Jessica Ma. B.

Rey
Reconciliare
March 20, 2014
Have faith in the universe and its capability to lead you
to the path of abundance. Stephen Richardsi
What does it mean to see nothing? It means to see
something that is out of sight. One does not simply mean that
seeing nothing is seeing something not visible. Hence, you see
nothing2. One sees the somethingness of nothing. Seeing is not
only limited to the eyes but it also pertains to the other senses
that confirms the presence of something that is nothing. It is
safe to say then that the presence of something is not only
limited to what the eyes can see. It extends all the way to what
one cannot see, what one cannot feel or hear or taste or smell.
There is something more than what our senses can perceive
and it encompasses all that one cannot intuit. This paper
concerns the nothing, the nothing that is present in the
absence of our capability to comprehend and is present in the
presence of our senses; the nothing that extends its invisible
self to what is visible, to the receiver of the perception, to the
subject.
It is something that one does not know, precisely,
and one does not know if precisely it is, if it exists, if
it responds to a name and corresponds to an
essence. One does not know: not out of ignorance,
but because this non-object, this non-present
present, this being-there of an absent or departed
one no longer belongs to knowledge. At least no
longer to that which one thinks one knows by the
name of knowledge. One does not know if it is living
or if it is dead The
Thing is still invisible, it is nothing visible at the
moment one speaks of it and in order to ask oneself
if it has reappeared. It is still nothing that can be
seen when one speaks of it.3
As the apple touched the ground as it fell from the tree,
Sir Isaac Newton supposed that there is an invisible force that
made the apple fall down from where it had been originally
placed. This force is that which cannot be seen but can be
perceived by the senses. What is this force that brought about

the falling of the apple? It is gravity. This is the working of the

gravity, an unseen force, a force that is outside the range of
what the eyes can see. There are also other forces that are
even much stronger than gravity and are not in the range of
human senses. There is the nothing; but it can never be
reduced to a mere force or a presence or be supposed to be
similar as gravity. This nothing is not only present as a steady
passive being that receives action. It is a very dynamic being
and it affects other things around it. Like gravity or
electromagnetic waves, this nothing manifests itself through
effecting traces of its presence to make sure that it marks its
being present in the world. It gravitates itself as it gravitates
to the person, the very concept of

attracting one another like the apple that had fallen from the
tree being attracted to the ground. Revisiting GWF Hegel:
But the pure concept or infinity as the abyss of
nothingness in which all is being engulfed must
signify the infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a
moment of the supreme Idea, and no more than a
moment.4
What is this nothing and why am I problematizing it? This
paper aims to reconcile the relationship between the object of
faith the nothing, the supreme Idea as Hegel may suppose it
and the subject of faith, the person, the self, the I. This is the
very reason why this paper is entitled Reconciliare, the latin
word for Reconciliation.5
This nothing I have been concerned this afternoon with is
the object of faith. It is where faith is being grounded on. It is
the believing in something that is nothing, that which cannot
be comprehended fully by the human senses and which
presence is cannot be traced wholly but that which affects
every single object. We seek to know the nothing as we
maintain on believing in it. This nothing is present now. It is
never docilely given a date in the chain of presents, day after
day, according to the instituted order of a calendar. 6
In its possibility as in the experience of the
impossible that will always have constituted it, it is
never a stranger to the event, that is, very simply, to
the coming of that which happens.7
What does it mean to have faith then into something that
is incomprehensible or that which presence does not exist in
the range of the senses and cannot be fathomed fully?
Perhaps, it is in the understanding of Jean Jacques Derrida
that we open ourselves to the infinite possibility of meaning.
That there is more than what it is as defined by the dominant
ideology of the present, that meaning along with history. The
coming of meaning, therefore, is in process. But one must also
be careful in the coming of meaning, for it has to be
understood that one must be in constant search for it as well.
It is then a mutual searching or mutual coming to the arrival of
meaning that meaning does not only come to the seeker but
the seeker must also come to the meaning.

It is there that differance, if it remains irreducible,

irreducibly required by spacing of any promise and
by the future-to-come that comes to open it, does not
mean only (as some people have too often believed
and
so
naively)
deferral,
lateness,
delay,
postponement. In the incoercible differance the
here-now unfurls.8
But it is also important to note that this process is a
continuous, dynamic process. One does not arrive to the
meaning as soon. One can never know when

or what point in time will it come to the seeker. It opens now

the person to the concept of infinity: the ever-coming of now.
This nothingness, this meaning as to which why we have faith
to the nothing is in constant question as to when to arrive. A
venir. To come. One can never know. One can never predict or
assume or expect or make a schedule as to when it will arrive.
This supposes an infinite waiting and coming to the meaning
as to knowing the nothing. And since one can never know, that
person is left to assume or to suppose that, perhaps, it may
never come or, perhaps, it may come soon. This concept
introduced by Derrida is called differance, understanding
through the networks of meanings that lie under.
Without lateness, without delay, but without
presence, it is the precipitation of an absolute
singularity, singular because differing, precisely
[justement], and always other, binding itself
necessarily to the form of the instant, in imminence
and in urgency: even if it moves toward what
remains to come, there is the pledge [gage]
(promise, engagement, injunction and response to
the injunction, and so forth). The pledge is given
here and now, even before, perhaps, a decision
confirms it. It thus responds without delay to the
demand of justice. The latter by definition is
impatient, uncompromising and unconditional.9
Though, one must keep in mind that this is nothing. One
must come to understand that the nothing is out within the
range of the senses that one comes to partially understand the
nothing as suppose to everything that it is not.10 One only
supposes its meaning through the presence of something
which is not nothing.
Therefore, neither external Nature nor mere feeling
has a right to that name. Immediate feeling that has
not been purified by rational knowing is burdened
with the quality of the natural, the contingent, of
self-externality and asunderness. Consequently, in
the content of feeling and of natural things, infinity
is present only formally, abstractly. Mind, on the
contrary, in conformity with its Notion or its truth, is
infinite or eternal in this concrete and real sense:
that it remains absolutely self-identical in its

difference.11
In this sense, nothing is presupposed as similar to a
higher being. In Hegels terms, the nothing is the absolute.
Incorporating Derrida, the nothing is introduced to the
concept of infinity. It is the infinite coming of the nothing. It is
the infinite waiting of man to the coming of meaning, to
understand and grasp the totality and actuality of nothing. But
this nothing is cannot be simply reduced to any representation
of its being. Since we cannot fully comprehend it, one cannot
be entitled to participate in the creation of its
representation.12 Even mere speech or thought cannot suffice
to the interpretation of the nothing.13 In Jean-Luc Nancys
interpretation of Hegel, he supposes that any representation
of any being desaturates its beingness. Likewise in the
Phenomenology of the Face by

Emmanuel Levinas, any representation is invalid and reduces

the being as mere
representations of the interpreter. It robs the beinginterpreted the chance to express itself on its own.
A face is not like a plastic form, which is always
already deserted, betrayed, by the being it reveals,
such as marble from which the gods it manifests
already absent themselves. It differs from an
animal's head, in which a being, in its brutish
dumbness, is not yet in touch with itself. In a face
the expressed attends its expression, expresses its
very expression, always remains master of the
meaning it delivers. A pure act" in its own way, it
resists identification does not enter into the already
known, brings aid to itself, as Plato puts it,
speaks.14
It may be a good question to ask as to How is the
nothing perceived if it is unavailable to the senses? Nothing
presents itself through grace. This grace is the trace of the
nothing15 for one cannot fully grasp the ontology of the
nothing; the phantasm of the nothing that reaches out to man,
the people. This is a trace of whats to come. A revenant may
already mark the promised return of the spectre of living
being.16 Grace partially reveals the nothing and expresses its
wanting to become into being, to be realized and actualized. 17
[I]s doubtless a supernatural and paradoxical
phenomenality, a furtive and ungraspable visibility of
the invisible or an invisibility of a visible X. that nonsenuous senuous of which capital speaks with
regard to a certain exchange-value; it is also, no
doubt, the tangible intangibility of a proper body
without flesh but still the body of someone as
someone other.18
Since the person is only left to presuppose to himself as
how to understand the meaning of his faith to the nothing,
Immanuel Kant invites man to use his rational capacity to
acquire truth and meaning. It calls out for an infinite
obligation of the self to know the nothing through ones own
thinking.19
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his selfimposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to

use one's understanding without guidance from

another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its
cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of
resolve and courage to use it without guidance from
another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] "Have courage
to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto
of enlightenment.20
Kant also invites man to the life in the community. It is in
the public use of reason without any hindrance that man is
continuously enlightened, that man is made available to the
creation of meaning. He also highlights the presence of other
people in verification of thoughts. 21 It now calls for collective
participation. This

enlarged mentality brings man to understand faith and to

bring meaning to it in the view of different interpretations.
Kant supposes both autonomy and heteronomy of reason. What
does it say, then, about reasoning and acquiring meaning? As
Foucault posits, ambiguity should be embraced. 22 And the
same is true for the Marxists who are anxious of
heterogeneity. For them, they fear that the plurality of
Marxism will bring decentrality in meaning.
Let us consider first of all, the radical and necessary
heterogeneity of an inheritance, the difference
without opposition that has to mark it, a disparate
and a quasi-juxtaposition without dialectic (the very
plural of what we will later call Marxs spirits.) An
inheritance is never gathered together, it is never
once with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one,
can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by
choosing.23
For Derrida, meaning creation is the main tenet of
Marxism. The real spirit of Marxism lies in the ground of
groundlessness. The real spirit of Marxism is its very suspicion
to foundation. It is the very act of inheritance. Inheritors that
we are of more than one form of speech, as well as of an
injunction that is itself disadjointed. 24 Meaning creation, then,
is in the very hands of the inheritors. Derrida through the
critique of Marx brings us faith that is open to different
meanings; through Kant, one is encouraged to look for the
truth without hindrances; it is the closing of self from any
dogma and actively waiting and participating in the coming of
meaning that one takes faith in the invisible.
One must means one must filter, sift, criticize, one
must sort out several different possibles that inhabit
the same injunction. If the readibility of a legacy
were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did
not call for and at the same time defy interpretation,
we would never have anything to inherit from it
The critical choice called for by any reaffirmation of
the inheritance is also, like memory itself, the
condition of finitude. The infinite does not inherit, it
does not inherit
(from) itself. The injunction itself (it always says
choose and decide from among what you inherit)
can only be one by dividing itself, tearing itself

apart, differing/deferring itself, by speaking at the

same time several time and in several voices. 25
As Derrida critics Marx in falling into the pit of his
critique, Derrida points out that Marx has failed in exorcising
the spectre he has conjured. Marx has localized the spectre, in
such a way that he had come to know and had familiarized
himself to the ghost.26 But isnt it the very mark of humanity?
That man is a limited being and could possibly err. It is in
Marxs attempt to create a one unified
Marxism that he has failed. 27 "This familiarity of the ghost, of
the trace, of the extension of the nothing that allows man to
exercise is his very act of faith. It is in familiarization of the
nothing even if it does not exist yet and exists in the evercoming now that provides even more fuel to the desire to
fathom it. By localizing

and personifying the nothing, by giving it an artificial body to

capture a partial totality of the incomprehensible nothing, man
creates a certain knowing and believing of it.
This familiarization is possible through becoming. 28 As
the self negates itself, it knows the other, it comes to arrive in
the process of knowing the negative.
Everything is in the absolute restlessness of becoming Its
absolute restlessness is itself from the determination of the
absolute.29 Nancy posits then that this process of negating
opens up the possibility of partially knowing the negative as it
undergoes the process of becoming. It is always the trembling
of the finite seized by the infinite: it is the sensibility of the
infinite in the finite.30 The very trembling in the face of the
other, the infinite, the nothing brings the relationality of
knowing each other, the thought penetrates the subject the
knowing of the other by the subject and the knowing of the
subject by the other. Thought cannot penetrate the thing
without trembling.31
This tarrying with the negative is the magical
power that converts it into being. This power is
identical with what we earlier called the Subject,
which, by giving determinateness an existence in its
own element, supersedes abstract immediacy, that
is, the immediacy that barely is, and thus is
authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose
mediation is not outside of it, but that is this
mediation itself.32
How is it to have faith into nothing and maintain which
without conjuration? Faith lives on the subjective personal
interpretations of the subject. As for Hegel, the subject is in
constant displacement in search for himself. 33 Faith, then, also
seeks autonomy in meaning creation aside from heteronomy.
Faith is a personal decision. No one simply inherits faith 34
This interpretation provided by the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines provides a very beautiful
capturing of what faith is. Faith is a personal decision. It is
coming from the inside, it reaches out from the core of the self
to the outside to validate whatever belief he has believed in. It
is the personal act of believing, 35 a response to the object of
faith In its very first figure, this relation to the other, and
more precisely, this being-self-through-the-other, gives itself as
that by which substance is made to tremble. 36 No one simply
inherits the meaning of faith for every subject is called to

participate in the creation of meaning in themselves.

Maybe it is worth looking at language. Aside from knowing
that the nothing is the object of faith, the center of faith, F-A-I-TH, is I the subject. Faith, then, seeks autonomy in meaning
creation.37 The subject then must reason out his faith and
provide interpretation to his faith on his own, without hindrance.
The meaning is coming from the inner self, from the center. The
response to the nothing comes from the self; the subject seeks
out the nothing to be one with it in the act of faith. It conjures
the nothing in the hopes of knowing it, in being familiar with it;
to

localize it. Not so much that the subject wants to be nothing

but the subject wants to be in unity with the nothing. The
eschatological truth of faith is the unity of the subject to the
nothing the meaning of faith.
How can one be late to the end of history? A
question for today. It is serious because it obliges
one to reflect again, as we have been doing since
Hegel, on what happens and deserves the name of
event, after history; it obliges one to wonder if the
end of history is but the end of a certain concept of
history.38
Remembering the interpretation of Derrida in his
Spectres of Marx, he says that Marx is concerned with the
historicity of the subject that the subject is in perpetual
displacement in search of the self in arriving to its meaning. 39
What is faith then in this context of the self? Its subjectivity
entails a certain inheritance of a responsibility this
inheritance is not merely a given that provides meaning to
faith but a responsibility of the person to contribute to the
creation of meaning.
There will be no future without this. 40 As for Marx, it can
never happen without transformation:
Well,
what
remains
irreducible
to
any
deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible
as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps,
a certain experience of the emancipator promise; it
is perhaps even the formality of a structural
messianism, a messianism without religion, even a
messianism without messianism, an idea of justice.
But this is perhaps what we must now be thought
and thought otherwise in order to ask oneself where
Marxism is going, which is also to say, where
Marxism is leading and where is it to be led: where
to lead it by interpreting it, which cannot happen
without transformation, and not where can it lead us
such as it will have been.41
The subject, then, has an infinite responsibility of
contributing to the creation of meaning as it is continuously
displaced. This meaning would come solely from the subject as
the source of decision. Inheritance is never a given, it is
always a task.42 Contribution to meaning creation is

important but what does this decision-making call for? Karl

Marx would simply say in his 11 th thesis on Feuerbach, The
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways;
the point, however, is to change it.43 What should be our
response to faith as Marx would point out? It is a call for
bringing about change. This is a responsibility every person is
accounted for. Marx emphasizes that every subject is [n]ot to
flee from the responsibility.44
It remains before us just as unquestionably as we
are heirs of Marxism, even before wanting or
refusing to be, and, like all inheritors we are
mourning. In mourning in particular for what is

called Marxism. To be, this word in which we earlier

saw the word of the spirit, means, for the same
reason, to inherit. All questions on the subject of
being or of what is to be (or not to be) are questions
of inheritance.45
Our faith should direct us to transformation. We do not
simply believe, or have faith. We put it into practice. Marx
underscores that it is what the subject chooses. He is
concerned as to how the subject will take stand to his
reasoning, to his beliefs. It now invokes the concept of Free
Will. The subject is given the free will to decide on his own, to
be the sole responsible figure to his own actions. It gives the
subject a choice as to how he plans to do something about his
faith. What he wants to do to the nothing which he cannot see
but he believes on. It is then, for Marx, an invitation to do
something about ones faith. It is not merely reasoning it out
as Kant would suggest or waiting for the meaning to come for
Derrida. It is in actualizing ones faith, 46 ones subjective
personal response to the nothing, that the person gets a
partial grasp of the meaning. Sense never being given or
readily available, it is a matter of making oneself available for
it, and this availability is called freedom. 47 That one must
make himself available for it.
This call for action is fueled by desire, the desire of
knowing and comprehending the nothing. It is not only that
there is desire to feed the curiosity but the desire to feed the
hollowness of the being that is denoted by the lack of
comprehension of the nothing.48 In Nancys reading of Hegel,
this desire is the The heart trembles because the self is
indeed bound to disappear, and it is this disappearance that it
must want in order to be in love, and in its freedom. 49 That it
must continue to desire for desiring is recognizing and
experiencing loss which calls for action, it is the very
experience of freedom in the making. Trembling from the
trembling of the other, and with the other, the self comes into
desire. Self-consciousness is essentially desire, because it is
consciousness of self as and out of its consciousness of the
other.50
Action would be less possible without the desire for this
gives, perhaps, a kind of certainty as to why live out faith. We
are in constant search for meaning for we have lost certainty. 51

This experience of losing certainty brings the subject to yearn

and to mourn. It calls for action, for something to be done
about this hollowness that one is again given the choice to do
something about it. By having the choice, one experiences
freedom. Perhaps, it is one of the sweetest things in the world
especially in knowing that faith is being lived out by the
constant search of certainty of the nothing which gives the
subject freedom to do something about it. There is beauty then
in loss of certainty.
A mourning in fact and by right interminable,
without possible normality, without reliable limit, in
its reality or in its concept, between introjections
and incorporation. But the same logic, as we
suggested, responds to the injunction of a justice
which, beyond right

or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever

is not, no longer or not yet living, presently living. 52
How do I reconcile, then, the middle ground between the
subject and the object of faith if there is an infinite
responsibility to create meaning and take action? The first
step, perhaps, in taking action is to trust that hopefully the
waiting for the coming will arrive; trusting that both of them
will arrive at the same time that the middle ground between
the subject and the nothing will be reconciled to the coming of
the truth, to the coming of the kingdom.
The self must come from the other, and it is in this
coming as this coming, that it has to be self
which is to say, unity with itself.
This necessity makes desire: this unity must
become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. selfconsciousness is Desire in general.53
The coming of the kingdom, for Hegel, is the complete
externalization process of becoming:
Yet this externalization is still incomplete; it expresses
the connection of its self-certainty with the object,
which, just because it is thus connected, has not yet
won its complete freedom. The self-knowing Spirit
knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or
its limit: to know ones limit is to know how to
sacrifice oneself in its existence nothing but this
eternal externalization of its continuing existence and
the movement that reinstates the Subject.54
As for the Marxist, the coming of Marxism is regarded to
as a messianic event. The eschatology of Marxism is the
realization of communism.
Now if there is a spirit of Marxism which I will never
be able to renounce, it is not only the critical idea or
the questioning stance (a consistent deconstruction
must insist on them even as it also learns that this is
not the last or first word). It is even more a certain
emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain
experience of the promise that one can try to
liberate from any dogmatics and even from any
metaphysico-religious determination, from any

messianism. And a promise must promise to be kept,

that is, not to remain
spiritual or abstract, but to produce events, new
effective forms of action, practice, organization, and
so forth55
It is in trusting that the nothing will soon take form into
something. The coming, the unity of the subject with the object
of faith must always remain to be a promise or else it will be
reduced to a mere presence which is without urgency and
excessiveness. If that is so, it will lose its demand, its very
desire to morph into being.56

But here-now does not fold back into immediacy, or

into the reappropriationable identity of the present,
even less that of self-presence. Although appeal,
violence, rupture, imminence, and urgency
are Blanchots words in the following paragraph, the
demand that he says is always present must
implicitly, it seems to us, find itself affected by the
same rupture or the same dislocation, the same
short circuit. It can never be always present, it
can be, only, if there is any, it can be only possible, it
must even remain a can-be or maybe in order to
remain a demand. Otherwise it would become
presence again, that is substance, existence,
essence, permanence, and not at all the excessive
demand or urgency that Blanchot speaks of so
correctly [justement]. The permanent revolution
supposes the rupture that which links permanence
to substantial presence, and more generally to all
ontology.57
Like what happened in the first few seconds of the
universe, from nothing, something has exploded all the matter
in the universe. The Big Bang happened. A very tiny and dense
point that was compressed to zero volume, a point which is
called singularity, exploded all the matter that is contained in
the space now58. From absolute nothing to concrete
something. This marks a rupture, like what Hannah Arendt
would say. It creates a break in the history, a novelty, a new
beginning. Without this rupture in the history, there will be no
universe, there will be no us that has evolved after billions
years since the explosion. And perhaps, it all lies in trusting,
trusting the nothing that soon it will take form.
There exists, however, another. claim which comes
closer to the heart of the matter. We have stressed
the element of novelty inherent in all revolutions,
and it is maintained frequently that our whole notion
of history, because its course follows a rectilinear
development, is Christian in origin. It is obvious that
only under the conditions of a rectilinear time
concept are such phenomena as novelty, uniqueness
of events, and the like conceivable at all. Christian
philosophy, it is true, broke with the time concept of
antiquity because the birth of Christ, occurring in

human secular time, constituted a new beginning as

well as a unique, unrepeatable event.59
What does it mean then to have faith? To accept that the
coming into being is now and that now is an ever-coming now.
To trust that in the openness of meanings, that it is never to be
limited to a mere representation. It is to trust that soon
enough freedom will be actualized in the loss of certainty that
as the end comes, the nothing will be realized in its purest and
truest form and that the subject will be united with
nothingness. Since I opened this paper with a quote, I shall
close it with another, parallel to the first Have faith in the
nothingness and its capability to lead you to the path of
abundance.

Notes:
i

Quoted from Think Your way to Success: Let Your

Dreams
Run Free by Stephen Richards
2
Translated
fromthe
Jean-Luc
Nancys
idea
of the
negative,
in this
case,
it
is
nothing
the
everything
which
isthe
opposite
of
something
that
which
presence
resides
in
concept ofcalled
theand
other.
It is also
absolute
init,
the
sense of
GWF Hegel.
3

Derrida, Jean Jacques. Spectres of Marx. p.6

God Himself is Dead. Hegel: Faith and Knowledge. trans. W.

Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1977) pp. 190-191
stress the by
supposed
importance
Jean Jacques
of language
Derrida. in creation of meaning as
6
Derrida, p.4
7
Ibid. P.89
8
Ibid, p.31
9
Ibid.
10
Nancys
of theis negative:
one is itthe
negative
of theinterpretation
other. The nothing
nothing because
is
not something.
11

Spirit as the Likeness of God from Section 441 of the

Zustze in Philosophy of Mind, pp181-82
12

MansTherefore,
limited rational
capacity
cannot
fully to
grasp
the
infinite.
is not
qualified
make
representations
of it forman
man cannot
equal
the divine.
13
In Nancys of
Hegel,
she
explains
in Trembling
thatfully
any
representation
pain
through
speech
does not
express the totality
of pain.
14
The Idea
of Idea
the Infinite
and the
Face
the Other.
Philosophy
and
the
of the
Infinite.
Text
andof
Commentary,.
Emmanuel
Levinas.
p.110.
The
face
is
not
simply
a
face. It is
also a master of its own interpretation.
spectre its
of longing
Marxism.
The ghost that manifests itself to
present
for existence.
16
Derrida, p. 99
democracyof
plenitude
itself,
a presence-to-itself,
from
every living
as present
totality of
understood
a presence
as
effectively
identical
to itself.
18
Derrida, p.7
19
Kant, Immanuel. What is enlightenment. (1784) p.1
20
Ibid.

21

By the on
very presence
of opens
other people,
knows
that he
is
thinking
He
himself man
in the
freedom
to
think
in light of his
the own.
perspectives
other.
Michel Foucault: Acceptance of ambiguous ties to
the autonomy
and heteronomy of reason.
Derrida,
p.16
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
conjured a ghost which he has failed to control.
27
Ibid.
28
Nancy, Jean-Luc.
Hegel:
The Restlessness
the Negative.
Minneapolis:
University
of Minnesota
Press. of
2002.
p.10

presupposes
the
absolute.
But
this
presupposition
is made
precisely in order to ruin all presupposition or pre-givenness.
becoming Its
determination
of the
absolute
absolute.
restlessness is itself from the
30
Ibid. p. 44
31
Ibid. p.45
32
The Tremendous
of Spirit.
pp. 18-19 Power of the Negative. Phenomenology
22

23
reconcile

Nancy, p.5 The subject and what it does, it is the act and
its doing the experience of the consciousness of the negativity
of substance as the concrete experience and consciousness of
the modern history of the world that is also the passage of
34
the world
its own
negativity.
CBCPthrough
, of
maturing
in Christian
Faith: National Cathetical
Directory
the
Philippines. (Pasay City, PH: ST. Pauls Publication, 1984) 143,
p.89
35
What is Catholic Theology About?
36
Nancy, p.43
37
Kant: autonomy of reason, reasoning without hindrance
38
Derrida, p.15
39
Check Differance
40
Derrida, p.13
41
Derrida, p.59
42
Spectres of Marx, p.54
York: W.W. Norton & Company. p.145
44
Derrida p.51
45
Ibid.
33

46

Marx and Engels, p.143

47

Nancy, p.7
Derrida, p.88
49
Nancy, p.59-60
50
Ibid. p.60
come eliminates certainty of what or when is it coming.
52
Derrida, p.97
53
Nancy, p.61
48

54

Hegel, GWF. The Absolute concept. Phenomenology of

Spirit. pp491-92
55
Derrida, p.89
56
Ibid. p32-33
57
Ibid. inp.33
The note of Blanchot as spectres being
political
nature.
originsit of
know
in the
the universe
present. on how the universe came to be as we
Arendt, Hannah.
Books. p.27

59

On

Revolution.

England:

Penguin