use and affects many environmental variables such as water quality and flow, soil quality and movement, natural
vegetative cover, and biodiversity. In countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), agriculture is the single largest user of water and source of pollution (Clay 2004).

4. Resource wars dont happen other variables at play

Victor, professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, 2007
(David, What Resource Wars?, November 12, Online:
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)
RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have
animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of "resource wars"-hot
conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources . Such fears come in many stripes,
but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas. First is the rise of China, which
is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs-such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals-and has already
"gone out" to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts
others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into
poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the
hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and
trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations. Most of this is bunk, and

nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are
good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world . To be
sure, resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes
of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them requires focusing on the
underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine
whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn't a dearth in
resources but a dearth in governance.

Warming Advantage
1. India and China override any gains that Western countries
make- other countries wont model b/c of profit motive
Mcardle 12 ( Megan, editor at The Atlantic, Why We Should Act to Stop Global
Warmingand Why We Won't, 2/28/12,
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/why-we-should-act-to-stopglobal-warming-and-why-we-wont/253752/, HG)
This for a set of targets that, from the planet's perspective, did roughly nothing to
delay the onset of global warming. If it's this hard to make weak targets work, how
are we going to get a global consensus for strong ones? Addressing global warming
is the mother of all collective action problems. The reductions needed to avoid
catastrophe are very sizeable, and they must occur across the globe. Yet fossil fuel
resources are fungible. Oil that is not burned in the United States does not stay
tidily in the ground; it gets shipped somewhere else, like China. This is especially
true these days, when there's basically no spare capacity; close to every available
barrel is being pumped. In this environment, lowering our oil consumption lowers
the price, but not supply. This is a nice charitable gift to emerging nations, but the
climate does not care whether the carbon comes from fat, disgusting Americans
thundering around in their mongo SUVs, or soulful Indian peasants getting their first
tractor. It will warm up, or not, just the same. And I've seen no evidence that the
Chinese, or the Indians, plan to do much of anything to reduce their emissions in the
near-term. They talk a bunch about green initiatives, which makes westerners all
excited, but from what I can tell, their green initiatives with teeth are aimed at
reducing their deadly, ubiquitous air pollution, not their carbon emissions. Oh, they
may reduce the carbon intensity of their Gross Domestic Product as their economy
upskills. But the United States is actually relatively carbon-efficient per dollar of GDP
compared to China or India. It's just that we have a lot more dollars worth of GDP.
For China to grow while merely holding its emissions steady--and their carbon
output already surpasses ours and Canada's combined--then the improvement in
carbon intensity will have to match their rate of growth. So far, this hasn't
happened, and given that China has vast coal deposits that it's using to bring
electricity to its citizens, it doesn't seem likely to in the near future. Yes, they've
made a big investment in solar panel production . . . for export to rich countries that
subsidize them. I'm not criticizing China or India, mind you--I'd be less than
enthusiastic about a bunch of rich countries telling me that I wasn't allowed to get
rich, too, because that would be bad for the planet. But I don't find the alternative-a one-for-one offset by the rich world--very plausible either. Energy is a key input
into GDP. And note how cranky we've gotten about a fairly small and temporary
reduction in our national income.

2. Warming is irreversible regardless of CO2 emissions- even

complete cessation does not solve.
Solomon 08 Susan Solomon, Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System
Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions, Proceedings of the

National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Dec 16, 2008,
Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/106/6/1704.long, Accessed on: 7/17/2014,
IJ)
Over the 20th century, the atmospheric concentrations of key greenhouse gases
increased due to human activities. The stated objective (Article 2) of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to achieve
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough
level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Many studies have focused on projections of possible 21st century dangers (13).
However, the principles (Article 3) of the UNFCCC specifically emphasize threats of
serious or irreversible damage, underscoring the importance of the longer term.
While some irreversible climate changes such as ice sheet collapse are possible but
highly uncertain (1, 4), others can now be identified with greater confidence, and
examples among the latter are presented in this paper. It is not generally
appreciated that the atmospheric temperature increases caused by rising carbon
dioxide concentrations are not expected to decrease significantly even if carbon
emissions were to completely cease (57) (see Fig. 1). Future carbon dioxide
emissions in the 21st century will hence lead to adverse climate changes on both
short and long time scales that would be essentially irreversible (where
irreversible is defined here as a time scale exceeding the end of the millennium in
year 3000; note that we do not consider geo-engineering measures that might be
able to remove gases already in the atmosphere or to introduce active cooling to
counteract warming). For the same reason, the physical climate changes that are
due to anthropogenic carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere today are expected
to be largely irreversible. Such climate changes will lead to a range of damaging
impacts in different regions and sectors, some of which occur promptly in
association with warming, while others build up under sustained warming because
of the time lags of the processes involved. Here we illustrate 2 such aspects of the
irreversibly altered world that should be expected. These aspects are among
reasons for concern but are not comprehensive; other possible climate impacts
include Arctic sea ice retreat, increases in heavy rainfall and flooding, permafrost
melt, loss of glaciers and snowpack with attendant changes in water supply,
increased intensity of hurricanes, etc. A complete climate impacts review is
presented elsewhere (8) and is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on
illustrative adverse and irreversible climate impacts for which 3 criteria are met: (i)
observed changes are already occurring and there is evidence for anthropogenic
contributions to these changes, (ii) the phenomenon is based upon physical
principles thought to be well understood, and (iii) projections are available and are
broadly robust across models.

3. Turn/ the af is not carbon neutraltheir projections only

assume emissions and production from the algae itself without
considering the spike in emissions from the carbon capture
they claim reduce GHGs
De Decker, Freelance Eco-Journalist and Manager/Creator of Low-Tech
Magazine, 2008
(Kris, Low-Tech Magazine, Leave the algae alone, April 4th, 2008,
http://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2008/04/algae-fuel-biof.html,
accessed 7/23/14 bh@ddi)
companies plan to hook up their production facilities to a fossil fuel energy
plant, in order to capture the CO2 and nitrogen emissions and "feed" them to the algae.
Several

This method is hailed as a way of reducing greenhouse gases emitted by coal and gas plants, which is a ridiculous

It's very curious that this capturing technology is criticized when used in the
context of "clean" coal, but applauded when it is used to make algal fuel . In both
cases, capturing CO2 from smokestacks raises the energy use of the power plant by
at least 20 percent. That not only makes the technology very expensive, it also
means that more coal or gas has to be mined, transported and burned. Algal fuel
can even be considered a worse idea than "clean" coal. In the "clean" coal strategy,
at least the CO2 is captured with the intention to store it underground. In the case
of algae, the CO2 is captured only with the intention to release in the air some time later,
by a car engine. Last but not least, capturing CO2 from power plants ties algal fuel
production to fossil fuels. If we switch to solar energy, where will the algal fuel producers get their CO2
from? Outsourcing energy use Again, are algae producers considering the extra use of energy
that arises by the capture of the CO2 when they claim that algae can deliver 100
times more energy than first generation biofuels? This seems very doubtful. All these claims have one thing
in common: they focus only on a small part of the total energy conversion chain.
claim.

4. Converting algae to fuel is energy intensive, it isnt

economically viable and their studies are small scale and ideal
Chanakya, Principal Research Scientist at the Centre for Sustainable
Technologies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 2012
(Hoysall, Sci Dev Net, Algal biofuels are no energy panacea, 11-6-12,
http://www.scidev.net/global/biotechnology/opinion/-algal-biofuels-areno-energy-panacea-.html, accessed 7-21-14, bh@ddi)
Of late, there is heady euphoria over 'green' algal biofuels that are dangled as a panacea for developing countries
such as India. While it is true that algal biofuels can contribute to a fossil fuel-free future, the promises of runaway
successes are unrealistic. Scientists and policy makers need to address several critical issues that raise doubts over
the sustainability of an extensive algal biofuel system. Do we need to re-learn sustainability lessons all over again in
the light of first 'green revolution' which raised crop yields but left a trail of environment impacts? Sustainability
criteria need to be spelt out before anyone claims breakthroughs in this field. All claims need to be demonstrated
on appropriate field-scale sizes; and an authenticated overall energy and resource balance established. Such a filter
will make awareness, research, action and policy elements more realistic, achievable, accountable and transparent.

Algal cultivation, like crops, will need land, water,

farmers, fertilisers, pesticides and weedicides. As it is, water-deficit India can barely meets it
The spectre of more land, water, chemicals and pollution

agricultural needs cumulative losses due to transpiration are 50-100 per cent higher than the rainfall. Producing
10 grams of algae per square metre from a water body daily will lead to a water loss of 10 litres and a conservative
oil content of 20 per cent from the algae. So,

producing a kilogram of algal oil will need 5,000

litres of water. A typical rainfed crop would function at a tenth to a fifth of this water use. All cultivable land in
India is already under crops, and wastelands suitable for algae are sparse. Large-scale, high-density algal
cultivation can be done simultaneously with constantly flooded paddy crop covering 20 million hectares. The sodic
wastelands of Kachch in western India offer three million hectares and the coastal shelf a similar area. With urban
wastewaters amounting to 40,000 million litres per day, the equivalent of 10 million hectares of dedicated
cultivable area could be reached To produce one kilogram of algal fuel, one kilogram of naptha is needed for
adequate nitrogen, tilting the energy balance to zero or negative Learning from agricultural crops especially
paddy where nitrogen uptake efficiency is about 30 per cent achieving high nitrogen efficiency is difficult in a
short time-frame. Raised simultaneously with flooded paddy, nutrients taken up by algae could be fed back to
paddy fields, after extracting oil and biomethanation of the residue. As the nitrogen is in organic form, its losses are
low and the overall efficiency could be high. However, this requires intensive farm nutrient management. In short,
the problems of algal biofuel are akin to those of high-yielding agriculture. Taking the algal biofuel path would
require India to double its area under cultivation, more than double its water budget and double its fertiliser use.

Algal productivity is
widely contested. Most productivity data are derived from small-scale
studies, with projections ranging between 18360 tonnes per hectare each year. The higher values arise from
feeding sugar and providing light for 1824 hours daily to the algal system. Algal cultivation is likely to
be in open pond systems where yields are likely to be in the range of 510 grams per
square metre daily. The perceived higher yields in sterile monocultures in
laboratories are difficult to replicate in the field where a host of algae feeders and
algal competitors thrive. In typical fast-growing algal ponds, nearly 3040 per cent of the algal biomass is
This is unaffordable for Indias economy and environment. Contested productivity claims

consumed by grazers and feeders. Studies show that in short growth cycles of 510 days lipid accumulation is at
best a paltry 1015 per cent; and reaches 80 per cent in cycles beyond 30 days. It is misleading to multiply the
highest lipid content of 80 per cent with the upper limit of yields of 360 tonnes per hectare per year (obtained by
feeding sugar and artificial light at one to three per cent energy efficiency) to project a potential yield of 288 tonnes
from every hectare each year. In the field, a potential oil yield in the range of three tonnes per hectare each year

the energy and solvent needs for oil extraction operations are
still unclear. Unless very efficient processes are evolved , algal biofuel extraction
would have poor energy balance. Making algae ecologically competitive is
something few understand. If we do not resolve the issues, we will end up with a system
similar the current model of poorly sustainable, high-input agriculture , something that we
would be more realistic. And

don't need and would like to avoid

Green Leadership Advantage

1. The ofense from the other advantages proves that they
wouldnt solve enough warming to get other countries on
board
2. 7 other countries are way too far ahead on algaeeven if
the US gets on board it will be perceived as tagging along not
leadership
Williams, Biofuels reporeter, 2012
(John, interviewing Dr. Jose Olivares, head of the National Alliance for
Advanced Biofuels and Bioproducts (this is who is talking in the card),
Biofuelsdigest.com, Who's in the lead? Algae around the
world,1/12/12,
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2012/01/12/whos-in-the-leadalgae-around-the-world/, accessed 7/27/14 bh@ddi)
India India has a long history of working with algae , but mostly as a nutritional source or for
wastewater treatment. They are trying to develop those areas into a biofuels industry to some extent. In fact, India
and the United States have cooperated in the establishment of a funding opportunity for the development of
biofuels in general, whether it is algae or cellulosic or some other energy plant that has yet to be determined. That
funding opportunity is in development process and promises to put nearly a million and a half to two million dollars

India is a force to contend

with because of their long history with algae , but at this point they are trying to determine
out how best to enter into the biofuels industry . We are very fortunate, from a NAABB perspective,
per year for research and development of biofuels in each country. I think

to be partnering with Reliance Industries Limited, which is one of the largest petrochemical companies in the world
and is located in India. They have two of the worlds largest refineries and they are in the top 20 petrochemical
producers in the world. Reliance Industries is in the process of developing a strategy for biofuels and algae biofuels
in particular. We are very privileged to be partnering with them in developing this strategy. Japan Japan has had
an even longer history than most countries in developing algae for commercial purposes, mostly macroalgae, for
nutritional sources and food sources. They have also had a top phycological society and are very active in
prospecting for new species of algae. The Japanese probably have some of the top researchers in the world looking
at species such as Botryococcus braunii. Much of this research is concentrated at the University of Tsukuba. There,

identified a new species of algae that grows very, very fast and has
fairly good oil productivity. Its very consistent and very fast growing in large
numbers, so its overall productivity looks promising for the biofuels industry. NEDO
they have actually

(New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), which manages government, industry, and
academic based energy research in Japan, is helping fund a few algae projects. With the University of Tsukuba and
several other companies, they have formed a small consortium of industry leaders to push forward with the
research and development of algae for biofuels. It is a fairly sizable effort overall, but you can point it to a few
institutions. China Within China, I went to visit the Qingdao Institute for Bioenergy and Biotechnology. The institute
was founded to help the region around Qingdao develop a bioenergy infrastructure and they are well on their way
to doing that. Within the last three years, they have put together an institute with about 200 researchers. It is kind
of amazing to see the research power that theyve been able to muster in that very short time. The

Chinese

have a few projects in algae

and we are, again, very fortunate within the NAABB to be partners. We are
collaborating with Dr. Jian Xu in the sequencing and the annotation and analysis of Nannochloropsis salina strain
1776 which we are also sequencing here at Los Alamos. This collaboration also involves NMSU and Solix Biosystems

Another entity in China working in the

algae industry is ENN, they have been developing some interests in photobioreactorbased systems for carbon sequestration and the development of algae for biofuels
which played a key role in developing our collaboration.

and bioproducts. This project looks like it is starting to take off, and they are well on their way with some test pilot

units already developed. Taiwan Taiwan is very similar to China. There is a very large steel plant in southern Taiwan,
the Chinese Steel Corporation in Tungkang. One of the largest steel plants in the world with sizable CO2 emissions.
This plant is collaborating with the National Cheng Kung University to develop a photobioreactor sequestration
system for CO2. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) itself is actually working very closely with

Taiwanese universities in transformation of algae , photobioreactor systems, belt screen

based harvesting technologies and supercritical extraction systems. NAABB, through Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, has recently entered into a research collaboration with ITRI in new membrane technologies for

this is a significant effort for a very small country . Australia

Australia has been in the news for quite some time and has been developing quite
an industrial interest in algae. Muradel, a small company forming in Adelaide and in Karratha (from a
harvesting systems. Overall,

joint venture between Murdoch U., Adelaide Research and Innovation Pty Ltd and SQC Pty Ltd) is developing a small
10 acre facility and currently has about two acres under development. Additionally, Aurora Algae has started
developing some facilities in Karratha, and MBD Energy is active in Queensland. The University of Sydney is
developing a number of technologies for the conversion of biomass into oils, in particular their hydrothermal
liquefaction capabilities look very promising for algae. The Australian government recently announced a $23/ton
carbon tax, which will be reinvested in renewable energy development. This will make about $23 B available for
new developments. Much of the effort will be managed through the Clean Energy Finance Corporation and the
Australian Biofuels Research Institute. Of course, we have all seen the interest from airlines such as Qantas and
Virgin Air, and airplane manufacturer Boeing, in the Australian bioenergy initiatives. All of this is a very, very nice

There are four new algae projects being funded by

the European Union. Three of them are located in Spain. Specifically, I visited the Repsol
level of development from Australia. Europe

Innovation Center in Madrid and University of Alicante. Repsol is a large Spanish petrochemical interested in the
development of biofuels. Repsol has a number of algae projects developing around Spain, including at the
Univeristy of Alicante. Their research is looking at plastics for photobioreactors, greenhouse containment systems,
strain selection, photobioreactor design, and fuel conversion. At the U. of Alicante I was particularly interested in
their work with hydrothermal liquefaction technologies. Of course,

there has also been great work by

Rene Wijffels at Wageningen University in the Netherlands, in understanding different types of photobiorector
systems and cultivation systems for the European-type environment. There are also some efforts in other countries
like Greece and Italy, but overall, Spain seems to be the one leading the development of the algae industry in
Europe. A nice, new technology just emerged out of a company called Evodos looking at a new centrifugal
technology that is very low energy and fairly well developed. They are already being looked at very heavily by a lot
of commercial entities and some research institutions. They have three different sized systems, from a research and
development system to systems that can be taken out into the field for harvesting algae very, very quickly up to
twenty thousand liters per hour flow rates for their largest systems. Israel and Korea Weve heard quite a bit from

Israel who has had a long history in developing nutraceuticals and now are using their
photobioreactor systems mostly for biofuels. This development has come primarily out of BenGurion University. In fact, Ami Ben-Amotz and his company Seambiotic are just starting to develop a new facility in
China for algal biofuels, from technology they developed in Israel.

Korea recently started the

Advanced Biomass R&D Center (ABC) a consortium of universities, institutes and industry funded the
Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology with an investment of more than $200 M over nine years. This
consortium will work to develop a number of new algae and cellulosic based biofuels technologies. NAABB partners,
primarily led by Brooklyn College and Los Alamos National Laboratory, will be collaborating with ABC in algae strain
selection and development.

3. Obama is pushing for clean tech now afs not key

Meltzer 14--Fellow in Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution,
and adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International
Studies. This article follows in part upon the authors earlier article. Joshua Meltzer,
[Joshua, A CARBON TAX AS A DRIVER OF GREEN TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE,ALLIANCE21,
http://www.alliance21.org.au/about/people/joshua-meltzer, Apr. 12, 2014, accessed
7/18/14]RMT
The EPA finding that CO2 from mobile sources endangers public health and welfare triggered a requirement under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate CO2 emissions from stationary sources. 91 EPA has proposed that as part of the
permitting process for a proposal to construct or operate new and modified stationary sources emitting at least
75,000 tons per year of CO2 emissions, there must be a demonstration that the applicant is using the best available

control technology (BACT) to limit its emissions.92 What constitutes BACT would be assessed on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the commercial viability and availability of the technologies for reducing GHG
emissions.93 In the near term, BACT is unlikely to require adopting technologies such as carbon capture and
sequestration that have yet to be technically and economically proven and instead will drive a transition toward

the EPA proposed new source

performance standards (NSPS) for CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants
with separate standards for natural gas and coal-fired units .94 Under these proposed
standards, CO2 emissions from new (and modified) fossil fuel-fired plants will be limited to
1,100lb CO2 per megawatt-hour (CO2/MWh). 95 And as coal plants emit on average
1,800lb CO2/MWh, only coal plants with (at least partial) CCS will meet this standard.96
Moreover, regulating new sources of CO2 emissions requires the EPA to also regulate
existing sources.97 President Obama has directed EPA to develop standards for
existing sources of CO 2 by 2016. 98 As this discussion demonstrates, most U.S. climate
change policies involve technology-push measures. The EIA table above illustrates
the United States bias toward technology-push measures and includes U.S.
spending on R&D, loan guarantees, and tax credits for suppliers of renewable
energy projects. Additionally, the increased fuel efficiency standards that apply to vehicle manufacturers and
energy efficient technologies. Most recently, in September 2013,

proposed new CO standards for stationary sources also operate as technologypush incentives. 2 That said, not all
U.S. climate change policy seeks to encourage the innovation and production of green technologies through supplyside policies. There are some demand-pull measures though these are piecemeal and mostly at the state level, such

a more comprehensive
demand-pull measure such as a federal carbon tax would, in addition to reflecting
the environmental externalities of carbon, induce greater innovation and thereby
complement the range of technology-push measures already in place.
as Californias cap and trade system. 99 For the reasons outlined above,

4. Turn - Hegemony causes econ collapse, backlash, and foreign

overstretch only retreat is sustainable
Posen 13 [Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, Pull Back, Vol. 92, Issue 1,
Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13]
To this end, the U.S. government has expanded its sprawling Cold War-era network
of security commitments and military bases. It has reinforced its existing alliances,
adding new members to NATO and enhancing its security agreement with Japan. In
the Persian Gulf, it has sought to protect the flow of oil with a full panoply of air,
sea, and land forces, a goal that consumes at least 15 percent of the U.S. defense
budget. Washington has put China on a watch list, ringing it in with a network of
alliances, less formal relationships, and military bases. The United States' activism
has entailed a long list of ambitious foreign policy projects. Washington has tried to
rescue failing states, intervening militarily in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Libya, variously attempting to defend human rights, suppress undesirable
nationalist movements, and install democratic regimes. It has also tried to contain
so-called rogue states that oppose the United States, such as Iran, Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, North Korea, and, to a lesser degree, Syria. After 9/11, the
struggle against al Qaeda and its allies dominated the agenda, but the George W.
Bush administration defined this enterprise broadly and led the country into the
painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States has long sought to
discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists
has added urgency to this objective, leading to constant tension with Iran and North
Korea. In pursuit of this ambitious agenda, the United States has consistently spent

hundreds of billions of dollars per year on its military -- far more than the sum of the
defense budgets of its friends and far more than the sum of those of its potential
adversaries. It has kept that military busy: U.S. troops have spent roughly twice as
many months in combat after the Cold War as they did during it. Today, roughly
180,000 U.S. soldiers remain stationed on foreign soil, not counting the tens of
thousands more who have rotated through the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thousands of American and allied soldiers have lost their lives, not to mention the
countless civilians caught in the crossfire. This undisciplined, expensive, and bloody
strategy has done untold harm to U.S. national security . It makes enemies almost as
fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and
convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Washington's plans, further
raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy . During the 1990s, these
consequences were manageable because the United States enjoyed such a
favorable power position and chose its wars carefully Over the last decade,
however, the country's relative power has deteriorated, and policymakers have
made dreadful choices concerning which wars to fight and how to fight them.
What's more, the Pentagon has come to depend on continuous infusions of cash
simply to retain its current force structure -- levels of spending that the Great
Recession and the United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable . It is
time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of
restraint. This approach would mean giving up on global reform and sticking to
protecting narrow national security interests. It would mean transforming the
military into a smaller force that goes to war only when it truly must. It would mean
removing large numbers of U.S. troops from forward bases, creating incentives for
allies to provide for their own security And because such a shift would allow the
United States to spend its resources on only the most pressing international threats,
it would help preserve the country's prosperity and security over the long run.

5. Data disproves their glorified depiction of US hegemony

Fettweis 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane
University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy,
Comparative Strategy, 30:316332, EBSCO)
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship
between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the
limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the
United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the
United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in
1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability,
this irresponsible peace dividend endangered both national and global security.
No serious analyst of American military capabilities, argued Kristol and Kagan,
doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas
responsibilities to itself and to world peace.52 On the other hand, if the pacific
trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against
interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and
violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more
peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its

security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none

took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to
address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and
no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was
diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not
a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United
States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global
conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President
Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back
up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that
the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to
disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once
again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best
indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security
commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during
this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of
hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is
decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending
during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true
that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends,
then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower
levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative
for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which
the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational
grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending
until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual
adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the
United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while
seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is
as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur
irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly
debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had
unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with
more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that
their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been
interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical
consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it
stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more
restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to
U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively
without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their
view on faith alone.

6. Current geopolitical climate proves no impact to heg

Bandow 13

[Doug Bandow, special assistant to President Reagan, editor of political magazine

Inquiry, 7-5-13, Egypt and American Hubris,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/egypt-american-hubris-8692, 7-7-13]
American foreign policy is a wreck. The presumption that Washington controls
events around the globe has been exposed to all as an embarrassing illusion. Egypt
teeters on the brink, again. Syria worsens by the day. Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations are dead, with another intifada in the wind. North Korea threatens to
nuke the world. Violence grows in Nigeria. The Europeans have gone from
disillusioned to angry with President Barack Obama. Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and
Venezuela reject U.S. leadership in Latin America. Even Iranian reformers support
Irans nuclear program. Zimbabwes vicious Robert Mugabe is likely to retain power
in upcoming elections. Iraq is friendly with Iran and supporting Bashar al-Assad. The
Afghan government remains corrupt, incompetent, and without legitimacy. Bahrain
cracks down on democracy supporters with Washingtons acquiescence. China and
Russia resist U.S. priorities in Syria and elsewhere. Venezuela without Chavez looks
like Venezuela with Chavez. It wasnt supposed to be this way. America was the
unipower, the hyperpower, the sole superpower, the essential nation. Washington
was the benevolent hegemon. Only members of the axis of evil had something to
fear from the United States. All the U.S. government had to do was exercise
leadership and all would be well. That U.S. pride swelled with the end of the Cold
War is hardly a surprise. But what unfortunately emerged was a rabid arrogance,
the view that what we say goes. It was the very hubris about which the ancient
Greeks warned. Alas, this all proved to be a world of illusion, filled with smoke and
mirrors. On 9/11 a score of angry young Muslims brought war to America,
destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon. A bunch of illequipped and ignorant Afghan fundamentalists refused to admit that they were
defeated, and more than a decade later still resist the United States backed by a
multitude of allies and a covey of local elites. The invasion of Iraq was met by IEDs
instead of flowers, and created an ally in name only, with Baghdad ready to thwart
U.S. military objectives when it saw fit. American pleading, threats, promises and
sanctions had no effect on the course of events in North Korea. Civil and military
conflicts ebbed and flowed and political contests waxed and waned in Congo,
Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe with Washington but an ineffective bystander.
Russias Vladimir Putin ignored U.S. priorities both before and after the fabled
reset in relations. China protected North Korea and bullied its other neighbors,
despite diplomatic pleadings and military pivots. As for succeeding events, where is
the evidence that Morsi, Egypts generals and the Egyptian people sat around
awaiting the opinion of U.S. policymakers? Washingtons support for the odious
Mubarak left it with little credibility. Maybe the generals can be bought with the
promise of more military aid, but even they know that the U.S. cannot protect them
if their soldiers refuse their orders. Morsis fate was decided in Cairo, not
Washington. Americans understandably pine for a simpler world in which
Washington is the center of the world and the U.S. orchestrates international
events. Alas, that world never really existed. It certainly does not exist today.
Instead of embracing the illusion of Washingtons omniscience, Washington officials
should acknowledge the limitations on their power and influence. They should

reflect on events spinning out of control in Egypt. Its time for the more humble
foreign policy that candidate George W. Bush promised in what seems to be a
lifetime ago.