Heritage and Nationalism in the Preah Vihear Dispute

Draft Version
Volker Grabowsky
(pp. 1-25)

Voices from Cambodia: Discourses on the Preah Vihear Conflict

Response paper by Sok Udom DETH
(pp. 26-30)

On 7 July 2008, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee announced at its 32nd Session held
in Quebec its decision to put the temple complex of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage list as
the property of Camboda. The nomination included only the actual temple buildings and their
immediate surroundings, but not the whole area of the sacred site which is much larger and
extends into an area disputed between Cambodia and Thailand, and even beyond into Thai
territory. The decision was greeted with joy everywhere in Cambodia but met with strong
opposition in Thailand. Only three days later, on 10 July 2008, Thai foreign Minster Nopphadon
Patthama declared his resignation, after the opposition had been accusing of having betrayed
the Thai position considering the temple complex also as a part of the cultural heritage of
Thailand. One of the most concise descriptions of the unique site of Preah Vihear (Thai: Phra
Wihan) is from a short essay on the legal implications of the 1962 judgment of the International
Court of Justice to be discussed further below:
The Temple of Preah Vihear is an ancient shrine situated on the borders of Thailand and Cambodia.
The temple and the grounds are of considerable artistic and archaeological interest, and are
potentially important militarily. The natural boundary between the two countries in this region is
formed by the high Dangrek Range, which, in the area of Preah Vihear, rises abruptly out of the
Cambodian plain forming a cliff-like escarpment from which the land then descends to the north
into Thailand. The temple is situated on a promontory at the edge of the escarpment overlooking the
Cambodian Plain in the south (Duke Law Journal 1963, p. 307).

Built in several phases over a period of almost three centuries, probably starting in the late ninth
century, the temple was originally dedicated to Shiva, the Hindu god of destruction, and known,
according to extant stone inscriptions, as ikhare vara, Summit of God Shiva (Skt ikhara +
i vara) (Roveda 2000, p. 10). At least since the rise of Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia to
the religion of the state at the end of the thirteenth century, was the Hindu temple transformed
into a Buddhist monastery. The present-day name Prasat Preah Vihear probably derives from
that time. This name is testified as Wihan Sawan (Heavenly vihra) in the 1877 version of

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the Royal Chronicles of Cambodia, translated into Thai in 1917.1 When the still powerful
Khmer empire began to reorientate itself towards the sea, the territories north of the Dangrek
Mountains i.e., todays Isan got out of the direct control of the Cambodian royal court. The
Preah Vihear temple has since then been merely of local importance for the Kui or Suai people
inhabiting the Dangrek Mountains on both sides of the present-day Thai-Cambodian border. It
seems that the temple was abandonned completely in later times and only visited by forest
monks for medidation practices. Preah Vihear was unknown to the Bangkok elite until 1899
when Phracao Brommawongthoe Krom Luang Sanphasitthiprasong, the Siamese High
Commissioner (kha luang thesaphiban) of Monthon Isan, visited the rough terrain south of
Kantharalak and discovered by mere chance the temple ruins, overgrown by climbing plants.2
However, French explorer tienne Aymonier who visited the ruins only a few years earlier and
to whom we owe the first description of the temple and its environments confirms that at that
time the local people of Khukhan (old name for Sisaket), coming from places far away, were
pouring in to the monuments of Preah Vihear to celebrate the Buddhist New Year at this place
of pilgrimage.3

The late re-discovery of the temple more than a century ago indicates the geogaphical isolation
of the frontier on both sides of the Dangrek (Thai: Dongrak) mountain range. The Siamese state
which had conquered the whole region in the last quarter of the eighteenth century exercised
only a nominal control over this border land by the end of the nineteenth century. With the
introduction of a centralised system of administration, along the lines which the European
colonial powers had implemented in their Southeast Asian possessions, Siam also took over the
Western concept of a territorial state with cleary defined borders (Thongchai 1991). Not long
after the very existence of Preah Vihear had come to the attention of both the Siamese elite and
French colonial administrators in Cambodia, two border treaties were concluded between
France and Siam in February 1904 and March 1907 stipulating that the new boundary between
Siam and the French protectorate of Cambodia should follow the watershed line in the Dangrek
mountain range. A map drawn by French cartographers based on a survey of the mixed
Siamese-French border commission was added in late autumn 1907 as Appendix I to the 1907
border treaty. It shows the borderline slightly north of Prasat Preah Vihear thus leaving the
entire temple within Cambodian territory. The divergence of this borderline running from the
actual watershed line following the edge of the cliff-like escarpment at Preah Vihear has
evolved into a dispute of ownership culminating in nationalist discourses about heritage.

Luang Rangdet Anan, Ratchaphongsawadan krung kamphucha [The Royal Chronicles of Cambodia], 2nd
edition. Bangkok 2007 (1917), p. 59.
The Siamese High Commissioner (kha luang thesaphiban) who discovered the temple was Phracao
Brommawongthoe Krom Luang Sanphasitthiprasong, one of the half-brothers of King Chulalongkorn. See
Anucha Paephanwan, Exclusive kan mang rang khao phra wihan [Exklusive: The Politics of the Khao Phra
Wihan Conflict]. Bangkok 2008, p. 28.
tienne Aymonier, Le Cambodge, Vol. II (Les Provinces Siamoises). Paris 1901, p. 207. [Ce monument de
Preah Vihar, abondonn et loign de tout village, est rest de nos jours un lieu vnr, un lieu de plerinage
o les Seigneurs et le peuple de Koukhan accourent de loin pour y clbrer les ftes du nouvel an.]

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This paper examines first concepts of heritage and their significance for national identies in the
light of the current Thai-Cambodian border dispute; then a short overview of the historical
background of the Preah Vihear conflict is provided. Thereafter the ongoing public debate in
Thailand over Preah Vihear as a symbol of national sovereignty and Thai cultural heritage is
analysed while the corresponding debate in Cambodia will discussed separately by Sok Udom
Deth. Finally, perspectives for a long-lasting solution of the management of Preah Vihear as
World Heritage will be explored.

Heritage: definitions and concepts

The Oxford English Dictionary defines heritage as property that is or may be inherited an
inheritance and, more concretely, as valued objects and qualities such as historic buildings
and cultural traditions that have been passed down from previous generations.4 This definition
evokes that heritage is something which can be passed from one person or group to another
over the course of time. This passage of property may pertain both to physical objects and
places of heritage as well as to practices of heritage. The UNSECO Convention concerning
the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, adopted in Paris on 16 November
1972, provides in Article 1 a rather narrow definition of cultural heritage restricting it to
monuments such as architectural works, groups of separate or connected buildings, and
archaeological sites. Not included in this definition are the intangible and quite often invisible
practices of cultural heritage, such as language, rites and beliefs, popular songs, oral traditions,
literature, and festive events.5 With the start of the new millenium, however, UNSECO has
broadened its scope of world cultural heritage by establishing a Representative List of the
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.
As Rodney Harrison observes, both kinds of cultural heritage are intertwined For every object
of tangible heritage there is also an intangible heritage that wraps around it the language we
use to describe it, for example, or its place in social practice and religion (Harrison 2010, p.
10). Emmon Hahn points out that there is an inherent relationship between heritage and issues
of identity reflecting two questions which arise when defining the term 1.) Who inherits what
from whom? and 2.) What rights does that process of inheritance give the inheritor?6 These
questions, Hahn continues, require the explicit identification of present and past owners of
inherited cultural property and of what property constitutes that inheritance. Serving as a
link between the past and the present, heritage provides individuals as well as groups and larger
communities the tool for the creation of identity narratives. Or, as R. Hewison has expressed it
4
5

See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/heritage (consulted on 9 September 2014).

UNSECO, Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, adopted by the
General Conference at this seventeenth session, Paris, 16 November 1972, p. 2, in: http://whc.unesco.org/
archive/convention-en.pdf.
E. Emmons Hahn, UNESCOs Heritage Policies and World Heritage as a Middle Path between Imperialism
and Nationalism, essay written in December 2011 for Professor Lor Khatchadourians seminar The
Archaeology of Orientalism at Cornell University, in http://sustainableheritagetourism.com/heritage/essayworld-heritage-alternative-politics.

4
aptly, [the] past is the foundation of individual identity, objects from the past are the source of
significance as cultural symbols.7 According to Graham et al., an authentic preservation and
even restoration of things classified as heritage is untainable as all heritage is created in and
by the present. Viewed in this light, heritage can be defined as that part of the past which we
select in the present of contemporary purposes, be they economic, cultural, political or social
(Graham et al. 2005, p. 28f.).
Heritage has a bearing for the present and should not be confused with the past, as Schouten
stresses Heritage is not the same as history. Heritage is highly processed through
methodology, ideology, nationalism, local pride, romantic ideas or just plain marketing into a
commodity.8 Some authors even argue that besides its social and political dimensions heritage
is used for economic purposes, heritage places being mananged as places of consumption.9
In other words, heritage can be understood as a resource of economic and cultural capital
(Graham et al. 2005, p. 33). Thus there is a clear connection between heritage and tourism as
highlighted in Hewisons book The Heritage Industry (1987). The relationship between
heritage and travel, however, can be traced back deep into history. Herodotus list of the Seven
Wonders of the World, reproduced in ancient Hellenic textbooks, might not be mentioned in
this context. The Thai and Lao chronicle abouth Buddhas Travels around the World
(Phracao liap lok) connecting famous religious pilgrimage sites in Southeast Asia with the
historical Buddha is as another case in point. In contrast to pre-modern times, the UNESCO
World Heritage List as a phenonmenon of the late twentieth century attests to the influences of
global migrations and transnationalism. Its particular image of heritage is imbedded in a canon
of heritage places which circulates freely around the globe and becomes widely available for
the consumption of people throughout the world (Harrison 2005, p. 21).

The global dimension of heritage is recognized in the 1972 UNESCO Convention which
deplores the insufficient and incomplete ability of nations to protect their material heritage from
deterioration or disappearance and emphasizes that parts of the cultural or natural heritage
are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of
mankind as a whole.10 With all its humanistic ideals and cheritable goals the Convention was
still inspired by an essentialist notion of culture, as something confining and static which hade
been developed and maintained by certain societies and indigenous groups over a long time
and, as such, was now threatened, as Hauser-Schublin aptly remarks (2011, p. 38). She
emphasises that the idea of an authentic culture which can be ascribed to a certain group of
people who can claim exclusive ownership has been challenged during the last couple of
decades. [I]t has been illustrated how easily cultural phenomena, classified by UNESCO as
7

10

R. Hewison, The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline. London: Methuen, 1987, p. 47, quoted
from Harrison, What is heritage?, p. 17.
F. Schouten, Heritage as Historical Reality, in Heritage, Tourism and Society. London Mansell, p. 21
quoted from Tim Winter, Heritage and Nationalism, p. 1.
R.D. Sack, Place, Modernity and the Consumers World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.
158f., in Graham et al., The uses and abuses of heritage, p. 31.
Quoted from Hahn, UNESCOs Heritage Policies and World Heritage , p. 10.

5
Intangible Heritage, have transcended borders. The latter also applies to the cultural settings in
which monumental heritage is located. They cannot be separated from the network of social
relations in which such constructions are embedded (Ibid.). The temple complex of Preah
Vihear, it may be argued, is an excellent case study to exemplify the transnational character of
monumental heritage sites.

The French explorer and linguist tienne Aymonier, the first European on record who visited
Preah Vihear, observed that the temple had a special cultural significance only for the Kui
people, the original inhabitants in the southern section of the Khorat Plateau and in the upper
part of the lowland plain of northern Cambodia. Though originally built by Khmer kings of the
Angkorean Empire a millennium ago, there is no evidence for any strong connection of Preah
Vihear with the political and cultural complex of the Cambodian lowlands, at least until French
colonial rule. It was French scholars like Groslier and Parmentier who defined Preah Vihear as
one of the most important monuments of the classical ancient Khmer art and part of the national
cultural heritage of Cambodia. Like Angkor and other monument sites, Preah Vihear became a
symbol of an ethnic-based Cambodian nation. In this vein, the nations geo-body (Thongchai
Winichakul) would ideally be determined by the distribution of the ruins of ancient Khmer
stone monuments. It is not without reason that the silhouette of Angkor Wat became the central
symbol of the Cambodian national flag under successive royalist, militarist and Communist
regimes (Anderson 1991, p. 183). In view of the fact that archaeological sites from the
Angkorean period are scattered throughout northeastern and eastern Thailand, such
identification of ancient Khmer architecture with Khmer ethnicity and Cambodian national
identity inevitably collides with Thai nationalism. The Thais, on their part, developed a concept
of Thainess which incorporates the monument sites of the ancient Khmer empire in present-day
Thailand as part of their own cultural heritage. In the heydays of Thai nationalism, in the 1930s
and 1940s, nationalist ideologues like Luang Vichitr Vadakarn claims that the Thai were the
true heirs of Khmer (called Khm in Thai) civilization whereas present-day Cambodian were
either not the same people of the ancient Khmers or only their degenerated descendants
(Luang Vichitr Vadakarn 1941, p. 129; cf. Charnvit et al. 2013, p.6). It is gainst this background
that the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the ownership of Preah Vihear in the late 1950s and early
1960s and its renewed outbreack in 2008 has to be judged.

The Historical background of the conflict

In the period from 1907 to 1929 there was no visible presence of state authority, neither from
the French nor from the Siamese government. Visits of Cambodian or French officials from
Kompong Thom province, to which the Dangrek sector near Preah Vihear belonged, are not
documented. But also the Siamese side could only claim a few sporadic visits from the district
seat of Kantharalak situated 15 kilometres north of the temple complex. It is reported that the
inhabitants of a small village situated in the vicinity of Prasat Preah Vihear contined to pay
taxes to the provincial authorities of Khukhan (later: Sisaket) province (ICJ 1962, pp. 94ff.).

6
During the whole period from 1907 to 1929 Prasat Preah Vihear was not given any remarkable
publicity in Siamese, Cambodian or French media.

This situation changed in early 1930. On 29 January 1930, Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong
Rachanuphap (a younger brother of King Chulalongkorn and former Minister of Interior)
visited Prasat Preah Vihear together with one of his daughters and serveral Siamese officials
from the nobility. The prince who was also a well-known expert in Thai and Southeast Asian
archaeology was greeted in Preah Vihear by the French governor of Kompong Thom and by
Henri Parmentier. The famous architect and art-historian Parmentier, member of the cole
franaise dExtrme-Orient, led Prince Damrong personally through the temple complex and
gave the Siamese guests some expert explanations. Several years later, Damrong published the
impressions of his visit along with several photos in his book Report on a survey of
archaeological sites in monthon Nakhn Ratchasima. Although he undertook his visit of Preah
Vihear as a private person, Prince Damrong, who at that time held the position as Chief of the
Supreme State Council, was welcome by his French hosts as a high-ranking state-guest. What
is more, Damrong had to swallow a bitter pill when the French tricolore was hoisted for his
welcome.11 As Damrongs daughter remarked many years later, her father did not dare to
protest, given the arrogant and intrusive behaviour of the French and given the painful
experiences of the past.12

In 1934/35 the Siamese government of Phot Phahonyothin sent a survey mission to investigate
the border in the Dangrek mountain range and, in particular, to determine the precise borderline
in the Preah Vihear area. It was discovered for the first time that the French map of 1907 (also
called Annex 1 map) showed an erroneous borderline placing the temple on the wrong side.
The real watershed was not running north of the temple but directly below the rock on which
the main sanctuary of Preah Vihear is situated.13 It was evident that the French experts made a
fundamental mistake in 1907 when mapping the creek OTasem. The creek was running slighly

11

12

13

Charnvit 2008, pp. 1424. In an excellent essay, written ten years before the outbreak of the latest ThaiCambodian dispute, the American anthropologist Peter Cuasay brilliantly explains why the majority of judges
completely misinterpreted Prince Damrongs polite overlooking of the French Residents behavior as a
political abandonment of sovereignty. According to Cuasay, the ICJ judges were largely ignorant of the
colonial-imperialist context in mainland Southeast Asia which still prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s thus
failing to understand the inconsistent attitude of the Siamese elite towards the use maps or the exercise of
sovereignty. See Peter Cuasay, Borders on the Fantastic Mimesis Violence, and Landscape at the Temple of
Preah Vihear, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, escpecially po. 855864.
Princess Phun Phitsamai Diskul is quoted by the Taiwanese judge Wellington Koo in his separate opinion
as follows It was generally known at the time that we only give the French an excuse to seize more territory
by protesting. Things had been like that since they came into the river Chao Phya with their gunboats and their
seizure of Chanthaburi. Quoted from International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah
Vihear, pp. 91. See also ibid., pp. 122ff.
Anucha 2008, p. 84. See also International Court of Justice 1962, p. 86 (dissenting opinion of Taiwanese
(National Chinese) judge Wellington Koo).

7
further south than determined in 1907.14 Immediately after this discovery the Siamese
government printed a map which showed the actual watershed as the boundery line in the
Dangrek sector placing the temple of Preah Vihear within Siamese territory. Besides this map
which was distributed only for internal use the Siamese continued printing maps for various
administrative and military purposes which were based on the Annex 1 map. Thus the Siamese
demonstrated at least an inconsistent and careless usage of maps.15

In lasted until 1939 when Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, the then Director-General of the Department
of Fine Arts (Krom Sinlapakn), objected to the Annex 1 map. The government of Field
Marshal Phibun Songkhram tried in vain to obtain a new agreement with the French authorities
in Indochina. In a public declaration on 11 October 1940, the government in Bangkok
unilaterally placed Prasat Preah Vihear and the territory north of the actual watershed under
Thai protection. In the same year, the temple was inscribed by the Department of Fine Arts as
an ancient archaeological monument of Thailand. Thereafter, a small group of soldiers was sent
to hoist the Thai flag over Prasat Preah Vihear.16

After a short and victorious military campaign against the French colonial troops in Indochina,
the Convention of Tokyo was concluded through the mediation of Japan on 28 January 1941.
The Convention envisaged the retrocession to Thailand of all territories ceded to France in 1904
and 1907. Through this stipulation Preah Vihear was placed once again under Thai
sovereignty.17 After the war, Thailand had to return all territories that she obtained during
World War II and by end of 1946 the status quo ante was restored (Charnvit 2008, pp. 2533).
But the Thai troops were not withdrawn from the Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding. The
government in Bangkok always assumed that both the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1904 and that
of 1907 determined the watershed as the border line in the Dangrek region. The watershed that
counted in the view of the Thai was the real one not the obviously mistaken one on which the
Annex I map was based. Three years later, in 1949, France filed with the consent of the
Cambodian colonial government an official complaint against Thailand. The complaint
demanded the total withdrawel of the Thai civilian and military personal from Preah Vihear
(Anucha 2008, p. 57). Thailand ignored this demand and clung to the status quo. There was no

14

15

16

17

These facts were confirmed by Dutch experts like Professor Willem Schermerhorn and analysed in detail by
the Australian judge Sir Percy Spender in his unusually long and haunting dissenting opinion. See
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, pp. 122ff.
The inconsistent and contradictory use of maps by the Siamese/Thai side is deplored by many Thai nationalists
as this was one decisive factor contributing to the ICJ decision of 1962 in favour of Cambodia. See Thamnong
Pracharak, Nam yk ok thai-kampucha, Bangkok: Samnakphim r.s. 129, p. 159.
Duangthida, Prasat phra wihan khwam khatyaeng talt khng sng prathet? Bangkok 2008, pp. 118f. See also
Phichet Saengtong (ed.) 2008. Phromdaen bon phaen kradat prasat khao phra wihan, p. 155.
In 1941, the Department of Fine Arts (Krom Sinlapakorn) published a book entitled Thai samai sang chat
(Thailand in the age of nation-building) mentioning that the temple of Preah Vihear had been returned
(klap khn ma) to Thailand. Prof. Bowornsak Uwanno concludes that this is an implicit acknowledgement
from the Thai side that Preah Vihear had come under French (Cambodian) suzerainty after the treaties of 1904
and 1907. See Bowornsak Uwanno 2013, p. 42.

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further official protest from the French side until the release of Cambodia into complete
independence in November 1953.

Shortly thereafter the government in Phnom Penh sent three guardians to watch the Temple,
but they were sent back by the Thai authorities. When the Cambodian ambassador in Bangkok
informed the Thai government about his own governments intention to dispatch troops to
Prasat Preah Vihear to take possession of the Temple, an armed police unit was immediately
sent to the area to prevent such action of the Cambodian authorities. Inspite of strong
Cambodian protests in January 1954, the status quo with Thai physical presence in the Preah
Vihear area remained unchallenged during the next four years.18 It seemed that the influential
governor of Siem Reap province, Dap Chhuon (Thai name: Chuan Khemphet), had turned a
blind eye to the Thai presence in Preah Vihear for quite a while. Due to domestic political
problems in Cambodia and fostered by the ascension to power of the authoritarian nationalist
military regime of Marshal Sarit Thanarat in Bangkok, the smouldering conflict escalated in
summer 1958 and culminated in the severance of relations in November of the same year. 19 In
the following year Dap Chhuon and several other right-wing Cambodian politicians were
arrested as part of a Thai-supported international conspirancy the socalled Bangkok Plot
to topple the government of Prince Sihanouk and finally executed. Thai-Cambodian relations
had broken down (Sok Udom Deth 2014, p. 66f.). Very popular in Thailand at that time was a
riddle based on a pun. To the question Thai people do not like what colour [si arai]? the
following answer was given The do not like Sihanouk (quoted from Cuasay 1998, p. 880).
In October 1959, the government in Phnom Penh appealed to the International Court of Justice
in The Hague to make a final decision on the sovereignty of Prasat Preah Vihear (Leifer
1961/62, pp. 361374).

The Judgment of The Hague of 15 June 1962 and its Consequences

It took almost three more years until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a
judgment. First of all, it should be emphasized that the Preah Vihear Case probably was one of
the most complicated and most contested cases about which the ICJ had to render a judgment.20
The ICJ had to decide on the following five demands of the Cambodian government.
18

19

20

International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, p. 86 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Wellington Koo). See also Phichet Saengthong, Phromdaen bon phaen kradat, p. 158f.
Relations between Thailand and Cambodia 1959, p. 4. At the height of the conflict between Thailand and
Cambodia Dap Chuen was accused of being part of a Thai-US plot to assassinate Prince Sihanouk in a scheme
to annex Cambodia. The pro-Thai governor was arrested and later executed. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1961, p. 6. Cf. Palmer 1977.
The competent jurisdiction of the ICJ to mediate in the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand resulted from
the fact that on 20 May 1950 the Thai government had explicitely recognised the International Court of Justice
in Geneva. Even though this Court had already ceased to exist sine 1946, the posterior Thai recognition had to
be transferred to the Geneva Courts successor, namely the International Court of Justice in The Hague,
established in 1945 by the UN Charta. This interpretation is confirmed by the Thai expert of international law,

9
1. the binding character of the French map of 1907 according to international law;
2. the fixation of the Thai-Cambodian border in the Dangrek sector according to the above
mentioned map;
3. the sovereignty of Cambodia over Prasat Preah Vihear;
4. the obligation of Thailand to withdraw her miltary forces from the ruins of the Preah
Vihear temple
5. the restitution of all objects of cultural value which Thailand had removed from the
temple.
As to the first two demands of Cambodia namely, a) to determine that the French map of 1907
had binding character according to international law and b) to define the actual border between
Cambodia and Thailand in correspondence to this map the ICJ made the decision that these
two demands were beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. For the exact location of state borders
have to be determined by bilateral negotiations between the concerned states. Yet, the ICJ
evaluated the first two Cambodian demands indirectly, by using the validity of the French map
as important evidence in its decision on the third through fifth demands of the Cambodian
government.

The ICJ decided by nine to three votes in favour of Cambodia on her third and fourth demands.
It stipulated that a) Preah Vihear was situated on territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia
and b) that Thailand was obliged to withdraw from the temple and its vicinity all military and
police forces as well as other security personnel. The ICJ decided by seven votes to five that
Thailand was obliged to restore to Cambodia all artifacts which had been removed from the
temple or its surroundings since 1954.
The courts majority based its arguments above all on the validity of the French map of autumn
1907 (scale 1:200,000) and also on the absence of protest on the part of the Thai authorities
against this map. In the view of the majority of the judges the fact that Prince Damrong never
complained against the hoisting of the French national flag during his visit of Preah Vihear in
early 1930 was interpreted as tacit consent. Because of Damrongs high-ranking position in the
Siamese state apparatus, the private character of his visit as emphasised by the Thai side
was refuted. Damrongs archaeological fact-finding mission was seen as having had an at-least
half-official character (ICJ 1962, pp. 24ff.). Therefore, according to the legal principal Qui
tacit consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset (He who keeps silent is held to consent
if he must and can speak), also called estoppel in international law, the ICJ ruled that
Thailand was bound by the limitations of the frontier as fixed in the Annex I map.21

21

Professor Bowornsak Uvanno, Chae ekkasan lap thi sut prasat phra wihan ph.s. 25052551 [Disclosing top
secret documents on Prasat Phra Wihan, AD 19622008]. Bangkok 2008. p. 29.
See Sven Miling, A Legal View of the Case of the Temple Preah Vihear, in World Heritage, Angkor and
Beyond: Circumstances and Implications of UNESCO Listings in Cambodia, ed. by Brigitta Hauser-Schublin.
Gttingen: Universittsverlag Gttingen, p. 61. Miling points out that the very broad notion of the term

10
The dissenting opinions focused on the circumstance that neither Siam nor France ever departed
or intended to depart from the principle of the watershed as borderline in the Dangrek sector.
The expert opinion of several internationally recognised geologists from the Netherlands had
proven that the watershed between the Nam Mun and the Mekong ran directly below Prasat
Preah Vihear, not only in 1962 but also at the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover,
Sir Percy Spender argued that the French map was not binding according to international law
as it did not bear the signatures of any high-ranking French government official (ICJ 1962, p.
118).

In spite of serious reservations expressed by the British judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his
Separate Opinion, the majority of judges arrived at the conclusion There is, however, no
reason to think that the Parties attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as
such, as compared with the overriding importance, in the interests of finality, of adhering to the
map line as eventually delimited and as accepted by them (Ibid., p. 33). At the same time the
court declined to make any judgment on the treaty character of the Annex I Map or to declare
that the frontier line between Cambodia and Thailand in the neighbourhood of Preah Vihear
was the line marked on the Annex I Map. This refusal was partly grounded on the fact that these
first two requests were enlargements of the original claim by the Cambodian government but
the requests were also considered too vague to allow the Court or the Government of Thailand
to appreciate what are the limits of the territory claimed (Ibid., pp. 13ff.). Limiting the subject
of the dispute to the sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear, the ICJ
decided only that the temple itself, a clearly defined small piece of land, and its vicinity were
located on Cambodian territory.

The judgment of The Hague was greeted with storms of enthusiasm all over Cambodia. In
Thailand, on the other hand, the judgment sparked off waves of protests. People were in shock
and called the day when the ICJ announced its judgment the Shameful 15 June 1962 (15
mithuna wan appayot).

Whereas Phnom Penh claimed the whole overlapping area marked by the watershed line and
the line of the Annex I Map as Cambodian territory, the government in Bangkok soon produced
a map with a scale of 1:50,000 delineating the border in the Preah Vihear frontier region. The
borderline marked on that map followed the actual watershed and left only the Preah Vihear
temple and its immediate surroundings on the Cambodian side of the border. 22 In this light it
was of great symbolic importance that the Thais, when withdrawing from Preah Vihear, not
only took down the national flag but carried with them the whole flagpole including its socket.

22

estoppel has often been criticized on the basis of a well-founded judicial argumentation, not only by the
separate and dissenting opinions, but also by a number of scholars.
Bora Touch (2009, p. 222) stresses that this Thai map only appeared as an annex to the 1962 Note when it
was later published in the Foreign Affairs Bulletin. This document was not published in UN official documents,
nor does it exist in the UN databases.

11
As Shane Strate aptly remarks in his analysis of the Thai public discourse of the late 1950s and
early 1960s on the Preah Vihear dispute, the loss of the temple became a symbol of Thailands
national humiliation by colonialist and neo-imperialist powers and institutions. The Thais
clearly felt betrayed not only by their enemies Cambodia and France but also by their
friends and allies, in particular the United States. Strate recalls that one major factor which
contributed to the Cambodian legal victory in 1962 was the fact that former US Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, one of the chief architects of the Cold War, became highly influential as
lead counsel for Cambodia in the Hague.23 In a way, the United States needed Cambodia more
that it needed Thailand. Since Thailand under the Sarit regime was a US vassal without any
alternative options, Sihanouks Cambodia, which had flirted with Beijing and Moscow since
the late 1950s, was considered a much more strategically important keystone which needed to
be kept in the anti-Communist camp at all costs. Without Achesons persuasiveness the balance
of power at the ICJ might have been different.
In the years and decades following the ICJs ruling, the Thai and Cambodian governments
failed to undertake through bilateral negotiations a final delineation of their 800-kilometre-long
border, including the Preah Vihear section.24 This failure was basically related to political
developments in Cambodia. In 1970, Cambodia became a sideshow in the second Indochina
War. During two decades of civil war, foreign intervention and murderous revolution, several
Cambodian regimes and resistance movements became dependent on Thai political, military,
and humanitarian support. They accepted reluctantly a modus vivendi, which allowed the Thai
largely unrestricted access to the temple complex. A new situation occurred in 1997 after the
Khmer Rouge who held their Preah Vihear stronghold over many years, surrendered and full
peace was restored in Cambodia.

Preah Vihear as UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site

At the beginning of the last decade Cambodia and Thailand were seriously planning to inscribe
the contested temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List. On 7 June 2000, the governments
in Phnom Penh and Bangkokthe latter still under Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of the
Democrat Partysigned a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Survey and
Demarcation of the Land Boundary which sought to pave the way for a solution of the Preah
Vihear dispute and other unresolved border problems. A Joint Boundary Commission was set
up for that purpose. From 2002 until 2007 there was an ongoing discussion between the two
23

24

Strate, Shane, A pile of stones? Preah Vihear as a Thai symbol of National Humilation, South East Asia
Research, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2013, p. 66. Public resentment of Achesons brilliant services for Cambodia
prompted the Foreign Affairs Bulletin of Thailand to ask how the American people [would] feel if someone
of similar position in Thailand were to act for Mr. Fidel Castro in an international body and especially a judicial
body? Quoted from Cuasay 1998, p. 865.
In 1966 there were 300 frontier incidents and 320 dead or wounded. Between 1422 April 1966, the relative
peaceful situation along the Thai-Cambodian border in the Dangrek sector near Preah Vihear was severely
disturbed by the intrusion of Thai armed forces into areas in the vicinity of the temple fortified by the
Camboadian army. See Letter dated 17 May 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodian
addressed to the President of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council, document no 8/7305, 18
May 1966. See also Cuasay 1998, p. 881.

12
sides on whether Thailand should give her consent to Cambodias decision to nominate Prasat
Preah Vihear as a Cambodian World Heritage site or whether the temple should be jointly
nominated by Thailand and Cambodia. At a meeting in Bangkok on 25 March 2004 a joint
committee, headed by Cambodian deputy prime minister Sok Anh and Thai foreign minister
Surakiat Sathirathai, agreed on a number of basic principles for the resolution of solve all major
problems related to developing the temple of Preah Vihear as a world heritage for humanity
(mradok lok khng manutsayachat). Both sides agreed at least implicitly on joint inscription
of Preah Vihear on the UNESCO World Heritage List. A joint nomination made sense since
parts of the wider temple complex, such as the Sa (Sra) Trao reservoir, are either situated inside
the disputed border area or even north of the Annex I Map line (Puangthong 2013, pp. 47ff.).

Three years later, in talks held in 2007 and early 2008, the Cambodian government flatly
rejected the idea of a joint nomination, arguing that the temple was under the sole sovereignty
of Cambodia and that Thailand should make a separate nomination for archaeological sites in
areas under Thai sovereignty. How can this sudden change of mind be interpreted? Why did
Hun Sen and Sok Anh decide to pursue no longer the idea of Preah Vihear as transnational and
trans-border joint heritage of Cambodian and Thailand? Puangthong speculates that
Cambodias decision was clearly based on the fact that the temple legally belongs to
Cambodia. Its legal ownership, however, had never been questioned, either by Chuan Leekpai
or by Thaksin Shinawatra. She further surmises that the Cambodians feared a Thai desire for
Cambodian territory, particularly for this cultural site (Ibid., p. 48f.). Such fears are only
understandable if we take into consideration the maximalist Cambodian legal standpoint, as
expressed in an article by Cambodian lawyer Bora Touch entitled Who Owns the Preah Vihear
Temple A Cambodian Position. This position claims that the ICJ had already determined the
location of the boundary in 1962 and that any Thai move to negotiate a boundary line deviating
from the line marked on the Annex I Map should be considered as an unjustified claim of
Cambodian territory. One may sympathise, even as a Thai scholar, with such a maximalist
position which perceives any negotiations with Thailand on the border issue as just an
opportunity for the Thai side to accept reality, in other word, to surrender to the legal position
of Cambodia. It is interesting to note that Bora Touch who of course speaks for himself and
not for the Cambodian government interprets the MoU, signed still under the Democrat Party
government on 7 June 2000, as a binding international agreement in which Thailand accepted
the Annex I Map as the terms of reference and thus also the border line marked on that map.

The military-appointed Thai government of General Surayudh Chulanont tried to persuade the
Cambodian side to accept a joint Cambodian-Thai inscription of Preah Vihear as a UNESCO
World Heritage site. One of the main arguments was that the only practical access to the temple
was from the Thai side of the border. Besides, several smaller temples and water reservoirs
were situated in the contested zone claimed by both countries. At the thirty-first annual
meeting of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2007
the Thai government insisted on that solution. This prompted UNESCO to postpone its decision
to the thirty-second annual meeting in Quebec in July 2008. But in spring 2008 the Samak

13
Sundaravej government suddenly changed the Thai position and accepted the registration of
Prasat Preah Vihear as an exclusively Cambodian World Heritage site (Anucha 2008, pp. 93ff.).
Samaks foreign minister, Noppadon Pattama, declared the MoU which he had negotiated with
the Cambodian side an important diplomatic success, because the Cambodian government had
pledged to restrict the registration of Prasat Preah Vihear to the territory immediately
surrounding the temple, presenting a map to prove that no parts of the disputed zone were
part of the deal. According to Noppadon, the Joint Thai-Cambodian Declaration did not imply
an agreement on the border at the Preah Vihear sector. The then parliamentary opposition in
Thailand nonetheless appealed to the Constitutional Court which decided that the Joint
Declaration indeed had a legally binding character and therefore rquired parliamentary
approval, according to Article 190 of the Thai constitution of 2007. As the government had
failed to obtain parliamentary approval before signing the Joint Declaration, the government
needed either to seek this approval or to revoke the Joint Declaration. Facing growing public
pressure, especially from the Peoples Alliance for Democracy (the Yellow Shirts), the
Samak government chose the second option. The government of Somchai Wongsawat, who
succeeded Samak as prime minister in August 2008, even sent a letter to the president of the
UN Security Council stating that Thailand does not recognize [the Annex I Map] under the
Memorandum of Understanding in 2000 as the basis for demarcation (quoted from Bora Touch
2009, pp. 226ff.). In the view of Cambodian legal experts this was, however, a futile attempt to
avoid eventual recognition of the Thai-Cambodian border on the basis of the French-drawn
map of 1907, as the MoU of 2000 was a binding international agreement, as mentioned above
(Ibid., p. 226).

The Preah Vihear debate in Thailand

In the following section it will be discussed how the conflict was perceived in Thai civil socierty
and how it was exploited by the contending political factions for their respective political
agenda. Numerous publications have appeared in Thailand since the escalation of the temple
dispute in 2008. They mirror a controversial public debate in Thailand which has as much to
do with Thai-Cambodian relations, concepts of national sovereignty and cultural heritage as
with internal Thai politics. Some publications have an academic or half-academic background
while others resemble pamphlets designed for political agitation. They may roughly be divided
into three four groups reflecting four different approaches to a solution of the Preah Vihear
dispute. The first approach adopts a hard-line attitude demanding that any Thai government
should stick to an uncompromising stance in the defence of Thailands legal position which had
been left unchanged since 1962. This approach has most strongly been advocated by the
Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) the socalled Yellow Shirt movement and called
ultra-nationalist by its enemies. It is supported by several other sectors of Thai civil society,
such as the Thai Patriotic Network and the Buddhist sectarian movement Santi Asoke. The
second, more flexible approach favours compromises with the Cambodian side to reach an end
of the deadlock though, if feasible, not at the expense of Thai sovereignty over the 4.6 km2 large

14
disputed area. The second tendency is supported with variations by the main political parties,
including the Democrats and the majority of the pro-Thaksin Pha Thai Party. A third
approach is supported by radical, anti-nationalistic intellectuals and a small minority of the Thai
public. It advocates Thai acceptance of the Cambodian legal position as an unavoidable price
which the Thai people have to pay to live in peace with their eastern neighbour. Finally, a fourth
approach argues that any long-lasting solution to the Preah Vihear dispute should, above all,
take into account the legitimate interests of the local people on both sides of the border. This
approach is anti-nationalistic as well but it is not pro-Cambodian as it refutes the exclusive
ownership of any of the two nation-states Thailand and Cambodian over the temple
complex.

Approach 1: Anti-Thaksin nationalists

Though all Thai governments after 2008, notwithstanding their political orientation, insisted
that the MoU of June 2000 did not compromise Thai legal claims on the disputed area in the
neighbourhood of the Preah Vihear temple, such a chain of arguments was grist for the mill of
the nationalist forces in Thailand. One of the first major publications appeared only a few
months after the first military clashes following the nomination of the Preah Vihear temple as
a UNESCO World Heritage site of Cambodia. It was edited by the Editorial Board of
Phuchatkan (Manager), a newspaper group founded by media-mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, one
of the top leaders of the PAD. This publication takes a decidedly nationalist standpoint with
regard to the sovereignty over Prasat Preah Vihear as is clearly visible at the book cover which
shows the Thai national flag flying over the temple ruins instead of the Cambodian flag as is
the reality.

The anonymous authors of this book accuse the Samak government of abandoning unilaterally
Thailands claims on Prasat Preah Vihear, a claim to which all Thai governments since 1962
had abided. Furthermore, Cambodia, now encouraged by the decision of the UNESCO, would
be tempted to enforce her sovereignty over the 4.6 km2 large disputed zone as well. If the
Cambodian side started to build hotels, markets, police stations and customs facilities or even
a casino in this zone, it could do so with the backing of the international community.
Furthermore, the Samak government was accused of having secretly abandoned Thai
sovereignty over Prasat Preah Vihear including the disputed area in exchange for a
concession from the Hun Sen government to develop a large-scale casino complex in the coastal
province of Koh Kong in southwestern Cambodia.25 This accusation was put forward by several
insiders like Kasit Phirom, a former close aide to Thaksin and Thai ambassador to Berlin and
Washington. After the demise of the Somchai government in December 2008, Kasit became
foreign minister in Abhisit Vejjajivas Democrat-led coalition government. In his new position
he pursued a more pragmatic policy vis--vis Cambodia, eventually becoming himself a target
25

Phucatkan Editorial Board (ed.) 2008, p. 51. See also Puangthong, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand , p.
64. See also Sok Udom Deth 2014, pp. 24346.

15
of PAD propaganda which tried to force the Abhisit administration to revoke the MoU of 2000
as it would provide Phnom Penh with a pretext to intrude into the disputed zone.26

It has been reported that PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul urged in February 2011 the Thai
military to occupy Angkor Wat and use it as security for obtaining the Preah Vihear temple and
its surrounding area (Puangthong 2013, p. 77). Nevertheless, most other statements by Sondhi
indicate that he criticizes Thai governments for their willingness to compromise with Cambodia
but does not figure out the Cambodian people as targets of chauvinist propaganda. Revealing
is the transcript of Sondhis famous speach of 9 May 2008, in which he explained for the first
time what he called the Samak governments hidden agenda on the Preah Vihear issue.
Sondhi appeals repeatedly to Thai patriotism, but he does so without insulting the Cambodian
people and their culture. Even Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is not personally attacked,
as Sondhis main target is the Thai government and its unwillingness to defend national
interests.
I do not want our people, our descendants accuse him [Samak] of selling the nation only for getting
advantages with regard to gas concessions, which a certain person [Thaksin] currently negotiates
with Prime Minister Hun Sen. I do not accuse him, but I do not want this to happen. I want him, our
Prime Minister, to be cautious. I am sure that he loves the nation, that he loves the country. But so
far he has not taken any concrete action in any of the issues which I raised. He has not yet
demonstated his love for the people He has allowed the Cambodians to nominate [Prasat Preah
Vihear] unilaterally. This gives rise to the suspicion that he might be involved in the conspiracy to
hand Prasat Preah Vihear over to Cambodia in exchange for gas concessions (Puangthong 2013, p.
103).

Other publications of the PAD network contain similar allegations of a political conspiracy of
the pro-Thaksin forces to abandon Thai claims on Prasat Preah Vihear for economic benefits
elsewhere. Most of these publications are of limited analytical value, when compared to the one
presented above. Many of them are clearly not written for an academic audience but for
providing arguments on the political battlefield. There are only very few voices which argue
that Thailand might be able to reclaim ownership of the temple one day in the future. The
argument that the 1962 ICJ decision placed only the temple buildings under Cambodian
sovereignty but not the temple ground (phnthi sung phrasat phra wihan tang yu), as put
forward by Prof. Dr. Sompong Sucharitkun, who in 1962 had been a member of the Thai
defence council in The Hague,27 did not convince even most hardliners since 2009. Such kind
of argument almost disappeared from public discourse. Given the effective Cambodian control
of Preah Vihear and its vicinity since the decision of the ICJ provisional ruling of 2011 that
both countries must withdraw their military forces from a relatively wide provisional
demilitarized zone around the temple, the main concern seems to be the defence of Thai
territorial claims on the contested zone (Ibid., p. 86). Given the fact that Cambodia considers
the 4.6 square kilometres as an integral part of Cambodia, the Thai government and media
26

27

As an example for a PAD diatribe against Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democratic Party and Thai Prime
Minister (20082011), is Phucatkan Editorial Board (ed.), D ta sai tham thai sia din daen [Obstinateness and
Ignorance Caused Thailand to Lose her Land]. Bangkok: ASTV Phucatkan raiwan, 2011.
Sompong Sucharitkun, San lok kap khadi prasat phra wihan, unpublished paper.

16
should strictly refrain from using the term disputed area (khet thap sn), otherwise Thailand
would lose all trump cards in future bilateral negotiations with Cambodia.28

Approach 2: The Realists and Pragmatics

One of the most prominent proponent of a realistic and pragmatic approach towards a solution
of the temple dispute is Professor Bowornsak Uwanno, who is a member of the Thai Royal
Insitute and one of the leading Thai law experts. From 1988 to 1990 Achan Bowornsak was
part of the young advisor team of Prime Minister Chatichai Chunhawan; thereafter he worked
for various governments as legal advisor, including the governments of Thaksin Shinawatra
and of Surayudh Chulanont. Though he is not specialized in international law, he felt an
obligation to inform the Thai public about the complex legal situation which resulted from the
1962 ICJ verdict as almost all Thai experts in international law remained silent.29 Already in
July 2008 he published the volume Chae ekkasan lap thi sut prasat phra wihan ph.s. 2505
2551 [Disclosing Top Secret Documents on the Preah Vihear Temple, AD 19622008] which
includes a collection of key sources, including a Thai translation of the 1962 ICJ judgment, and
a comprehensive analysis by the editor. Bowornsaks political position is that of a Thai
patriotism which is based on the recognition of the reality. The author states that the Thai people
should accept the 1962 judgment though painful as this may be for many of them. Instead of
dreaming to regain the Preah Vihear temple itself, Thai diplomacy should concentrate on
defending Thailands claims on the disputed zone. Therefore the book cover does not show
unlike the Phuchatkan publication presented above the national flag of Thailand flying over
the ruins of Preah Vihear but the national flag of Cambodia as is the reality of today.
A similar line of arguments is adopted by Vichitvong na Pombejras more popular book Prasat
phra wihan: mummng mai nai bribot khng prawattisat khwam kiaokhng rawang thai kap
kamphucha [The Phra Wihan Temple: New Perspectives in the Context of Thai-Cambodian
History. The author endorses a reconciliation of Thai and Cambodian national interests on the
basis peace, friendship and brotherhood as the final chapter of his book is entitled. Vichitvong
arrives at the final conclusion that at the same time the World Committee would be happy if
both countries expressed their intention to adjust the status of Prasat Preah Vihear to become
their joint World Heritage of which there are already examples in many places of the world
(Vichitvong 2009, p. 136).

In a recent book with the telling title Ru cing ru lk mahakap phra wihan: cut cop r cut roem
ton khwam khat yaeng [Knowing the truth knowing in-depth about the Preah Vihear saga: the
28

29

See, for example, Thaithai Sucharitkun, Wan nan thng wan ni, Bangkok 2013, p. 46f. A similar line of
arguments is put forward by Khammun Sitthisaman in his volume Cut yn cut plian cut cop prasat phra wihan
(Bangkok 2013) which contains a collection of articles published between 2009 and 2013. The volume has a
preface written by Prof. Dr. Somng Sucharitkun and Sonthi Limthongkul.
Interview of the author with Prof. Dr. Bowornsak Uwanno in Bangkok, 20 August 2014.

17
end or the beginning of a dispute], Bowornsak Uwanno offers an excellent analysis of the ICJ
judgment of 11 November 2013 interpreting, at the request of Cambodia, the ICJ judgment of
15 June 1962. Bowornsak demonstrates how the Cambodian government manipulated the
Annex I Map by adding the words Phnum Trap and Pagoda as legends of a map submitted
to the ICJ along with its request of (re-)interpretation. This was done because Cambodia
wanted to give the impression that in 1962 the Court had taken a special interest in these
geographical locations as well instead of paying attention only to the temple of Preah Vihear
(Bowornsak 2013, p. 126f.). As for the ICJ interpretation of the term vicinity of the temple,
Bowornsak recommends to adopt a pragmatic approach as the Court had only defined the
promontory of Preah a smaller part of the disputed area as territory under the sovereignty
of Cambodia (Bowornsak 2013, pp. 152ff.).

Approach 3: Philo-Cambodian Anti-Nationalists

Charnvit Kasetsiri is one of the most influential Thai historians of today. The former rector of
Thammasat University is a harsh critic of an ethnic Thai nationalism. For this reason he has
been campaigning for quite a while to abandon the countrys official name Thailand and
replace it by the old name Siam (Sayam). In the Preah Vihear debate Charnvit, together with a
number of other Thai intellectuals adopts a decidedly anti-nationalistic perspective.

Charnvit claims that King Chulalongkorn had concluded the border treaties with England and
Frankreich for reasons of state. This great monarch considered the loss of Malay, Lao, and
Cambodian territories as necessary and even inevitable sacrifices to ensure the
independence and sovereignty of Siam:
All this happened in order to live in peace with the colonial powers France and England. In
particular, it was a guarantee to safeguard the independence and sovereinty (ekkarat lae athipatai)
of the major part of the country. At the same time this meant that the Siamese nobility was able to
maintain its own position of power. This indeed brought about the rise of the absolute monarchy
(somburanayasithirat) (Charnvit 2008, p. 13).

Only the nationalist regime of Marshal Phibun Songkhram, which emerged not long after the
abolition of the absolute monarchy and changed the countrys name to Thailand in 1939,
initiated a discourse on socalled territorial losses of Siam in order to achieve acceptance of a
chauvinstic and expansionist foreign policy. In the wake of this discourse even ancient Khmer
temples such as Prasat Preah Vihear were discovered as Thai cultural heritage. 30 The

30

Thus the British judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice remarks As to the Khmer origins of the Temple this factor
(put forward by Cambodia) operates in an equally neutral way, since it seems to be admitted that there are and
were, in these regions, populations of Khmer race on both sides of the frontier. See International Court of
Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, p. 54. Taking a similar line of argumentation, one would
also have to reject a (hypothetical) claim to sole representation of all archaelogical sites of ancient Greece in
Anatolia by the present-day Greek nation-state or a likewise absurd claim by Italy with regard to ancient Roman
sites in Spain, France or Germany.

18
campaign of the PAD and the Democrat Party, Charnvit underscores, is part of a dubious
tradition of anti-Khmer Thai chauvinism.
In a later book publication (2009) Prasat khao phra wihan: lum dam latthi chatniyom
prawattisat phlae kao prawattisat tat ton kap ban-mang khng rao [Siamese/Thai Nationalism
and Cambodia: A Case Study of the Preah Vihear Temple] Charnvit expands his arguments
outlined above. Special emphasis is given to Prince Damrongs friendly attitude towards the
French. Charnvit argues that Damrong and many other princes of his generation had genuinely
accepted Siams territorial losses in the 18931909 period. Damrongs friendly attitude towards
his French hosts when visiting the Preah Vihear temple in January 1930 thus was not just
oriental politeness but a reflection of honest feelings. As further evidence to substantiate this
argument, Charnvit quotes from a book published in 1925 to commemorate the fifteenth
anniversary of King Vajiravudhs ascension to the throne. This volume states that Siam and
France were getting closer and their relationship prospered Charnvit 2009, p. 76).31
Advocating a broad and open-minded new form of nationalism which he also calls prachachat niyom (popular nationalism), Charnvit proposes his solution of the deadlock in the
Preah Vihear controvery. Among four possible scenarious he rejects two as either unrealistic
or dangerous, namely a new appeal of Thailand to the ICJ to revoke its 1962 judgment; and the
military occupation of Prasat Preah Vihear and the disputed area. A third alternative, namely
negotiations on the basis of the Thai-Cambodian MOU of June 2000, would be more
reasonable. The preferred solution, however, is the fourth alternative: the acceptance of a new
way of thinking based on the relinquishing (plong) of all territorial claims in the Preah Vihear
area. In other words, the Thai people should accept without reservation the Cambodian
sovereignty over the temple and the disputed zone (Ibid. pp. 172ff.).

Approach 4: The perspective of the indigenous people

It should be stressed that a rejection of Thai nationalism in the Preah Vihear controversy does
not necessarily mean a support of the Cambodian legal viewpoint. The respected Thai
archaeologist Sisak Vallibhotama (Wanliphodom), whose pioneering role in the study of the
Khmer and Lao dominated pre- and early history of northeast Thailand is widely acknowledged,
emphasises that the ruling elites in Bangkok and Phnom Penh were never genuinly interested
in Prasat Preah Vihear, but for the local Khmer and Kui people living on both sides of the
Dangrek mountain range this sanctuary has always been of vital importance. Therefore, any
31

Though the more cautious and less vigorous position of Damrong and the royalist elite towards the French,
especially when compared to the more belligerent attitude of the anti-royalist nationalists of the post-1932
regime, shall not be disputed, it nevertheless seems that Charnvit overinterprets his sources. For me it is
difficult to comprehend how Charnvit can interpret an acceptance of territorial losses out of the following
statement made in the above mentioned commemoration volume In a deal with France in this treaty, Siam
agreed to cede Battambang, which originally belonged to Cambodia and had been under Siamese ruler since
1809, to France (ibid., p. 77).

19
solution of the conflict should in the first place address the needs of the local population, not
those of the national elites in Thailand and Cambodia.32 Sisak shares with the PAD his distaste
of the Thaksin regime but disagrees with the latters defence of the nation state. He is a
proponent of a decentralized Thailand which acknowledges the countrys variety of cultures,
ethnic groups, religious traditions and historical experiences. In this respect he also shares some
of Charnvits ideals but in contrast to Charnvit, Sisak seems more interested in the rediscovery
of regional cultures, rather than favouring any deconstruction of Thainess.

When the public debate on the Preah Vihear dispute reached its first peak in 2008, Sisak
published as a special volume of Sinlapa-watthanatham (Arts and Culture) his booklet Khao
phra wihan: raboet wela cak yuk ananikhom [Khao Phra Wihan: A Time Bomb from the
Colonial Period]. Sisaks point of departure is the polycentric structure of the pre-modern
Mandala state system in Southeast Asia. In this theoretical framework he studies the
relationship between the political and cultural centres of the Khmer and, later on, the Siamese
empires and their vassal states in a vast area which is nowadays northeast Thailand, central and
southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia. Sisak sees the significance of Preah Vihear the
ancient temple as well as the community which once surrounded it in its social and cultural
relationship with other communities in the Khorat plateau which had been for centuries no
mans land (Sisak 2008, pp. 2733 and 5157).
As a member of the Thai Peoples Network (Khra khai prachachon chao thai) Sisak
demanded in a petition to the Thai government, dated 26 January 2009, that Thailand should
either hold back or withdraw its consent to the inscription of Prasat Preah Vihear on the
UNESCO World Heritage List.33 Interestingly, many of Sisaks ideas are shared by Western
scholars specialized in the ethno-history of the Khorat plateau. Peter Cuasay,34 for example,
proposed as early as 1998, at a time when the temple has just again been opened for visitors
and jointly managed by Cambodian and Thai officials, the management of Preah Vihear as a
transnational cultural heritage. It should be given back to nature and the indigenous peoples,
to be managed cooperatively between the two governments in equal partnership with local
communities. He warns us against seeing the Temple of Preah Vihear as a picturesque ruin,
a spectacle for tourists showcased as a world heritage site and exhibited as a poignant testimony
to the grandeur of an ancient civilization.35

32
33

34

35

See the feature on Preah Vihear in Bangkok Post, 22 May 2008.

For this petition Sisak was heavily criticised by Charnvit Kasetsiri as being allied to the pro-PAD nationalist
movement of formerly progressive intellectuals. See Charnvit 2009, p. 159.
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Anthropology, University of Washington (2002). Disseration entitled Time
borders and elephant margins among the Kuay of South Isan, Thailand.
Cuasay, Borders on the Fantastic, p. 888.

20

Perspectives of a solution of the Preah Vihear problem

What are the prospects for solving the conflict on Preah Vihear, or Phra Wihan? When the
conflict started to become violent three years ago, I predicted that the Cambodian government
would be tempted to use the registration of Preah Vihear as UNSESCO World Heritage Site to
internationalise the conflict with Thailand and thus put pressure on the Thai government to
yield to the Cambodian legal viewpoint. Exactly this happened in 2011, when Phnom Penh
asked the ICJ in the Hague to make a final and binding decision on the border in the vicinity of
Preah Vihear sector. But for what reason should the ICJ depart from the principle that border
disputes among states should be solved exclusively through bilateral negotiations? Why should
the ICJ make a judgment on Cambodian demands with which it refused to deal in the operative
clause of its judgment half a century ago? As Virachai Plasai, Thai representative at the ICJ
hearing on 30 May 2011, aptly remarked, reversing the logical order, Cambodia is asking the
Court to interpret the reasoning in its 1962 Judgment in light of the operative part.36

The Cambodian government is pushing vigorously for a quick solution. Tens, if not hundreds
of thousands, of visitors are expected to visit Preah Vihear each year.37 Before the escalation of
the conflict in summer 2008, more than 60,000 tourists visited Preah Vihear from the Thai side
of the border, as against fewer than 4,000 who reached the temple from the Cambodian side.
That is not astonishing, given the present-day infrastructure and the natural environment. Hotels
and other facilities shall be built in the wider vicinity of the temple, which comprises large parts
of the zone claimed by both countries. The Cambodian side has already created such faits
accomplis by building a Buddhist temple (Wat Kaeo Sikkhakhirisawara) and several residential
buildings in the disputed zone. It has even been reported that in the years following the MoU
of 2000 three hamlets with 500600 settlers from central Cambodia were built by the
Cambodian government close to the temple of Preah Vihear and, following attacks by the Thai
military in July 2008 transferred further away from the borderline but still in territory claimed
by Thailand. These faits accomplis would most probably be used by any future ruling of the
ICJ as a proof of effective Cambodian control of the 4.6-square-kilometre disputed zone, as
Thai historian Suwit Thirasasawat predicted in 2010 (Suwit 2010, p. 370).

Puangthong Pawakapan who finished her study shortly before the ICJ had ruled on the
interpretation of the 1962 judgment at the request of the Cambodian government made the
reasonable prediction that a decision in favour of Cambodia, i.e. assigning the whole disputed
area of 4.6 square kilometres to Cambodia, would certainly cause a public uproar in Thailand
and result in serious border clashes (Puangthong 2013, p. 87). Therefore, the courts final
decision, announced on 11 November 2013, came to the relief of both Cambodia and Thailand,
36
37

ICJ proceedings, Monday, 30 May 2011, uncorrected translation.

Phiphop Udon, Krani prasat phra wihan rawang thai-kampucha: rian khon la dan khng ngoen khon la sakun
[The Dispute between Thailand and Cambodia on Prasat Phra Wihan: Two Sides of a Coin of Different
Currency]. Bangkok 2008, p. 19.

21
as it did not leave a clear winner. The ICJ defined the whole promontory of Preah Vihear as the
vicinity of the Preah Vihear temple which the 1962 verdict had declared as territory under
Cambodian sovereignty. Cambodia can now safely claim roughly one quarter of the disputed
area as her territory. The pagoda, a market and the three hamlets mentioned above are all
situated in this realtively small zone immediately to the west of the temple. The serpentine road
which the Cambodian built in 2010 with Chinese help to link the temple with Cambodian
territory also cuts across the promontory and has to be respected by Bangkok as territory under
Cambodian sovereignty as well. This certainly satisfies Phnom Penh. However, the larger part
of the disputed zone, lying further to the west and including the neighbouring hill of Phnom
Trap, was ruled by the ICJ as lying outside the disputed area. 38 Therefore, the Thai
government is now entitled to claim almost three quarters of the 4.6 square kilometres as
territory under Thai sovereignty in any future bilateral negotiations on the delimitation of the
border in the neighbourhood of Preah Vihear.

It is not yet too late to have Prasat Preah Vihear inscribed as a joint Thai-Cambodian World
Heritage Site. The UNESCO decision of June 2008 still leaves this option open, as it recognizes
that Thailand has repeatedly expressed a desire to participate in a joint nomination of the
Temple of Preah Vihear and its surrounding areas and by considering further that
archaeological research is underway which could result in new significant discoveries that
might enable consideration of a possible new transboundary nominatione, that would require
the consent of both Cambodia and Thailand.39 The American anthropologist Helaine
Silverman, an expert on heritage management and museum theory and practice, strongly
supports the idea of a joint Cambodian-Thai management of Preah Vihear as a transborder
World Heritage Site. She stresses that, given the history of the conflict, UNESCO was adding
fuel to the fire by allowing the temple be inscribed as the heritage of only one nation-state It
is UNESCOs own decision to list Preah Vihear that provoked the recent violence that has
damaged the site, in contravention of the explicit goal of the World Heritage List and World
Heritage Convention to promote site protection (Silverman 2011, p. 15). A solution acceptable
to both countries in the long run would presuppose that the temple were conferred a borderless
status, assisting the two countries to prepare dual access routes to the site with appropriate
passport control. The UNESCO flag and the flag of both countries would fly over the site
(Ibid.). Given the temples architecture, which shows a clear natural orientation towards the
north, and given the fact that the easiest and most convenient access to the temple is from the
Thai side, joint management of Preah Vihear still seems the best solution. Several Thai scholars
also point at the UNESCO rules calling for a sufficiently large management area of World
Heritage sites. In the case of Preah Vihear such a management area would have to include an
areas comprising not only parts of the disputed zone of 4.6 square kilometres but also some
areas within Thailand, such as Sa Trao, Sathup Khu (Twin Stupa), and the pre-historic
pictorial engraving at the M-I-Daeng cliff (Watcharin 2011, p.81).
38

39

ICJ, Request for interpretation of the judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the temple of Preah
Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 11 November 2013, section 98.
UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage
Committee, Quebec City, Canada, 210 July 2008.

22
The German laywer Dr Ren Gralla has come forward with an ingenious idea proposing an
Andorra-style solution for Preah Vihear. The whole disputed area of slightly less than five
square kilometres would be proclaimed as the independent state of Preah Vihear-Phra Wihan
ruled by two diarchs, namely the King of Cambodia and the King of Thailand, harbouring a
population of monks and local villagers from both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border, mostly
ethnic Kui and Khmer, apart from some Lao and Thai. Such a mini-state could promote tourism,
attract foreign investors, and finally become the symbol of eternal friendship beween Thailand
and Cambodia.40 A dream? Perhaps, but one that should be tried.

40

Ren Gralla and Volker Grabowsky, Andorra-stlye solution beckons in Preah Vihear row, in Bangkok Post,
24 September 2013.

23

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24
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25
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=46&case=45&code=ct&p3=4, consulted on 25
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Institute for Culture and Society, University of Western Sydney.

26
Response paper by Sok Udom DETH (Zaman University, Cambodia)
Voices from Cambodia: Discourses on the Preah Vihear Conflict

As Prof. Grabowsky suggested, The decision [by UNESCO to inscribe Preah Vihear
temple as a World Heritage Site] was greeted with joy everywhere in Cambodia but met with
strong opposition in Thailand. Yet, unlike in Thailand where plural voices and different
propositions existed over the issue of the Preah Vihear conflict, in Cambodia, there has been
a relatively more unanimous discourse on the Preah Vihear conflict: that Preah Vihear temple
and the roughly 4.6 sq. km. disputed area undoubtedly belong to Cambodia, and Thailand
should once and for all renounce its claim over the temple and the disputed territory.
Nonetheless, certain nuanced differences/emphases do exist among different political
factions and various social groups in Cambodia, depending on their political background,
affiliation and/or interests. This section of the paper discusses such differences and proposes
an alternative solution to the conflict.

Views from Cambodia

To the majority of (if not all) Cambodians, Preah Vihear temple has always been a
Khmer temple, built by several Khmer kings at different times during the Khmer Empire era
between the 9th and the 13th centuries (there is even a Khmer rap song describing the
chronology of the temple construction during the different reigns of Khmer kings). The fact
that the Western parts of Cambodia (including where Preah Vihear temple is located) had
fallen under Siamese (old name for Thailand) control between the 18th and mid-20th centuries
became less pronounced as a historical point of reference. More importantly, the
International Court of Justices (ICJ) 1962 verdict declaring the temple and its vicinity area
under Cambodias sovereign demonstrated to Cambodians that Cambodia had always been
the rightful owner of the temple and over the disputed territory. Such a view is supported by
notable Khmer scholars, including Touch Bora (lawyer based in Australia), Sorn Samnang
(President of Cambodian Historians Association), and Sok Touch (Rector of Khemarak
University). Technicality and any possible legality related to the watershed line which
deviates from the boundary line as shown in the Appendix I to the 1907 border treaty (that
would have possibly put the temple under Thailands sovereignty) has not appeared in any
public discussion in Cambodia. To the Cambodian government and the Cambodian public in
general, any Thai claim contrary to such an understanding is viewed as an invasionist
position and would confirm many Cambodians suspicion of Thailands unending ambition
to steal Cambodian land.

27
During the climax of the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand under PM Abhisit
between late 2008 and 2011, nationalist rhetoric intensified in both countries. Diplomatic
press releases, the media, and comments expressed by users on social-networking sites
reflected mutual dislike and distrust between the two nations. News and analyses about the
border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand dominated the media in both countries with
varying degrees of bias on both sides. During this period, one could be forgiven for thinking
that Cambodia and Thailand had always been enemies since time immemorial.

Different groups in Cambodia have used to Preah Vihear issue to highlight their own
positions and, as much as possible, advance their own interests. The Cambodian government
led by PM Hun Sens Cambodian Peoples Party, for instance, did not forgo the opportunity
in giving itself the credit of successfully enlisting the temple as a World Heritage Site, and as
the protector of Cambodian territory and sovereignty after conflict with Thailand ensued. For
example, the Cambodian government erected a sign at the entrance to the Preah Vihear
temple that reads I have pride to be born as Khmer. As John D. Ciociari pointed out:

The Cambodian government also seized on the issue for political gain. Stoking
resentment of Thailand is not difficult in Cambodia, where many people resent
what they perceive as a Thai sense of superiority [] Hun Sen and other
members of his Cambodian People's Party used the Preah Vihear dispute to rally
nationalist support in the run-up to national elections in late July.

Not wanting to lose out politically from the Preah Vihear conflict, opposition leader
Kem Sokha travelled to the temple region in late January 2009 and brought donations to the
soldiers stationing along the border, but was denied access to the temple. The highest-ranking
field commander in Preah Vihear, Srey Deuk, then remarked: "It is their right to distribute
gifts, but, in any case, the soldiers do not want gifts from HRP [Human Rights Party]. They
know it is the opposition party (Phnom Penh Post, 5/11/09). For his part, Sokha reckoned
that This kind of political discrimination is regrettable. The soldiers belong to the nation, not
one political party.
Likewise, PM Hun Sens strong posturing against Thailand also came under fire among
his critics, for his supposed hypocrisy about his close relationship with Vietnam. For
instance, a commentator on a Youtube video of the Premiers speech wrote

Why Hun Sen is so strong a leader to fight the Thais while he is a puppet of the
Vietnamese? Something wrong with the brain cells! The Vietnamese fish and
come to Cambodia freely while Hun Sen declares no one millimeter of land is

28
lost to Thailand. That is right. No one millimeter of land lost on the Western
border but millions of millimeters of land lost to Vietnamese who can claim
freely and no questions asked. (sic)

His view is certainly a widely-shared one among many critics of the Cambodian
government. Not surprisingly, opposition leaders share such views as well.

Interestingly, besides political discourses, corporate opportunism wishing to exploit

nationalistic sentiment could also be seen with the production of Cambodia Beer (a new beer
brand by Khmer Brewery), which features the iconic faade of Preah Vihear temple as its
logo.

Among civil society groups, a think-tank that most closely monitored CambodiaThailand conflict was the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), especially
when former Industry Minister and Ambassador to Japan, Pou Sothirak, became its
Executive Director. Frequent guest speakers to the organization were Thai scholars Charnvit
Kasetsiri and Pavin Chachavalpunpung. These three former fellows at ISEAS of the National
University of Singapore eventually co-authored a book titled Preah Vihear: A Guide to the
Thai Cambodian Conflict and its Solutions, published in 2013, in which they proposed that
The most suitable compromise would be a return to bilateral negotiations, with ASEAN
(Indonesia) as an observer, and willingness on both sides to accept the ICJs decision,
whatever they may be (Kasetsiri et al, 2013, p. 90).

Other organizations in Cambodia such as the Cambodian Center for Human Rights
(CCHR) and the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), on the
other hand, emphasize more on the issues of alleged abuses or disproportionate use of force
by Thai authority or individuals on Cambodian migrant workers or loggers. At times, they
have also called for peaceful solutions to the Cambodian-Thai conflict.

Anecdotal findings from an ongoing research by Kimly Ngoun, a Cambodian doctoral

student at the Australian National University, titled Understanding Khmer Nationalism in
the Preah Vihear Temple Conflict with Thailand The State, the City, and the Border seem
to suggest that Cambodians living along the border region may be holding less nationalistic
sentiments against Thailand. In fact, some interviewees were even reportedly making a joke
by thanking Thailand (and the Preah Vihear conflict) for bringing the attention and the
ensuing development projects (such as national road pavement and economic opportunities)
to Preah Vihear province, once a remote region of the country.

29

Solution(s) to the conflict

The latest ICJs interpretation in November 2013 of the 1962 verdict has further
confirmed that Cambodia has the legal ownership over the temple and at least a certain part
of the disputed area. Since Cambodia is currently already holding effective control over the
temple, any suggestion that the temple should be co-managed by both Cambodia and
Thailand would meet strong opposition in Cambodia, and no political leaders in Cambodia
(from both the incumbent government and the opposition party) would agree to such an
arrangement. In addition, the ruling Thai military junta has not made an open protest to the
ICJs interpretation. What remains unresolved, however, is the question over sovereignty of
the area beyond the promontory over which the temple sits on. Since the latest coup in
Thailand last year, question over the implementation of the ICJs decision has not been
brought up in formal meetings between the two governments, despite Cambodias occasional
pledges to raise the issue with Thailand to the chagrin of many Cambodians who believe
that Cambodia has full sovereignty over the whole disputed area and that Thailand should
simply abandon its claim to the contrary.

John Ciorciari, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of
Public Policy of the University of Michigan opined that:
[The] flexibility [of the ICJs ruling] also has its role. The exercise of caution on
setting strict boundaries and deciding on Phnom Trap has helped insulate the
Court from charges of overreach. It has also enabled both sides to claim a partial
victory [] A more decisive ruling in favor of Cambodia would have risked a
significant backlash in Thailand.

While Cambodia now has a stronger legal claim to the ownership of the Preah Vihear
temple itself, its sovereignty over the whole disputed area is in question. At this point, it
seems unrealistic that either side can convince the other for its sole control over the disputed
territory, especially over Phnom Trap region. While leaving the issue un-discussed may
maintain the non-conflict status quo, a long-term solution will have to result from a sincere
negotiation between both sides of how to manage the disputed territory. An idea would be to
develop a Zone of Peace in the disputed area, through which visitors from the Thai side
may have access to the Preah Vihear temple, which Thailand should now accept that the ICJ
has already made its case that Cambodia is its legal owner.

30

References:
Ciorciari, John D. 2009. Thailand and Preah Vihear The Battle for Preah Vihear, Spice
Digest, Fall 2009, pp. 13.
Kasetsiri, Charnvit et al. 2013. Preah Vihear: A Guide to the Thai Cambodian Conflict and its
Solutions. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.
Sokchea, Meas. 2009. News Brief HRP leader snubbed at Preah Vihear, Phnom Penh Post,
5 January 2009. Retrieved on 30 September 2014 from:
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/news-brief-hrp-leader-snubbed-preah-vihear.