Bruschke Realist Performance Neg

ADI 2007 1
Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Realist Performance Neg
Realist Performance Neg......................................................................................................................................................1

State-Lovin’ 1NC..................................................................................................................................................................2
.............................................................................................................................................................................................6
Realism True: Human Nature...............................................................................................................................................7
Policy Analysis Key to Realism............................................................................................................................................8
A2: Perm...............................................................................................................................................................................9
Turn Shield – Realism is Dynamic.....................................................................................................................................11
Turn Shield – Defensive Realism.......................................................................................................................................12
A2: Realism Causes War.....................................................................................................................................................13
A2: State is Obsolete...........................................................................................................................................................14
A2: Leaders aren’t Objective..............................................................................................................................................15
A2: Realism Excludes!.......................................................................................................................................................16
A2: Realism is Unethical....................................................................................................................................................17
ADI 2007 2

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[1/5]
Contention One: Realism is Capital “T” True
States will inevitably compete for power to survive – three reasons

John Mearsheimer – Prof of PoliSci at U. Chicago – 2001 The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics p. 2-3
This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the
distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary
capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain
power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus,
a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to
undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor.
Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of international system forces states
which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the
international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that
sites above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive
military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Given this
fear – which can never be wholly eliminated – states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to
their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon,
because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power.
Self-interest is rooted in human nature, which results in realism

Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
1.Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their
roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which
society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only
at the risk of failure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of
developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It
believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is
true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a
subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.
Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies
of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in
political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fact that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory, has never
been heard of before tends to create a presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness.
Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ag~as was
the theory of the balance of power-does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete. A
theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience. To dismiss such a theory
because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice
that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory
as a "fashion" or "fad" is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.
ADI 2007 3

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[2/5]
Contention Two: You’re not Realist.
There is no room for their project in the study of international relations –

emphasizing the role of personal discourse and narrative undermines the
theoretical consistency needed to realistically respond to political problems.
Darryl S.L. Jarvis – Professor at University of Sydney – 2K International Relations and the
Challenge of PostModernism: Defending the Discipline p. 200-1
What then, would we be left with and what could this newly constituted enterprise offer? As Ashley freely
admits, it could offer little. It could not “claim to offer an alternative position or perspective” since there would
be no secure ontological ground upon which these could be established. Nor could it offer alternative
interpretations save it would attempt to impose “interpretation upon interpretation” and capture history by
imposing fixed meanings and understandings. Least of all could it offer theory, the very tyranny of modernist
narratives that tend to “privilege” and “marginalize”. Absent any theoretical legacy or factual knowledge, we
could forced into an endless intertextual discourse predicated on consumption of words and the individual
thoughts they evoke: a kind of purified anarchism albeit in a perpetual state of self-dispersal. We would live
in a world of relativistic knowledge claims, each “true” to those that think it, but its truthfulness unobtainable
to those who would read it or wish to communicate it. Above all, we would be left without theory- knowledge
as a basis for decision, judgment, prescription, and action, surrendering us to “a view from afar, from up
high”. But as Nicholas Onuf asks “what does this leave for dealing with those close at hand?”
In the end, however, the intellectual rift that separates these counter-poised disciplines is not so much a
theoretical chasm as a political one. The attacks by Ashley and subversive postmodernists stem as much
from a deep political suspicion not only toward the discipline, but the implicit project they think it harbors and
the political-sectional elite interests they accuse it of representing. Robert Keohane’s desire for theoretical
synthesis of these contending approaches thus proves naïve, not least for the fact that subversive
postmodernism is likely best appreciated as a neotheoretical tool for inflicting damage upon a discipline that
subversive postmodernists would see done away with – a spanner in the works, as it were, which much like
sabotage threatens to clog the wheels of theoretical endeavor and reconstitute the machine in partisan terms
defined by their respective political agendas. Here the need for vigilance, or more precisely, standards in the
evaluation of theory and of the various theoretical importations that are frequently attempted in International
Relations. If only because of a liberal tolerance for intellectual dissonance, International Relations has been
welcoming of all schools of thought and all perspectives. I, for one, support this, believing it to be the
embodiment of intellectual discourse and progress. Yet this has to be reconciled amid a notion of discipline,
one that demands some degree of conformity in terms of subject matter, aims, approach, and theory, save
the very essence of our discipline dissipates into an intellectual free-for-all where anything goes, anything
counts as theory, and where everything is assumed to fall within the purview of International Relations. This
is not the case and is most definitely inappropriate. To be sure, intellectual innovations are nearly always
controversial, the seeding of new ideas frequently derided as obtuse or unrelated, often requiring time to
germinate and thereby grow and mature. But never are attempts at dismantling the basis of intellectuality by
suggesting theoretical closure through deconstruction, or by initiating witch hunts that threaten to hunt down
those implicated in the so-called modernist project. Such approaches fail the test of theory, falling short of
the aims, ambitions and purpose of a discipline that strives to understand, not to reproach.
ADI 2007 4

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[3/5]
We must remove irrational and subjective knowledge from policy-making or it

results in foolish wars
It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a
course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the
weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational
course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to
marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy
itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from
these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to
be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.
Deviations from rationality which are not the result of the personal whim or the personal psychopathology of
the policy maker may appear contingent only from the vantage point of rationality, but may themselves be
elements in a coherent system of irrationality. The conduct of the Indochina War by the United States
suggests that possibility. It is a question worth looking into whether modern psychology and psychiatry have
provided us with the conceptual tools which would enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of
irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics.
The experience of the Indochina War suggests five factors such a theory might encompass: the imposition
upon the empirical world of a simplistic and a priori picture of the world derived from folklore and ideological
assumption, that is, the replacement of experience with superstition; the refusal to correct this picture of the
world in the light of experience; the persistence in a foreign policy derived from the misperception of reality
and the use of intelligence for the purpose not of adapting policy to reality but of reinterpreting reality to
fit policy; the egotism of the policy makers widening the gap between perception and policy, on the one hand,
and reality, on the other; finally, the urge to close the gap at least subjectively by action, any kind of action,
that creates the illusion of mastery over a recalcitrant reality. According to the Wall Street Journal of April 3,
1970, "the desire to 'do something' pervades top levels of Government and may overpower other 'common
sense' advice that insists the U.S. ability to shape events is negligible. The yen for action could lead to bold
policy as therapy."
ADI 2007 5

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[4/5]
Their criticism is based on overly optimistic assumptions about human nature.

Inclusion is not always progress, it’s important to first address concrete realities
– gradual governmental reform is a pre-condition to a peaceful international
community where their project might be possible
Murray 97 (Alistair J. H., lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea, Reconstructing Realism
Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 194-95)
At the same time, however, realism no more fits into a reflectivist mould than it does a rationalist one.
Whilst it joins the critique of contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority, it also
recognises that they provide an essential measure of order in a disorderly world. Whilst it remains
open to the possibility of development towards more inclusive forms of community, it refuses to take
the additional step of assuming that this development can necessarily be described as progress.
Realism ultimately agrees that the 'necessitous' elements of the international system are largely social
constructions generated by human practices, but it retains an ambivalence about human motivations
which dictates a sceptical position towards the possibility of overcoming estrangement. For every
example of progress created by man's ability to transcend 'learned responses', for every case of his
'inherent self-developing capacity', we have examples of regression as he employs this for purposes
other than promoting self-determination. For realism, man remains, in the final analysis, limited by
himself. As such, it emphasises caution, and focuses not merely upon the achievement of long-term
objectives, but also upon the resolution of more immediate difficulties. Given that, in the absence of a
resolution of such difficulties, longer-term objectives are liable to be unachievable, realism would seem
to offer a more effective strategy of transition than reflectivism itself. Whereas, in constructivism, such
strategies are divorced from an awareness of the immediate problems which obstruct such efforts,
and, in critical theoretical perspectives, they are divorced from the current realities of international
politics altogether, realism's emphasis on first addressing the immediate obstacles to development
ensures that it at least generates strategies which offer us a tangible path to follow. If these strategies
perhaps lack the visionary appeal of reflectivist proposals, emphasising simply the necessity of a
restrained, moderate diplomacy in order to ameliorate conflicts between states, to foster a degree of
mutual understanding in international relations, and, ultimately, to develop a sense of community
which might underlie a more comprehensive international society, they at least seek to take advantage
of the possibilities of reform in the current international system without jeopardising the possibilities of
order. Realism's gradualist reformism, the careful tending of what it regards as an essentially organic
process, ultimately suggests the basis for a more sustainable strategy for reform than reflectivist
perspectives, however dramatic, can offer.
ADI 2007 6

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[5/5]
Contention Three: Reject their performance.
Realism is the beginning and end of international relations – debates must engage
in policy argumentation to engage the discipline meaningfully.
Francis A. Beer (Professor of Political Science at U. of Colorado, Boulder) and Robert Hariman
(teaches rhetorical theory and the critical study of public culture at Northwestern) 1996 Post-Realism:
The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations. Michigan State University Press. p. 1-2 [nfb]
The conduct of international relations has always involved skillful use of persuasive discourse. Relations
between states might depend on factors such as military capability and natural resources, but the decisions
made about the conduct of peace and war are also a result of the successes, failures, habits, and nuances of
persuasive appeal among elites and publics alike. For the most part, however, academic research in
international relations has not focused on the forms and effects of conversations, speeches, debates,
narratives, or discourses in political practice. This systematic inattention to the role of words in foreign affairs
is the result of a specific intellectual history that emphasized the material bases of international politics as it
"really" was. Political realism, historically known as reason of state or Realpolitik, was contrasted with both
the utopian tendencies of philosophical idealism and the liberal overvaluing of verbal agreements that was
epitomized at Munich. As it was linked to the modern valorization of scientific method, the doctrine of political
realism became the dominant theory within the contemporary discipline of international relations. By 1960,
political realism had "swept the field in the United States"; one more recent study suggested that 90 percent
of the hypotheses in behavioral studies in the discipline were realist in conception. 1
There has been a corresponding lack of attention to foreign affairs in rhetorical studies, which have been
directed largely to domestic politics and national literatures. Recently, however, we have seen a convergence
of interests, a bridging of the realist's unexamined divisions between foreign and domestic politics and
between the languages of politics and of inquiry. On the one hand, scholars in rhetoric have produced a
number of critical studies of foreign policy discourse. 2 These studies reveal that foreign policy decision
making is influenced powerfully by modes of persuasive appeal that realist explanation overlooks or
presumes irrational or even replicates dangerously. On the other hand, "dissident" scholars in the discipline
of international relations have taken a linguistic turn. 3 By drawing on a number of linguistic methodologies
ranging from Chaim Perelman's anatomy of rhetoric to various post-structuralisms, these initiatives not only
explicate phenomena that were excluded from realist explanatory schemes but also suggest how realist
discourse operates as a rhetoric influencing the world it purports to describe.
Periodic criticisms of the realist paradigm have not substantially altered either the conventional wisdom of
international studies or its considerable influence over foreign affairs. For most political scientists and the
many practitioners they school, the analysis, explanation, and evaluation of international relations begins and
usually ends with the realist paradigm. Consequently, any reconsideration of international studies has to
come to terms with realism: considering how it produces and limits knowledge of foreign affairs, how it
describes and structures political practice, how it contains untapped resources and misleading directions,
and how it needs to be adapted to changes in world politics and in the conduct of inquiry. Rhetorical scholars
have additional interests as well. The realist paradigm is a superb example of persuasive success in
twentieth-century modernist culture, and, so long as realist assumptions structure international study, such
inquiry will not be hospitable to the rhetorical tradition. By identifying how realism works as a persuasive
discourse, one can challenge its hegemony within international studies and demonstrate how a rhetorical
sensibility can contribute to more sophisticated and strategic understanding of foreign affairs.
ADI 2007 7

Realism True: Human Nature
Humans are universally driven by self-interest, which proves realism
www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is
the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public
virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely
disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined
dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of
private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human
nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a
great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on
the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.
ADI 2007 8

Policy Analysis Key to Realism
Specific policy analysis is key to adapt realist principles to specific countries –
[that’s an impact to topic-specific education]
Heller ’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An
Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy”.
November 2003. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Heller/contents/partone.html)
Realism in its purest form is based upon the following assumptions: 1) that states are primary and rational
actors, 2) states adjust their policies in order to further their own self-interests, and 3) for states, military and
national security interests are the principal policies.[1] Further along in this analysis some of these
assumptions will be slightly relaxed, at times incorporating principles related to structural realism. The author
believes that in order to truly understand how a state is operating, one must study social, economic, security,
and political elements of a country and how each of these parts interacts with one another. Such adjustments
will include the role of multinational corporations and international organizations in the policy calculus, and
economic determinants will be combined with military factors in determining the power of a state. Thus, the
principal measures of power potential are population, gross national product (GNP), military size, and
defense expenditures and trends. Only by incorporating all of these dynamics can a researcher grasp how a
country’s leadership is thinking and as such, what that leadership’s next moves will be.
Realism demands a photographic picture of the political world only possible

through rational analysis
At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign
policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies
both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants the
photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the
inevitable gap between good—that is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political
realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that
foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.
Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live
up to it. That argument misunderstands the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate
description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics. Far from being invalidated by the
fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes that
reality, being deficient in this respect, must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an ideal
system of balance of power.
ADI 2007 9

A2: Perm
[1/2]
Cross-apply the Jarvis evidence- realism demands standards for scholarship
which they have not met. Their inability to present a coherent theory of
international politics means they must be excluded for the discipline to survive –
the permutation is a wrench in the works of realist analysis
Inclusion of their project poisons realism and is unnecessary, realism can already
adapt to important world events
Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 178)
Cox's articulation of the division between the two approaches is perhaps definitive, but his conclusion
is much more problematic. Whilst he is undoubtedly correct to argue that each has a contribution to
make, this does not suggest, as he presumes, a strategy of alternation according to the stability of the
historical process. It is precisely this question of stability which is ultimately at stake in the debates
between rationalist and reflectivist perspectives, and the danger is always that the one will
predominate to the exclusion of the other in periods ill-suited to it, undermining whatever possibilities
of order or reform actually exist. Consequently, a strategy of alternation is inevitably going to prove
inadequate to the challenges posed by world politics; what is required is some form of synthesis. 6
Realism, I will argue, is capable of providing a foundation on which such a perspective might be built.
It is, of course, conventionally treated as a part of the rationalist orthodoxy — and hence criticised for
reproducing an iniquitous status quo by seeking to mitigate its problems. Yet, as should already be
apparent from the understanding of realism put forward in earlier chapters, this account is clearly
problematic. If realism emphasises the need to grasp what semblance of order can be obtained under
the current structure of the system, it nevertheless acknowledges the need to investigate the
possibilities of reforming this structure. If it makes use of aspects of the positivist methodology
employed by rationalism, it is nevertheless convinced of the importance of the more interpretative
approach adopted by reflectivism.7 Realism ultimately avoids the monism of perspective which leads
to the self-destructive conflict between the two, maintaining a position which provides an opening for a
path between the conservatism that privileges the extant to the exclusion of the possible and the
progressivism which privileges the possible to the exclusion of the extant.
Their approach cannot create strategies for change –realism’s concrete goals are
mutually exclusive with their aimless rambling
Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 189)
In the final analysis, then, Ashley's post-structuralist approach boils down to little more than a
critique — and, at that, a critique which fails. It is predicated on the assumption that the constraints
upon us are simply restrictive knowledge practices, such that it presumes that the entirety of the
solution to our problems is little more than the removal of such false ways of thinking. It offers nothing
by way of alternative — no strategies, no proximate goals, indeed, little by way of goals at all. If, in
constructivism, the progressive purpose leads to strategies divorced from an awareness of the
problems confronting transformatory efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, it produces
strategies divorced from international politics in their entirety, in post-structuralism it generates a
complete absence of strategies altogether. Critique serves to fill the void, yet this critique ultimately
proves unsustainable. With its defeat, post-structuralism is left with nothing. Once one peels away the
layers of misconstruction, it simply fades away. If realism is, as Ashley puts it, 'a tradition forever
immersed in the expectation of political tragedy', it at least offers us a concrete vision of objectives and
ways in which to achieve them which his own position, forever immersed in the expectation of
deliverance, is manifestly unable to provide.
ADI 2007 10

A2: Perm
[2/2]
Realism depends on a coherent theory that allows us to map outcomes – they have
failed to justify their perspective within realism and most be excluded
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that
the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts
performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have
actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives
might have been.
Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we
must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible
meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a
certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational
alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these
circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives
this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational
hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of
international politics.
ADI 2007 11

Turn Shield – Realism is Dynamic
Realism adapts to changing circumstances and provides effective strategies for

reform – their project has no way to achieve the transition
Murray 97 (Alistair J. H., lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea, Reconstructing Realism Between
Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 179)
Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only
that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable, but, beyond this,
that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate
themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives
ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of
transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so
divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they
threaten to become counter-productive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies
so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure
of international politics. And, in post-modernism, it reaches its highest form, producing an absence of
such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique.
Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach
to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its
weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of
rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.
ADI 2007 12

Turn Shield – Defensive Realism
There’s different kinds of realism – offensive and defensive
In the simplest bifurcation of realism, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller argue that realism is composed
of both an aggressive and offensive version and of a more defensive orientation. In offensive realism, states
view security as a fixed pie; unless a state works to increase its own security and resources by coercive
means, others will take their portions and use them against the state that surrendered such capabilities in
order to obtain more security. In such a circumstance, war and other aggressive military postures are more
likely, and international competition will be rampant. At the same time, those states that believe that there is
an infinite amount of security in the international system will adopt defensive strategies and view security as
non-zero sum, therefore allowing themselves simply to work to retain their own security.[9] In this
configuration, the old cliché that the best offense is a good defense holds true. Chairman Mao Zedong once
called for an “active defense,” by which he meant that the Chinese must assert an “offensive defense, or
defense through decisive engagement.”[10] Mao’s statement provides a springboard for this paper’s
argument that China is best described as a defensive realist state.
We advocate defensive realism, their evidence assumes offensive realism – none of

their offense applies.
Heller’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An
Defensive realists believe that much of international politics is a Prisoners’ Dilemma or a more complex
security dilemma. The desire to gain mixes with the need for protection; much of statecraft consists of
structuring situations so that states can maximize their common interests. The ever-present fear that others
will take advantage of the state—and the knowledge that others have reciprocal worries—leads diplomats to
seek arrangements that will reduce if not neutralize these concern.[12]
In this respect, the defensive realist will utilize a minimax strategy; maximizing minimum gain and minimizing
maximum loss. This paper argues that states that adhere to a defensive strategy will not only adopt
defensive policies, but those states will also form a sphere or arc of influence in their immediate global
theater that they will claim as a defensive perimeter. Within such a region, a state is willing to project its
power to retain control over that which it feels belongs to it. Defensive realism argues that states will respond
to the anarchy of the international system with the use of force out of fear, rather than out of hegemonic
desires. It is also important to note that both defensive and offensive realists share the idea of relative gains
as all realist states do. A defensive realist would be concerned with the relative gains necessary to secure
control over its defensive perimeter, for example, as well as all of the other prescriptions for a defensive
realist state presented in Table 1. Similarly, while an offensive realist state is concerned with absolute gains
to a great extent, it also strives to obtain relative gains until it has the capability to overcome the defenses
and conquer a territory or state, for example, as well as the other ideas indicated in Table 1. At the same
time, though, defensive realists assert that analysts should not overstate the role of anarchy in international
relations, for global interactions provide incentives for restrained behavior. Reckless, expansionist behavior
characteristic of offensive realism is a result of domestic political factors, and not attributable to anarchy.[13]
In a globalized world where trade and economic policies carry great influence and the ability to adopt
internationally accepted, imperialist policies is non-existent, a defensive strategy is likely to be the most
widely accepted and tolerated.
ADI 2007 13

A2: Realism Causes War
Realism doesn’t cause war, it gives the theoretical tools to prevent it. Because
international competition is inevitable, the only way to stop it from escalating is to
understand it fully.
And realist wars will never escalate to extinction because its in states’ best interests to
survive – the success of deterrence during the Cold War shows that realist states will
follow mutually assured destruction. It’s only when idealist follies like the affirmative enter
the picture that miscalculation becomes possible.
And states only fight when its in their interests – they rationally calculate when to
do so
Realism concludes that states are motivated by power and national interest and as such will pursue gains
relative to their peers and adversaries. The argument continues that in a system characterized by anarchy
and threats viewed as omnipresent, a state will strive to increase its tangible power assets in comparison to
its nearest threat or competitor.[4] Subsequently, nations will seek to maintain their territorial integrity and will
focus on military security in its interactions with other actors in the system. Additionally, material capabilities,
leadership, and unity are viewed as the center of power. States may also form alliances to balance power
and thus increase their relative security.[5] Because states are rational actors, they will assess the costs and
benefits of engaging in provocative actions and determine whether or not the expected utility that can come
from such aggressive policies will be worth the consequences.[6]
ADI 2007 14

A2: State is Obsolete
The state is vital and alive. Global and local challenges do not contest the relevance
of sovereignty
Soguk 1997 (Nevzat; Ph.D. from Arizona State University, Associate Professor of Political
Science, University of Hawaii; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities;
page 286-287)
In reflecting upon the conditions of local and global interactions, there seems to be a loose
convergence around an image that makes it increasingly more problematic to speak of the conditions
of local and global life in terms of a Cartesian spatial segmentation built around the image/name of the
modern state. This familiar state-oriented practice of territorialization or “the spatial
incarceration of peoples,” their images, ideas, and identities within/around the state is beset by
challenges from within and without. Increasingly, “pride of place” is attributed to the notion of spatial
mobility perceived largely as the movements of peoples, identities, images, ideas, and technologies in
a non-Cartesian space through nonisomorphic fashions. Put succinctly, the pervasive activity of the
day is the politico-cultural and politico-economic deterritorialization of “life” across the borders and
boundaries drawn at the juncture of modernity. It is at this juncture where the notions of nation, the
state, sovereignty, identity, and security collapse into one another to create “the myth of the modern”
that the dislocations, accelerations, and contingencies of the world gradually inculcate the images and
manifest the realities of “many worlds.” Thus, the perceptions of the worlds we live in are more divers
than ever before.
These emergent images of the conditions of the global and the local do not point,
however, to the demise of the statist activities as territorializing practices. In fact, an economy
of statist practices, best conceptualized and understood in the articulation of peculiar
sovereignty claims on life expressions and meanings, is a practice prevalent in the terrain of
activities, though no more eliciting an axiomatic reverence and approval. In a practical sense,
sovereignty claims, connected inescapably to some understanding of space/territory/identity, are
territorializing practices in the quest for constructing: representable” essences, meanings,
identities, and cultures. In that sense, sovereignty claims over a space/territory/body are engaged not
only in the construction of “referable” national physical borders and boundaries but also in the
construction of “representable” cultural, political, and economic identities and “essences” (of
bodies/spaces) ostensibly overlapping with the physical borders.
ADI 2007 15

A2: Leaders aren’t Objective
Viewing IR as power creates a rational framework that doesn’t depend on individual

people – the search for motives is self-defeating
The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational
order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On
the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in
foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational
continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and
intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will
guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.
To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It
is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond
recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own
motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?
Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in
understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman's
motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be. It cannot
give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies. History shows no exact and necessary
correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and
political terms.
ADI 2007 16

A2: Realism Excludes!
Yes realism ignores some groups, disregarding some perspectives is necessary for
collective security that allows anyone to speak at all.
Domestic social policy describes how a state’s government treats ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority
groups within the state’s border and whether they seek to blindly subjugate them or have respect for human
rights. Both the defensive and offensive realist state works to put down internal movements seeking to
disrupt state policy, yet the aggressiveness with which each variation does so differs. The offensive realist
state will not respond to international objections and pressures to curtail abuses of minorities and political
dissidents. A defensive realist state, however, stops short of blind persecution, instead working to control
these movements only to the point that the international community sees the country as unified.
Political rhetoric is a subjective idea that pertains to how a state interacts diplomatically with other states and
how said state promises to pursue its policy objectives. The concept of territory is crucial, especially to this
paper, in that it highlights a given state’s respect for the notion of the Westphalian nation-state and a nation’s
policy concerning additional territory acquisition. Where an offensive realist state will overtly declare its broad
intention to challenge the hegemon and regional competitors, the defensive realist state will be very clear in
what policies it is pursuing, the objectives behind those policies, and how it will react to any member of the
international community attempting to disrupt its agenda.
ADI 2007 17

A2: Realism is Unethical
Incorporating ethics into international relations doesn’t assure good outcomes – its
more likely to cause the wrong results
We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally
praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue
policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to
know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have
statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often
have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired?
Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler proves our arg – good motives excuse terrible
policy
Neville Chamberlain's politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he
was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime
ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies
helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions of men. Sir Winston
Churchill's motives, on the other hand, were much less universal in scope and much more narrowly directed
toward personal and national power, yet the foreign policies that sprang from these inferior motives were
certainly superior in moral and political quality to those pursued by his predecessor. Judged by his motives,
Robespierre was one of the most virtuous men who ever lived. Yet it was the utopian radicalism of that very virtue that made him kill
those less virtuous than himself, brought him to the scaffold, and destroyed the revolution of which he was a leader.
Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success of the
policies they inspire. What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is not primarily the motives of a statesman,
but his intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his political ability to translate what he has
comprehended into successful political action. It follows that while ethics in the abstract judges the moral qualities of motives, political
theory must judge the political qualities of intellect, will, and action.A realist theory of international politics will also avoid
the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political
sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen, especially under contemporary
conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political
sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will distinguish with Lincoln between their "official duty,"
which is to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their "personal wish," which is to see their own moral values and political
principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral
principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and
at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.
Only acting rationally can create ethical foreign policy

Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth
Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern
the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All
nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the
moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty
what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations
stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and
that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the
counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical
prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment
which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations-in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself.
On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that
political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective
interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them
in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then
ADI 2007 18

capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those
of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.

Bruschke Realist Performance Neg

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ADI 2007 1

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Realist Performance Neg......................................................................................................................................................1

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

States will inevitably compete for power to survive – three reasons

Self-interest is rooted in human nature, which results in realism

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Contention Two: You’re not Realist.

There is no room for their project in the study of international relations –

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

We must remove irrational and subjective knowledge from policy-making or it

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Their criticism is based on overly optimistic assumptions about human nature.

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Contention Three: Reject their performance.

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Realism demands a photographic picture of the political world only possible

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Realism adapts to changing circumstances and provides effective strategies for

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

We advocate defensive realism, their evidence assumes offensive realism – none of

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Viewing IR as power creates a rational framework that doesn’t depend on individual

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

Only acting rationally can create ethical foreign policy

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy

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