Professional Documents
Culture Documents
60
chapter two
Rickerts Relevance
The Ontological Nature
and Epistemological Functions of Values
by
Anton C. Zijderveld
BRILL
LEIDEN BOSTON
2006
ISBN-10 90 04 15173 7
ISBN-13 978 90 04 15173 4
Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic
Publishers, Martinus Nijho Publishers and VSP.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior
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The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive,
Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
For Angelika,
who for forty years now has followed my sociological
and philosophical exploits with apposite distance and
wholesome forbearance.
CONTENTS
Preface ........................................................................................
xi
Introduction ................................................................................
Rickert revisited ......................................................................
Motives ....................................................................................
Rickerts philosophical relevance argued e contrario ..........
Systematic philosophy and heterology ..................................
The two neo-Kantian schools ..............................................
Composition ............................................................................
1
1
10
14
19
24
26
Chapter One
31
45
45
47
53
60
65
67
70
72
75
78
82
85
85
93
96
102
104
110
113
118
viii
CONTENTS
123
126
130
133
139
139
145
155
161
168
174
180
184
198
201
212
215
219
219
226
235
241
244
246
255
261
271
275
282
291
297
297
299
CONTENTS
ix
308
315
320
Conclusion ..................................................................................
347
361
PREFACE
Heinrich John Rickert (18631936) has haunted me for a couple of
decades. There are several individualsstudents, friends and a few
sociological colleagueswho had to endure my expositions about his
ideas and writings. They helped me, often unknowingly, to clarify
my own thoughts of and about the Rickertiana that got piled up in
my mind. I cannot begin to mention them by name, but feel obliged
to thank them anonymously for functioning as a formal audience in
the lecture hall of the university and as an informal audience outside of it.
Ren Foqu, professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of
Louvain and the Erasmus University of Rotterdam is my esteemed
colleague and friend with whom I am professionally connected for
many years now. I am grateful for his willingness to function as
my philosophical guide and advisor in a later stage of my Rickertproject. His astonishing knowledge of the history of ideas and the
various currents of contemporary philosophy, but above all his joy
of concept formations and theory constructionswhat Rickert once
aptly called Logosfreudigkeitwere a great source of inspiration. Naturally,
I am responsible for all the flaws and mistakes in this book, but in
general it would not have become the book that it is now without
his assistance and collegial advice.
Herman Philipse was my advisor in an early stage of the project.
I profited from his phenomenal expertise in the field of analytic philosophy, his unrelenting critical mind, mellowed by a great sense of
witty humor. He remained alien to the world of neo-Kantianism and
in particular to the somewhat surrealistic philosophy of Rickert, but
we developed a mutual friendship which I shall always cherish.
In the last stage of the project I have benefited from very valuable, critical comments by Koo van der Wal, professor emeritus of
the Erasmus University and Maurice Weyembergh, professor emeritus of the Free University of Brussels. Their impressive knowledge
of the history of philosophy averted some serious errors of interpretation. Needless to add that I remain responsible for the faults
that still remain in the present expositions.
xii
PREFACE
PREFACE
xiii
end of the book. I prefer to present such references with their complete annotation as to publisher, place and date of publication in
the footnotes.
Finally, I wrote the book in English for two reasons. First of all,
neo-Kantian philosophy in general and Rickerts publications in particular are, apart from a few exceptions, not accessible to the AngloSaxon world. English, after all, is in this day and age of globalization
the lingua franca, not just in the worlds of business and politics, but
in the intellectual world as well. It is my hope that the present exposition and discussion may lead to translations of Rickerts extensive
oeuvre. His little book on cultural and natural science, for instance,
and his brilliant exposition and witty criticism of vitalism are perfectly suitable for translations into English, particularly since they are
still (or again) very timely.
The second reason is yet more relevant. Translating Rickerts often
quite fanciful and sometimes even literary German into English helped
me to clarify for myself and hopefully also for the reader his complex ideas, concepts and theories. It is my conviction that one should
be able to translate German concepts and sentences into English,
lest they are closed to a clear understanding of their meaning and
significance.
Even in the exceptional case of English translations, such as a few
essays from Webers Wissenschaftslehre and a partial translation of
Rickerts opus magnum on the demarcation of Natural Science and
Cultural Science, I decided to translate all German quotations myself.
But I added the original German texts in the footnotes in order to
enable the reader who possesses a passive and/or active knowledge
of the German language to control my translations.1
For biographical and bibliographical data I refer to the handsome
volume of essays by Rickert edited by Rainer A. Bast.2
1
The translations and references of the two mottos of this book are the following:
(A) Who wants to acquire knowledge, should think and perceive. Heinrich Rickert,
Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins, (The One [as opposed to the Other], the Unity,
and the First [as in number 1]), (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1924), p. 87. (B) Man
who is being known, is made by nature and history: but man who knows, makes
nature and history. Georg Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, (The Problems
of the Philosophy of History), 1892, (Mnchen, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot,
1923), p. VII.
2
Heinrich Rickert, Philosophische Aufstze, (Philosophical papers), (Tbingen: MohrSiebeck, 1999), pp. 437457. See also the Internet: in November 2004 Google
oered 23,300 and Yahoo 70,400 hits under Heinrich Rickert.
INTRODUCTION
Tief und ernstlich denkende Menschen haben gegen das
Publikum einen bsen Stand.
J. W. Goethe1
RICKERT REVISITED
The Reformation and in its wake the Enlightenment caused a penetrating transformation in Germany of the medieval universities in
general and of philosophy in particular. It was a change from the
medieval, other-worldly scholarship supervised and ideologically
drenched by the Roman-Catholic Church, to a early-modern, innerworldly professional training of lawyers, medical doctors and protestant ministers. The theological faculty, for instance, still viewed as
the first and most important faculty, was rebuilt in the 16th century
into a retraining institution for catholic priests converted to Lutheran
Protestantism. The Enlightenment introduced not only a secularized
version of rationalism but emphasized also the utilitarian notion of
a practical education of young men who after their academic training were going to function as the societal elite of the future. In other
words, the post-medieval, early-modern university was in fact a professional school in which young men were trained for practical jobs
in the rapidly changing society. German Romanticism of the 18th
and 19th centuries would soon object to this one-sided emphasis
upon rational, practical and applied knowledge and allied skills,
launching its ideal of Bildung, i.e. of an education in which students
were primarily taught to cultivate and strengthen their mental as
well as moral capacities. Schelling, Schleiermacher and Fichte were
the first propagandists of this Romantic Bildungsideal, but it was perhaps
Deeply and seriously thinking people are not very popular. J. W. Goethe,
Betrachtungen im Sinne der Wanderer (Contemplations in the Style of the Wayfarers),
in: Vermischte Schriften, Werke Bd. VI, (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel Verlag, 1966), p. 459.
Rickert has been deeply impressed throughout his life by the works of Goethe. It
culminated in a monograph of 544 pages, which he published at the end of his
life: Heinrich Rickert, Goethes Faust. Die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, (Goethes
Faust. The Dramatic Unity of the Poem), (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1932).
1
INTRODUCTION
2
F. Schiller, Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte? (What
is the meaning of and for what end does one study universal history?), in: Schillers
Werke, vol. IV, (Frankfurt A.M.: Insel Verlag, 1966), pp. 421438. The rather exalted
tone of Schillers address conceals the fact that he experienced considerable diculties
in his professorship, and that the sentiments of the bread-scholar were not totally
alien to him. According to Golo Mann, Schiller once sighed that the university
could do one may not say what, if he only had married a rich wife. Golo Mann,
Schiller als Geschichtsschreiber (Schiller as Historiographer), ibid., p. 890. For the
context and content of this inaugural address see Rdiger Safranski, Friedrich Schiller
oder die Erfindung des Deutschen Idealismus, (Friedrich Schiller or the Invention of German
Idealism), (Mnchen, Wien: Hanser Verlag, 2004), in particular pp. 306316.
INTRODUCTION
to a life of social solitude and civil, thus also spiritual, freedom.3 The
university in this vision educated young men not only cognitively,
but also emotionally and morally, enabling them to develop into autonomous and creative personalities. It is in this sense that the academically educated young men could contribute to society and the
public sector. In other words, theirs is an indirect not a direct socioeconomic and political utility and usefulness. Needless to add that
the Humboldtian university was envisaged as the institutional haven
of the Geisteswissenschaften with their emphasis upon Verstehen (understanding) of meanings and values in opposition to the Naturwissenschaften
and its focus upon Erklren (explaining) of facts and causality.4
After roughly 1850, however, Germany went through several radical changes. Socio-economically and culturally the various German
states developed from traditional-agrarian communities into modernurban and increasingly industrial societies.5 It led to a bourgeoisie growing in numbers and power in opposition to an equally increasing
working class, causing the awakening of an initially slumbering class
conflict. The Humboldtian Bildung was, of course, not able to prepare
its students for this deeply penetrating socio-economic and societal
transformation. Politically, Germany was transformed by Bismarck,
after the French-German war of 18701871, into a unified empire
in which the balance of unity and diversity became a dominant
political aim. There was a dire need for public administrators which
were able to maintain this balance. The ideal of a generalized Bildung
was not sucient to satisfy this public need. At the same time, the
natural sciences and their technical applications in the emerging
industrial society reaped unprecedented successes which exerted strong
pressures on the university to deliver practically, usefully and scientifically trained academics. In fact, after 1850 the natural sciences
3
Cf. Helmuth Schelsky, Einsamkeit und Freiheit. Idee und Gestalt der deutschen Universitt
und ihrer Reformen, (Solitude and Freedom. Idea and Structure of the German
University and its Reforms), (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1963), in particular pp. 79130.
4
See also Theodor Litt, Wissenschaft, Bildung, Weltanschauung, (Science, Bildung,
Worldview), (Leipzig, Berlin: Teubner, 1928), in particular Chapter Two: Naturwissenschaft und Geisteswissenschaft in Verhltnis zur Bildung, pp. 1236.
5
The transition was, of course, not limited to Germany but rather a general
European process of modernization. It was conceptualized by Ferdinand Toennies
in his classic essay Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegrie der reinen Soziologie, (Community and Society. Basic Concepts of Pure Sociology), 1887, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963).
INTRODUCTION
became the predominant methodological model for all sciences, including the humanities. In philosophy there grew a penetrating and
dominant positivism which was based upon the firm belief that
Naturwissenschaft, Natural Science, operating with exact, quantitative
methods produced the only legitimate knowledge because it was
applicable and useful. If there still was any valuable reason for its
existence, philosophy had to be compartmentalized, in the opinion
of the positivists, into several methodologies of the dierent scientific,
specialized disciplines. There was no room any longer, it was believed,
for a general, universal philosophy, since that would necessarily end
up in unscientific metaphysics. Naturally, there was in the positivist
view of the world and the sciences no legitimate place for metaphysical
dreams and reflections.
This, of course, led again to a Romantic reaction in which once
more the humanities were propagated as legitimate sciences which
were logically and methodologically dierent, yet had to be seen
philosophically on a par with the natural sciences. Social sciences
such as psychology, sociology, history and even economics, it was
argued, deal with human beings and their actions, emotions and
thoughts, not with atoms and physical processes which unlike human
beings are not related to values and meanings, do not act and interact
in a meaningful manner and thus cannot be understood empathically.
There is, it was argued, an essential dierence between Natur which
is driven by mindless causality and measurable objectivity, and Geist
which on the contrary is driven by values and meanings, and by the
forces of the human Seele and Bewusstsein, i.e. by the human psyche
and consciousness. This essential dierence cried out for a dierentiation
of the sciences: Naturwissenschaft versus Geisteswissenschaft. Moreover,
modernization entailed indeed a process of rationalization, but that
does not mean that the irrational had disappeared from the human
universe. On the contrary, the more rational the scientific, technological
and increasingly bureaucratic world grew, the more it seemed to
escape our cognitive and emotive understanding, the more irrational
factors which cannot be measured and analyzed in a natural-scientific
manner, seemed to determine the economy, society and polity, and
above all the human mind and soul. In fact, the ages old philosophical
question as to how it could be possible to acquire rational and
ordered knowledge of the world, let alone how we could begin to
understand it rationally, returned in full weight and cried out for an
answer.
INTRODUCTION
It is at this point that in the second half of the 19th century and
in the first two decades of the 20th century the two towering philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries, Kant and Hegel, and their
various schools of neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism regained
philosophical interest. In a admittedly too rough way we could label
the latter as a sphere of thought in which ontology and metaphysics
occupied a primary and logic and methodology a secondary position, whereas the former focused primarily on epistemology, logic
and methodology, viewing ontology and metaphysics as sub-disciplines of the latter. We return to this later, because Rickert occupied a special position in this dilemma of ontology and epistemology.
At this point it suces to mention the fact that we will focus in the
present study on neo-Kantianism, in particular on that of the SouthWest German School, and again in particular on that of Heinrich
Rickert. As we shall see, Rickert assumed a philosophical position
which tried to bridge the dilemma of Rationalism and Romanticism,
of Natural Science and (as he preferred to call it) Cultural Science,
of ontology and epistemology. He designed a modus operandi for that
which he called heterothesis and heterology which in essence, as we shall
see, is a playful alternation between opposites in a dilemma. It makes
sense, I think, to renew the acquaintance with this philosopher who
unjustly has been largely forgotten after his death in 1936. When
he is still referred to, it is usually in terms of a rejecting critique which
in my observation is most of the time not based upon a serious and
close reading of his texts. In fact, there are a few critical clichs about
his work which are generally unfounded, yet repeated all the time.
Heinrich Rickert (18631936) was famous and the object of critical
debates around the turn of the former century. But after World War
I he fell into disrepute. In fact, it is fair to say that he was actually
buried in oblivion already before his death in the 1930s. There was
no interest anymore in the intricate conceptual abstractions of neoKantian philosophy in general and Rickerts brand of it in particular after the Great War, when young academic men, having survived
the massive slaughter in and around the trenches, returned home.
They were disoriented by what they saw as the Great Defeat and
tried, together with their fellow Germans, to mend the fragments of
their shattered lives. In fact, there was now this longing for a philosophy which would no longer focus, as Rickert did, on knowledge
and thus on epistemology and logic. Instead one craved as it were
INTRODUCTION
6
Der eitle alte Mann bleibt fr mich die leere Hlse einer ehemals lebensstarken
Tradition. Als Maske, ohne Charakter dahinter, hat dieser Schler Immanuel Kants
sich dann auch 1933 erwiesen. Golo Mann, Erinnerungen und Gedanken. Eine Jugend in
Deutschland, (Memories and Thoughts. A Youth in Germany), (Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer Verlag, 1986), p. 291.
INTRODUCTION
7
Cf. Hermann Glockner, Heinrich Rickert , in: Heinrich Rickert, Unmittelbarkeit
und Sinndeutung. Aufstze zur Ausgestaltung des Systems der Philosophie, (Directness and
Interpretation of Meaning. Papers for the Construction of the System of Philosophy),
August Faust, ed., (Tbingen: Morh-Siebeck, 1939), pp. VIIXIV.
8
Cf. Julie Gibbons, Zen and the Art of Franz Rickert, in: Craft Culture,
http://www.craftculture.org/archive/frickert.htm which gives an insight in Franz
Rickert as craftsman and as teacher at the Academy of Arts, Munich, where he
was appointed professor in 1938.
9
Franz Rickert told me in the interview that his mother who was a rather accomplished sculptor, and together with the wives of Max Weber and Georg Simmel,
active in the womens movement of those days, devoted her life mainly to her husband and her family. She saw to it that the philosopher took his medications on
time and at regular intervals. He had many little bottles standing in a row on the
mantelpiece in his study. She meant well, of course, but I am afraid she actually
poisoned my father slowly.
INTRODUCTION
10
A granddaughter of Heinrich Rickert, Mrs. Marianne Rickert Verburg from
Hamburg, lived as a young girl with her grandparents in Heidelberg during the
last two years of the philosophers life. In an interview (Hamburg, October 8, 1988)
she showed me many, usually brief letters and cards Rickert received from various
colleagues within and outside Germany. They were mostly letters and cards of
thanks for a publication Rickert had sent. Among others: A. Meinong, H. Eucken,
P. Natorp, R. Otto, G. Radbruch, E. Rothacker, M. Scheler, O. Spann, R. Stammler.
There are in this personal archive of Mrs. Verburg also a few notes which Rickert
and Max Weber exchanged. They give some insight in the (usually rather petty)
faculty politics the two of them engaged in. It dealt mainly with appointments of
new faculty members. Hermann Glockner provides an interesting personal insight
in the social world of academic Heidelberg in Rickerts days. Cf. his Heidelberger
Tagebuch (Heidelberg Diary), (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1969). According to Franz
Rickert the details about his father and his family are correct and reliable.
11
Walter Benjamin (18921940) who attended Rickerts lectures and seminars in
Freiburg wrote in a letter to his friend Gerhard Scholem (d.d. July 25, 1921):
Rickert ist grau und bse geworden. (Rickert has become grey and evil.), In:
Walter Benjamin, Briefe I, (Letters, vol. I), G. Scholem, Th. Adorno, eds., (Frankfurt
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 268. Although he once wrote Adorno with some pride
that he had been Rickerts student, he apparently distanced himself from him after
he finished his academic studies. A long letter sent from Paris to Adorno, opened
with Mein lieber Teddie (My dear Teddie), d.d. May 7, 1940. Briefe II (Franfurt
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 857.
12
Cf. August Faust, Sozialerziehung und Nationalerziehung, Deutsches Bildungswesen,
July 1933. Glockner gives an interesting picture of Faust. Cf. his o.c., pp. 221245.
Faust, who lived in Rickerts house, was not just his teaching assistant but also considered to be part of the family. Although Mrs. Verburg claimed that the family
was unaware of his nazi sympathies, it is unavoidable to assume that he asserted
a fatal political influence on the aged and despondent Rickert who had always been
a liberal politically but developed into a right-wing conservative after the defeat of
World War I. That was apparently quite normal among German philosophy professors
of those days. It happened, for example, also with the mathematical philosopher
Gottlob Frege. Both Frege and Rickert joined the German Philosophical Society
and its journal which was a right-wing split-o from the prestigious journal Kant
Studien. It was founded by Rickerts student Bruno Bauch who after 1933 became
a devoted Nazi and anti-Semite. Glockner, himself not immune to the nazi ideology,
mentions the fact that Rickert, impressed as he allegedly was by the national-socialist revolution, held a lecture on Fichte shortly before his death. It was, as Faust
also claims, a national-socialist paean. The title (translated) was indicative: Fichte
INTRODUCTION
as a Social and National Thinker. Glockner, o.c., p. VIII. Faust, ibid., p. XVIII.
There is for many Germans, as the former German Kanzler Helmuth Kohl once
said, the grace of the late birth, i.e. after 1945. It may be added that obviously
some Germans have, like Rickert, also experienced the grace of a timely death. See
Hans Sluga, Heideggers Crisis. Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 83100.
13
Sluga mentions in a footnote that Rickerts turn to the right caused the end
of his friendly relationship with a former, Jewish student who taught at Freiburg
university but was then in 1933 dismissed by rector Martin Heidegger. Rickert
remained silent. Sluga, o.c., p. 267, note 48. Sluga probably refers to Jonas Cohn
(18691947), an extraordinary professor for philosophy and pedagogy, who fled
in 1939 to Birmingham, England, where he died after the war. Rickert did not
intervene on his behalf.
14
Quoted interview in Munich. See Otto Friedrich, Before the Deluge (New York:
Harper & Row Publ., 1972). The Dutch edition: Vr de zondvloed (Baarn: het Wereldvenster, 1972), p. 92.
15
In his book on the philosophy of life, a current of thought which he saw as
the dominant and fashionable trend in the philosophy of his days, Rickert noted
that there were still small circles of thinkers who linked up with the work done by
great thinkers in the past and tried to elaborate on their systems of thought. He
mentioned himself as one of those, who worked in the tradition of German Idealism.
Heinrich Rickert, Die Philosophie des Lebens. Darstellung und Kritik der philosophischen
Modestrmungen unserer Zeit (The Philosophy of Life. Presentation and Critique of
Fashionable Currents in the Philosophy of our Time), 1920, (Tbingen: MohrSiebeck, 1922), p. 34.
10
INTRODUCTION
16
Cf. Richard Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn, 1967, (Chicago: the University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
17
Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science. A Logical
Introduction to the Historical Sciences (abridged edition), edited and translated by Guy
Oakes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). A rare study in the 1960s
was Hermann Seidel, Wert und Wirklichkeit in der Philosophie Heinrich Rickerts (Value
and Reality in Henrich Rickerts Philosophy), (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1968.) A
recent, voluminous study is Christian Krijnen, Nachmetaphysischer Sinn (Postmetaphysical
Sense), (Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann, 2001).
18
Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (Cultural Science and
Natural Science), 1926, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986). Philosophische Aufstze (Philosophical
Papers), edited and introduced by Rainer A. Bast, (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999).
19
See the website www.phil-fak.uni.duesseldorf.de/philo/rickert. It is the website
of the Heinrich Rickert Forschungsstelle of the University of Dsseldorf, Germany,
of which professor Rainer A. Bast, PhD is the managing director.
INTRODUCTION
11
20
12
INTRODUCTION
21
Quoted interview with Franz Rickert. Glockner who rented for a while a room
in Rickerts house as did the literary historian Ernst Robert Curtius (18861956),
and the previously mentioned August Faust, gives a slightly dierent story. In a discussion with Curtius about Rickerts writing habit Glockner mentions the fact that
the parlograph was eventually set aside because the secretary could not handle it.
Rickert then dictated his texts to Frau Pfeier, without paying any attention to
punctuation in the often very long sentences, to orthography of the philosophical
concepts, and to the insertion of footnotes. That would have interrupted his stream
of thoughts. The typed manuscript, a first draft, was next drastically edited by hand,
and dictated once more to the typing secretary. This was, Glockner relates, sometimes repeated four or five times. The texts were then given to Rickerts closest
assistants for comments on clarity and readability. This dictating procedure, Glockner
concludes, made the texts too broad and too long. Rickert should have been more
ecient. But Curtius defends Rickert: An ingenious author (. . . .) always imagines,
also when he dictates, readers who are as smart and educated as he himself is;
never a bunch of unknowing students who resist conceptual thought. (Ein geistreicher Schriftsteller (. . . .) stellt sich auch beim Diktieren immer nur Leser vor, die
so klug und gebildet sind wie er selbst; niemals jedoch einen Haufen unwissender
und begristutziger Studenten.) Glockner, o.c., p. 255f.
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13
14
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15
16
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INTRODUCTION
17
und seine Zeit (A Master from Germany. Heidegger and his Time), (Mnchen, Wien:
Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994). Heidegger was a student of Rickert and despite philosophical disagreements remained, as Mrs. Verburg told me, a friend of the family.
See Martin Heidegger, Heinrich Rickert, Briefe 1912 bis 1933 und andere Dokumente,
edited by Alfred Denker (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002).
26
The popular, well written publications of Richard Rorty come to mind here.
Cf. in particular his volumes of essays Contingency, irony and solidarity, 1989 (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Idem, 1991).
27
The so-called kritische Theorie of the Frankfurter Schule rejected the abstaining of
value-judgments in the social sciences and in social philosophy, yet engaged in epistemological reflections. Jrgen Habermas, for instance, did not ignore Rickerts epistemology as most vitalists have done, but subjected it to a critical and extensive
18
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
19
29
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), para 67, p. 32e.
30
Cf. Theodor W. Adorno c.s. (eds.), Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie
(The Positivism Conflict in German Sociology), 1969, (Neuwied, Berlin: Luchterhand
Verlag, 1972).
20
INTRODUCTION
As we shall see later, Rickert rejected a predominance of metaphysics in philosophy. To him philosophy is an autonomous science
alongside the specialized (natural and cultural) sciences. It is founded
upon a distinct (transcendentalist) ontology and epistemology and
subjected to the laws and norms of formal logic. It also has its specific
object of investigation and here lies the great dierence between philosophy and the other sciences whose objects are necessarily specialized compartments of reality as a whole. Whereas we experience
the world, including ourselves, pre-reflectively as an undierentiated
whole, each natural science and each cultural science investigates its
own particular, specialized part of reality. Philosophy, on the contrary, should subject das Weltall, that is reality-in-its-totality, realityin-toto (a concept, incidentally, not used by Rickert) to investigation
and concept formation, lest it loses its legitimate, autonomous place
in the realm of sciences. This encompassing object needs, of course,
a systematic, non-specialized approach. Philosophy is systematic or
it is nothing!31 This has ontological and epistemological consequences.
Ontologically Rickert distinguishes dierent yet related realities which
he calls realms: the first realm consists of observable objects (including mans psyche), the second realm consists of understandable meanings and values, and the third realm, which connects the former two,
is the reality of the transcendental I which links the formal and
abstract values to the substantial and concrete objects in a meaning
bestowing act (Aktsinn). As we shall see later, Rickert distinguished
finally a fourth realm of this total reality, the metaphysical Beyond.
This fourth realm, however, is no longer part of scientific philosophy because its concepts are similes, symbols, allegories. It is the
abode of normative worldviews which yield not knowledge but faith.
In order to realize such a systematic approach successfully, the
philosopher must be able to bridge the alternatives and opposites of
various epistemological dilemmas, otherwise he maintains a conceptual fragmentation of reality-in-toto. Rickerts concept formation there-
31
See especially the first two chapters of his Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie
(General Foundation of Philosophy), (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1921), pp. 114;
1424. In his doctoral dissertation and first book sized publication Rickert already
emphasized the systematic nature of each science, including philosophy. See Heinrich
Rickert, Zur Lehre von der Definition, (On the Theory of the Definition), 1888,
(Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1929, 3rd improved ed.), p. 23.
INTRODUCTION
21
fore operates with opposite pairs which do not exclude but include
each other: subject and object, immanence and transcendence, theoretical thinking and non-theoretical thinking, thinking and acting,
form and substance, identity and dierence, empirical (sensual) reality and non-empirical (non-sensual) reality, being and validity, facts
and values, Natural Science and Cultural Science, etc. These conceptual pairs are not each others opposites, as in Hegels thesis and
antithesis which are then lifted up (aufgehoben) into a synthesis that
poses a new thesis. They constitute, on the contrary, a mutually
inclusive heterothesis in which the autonomy of the pairs is not dissolved into a synthesis, but fully maintained.32 It is the systematic
cross-reference of polar concepts. The meaning of the one is explained
in terms of the opposite meaning of the other.
Often such heterological arguments border on tautologies. For
instance, he fiercely and recurrently criticizes those philosophers who
proclaim the end of systematic philosophy because according to them
modern philosophy could only focus adequately on parts and components of reality, not on a supposedly total reality. He then argues
that it is only possible to think and talk about parts and components,
if there is a conception of a totality of which they are parts and
components. But such tautologies emerge only when one ontologizes ones concepts. If they are kept analytical, that is a priori, transcendental, heterology and heterothesis will not be tautological. The
heterological approach, as will be seen repeatedly later, rather intends
to preclude the rigidity of ontologized conceptualizations. Due to
heterothesis, Rickerts concepts are not static, but flexible. Concepts,
he says time and again in a typically Kantian vein, do not depict a
static reality, as is done by the so-called Abbildlogikthe logic which
views concepts as pictures or mirrors of reality. They instead demarcate like pickets an eternally changing and moving reality. In a sense,
reality lies or moves in the space between the heterologically juxtaposed concepts which are, as we shall see, a priori, transcendental,
to boot.
32
See e.g. Heinrich Rickert, ibid., pp. 5057. Also Heinrich Rickert, Grundprobleme
der Philosophie. Methodologie. Ontologie. Anthropologie (Fundamental Problems of Philosophy.
Methodology. Ontology. Anthropology), (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1934), para 7:
Philosophie und Heterologie, pp. 3947. See also Christian Krijnen, op. cit., pp.
227298.
22
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
23
24
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
25
39
At the end of his life Cassirer wrote an essay commemorating the hundredth
birthday of Cohen: Ernst Cassirer, Hermann Cohen, 18421918, in: Social Research,
vol. X:2, 1943, pp. 219232.
40
Cf. Ernst Cassirer, Kants Leben und Lehre (Kants Life and Doctrine), 1918,
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft; Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001;
volume 8 of the Hamburg Edition of Cassirers Collected Works in 25 volumes).
Cassirer also co-edited the publication of Kants collected works. For a complete
bibliography of Cassirer see Raymond Klibansky, H. J. Paton (eds.), Philosophy and
History. The Ernst Cassirer Festschrift, 1936 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp.
338353.
41
Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (Philosophy of Symbolic Forms),
three volumes, vol. One: Die Sprache (Language/Speech), vol. Two: Das mythische
Denken (Mythological Thought), vol. Three: Phnomenologie der Erkenntnis (Phenomenology
of Knowledge), 1925, (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 1997). This intellectual transition took place after his move to Hamburg University in June 1919. Here he got
acquainted with the famous Cultural-Scientific Library Warburg, erected by the
wealthy businessman Aby Warburg. The library harbored an enormous stock of
historical, cultural-anthropological and sociological books which Cassirer used intensively while writing his three volumes on the philosophy of symbolic forms. According
to Paetzold, Hamburg was the place where Cassirer became a cultural philosopher.
See Heinz Paetzold, Ernst Cassirer. Von Marburg to New York. Eine philosophische Biographie
(Ernst Cassirer. From Marburg to New York. A Philosophical Biography), (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995), p. 47. On Cassirer and the Warburg Library:
ibid., pp. 6880. At the end of his life, living in the United States as a refugee
(New Haven, 19411944; New York, 19441945) Cassirer expanded and intensified
his interests in cultural philosophy. Cf. Paetzold, o.c., pp. 191222. See Ernst Cassirer,
An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1944; reprint: New York: Doubleday, 1951) and Ernst Cassirer,
The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946).
26
INTRODUCTION
42
Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (History and Natural
Science), 1894, in: Prludien. Aufstze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte
(Preludes. Essays and Lectures on Philosophy and its History), vol. 2, (Tbingen:
Mohr-Siebeck, 1915), pp. 136160. Windelband was more a historian of philosophy than a philosopher of history. He earned fame in particular with his textbook
that deservedly acquired the status of a classic, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie
(Textbook of the History of Philosophy), 1891, edited and enlarged with a chapter on philosophy in the 20th century by Heinz Heimsoeth, (Tbingen: MohrSiebeck, 1957, 15th ed.).
43
It is in this context interesting to read Hempels essay Explanation in Science
and in History, 1963, in: James H. Fetzer (ed.), The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel. Studies
in Science, Explanation, and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 276296.
Without mentioning them he addresses the same logical and methodological issues as
Windelband and Rickert, albeit within the paradigm of analytic philosophy.
INTRODUCTION
27
reading and re-reading of his texts. They often discuss ideas and
theories in a fragmentary manner which is not only unfair but what
is worse scientifically reproachable.44 In addition critics often repeat
the criticism of other critics without apparently checking these criticisms
by reading Rickerts own texts. All this does, of course, not help at
all to understand what Rickert actually meant to say. Therefore I
found it necessary to read and re-read him closely and follow him,
as it were, step by step, trying to understand his often complex and
abstract, yet never boring and bone-dry argumentations without subjecting them to hasty judgments which are by definition almost always
prejudgments.
I found it necessary to write this book in English. His opus magnum
on the limits of Natural-Scientific concept formation which is, as we
shall see in the fifth chapter, an elaborate logic of historical research,
has been translated into English, albeit in an abridged edition.45 His
books on epistemology, methodology, logic and philosophy of values
are not available in English. It is therefore hard for the Anglo-Saxon
world to get acquainted with Rickerts peculiar philosophy which at
present is experiencing a modest renaissance in Europe. Hopefully,
the present study may lead to more translations of Rickerts work.46
But there is a more private reason for this English publication. I
found it heuristically helpful to represent Rickerts ideas in English
and to translate quotations from Rickert into English. I would find
it extremely dicult, if not impossible, to do so in the case of Hegel,
Husserl or Heidegger, but to my pleasant surprise Rickerts German
was, despite the complexity of his ideas, surprisingly transparent and,
apart from a few technically philosophical concepts, not at all dicult
to translate.
The first chapter presents a first introduction to Rickerts philosophy by means of a brief summary. It is meant to facilitate the reading of this book with a general overview that omits all the complex
44
A telling example presents R. G. Collingwood who in less than two pages summarizes and severely criticizes Rickerts concept of history and his historical methodology: The Idea of History, 1946, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 168170.
45
Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science. A Logical Introduction
to the Historical Sciences (abridged edition), edited and translated by Guy Oakes, o.c.
46
The books most appropriate for English translation are, in my view, the small,
lucid Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, o.c., the also lucidly written introduction
to his own philosophy Grundlegung der Philosophie, o.c., and in particular the critical
and at times ironical study on vitalism which will be discussed extensively in Chapter
Two: Die Philosophie des Lebens, o.c.
28
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
29
CHAPTER ONE
1
Cf. (1) Heinrich Rickert, Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie I, (General Foundation
of Philosophy. Vol. I (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1921), pp. 149; (2) Grundprobleme
der Philosophie. Methodologie, Ontologie, Anthropologie (Fundamental Problems of Philosophy.
Methodology, Ontology, Anthropology), (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1934); (3) Thesen
zum System der Philosophie, (Theses on the System of Philosophy), in: H.-L. Ollig
(ed.), Neukantianismus, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982), pp. 174181.
32
CHAPTER ONE
RICKERTS PHILOSOPHY
33
34
CHAPTER ONE
(2) Rickert then defends, to begin with, the thesis that philosophy
ought to be both scientific (i.e. non-metaphysical) and systematic. That
is, philosophy focuses, like the other sciences on empirical reality,
i.e. the reality which we experience through our senses. The scientific
approach is also called by him theoretical, in contrast to the socalled a-theoretical approaches of music, the arts, religion, eros.2
Within the orbit of the sciences philosophy is not just a science
among other sciences, but occupies a relatively exalted position, since
its object of investigation is reality-in-toto, unlike the specialized natural and cultural sciences which explore distinct parts of reality. Its
aim is to construct concepts which refer to das Weltall, to total reality, not just to one specific, specialized part of reality. This, of course,
needs a systematic approach. The concepts and their logically coherent theories form, as it were, a network which help us to know and
understand reality not only rationally (i.e. logically and not just intuitively), but also systematically (i.e. not compartmentalized, as is necessarily the case with the specialized natural and cultural sciences).
Reality-in-toto cannot be reconstructed by simply adding up the specialized scientific accounts of reality, and their specific philosophies.
Neither does general, systematic philosophy come about by simply
adding up the philosophies of various scientific disciplines, such as
legal, social, economic, political, natural philosophy. That procedure
would, of course, not lead to a philosophy with its own autonomy
and authenticity, its own logical and methodological space among
the other sciences.
Yet once more, philosophy is not just a specialized discipline alongside, or in the service of, other specialized sciences. It has, as has
been remarked before, a relatively exalted position but that should
not be interpreted in a Platonic or Hegelian sense. Rickert uses the
following metaphor: philosophy is still the queen of the sciences, but
the days of its autocratic reign are over; it reigns today as in a constitutional monarchy, i.e. in constant communication with the parliament of sciences. Philosophy, we may also say, is no longer the
prima donna she was in former days, but a prima inter pares.
RICKERTS PHILOSOPHY
35
(3) This emphasis upon a Weltall and upon the concurrent need of
a non-specialized, systematic philosophy sounds rather old-fashioned
and quite pass today. However, this was already so in Rickerts days,
and he was fully aware of that! He singles out Nietzsches vitalism and
Kierkegaards existentialism, and their manifold followers, as the main
representatives of an anti-rational and anti-systematic philosophy.
But the fragmented vision of philosophy is, he realizes, also fostered
by the strong specialization of the various, natural-scientific as well
as cultural-scientific disciplines each of which, if they are interested
in philosophy at all, develops and promotes its own field-specific
philosophy. In opposition to all this, Rickert sticks stubbornly to his
total and systemic approach for two main reasons. First, if one
sticks to the allegedly inevitable compartmentalization of philosophy
in as many specialized philosophies as there are scientific disciplines,
one must answer the question what it is that justifies the qualification
of their being philosophies. Or, in other words, what is the genus
of which these specialized philosophies are specimens? Second, to
answer this question satisfactorily general philosophy needs to possess
(a) its own object of investigation and (b) its own characteristic approach
to this object. If the object cannot be a compilation of the specialized
objects of the empirical sciences, it must be reality-in-toto. In order
to be able to investigate this total reality, it must be systematic.
That may be old-fashioned, but the question isalso nowadays
whether it is logically unsound.
Rickert does realize that Weltall, reality-in-toto, is a rather problematic
and hazardous concept. It smacks of Platonic metaphysics, i.e. the
vision of an encompassing, overarching reality from which the empirical
realities, with which we humans have to do and in which we live
day by day, emanates. This is not at all what Rickert means by it.
There are several passages in his writings which indicate that the
envisaged reality-in-toto is a Kantian postulate which one must stick
to, in order to avoid the fragmentation of philosophical thought into
many specialized philosophies. It is, in other words, more of an epistemological than an ontological and metaphysical concept. It is a
fact, Rickert argues rather phenomenologically, that in our daily
existence we do experience reality pre-reflectively as a whole, i.e. in
toto, and thus not in the specialized terms of the various, compartmentalizing sciences. It is then the task of the philosopher to systematize
and indeed rationalize this pre-reflective totality of reality, but that
does not mean that he has to get lost in the quicksand of metaphysics.
36
CHAPTER ONE
RICKERTS PHILOSOPHY
37
38
CHAPTER ONE
RICKERTS PHILOSOPHY
39
40
CHAPTER ONE
RICKERTS PHILOSOPHY
41
determined, ahistorical objects, the latter investigating the understandable world of historical values and meanings. Nature in Kants
elegant definition is (liberally re-phrased) the world left to its own
development, while culture rather constitutes the world worked
upon by men with their value-related interests and designs. Rickert,
however, is not really in favor of such a substantive dierentiation
of the two main groups of sciences. He rather distinguishes Natural
Science and Cultural Science in the formal terms of two mutually
quite dierent methodologies. Natural Science then is the generalizing approach to reality which searches for general and ahistorical
concepts as the building blocks of general causal laws of development, whereas Cultural Science is the individualizing approach to
reality which coins individual and historically grounded concepts
which are the building blocks of interpretations of particular, individual men, events, and institutions. Particular facts or objects are
for Natural Science just specimens of generic concepts. When these
concepts have been formulated satisfactorily (in accordance with the
demand of verification and/or falsification), there is no need any
longer to search for and investigate more individual facts or objects.
In Cultural Science historical facts and objects remain relevant for
the ongoing research, since the values, norms and meaning to which
they are related will change and develop in time. Newly discovered
historical facts or events will also contribute to the re-formulation of
the cultural-scientific concepts and theories.
Unlike the traditional dichotomy of Naturwissenschaft versus Geisteswissenschaft, Rickerts methodological pair of Natural Science and Cultural
Science must be seen as constructed and therefore non-empirical
ends on a continuum, which is the logical space wherein the empirical sciences operatesome very close to the Natural-Scientific pole
of the continuum, like chemistry, physics, astronomy, etc., others
operating at the opposite pole, like the historical discipline in particular. But most social sciences, like psychology, sociology, economics,
etc. will operate somewhere in between the poles, sometimes close
to the Natural-Scientific end of the continuum, as in behavioristic
psychology or econometrics, sometimes closer to the Cultural Scientific
pole of the continuum, like cultural sociology or institutional economics. The latter are usually active in historical and comparative
analyses and interpretations, rather than in a search for exact laws
of development. The conclusion of this methodological demarcation
of the natural and the cultural sciences is that a conflict of methods
42
CHAPTER ONE
(Methodenstreit) in the social sciences is logically unnecessary. It produces, as the history of these sciences has demonstrated, more noise
than information.
(10) Rickert distinguishes, as we have seen, three dierent, yet interlinked realms (Reiche): first the observable (sinnliche) realm of facts,
objects and events, investigated by the specialized research of the (natural and cultural) sciences; second, the understandable (unsinnliche) realm
of values and meanings; third, the pro-physical realm of the transcendental Ego which functions, as it were, as the motor of the
knowledge process. These three realms constitute ontologically the
reality-in-toto which is the proper object of philosophy as a transcendental, systematic and scientific discipline, next to the various
empirical and specialized (natural- and cultural-) scientific disciplines.
Yet, Rickert realizes, this ontology is still not really total and not
really systematic since it still fragments the world into three components. What can be said about the fundamental anthropological
quest for a meaningful life, for a coherent and overarching view of
the world, of history and of the futurei.e. a worldview that oers
an open and positive perspective on life and history? Or phrased
dierently, what is the logical status of a full-filled (voll-ended )3 existence? These are no longer ontological reflections but clear-cut metaphysical yearnings which, however, may not be neglected, if one
aims at a truly coherent and total vision of reality and history.
To sum up, metaphysics which Rickert carefully keeps out of his
transcendental philosophy is at the end introduced as a kind of copingstone without which philosophy would not be able to remain faithful to its mission of focusing philosophically on reality-in-toto. However,
he wants to remain faithful also to the scientific nature of this total
and systematic philosophy. These two motives exclude each other
and there is no heterology that can solve this dilemma. As we shall
see in Chapter Four, he takes refuge in the theory that metaphysics
is epistemologically and ontologically indispensable as a postulate and
that it can only be conceptualized by means of symbols, similes and
allegories, not by theoretical, i.e. scientific concepts. Naturally, the
ideas of Kant come to mind here. In any case, the metaphysical
3
Instead of the word fulfilled I maintain Rickerts neologistic German concept
voll-ended, translating it into full-filled.
RICKERTS PHILOSOPHY
43
reality-in-toto thus presents an atheoretical reality, comparable to religion, ethics, literature, and the arts. This is a remarkable conclusion,
because at the end of his ontological and epistemological journey
Rickerts theoretical philosophy finds its fulfillment in an atheoretical,
metaphysical Beyond, where knowledge is superseded by faithan
non-religious, agnostic type of faith.
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
Das, was lebt, ist etwas anderes als das, was denkt.
Gottfried Benn1
46
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
47
48
CHAPTER TWO
we experience through our sense-organs, is carefully analyzed by various scientific disciplinesby the so-called natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) first and foremost, and subsequently, where these sciences
run up against their limits, as in the case of the non-empirical values,
by the cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaften). According to Rickert,
these two groups of sciences, as we shall see in Chapter Five, must
be seen on a continuum rather than in mutual opposition or even
exclusion. These empirical scientific disciplines necessarily compartmentalize reality, since they focus on reality in terms of their own,
specific methods of research and logic of concept formation. Philosophy
then is an additional and autonomous Wissenschaft which tries to
approach reality not in a compartmentalized but in a total, systematic
manner. Various scientific disciplinesphysics, chemistry, astronomy,
psychology, sociology, economics, history, etc.dissect, as it were,
reality into distinct parts or components. That is logically legitimate,
Rickert argues, but reality as a whole is more than and dierent
from the sum of these parts. Each of them (distinct disciplines, ACZ)
covers, according to its conception, only a part of the world. The
whole is something else than a mere stringing together of its parts.7
Rickert warns against the devastating eect, if philosophy followed
this compartmentalization and cut itself up into specialized philosophies, such as philosophy of biology, of physics, of psychology, of
sociology, of history, etc.
The consequence of such a fragmentation, Rickert adds, would in
the end of the day be an unsatisfactory kind of relativism, since these
fragmented, empirical disciplines and their philosophies would have
no access to shared and guiding values and norms. Or, in other
words, scientific disciplines and their specialized philosophies are
inherently unable to forge and formulate guiding values and norms.
In the colloquial terms of today, a scientifically and philosophically
compartmentalized world would yield a culture ruled by the dictum
anything goes. In such a fragmented world theories could not possibly be more than sets of aphorisms.8 Naturally, Nietzsche, the great
Jede von ihnen behandelt ihrem Begri nach nur einen Teil der Welt, und
das Ganze ist etwas anderes als die blosse Aneinanderreihung seiner Teile. Ibid.,
p. 13.
8
Heinrich Rickert, Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck,
1921), p. 2. The first section of the first chapter deals with Rickerts ideas about
the systematic nature of philosophy. He indicates clearly that he is aware of the
7
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
49
50
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
51
Rickert, trained in the Kantian tradition, rejects the so-called Abbildungslogik, that is the representational logic which views words, concepts,
or theories as pictures of reality. In this logic truth is measured by
the realistic quality of the concepts and theories. Most vitalists hold
on to this view, since they long for concepts and theories which are
true to life. Indeed, in this view theoretical truth is not dependent
on the rules of formal logic and the results of empirical research. It
rather depends on the correspondence of concepts and theories with
lifelife which is experienced. Rickert rejects this type of logic
vehemently. Empirical reality is not just grasped by sense impressions. In daily life, for instance, we filter and order our experiences
and sense impressions through languagethrough concepts and names
that we attribute to things, events and beings. Language, according
to Rickert, is in essence a reduction of the complexity of the world.
In fact, there are two types of such complexity reducing words, names
and concepts. For practical reasons we always reduce the complexity of reality by the use of generalizing concepts, that is, by means of
generic species names (Gattungsnamen) which order individual objects
(things, persons, events, etc.) according to their shared qualities, as
specimens of general types. Or we order them in terms of individualizing proper names (Eigennamen) which rather focus on their unique
and indivisible, that is individual qualities. This is still a pre-scientific
kind of conceptualization, in which we, as speaking human beings,
engage pre-reflectively and arbitrarily. In the natural and cultural
sciences this conceptual ordering and reduction of complexity is realized in a systematic and logically cogent manner.14
But Rickert still adds another dimension to this. The world is not
just the object of philosophy as the co-coordinating science of sciences, one also expects philosophy to elucidate mans position in it.
What the scientific disciplines cannot oer, general philosophy should
oer. That is, systematic philosophy is also a philosophical anthropology, as it ought to demonstrate what mans position in the world
is, and what the meaning of his life is or could be. That, however,
his former student Bruno Bauch who was a devoted Nazi until his death in 1942.
Sluga, pp. 8285, 9295, 164167, 210214.
14
Ibid., p. 7. The dynamics of generalization and individualization in everyday
life human cognition is broadened by Rickert into a basic categorization and logic
of the sciences and humanities. We shall discuss all this in more details in Chapter
Five.
52
CHAPTER TWO
is only possible, if we know what the values are that provide meaning to what we do and are in the world. Moreover, the specialized
scientific disciplines are by definition limited in time. They either
neutralize time, as in the case of the natural sciences which in actual
fact are ahistorical, or they pin down time to the past, as in history,
or the here-and-now, as in the social sciences. Philosophy with its
focus on values transcends such limits of time, introduces eternity as
a philosophical problem. After all, human evaluations are historical
and thus time-bound, but the values to which these evaluations
refertruth, beauty, justice, the good, etc.are timeless, ahistorical
and in this sense eternal.15
If we lived without language, without names and concepts, we
would experience reality as a chaos, as an irrational mle of sense
impressions, as a congeries of meaningless fragments. But when we
are able to order these bits and pieces into a meaningful whole linguistically, we will be able in principle to experience and understand
reality as a meaningful cosmos. That is, in other words, its heuristic
function. Philosophy should follow this heuristic path of everyday
language. If it is systematic and general, philosophy will be able to
contribute to such a sense of meaning and order: Reality is not at
all a world yet, as it first meets us before we understand it systematically. It is rather a congeries of fragments or a chaos. It is only after
we have ordered its components that something emerges which we
call the cosmos. Only the system makes it possible that for us the
world-chaos develops into a world-cosmos. In this respect one could
say that each philosophy should have the form of a system.16
Philosophy should not want to accomplish more, but as a universal
approach its intentions should not be less. How much it is really
able to accomplish, Rickert adds wisely, is a dierent question.
Despite their widely dierent approaches and conceptualizations,
vitalists share one basic insightthat of Life as the overarching concept which is viewed and treated as an encompassing principle
(Weltallprinzip). With the help of this principle not only the various
Rickert, Die Philosophie des Lebens, p. 13.
So wie die Wirklichkeit uns zuerst gegenbertritt, bevor wir sie systematisch
begreifen, ist sie berhaupt noch keine Welt, sondern eine Anhufung von
Bruchstcken oder ein Chaos. Erst indem wir ihre Teile ordnen, entsteht das, was
wir den Kosmos nennen. Das System allein ermglicht es also, dass aus dem
Weltchaos fr uns der Weltkosmos wird, und insofern kann man sagen, muss jede
Philosophie die Form des Systems haben. Rickert, o.c., p. 14.
15
16
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
53
54
CHAPTER TWO
19
also nicht [. . . .] Wille durch Erkenntnis bedingt sei; wiewohl Erkenntnis durch
Wille. Arthur Schopenhauer, ber den Willen in der Natur, (On the Will in Nature),
Zrcher Ausgabe. Werke in zehn Bnden, Kleinere Schriften I, (Zrich: Diogenes,
1977), p. 203.
20
Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, (The World as Will
and Imagination), ibid., Vol. I:1, 1 para. 18, p. 143: ja, dass der ganze Leib nichts
Anderes, als der objektivirte, d.h. zur Vorstellung gewordene Wille ist.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
55
21
Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus, (Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche. A Cycle of Lectures), (Mnchen, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1920),
the first lecture, pp. 119.
22
Man erklrt das Leben fr das eigentliche Wesen des Weltalls und macht
es zugleich zu Organon seiner Erfassung. Das Leben selber soll aus dem Leben
heraus ohne Hilfe anderer Begrie philosophieren, und eine solche Philosophie muss
sich dann unmittelbar erleben lassen. Ibid., p. 5.
56
CHAPTER TWO
(to experience), sich einleben (to immerse oneself ), mitleben (to sympathize with). In particular, lifes oppositedeathgives weight to the
notion of life in the vitalists view of the world: Only what is alive
dies, and what has died has died out and is actually dead.23 Note
again, Rickerts ironic use of a blatantly redundant formulation! In
particular the clich expression Erlebnisexperienceinvites his
derision. It is, he says, so hackneyed that it is not sucient enough
anymore. Therefore, one believes it essential to advance into the
notion of a primordial experience, which apparently is an even livelier experience than the ordinary one.24 In any case, the word experience, Rickert continues, can actually not be used anymore, and is
therefore often written between inverted commas. It lacks by now
any sensible meaning: Not rarely does it mean an empty phrase
and serves as a cover up for thoughtlessness.25
Vitalism has deeply penetrated into the arts, as is apparent, Rickert
adds, in expressionism, but also in the religious life of his (and, one
could add, also our) day. In expressionism the artist searches for
authentic expressions which focus on individual originality rather
than remaining faithful to the alleged coercion of artistic schools and
forms. In religion mystic or emotional experiences are sought for,
and opposed to doctrines and lifeless religious language and dead
dogmatisms. Butand this has Rickerts special interestvitalism
has in particular penetrated into the specialized sciences. The concept
of nature, often tied to that of the organic, is revitalized and contrasted to a materialist and mechanistic notion of it. It is hard to
fathom, Rickert asserts, how the natural sciences could be conceptualized in terms of these vitalist notions. What is one to understand
by lively physics? Up till now, Rickert mocks, a lively mathematics has not yet been introduced by the vitalists, but mathematics is
anyhow not cherished by most proponents of lively sciences.26
23
Nur das Lebendige stirbt, und das Gestorbene allein ist abgestorben und im
eigentlichen Sinne tot. Ibid., p. 6.
24
. . . zumal der Ausdruck Erlebnis ist allerdings bereits so abgegrien, dass er
nicht mehr gengt und man daher zum Urerlebnis glaubt vordringen zu mssen,
das wohl ein noch lebendigeres Erlebnis als das gewhnliche sein soll. Ibid., p. 7.
25
Nicht selten bedeutet es eine leere Phrase und dient zum Deckmantel fr
Gedanklenlosigkeit. Idem.
26
Ibid., p. 9. See also p. 37, where he calls the idea of a lively mathematics
absurd.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
57
27
Lebe! so lautet der neue kategorische Imperativ. Ethische Bedeutung gewinnt
das Leben nur, wenn es zum Gipfel der Lebendigkeit gefhrt und in seiner ganzen
Breite vom Leben durchstrmt wird. Ibid., p. 11.
28
Max Weber, Politik als Beruf , (Politics as a Vocation), 1919, in: Gesammelte
Politische Schriften, (Mnchen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1971), pp. 551560.
58
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CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
59
and stands in opposition to everything indierent, meaningless, valuefree, alien, inauthentic and dead. Experience means in that case not
just what is (was ist), but what actually ought to be (was sein soll )
because it has value. We desire experiences in order to enrich our
lives and to make life worthwhile. Experience becomes an overarching
value.32 At this point Rickert could have quoted Christian Morgenstern
who in one of his quite surrealistic Palmstrm-poems exclaims: And
he comes to the result: the experience was just a dream. Because,
he concludes razor-sharp, what can not be, may not be. 33
Rickert discusses two vitalist philosophers who are also sociologists:
Max Scheler and Georg Simmel. Like Max Weber he is critical of
Scheler, whose brand of phenomenological intuitionism he hardly
takes seriously, but he is also like Weber sympathetic to Georg
Simmel. In fact, he devotes a whole chapter in his book to Simmels
philosophy. Simmel published at the end of his life, when he was
dying of liver cancer, a book called Lebensanschauung.34 Rickert is fascinated by the ideas in this book, particularly since Simmel demonstrates
that he does not belong to what Rickert calls, with a hardly concealed
disdain, the prophets of vitalism. Unlike them, Simmel realizes that
life is not just a constant stream of change and evolution, but also
needs forms in order to exist. This then places him before a dilemma:
as a vitalist Simmel views life as a Bergsonian dure, a permanent
process of change and development, but as a neo-Kantian sociologist
who has developed an elaborate sociology of socio-cultural forms, he
realizes that life is limited by forms which are rather rigid, solid,
inflexible.35 Take for example the sociological phenomenon of conflict.
In terms of substance there are many dierent kinds and types of
conflict (between groups, nations, individuals), yet it is possible to
determine what the common characteristics of these conflicts are,
reducing them to a single form which is timeless and ahistorical.36
Ibid., p. 43f.
Und er kommt zu dem Ergebnis: Nur ein Traum war das Erlebnis. Weil,
so schliesst er messerscharf, nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf. Christian
Morgenstern, Palmstrm, 1910, in: Palmstrm, Palma Kunkel, (Mnchen: Deutscher
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1961), p. 68.
34
Georg Simmel, Lebensanschauung. Vier Metaphysische Kapitel, (View of Life. Four
Metaphysical Chapters), (Mnchen-Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922).
35
Cf. Anton M. Bevers, Dynamik der Formen bei Georg Simmel, (The Dynamics of
Forms in Georg Simmel), (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985).
36
Georg Simmel, Der Streit, in: Soziologie. Untersuchungen ber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, (Sociology. Investigations of the Forms of Sociation), (Berlin: Duncker &
32
33
60
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
61
himself, who despite his theological training did not extrapolate his
scientific ideas into an encompassing, metaphysical philosophy.39 It
was rather the philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer, who
developed an encompassing evolutionist worldview. Rickert fails to
notice the fact that Spencer (whose name, incidentally, he spells consistently wrong as Spenzer) became the founder and grand old man
of Social Darwinism which developed into a forceful socio-political
ideology, legitimating liberalism and, in particular, American laissezfaire capitalism.40 This ideology fits Rickerts descriptions of biologism
perfectly well.
Although Darwin himself, as Rickert observes astutely, was not a
philosophical vitalist, his biology and evolutionary views did give rise
to metaphysical extrapolations. Rickerts discussion of this point is
quite interesting.41 The crucial component in Darwins biology, he
claims, was the connection with Malthuss demographical theory. It
led to concepts which from the outset referred to human culture and
social life, thus enabling followers to apply the evolution theory to
areas outside nature. Malthus, as is well known, claimed that populations grow disproportionately faster than the supply of food. This
then would eventually engender severe (global) inequalities and
conflicts. Darwin applied this idea to his theory of the origins of
species in which he attributed a central place to the struggle for
food. In fact, this struggle was then generalized to all of organic
nature. It is but a small step to then speak of a general (if not metaphysical) Struggle for Life.
Before Lebensphilosophie became fashionable in Germany, Rickert
adds ironically and maybe with a wink at Heidegger, it was usually
called the struggle for Dasein. In any case, within the strictly scientific
context of Darwins theory of evolution it is the struggle for food
and for life which causes a natural selection and the concomitant
emergence, survival and decline of the various species of organic
nature. It is then but a small, yet scientifically false step to biologism
as a metaphysical worldview and socio-political ideology. In this biologistic worldview the principle of natural selection as a mechanistic
(non-voluntaristic, non-teleological) process and the closely related
Rickert calls Darwin this great researcher of nature. O.c., p. 87.
Cf. Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1944, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967, 14th ed.).
41
Rickert, o.c., pp. 8690.
39
40
62
CHAPTER TWO
42
The contemporary reader is reminded of similar extrapolations of scientific
genetics in the direction of a rather metaphysical and mechanistic worldview. See,
for example, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 1976, (Oxford-New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989) and Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine, (Oxford-New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999). Needless to add that Schopenhauers metaphysical
conception of the blind will comes to mind also. The will, after all, is seen as a strong
developing force, yet this development (evolution) is aimless, non-teleological, blind.
43
Der Mensch steht unter dieser Voraussetzung als trauriger Fremdling in der
ihn umgebenden Welt. Rickert, o.c., p. 89.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
63
44
Ibid., p. 93. Vergeude keine Energie, verwerte sie. Das soll an die Stelle von
Kants kategorischem Imperativ treten! Rickert also mentions Max Webers critique in
his essay Energetische Kulturtheorien, 1909, in: Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre,
(Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1968, 3rd ed.), pp. 400426. Weber focused his critique
on Wilhelm Ostwald, Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft, (Energetic Foundations
of Cultural Science), (Leipzig: Klinkhardt, 1909) and takes him severely to task for
mixing value judgments with objective, scientific facts. See also Wilhelm Ostwald,
Naturphilosophie (Philosophy of Nature), in: Paul Hinneberg (ed.), Die Kultur der
Gegenwart. Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele, (Contemporary Culture. Its Development
and Aims), (Berlin, Leipzig: Teubner Verlag, 1908), pp. 138172.
64
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
65
always emphasize the alleged fact that the law of natural selection,
which is seen as a law of progress, reigns (Sein), and even should
(Sollen) reign supremely in the body politic.
But our individual thinking, feeling and acting too have to comply with the demands of these biological norms. Ethical demands
can allegedly be derived solely from these notions of rising life,
progress, and health. Love, marriage, family, educationthey ought
to be lived in terms of these biologically based life-norms. The arts
and even the sciences too should serve Life. Religion can only be
justified existentially, if it fortifies the health of individuals and helps
to strengthen nations in their struggle for life.48
Within biologistic vitalism, however, this type of post-Darwinian
philosophy has been rejected, Rickert argues, by a new direction in
biologism. In this new direction three fateful tendencies were avoided:
the emphasis upon the Malthusian component in Darwins theory,
the mechanistic view of culture and society, and the utilitarian ideal
of parsimony. Rickert thinks that Henri Bergson in particular played
the leading role in this new direction of anti-Darwinist vitalism.
However, before we turn to this new direction in general and Bergson
in particular, we should first discuss Rickerts typology of biologistic
theories which is, I believe, still heuristically useful.
FOUR TYPES OF BIOLOGISM
By now the picture of biologistic vitalism is quite complex and thus
confusing. Rickert tries to clarify it by the introduction of four types
which represent four fundamentally dierent dimensions of biologism.
They do share a common foundation, yet stand in opposition to
each other. In a rare exercise of social philosophy, Rickert constructs
a quadrant alongside two social-political dilemmas: socialism (or
collectivism) versus individualism on the one hand, and democracy
versus aristocracy on the other. It yields four types of tendencies:
(a) liberalism (individualism plus democracy); (b) social democracy (socialism
plus democracy); (c) individual aristocracy (individualism plus aristocracy);
(d) social aristocracy (socialism plus aristocracy). Rickert provides examples
of these tendencies which he discusses in broad outlines.49
48
49
Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., pp. 8286.
66
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
67
(d) The social-aristocrats often refer to Nietzsche as far as antidemocratic aristocracy is concerned, but they reject Nietzsches
individualism. They rather return to the ideal of the horde
which is interpreted in terms of groups, nations and races.
There is a social element in this aristocracy in that the members
of the same group, nation, race, or species should help each
other. This is not the idea of Christian neighborly love, since
that is after all more democratic than aristocratic. It is rather
the support of the best and the strongest so that the group,
nation, race or species can survive in the biological struggle
for life. Therefore, not the individual but rather society and
the state ought to be the ultimate aim of our socio-political
actions. Although Rickert does not use such concepts, it is not
dicult to fill in fascism and even National Socialism as examples
of this type of biologism. Rickert does mention the fact that
this type of biologism is the direct opposite of the Spencerean
type of individual democracy, and he does warn against the
attempt to set up the Germans as the proper Aristokratenvolk von
Lebewesen (aristocratic people of life-beings) against the French
nation which due to its anti-natural Malthusianism is allegedly
destined to decline.50
This typology is in view of Rickerts rather abstract transcendentalism remarkable, because it actually covers two specialized disciplines,
sociology and political science the basic dynamics of which he apparently understood quite well. This was probably due to his close intellectual relationship with Max Weber. In any case, the typology
presents a conceptual grid which, I think, is still quite heuristic and
useful in modern political science and sociology.
BIOLOGISM BEYOND NIETZSCHE
Once again, Rickert distinguishes between an old and a new biologism. Old biologism applies the basic tenets of Darwins evolutionary
principles, whereas new biologism, to which we must turn now, stands
50
Ibid., p. 86. Rickert could have mentioned Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines
Unpolitischen, (Reflections of an Unpolitical One), 1918, (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer
Verlag, 1983) as an example of such an anti-French, social-aristocratic type of
vitalism.
68
CHAPTER TWO
51
Ibid., p. 98. Rickerts summary of Nietzsches vitalism strongly resembles Simmels
perceptive discussion of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, in which Simmel underlined
Nietzsches Lebensfreudigkeit, i.e. his zest for life. Simmel, o.c.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
69
Like Nietzsches, Bergsons vitalism was also in its essence biologistic, albeit anti-Darwinist. Unlike Nietzsche, however, who scorned
metaphysics as an enterprise for philosophical Hinterweltler, i.e. people who live in an alleged world behind reality, Bergson viewed,
more like Schopenhauer, life metaphysically as the very essence of
the world. In particular in his later writings he demonstrated that
he was not just an intuitionist but a biologistic vitalist as well. It
suces to refer to the typically Bergsonian concept of volution cratrice in which organic life is presented as an intrinsic part of the
world in contrast to inorganic, dead nature.52 He too rejects the
post-Darwinian, mechanistic view of the world, the highest aim of
which is harmony, balance, equilibrium, equality. The metaphysical
essence of the world is the steady increase of life and vitality. The
natural sciences with their inherent principles of mechanicity and
parsimony are not suitable to acquire knowledge of this eternally
changing and evolving, lively world. Intuition as the pre-reflective
immersion of the mind into the ongoing stream of life (dure) is the
proper epistemological vehicle.
Like Nietzsche, Rickert hastens to add, Bergson is an important
thinker and theorist.53 Their ideas became popular and entered into
the fashionable current of vitalism in popularized versions distributed
by minor minds. There is no need, Rickert argues, to discuss these
minor philosophers but he makes one exception: Max Scheler. The
few pages devoted to him are very critical, though, and do not add
much to the picture of post-Nietzschean vitalism which the previous
pages had oered.54
52
Cf. Henri Bergson, Lvolution Cratrice, (Creative Evolution), 1907, (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1966, 118th ed.).
53
When I interviewed her in Hamburg, Mrs. Marianne Rickert Verburg showed
me a letter by Bergson addressed to Heinrich Rickert, dated June 24th, 1909.
Bergson thanked his trs honor Collgue for sending him two of his publications,
Geschichtsphilosophie and Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. He writes that he
will take these books on vacation upon the end of the teaching semester, and adds
that he had for a long time already the plan to enter into direct contact with
Rickerts philosophy: Je crois quil y a plus dun point commun entre nous, et que,
malgr la dirence des sujets traits et des mthodes suivies, nous arrivons des
conclusions assez voisines ou tout au moins conciliables entre elles. (I believe that
we have more than one point in common, and that, despite the dierence of subjects dealt with and methods followed, we arrive at conclusions which are rather
close to or at least reconcilable with each other.) This conclusion was, I think,
more courteous than correct.
54
Ibid., pp. 100104.
70
CHAPTER TWO
RICKERTS CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGISM
55
Ibid., p. 107. In a footnote Rickert refers to his book on the limits of naturalscientific conceptualization which will be discussed extensively in Chapter Five.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
71
not the concepts employed by these vitalists also rationalized concepts derived from biology as a scientific discipline? Are not these
biological concepts, so eagerly adopted by the vitalists, removed from
real life as it is directly lived and emotionally experienced?
As the science which it is, biology must kill life, to apply for
once the language of intuitionist vitalism. Or, to use an expression
of Bergson, like the other sciences biology indeed creates ready-made
clothes which do not fit each individual in particular, since they must
fit all individuals in general. In short, if one wants to experience life
directly, one should not engage in scientific research, even if its object
of research is life, as in the case of biology. Rickert draws a radical conclusion which is the very essence of his epistemology and general philosophy: Lifelessness and unreality is inherent to the products
of not only the generalizing natural sciences, but of each scientific
enterprise. (. . .) There is no science without conceptual thinking, and
that is precisely the sense of each concept, namely that it puts
objects at a distance from directly real life. Even the most lively
object, to which any kind of understanding turns, stops living really,
the moment it is understood. The dualism of reality and concept
can never be abolished.56
Then comes the final, typically neo-Kantian verdict of all vitalism: What is directly experienced as reality, cannot be known. Thus,
there is no metaphysics of life. (. . .) As direct reality life can only
be experienced. As immediate life it mocks any attempt to get to
know it.57 In fact, the mere experience of real life lacks a proper
language. There are no appropriate words for it. It is, Rickert, says,
born mute. The so-called essence of the real world must remain
anonymous, lest it loses its directness and its reality.58
56
Unlebendigkeit und Unwirklichkeit ist mit den Produkten nicht allein der generalisierenden Naturwissenschaften, sondern mit denen jeder Wissenschaft verknpft.
(. . .) Es gibt keine Wissenschaft ohne begriiches Denken, und das gerade ist der Sinn
jedes Begries, dass er die Dinge in einen Abstand vom unmittelbar wirklichen Leben
bringt. Das lebendigste Objekt, worauf irgend ein Erkennen sich richtet, hrt auf,
real zu leben, so weit es begrien ist. Der Dualismus von Wirklichkeit und Begri
ist niemals aufzuheben. Ibid., p. 110.
57
(. . .) was als Realitt unmittelbar erlebt wird, kann nicht erkannt werden. Also
gibt es keine Metaphysik des Lebens. (. . .) Das Leben als das unmittelbar Reale
lsst sich nur erleben. Es spottet als unmittelbares Leben jedem Erkenntnisversuch.
Ibid., p. 113.
58
Ibid., p. 114.
72
CHAPTER TWO
59
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
73
and asks what conditions are needed to reap these results. The causal
relationship is always conditional. A new component is introduced,
however, when the will of the technician enters the relationship. He
posits a certain eect as his desired aim or objective. That is, he
connects the aim with values and transforms thereby the conditions
into the means by which he can obtain his cherished aim. The
causality of physics is then altered into a teleological relationship.
Consequently, the means of realizing the aim acquire a normative
meaning. After all, it is the human, evaluating will that alters causal
eects into meaningful purposes, and causal conditions into teleological means which contain norms. However, physics itself does not
contain such purposes, and is unable to provide moral norms. It tells
the technician what to do, when he wants to arrive at certain eects,
but this telling what to do is a matter of amoral mssen not of
moral sollen. Likewise, the value of an allegedly perfect machine
depends solely on the human evaluation of its performance and
achievements.
Biologistic vitalists, however, claim that biology occupies in this
respect a special place in the realm of the natural sciences. Usually
the physician is taken as an example. He derives the norms of his
profession from biology directly, that is without first adding normative purposes to its concepts. Biology teaches him what the conditions are for a healthy life, and these are then the means which he
must apply in order to do his job properly. Moreover, biology works
with concepts such as organism and development which physics
lacks. The notion of an organism as a whole to which all parts and
components contribute to the advancement of its lively and healthy
state is obviously teleological. Likewise, the biologistic vitalist argues,
the notion of development is much more than just a series of merely
causal transformations. The changes refer to a final stage which is
developed teleologically. In short, the biologistic vitalist claims, purposes and means, values and norms are not brought into the biological world of organisms and developments from the outside by
the human will and its normative evaluations. They are inherent to
biology. They are the natural values and norms.
This, Rickert counters, is a grave and fundamental, logical mistake. As is often the case, he argues, the basic lack of clarity is caused
by the ambiguity of a word. In this case it is the word teleology that
is ambiguous. It is derived from the Greek telos which has a double
meaning. Its meaning is not only purpose which is a value concept
74
CHAPTER TWO
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
75
62
63
Ibid., p. 134f.
Ibid., pp. 156195.
76
CHAPTER TWO
64
Genau wie der logische Sinn eines wahren Satzes ist auch der sthetische Sinn
eines Kunstwerkes, den wir verstehen, und auf den es allein dem sthetischen
Menschen ankommt, ebenso unwirklich, wie es unlebendig ist. Ibid., p. 160f.
65
Ein Kunstwerk, das nur lebendiges Leben enthlt, wird man vergeblich suchen.
Ibid., p. 161.
66
Ibid., p. 162. This was obviously meant as a critique of Nietzsches aesthetic
theories. As to music, Rickert is quite ill informed. It suces to just mention the
naturalistic tone poems of Richard Strauss, or Jean Sibelius, and the evocations
of nature and celebration of life in Gustav Mahlers Das Lied von der Erde, or the
verismo in Italian opera (Giacomo Puccini). Naturalism is also prominent in the arts.
Rickert discusses briefly the sculptures of Gustave Rodin, and tries unsuccessfully
to deny their naturalistic animus.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
77
Ibid., p. 165.
One could counter this thesis of Rickert by claiming that there may well be
religious genes, as there are perhaps erotic, artistic and scientific genes. Rickert
would answer though that these are still the biological impulses, not the values
imputed to them by men.
69
Rickert fails to observe that there is such a thing as natural religion as opposed
to religion based on a believed revelation. Proponents of natural religion could well
argue in terms of biologistic and/or intuitionist vitalism. Moreover, in mysticism
the dualism of God and life is dissolved in a monism of irrational religiosity, the
so-called unio mystica.
67
68
78
CHAPTER TWO
VITALISMS CREDIT SIDE
Meanwhile, the impression may have arisen that Rickert could not
discover anything positive and worthwhile in vitalism.The concluding chapter of his book on vitalism negates this impression.70 He
argues that this school of thought has a certain right of existence.
According to Rickert, philosophy is, as we saw before, a non-specialized, systematic science, based upon and ruled by formal logic.
It is in a sense an empirical science, since its sense-data stem from
reality, or, if you want, from life, as it is experienced through the
senses. It is systematic in that it transcends the fragmented views of
reality by the specialized scientific disciplines, arriving at a rational
comprehension of the world-in-toto. As we will see in the following
chapters, this totalizing comprehension comes about by means of
abstract concepts (the transcendental categories) and through the
relating of values to facts in acts of judgment. As a scientific enterprise philosophy, like the specialized sciences, works with concepts
and theories which are detached from life and direct existential experiences. Yet, Rickert is well aware of the fact that the history of philosophy has demonstrated time and again, how great and classic
philosophers have been followed slavishly by multitudes of admirers,
smaller minds which swear by the words of the masters, even when
these words have become obsolete and have been surpassed by the
ongoing development of thinking and research. The result is a stale
dogmatism which correctly can be called rigid. It is a kind of deadening scholasticism which severely impairs the progress of philosophy.
It stands to reason that people will emerge who rebel against this
rigid dogmatism and scholasticism, dealing summarily with it.
Understandably, yet falsely, these people will revolt subsequently
against each and any system, seeing them as the seedbeds of dry
and lifeless rationalism. It is a kind of reaction which emphasizes
what is conceived of as being original, elementary, natural. Allegedly,
the original, the elementary, the natural cannot be grasped by
reason but must be experienced in an irrational, intuitive manner.
Such a naturalistic reaction was exemplified by German romanticism (particularly in Sturm und Drang), but its basic tenets occur also
70
Ibid., pp. 171195: Das Recht der Lebensphilosophie (The Right of Vitalism).
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
79
in various currents of vitalism. Rickert then views vitalism as a basically false, yet fully understandable naturalistic reaction against a
rationalism which had become petrified into a dogmatic and indeed
lifeless kind of intellectualism.
Bergsons complaint about the ready-made clothing and reach-medowns of rationalistic concepts comes to mind immediately. And in
all fairness, Rickert says, his intuitionist vitalism has its advantages.
Those who rigidly stick to obsolete systems of thought and certainly
those who believe that a mix of natural-scientific concepts can be
employed in order to understand and grasp the world-in-totobasing
their ideas and concepts, for instance, on the physics of Newton, the
biology of Darwin, or the mathematics and astronomy of Einstein71
should be advised to read Bergson. The world is not so small and
poor that it can be understood completely and exclusively by statistical calculations. Bergson, Rickert comments, has seen the other side
of reality which is impervious to calculation. As no one in his day
he saw the limits of natural-scientific conceptualizations.
Before him, Nietzsche exerted the same eect on his readers. With
an overwhelming linguistic force (Sprachgewalt) he managed to communicate the atheoretical importance of what cannot be forged into
concepts. One feels it directly while reading Nietzsche, without understanding it logically.72 Nietzsches enticing, Dionysian celebration of
life is not philosophy yet, but it reminds us, Rickert claims, of the
fact that philosophy is not a mere game of abstract concepts and
theories. Indeed, although philosophical concepts and theories are
necessarily estranged from life, they yet focus at the end of the day
on life and try to grasp it theoretically. If this is forgotten, one ends
up in a fruitless and abstract intellectualism and rationalism.
Rickert then formulates the dilemma somewhat enigmatically as
follows: We are unable to think about what we do not somehow
live, and in philosophy we must think about all of life.73 He claims
then that he too wants to develop a Lebensphilosophie, but he is not
prepared to let it drift o into irrationalism. He wants to remain
Ibid., p. 177.
(. . .) die ungeheure atheoretische Wichtigkeit dessen, was sich in keinen Begri
bringen lsst. Man fhlt sie bei Nietzsche unmittelbar, auch ohne dass man sie
logisch versteht. Ibid., p. 179.
73
Was wir nicht irgendwie leben, darber knnen wir auch nicht denken, und
ber alles Leben haben wir in der Philosophie zu denken. Ibid., p. 181.
71
72
80
CHAPTER TWO
74
For Rickerts philsophical anity with Kant see his Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur, (Kant as Philosopher of Modern Culture), o.c.
75
Ibid., p. 185.
76
Werte als Werte knnen sich nicht ndern. Nur unsere Stellungnahme zu
ihnen ist dem Wandel unterworfen. Ibid., p. 185f.
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
81
77
Wo man (daher) verstehen will, darf man die Werte nicht ignorieren. Sonst
weiss man nicht, was man versteht. Ibid., p. 187.
78
Das bloss Seiende gilt nie, ebenso wie es unverstndlich ist. Ibid., p. 187.
82
CHAPTER TWO
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
79
Arnold Gehlen, Idealismus und Existentialphilosophie, 1933, in: Arnold Gehlen,
Philosophische Schriften I (19251933), (Philosophical Essays, vol. I, 19251933),
Gesamtausgabe Band I, (Collected Works, vol. I), (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, pp. 383403). See also his paper Heinrich Rickert und die Transzendentalphilosophie, 1933, ibid., pp. 403417. His anthropology was systematically treated
in Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, (Man. His Nature and Position
in the World), K.-S. Rehberg, ed., two volumes, Collected Works, vol. 3.1 and
3.2, (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993).
80
Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 1928, (Bern: Francke Verlag,
1962).
CRITIQUE OF VITALISM
83
Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, (The Stages of the
Organic and Man), 1926, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965). Arnold Gehlen, Der
Mensch, o.c. For an introduction to biologically founded anthropology see Marjorie
Grene, Approaches to a Philosophical Biology, 1965, (New York-London: Basic Books,
1968). She does, however, not discuss Arnold Gehlen which is a serious omission.
82
I discussed Plessner and Gehlen in my The Institutional Imperative. The Interface
of Institutions and Networks, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000). See in
particular chapter 2, Institutions and the Transcendence of Biology, pp. 4376.
On Plessner, pp. 4551; on Gehlen, pp. 5163.
81
84
CHAPTER TWO
unlike Rickert, that nothing sensible can be said about such a transcendent reality. Practical evaluations are after all ethical statements,
and these are in Wittgensteins view senseless. It is clear, Wittgenstein
declares in thesis 6.421, that ethics cannot be expressed verbally.
Ethics is transcendental.83 Note the concept transcendental!
Rickert would immediately want to know what Wittgenstein means
by the concept transcendental. He had some ideas about that. What
are his ideas about transcendental philosophy, its peculiar logic and
its related epistemology? This is the main subject of the next chapter.
83
Es ist klar, dass sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen lsst. Die Ethik ist transcendental. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 1921, (Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964), p. 112.
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86
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3
Heinrich Rickert, Die Logik des Prdikats und das Problem der Ontologie, (The Logic
of the Predicate and the Problem of Ontology), (Heidelberg: Carl Winters
Universittsbuchhandlung, 1930), passim. For the copula-function, cf. ibid., p. 60f.
4
dass zwar der Satz: es gibt keine Erkenntnisfrage ohne Seinsfrage richtig ist,
genau ebenso richtig jedoch zugleich, wenigstens fr die allgemeine Ontologie, die
Umkehrung dieses Satzes: es gibt keine Seinsfrage ohne Erkenntnisfrage. Ibid.,
p. 172. When Rickert uses the concept logic he does not refer to formal logic,
as in Aristotelian logic, but much broader to a form of epistemology. The proper
object of logic is, according to Rickert, the truth of thought and knowledge, and
beyond that the essence of truth. How do we arrive at, and what is actually, a true
sentence about reality which then yields true knowledge? Logic is always epistemology,
epistemology is not necessarily always logic. Epistemology studies and analyzes the
processes of knowledge production, the formation of concepts in the first place.
87
guished ontologically two realms, the aistheton and the noeton, i.e. the
relative phaenomena and the absolute noumena. The latter constitute a
world of non-empirical concepts, the Ideas. They transcend the sheer appearance of the senses which are unable to produce any true and generally
valid knowledge. (Needless to add that this is quite dierent from Kants
definition of the noumenon.) The metaphysical Ideas constitute a transcendent reality which must be understood and functions as the aboriginal
picture of reality and as the model for all general concepts of reality. It is
the world of absolute Being which is the source and origin of everythingthat-is: ontos on.
This exhibits a second presupposition of the Platonic epistemology and
ontology, namely the notion that true knowledge is a representation, a picture of reality. It is in fact the origin of the Abbildlogik, the representational
logic, that was elaborated in the medieval, scholastic doctrine of the adequatio rei et intellectus, also adopted by early-modern philosophers, like Hume,
and then vehemently rejected by Kant. However, this presupposition too
demonstrates that in the Platonic philosophy the ontological concept of true
Being depends on the epistemological concept of true knowledge. The
question which metaphysics must answer is, what in sentences about reality does constitute a true predicate and what must be defined as sheer
appearance. Before one answers the question one must know what true
knowledge is.
In early-modern philosophy the search was for an ontology without metaphysics. According to Rickert, Hume was in this respect the most important eye-opener. He is usually discussed as a theoretician of knowledge, but
he was, Rickert emphasizes, at the same time an ontologist who searched
for an understanding of the being of the world in its totality. Although
he maintained the Platonic representational logic, he developed in fact a
radically opposed theory. If Plato created a metaphysical ontology, Hume
was the originator of an anti-metaphysical, sensualistic ontology. He defined
being as a combination of sense-impressions and its copies, i.e. the ideas.
Everything outside these impressions and ideas is, in his view, fictitious.
Here again we encounter the close bond between ontology and epistemology or logic: Ontology is the result of logic.5
Rickert, as we shall see later, is a great admirer of Hume, but certainly
not an uncritical one. In particular the notion that concepts, ideas, were
the representations or pictures of the sensual impressions, could not meet
with his approval. Hume, he points out, forged and applied concepts all
the time which were not all representations of impressions. His theory of
causality, for example, presupposed a conception or an idea of causality
which is far removed from sensual observations. Causality emerges, Hume
claimed, from habits and thus eectuates itself. Humes ontology and epistemology, Rickert concludes, got stuck in the logical fallacies of sensualism, i.e. the belief that knowledge emerges from sense impressions which
5
88
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89
however, he was still unable to free himself from the dominant ontological thinking of his days, inherited from Classic and medieval philosophies,
completely. After all, he saw man as a thinking thing tied to a body in
a rather contradictory manner: And although perhaps (or rather I shall
shortly say, certainly,) I have a body to which I am very closely united,
nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of
myself in so far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and because,
on the other hand I have a distinct idea of the body in so far as it is only
an extended thing but which does not think, it is certain that I, that is to
say my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct from
my body, and may exist without it.8 This is a crucial point in Descartes
argument: my mind by which I am what I amindependently, that is,
of the body.
In fact, this argument in the Sixth Meditation reads like a foreshadowing of the Kantian transcendental a priori. Descartes continues to discuss
the faculties of imagination and perceiving which he views as faculties of
thought. Such faculties cannot be conceived without some sort of attachment to the body as an extended thing. But the conceptions (ideas) of
these faculties do not just emerge in my mind passively. There must be in
me an active faculty capable of forming and producing those ideas.9 This
saddles Descartes with a formidable problem because, he continues, this
active faculty is obviously not part of me as a thinking thing since these
ideas often emerge in my mind without any contribution to them on my
part. Indeed they frequently do so against my will. This active faculty must
be a substance dierent from me. Descartes then jumps to the metaphysical conclusion that it is God himself, or some other creature more noble
than body, in which body itself is contained eminently.10 Needless to add
that neither Kant, nor Rickert or Husserl would accept this epistemological deus ex machina. In neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy and in Husserls
phenomenology this active faculty consists of the completely unextended,
formal transcendental Ego. Prior to Kant, Rickert and Husserl the earlymodern philosophers would more often have recourse to the epistemological deus ex machina.
Locke confronted a basic problematic issue in Descartess epistemology
and ontology. If the unextended thinking thing (res cogitans) is separated
from the extended things (res extensae) the fundamental epistemological question emerges how it could be possible at all that the subjective mind acquires
knowledge about the objective world. Ontologically Locke stuck to the socalled corpuscular theory which in eect was a resumption of the Classic
atomism of Democritus and Epicurus, felt to be adequate again in the
Descartes, idem.
Descartes, ibid., p. 157. The concept of ideas is used by most philosophers
discussed in this section but that is done with many dierent meanings. This is not
the place to discuss this concept in the broader context of early modern philosophy. It would deserve a special monograph though.
10
Ibid., p. 158.
8
9
90
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11
Cf. J. O. Urmson, Berkeley, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), chapter
one. I used the Dutch translation by A. van Kersbergen: J. O. Urmson, Berkeley,
(Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, 2003, 2nd ed.), pp. 723. See also G. J. Warnock, Berkeley,
1953, (London: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 91109. Locke developed his ontology
and epistemology in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1689.
12
Warnock, o.c., p. 93.
91
13
Ibid., p. 99. Berkeley developed his epistemology in his A Treatise Concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710.
14
Ibid., p. 101. See also p. 108.
15
See the Dutch edition of J. O. Urmson, o.c., pp. 6669.
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are the often lively impressions when we hear, or see, or feel, or hate, or
desire. There are secondly the less powerful and lively, more abstract
thoughts or ideas which are representations or copies of these impressions.
The human mind is able to combine the impressions into sometimes fantastic images as long as the components of these images are based upon
impressions. Thus, we can imagine a golden mountain because we know
from experience what gold is and what mountains are, although a golden
mountain does, of course, not exist empirically and objectively.16 Is there
then, according to Hume, such an objective reality of things and objects
independently of the human mind?
Hume argues that it is the natural attitude of man to assume that the
images of the senses reflect external objects: This very table, which we see
white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our
presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It
preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of
intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.17 It would be nice, Hume
admits, to be able to believe in the existence of independent objectsa
belief which is widely spread and popular. Yet, this is, he admits, not possible. He deplores, as Ayer claims, the consequential skepticism but does
not know how to avoid it.18 His position is a bit wavering: It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By
experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present
to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their
connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore,
without any foundation in reasoning.19 He then illustrates this point by his
famous and best known analysis of the phenomenon of cause and eect.
The steady succession of cause and eectis, of course, not caused by
God, or any other metaphysical force, but by the association of ideas in
our mind. If a billiard ball bounces against another still billiard ball, we see
the movement of the first ball, then the collision, and then the movement of
the other ball which did not move before. That is all. The eect of the collision of the two balls cannot be found in the supposed cause, because the
eect diers totally from the cause: Motion in the second billiard-ball is a
quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the
one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.20 Due to experiences and past
observations we have been able to ascertain certain regularities and then
16
Cf. David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1772, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975, 3rd ed.), Section II, On the Origin of Ideas, pp. 1723.
17
Ibid., p. 151f.
18
A. J. Ayer, Hume, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). I used the Dutch
translation by W. Visser (Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, 1999), p. 57.
19
Hume, o.c., p. 153.
20
Hume, o.c., para 25, p. 29.
93
to develop certain laws which should explain the process of cause and eect.
However, we shall never know what precisely last causes are and what precisely causality is. In this sense, Humes epistemology ends in skepticism.21
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young men and women in the final days of the nineteenth century
he is enticed, he admits, by Humes empirism which claims that
our ideas and thoughts are caused by impressions which must be
ascertained as facts. What is not an impression or a copy of an
impression is a fiction. Rickert believes that this nave empirism is
essentially what contemporary phenomenology (Edmund Husserl) is
in essence still all about, since it claims that knowledge is in the end
the result of what is viewed immediately and intuitivelyWesensschau.
This is not altogether wrong but too one-sided. Kant, Rickert continues, can help us to overcome such nave impressionism and intuitionism. Sheer impressions of reality, intuitively viewed, observed
and absorbed can, according to Kant, never yield reliable and valid
knowledge. Such knowledge emerges only, when the content of the
impressions and sensations is in a sense molded by logical, rational
forms, called concepts (Begrie) or categories, such as causality, quality, quantity, etc. Kant, in other words, did not dismiss Humes
impressionism but corrected it by the consequent linking of the
impressions and sensations (content) with the abstract concepts or
categories (forms).
It is more than linking, we may add. The passive impressionism
of Hume is transformed by Kant into an active constructionism,
because by our concepts or categories we in a sense construct reality. This dualism was aptly formulated by Kant in these often quoted
words: without conceptual forms perceptions (Anschauungen) are blind,
while concepts or categories without perceptions remain empty. If
we follow this basic epistemological idea of Kant consistently, and
that is what Rickert sets out to do, we will avoid the empirism of
Hume and the rationalism of, for example, Hegel or the Marburg
School of Neo-Kantianism (particularly Paul Natorp). Avoiding both
pitfalls, yet acknowledging their partial validity, he forged an epistemology which once was called transcendental empirism a label Rickert
did accept with a few reservations.23
However, Rickert is not an orthodox neo-Kantian philosopher. In
many respects he follows his own idiosyncratic path. But from one
point of view he is definitely a follower of the great philosopher of
23
Heinrich Rickert, Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik des
Zahlbegris (The One [as opposed to the Other], the Unity, and the First [as in
number 1]), (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1924), pp. 8486.
95
24
A detailed and systematic analysis of Husserls logical investigations was given
by Herman Philipse, De fundering van de logica in Husserls Logische Untersuchungen, (The
Foundation of Logic in Husserls Logical Investigations), PhD dissertation Leiden
University 1983, (Leiden: Labor Vincit, 1983). For Frege see his Logische Untersuchungen, 1918,1923, in: Gottlob Frege, Kleine Schriften (Small Papers), 1967, (Hildesheim, Zrich, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990), pp. 242394.
25
meine Schrift will nur Erkenntnistheorie, und nicht Psychologie oder Metaphysik
geben. Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 1892, (Tbingen: SiebeckMohr, 1921, 4th and 5th ed.), p. VII. His fight against any introduction of psychology in epistemology and logic is very similar to Freges rejection of attempts
to found logic and arithmetic on psychology. See e.g. Freges very critical appraisal
of Husserls book on the philosophy of arithmetic: Rezension von: E. G. Husserl,
Philosophie der Arithmetik. I, (1891), (Review of E. G. Husserl, Philosophy of
Arithmetic, vol. I), 1894, in: Gottlob Frege, o.c., pp. 179192. Frege speaks of the
devastations which the infringement of psychology caused in logic and called it a
widely spread philosophical disease. Ibid., p. 192.
26
For a concise and adequate survey of Brentanos philosophy in general and
his concept of intentionality in particular which, incidentally, also influenced Husserl
phenomenology, see Wolfgang Stegmller, Hauptstrmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie.
Eine kritische Einfhrung, (Main Currents of Contemporary Philosophy. A Critical
Introduction), (Stuttgart: Alfred Krner Verlag, 1960), pp. 248.
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Kants transcendentalism seems to open indeed the gates for psychological notions and concepts, although Kant himself was critical
of any psychologicalization of his epistemology. Rickert, as we saw
before, claims repeatedly that there is a distinct dierence between
philosophy as a general discipline which tries to grasp reality-in-toto
and the various specialized sciences which approach and investigate
reality in the compartmentalized terms of their specific world of
objective facts and their specific methodological focus. Psychology is
such a specialized scientific discipline and is as such unable to function as a foundation of general philosophy and general epistemology. As a specialized and exact scientific discipline, psychology has
in his view nothing to oer to general philosophy and general epistemology, and the other way around. In fact, all attempts at introducing psychology into epistemology and logic result eventually in a
rather murky, metaphysical psychologism which does harm to both
psychology as a specialized science and philosophy as a general science. Philosophy, he emphasizes time and again, is a science which
tries to acquire knowledge of total reality, unlike the specialized sciences, including psychology, which focus their scientific attention on
specific parts of reality.
BASIC TERMINOLOGY
In his book on epistemology Rickert complains at regular intervals
about a linguistic problem that plagues him permanently but cannot be solved by him in a satisfactory manner. With this book he
tries to introduce the reader into his brand of Transzendentalphilosophie
(transcendental philosophy) and wants to stay as close as possible to
everyday life language in order to remain understandable for students and lay philosophers. Yet, he permanently feels that this language is not able to express precisely and exactly what he wants to
say and convey. Actually, everyday language is not just inadequate
but, which is, of course, much worse, rather misleading too. Since,
for instance, consciousness and mind play a leading role in epistemology, one is easily seduced to attribute scores of psychological
features to it, and thus gradually relapse in psychologism. Rickert
complains, as we saw previously in the introduction, about the fact
that normal, everyday-life language does not oer words and concepts that are in accordance with the theoretical, epistemological
97
98
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99
100
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Immanence then is the subjective reality of mind and consciousnesstwo of such misleading concepts which we must use in
default of adequate epistemological words. Mind, the cognitive Geist,
is manageable theoretically, but consciousness (Bewusstsein) is, Rickert
acknowledges, an awkward concept. Yet, it suces here to realize
that one can grasp it intuitively by realizing that we humans do not
only experience fellow men, animals, things, and events, but are also
able to reflect upon them in our mind and next reflect upon our
experiences of them. In fact, consciousness is first and foremost selfconsciousness. I know that I know, I experience that I experience,
I am aware that I am aware. The I is immanent, but so are its feelings, impressions, ideas, observations. All this is lumped together in
the concept of immanence which stands vis--vis transcendence.
But, as we shall see, loyal to the Idealist tradition he bridged the
Cartesian gap between them by arguing that transcendent reality is
in epistemology only viewed as reality because we, conscious human
beings, adorn it with the idea of reality which is an empty, epistemological form put to use by our mind in its judging capacity. That
needs, of course, a further explanation which will be given presently.
It is also useful to reflect preliminarily on Rickerts concept of
Gegenstand which is hard to translate. In the expression Gegenstand der
Erkenntnis the translation could be object of knowledge. Rickert realizes fully that the Idealist tradition is in danger of a radical subjectivism in which subjective consciousness, as it were, colonizes the
objective world of things. He rejects that position and emphasizes,
as we shall see, the simple fact that in the case of knowledge there
ought to be a reality to be known which somehow is in contrast to
the knowing subject. The German word Gegen-stand means literally
something that stands over against something else: ob-jectum. Naturally
das Ding-an-sich, Kants reality in and of itself, does exist. It is the
substance of all knowledge, it is the chaotic and complex stu of
which knowledge is made. Yet, the object of knowledge is not, as
one tends to believe at first sight, the world of things-in-themselves
because epistemologically a Ding-an-sich acquires the status of reality
only after it has been experienced (as phaenomenon) and after the
human mind has invested it with the form of reality in the act of judging. In this respect the object of knowledge is partly, i.e. as far as
the form is concerned, the product of the subjective mind. Later we
shall see that to Rickert the proper Gegenstand, or object of knowledge is not empirical reality, as the empirists want us to believe,
101
but in the final analysis the transcendent (i.e. not subjectively conscious), non-empirical values. (It is for this reason also that his epistemology must end up in a philosophy of values. That is the subject
of the fourth chapter.)
This distinction of objective content and subjective form is essential to Rickerts epistemology, in particular since he wants to avoid
what he calls the absurdity of solipsism which is the point of view in
which all knowledge is reduced to the subjective construction of reality. The solipsist, he sneers, goes to bed at ten oclock in the
evening and wakes up again at six in the morning without having
dreamed. The real existence of the world was thus interrupted for
eight hours. The solipsist was born in the year such and such at this
and this definite time of the day. This means that this moment was
the beginning of the real world. And from then on the world continues to exist with daily interruptions of so and so many hours while
being asleep, until his death, and then there is no real world anymore. What was there before the year of his birth? And what will
there be after his death? He can come up with only one answer:
nothing that would really exist. This result is after all a bit dubious.32
In a sense, subjectivist solipsism is the exact opposite of nave realism, or empirism. Rickert tries to avoid both erroneous positions
erroneous, that is, in the context of epistemology. As to the distinct,
specialized, empirical sciences, he argues, there is nothing wrong with
such empirism.
Rickert puts so much emphasis upon the Gegenstand dimension of
knowledge, because it represents the standard or measuring rod
(Massstab) of its objectivity and truth. Without a proper and objective
Gegenstand knowledge would float around without sense or meaning, just
as, by the way, the Gegenstand in its turn needs the conscious form of
reality in order to be molded into reality. But again, within the context of Rickerts epistemology Gegenstand, object of knowledge, does not
32
Der Solipsist legt sich abends um 10 Uhr schlafen und wacht um 6 Uhr
wieder auf, ohne getrumt zu haben; dann ist das reale Sein der Welt fr acht
Stunden unterbrochen gewesen. Der Solipsist ist im Jahre so und so viel um die
und die Zeit geboren. Daraus folgt, dass dieser Zeitpunkt der Anfang der wirklichen Welt war. Von da an dauert die Welt mit tglichen Unterbrechungen von
so und so vielen Stunden, whrend er schlft, bis zu seinem Tode, und dann gibts
keine reale Welt mehr. Was war vor dem Jahre seiner Geburt, und was wird nach
seinem Tode sein? Er kann darauf nur eine Antwort geben: Nichts, was real existiert.
Dies Resultat ist doch etwas bedenklich. Rickert, o.c., p. 76f.
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103
34
104
CHAPTER THREE
105
Rickert, o.c., p. 1.
Rickert fails to distinguish between non-rational and irrational. A stone as such
is non-rational, but a person who in an attack of fury throws a stone at someone
else acts irrationally. I prefer to call the Kantian thing-in-itself non-rational, and
not, as Rickert does, irrational. However, this is not the place to discuss this distinction in more detail. I follow Rickerts use of the adjective irrational.
37
38
106
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107
108
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Subjects:
109
47
Ibid., p. 17. Rickerts use of the word positivism is not very clear, nor very
consistent but that is in the totality of his thinking a minor point.
48
Wer die Realitt der rumlichen Aussenwelt oder der Dinge ausser uns fr
ein philosophisches Problem hlt, hat noch nichts von Erkenntnistheorie verstanden.
Ibid., p. 19.
110
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111
50
der Satz der Immanenz (. . .), wonach alles, was fr mich da ist, unter der allgemeinsten Bedingung steht, Tatsache des Bewusstseins zu sein. Ibid., p. 27. (Italics by
Rickert)
51
. . . das Ich das sich, wie man sagt, seiner selbst und zugleich seiner Vorstellungen
bewusst ist. Ibid., p. 28.
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impressions, ideas, feelings, etc.of which we are rationally and logically ignorant. Knowing, knowledge, the knownthey constitute theoretical behavior in which logical rationality plays a dominant role. This
diers, for instance, from aesthetic behavior which is often devoid
of knowledge and rather illogical and irrational. A good example is
to be seen in listening to music: the contents of music enters our
consciousness and is thus bewusst, but for musical enjoyment there is
no need for (musicological) knowledge of the score. It is therefore
not gewusst by the ordinary listener.52 This is also illustrated by our
memories. Remembering things from the past is a conscious activity, but it is usually not a theoretical behavior, as it is in the case
of history as a scientific discipline. In fact, memories are often very
illogical, irrational, emotional.
Three sorts of conscious objects ought to be distinguished: (a) logically permeated, rational objects; (b) real or possibly ideal objects
which are logically impenetrable, yet known and recognized; (c)
objects in consciousness which are neither logically permeated, nor
acknowledged or known. These three types of conscious objects correlate with three types of conscious subjects which Rickert discusses in
reversed order: (c) the most comprehensive subject (das umfassendste
Subjekt), or consciousness which has conscious content without knowing
anything theoretically about it; (b) the theoretical or knowing subject
which knows its objects even though they are irrational; (a) the knowing subject which knows its objects as being rational (logical) as in
the case of mathematics or formal logic. Later, when we follow the
objective path, we shall see that the last type (a) predominates in
transcendental philosophy. In the standpoint of immanence, it is the
first type (c) which plays the leading role.53
Rickert issues another warning still. In the tradition of transcendental philosophy one should not equate consciousness with spatial
realities, to which ordinary language often invites, or rather seduces
us. The expression within consciousness is often equated with in
our head. Yet, this is not very helpful since in the theory of knowledge
consciousness is not an entity in space and time. It is to be conceived
of as a brainless subject (hirnloses Subjekt). Naturally, thinking, knowing,
being aware and being conscious need physical brains, but rational
52
53
Idem.
Idem.
113
54
Ibid., p. 31.
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Ibid., p. 32.
Ibid., p. 33.
57
Ibid., p. 34. George Herbert Mead who distinguished within the Self an I
and a me argued in a similar manner, albeit within the context of empirical social
psychology: The I does not get into the limelight. . . . I talk to myself, and I
remember what I said and perhaps the emotional content that went with it. The
I of this moment is present in the me of the next moment. There again I cannot turn around quick enough to catch myself. I become a me in so far as I
remember what I said. Mead, o.c., p. 174.
55
56
115
the knowing I is not the same as the known I.58 The yesterday
known and the today knowing I are not identical, but only one part
of the I is the known of yesterday, and the other part is the knowing
I of today. (. . .) We may conclude then that the complete I can never
be knowing and known at the same time.59
Now, how do we arrive at a subject which is not an object? Rickert
employs a method which he uses quite often: thinking away components of a phenomenon, conceptually stripping it successively of
its constitutive elements or dimensions. The concept of consciousness, he argues, is often used thoughtlessly, as if it were a coherent
thing. This is wrong, it is a complex and always changing world
which we reduce for claritys sake to two main components: the
immanent subject and the immanent object. Now, in order to arrive
at a proper understanding of what the I is as nominative, i.e. as
pure subject, we should mentally strip consciousness of all its objective elements and dimensions, i.e. of its predicative contents. What
remains is the subject for itself (das Subjekt fr sich) which cannot be
reduced into an object. This contentless, formal, pure subject which
is hard to imagine and impossible to define with the help of ordinary language, is the counterpart of the immanent objects and the
transcendent objects.60
We saw earlier that Rickert distinguishes three types of subjects
which are correlated to three types of objects. Let us retake once
more the first, psycho-physical subject, i.e. the I as my body plus a
psyche/soul. Now, Rickert proposes, let us de-objectify and think
away one hand first, the second hand next, the legs, the torso, and
finally even the head with its brains. What is left in this physical
reduction in the form of a thought experiment is the psychic sphere
as a border concept (Grenzbegri ). It is the concept of a bodyless and
brainless subject. Its counterpart is the massive, transcendent objectivity
58
Rickert, o.c., p. 38. Once again, this is similar to Meads distinction between
the I and the me.
59
Das gestrige gewusste und das heutige wissende Ich sind nicht identisch, sondern nur der eine Teil des Ich ist das gewusste gestrige, der andere Teil ist das wissende heutige Ich. (. . .) So kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis: das ganze Ich kann nie
wissendes und zugleich gewusstes sein. (Italics by Rickert) Ibid., p. 39.
60
Idem. Rickert elaborates here on Kants concept of the transzendentale
Apperzeption. Similarities and dierences of this pure I and the transzendentales
Ego of Husserl cannot be discussed here. It would take us too far away from the
main path alongside which Rickert leads us now. Cf. Ibid., p. 39.
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consisting of things and objects, including my own body. The psycho-physical subject has become less and less physical and more and
more psychical until it has reached the ultimate concept of the psychical I vis--vis a massive objective reality, including my own body.
Rickert continues this de-objectifying, de-ontologizing process, stripping the psychical subject too of all possible characteristics and objective elements/dimensions. In fact, as long as we think of the psychical
subject as some sort of substance or entity in our consciousness
(vis--vis the immanent and transcendent objects) it is still invested
with objectivity and reality. If we think all that away, we arrive at
a final border concept: the subject as an empty form. Rickert calls it the
epistemological subject (das erkenntnistheoretische Subjekt).
At the end of the de-objectifying, object stripping process we are
thus left with a concept of the subject as a contentless empty form.
Without this subject form or formal subject, Rickert claims, we would be
unable to even think about subjects!61 He uses still another concept
for this subject form or formal subject: Bewusstsein berhaupt, which
can be translated as absolute consciousness. Or better still, since Bewusstsein
still carries the concept of being (Sein), Bewusstheitthe absolute conscious status. It will play a crucial role in the second part of our
journey, the objective path, but Rickert introduces it here in order
to complete the picture of the subject-component of the subjectobject relationship in knowledge. This idea of a formal subject
subject conceived as a contentless, empty formmay be odd at first
sight but is on second thought quite understandable. After all, we
all know from experience what we mean when we say subject, just
as we understand immediately what the word form means since all
reality consists of content and form. Now then, the concept subject
form is that which cannot be objectified, which cannot be thought
as an object, and is yet understandable as long as we do not relate
it to real things but to a conceptually isolated, formal dimension only.
With each real subject we also think of this form of subject, that is,
if we think at all of a subject distinguishable from an object. All it
needs is to think of the form itself, while we disregard all content.62
Ibid., p. 42.
Bei jedem realen Subjekt denken wir diese Form des Subjekts mit, falls wir
berhaupt ein Subjekt im Unterschied vom Objekt denken, und es kommt nur
darauf an, die Form fr sich zu denken, indem wir von allem Inhalt abstrahieren.
Ibid., p. 49.
61
62
117
It stands to reason that even the idea of an I ought to be eliminated from the subject form. The contentless absolute consciousness
can never be my consciousness since that would re-introduce notions
of substance and content again. Everything individual in the I, or
everything that made me into this unique and special, real person,
is objectifiable. It must therefore as object be juxtaposed to the formal, unreal, epistemological subject which is the end of the series of
subjects.63 Absolute consciousness is formal and timeless, comparable to mathematics and the rules of formal logic. But we should at
all times keep in mind what Rickert says about its main function: it
is because of the subject form that we are able at all to think, speak
and write about subjects. That is precisely why it is called the epistemological subject! In fact, Rickert adds, we should refrain from
speaking about a subject which experiences impressions and thinks
ideas, since such a subject is still not an empty form. We are confronted here with a nameless, general, impersonal consciousness.64
It is indeed an absolute consciousness (Bewusstsein berhaupt), Bewusstheit
which is impossible to translate but means something like the state
of being conscious.65 But again, it is actually not wise to speak in
ontological terms about this absolute consciousness. Actually, Rickert
thinks and writes about it in functionalist terms. We cannot determine what it is, but only what it does.
All this leads to an epistemological question which is, incidentally,
not asked within the standpoint of immanence, but very crucial to
Rickerts brand of transcendentalism: is there outside the immanently
63
Alles Individuelle am Ich oder alles, was mich zu dieser einmaligen, besonderen realen Person macht, ist objektivierbar. Es muss daher als Objekt dem formalen irrealen erkenntnistheoretischen Subjekt gegenber gestellt werden, das am
Ende der Reihe von Subjekten steht. Ibid., p. 43f.
64
ein namenloses, allgemeines, unpersnliches Bewusstsein. Ibid., p. 45.
65
Not surprisingly Rickert and his assistants had quite a few Buddhist students
from Japan. See Glockner, op. cit., 229234. There is, of course, a kind of selective anity between the mystical elements of buddhism and (neo)Kantian transcendentalism. Rickert even taught in private an extremely rich samurai, named
Kuki. With him he read Kants Critique of Pure Reason. There were two advantages for the philosopher: first, he enjoyed to once again subject Kant to a close
reading; second, he could improve his private finances which had suered great
losses during the inflation years of the 1920s. Kuki claimed himself that his name
meant Neunteufel (Nine Devils), and in the family circle of Rickert he was always
called Baron Neunteufel. Mrs. Rickert Verburg gave me a witty poem written by
Rickert for a festive occasion in the family, in which he praised his Japanese student,
in particular because of his financial succor. See also Glockner, op. cit., p. 232.
118
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66
Rickert phrases this question, which I paraphrased, as follows: gibt es ausser
dem formalen erkenntnistheoretischen Subjektzugehrigen oder von ihm abhngigen,
immanenten, bewussten Objekten noch transzendenten Objekte als Realitten? Oder:
gibt es ausser den vorgestellten Dingen, die Inhalte eines Bewusstseins berhaupt
sind, noch Dinge an sich, die als transzendent reale Dinge nie den Charakter der
Bewusstheit tragen oder nie immanent reale Objekte werden knnen? Ibid., p. 46f.
67
This reference to the evolving, functioning and changing objects of the empirical sciences reminds one of Ernst Cassirer, Substanzbegri und Funktionsbegri. Untersuschungen
ber die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik, (Concept of Substance and Concept of Function.
Investigations about the Fundamental Problems of the Critique of Knowledge),
1910, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. Collected Works, vol. 6). Rickerts
conception of the transcendent objects is predominantly substantive (almost cor-
119
puscular), but comes often also close to Cassirers more modern functionalism.
However, since his epistemological focus is primarily on what goes on in the observing, thinking and judging subject the dierence between a substantive and a functional view of objective reality is not very relevant. Moreover, Rickert would
probably argue that Cassirers discussion pertains to the specialized, empirical sciences, not to his own brand of transcendental epistemology. Rickert, incidentally,
did exchange a few brief letters with Cassirer but did not incorporate his extensive
writings in his own publications, neither did Cassirer in his.
68
Rickert, o.c., p. 54f.
120
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about it. The basic fault of this kind of criticism is that one defines
thinking as imagining (vorstellen) and a concept as a kind of imagination (eine Art Vorstellung). But what we have here is judging (urteilen).
The judgment the transcendent is not a content of consciousness is
valid and not at all a contradiction.69 (We will later return to Rickerts
theory of judgments.)
The concept of transcendent object is problematic, since this
object is apparently independent of a subject which is not possible,
since in our thinking subject and predicative object always presuppose each other. Yet, we saw before that we could and conceptually should as in a theoretical hypothesis coin the concept unconscious
subject. In that case we can also speak of a correlated unconscious
i.e. transcendentobject. It is admittedly very thin conceptual air,
but Rickert believes that in the conceptual world which is, to phrase
it in modern terms, a virtual world, such constructions are possible,
admissible and even unavoidable. He then comes to the following
concluding, negative definition of the concept of transcendence. It is
something of which it is denied that its destiny would be to become
a content of consciousness, or to be imagined by consciousness.70
Kant used, of course, a less cumbersome description of the transcendent
world: das Ding-an-sich, the thing in and of itself, without the interference of subjective consciousness. But, as we have just seen, Rickert
would comment that the concept of Ding already contains as concept
or as name the interference of subjective consciousness.
One of the major problems of the epistemological concept of transcendence is the naive realism by which we usually think and reflect
about it. For example, there is a tenacious tendency to interpret the
relationship between subject and object in physiological terms. The
idea behind it is that physiology could function as a reliable, scientifically under girded foundation for epistemology. Rickert rejects that
conclusion relentlessly. There is really nothing more simple, he argues,
than the following chain of thought: here is a table; its color, solidity,
temperature etc., which is all subjective, content of consciousness,
pure experience, immanent. That can surely not be doubted. But all
this is, at the same time, just the eect of the table, as it exists really,
independent of any experience of the subject. Without transcendent
table there would be no immanent table. As a result one may not
69
70
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 60.
121
cast doubt on the one or the other.71 The typically realistic idea
behind this chain of thought is, of course, that reality outside consciousness is the main cause, the causa eciens, of the impressions and
sensations of it in the human mind. So far so good, but what sort
of cause is the realist thinking of ? Certainly not the epistemological
subject of the absolute consciousness (Bewusstsein berhaupt), but the
psycho-physical objectthe body invested with psyche or consciousness.
In fact, the realist arguing in physiological terms views the subjectobject relationship in terms of physiological processes between bodies. That is certainly correct within the context of the natural-scientific,
specialized discipline of physiology, but it does in no way whatsoever bear on the epistemological problem of immanence and transcendence in knowledge.
Let us recall once more the three types of subject correlated with
the three types of object, as has been explained before. It was the
third type of subjectthe epistemological one as a contentless form72
which was correlated to a very problematic transcendence. Transcendence is a problem, not physiologically, but epistemologically, because
it is permeated by immanence due to the concepts which are imposed
on it. Even the realities of the natural sciences, e.g. physiology, are
not real in and of themselves but real due to the concepts which
the knowing subject employs and applies in order to understand
them. Color, temperature, solidity, and yes the overarching concept
of realitythey are not intrinsic components of the table but
conceptually imposed upon it by us who are epistemological subjects. Rickert speaks of the immanence of all spatial beings.73
71
Es gibt wirklich nichts Einfacheres als diese Gedankengang: hier ist ein Tisch;
seine Farbe, seine Hrte, seine Temperatur usw., das alles ist subjektiv, Bewusstseinsinhalt, blosse Empfindung, immanent. Daran drfen wir gewiss nicht zweifeln. Aber
das alles ist zugleich nur Wirkung des Tisches, wie er an sich, unabhngig von
jeder Empfindung des Subjekts real besteht. Ohne transzendenten Tisch gbe es
auch keinen immanenten Tisch. Folglich darf man den einen so wenig wie den
anderen in Frage stellen. Ibid. p. 64.
72
Das Bewusstsein als Subjekt ist keine transzendente Seele; es ist berhaupt
keine Realitt. (Consciousness as subject is not a transcendent soul; it is no reality at all. Ibid., p. 73.
73
Ibid., p. 63. The thesis that there is a logical dierence between the natural
sciences on the one hand and (transcendental) epistemology on the other, and that
there is no conflict between the two, is essential in Rickerts thinking. We will discuss it again in the chapter on the natural and cultural sciences. It returns several
times in Rickerts Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, but is elaborated specifically in the
section Das Transzendente als Ursache (Transcendence as Cause), o.c., pp. 6273.
122
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123
75
124
CHAPTER THREE
77
Ibid., p. 125.
125
126
CHAPTER THREE
Rickert finally reaches the destination of his epistemological journey, when he decides to further investigate the knowledge act, that is
the act of attributing conceptual forms (real, actual, factual, true,
etc.) to immanent contents (experiences, impressions, ideas, etc.). If
we conclude that something is real or a fact, we express a judgment
(Urteil ). Till now our search for the epistemological object of knowledge has been negative. We have investigated various roads which
were unsatisfying, although in many respects enlightening and at
some points not totally incorrect. But Rickert invites us now to look
at the problem of knowledge and its criterion of truth and objectivity in a positive manner: knowing is an act, namely judging: Each
knowledge starts with judging, progresses to judgments and can only
end in judgments. Therefore, as actual knowledge it consists only
of acts of judgment.81
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ACT
If we define knowing in terms of the act of judging, we choose for
the primacy of the practical reason above the theoretical reason. Or, phrased
dierently, we define the theoretical reason which generates words
and concepts in terms of the practical reason which generates acts.
But here another change is involved still. From the standpoint of
immanence knowledge is an aair of consciousness. Reduced to its
essence, knowledge is from this standpoint, as we have seen, an
immanent imagining (Vorstellen) of the equally immanent impressions
(Wahrnehmungen). Now we must go beyond that position and define
knowledge in terms of an act of judgment by which a form, e.g. reality or truth, is imposed on experiences and impressions. Knowledge
is then transformed from something conscious (Bewusstes) to something known (Gewusstes). What then is the object (Gegenstand ), i.e. the
objective criterion (Massstab) which is independent of the judging subject and therefore transcendent? Also, what then is the judging subject which imposes its judgments on the immanent impressions and
experiences? We are back at the initial question of the subject-object
relationship of knowledge, but this time knowledge is defined in terms
of an act, not an inner-consciousness aairthe act of judging.
Jede Erkenntnis beginnt mit Urteilen, schreitet in Urteilen fort und kann nur
in Urteilen enden. Sie besteht also als aktuelle Erkenntnis allein aus Urteilsakten.
Ibid., p. 163.
81
127
82
Once again, this resembles the main argument of Ernst Cassirer, Substanzbegri
und Funktionsbegri. Untersuchungen ber die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik, o.c. The dierence
between Rickert and Cassirer is the fact that the former argues in terms of systematic transcendentalism, while the latter argues in terms of the specialized discipline of the history of philosophy.
83
Ibid., p. 140f. Gottlob Freges important distinction of Sinn and Bedeutung will
be discussed in Chapter Four. Rickert does not distinguish as sharply between sense
and significance, as Frege does.
128
CHAPTER THREE
observing of reality. On the contrary, in judgments we take positions vis--vis one or more values! That is, we value things, rate them,
estimate thempositively (approving) or negatively (disapproving).
True or false judgments are always evaluating acts.84
Thus, knowledge is not a neutral, value-free, and passive observation, but it is an act of judging in terms of an approval or a disapproval, based upon positive or negative values. But we should keep
in mind that this brand of epistemology is Idealistic by nature. We
make observations and receive impressions (Wahrnehmungen). These
immanent objects, however, are in and of themselves rather chaotic
contents which must be molded and ordered by forms in order to
become coherent, solid and reliable knowledge. Well then, in the
case of judgments these forms are the approvals or disapprovals of
the act of judging which in their turn again are related to positive
or negative values.
Meanwhile, Rickert emphasizes the fact that we are dealing here
with knowledge, and thus with a purely theoretical approving and disapproving related to the theoretical values of truth/falsehood, or
reality/unreality. If I say this is a sheet of paper, I do not express
a purely neutral fact, but issue (usually without being aware of it)
a judgment in which I impose forms like facticity and reality on
my impression of the sheet of paper. But these impositions are values because the question to be answered after the statement was
made, is something like this: is it true? Is this object really a piece
of paper? The question is to be approved or disapproved. Now,
Rickert acknowledges that all this is rather strange at first sight. It
is strange, because in everyday life we usually rate and evaluate in
terms of non-theoretical values, such as the hedonistic values (pleasure/displeasure, lust/pain), aesthetic values (beautiful/ugly), or ethical values (good/evil).85 In epistemology, however, these non-theoretical
values should be distinguished from the cognitive, theoretical act of
judging. Only truth/falsehood and reality/unreality are admissible in
our theoretical judgments about realityor, more precisely, about
the immanent objects, i.e. our impressions and experiences of reality.
84
Ibid., p. 165. This is similar to Brentanos epistemology in which the positive
or negative judgment (Urteil ) plays a crucial role. The dierence again is that
Brentano sees the act of judging as a psychological act which Rickert rejects as a
psychologistic fallacy. For Brentano see Stegmller, o.c., pp. 217.
85
Ibid., p. 170. We will return to this in more detail in the next chapter.
129
Thus the meaning of sentences like: this smell is pleasant, or: this
picture is beautiful, or: this will is morally good, remain outside consideration.86 These sentences, Rickert adds, are strictly speaking also
truth claiming judgments, but fall outside the realm of epistemology
because they refer predominantly to hedonistic, aesthetic and ethical values and ratings. If the question of their truth is raised, it is
very hard to decide whether hedonistic, aesthetic and ethic evaluations are correct or incorrect, true or false. In epistemology which
searches theoretically for objectivity and truth, we should abstain
from them.
We must now direct our attention to the knowing subject. It is,
so much is clear by now, the approving or disapproving, evaluating
and rating subject. However, it should not be confused with the individual, historical knowing person of flesh and blood. Rickert disagrees with Wilhelm Dilthey on this point. In his philosophy Dilthey
warned not to isolate a knowing subject from the total human being
of flesh and blood. He stood, as we saw before, in the tradition of
Lebensphilosophie and rejected any attempt, such as Rickerts, to isolate the knowing function from the rest of the human being. This
may be the correct thing to do, Rickert counters, in psychology or
in history as scientific disciplines, but it is inadmissible in epistemology which works with a theoretical concept of knowledge and
searches for the objectivity of the cognitive performance of judging.
Epistemology is not to be confused with philosophical anthropology.
Its mission is much more modest. After all, we only want to understand the essence of theoretical thinking and its capacity to arrive
at objectivity.87 The theory of knowledge is only concerned with the
theoretical behavior of the subject, and is in that sense a theory of
theory.88 But it must be repeated once more, the subject acquires
reliable knowledge only by issuing judgments. That is, knowing is
not only theoretical but above all practical as well: it approves or
disapproves and thereby relates objects to positive or negative values.
86
Der Sinn von Stzen wie z.B.: dieser Geruch ist angenehm, oder: dieses Bild
ist schn, oder: dieser Wille ist sittlich, bleibt deshalb hier vllig ausser Betracht.
Ibid., p. 169f.
87
Wir wollen ja lediglich das Wesen des theoretischen Denkens und seine Fhigkeit
zur Objektivitt verstehen. Ibid., p. 168.
88
eine Theorie der Theorie. (Italics by Rickert). Idem.
130
CHAPTER THREE
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE OF JUDGMENTS
At this point of our journey which nears its end, another dimension
must still be added to the act of judging in terms of positive or negative values. Rickert calls it the judgments necessity (die Urteilsnotwendigkeit), or its commanding dimension expressed in verbs like to
have to, or ought to which contrasts with beingin German: das
Sollen as opposed to the facticity of das Sein.89 It is obvious that the
theoretical and non-theoretical values to which the judgments relate,
cannot be characterized by the concept of being. Values do not
exist in terms of sheer being, as things, human beings, animals, and
also events and happenings exist. Values cannot be experienced by
the senses. That is, values are not, but are valid or not valid. Not
being, or existence but validity is their essence, although one should
actually not talk about them in such essentialist terms. In any case,
in and of themselves values are not real. They acquire reality (being)
by attaching them to real beings through their judgments. We want
these judgments about reality to be true in the sense of valid. If
that is accomplished, we may even experience a hedonistic sense of
certainty. (The famous German Aha-Erlebnis comes to mind here.)
But, Rickert hastens to add, this is a psychological category which
should be left out of the exclusively theoretical, scientific orientation
of his epistemology. It certainly cannot function as the theoretical
foundation of the judgments necessity we are discussing here.
Rickert did (and probably would) not phrase it this way, but I am
inclined to call this necessity of judgment an epistemological categorical
imperative which is again to be seen and interpreted as an empty and
timeless form attached to equally timeless, ahistorical values as forms
(true-false, real-unreal). Unlike the hedonistic values (pleasure and
pain) which are historical, time bound and individually real, the theoretical values (true-false, real-unreal) are logical values and thus, like
the rules of mathematics, ahistorical, timeless and formal. More relevant still, these theoretical values are independent of our individual contents of consciousness, i.e. our impressions, imaginations,
feelings, expressions of the will. The latter are not general or universal but individual and time bound, since they have a beginning
at our birth and find their end in our death. Theoretical values, on
89
131
the contrary, are and remain valid independent of our birth and
death. They are universal and general like the rules of mathematics. Because of the universal and general nature of the theoretical,
logical values we cannot judge, i.e. approve or disapprove, vicariously but are bound by a power which we are obliged to acknowledge and obey. To give a simple example, when I hear tones and
am asked, if I hear anything, I must, I have to admit that I hear tones:
Yes, I hear music. Without this necessity, this Sollen, I would remain
stuck in uncertainty, and either not judge at all, or decide to abstain
from any judgment. This certainty gives my yes-judgment the character of unconditional necessity. It is a thought necessity and judgment necessity (Denknotwendigkeit and Urteilsnotwendigkeit),90 that is, a
categorical imperative. Naturally, this pertains equally to statements
of fact. They acknowledge the necessity that one has to judge this
and this way and not dierently. It is the necessity of the Sollen which
is not a causal-psychic coercion but a logical ground: it is a logical
Sollen, not a causal Mssen.91
Rickert then draws a spectacular conclusion which he himself
labeled as our Copernican standpoint:92 the assignment of reality and truth to the impressions and observations (Wahrnehmungen and
Vorstellungen), and not these impressions and observations themselves,
decides what is real and true, or unreal and false. Such an assigning Urteil can only be accomplished by the interference of logical
values (true/false, real/unreal), and by valuing, rating judgments in
the form of admitting (bejahen) or denying (verneinen). These values
are, in the theoretical sphere of epistemology, not specific, historical
and individual, but timeless, general and universal. They are above
all couched in the necessity of the verb ought to (Sollen). In the
final analysis thenand this concludes Rickerts epistemological search
for the Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, i.e. for the object of knowledge that
functions as the criterion (Massstab) of truth and objectivitythe
object of knowledge and criterion of its objectivity and truth is not
Ibid., p. 177.
Ibid., p. 179, footnote 1. It is for a non-native user of the German language
hard to distinguish Mssen from Sollen. Maybe the following simple example may
help somewhat: all human beings must (Mssen) eventually die; a prisoner condemned to death has to (Sollen) die on a set date. Mssen (have to) is naturally
causal, Sollen (ought to) on the other hand is morally, or legally causal.
92
unser kopernikanischer Standpunkt, ibid., p. 182.
90
91
132
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93
In the next chapter we shall see that Rickert has called his position also transcendental empirism. After all, he never denied the existence of an objective, transcendent reality (Kants thing-in-itself ) which is the proper object of the empirical,
specialized sciences and the very source of human experiences and sensations. This
is indeed an empirist dimension of his epistemology, but the Kantian idea that the
proper object of knowledge is not the thing-in-itself that cannot be known but the
immanent deposit of the experiences and sensations in consciousness is its Idealist
dimension.
133
CONCLUSION
With this conclusion we have reached the final destination of our
epistemological search for the object and the subject of theoretical
knowledge. We are, as Rickert observes correctly, in everyday life
and in the dierent scientific disciplines as well, thoroughly embedded in empirism. We do not cast doubt on the objectivity of facts,
organic beings and inorganic things. Yet, if we do not discard epistemology as a valid philosophical enterprise, one may wonder with
Kant and the neo-Kantians, as to how valid or true knowledge of
the surrounding reality and of our own bodies and minds as parts
of this reality, can come about at all. It is a basic and directly understandable fact that we perceive this reality through our senses. We
hear, taste, see, feel reality (organic and inorganic things, and historical events) incessantly, and it is quite obvious that these sensations and perceptions are the raw material of what we usually call
knowledge. It is then quite convincing also that there must be an
instance which organizes this raw material into a structured and
systematic material, using categories like time, space, quality,
quantity and causality as organizing instruments. This instance
is not the I, or the mind or the psyche of empirical psychology,
because they are still predicative objects of the knowing subject,
which is itself obviously not part of this reality. It is not real or
empirical, but a priori and transcendental.
When we are prepared to engage in epistemology, Rickert asks
us to shed our everyday life, often nave realism or empirism. Scientists,
who want to reflect upon epistemological issues, are also invited to
bracket their legitimate belief in the objectivity of the facts which
are being investigated within the boundaries of their specific disciplines. That reminds one, of course, of Husserls epoch. In fact,
Husserl is next to Rickert one of the few philosophers who elaborated on Kants transcendentalism. There are, however, basic dierences
between Rickerts neo-Kantianism and Husserls phenomenology. In
particular Husserls Wesensschau as the phenomenological technique
that allegedly could bridge immanence and transcendence is alien
to Rickerts epistemology and philosophy of values.94 Reduced to its
94
This is not the place to enter into a detailed, comparative analysis of the similarities and dierences of Rickerts and Husserls transcendental epistemologies.
That would be an interesting exercise though.
134
CHAPTER THREE
95
As I related earlier, several Japanese philosophy students came to Heidelberg
in the 1920s in order to learn the intricacies of neo-Kantian transcendentalism.
This is not amazing, since in the Zen-Buddhist and Shintost traditions emptiness
135
and empty forms play a predominant role. Once, during a stay in Japan as a visiting professor, I participated in a tea ceremony held in one of the many Japanese
temples. Afterwards I asked the Japanese colleague who accompanied me, what the
meaning of the ceremony actually was. He smiled and said that this was a typically Western question: the ceremony had to have a meaningful content. He explained
to me that it has no meaning, no substance, no content. It is an empty form which
puts one at rest, which in a way empties the mind and the soul. It does so by simple forms such as the very sparse furniture ( just a wooden table and a few tatamis),
the simple shape of the bowl from which one drinks the tea (with the imperative
that the bowl is to be held by both stretched hands), and also the gestures of the
hostess who pours the tea and of the guests who drink it. Rickert, who incidentally
was an avid tea drinker, would certainly have sympathized with this Japanese ceremony and its inherent formalism. But then, he would also realize that this formalism was primarily aesthetic and maybe even hedonistic, but not theoretical and
epistemological. It may bring about a kind of mystical, phenomenological Wesensschau,
but it will not render any rational, value related, theoretically sound knowledge of
reality.
96
Richard M. Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn. Essays in Philosophical Method, 1967,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). The classic, although disputed
text is Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1936, (New York: Dover Publications,
n.d.).
97
E. Berns, S. IJsseling, P. Moyaert (eds.), Denken in Parijs. Taal en Lacan, Foucault,
Althusser, Derrida, (Thinking in Paris. Language and Lacan, Foucault, Althusser,
Derrida), (Alphen a.d. Rijn, Brussel: Samson Uitgeverij, 1981), p. 23.
136
CHAPTER THREE
98
John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, (New York: The Free Press,
1995; Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1995). We return to Searles
constructionism within an institutional context in the Conclusion.
137
hand, is an instrument for action, i.e. for judgmenta sort of measuring rod which is used by the subject, when it makes judgments.
Now, at the end of his epistemological chain of arguments, Rickert
introduces necessity (Sollen) as the essence of judgments, and judgments as the essence of knowledge. He next argues that the necessity of judgment is the main criterion for its theoretical truth or
falsehood. So far so good, but he then proclaims this criterion
(Massstab) as the object (Gegenstand ) of knowledge. Well, it may be a
criterion but it is very hard to fathom how necessity (Sollen) as a
characteristic of the evaluating judgment could be an object (Gegenstand )
of knowledge. If object and criterion are mixed up theoretically, one
ends up in theoretical confusions which no language could ever put
into words, let alone clear them up.
In the concluding pages of his epistemological treatise he engages
in finely tuned analyses of the values which in fact are a prelude to
his general and systemic philosophy of values. That leads us beyond
his epistemology. It is time now to leave the epistemological considerations, and focus our attention on his philosophy of values. It
will be the main subject of the next chapter. After that, we turn to
his ideas about natural-scientific and cultural-scientific concept formations, for which the road was paved by his epistemology and his
theory of values.
CHAPTER FOUR
140
CHAPTER FOUR
141
the world is something else than the aggregate of its parts. Moreover,
if someone has understood all the parts, he has not yet grasped the
totality scientifically. (. . .) The totality is nothing but the name for
the form which holds all the parts together.3 It is an autonomous
reality with its own constitution and characteristics. We cannot put
it together by placing, as it were, the various scientific disciplines in
a row and adding them up into one gigantic whole. This is a misconceived sort of holism which Rickert rejects. There would be, in
all probability, no end to this row. It would yield an endless reality (unendliche Wirklichkeit), representing a semi-empirical, and rather
metaphysical kind of whole. Indeed, specialists of the various sciences have come up with such metaphysical speculations as is testified
by biologism, psychologism, historicism, etc. In all these cases one
can observe the typically holistic pars pro toto reasoning.
Next to holism as a metaphysical system based on biology, which was explicated first by Jan Christiaan Smuts in 1926, Wolfgang Khlers Gestalt psychology and Kurt Lewins Field Theory come to mind here. J. C. Smuts
(18701950), South-African General and Prime Minister who was a student
in literature and science at Stellenbosch University and studied law at
Cambridge University, saw holism as a tendency in the organic world
which incessantly forge parts into wholes that acquire autonomy vis--vis
the parts: Both matter and life consist of unit structures whose ordered
grouping produces natural wholes which we call bodies or organisms. The
character of wholeness meets us everywhere and points to something
fundamental in the universe.4 He saw six progressive phases in the holistic
evolution of the world: (1) The sheer synthesis of parts in the inorganic
world which lack mutual internal activities as in a chemical compound. (2)
The synthesis of parts with mutual activities in order to maintain the body
as in plants. (3) The co-operative activities are centrally controlled, yet
implicit and unconscious as in animals. (4) The central control is conscious
and culminates in a single personality, or collectively in societal groups. (5)
In human associations this control is superseded by the state and similar
group organizations. (6) Finally, there emerge the ideal wholes, or Holistic
Ideals, or Absolute Values, disengaged and set free from human personality,
operating as creative factors on their own account in the upbuilding of a
spiritual world. Such are the Ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, which
. . . das Ganze der Welt ist etwas anderes als das Aggregat ihrer Teile, und
auch wer alle Teile begrien had, hat daher noch nicht das Ganze wissenschaftlich
erfasst. (. . .) Das Ganze ist nichts als der Name fr die Form, die alle Teile zusammenhlt. Heinrich Rickert, o.c., p. 16f.
4
Jan C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution, 1926, (New York: The Viking Press, 1961),
p. 86.
3
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lay the foundations of a new order in the universe.5 Phase 6 is very similar,
as we shall see, to Rickerts notion of the realm of values. Yet, Smuts
social philosophy and metaphysics are very dierent, because to Rickert
absolute values are not empirical emergences from lower systems but
unreal, transcendent forms. Rickert would, of course, also reject the metaphysical idea of holism as an ubiquitous process in the universe. It results
in a mere adding-up of so-called unit structures without any systematic
order. The result is limitless and thus unknowable.
Khlers well-known psychological notion of a Gestalt, i.e. a structured
whole, seems likewise to be similar to Rickerts concept of totality, but is
also essentially dierent. Rickert would sympathize with Khler (18871967),
yet remark that the concept of Gestalt belongs to the specialized discipline
of psychology, not to general philosophy. Therefore it cannot contribute to
a general-philosophical and transcendental notion of the cosmos as a totality.
The following quote corroborates this: Phenomenally the world is neither
an indierent mosaic nor an indierent continuum. It exhibits definite segregated units or contexts in all degrees of complexity, articulation and clearness.
Secondly such units show properties belonging to them as contexts or
systems.6 That might be psychologically correct, philosophically this notion
is useless.
Smuts combined his idea of wholes with that of fields. As there are, he
argued, fields of energy in physics, there are fields or zones of energy around
concepts and theories, as well as around things and objects.7 This resembles the well-known Field Theory of Kurt Lewin (18901947) which was
forged and applied by him as a method of studying group dynamics. It is
essential according to Lewin to observe the individual within his or her situation and to view that situation as a whole, as a field: What is important in field theory is the way the analysis proceeds. Instead of picking out
one or another isolated element within a situation, the importance of which
cannot be judged without consideration of the situation as a whole, field
theory finds it advantageous, as a rule, to start with a characterization of
the situation as a whole. After this first approximation, the various aspects
and parts of the situation undergo a more and more specific and detailed
analysis.8 Rickert would again sympathize with this notion of a field as a
whole of facts constituting the situation of the individual, but he would
once more point out that it remains restricted to the specialized field of
empirical psychology. He would probably object though to Lewins use of
the concept theory, since it apparently is not a theory but rather a method
or research technique.
Smuts, o.c., p. 106f. The quotation is on p. 107.
Wolfgang Khler, The Place of Value in a World of Facts, 1938, (New York,
London: A Mentor Book, 1966), p. 75.
7
Smuts, o.c., pp. 17f., 112114.
8
Kurt Lewin, Field Theory and Learning, 1942, in: Kurt Lewin, Field Theory
in Social Science. Selected Theoretical Papers, 1951, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964),
p. 63.
5
6
143
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subject nor object, thus nothing. Maybe this country is the homeland of philosophy?10 This is an exaggeration. It is obvious that the
homeland of Rickerts philosophy consists of two heterologically linked
parts: the immanent/transcendent reality of objects and facts, and
the unreal reality of values.
Before we explore this further, we must emphasize at this point
once again that Rickerts reality-in-toto (Weltall ) is initially a non-metaphysical and non-scientific concept. He views it, as we have seen,
definitely as a theoretical concept of philosophy-as-science, which is
a general, not specialized science. Neither is this reality-in-toto the
metaphysical result of the adding-up of the dierent compartmentalized realities of the specialized sciences into some sort of massive
and endless whole, as happens in holism. It is also not a neo-Platonic,
encompassing and idealistic totality from which all realities metaphysically emanate. Weltall is a formal and autonomous reality, yet
it is not real in the empirical sense of the word. In fact, he sees this
reality-in-toto rather as a postulate which the philosopher needs in
order to grasp the world of facts and the world of values in a noncompartmentalized and non-specialized manner. Or rather, realityin-toto is more of a formal Mglichkeit (possibility) than a material
Wirklichkeit (reality).11 Indeed, coping with Rickerts philosophy needs
a good deal of Robert Musils Mglichkeitssinn, a sense of possibility,
rather than, as we are used to in the various scientific disciplines,
Wirklichkeitssinn, a sense of reality.
With this concept of the Weltall, which is admittedly at first sight
hard to grasp, Rickert searches for a concept which distinguishes
and simultaneously links the world of transcendent/immanent things
on the one hand, and that of values on the other hand, without
destroying their respective autonomies as happens in the dialectics
of thesis and antithesis merging into a synthesis. In fact, he distinguishes within this total reality three interlinked realisms. There is
the First Realm of transcendent/immanent facts and objects, which
10
. . . etwas jenseits vom Subjekt und Objekt, (. . .) ein Reich, das zwar allen
naheliegt, das aber viele in seiner Eigenart verkennen, weil es (. . .) weder Ich noch
Nicht-Ich, weder Welt noch Nicht-Welt, weder Subjekt noch Objekt, also Nichts
zu sein scheint. Vielleicht ist dies Land die eigentliche Heimat der Philosophie.
Rickert, o.c., p. 72.
11
In order to understand Rickerts concept of the Weltall one needs to divest
oneself of what Musil called the sense of reality (Wirklichkeitssinn), and exchange it
for the sense of possibility (Mglichkeitssinn). Robert Musil, o.c., p. 16.
145
is heterologically linked to the Second Realm of values and meanings. Reality-in-toto is in this sense bifocal. But that would still not
be a really total, encompassing reality. There is therefore a Third
Realm of meaning bestowing acts which is not metaphysical but in
fact very empirical, yet not real in the empiricist or positivist sense
of the word. This is remarkable, because the bifocal reality in this
conception of Rickert is integrated and unified by means of an act
the act by which the meaning of the Second Realm is bestowed on
the transcendent/immanent facts and objects of the First Realm.
However, these three realms do not yet constitute reality-in-toto since
they are after all still three autonomous realms. We shall see later
that he posits an encompassing (and quite surrealistic) Fourth Realm
which is the metaphysical Weltall. It cannot be grasped cognitively
by means of scientific concepts, but reveals itself by means of symbols, similes and allegories. But before we enter into this phantasmagoric
world we must first continue the analysis of values and meanings.
FACTS AND VALUES
The first and most basic idea of Rickerts theory of values is his distinction between two realms which exist autonomously, yet are linked
to each other: The unreal values are an independent realm. They
are juxtaposed to the real objects which also constitute an independent realm.12 This sounds like Platonism, but that is not what it is.
The Platonic world of ideas is the first and utmost (essential) reality
from which all realities emanate metaphysically. Rickerts realm of
values, on the contrary, is heterologically linked with the empirical
realm of facts and objects. Both realms are transcendent vis--vis the
immanence of consciousness. They are autonomous and in that sense
independent, yet they are heterologically linked to each other: the
one is nothing without the other. There is yet a distinct dierence
between the two realms. The real (transcendent) objects are not of
anybodys interest, they just exist, they are just factual. They are as
such irrelevant, they do not touch us, we can imagine them but consider them as just being there. It is a mere existing (blosses Existieren).
Take a block of granite somewhere in nature as an example. It is
12
Die irrealen Werte stehen als ein Reich fr sich allen wirklichen Gegenstnden
gegenber, die ebenfalls ein Reich fr sich bilden. Heinrich Rickert, o.c., p. 114.
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13
Max Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf (Science as a Vocation), 1919, in: Max
Weber, Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1968), p. 604.
147
14
In Chapter Six I shall discuss Simmels important critique of this theorem of
Rickert, which he calls the negation problem (Negationsfrage).
15
Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann,
1975; 11th ed.).
16
Heinrich Rickert, Die Logik des Prdikats und das Problem der Ontologie, (The Logic
of the Predicate and the Problem of Ontology), (Heidelberg: Carl Winters
Universittsbuchhandlung, 1930), pp. 198236.
17
Rickert discusses the concept of nothingness in Platos Sophistes, the negative theology of the mystic Angelus Silesius, Goethes Faust (the radical nihilism of
Mephistopheles), and Hegels dialectical logic comparatively: ibid., pp. 210226. Quite
remarkably Rickert overlooks the theory of being and nothingness by his neoKantian predecessor Hermann Lotze (18171881) who claimed that the being of
things is experienced in their relations and interactions with other things. He then
defines nothingness as pure being without relations and interactions. It is not a
metaphysical but a logical concept, Lotze claimed. Cf. Hermann Lotze, Der Zusammenhang der Dinge, (The Coherence of Things), (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1864),
pp. 719.
18
This conceptual distinction reminds one of Gottlob Freges distinction of sense
(meaning) and significance (Bedeutung) which will be discussed presently.
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this radical manner. When we use the word nothing it carries mostly the
meaning that it can be actually thought of, but that it does not in fact
exist in the world. It is the relative nothingness, i.e. nothingness in relation
to the actual existing in the world. Again, the three cornered circle or the
unicorn are examples of relative nothingness. Rickert does not provide us
with an example of absolute nothingness. That, of course, is impossible
because there is no way to imagine it, thus there are no words for it. The
mystic would have an answer: in mysticism God is the absolute, unimaginable Nothingness which can only be experienced without thoughts and
without words.19
Rickert then concludes his discussion of the concepts of being and nothingness by addressing himself to Heideggers inaugural address. Heidegger,
he argues, rejects logic and epistemology in favor of metaphysical ontology. As to nothingness, das Nichts, he rejects the idea that logic, epistemology, reason are able to grasp and reveal its very nature. However,
Rickert points out, Heidegger has to use words in order to explain his
ideas, words which must be understood by means of reason. The word
nothingness is such a word, a concept that must be clarified. The epistemological and logical question then emerges what Heidegger means by
nothingness and what its relation is to the theory of nothingness as a
logical predicate, i.e. not just as a form of thought, but as a form of knowledge. In Heideggers metaphysics, Rickert summarizes nothingness is the
something of which nothing positive can be said, yet which is not a simple negation but a non-something in view of its predication. Actually,
Heideggers nothingness is heterologically the other side of predicative
being (das Andere der erkennbaren Welt). It is even the source and origin of
each no and each denial, not the other way around. He goes even one
step further, Rickert continues, when he describes the world in which we
live, the world of predicative and immanent being, as a finite world, whereas
the other dimension of this world is the infinite world of transcendent nothingness. Being reveals itself in our Dasein when it is confronted with this
transcendent nothingness. Rickert wants to elaborate this metaphysical notion
in an epistemological and logical direction: we need nothingness as the
other dimension of the world, in order to catch comprehensively that
which is, i.e. that which is for us, or the world, i.e. our world. And he adds
19
In his discussion of Silesius he brands this mystic as a representative of the
relative notion of nothingness. Silesius did indeed put his negative theology into
words defining God by negating everything that is usually said, felt, written about
him: What God is, we do not know: he is not light, not spirit, not truth, unity,
oneness, not what one calls divinity, not wisdom, not reason, not love, not will, not
goodness, no thing, no non-thing (Unding), etc. Rickert, o.c., p. 212. Yet, it seems
to me that even this attempt to formulate the being of God in terms of various
negations is not really relative, as it strips God of all positively existing features.
What rests is total emptiness, total kenosis, i.e. total nothingness. The true mystic
remains silent, abstains from speech and written words. The Greek verb muein from
which the word mystic is derived, means to remain silent.
149
with some pride: Heidegger thus thinks not just logically, but even heterologically, i.e. he knows that one understands the one only then completely logically, when one distinguishes it simultaneously from the other.20
Rickert finishes with the observation that all the philosophers whom we
call great focused primarily not on the metaphysical Beyond of Nothingness,
but on the world which can be known and understood, i.e. real world
which can be predicated positively. Heideggers expositions about nothingness
may be confronted, Rickert concludes, by these words of Goethe: Remain
happy in Being.21
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That is to say, what is being said about reality makes sense, has
meaning. The meaning of the sentence is, more precisely, that this
statement applies the value Reality to the content of the statement.
Or in Kantian terms, the content the statement is about, is brought
under the form Reality. This statement is true means this statement covers reality. It is the essence of science to arrive at meaningful and true statements about realitywhatever that reality may
be. The essence of such scientific, theoretical statements is their value
which is in this case truth (Wahrheit). That is, of course, closely connected with reality (Wirklichkeit). As scientists and philosophers we are
involved with Truth and Reality, they grasp us, and we take up
positions in regard to them. Rickert is in his theory of values primarily interested in these theoretical values. They are, in fact, the
measuring rods for the other (atheoretical) values.
Atheoretical values are either aesthetic (beauty-ugliness), hedonistic
(pleasure-pain), ethical (goodness-badness), or religious (faith-unbelief ).23
They are non-scientific and cannot be criticized sensibly by rational
logic. Rationalists like to believe that these non-theoretical values can
be criticized logically, but they disregard the essential dierence between scientific and non-scientific rationalities.24 Scientific rationality,
Rickert argues, is dominated and even steered by the value of truth.
However, it cannot employ legitimately the values of the other atheoretical domains (e.g. beauty, goodness, or faith), nor can it reach
the atheoretical domains by means of its value of truth. The theoretical
statement this is true cannot be criticized or rejected in terms of
One may, of course, raise the question whether this series of values is exhaustive.
What about the economic value of economic goods? What about socio-political
values such as powerpowerlessness, order/systemchaos/anarchy, or the legal
values ( justice-injustice)?. He did refer to the monetary value, as we shall see instantly,
but this did not result in a special category of Economic Value, comparable to
Truth, Beauty, etc. At the end of his life, Rickert did try to construct a social philosophy in which socio-political values, such as community and people (Volksgemeinschaft ),
occupied a prominent role. Regretfully, he then came close to a fascist worldview, evaluating power, order, system positively and their heterological counterparts
negatively.
24
Here Rickert diers, of course, radically from the Vienna School. See the manifesto of this school written by R. Carnap, H. Hahn, O. Neurath, Wissenschaftliche
Weltauassung: der Wiener Kreis, (The Scientific Worldview of the Vienna Circle)
(Vienna: Wolf, 1929). Also R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, (The Logical
Construction of the World), (Berlin: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928). For an introduction
and collection of relevant texts see A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, (Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, 1959).
23
151
25
As to scientific proof Rickert was somewhat navely positivistic. In the debate
on verification (Carnap) and falsification (Popper) he would probably have chosen
for the former. It is not clear, if he was acquainted with this debate. That could
have been possible, since Karl Poppers Logik der Forschung, translated into The Logic
of Scientific Discovery, 1959, (London: Hutchinson, 1974, 7th ed.) appeared in Vienna
in 1934.
26
Nur Gter und Wertungen sind real, Werte als Werte nie. Rickert, o.c., p. 122.
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27
Das Geld selber ist kein Wert, sowenig wie das reale Kunstwerk, sondern es
haftet an ihm Wert, und wenn wir sagen, dass es ein verwirklichter Wert sei, so
meinen wir damit, dass ein Wert sich mit ihm verbindet, der es zum Gut macht.
Der Wert selber ist auch in diesen Fllen nicht real. Betrachten wir Geld ausschliesslich als reales Objekt, so ist es wertfrei. Ibid., p. 119. I changed the plural
in diesen Fllen in the singular in this case, since the main subject of the quoted
sentence is a singular. An interesting case is, of course, the restorers of old paintings. Their interest is not only and not even primarily the aesthetic value of the
painting to be restored, but in particular the material composition of the linen and
the chemical composition of the paints and lacquer which the painter originally
used. Natural science, art history and the skills of craftsmanship thus form a unique
unity within the interest and expertise of the art restorer. See Anne van GrevensteinKruse, Restauratie: Geschiedenis en Vooruitgang, (Restoration: History and Progress),
inaugural address University of Nijmegen, May 26, 2005, (Rotterdam: Nijmegen
University Press, 2005).
28
Rickert rarely referred to Freud but it seems obvious that he would disagree
with his theory of the pleasure principle vis--vis the reality principle. He would
interpret pleasure, as Freud has dealt with it, as a psychological good, and thus as
a an inherent component of reality.
29
Rickert claims that such values, in particular the theoretical value of truth, are
eternally and absolutely valid. But there are, of course, occasional statements such
as it rains now and this is red. Rickert would probably counter that, if it has
been proven empirically that the rain falls and the color is red indeed, the validity of these truths will be eternal and absolute because it is no longer dependent
on now and this.
153
gratified here and now.30 Here Rickert disagrees obviously once more with
Nietzsche, whose Zarathustra sang: All pleasure wants eternity, wants deep,
deep eternity.31 Pleasure, Rickert would probably sneer, does not want eternity, it wants immediate gratification. Yet, values, including Truth, do not
float about but are always connected to the interest and the will of empirically real, evaluating subjects: There can be no values without a will that
acknowledges or demands them. The will, however, is always part of reality.32
Naturally this Wollen (will) is closely tied to the Sollen (ought to): most
Sollen depends on Wollen in whose name something ought to be and
thus is demanded. However, we should realize that a demanding
value is never identical with the demanding will as it occurs in reality, because there is this dierence between the real reality of the
objects and the senses, and the unreal, ideal reality of the values
and norms. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the value which expresses
a demand would disappear, if there were no people who wanted it,
and who practically and actually demanded it. Take the normative
rule thou shall not kill. It could be seen as the demand of a divine
will. Since in that case God wants it (a divine Wollen), many of us
consider this norm to be valid for us. But if one no longer believes
in God, one will either no longer acknowledge the norms validity,
since the real divine will disappeared, or one will in its stead posit
a human will, and next claim that this human will validates the
norm. Killing is then no longer viewed as sin, i.e. as an oence
against the norm thou shall not kill, but as an inhumane injustice, or a crime punishable by a secular state law. If, however, there
were no people who rejected killing, it would no longer be an injustice, and the norm would no longer be valid.33
Incidentally, this goes to show that values and norms are actually
not that tidily knit together as is often believed. The norm thou
shall not kill was connected first, as part of the Ten Commandments,
Ibid., p. 124.
Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit, will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit. Friedrich Nietzsche,
Also sprach Zarathustra, (Thus Spoke Zarathustra), part three, in: Friedrich Nietzsche,
Werke in Drei Bnden (Worls in Three Volumes), volume two, (Mnchen: Carl Hanser
Verlag, 1955), p. 473.
32
Ohne einen Willen, der sie anerkannt oder fordert, gibt es auch keine Werte,
die gelten, und der Wille gehrt stets zum Wirklichen. Ibid., p. 128. This stands
in contrast to Rickerts observation that the theoretical value of truth is eternal and
absolute, not related to individuals, including their will we may assume.
33
Ibid., p. 128.
30
31
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with a divine will and thus with an allegedly divine value. But the
very same norm may disengage itself from this religious value, and
next be tied unaltered to a very dierent, more humanist kind of
value, namely that of humane justice. Nowadays we fill the norm in
with the notion of human rights.
All this demonstrates once again that values do not exist, but are
or are not valid. Not Sein (being) but Geltung (validity) is the essence
of values! This validity is not something like recognition or acknowledgement on the part of empirical human beings. In that case validity
would be an empirical, rather relativistic fact or datum which it is
not. Validity is not empirically real and contingent like facts, things
or objects. Validity is tied to values and partakes in their unreal,
virtual character. Try to imagine value-free validity! Value-free
validity, Rickert comments playfully, reminds one of non-nicotine
tobacco or decaeinated coee. Maybe many love it only, because
they are philosophically too nervous to endure the world problems scientifically.34
Only values can be valid. Something that just exists and in fact
does not interest us, cannot be valid. So facts as such are never valid
or invalid, but value-judgments about facts are valid or invalid in so
far as the values involved are valid or invalid. The existence of a
piece of paper is neither valid nor invalid, but the statement this
paper is white is either true or false, since the form and value
Reality is or is not applicable: it is or is not really white. After all,
the value couple of truth/reality-falsehood/nonreality is involved here.
These are theoretical values, but the atheoretical values too are characterized not by their existence but by their validity. A banknote is
valid or invalid. However, not the real object, i.e. the banknote as
a piece of paper, but its embodied unreal monetary value is valid
or invalid.35
34
Wertfreies Gelten erinnert an nikotinfreien Tabak oder koeinfreien Kaee.
Manche lieben es vielleicht nur deshalb, weil sie philosophisch zu nervs sind,
um die Weltprobleme wissenschaftlich zu vertragen. Ibid., p. 126.
35
In daily parlance we, of course, say this banknote is counterfeited and thus
invalid. Yet, if we go to the bank for reimbursement, we will be told that the counterfeited banknote is null and void because it does not carry any monetary value.
Or, in other words, that this banknote is indeed just a piece of paper like any other
valueless piece of paper. Values are carried by goods, but Rickert emphasized
time and again that one should distinguish between unreal values and real goods
which are the carriers or embodiments of the values.
155
36
Heinrich Rickert, Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik des
Zahlbegris, (The One [as Opposite of the Other], the Unity, and the First [as in
Number One]. Comments on the Logic of the Concept of the Numeral), (Tbingen:
Mohr-Siebeck, 1924).
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37
Pfeerkuchen- und Kieselsteinarithmetik, Rickert, ibid., p. 6. Mill did not
argue in such a simplistic manner. In his logic of the sciences he defended a radically inductive method, applying it even to what he called the science of number. All numbers must be numbers of something; there are no such things as
numbers in the abstract. Ten must mean ten bodies, or ten sounds, or ten beatings
of the pulse. But such induction will eventually lead to the notion numbers of
anything and thus give cause to the idea that numbers are abstract things not tied
to concrete experiences. The proposition 1=1 is not as certain as we want to believe
because both units are not necessarily equal: for one actual pound weight is not
exactly equal to another, nor one measured miles length to another; a nicer balance or more accurate measuring instruments would always detect some dierence.
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, 1843; abridged version: Ernest Nagel (ed.), John
Stuart Mills Philosophy of Scientific Methods, 1950, (New York: Hafner Press; Collier
Macmillan Publishers, 1974), 161170; quotations on pp. 163, 167, 168. For Nagels
critique on Mills inductive theory of number see his (informative) Introduction, o.c.,
p. XLVI f.
157
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40
41
42
Ibid., p. 40.
Die Euthanasie der Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 41.
159
160
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lead to the notion of an endless total reality as the sum of all the
mutually relative parts. Rickert admits that this logically faulty concept of an endless Weltall is at least able to function as the stable,
non-relative point to which single parts of reality can be related
meaningfully. But that is, of course, no longer relativism. In fact, it
is the only correct use of the concept of relativity, i.e. as something
relating to something else which is not relative. As we shall see
presently, he does not embrace the relativistic notion of an endless
totality as the result of an endless regression, but is in agreement
with the allegation that it at least can function as a relatively stable
point to which the compartmentalized parts of reality can be related.
He prefers to call it relationism instead of relativism,46 and searches
next for a more adequate concept of the non-relative Weltall (totality).
Rickert then sums all this up in his custormary heterological manner: Everything is never just the one which is related to something
else, but everything is always the one and the other to which the
one is related. In the one and the other linked together we then
encounter the absolute, within which something relative is at all possible.47 It is remarkable that the notion of relativity is not rejected,
161
dessen ein relatives berhaupt erst mglich wird. Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie,
o.c., p. 42f. This heterological section of his book on General Philosophy is repeated
verbatim in his previously quoted essay Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins, pp. 916.
48
Cf. Allgemeine Grundlegung, p. 43.
49
I shall consistently translate the concept Sinn by meaning or sense, and the concept Bedeutung by significance.
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(meaning) to truth value (significance), and may often oend our aesthetic
or religious sensitivities: With the quest for truth we would leave the enjoyment of art and turn towards a scientific observation. For that reason we
do not care, whether for instance the name Ulysses contained any significance, as long as we adopt the poem (i.e. Homers Odyssey, ACZ) as
a work of art. It thus is the pursuit of truth, which inspires us everywhere
to push from meaning to significance.50
Rickerts conceptual distinction of Sinn (meaning, sense) and Bedeutung
(significance) is not as clear as Freges. However, the weak spot in Freges
theory is the (sociological!) notion that we are being driven from meaning
to significance everywhere and thus always. This is, of course, extremely questionable. In everyday life, and also outside Western culture, people are
more often than not quite satisfied with meaning-without-significance. In
fact, it can be argued that unlike science, particularly religion and art are
grounded upon meaning-without-significance. Truth and its pursuit have a
very dierent meaning in religion and art than in science and logic.
Let us start, Rickert the teacher proposes, all over again.51 The most
comprehensive concept which covers all conceivable objects is that
of Being (Sein). Being can indeed mean everything that we are able
to think of. If we say this paper is white, we state that this particular sheet of paper belongs to being, carrying predicatively an
additional feature, namely that it is white. Next, we can also say
the world is. We then mean to say that everything that belongs to
the world exists, including what possibly could be thought of as being
unreal. After all, something is unreal means to say that the unreal
50
Mit der Frage nach der Wahrheit wrden wir den Kunstgenuss verlassen und
uns einer wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung zuwenden. Daher ist es uns auch gleichgltig, ob der Name Odysseus z.B. eine Bedeutung habe, solange wir das
Gedicht als Kunstwerk aufnehmen. Das Streben nach Wahrheit also ist es, was uns
berall vom Sinne zur Bedeutung vorzudringen treibt. Gottlob Frege, ber Sinn
und Bedeutung, 1892, in: Gottlob Frege, Kleine Schriften (Small Papers), 1967,
(Hildesheim, Zrich, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990, 2nd ed.), pp. 143162.
Quotation, p. 149. In this context the quest for the historical Jesus is an interesting case. The four gospels in the New Testament provide stories, it is claimed
by most theologians, which are not historical but kerygmatic; i.e. they belong to
and originate in the preaching and teaching of early Christianity. Some New
Testament scholars have tried to destill from the recorded sayings of Jesus a picture of who he historically, i.e. prior to the preaching and teaching of the early
Christian community, really was. In Freges terms, the gospels have meaning (in
particular for Christian believers), but they have no significance (in particular for
historians). Cf. H. Ristow, K. Matthiae (eds.), Der historische Jesus und der kerygmatische
Christus (The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ), (Berlin: Evangelische
Verlagsanstalt, 1960).
51
Cf. Rickert, o.c., pp. 101.
163
52
Der Satz, etwas ist nicht-seiend, klingt in der Tat wie: etwas fllt nicht fallend, oder brennt nicht brennend, und scheint also Unsinn zu enthalten. Rickert,
o.c., p. 103.
53
I have adopted the useful concept of sense-data from Bertrand Russell. Cf.
Bertrand Russell, The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics, in: A. Danto, S. Morgenbesser (eds.), Philosophy of Science, 1960, (New York: New American Library/Meridian
Books, 1974), pp. 3355, in particular p. 36.
54
One may object that lust can definitely be felt and experienced physically.
However, Rickert would remind us to distinguish between the lust experience and
the lust value, as we usually know to distinguish beauty as value and the experience of it in daily life.
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165
purely technical term and thus not at all related to any kind of metaphysical existentialism. It is introduced in order to cover the two
dimensions of reality: existing is first the subjective-objective (immanent-transcendent) reality of the senses (sinnlich Reales) and second the
ideal reality beyond, or prior to the senses (unsinnlich Ideales),58 as in
the case of values. These are two epistemological domains, two realms.
However, there is still a kind of reality which is something, yet does
not exist in the double sense mentioned. It constitutes a third domain,
a third realm. It is neither sinnlich real, nor unsinnlich ideal. For example, if we understand that a statement is true, we call that which
is being understood the meaning of the sentence. There is, in other
words, this understandable meaning of the true sentence, yet this
meaning is unreal, i.e. it does not exist as either an empirical and
sensual reality (meaning cannot be smelled, touched, heard, etc.), or
as a non-sensually ideal reality (meaning is not comparable to a
mathematical statement or a value). It is an ideal (transcendent) reality but without existing in the dual sense of the word. In short,
meaning does not exist, but is valid. Being valid and validity ( gelten,
Geltung) characterize meanings.59 Or, as Rickert phrases it, the word
existing (Existieren) contains everything that is not valid. Validity then
can be viewed as a special kind of being, but is not existing.60
Ibid., p. 108.
Rickert applies this also to the rules of formal logic which are, unlike the rules
of mathematics that belong to the non-sensual, ideal reality, components of a third
realm that is not and that does not exist, but that is or is not valid. This validity, as we shall see, is part and parcel of the value of Truth.
60
Rickert, Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins, o.c., p. 83. This is, on first sight, confusing, since we saw before that validity is also what dierentiates values from the being
of the immanent-transcendent reality of experiences and impressions. In the Preface
to his Die Logik des Prdikats und das Problem der Ontologie, (The Logic of the Predicate
and the Problem of Ontology), (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universittsbuchhandlung,
1930), p. 8, Rickert announces an essential change of the use of language. The
concept Being is now no longer used in opposition to the unreal Validity, i.e. to
values, meanings and Sollen. Validity, value and meaning, are, he argues, after all,
inherent components of the world-in-toto which without them would be incomplete.
He refers to the Preface of the 4th and 5th edition of Gegenstand der Erkenntnis,
(Object of Knowledge), 1892, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1921), p. XII, where he
also re-defined Being as no longer the opposite of unreal validity and meaning,
but as the encompassing concept for everything that can be thought of at all (alles
Denkbare berhaupt). Regretfully, he did not incorporate this re-definition in this
epistemological opus magnum and neglected the useful distinction of Existieren and
Sein. Consequently, this re-definition does not contribute to the necessary perspicuity
of his ontological and epistemological concept formation.
58
59
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Scientific activity is not possible without understandable, true meanings.61 But, once more, the meaning of a true sentence is unreal in
the sense of non-existent. The psychological act of understanding the
meaning of the true sentence (Verstehen) is real, and thus does exist,
yet the meaning that is to be understood, is but does not exist.
Here we encounter once more the diculty of expressing all this in
everyday life language which is inaccurate, when it comes to a priori phenomena. Meaning, it was said, is neither sensually real, nor
non-sensually ideal, and thus is non-existent. Yet, it is not nothingness in which case we would not have to talk about it at all.
This is hard to conceive: meaning is not and does not exist, yet
the word nothingness does not apply to it. It is in a sense a third
realm which connects the first realm of sensual objects and the second realm of ideal objects in a heterological manner. He views these
three realms as the Weltall, the reality-in-toto, he searched for. It covers the real and the unreal, i.e. it covers (1) what exists sensually
real (sinnlich real ), that is, the sense-data. Rickert calls it the First Realm.
It covers also (2) what exists unsensually ideal (unsinnlich ideal ), that
is, the values and the mathematical statements. He calls it the Second
Realm. But it covers in addition (3) what is non-existent ideal (ideal
nicht-existierend ), that is, the meaning of a true statement or, Rickert
adds, the rules of logic. This is the Third Realm. These are three
realms, of which the third one reconciles the other two that are
heterologically dierentiated. That resembles Hegels Aufheben, because
the first and the second realm are not annulled but, as it were, lifted
up into a third realm.62 We will see, however, that this is not what
Rickert meant.
61
Naturally Frege would use the concept of significance (Bedeutung) here instead
of the concept of meaning (Sinn).
62
This is not the place to discuss the similarities and in particular the dierences
of Hegels dialectics and Rickerts heterology. Rickert admired Hegels logic which
he studied intensively, yet placed his own heterological logic in the tradition of
Kant. Cf. Heinrich Rickert, Die Heidelberger Tradition und Kants Kritizismus.
Systematische Selbstdarstellung (The Heidelberg Tradition and Kants Criticism.
Systematic Self-Presentation), 1934, in: Heinrich Rickert, Philosophische Aufstze,
(Philosophical Papers), R. A. Bast, ed., (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1999), pp. 347412.
In his preface to Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins, he calls Hegel the greatest philosopher Heidelberg has had. O.c., p. III.
167
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STAGES OF BEING AND VALIDITY
But before we discuss Rickerts theory of values, validity and meaning bestowing acts, we must still investigate first another aspect of
real being and valid values, namely the fact that they occur in three,
or perhaps four stages. Rickert enumerates first the three, or four,
stages of being.
Firstly, we begin with the stage of real being which Rickert heterologically links to appearance (Schein). Being and appearance (Sein
und Schein) are, of course, strictly separated in scientific research. Also
in common-sense the two are usually kept apart. The dierence
between being and appearance depends on the subject-object relationship. After all, each appearance presupposes a subject that holds
for real something that is not real, whereas real being exists objectively
independent of any subject. Yet, quite often appearance is a form
of real being as well, as is the case with the hallucinations of an
individual. They are, strictly taken, appearances, but they are not
nothing, in fact they are quite real to the individual involved. (Or
in Freges terminology, hallucinations are subjectively, i.e. to the person involved, meaningful but have objectively, in terms of empirical
science, no significance.) The hallucinating person sees something
apparently real which others do not behold. It is easy to think of
other examples of such individual and subjective, phantasmagoric
appearances. This then is the first stage of real being. It is an individual-subjective stage of being, which is the heterological counterpart of appearance. Whenever we want to determine what is real,
we must avoid this primary form of appearance.
Secondly, there are forms of collectively subjective appearances
which do exist, yet are unreal. For example, we all see a straight
sta as if it were broken in the water, or in the summer the cellar
feels cool, while it feels warm in the winter. These are not individual and particular, but collective and general experiences. They are
real, yet they are nonetheless only subjective appearances.
Thirdly, the former two stages of appearance were (individually
and collectively) subjective. The third stage is very dierent, as it
concerns an objective, independent being which is the objectively
testable reality of the empirical sciencesthe proper and real reality, devoid of any appearance (Schein). Neo-positivists believe it to be
the one and only true reality, outside of which everything is but
appearance.
169
Rickert would agree with the following argument of Rudolf Carnap. In section 10 of his Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie, (Fictitious Problems in Philosophy),
1928, he presents by means of illustration the following philosophical case.
Two geographers, the one a philosophical realist, the other a philosophical idealist, are sent to Africa to find out, whether a legendary mountain
really exist or not. As scientists the two geographers are in possession of
certain criteria by which the question can be answered, independently of
idealist and realist philosophical positions and propositions. After some diligent research the two geographers will arrive at a consensus as to the existence (or non-existence) of this mountain. And if it exists, they will also
come up with concurrent facts about its height, location, Gestalt, etc. There
will be consensus on all such empirical questions. The option for one or
the other philosophical standpoint has no substantial bearing on their
scientific investigations.
However, disagreement will arise the moment these scientists change into
philosophers and begin to interpret the data of their empirical research.
The realist will then say that this mountain does not only carry geographical
characteristics, but is also real; or, he will conclude in a phenomenalist
version of realism that there is something real, though unknowable, in the
essence of this mountain. The idealist will disagree and claim that this
mountain is not real, but it is our observations and other conscious processes
that are real. Now these two theses, Carnap concludes, lie beyond our
empirical experiences and are therefore nicht sachhaltig, not relevant. Neither
of them proposes to verify his thesis by a joint, conclusive experiment, nor
does either of them oer the suggestion of an experience which could give
a foundation for his thesis.63
Rickert would agree with this conclusion, but add that Carnap should
have said scientifically not relevant. Geography is one of the specialized
sciences which focuses its attention on but one compartment of total reality, and in doing so is completely justified in disregarding philosophical
questions and sticking to a (philosophically nave) positivism or empiricism.
However, the moment one does ask realist or idealist questions as to the
constitution of reality and consciousness, one engages logically in a metabasis
eis allo genos, i.e. a transition to a completely dierent worlda generalphilosophical world in which the debate between realism and idealism is
meaningful. In fact, Carnap himself testifies blatantly to the fact that he
has chosen for a radically realist position. Moreover, after this logical transition from specialized science to general philosophy and epistemology it
does make sense to conclude that both geographers are as scientists also
driven or guided by values, the value of Truth to begin with. These values
63
Rudolf Carnap, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie. Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit, (Fictitious Problems in Philosophy. The Non-I and the Realism Conflict),
(Berlin: Im Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928), pp. 35f. The concept Fremdpsychisches is very
hard to translate. It means the psyche or consciousness of other people apart from
myself. I decided to translate it as Non-I.
170
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64
171
172
CHAPTER FOUR
objective. Yet, one may not forget the fact, as rationalists are prone
to do, that the statement this mountain does indeed exist is also a
value-judgment (Werturteil ), because truth or falsehood is involved
here, and truth is after all the prime (theoretical) value.
However, what applies to the theoretical value of truth (i.e. its
objective validity), cannot simply be applied also to the atheoretical
(aesthetic, ethic, hedonistic, religious) values, because if these values
were objectively valid, i.e. true, they would not be atheoretical but
theoretical, i.e. scientific. It would be sheer intellectualism to believe
that the atheoretical values, like beauty or lust, could be proven logically and scientifically to be true and absolutely valid. This, we could
add, would be scientism, i.e. an inadmissible, metaphysical overrating of science through which the world is viewed as a scientific
world.65 Rickert labels it rationalism or intellectualism. Its origin lies,
according to him, in Platos concept of the metaphysical Logos, which
was further elaborated by Hegel in his concept of Geist. Logos or
Geist as the most general concept which covers everything, not just
the real reality of objects and things but the goods, as the incorporations of values, as well.66
The rejection of intellectualism or rationalism, Rickert warns,
should not lead us astray into relativism or skepticism. First of all,
if the atheoretical values cannot be theoretically (i.e. logically and
scientifically) supported, their validity can at the same time not be
theoretically shaken either. All attempts to prove by means of logical arguments that aesthetic, ethic, hedonistic or religious values are
invalid, are as untenable as opposite attempts to prove their objective validity by means of theoretical arguments. It is the main task
of a sound theory of values to understand, not to falsify or prove, the
65
This is, of course, what Rickert separates from the philosophers of the Vienna
Circle. See for instance Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The logical
Construction of the World), o.c. It is interesting to contrast this book with Alfred
Schutz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, (The
Meaningful Construction of the Social World. An Introduction to Understanding
Sociology), 1932, (Wien: Springer Verlag, 1960). Alfred Schutz (18991959) was a
professional banker and a lay philosopher, but he saw himself as a student of both
Edmund Husserl and Max Weber. In this PhD dissertation and later publications
he made an attempt to go beyond Webers neo-Kantianism in the direction of a
phenomenologically inspired understanding sociology.
66
Rickert, o.c., p. 150. Needless to add that Carnap would not have been amused
by this argument which labels his positivism as scientism, and scientism as
Platonic or Hegelian Idealism.
173
174
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175
176
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Once again, the Third Realm consists of the act of connecting the
First and the Second Realm, the world of objects and facts on the
one hand and that of values on the other. This is, of course, an
evaluating act (Akt des Wertens), because the meaning of life is not
meant as an objective fact, but constitutes a subjective, evaluative
judgment (Werturteil ), namely that life has meaning, is inherently
meaningful.71 Or, in other words, we evaluate life as being more than
just a biological fact. It is a biological fact which carries an inherent meaning. The fact is thus related to a value, and that is an act.
How one fills in this more, this inherent meaning, depends on ones
set of values. To a believer life may be a gift of God, to the unbeliever a gift of Nature, to some a miracle, to others a painful burden.72 Yet, they all have in common that they experience and express
a connection between facts and values, that they actively connect the
First Realm of real facts with the Second Realm of unreal values.
For this act Rickert coins the concept Aktsinn, i.e. meaning bestowing
act.73 He views it as the Third Realm that stands between the First
and the Second Realm, connecting them heterologically (as it were
bifocally), without annihilating their autonomy. Life still remains a
biological aair, its value still remains a non-sensual, non-real reality. By connecting values of the Second Realm with facts, events
and objects in the First Realm, human beings render the latter meaningful. In this sense the Aktsinn is a meaning bestowing act. This is
remarkable, because the Third Realm then consists of an activity
comparable to the epistemological evaluating judgment. The values
in the Second Realm may be subjective and thus relative, the act
of linking the two realms is universal, objective and thus non-relative.
Everywhere and in all times, human beings have been busy bestowing meanings on the objects and events they ran and run into. In
conjunction the three realms constitute the world-in-toto.
71
Naturally, the judgment about life can be, and often is, also negative: life is
meaningless. Each value, we have seen before, has its counter-value which is not
its denial but an opposite value. For the sake of clarity Rickert restricts the present discussion to the positive value.
72
Schopenhauer was, of course, the philosopher who pre-eminently defined life
as a painful burden. For a modern version of this vision see E. M. Cioran, De linconvnient dtre n, (On the Inconvenience of Being Born), (Paris: ditions Gallimard,
1973).
73
Aktsinn (literally: Actmeaning) is an awkward neologism. In the present context
I prefer to translate Aktsinn as meaning bestowing act.
177
178
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179
Explanation (Erklren)
180
CHAPTER FOUR
NEITHER PSYCHOLOGISM NOR METAPHYSICS
The previous section may give rise to the opinion that the Third
Realm is in essence a psychological world, since the Aktsinn is performed by the subject. Others may conclude that Rickerts conceptualization of the Third Realm in terms of the meaning bestowing
act which connects the real world of objects and the unreal world
of values is, despite his arguments to the contrary, actually rather
metaphysical. He spends considerable time in denouncing these two
opinions which in his view gravely distort his theoretical intentions.79
In Rickerts view, we repeatedly saw, psychology is an empirical,
specialized discipline whose object of research lies in the First Realm.
The object of psychology is circumscribed by him alternatively as
empirical psychic life (empirisches Seelenleben) and as real psychic being
(real psychisches Sein). Today, he would probably rather speak of individual behavior or psychological functions. In any case, as an empirical science psychology should stick to the description and explanation
(Beschreibung und Erklrung) of facts. Its proper field of operation is,
according to Rickert, the empirical world of objective things and
processes, not the unreal reality of values and meanings. He is,
therefore, certainly not an adversary of psychology as a scientific discipline. On the contrary, he holds for instance experimental psychology in high esteem as long as it abstains from philosophical
considerations and metaphysical ruminations. His criticism is, in other
words, directed against metaphysical transgressions of the disciplinary boundaries of the psychological discipline into the domains of
philosophy, i.e. he fought and rejected psychologism.80 In his view
Cf. ibid., pp. 277297.
In a letter to the experimental psychologist Alexius Meinong (18531920),
founder of the first laboratory for experimental psychology in Graz, Austria, Rickert
allegedly had written that he knew not one central issue in philosophy to which
psychology could contribute positively. Meinong responds to this remark in a letter
dated December 22, 1912, in which he turns the argument around: I know of no
problem which would be so central, that one would not have addressed it, as far
as one is acquainted with it, by means of psychological techniques, and that, while
doing so, one would not need, given the circumstances, to stay in close contact
with a possibly advanced stage of psychological knowledge. (Ich weiss kein Problem,
das so zentral wre, dass man an dasselbe, sofern man es kannte, nicht schon mit
psychologischen Bearbeitungsmitteln herangetreten wre und bei dem man nicht
unter Umstnden eine recht enge Fhlung mit einem mglichst vorgeschrittenen
Stande psychologischen Wissens bedrfte. (Letter from the personal archive of Mrs.
Marianne Rickert Verburg.) With such a petitio principii a further discussion between
Rickert and Meinong was, of course, impossible.
79
80
181
182
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. . . sie hat die gltigen Werte auf eine absolute, metaphysische Realitt des
Weltsubjektes zu sttzen, um dann den Sinn, der unsern individuellen Wertungen
innewohnt, als Wiederspiegelung oder Abglanz von Welttaten der wahren Wertwirklichkeit des Geistes zu verstehen. Ibid., p. 291f. This is obviously an ironical
reference to Hegels philosophy. He adds that this sort of metaphysics works with
words and names that resonate strongly in the chest of many people and obviously
satisfy more than just theoretical needs. The word Geist alone has a magical
influence on many which by far transcends that of a scientific theory. (Schon
das Wort Geist bt auf Manche einen Zauber, der weit ber den einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie hinausgeht.) Ibid., p. 292. The same holds true, of course,
of the Platonic Logos, and it is not far-fetched to apply it also to the Marxist notion
of the Proletariat as the agent which eventually causes the End of History in the
world revolution. Cf. Georg Lukcs, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, (History and
Class Consciousness), 1923, (Neuwied, Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand, 1971).
81
183
to wise men as to fools: and three make equal, so you are rich! To
the scientific man the three parts will always remain unequal.82 Science
always moves from the fuzzy and indistinct mass of experiences to
the clear plurality of concepts. It is the only way to make people
conscious of the wealth of the world. Yes, one will skeptically examine the content of the word spirit, when man searches more for
clarifying concepts than for uplifting or intoxicating sounds.83
Rickert agrees with Nietzsche: we should shy away from this metaphysical back world (Hinterwelt).84 Since he loves to play with words,
he states that his own theory of the logically predominant role of
the Third Realm of meaning interpretation (Sinndeutung) and meaning bestowing activity is not a meta-physical back world, but rather
a pro-physical front world (Vorderwelt): it is the logical predecessor
of reality and values, and of our knowledge of them.85 This front
world is not an abstract, far away reality, but it is part of our everyday world, since we constantly, though usually unconsciously, interpret the meaning of what we and the others do and say in terms
of values. Or, in more modern terms, we are essentially meaning
bestowing, that is communicating beings. It is the task of philosophy to conceptualize this activity. That is precisely what the not
meta-physical but pro-physical theory of the three independent, yet
heterologically connected realms does. In the night of the back world
everything is, to quote Hegel, black. In the day of the front world
the one stands out clearly from the other. He who wants to know,
cannot doubt in which direction he ought to look.86
82
. . . ein Hexeneinmaleins, geheimnisvoll fr Weise wie fr Toren: Und Drei
mach gleich, so bist du reich! Fr den wissenschaftlichen Menschen werden die drei
Teile immer ungleich bleiben. Ibid., p. 293.
83
Ja das Wort Geistwird man besonders misstrauisch auf seinen Gehalt prfen,
falls man mehr nach klrenden Begrien als nach erbaulichen oder berauschenden
Klngen sucht. Idem. This is one of the main reasons why Rickert, as we shall see
in Chapter Five, replaces the concept Geisteswissenschaft by Kulturwissenschaft.
84
Ibid., p. 295f.
85
In view of this concept of pro-physics the title of Christian Krijnens voluminous study is remarkable: Nachmetaphysischer Sinn, i.e. post-metaphysical meaning.
Krijnen, o.c.
86
In der Nacht der Hinterwelt wird, um mit Hegel zu reden, alles schwarz.
Im Tage der Vorderwelt hebt sich das Eine von dem Andern deutlich ab. Wer
erkennen will, kann nicht zweifeln, wohin er zu blicken hat. Ibid., p. 297.
184
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE IN OUTLINE
185
that for example institutions are true Sinngebilde, meaningful configurations. Such interpretations could eventually even produce knowledge,
Rickert claims, about what life is all about, i.e. about the grand issue
of the meaning of life. In the end his philosophy or theory of values, which can also be called a philosophy of culture, could thus produce a philosophical Lebensanschauung. This is, of course, a large order,
certainly if one takes into account that such a philosophy may not
result in a metaphysical Weltanschauung.
At this point of his argument he again warns and argues against
psychologism. We should not focus on individual and personal acts
of value-judgments, since that would not yield any systematic knowledge and insight. One would get lost in the chaotic thicket of subjective emotions and opinions. Individuals, for instance, usually
experience and evaluate the aesthetic value of a work of art in vastly
dierent manners. And when individuals are described and analyzed
psychologically in a uniform manner, as in the case of a true scientific
statement, it is generally not asked, whether their judgment is true
or false, because it is psychologically irrelevant whether someone
thinks and argues correctly or falsely. Telling lies is psychologically
interesting in terms of the mental and psychic processes involved in
the lying. The nature of a lie in terms of truth and falsehood as values is of no concern to the scientifically operating psychologist, nor
are for that matter the normative, moralistic value-judgments about
lying. Those are philosophical issues. Psychology as an empirical science should stick to the explanation of real psychological processes
and is as such not of any significance to the philosophical theory of
values.
This argument can be illustrated additionally in the case of religion. The
scientific study of religion, as in the case of comparative religion, or sociology of religion, or psychology of religion, is interested in the empirical
expressions of religious values in the First Realm. It subjects these values
which are dear to the true believers, to objective analysis and research,
without leaving the First Realm, e.g. without asking what the intrinsic values and meanings of the religious expressions under investigation essentially are. An atheist can be a perfect scientific student of religion, just as
a musicologist does not have to excel in musicality. In Rickerts Aktsinn,
however, the philosopher will focus on the immanent meaning of the religious values in the Second Realm and bestow them on the empirical religious expressions in the First Realm. Without necessarily being a believer,
he will try to determine what it exactly is that renders these expressions
religious. In this sense he will search for the essence of religion, but without
186
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any normative religious intentions. This brings him close to the phenomenology of religion, as formulated in an exemplary manner by Gerard van
der Leeuw who would be fully acceptable for Rickert because he did not
take refuge in psychologism as most phenomenologists of religion have been
prone to do, nor did he alter his comparative study of religious phenomena into a normative theology.87 It is necessary to distinguish the philosophy of religion as a scientific enterprise from systematic theology as a
normative, dogmatic discipline. In Rickerts terms theology would certainly
not belong to the Third Realm, but rather be part of metaphysics which
is beyond the three realms. The history of systematic theology, however,
would again be part of the First Realm, as a scientific study of religion.88
87
Gerard van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation. A Study in Phenomenology,
2 volumes, 1933, transl. From the German by J. E. Turner, (New York, Evanston:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1963). See also Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane.
The Nature of Religion, 1957, transl. From the French by W. R. Trask, (New York:
A Harvest Book; Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959). A classic in this tradition is
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy. An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of
the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, 1917, transl by J. W. Harvey, 1923, (Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). This book is drenched in romantic psychologism though, as it defines the Sacred as the human feeling of being nothing,
and thus dependent on the awe inspiring sacred as a mysterium tremendum (tremendous mystery).
88
As an example of such a normative, dogmatic theology see the brief introduction in orthodox-Calvinist, systematic theology of Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology,
1963, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books; Doubleday, 1964). For a liberalLutheran introduction see Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 1957, (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1958). A classic history of Christian doctrines is Adolf Harnack,
Dogmengeschichte, 1889, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1905). Examples from other world
religions can, of course, be added.
187
(Kulturphilosophie): (a) mores and morality; (b) the arts and beauty;
(c) the religions and the divine; (d) the sciences and truth. It is interesting to note though that the domain of pleasure and erotic lust
which Rickert discusses also, is absent from this Kantian catalogue,
as is the domain of justice which Rickert too neglects.89 In any case,
Rickert repeats once more that the cultural-historical, special sciences
subject the institutions (cultural goods) within these domains to investigation. They thereby remain in the First Realm of objective facts.
They oer the material for the philosophy of values which distills
from these investigations information about the values of the Second
Realm. By an interpretation of the intrinsic meaning (Sinn) of these
four cultural areas, relating it to their respective values, Rickert tries
to construct an autonomous philosophy of values. Let us briefly follow his arguments.
Mores and morality.90 Human beings grow up and lead their lives in an
environment of mores which are part of a collective, social culture.
These ways of doing things are, of course, related to values and
the philosophical observer naturally wants to know what the validity of these values are. He will observe that these value laden mores
provide people with the experience of meaning (Sinn). It is, for example, impossible to interpret the meaning of life without reference
to these mores and their inherent values.
Now, what does actually the concept of morality mean? In order
to be called moral, Rickert argues, human actions must be driven
by a conscious and purposeful will which intends to do what is considered to be right. There must be an intrinsic sense of duty (Pflicht,
Sollen), yet this should not be seen as some sort of slave morality
(Sklavenmoral ) which blindly follows alien orders. On the contrary, the
sense of duty should be an autonomous self-control which is based
upon the conviction that it is intrinsically right to do what one has
89
For a philosophy of law which is inspired by neo-Kantianism see Gustav
Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 1914, (Stuttgart: J. F. Koehler Verlag, 1950; 4th ed.), in
particular chapter one: Wirklichkeit und Wert (Reality and Value), pp. 9197,
and various references to Kant, Windelband and Rickert.
90
Cf. the section Die Sitten und die Sittlichkeit, ibid., pp. 324333. The German
concept Sitten can be translated as folkways which in itself is again a rather pluriform concept, covering usages, manners, customs, mores and morals. Cf.
William Graham Sumner, Folkways. A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages,
Manners, Customs, Mores and Morals, 1906, (New York: A Mentor Book; The New
American Library, 1960) I shall use mores for Sitten and morality for Sittlichkeit.
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189
autonomous, moral person. This comes close to the rather relativistic, sociological theorem of the self-fulfilling prophecy which was initiated by William Isaac Thomas which runs as follows: If men define
situations as real, they are real in their consequences.94 It seems as
if Rickert at this point remains stuck in the First Realm of valuejudgments and cultural goods, and is unable to get hold conceptually and theoretically of the ahistorical, unempirical (ideal, formal)
values in the Second Realm. He would, however, probably argue
that he as philosopher bestows meaning on the values of the Second
Realm linking them to their moral enactment by human beings
(moral personalities) in the First Realm.
He follows the same route of arguing, when he defines cultural
goods in terms of institutions such as marriage, family, law, state,
etc. which harbor the social values of a social morality. These institutions, he argues, are the proper object (Gegenstand ) of social sciences, like psychology, sociology and anthropology. When philosophy
tries to formulate its autonomous theory of moral values in the format of social ethics, it must stay in close contacts with these disciplines, because they explain how the mores and the institutions
function. Yet, it ought to transcend these empirical sciences and try
to understand the intrinsic meaning (Sinndeutung) of the institutions
as meaningful configurations (Sinngebilde) which are related to objective
values and their objective validity. In this respect there is this special
place of philosophy next to the special sciences: a moral theory in
the format of a social ethics which does not oer normative directives
but rather interprets moral values as the immanent moral meaning
of the social institutions. It, in other words, reveals the moral nature
of the institutions which empirical disciplines like sociology or anthropology could never do without leaving their specific field of expertise.
To sum up, the concept of freedom or autonomy, linked to the
internalized sense of duty, is what demarcates mores and morality
as the special subject and focus of moral philosophy. This branch
of cultural philosophy is in fact social ethics which, as we have seen
above, views morality as being social, personal, and active. This is in contrast to the other branch of cultural philosophy which is predominantly non-social, factual (sachlich), and contemplative.
94
Cf. Willliam Isaac Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl, 1928, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1967), p. 42f. Also Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1944,
(New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 421438.
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The arts and beauty.95 Works of art are cultural goods and therefore
bearers of a value which we can loosely describe as beauty (or its
heterological counterpart). This artistic value is not attached to individual human beings or social units, but to buildings, sculptures, paintings, poems, plays and musical compositions.96 Even if the artist is
seen as a creative subject, driven by the aesthetic value of beauty,
he or she is actually not viewed as a person, but rather as the bearer
of an aesthetic value, and thus as an aesthetic object (Sache). In that
respect the domain of aesthetic values is, unlike the moral domain,
sachlich, factual or matter-of-fact like. There is and has been a
rather romantic worldview of aesthetic beings (Weltanschauung des
Aesthetentums) which tries to superimpose the aesthetic values on personal, social, or political values, as was exemplified by Oscar Wilde
whom Rickert mentions here specifically. But that is not of much
interest to the philosophical theory of art and beauty. In this theory the focus is rather upon the intrinsic value of art (Eigenwert der
Kunst) and not upon aestheticist ideologies.
Beauty is the basic value here. However, Rickert is aware of the
fact that this word is quite old-fashioned and misleading. Yet that
is, according to him, but a matter of terminology. What is meant essentially, is the fact that special values adhere to art and these values
are lumped together in the concepts beauty and beautiful (and
their heterologically related opposites). How can we theoretically substantiate these admittedly vague concepts? Rickert argues as follows.
We behold an object of art and dwell with it for its own intrinsic
worth. It stands apart from the rest of the world, and it constitutes,
with all its often quite dierent, yet mutually related parts, a complete, well-nigh closed configuration. A framed painting demands its
own place on a wall, a sculpture fills its very own space in the exhibition hall. Furthermore, such works of art do not need any reference to other realities. It is in that sense, unlike mores and morality,
impersonal and non-social. In fact, we are ready to call beautiful
each part of reality which constitutes a harmonious, independent
whole, which seems to rest in itself. Our primary reaction towards
191
192
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Rickert does not mention Oscar Wilde by name here, but it is obvious that
he refers to Wildes well-known essay in the form of a dialogue The Decay of
Lying. An Observation, 1891, in: Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, ed. by Vyvyan
Holland, 1948, (London, Glasgow: Collins), pp. 970992. The conclusion of the
essay is that life follows art: The third doctrine is that Life imitates Art far more
than Art imitates Life. Ibid., p. 992. Rickert loved paradoxes since they are, of
course, essentially heterological. And although he rejected his aestheticism and vitalism he had a distinct preference for Oscar Wildes writing, probably also for heterological reasons.
100
193
194
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103
Ob wir selbst religis sind oder nicht, ist dabei gleichgltig. Rickert, o.c.,
p. 341.
104
Idem.
195
impersonal (sachlich), and non-social meaning. In mysticism, for example, one merely wants to observe (schauen) God passively and be
absorbed by contemplation. It is believed to be the only way to get
rid of human imperfection as one merges, as it were, with divine
perfection. In the end, even the personality may disappear, being
totally absorbed by the deity. Such a non-social, impersonal and contemplative religious life resembles art and artistic life. However, in
religion the human being can also be oriented to his fellow human
beings and be active in the world. This activity is often interpreted
as a task imposed by the divinity. Religious life resembles in that
case the moral activities, and is likewise social, personal and active.
In fact, God is viewed as a social, personal and active force which
gives society, when it identifies with this religious view, an active,
personal and social character.
So we have two opposite types of religion here. On the one hand,
there is withdrawal from the world and depersonalization, on the
other hand there is working in and upon the world and the formation of a personal individuality. Rickert could have referred here
to Max Webers ideal typical distinction of an outer-worldly asceticism (ausserweltliche Askese) and an inner-worldly asceticism (innerweltliche Askese). The most telling example of the latter type is in
Webers view the protestant (in particular puritanical) ethics.105 It
exemplifies the coalescence of Rickerts concepts of mores/morality
and active religion/deity, and demonstrates the very similar Aktsinn
which Weber would call the subjectively intended meaning.106
Rickert finally points at an important feature of religion. It is
inclined, he argues, to refuse to accept a co-coordinative position
with the other sectors of life. It rather attempts to superimpose its
values on other parts of culture, in particular when a specific religious conviction is absent and the ethical and aesthetic values acquire
a vaguely religious color. In that case, religious values often exhibit
105
Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1904, in:
Gesammelte Aufstze zurReligionssoziologie, vol. one, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1963), pp.
84163.
106
Hannah Arendts discussion of the Ancient Greek and medieval ideas concerning the vita contemplativa vis--vis the vita activa (bios theoretikos vis-vis bios politikos in Aristotle) and the traditional primacy of contemplation over activity, which
in modernity is just the other way around, comes to mind here. See Hannah Arendt,
The Human Condition, 1958, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959),
in particular pp. 918.
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a tendency to spread over all of human existence as what the sociologist of religion Peter L. Berger called a sacred canopy. Thomas
Luckmann caught the force of this embracing kind of religion by
his notion of the invisible religion which, in a secularized society,
penetrates into such sectors as politics, the arts and sometimes even
the sciences.107
Sciences and truth.108 From the standpoint of cultural philosophy the
true statements (wahre Stze) of science, to which theoretical values
(e.g. truth, reality) are attached, are empirical cultural goods that
exist in the First Realm. As we have seen before, Truth is just like
Beauty or Morality a value concept (Wertbegrif ). True sentences can
be understood in all their pluriformity with regard to the validity of
their theoretical values. We can next interpret the acts of the theoretical subject (i.e. the scientific researcher) and explain them in terms
of their immanent meaning. This then results in what is called theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre) which should be understood as part
of the general cultural philosophy, alongside ethics, aesthetics, and
philosophy of religion. Its main task is to acknowledge impartially
all attempts by which people seek truth for the sake of truth. Indeed,
it should do so impartially, because just as aesthetics should not
speak up for a special artistic direction or taste, or religious philosophy for one specific religion or conviction, the philosopher of sciences
should avoid any scientific partisanship. As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, representatives of cultural science (Kulturwissenschaft ) are related to the values of their environment, yet should abstain
from normative value-judgments for the duration of their scientific
activities. It is the fine, yet important dierence between valuerelatedness (Wertverbundenheit) and abstaining from value-judgments
(Wertungsfreiheit).
Partisanship with its unavoidable value-judgments is quite common among philosophers of science, Rickert warns. He refers to
those who claim that natural science (Naturwissenschaft) or mathematics
197
198
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199
116
ein von greisenhafter Stimmung getragenes Buch ber den Untergang des
Abendlandes, Rickert, o.c., p. 349. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes,
2 vols., 1922, (Mnchen: Oskar Beck Verlag, 1923, 44th ed.). As to Rickerts rejection of historicism, the contemporary reader is, of course, reminded of Karl R.
Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 1957, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969)
with the main argument of which Rickert would have agreed.
200
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117
Den inhaltlichen Evolutionismus erkennen wir unbedingt an. Den Evolutionismus
der Form lehnen wir ebenso entschieden ab. Ibid., p. 352.
201
118
Rickert uses the concept of culture in this section in a dual manner. In this
sentence culture is similar to civilization. Cf. the idea of civilizations that come and
go in world history. But culture is also used in terms of the totality of values and
meanings in a given period of time. In the next chapter in which we discuss his
idea of a Kulturwissenschaft (cultural science) vis--vis Naturwissenschaft (natural science)
culture (Kultur) is employed as a non-psychological alternative for mind (Geist as in
Geisteswissenschaft). Incidentally, the idea expressed by Rickert that civilizations will
eventually perish comes close to the historicism of Spengler which he had just
rejected. However, it does not play a pivotal role in his theory of value systems.
202
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119
This is remarkable because we saw earlier that he adopted Brentanos
intentionality.
203
beautiful objects of arts) radiate their meaning (truth, beauty) to the subjects concerned. However, it then remains unclear what precisely the role
of these subjects is. It seems obvious that there must be subjects who in
meaning bestowing acts (Aktsinn) in the Third Realm impose these (positive as well as negative) theoretical and aesthetic values of the Second
Realm as forms on the objects in the First Realm as contents, rendering
the latter into true statements and beautiful objects of art. Consequently,
the subjective sense of truth or beauty radiates from these meaning bestowing acts by the subject first, and from the true statement or beautiful art
object next. Beauty may not be initially in the eye of the beholder, but it
is, to begin with, in the act of beholding in terms of the a priori form
beautiful that there is beauty at all. And after this act the good, i.e. the
object of art beheld, may then radiate its beauty to the beholderand we
may add sociologically, to people who follow the taste of this beholder. In
any case, it is the beholder who initially imposes the a priori form beauty
on the content beheld, transforming the latter into a beautiful and then
also beauty-radiating piece of art. Rickerts fallacious objectivism is, it
seems to me, caused by his emphasis on aesthetic contemplation which will
be discussed shortly. There is, in other words, an unsolved tension between
his notion of Aktsinn and his emphasis upon contemplation.
The theoretical and aesthetic values and goods are compared next
with the ethical values. Rickert sees an important dierence here.
To begin with, in ethics subjects ought to be autonomous and active
subjects, i.e. personalities with a free will (free in the Kantian sense)
who unlike the contemplative attitude of the theoretical or aesthetic
subjects, are active. In fact, subjective action is the essence of ethics.
(Once more, action is the essence also of the Aktsinn in the case of
theoretical and aesthetic values!) In the case of a scientific statement
or a piece of art, truth or beauty radiates to the subjects from these
goods. However, the predicate moral or ethical refers at all times
to the actions taken by the actor, and do not radiate from his
actions. The ethical good cannot be separated from the ethically acting subject, in contrast to the theoretical and aesthetic goods which
could be and should be separated from the theoretical or aesthetic
subjects. The will of a person is not called ethical or moral, because
he produces ethical goods, but it is the subjective intention (Gesinnung)
that counts, irrespective of the outcome of the actions taken. This
is, Rickert argues, the opposite of an ethic of results (Erfolgsethik). It
is an ethic of subjective intention (Gesinnungsethik).120 When a person, Rickert claims, tries to save someones life, his action will not
120
204
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205
ends first propagate their love against violence and next call for violence
as the last violence which will end all violence.123
Rickert who did not discuss the morally crucial distinction between ends
and means, did at one point briefly touch on Webers position. People, he
argues, should of course always tell the truth. The ethical duty of veracity
is an essential personal value. However, it is possible that a conscientious
person may in certain circumstances be morally urged to lie, for instance
when he, in doing so, serves a socio-ethical objective, the realization of
which he feels to be his duty or obligation. A theoretical non-truth is not
the same as a morally objectionable lie. A scientifically proven truth can
never enlarge the value of a moral personality, nor can an untrue sentence
degrade it. There is a distinct dierence between a real theoretical truth
and personal moral veracity.124
123
Max Weber, Politik als Beruf , 1920, in: Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische
Schriften, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1958), pp. 549554.
124
Rickert, o.c., p. 364.
125
In this he finds Isaiah Berlin on his side. See Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on
Liberty, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), in particular the
Introduction, pp. IXLXIII. Ernest Nagel criticizes Berlins voluntarism in defense
of a determinism which is based on a natural-scientifically oriented logic: Ernest
Nagel, The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, 1961, (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, 4th ed.), pp. 599605. Nagel refers here to Berlin,
Historical Inevitability, (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).
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like the true statement or the beautiful work of art. The nature of
ethics is exclusively dependent on the duty conscious will of the free,
autonomous personality. Actually, Rickert continues, a moral person
wills an autonomous, free will. In a sense, the free will itself, or
rather its autonomy, is a moral good. This is a remarkable state of
aairs: We want (wollen) [. . . .] subjectively ethically something that
is objectively ethical; that is, a will, that wants autonomy autonomously,
is moral in a dual manner, i.e. he is morally motivated, he wills
because of duty, and what he wills, is itself morality, namely freedom realized in a duty conscious willing.126
(b) Contemplation and activity
Closely related, yet logically quite dierent, is the next alternative in
the relationship between subjects, objects and values. In contemplation as enacted in the theoretical spheres of science and logic as well
as in the atheoretical, aesthetic spheres of the arts, the subject is distanced from the independent object. Mysticism may present an exception here, since the subject allegedly merges with the object. But
then, Rickert remarks ironically, as the word indicates mysticism is
a mystery and therefore philosophically not of any importance.
Scientific research is a telling example of this distance between subject and object, because after all science renders everything it focuses
on into an object!127 Also in the aesthetic contemplation there is no
room for an identification of the beholder of art and the object of
art. One looks at a painting, or a sculpture, or a play on the stage,
one listens to the performance of a piece of music.128
126
Wir wollen [. . . .] subjektiv ethisch etwas objektiv Ethisches, oder eine Wille,
der autonom die Autonomie will, ist zwiefach sittlich, d.h. einmal sittlich motiviert,
er will aus Pflicht, und das, was er will, ist selbst das Sittliche: die Freiheit verwirklicht im pflichtbewusstsen Wollen. Ibid., p. 361.
127
Rickert does not refer at this point to intuitionist methodologies like Verstehen
as empathy, as a kind of merging with the object of investigation. Phenomenological
Wesensschau too comes close to such an obfuscation of the distance between the subject and the object. As we have seen in Chapter Two Rickert reckons all this to
vitalism (Lebensphilosophie) and rejects it summarily.
128
Here again there have been opposite opinions. The Russian actor and stage
director Konstantin Stanislavski (18631938) who staged several plays of Anton
Chekhov, professed naturalism and realism on the stage which should lead to empathy and even catharsis in the audiences. This was contested radically by the Marxist
playwright Bertolt Brecht (18981956) who called this typically bourgeois. In his
plays he employed various estrangement techniques (like banners above the stage
207
208
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129
die Form kann den Inhalt nur umschliessen wie ein Gefss. Es gibt kein
Kunstwerk mit sthetischen Sinn, in dem alles Form ist, und das zugleich eine selbststndige sthetische Bedeutung besitzt, sondern stets zeigt sich ein Inhalt so gestaltet oder geformt, dass er auch als Inhalt sthetisch wirkt. Rickert, o.c., p. 366.
130
The remark about jewelry may have been inspired by the education of his
youngest son Franz Rickert at the Munich academy for design. He, of course, could
not have knowledge of so-called conceptual art. He probably would have denied
its aesthetic significance and meaning.
131
Rickert discussed this in more detail in his essay Das Eine, die Einheit und die
Eins, o.c. He probably refers here to the intuitionist mathematics of the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer. Cf. the Dutch biography by Dirk van Dalen, L. E. J.
Brouwer, 18811966, (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002).
209
210
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211
B. Activity
Social personalities
Forms which penetrate into
objects
Pluralism
(Ethical behavior)
Other play mutually reinforcing roles. Cf. my Dutch introductory text De Theorie
van het Symbolisch Interactionisme, (The Theory of Symbolic Interactionism), (Amsterdam:
Boom/Meppel, 1973), pp. 7386. Also Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism. Perspective
and Method, (Englewood Clis, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
134
Rickert, o.c., p. 372.
135
So kommen wir berall aus dem Relativen der Geschichte ins Absolute, d.h.
fr alle geschichtliche Kultur Gltige. Idem.
136
In der philosophischen Wissenschaft vom Weltganzen fhrt der Weg notwendig
vom Allgemeinen und formal Leeren allmhlich zum Besonderen und inhaltlich
Erfllten. Ibid., p. 374.
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THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE OF FULL-FILLMENT137
Searching for a ranking order of values one runs into the obvious
problem that they are unreal and thus too abstract to be placed
in such a ranking order. However, as we saw before, values become
concrete and empirical in the cultural goods and the evaluations
or value-judgments. Now goods, like scientific theories, works of art,
or cultural institutions, are also hard to classify in a hierarchy, since
they exist in a complex and chaotic multitude of countless particularities. However, it is possible to construct a ranking order in the
evaluations, or value-judgments of the value-relating subjects.
But there is also an additional, though related, problem. Rickerts
systematic philosophy aims at the formation of a theory which enables
us to grasp and understand reality-in-toto. The problem with the three
realms is, of course, that it is an ontology which still compartmentalizes reality into three parts, the First, the Second and the Third
Realm. Such an ontology does obviously not represent an encompassing, totalizing conceptualization! It is at this point that he introduces the concept of full-fillment which is no longer theoretical (scientific)
and ontological, but metaphysical. It also represents the top of the
scale of values. Naturally, this presents him with a formidable problem, because how can one speak of and about a metaphysical reality without theoretical (scientific) concepts? Let us follow Rickerts
argumentation.
Of superior importance to us human beings are those values which
are relevant to the explanation of the meaning of life (Deutung des
Lebenssinnes). It is at this point that the concept of Leben which plays
such a crucial (metaphysical) role in the philosophy of life, so much
criticized by Rickert as we saw in Chapter Two, assumes an important
position in his own philosophy of values. He adds immediately that
the evaluating subject in search of the realization of lively values
137
This section is a brief discussion of a chapter in which Rickert develops his
ideas about a crucial concept in his philosophy, namely Voll-Endung. Cf. Rickert,
Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie I, o.c., pp. 375385. The correct spelling of the
German word is Vollendung, meaning consummation. The hyphen in Rickerts concept underlines the deeper philosophical meaning of the word which literally translated would mean something like bringing to a full or complete end, but that is
of course awkward. I chose for the literal translation full-fillment with the original hyphen. This, I think, comes closest to Voll-Endung. See also his Die Logik des
Prdikats und das Problem der Ontologie, o.c., pp. 185198: Das logische Problem der
Metaphysik, (The logical problem of metaphysics).
213
214
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215
216
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217
CHAPTER FIVE
1
Not the real connections of things, but the cognitive connections of problems, lie at the foundation of the working domains of the sciences. Max Weber,
Die Objektivitt sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, 1904,
in: Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, (Collected Papers on the Logic of Science),
(Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1968, p. 166.
220
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221
2
Cf. my monograph A Theory of Urbanity. The Economic and Civic Culture of Cities,
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), in particular pp. 1731: Urbanity:
Origins and Ramifications.
3
It has become customary to speak of a scientific revolution, but it is historically questionable whether this is correct. The historian of science Steven Shapin,
for instance, opens his book The Scientific Revolution, (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1996) with this clarion-call: There was no such thing as the Scientific
Revolution, and this is a book about it. He then defines the alleged revolution as
a coherent, cataclysmic, and climactic event that fundamentally and irrevocably
changed what people knew about the natural world and how they secured proper
knowledge of that world. It was the moment at which the world was made modern, it was a Good Thing, and it happened sometime during the period from the
late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century. Ibid., p. 1. With fellow historians
Shapin doubts that there was any single coherent cultural entity called science
in the seventeenth century to undergo revolutionary change. There was, rather, a
diverse array of cultural practices aimed at understanding, explaining, and controlling the natural world, each with dierent characteristics and each experiencing
dierent modes of change. (. . . .) The continuity of seventeenth-century natural philosophy with its medieval past is now routinely asserted. Ibid., p. 3f.
222
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4
Isaiah Berlin, Giambattista Vico and Cultural History, in: Isaiah Berlin, The
Crooked Timber of Humanity, 1959, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 66: the
famous Battle of the Ancients and Moderns.
5
See Elio Gianturcos Introduction to his translation of De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, 1709, On the Study Methods of Our Time, (New York: The Library of Liberal
Arts; The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), p. XIII. Wilhelm Windelband called Vico
the lonely brooding Neapolitan, in whom we should see the first Romanic opponent of the mathematical natural sciences and of the rationalistic metaphysics of
the era of Enlightenment. Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichtsphilosophie. Eine Kriegsvorlesung,
(Philosophy of History. A War-Time Lecture), in: Kantstudien, Ergnzungsheft, No.
38, 1916, p. 17.
6
(Vico) did not impugn the validity of mathematical knowledge, but he did
impugn the Cartesian theory of knowledge with its implication that no other kind
of knowledge was possible. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, 1946, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 64. For Collingwoods discussion of Vico see
ibid., pp. 6371.
7
Gianturco, ibid., p. XXXII. He quotes a colleague, Maria Goretti, who concluded correctly: Thus, Vico, the opponent of the geometric spirit, who is not,
however, deaf to the powerful voices of the modern achievements of science and
technique, appears to us, not so much the adversary of the Cartesian spirit, as,
rather, the enemy of the intellectualistic schema: a schema which forces tumultuous,
contradictory human nature into the straightjacket of an absolute truth, of a truth
excogitated, dreamt of, but never to be actually met with in reality. Idem.
223
a return to the Middle Ages. In his estimation the Cartesian Moderns were
not really modern.
Vico was, according to many, mistaken in defending Euclidian, synthetic
geometry as being superior to Cartesian analytic geometry. However, in
view of the discussions of the intuitionist mathematics in the first half of
the former century, he might, according to others, have had a point there.8
In any case, he was correct in rejecting Descartes and the Cartesians scientism, i.e. their belief that the Cartesian scientific method, based upon mathematics and geometry, could cover all of reality, not only nature but history
and human beings as well. Nature can be objectified in this manner, Vico
counters, but it is highly questionable, if not simply fallacious, to believe
that history and the socio-cultural world of man can thus be adequately
investigated and understood. Nature is created by God and lies open for
mans labor and research, but history and the socio-cultural world is constructed by human beings and must be approached by a dierent method
than the mathematically and geometrically founded method of Descartes
and the Cartesians.9 Because the human socio-cultural world now and in
the past is made up of and constructed by fellow human beings we are
able to understand it adequately, unlike the sun, the rocks, the animals, in
short nature, of which we can acquire knowledge but which we cannot
really intuitively understand. This is what he meant by the often misinterpreted formula verum factum: man can understand correctly only what he
himself has made. This understanding (Berlin calls it Verstehen which he
opposed to Cartesian Wissen),10 Vico argues in his Scienza Nuova (1744), is
a special epistemological giftthe phantasia puerilis, the youthful fantasy and
curiosity which has been lost completely in Descartes rationalistic intellectus purus.11 The latter led to a disdain for the study of history and letters,
to an anti-humanistic rejection of what later was going to be called humaniora, or moral sciences, or in Germany Geisteswissenschaften.
With this emphasis upon youthful and imaginative fantasy Vico introduces in his historical epistemology an aesthetic, early romantic dimension
which, of course, was totally alien to the adherents of the Enlightenment,
whose view of man was thoroughly secularized and naturalizedi.e. Gods
role as a deus ex machina in history was finished and man was an inalienable part of nature, sharing the uniformity which natural science imposed
on nature.12 In Germany Johann Gottfried Herder (17441803), without
Gianturco, ibid., p. XXVI f.
Berlin, l.c., p. 63.
10
Berlin, l.c., p. 62.
11
Gianturco, l.c., p. XXIX. Giambattista Vico, The New Science, transl. by T. G.
Bergin, M. H. Fisch, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948).
12
Cf. Cliord Geertz, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept
of Man, in: Cliord Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books,
1973), pp. 3354: The Enlightenment view of man was, of course, that he was
wholly of a piece with nature and shared in the general uniformity of composition
which natural science, under Bacons urging and Newton guidance, had discovered there. Ibid., p. 34.
8
9
224
CHAPTER FIVE
In this quarrel of the ancients and the moderns one issue stood out
in particular as of special interest, i.e. the logical dierence between
13
Cf. Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder, (London: Hogarth Press, 1976). In this section I relied heavily on F. M. Barnard, Humanity and History: Causation and
Continuity, in: F. M. Barnard, Herder on Nationality, Humanity and History, (Montreal:
McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), pp. 105131. Barnard, it seems to me,
underexposes Herders theological belief that the continuity in history is due to
Gods providence, whereas within this grand metaphysical framework particular histories of men and nations are divergent and characterized by contingency and discontinuity. Unlike and also against Voltaire and the Enlightenment philosophes, Herder
thus maintained the traditional idea of Gods hand in history. See the Nachwort
(Postscript) of Hans Dietrich Irmscher in his edition of Johan Gottfried Herder,
Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, (Also a Philosophy of
History for the Education of Humanity), 1771, (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1990),
pp. 140159.
14
Barnard, l.c., p. 108.
15
Cf. Collingwood, o.c., p. 87. Needless to add that there is today a resurgence
in the interest in narrative history. The social psychologist and philosopher George
Herbert Mead (18631931) added an interesting dimension to this romantic looking back to the past: the romantic historian or the historical novelist identifies with
a distinct period of time in the past, identifying oneself with the heroes and heroines of the past and looking back from there at himself in the present in order to
receive a better understanding of himself. It is a journey of the self into the past.
Mead gives the novels of Sir Walter Scott and the interest of people in Gothic
architecture as examples. George Herbert Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth
Century, 1934, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 62.
225
16
Cf. Collingwoods extensive discussion of Croces philosophy of history in his
The Idea of History, o.c., pp. 190204. See also H. Wilson Carr, The Philosophy of
Benedetto Croce. The Problem of Art and History, 1917, (New York: Russell & Russell,
1969). This is probably the first English reproduction of Croces aesthetic philosophy, consisting of mostly very long, literal quotations.
17
Cf. Henri Bergson, Lintuition philosophique, 1911, in: Henri Bergson, La
pense et le mouvant. Essais et confrences, (Thought and the Moving. Essays and Speeches),
(Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1966, 63rd ed.), pp. 117143. In the essay
Introduction la mtaphysique Bergson defines intuition as la sympathie par
laquelle on se transporte lintrieur dun objet pour coincider avec ce quil a
dunique et par consquent dinexprimable. (The sympathy by which one transfers oneself to the interior of an object in order to coincide with what it has that
is unique and consequently inexpressible.) Ibid., p. 181.
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CHAPTER FIVE
However, his radical separation of history as an art form from science as the generalizing search for causal laws put him at a distance
from the neo-Kantian approach to the quarrel of the ancients and
the moderns. Windelband rejected Croces aesthetic definition of history emphatically, while Rickert radicalized Windelbands approach
and came, as we shall see presently, close to a satisfactory solution
of the quarrel which resembled Vicos position but was the opposite of Croces. As we shall see, Rickert viewed Natural Science and
Cultural Science in terms of a heterological dynamics within a continuum, of which both are the extreme ends and between which the
various scientific disciplines move, sometimes close to the pole of
generalizing Natural Science, then again closer to the pole of individualizing Cultural Science.
THE CONTINUUM OF SCIENCES
For the so-called social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, history, economics, political science, etc., Rickerts ideas and theories
about the methodological dynamics of the natural and the cultural
sciences are of special relevance. If one sets out to model them onesidedly and exclusively after the traditional natural sciences, such as
physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, biology, etc. in order to render their research results exact, calculable and thus predictable
a methodological position which is usually called neo-positivism, but
Rickert labels naturalismone will find Rickert in opposition. If one
claims, on the other hand, that these social sciences dier from the
natural sciences essentially, since they after all deal with human
beings and their conscious actions and interactions, and thus not
with mindless atoms and aimless, in the sense of mindless, processes
which allegedly would need an approach dierent from that of the
natural sciencesa methodological position which is usually called
anti-positivismone will also find Rickert as an opponent.
Rickert prefers the concept of Kulturwissenschaft (cultural science)
above Geisteswissenschaft for methodological reasons. In his days, Geist
was primarily viewed as mind and psyche which would put psychology in the center or even at the very foundations of the alleged
humaniora, as was actually the case in Diltheys conception of
Geisteswissenschaft. Yet, Rickert, as we have repeatedly seen, views the
psychological discipline, certainly when operating as an experimen-
227
tal psychology, as a (generalizing) science rather than an (individualizing) humanity. This will be explained in more detail later. In any
case, we shall see how Rickert views Natural Science and Cultural
Science as two heterologically related methods and as two abstract,
logically constructed extremes on a continuum. In what follows I
shall, therefore, employ the concepts of Natural Science and Cultural
Science as equivalents of Rickerts concepts Naturwissenschaft and
Kulturwissenschaft. They must be seen as constructed types in the sense
of Max Webers reine Typen (ideal types, ideal meaning logically constructed and in that sense unreal, or non-empirical). When I use the
capitals I refer to Cultural Science and Natural Science as such ideal
typical extremes on a continuum. Without capitals I refer to the
empirical and specialized natural and social sciences, like physics or
chemistry, and history or cultural (historical) sociology.
Epistemologically and methodologically the empirical sciences,
whether natural or social, operate somewhere between these extremes,
sometimes moving closely towards the pole of Natural Science, as
in the case of most natural sciences, like chemistry, physics, or astronomy, sometimes operating very close to the opposite pole, that of
Cultural Science, as in the case of history or cultural (historical) sociology or (institutional) economics. In reality, i.e. empirically, most
sciences operate epistemologically and methodologically between these
extremes. In an address delivered in 1899, the contents of which lay
at the foundation of his Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (1926),
Rickert phrases this continuum and its two extreme poles as follows:
In this lecture I want to restrict myself to the exposition of both
extremes, in the middle of which in a sense almost all empirical sciences are
located. And in order to make the distinctions (of Natural Science,
Cultural Science and their respective methodologies, ACZ) clear, I
have to separate what is mutually closely connected in reality.18 He also
18
Ich will mich in meinem Vortrag auf die Darlegung der beiden Extreme
beschrnken, zwischen denen in gewisser Hinsicht fast alle empirische Wissenschaft in der Mitte
liegt, und ich muss zur Klarlegung der Unterscheide begriich trennen, was in
Wirklichkeit eng miteinander verknpft ist. Italics by HR. Quoted by Rickert in
Nachwort 1928, (Postscript 1928), at the end of his opus magnum Die Grenzen der
naturwissenschaftlichen Begrisbildung, (The Limits of Natural-Scientific Concept Formation),
1902, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1929, 5th ed.), p. 764f. Due to the many additions and improvements one should only use the fifth edition of Die Grenzen. For a
contemporary extensive critique of Windelbands and Rickerts demarcations of the
natural and cultural sciences see: Erich Becher, Geisteswissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften.
228
CHAPTER FIVE
Untersuchungen zur Theorie und Einteilung der Realwissenchaften, (Spiritual Sciences and
Natural Sciences. Investigations about the Theory and Grouping of the Empirical
Sciences), (Mnchen: Duncker & Humblot, 1921). By maintaining the concept of
Geisteswissenschaft instead of Kulturwissenschaft Becher demonstrates that he fails
to understand a crucial component of Rickerts anti-psychologistic logic and methodology. Begrisbildung, concept formation, is a technical-logical concept which plays
a crucial role in Rickerts doctoral dissertation Zur Lehre von der Definition, (On the
Theory of the Definition), 1888, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1929, 3rd improved
ed.), p. 21, 46.
19
Zwischen den Extremen liegt eine Flle von verbindenden bergngen. Es lsst
sich eine Reihe von Stufen konstatieren, die vom Allgemeinsten oder absolut Allgemeinen
bis zum Besondersten oder absolut Individuellen allmhlich hinberfhren. Italics
by HR. Ibid., p. 765.
20
Cf. Th. W. Adorno et al., Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie, (The
Positivism Conflict in German Sociology), 1969, (Neuwied-Berlin: Luchterhand,
1972).
229
230
CHAPTER FIVE
231
Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologie der
Weltgeschichte, (The Decline of the West. Outline of a Morphology of World History),
1922, (Mnchen: Oskar Beck, 1923; 33rd47th ed.).
24
Cf. Rickert, Die Grenzen, pp. 462. Rickert, referring to Ernst Haeckel, calls
phylogenetic biology an historical biology. Elsewhere, however, he acknowledges that
the interest of biologists turns away from the phylogenetic approach in favor of a
more natural-scientific ontogenetic evolutionary theory. Cf. Rickert, ber die
Aufgaben einer Logik der Geschichte, (On the Tasks of a Logic of History), in:
Archiv fr Philosophie, II. Abteilung: Archiv fr systematische Philosophie, Neue Folge, VIII.
Band, 2. Heft, (Archive for Philosophy, Section II: Archive for Systematic Philosophy.
New Series, Vol. VIII, Book 2), 1902, p. 149f.
23
232
CHAPTER FIVE
25
26
233
One will not encounter in Rickerts logic and methodology any antinatural scientific animus, as was exhibited often by the contemporary proponents of so-called Geisteswissenschaft. He rather searches for
the logical limitations of the Natural-Scientific formation of concepts
which to him become apparent, if one focuses ones scientific investigations on meanings, values and norms.27 In view of meanings, values and norms the generalizing approach of Natural Science fails
significantly. In fact, if one adhered mono-methodologically to the
natural-scientific approach, which Rickert, as we saw before, calls
naturalism, one would have to disregard meanings, values and norms
which, of course, is nonsensical. Language is more than and quite
dierent from movements of the larynx: Each word that we observe
by the senses, possesses if we understand it, simultaneously a nonsensorial meaning. (. . . .) A scientific sentence which we hear or read
and then understand as being true or perhaps also false, possesses a
meaning which must be fundamentally dierent from the words to
which it is attached, because the words as real configurations can
be neither true nor false. They become true or false always exclusively as bearers of a meaningful configuration.28 Or, to phrase it
dierently, the performance of a violin or cello concerto is more
than the scratching of cat entrails (the strings) by the hairs of a
horsetail (the bow). All these sound waves carry meanings, even values and norms which cannot be covered adequately by naturalscientific concepts.
In 1872 the German physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond read a paper to
an audience of natural scientists. The lecture was entitled On the Limits of
the Knowledge of Nature.29 In it he criticized the philosophical materialism,
27
This is the gist of the title of Rickerts voluminous study on the methodology
of the cultural sciences: Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begrisbildung, (The Limits
of the Natural-Scientific Concept Formation), o.c.
28
Jedes Wort, das wir sinnlich wahrnehmen, besitzt, falls wir es verstehen zugleich eine unsinnliche Bedeutung. (. . .) Ein wissenschaftlicher Satz, den wir hren
oder lesen und dabei als wahr oder eventuell auch als falsch verstehen, hat einen
Sinn, der sich grundstzlich von den Worten, an denen er haftet, unterscheiden
muss, da die Worte als reale Gebilde weder wahr noch falsch sein knnen. Sie werden das eine oder das andere immer erst als Trger eines Sinngebildes. Heinrich
Rickert, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universittstbuchhandlung, 1924, 3rd, renewed edition), p. 20from now on quoted as
Problems.
29
Emil du Bois-Reymond, ber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens, (Leipzig: Verlag von
Veit, 1872).
234
CHAPTER FIVE
quite popular in his day among natural scientists, by discussing two riddles
which, according to him, could not be solved philosophically in a satisfactory manner. The first riddle concerns the universal changes in nature due
to a relation between material atoms and force or energy like gravitational
attraction. It would, he argued, need a super scientist with a universal
spirit to combine all the laws of force into one single universal formula.
This is inconceivable and thus it remains unexplained how and why changes
do occur in the material world. The second riddle concerns the relationship between the human body and brain on the one hand and the phenomenon of human consciousness on the other. He refers to a saucy
expression (der kecke Ausspruch) of a physiologist which caused a kind of
contest about the soul (eine Art von Turnier um die Seele). The physiologist in
question claimed that all those capabilities which we understand as activities of the so-called soul, are but functions of the brain, or, to phrase it
somewhat grossly, that the thoughts entertain approximately the same relationship to the brain as bile to the liver or urine to the kidneys.30 These
two riddles, Du Bois-Reymond concludes, are mutually closely connected
and will never be solved. The last word of his address is Ignorabimus! 31
Rickerts reaction to this resignation would be that Du Bois-Reymond
remained caught in naturalism and thus failed to locate consciousness in a
transcendent space, where it is confronted with unreal but valid (or invalid)
values. One of the consequences of this naturalism or neo-positivism is the
relapse to psychology, as was testified, for instance, by Carl G. Hempel
(19051997) who in an essay on the limits of science referred favorably to
Du Bois-Reymond.32 W. V. Quine (19082000) is even more radical than
Hempel. In contrast to the Vienna School of logical positivism (Carnap,
Neurath, etc.) which intended to do away with metaphysics first and epistemology next, Quine believes there is still room for epistemology, but in
a new setting and a clarified status. Epistemology, or something like it (sic!,
ACZ), simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled
inputcertain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance
and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of
the three-dimensional external world and its history.33
30
dass alle jene Fhigkeiten, die wir unter dem Namen Seelenthtigkeiten begreifen,
nur Functionen des Gehirns sind, oder, um es einigermassen grob auszudrcken,
dass die Gedanken etwas in demselben Verhltnisse zum Gehirn stehen, wie die
Galle zu der Leber oder der Urin zu den Nieren. Du Bois-Reymond, o.c., p. 31.
31
Ibid., p. 33.
32
Carl G. Hempel, Science Unlimited?, in: James H. Feitzer (ed.), The Philosophy
of Carl G. Hempel. Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality, (Oxford: The Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 276297.
33
Willard Van Orman Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in: W. V. Quine,
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969),
6990, quotation: p. 82f.
235
It is interesting to notice that Quine, without calling it such, also introduces sociology as an inherent component of epistemology. Speaking about
observation sentences, or what the Vienna School called Protokollstze, i.e.
simple statements about the external world, such as A red cube is standing on the table, Quine claims that their truth, contained in the meanings
of the constituting words, depends on a community-wide, social acceptance:
a sentence that is true by mere meanings of words should be expected, at
least if it is simple, to be subscribed to by all fluent speakers in the community.34 He even calls it a straightforward attribute of community-wide
acceptance, and distinguishes sociologically dierent communities: What
count as observation sentences for a community of specialists would not
always so count for a larger community.35 This is, of course, not epistemology but empirical sociology of knowledge. However, psychologism and
sociologism and their inherent scientism are based upon a rather ideological petitio principii. It is, in fact, the end of epistemology (if not of philosophy altogether). Quine calls this psychologistic and sociologistic epistemology
new, contrasting it to an allegedly old epistemology as it was traditionally exercised in philosophy. However, in view of Brentano, Dilthey, or
Meinong, epistemological psychologism is in fact quite old and traditionally stale, whereas a sociologistic theory of knowledge occurred in the sociology of knowledge, particularly in the sociologically focused epistemology
of Karl Mannheim.36
This protracted debate on the demarcations of history and natural science and on the role of psychology, or sociology in the theory of knowledge demonstrates the importance and originality of Rickerts approach as
laid down in his Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlischen Begrisbildung and in
Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft. It needs more than one close reading
to fully understand the weight of his ideas concerned.
ANALYTICAL MATRIX
Empirical reality, i.e. reality as it is experienced in daily life, Rickert
argues, is in and of itself extremely complex and in that sense irrational.37 He coined the ontological concept of a heterogeneous continuum
Quine, l.c., p. 86.
Ibid., p. 86 and 87.
36
Cf. e.g. Karl Mannheim, Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens, (The
Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge), in: Karl Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie. Auswahl
aus dem Werk, (Sociology of Knowledge. Selection from the Oeuvre), (Berlin, Neuwied:
Hermann Luchterhand, 1964), pp. 308388. For a sociological critique of Mannheims
epistemological definition of knowledge see Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann,
The Social Construction of Reality.A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 811, 183f.
37
Rickert, like Weber, uses the concept irrational when referring to the transcendent reality of everyday experienceor, for that matter, to Kants Ding-an-sich.
34
35
236
CHAPTER FIVE
237
which try to be as adequate as possible, if it comes to an understanding of reality. However, as we have seen time and again before,
Rickert rejects the popular notion that such scientific concepts are
only exact and true, if they represent or depict, as faithfully as possible, the facts and events in reality. It is the so-called Abbildlogik, the
logic of reproduction, which, as we saw in the second chapter, lies
at the foundation of the Lebensphilosophie and its belief in the adequacy of emotional and psychological empathy. Rickert is decisively
critical of this approach and repeats his emphatic rejection of it
repeatedly. To him, it is a simple and evident fact that our mind is
far too limited to encompass, store up and grasp the intensive and
extensive complexity of the heterogeneous continuum in its totality.
The mind must reduce complexity through the formation of concepts and theories.
But even if we were able to do sofor instance by means of a
computer, we could add todaywe would not get what we in science and philosophy try to acquire, namely rational knowledge of
an irrational reality. The irrationality of realityits endemic heterogeneity and continuitywould be duplicated in our mind or in
the computer, and thus not yield any true knowledge, since this
duplication would in its turn beg for a rational explanation. There
is an unbridgeable gap between our scientific, rational, abstract and
steadfast concepts on the one hand, and the continuous stream of
intrinsically heterogeneous reality on the other. Rickert compares
metaphorically our scientific concepts with the piers of a bridge which
overarches a river. We may try to build these piers as close to each
other as possible, yet the ongoing stream with its continuous and
therefore inexhaustibly dierent qualities will still flow between them
without being grasped or understood. Therefore, with our concepts
we can only construct bridges over the stream of reality, as close to
each other as the various arches of these bridges may be. That will
not be changed by any science of empirical reality.41 In this respect,
one could speak of the powerlessness, if not impotence of scientific
concepts.
41
Wir knnen also mit den Begrien nur Brcken ber den Strom der Realitt
schlagen, mgen die einzelnen Brckenbogen auch noch so klein sein. Daran wird
keine Wissenschaft vom realen Sein etwas ndern. Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft,
p. 53.
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CHAPTER FIVE
This stands, of course, in strong contrast to the neo-positivistic belief in prediction and control as in the case of traditional behaviorism. The founder of
this natural-scientific brand of psychology, John B. Watson (18781958),
boasted: Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified
world to bring them up in and Ill guarantee to take any one at random
and train him to become any type of specialist I might selectdoctor,
lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his
ancestors.42 It is the idea of an applied social science for the betterment
of man and society: To answer any of the whys adequately about human
activity we need to study man as the chemist needs to study some new
organic compound. Psychologically, man is still a reacting piece of unanalyzed protoplasm.43 Incidentally, Watson added the need for genetic experiments: (. . .) only systematic long-sustained, genetic studies upon the human
species begun in infancy and continued until past adolescence will ever give
us the experimental control over human conduct so badly needed both for
general social control and growth and for individual happiness.44
Burrhus F. Skinner (19041990) designed a special ontology in order to
be able to realize his behavioristic program of prediction and control. It is
the precise opposite of Rickerts heterogeneous continuum, while its normative and metaphysical content is obvious: Science is more than a mere
description of events as they occur. It is an attempt to discover order, to
show that certain events stand in lawful relations to other events. No practical technology can be based upon science until such relations have been
discovered. But order is not only a possible end product; it is a working
assumption which must be adopted at the very start. We cannot apply the
methods of science to a subject matter which is assumed to move about
capriciously. (. . .) If we are to use the methods of science in the field of
human aairs, we must assume that behavior is lawful and determined.45
As is well known, Skinner, following the experiments on conditioned reflexes
by Iwan Pawlow (18491936),46 rejected notions about inner states like
consciousness and mind, since they could allegedly not be analyzed scientifically
and thus not be made socially functional: The objection to inner states is
not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional
analysis.47 He focused on bodily functions, in particular those he named
42
John B. Watson, Psychology. From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 1919, (London,
1924), p. 9.
43
Ibid., p. 6.
44
Watson, o.c., p. 8.
45
Burrhus F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, (New York: Macmillan, 1953),
p. 6.
46
Cf. Iwan P. Pawlow, Vorlesungen ber die Arbeit der Grosshirnhemisphren,
(Lectures on the Function of the Cerebral Cortex), in: Augewhlte Werke, (Selected
Works), (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1955), pp. 129154. His famous experiment
with the ticking metronome and the salivating dog: l.c., p. 149f.
47
Skinner, o.c., p. 35.
239
240
CHAPTER FIVE
241
242
CHAPTER FIVE
sown the seeds.55 Rickert refers here to the original Latin connotation of culture as cultura agri, i.e. agriculture. Wild strawberries, to
give an obvious example (not Rickerts though), are natural products, growing without any interference of men, and as such not
invested with value or meaning. Potatoes, on the other hand, are
sown, cultivated and harvested, and are as such products of agriculture. In other words, culture is what man produces according to interests and valued goals, or, if it exists already, what is carefully attended
to because of its inherent value and interest. Nature then is reality
as far as it is value-free, i.e. not related to values and interests.
This material (ontological) definition of nature is rather problematic. Rickert
is obviously aware of this, since he acknowledges, as we just saw, that nature
can only be determined more precisely through the concept to which one
opposes iti.e. culture. Nature is then non-culture which, of course, is
redundant. But even then it remains a problematic material (ontological)
concept, because in the end it appears to be formal (epistemological).
Ontologically, there is very little nature because the moment humans
approach nature it changes into a valued reality and thus into culture. In
agriculture nature is in the end always culturized, as it is in ecology. Wild
strawberries are natural products, but the moment children pick them and
gather them in their buckets, take them home, wash and consume them
they are valued and thus cultural goods. The atoms, molecules and genes
of the natural scientist are as such not related to values, but the moment
the physicist, chemist or geneticist starts to investigate them scientifically,
they become objects of scientific interest and are then related to values
the values of the cultural good Science. Strictly speaking, nature exists ontologically only, when it cannot be observed, as in the case of particles or
objects and phenomena in outer space. But even that shrinks increasingly
due to the discoveries of nanotechnology and the detecting techniques of
astrophysics. The conclusion is that material ontology is in the end always
formal epistemologyas, incidentally, the second half of the concept ontology, referring to the Greek logos, indicates.
Rickert sticks usually to the Kantian primacy of epistemology over ontology. Yet, his definition of nature is ontological. Rickerts rejoinder would
probably be that the ontological concept of a value-free nature is possible
and meaningful, when one strips reality conceptually (as in a thought experiment) of meanings and values, when one thinks away meanings and values. The concepts wild and strawberries carry meanings and values in
55
Die Worte Natur und Kultur sind nicht eindeutig, und insbesondere wird der
Begri der Natur immer erst durch den Begri nher bestimmt, zu dem man ihn
in einen Gegensatz bringt. (. . .) Naturprodukte sind es, die frei aus der Erde wachsen. Kulturprodukte bringt das Feld hervor, wenn der Mensch geackert und gest
hat. Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, o.c., p. 35.
243
our minds, but we are able to strip them away as in a thought experiment:
after all, strawberries without any interest, meaning and value are conceivable, so are the value-free atoms, molecules, particles in the laboratories of natural scientists. But this rejoinder would not be convincing, because
the thought experiment of thinking away is, of course, an epistemological
technique applied to empirical reality. Formal epistemology still precedes
and overshadows (material) ontology.
We may, therefore, hold on to the idea that the material distinction of
nature and culture is epistemologically a weak one. In fact, in view of the
formal distinction of Natural Science and Cultural Science as two dierent,
yet correlated, mutually amplifying approaches or methods, the ontological
distinction is superfluous. But before we discuss this, we must first look at
Rickerts material definition of culture in more detail.
244
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245
56
Es gibt fr die Wissenschaft einerseits Objekte, die wie die Kultur eine Bedeutung
oder einen Sinn haben, und die wir um dieser Bedeutung und dieses Sinnes willen
verstehen, und es gibt andererseits Objekte, die wie die Natur uns als vllig sinnund bedeutungsfrei gelten und daher unverstndlich bleiben. (. . .) Natur wre danach
das bedeutungsfreie, nur wahrnehmbare, unverstndliche, Kultur dagegen das bedeutungsvolle, verstehbare Sein. Ibid., p. 37f.
57
Ibid., p. 38.
58
Rickert, Probleme, p. 42.
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and events, such as the spoken or written words as expressions of meaningful configurations (Sinngebilde). As is obvious, these are two analytical
interventions leading to the formal (epistemological) and not material (ontological) distinction of an observable reality vis--vis an understandable reality.
247
almost the status of a philosophical clich. In view of Rickerts similar distinction between individualizing Kulturwissenschaft and generalizing Naturwissenschaft we must briefly discuss Windelbands theory of
the idiographic and nomothetic sciences.
In this lecture Windelband admits right from the start that he is
not happy with the opposition of Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft,
based on the opposition of Natur and Geist, which was already very
popular in his day. The distinction of Natur and Geist, Windelband
argues, is a survival of an ancient, material (ontological) opposition
which became prominent at the end of Antiquity and at the beginning of medieval philosophical and theological thought. It was then
prolonged with all of its coarseness in the newer metaphysics from
Descartes and Spinoza till Schelling and Hegel. The opposition, however, is, Windelband continues, epistemologically very questionable,
as is demonstrated by psychology as a scientific discipline. According
to its object of investigation psychology would be a Geisteswissenschaft
but according to its actual execution, i.e. methodologically, appears
to be a Naturwissenschaft. What then is it that renders psychology
methodologically a natural science? Obviously, psychology collects
and processes facts, and tries to grasp the general, lawful regularities to which these facts are subjected. But that is precisely what the
natural sciences are doing. However, the methodology of the sciences we call Geisteswissenchaften, history first and foremost, does not
focus on such general regularities, but is, on the contrary, oriented
towards what is particular, unique (einmalig), and limited in time. In
other words, there is a logical and methodological dierence at work
here: some sciences, like the traditional natural sciences, such as
chemistry, physics, astronomy, etc. search for and analyze general
and timeless laws of development. They are in that sense nomothetic.
Others, like history, focus on and describe unique and particular
events in time and are in that sense idiographic. The former are,
Windelband adds, Gesetzeswissenschaften (law-oriented sciences), the latter Ereigniswissenschaften (eventful sciences).
This is a formal, not a material distinction. One and the same
object, Windelband warns, can be subjected to either a nomothetic
or an idiographic investigation. A particular language, for example,
can remain stable and alter minimally over a very long period of
time. It thus lies open for a nomothetic analysis. Yet, this particular language is also a historical, transitory phenomenon within the
linguistic life of humanity in its totality. It can thus be approached
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and described also idiographically. The same applies to the physiology of the body, or for geology, and in a certain sense even to
astronomy: and thereby the historical principle is transferred to the
area of the natural sciences.61 Yet, there are, Windelband notices,
immense methodological dierences between history and the natural
sciences. Both depend on experiences, on facts of observation, but
the natural scientist searches for general laws (Gesetze), the historian
for individual figures (Gestalten), the one leans strongly on cognitive
abstraction, the other on concrete graphicalness (Anschaulichkeit). The
historianand this reminds one of Croces aestheticismpaints a
picture of the past in such a way that it begins to live in the present time in all of its individuality. Therein roots the anity of the
historical creation with the aesthetic creation and the anity of the
historical disciplines with the belles lettres.62 The historian paints pictures of people and of human life.
Windelband emphasizes that all human interests and judgments,
i.e. all human evaluations, are linked to the individual and the unique
(das Einzelne und das Einmalige), because all our feelings of value are
solidly rooted in uniqueness and incomparability.63 Value-relatedness
is therefore the essence of the idiographic approach to reality. However,
both methods, the nomothetic and the idiographic approach, should
not be held in strict separation. Windelband gives an example.
Nomothetically, the cause of an explosion is the composition of the
explosive material whose chemical-physical laws can be reconstructed,
but idiographically the cause is a particular move, a single spark, a
shock or something similar. Only the two together cause and explain
the event, but neither one of the two is the result of the other.64
Dilthey distinguishes within the psychological discipline a naturalscientific, explanatory approach which focuses on causal processes,
on the one hand, and what he called descriptive psychology aiming at
an understanding of inner, experienced processes, on the other. The
61
hnliches gilt fr die Physiologie des Leibes, fr die Geologie, in gewissem
Sinne sogar fr die Astronomie: und damit wird das historische Prinzip auf das
Gebiet der Naturwissenschaften hinbergetrieben. Windelband, l.c., p. 146.
62
Darin wurzelt die Verwandtschaft des historischen Schaens mit dem sthetischen und die der historischen Disziplinen mit den belles lettres. Windelband, l.c.,
p. 150.
63
Ibid., p. 155.
64
Erst beides zusammen verursacht und erklrt das Ereignis, aber keines von
beiden ist eine Folge des anderen. Ibid., p. 158.
249
250
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dierence between the natural sciences and the humaniora is, according to Dilthey, the fact that the latter are able to understand their
objects of investigation. This understanding (Verstehen) was viewed by
him as the process by which the objects of outer experience are
being linked to the intuitive inner experience.68 (We return to this
later.)
Rickert follows Windelbands arguments closely, but tacitly rejects
his theory on mainly two points. First, he cannot accept the idea
that the historical disciplines remain graphic and aesthetic. Cultural
Science does dier from Natural Science in that it is, as Windelband
also says, value-related and focused on the individual, the unique
and particular, but it may not, as Windelband like Croce suggests,
evaporate in idiographic aestheticism. The historian engages in historical research and reports his findings scientifically. He is not supposed to tell nice stories. Cultural Science should remain scientific,
should construct concepts, and not aspire to be some sort of art
form. Second, Rickert also rejects Windelbands distinction of natural-scientific abstraction vis--vis historical (idiographic) Anschaulichkeit
which were allegedly concrete because it would produce pictures
of men and human life (Bilder von Menschen und Menschenleben). This
smacks, of course, too much of Lebensphilosophie which, Rickert would
argue, does not befit a true student of Kant.
He directs the same criticism to Dilthey and adds that his focus
on inner experience and the related processes of intuition and understanding end up in what Dilthey called descriptive psychology and
thus in a psychologistic methodology. Despite some remarks to the
contrary, Diltheys abundantly used concepts Geist and Seele (soul, or
psyche) carry the very same psychological meaning. There is indeed
a lot of soul in his Geist. That may warm the hearts of vitalists, but
will not much enlighten their minds.
It is for these reasons that Rickert shies away from the concepts
nomothetic and idiographic, and exchanges them for generalizing
and individualizing, when he characterizes the distinct methodological and logical dierences between Naturwissenschaft and Kulturwissenschaft.69 In order to avoid any suggestion of embracing vitalism
Cf. de Mul, o.c., p. 171, also pp. 319331.
See Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1915), an
In Memoriam of 43 pages. Rickert does not only discuss Windelbands contribution
to the philosophy of values, but uses the opportunity to explain also his own phi68
69
251
252
CHAPTER FIVE
Thomas Mann, Herr und Hund, 1919, (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1981),
in: Gesammelte Werke. Spte Erzhlungen, (Collected Works. Late Short Stories), pp. 7101.
72
Es gengt zu sagen, dass in diesem Falle der Begrisinhalt aus sogenannten
Gesetzen besteht, d.h. unbedingt allgemeinen Urteilen ber mehr oder minder umfassende
Gebiete der Wirklichkeit, die niemand in ihrer Totalitt beobachtet hat. Ibid.,
p. 58f. Italics by HR.
71
253
254
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change and throw new light on these particular objects. Unlike the
research in Natural Science which comes to rest after the generic
concepts and their natural-scientific laws have been formulated. Only
when (usually) suddenly irregularities are being discoveredwhich,
incidentally, often happens in terms of serendipitythat cannot be
explained by the existing general concepts and laws, will further
research and experiments on individual objects and processes be necessary. Here Rickert comes close to the idea of paradigmatic revolution, but he was not yet able to formulate it expressedly and clearly.74
A simple example can illustrate the methodological dierence of NaturalScientific generalization and Cultural-Scientific individualization. Rickert
would find the example too simple to be useful, but it might be helpful for
those who are not well introduced into his brand of neo-Kantian thinking.
In everyday life we all know immediately what the word forest refers to.
Now let us take as an example a specific forest, located in a specific province
or region of a specific country. In this forest there is a hut in which an
hermit dwells, prays and meditates. A botanist will be interested in the forest in so far as it may comprise some specimens of a rare genus of plants.
He will roam through the forest, pass the hut of the hermit, and search
for these specimens which can tell him more about the rare botanic genus.
When he has found sucient specimens which enable him to formulate
the generic and regular (law like) features of these individual plants, there
will be no need for him to return to the forest or any similar forest elsewhere in order to collect more individual specimens. In other words, there
is no need for any further individualization.
A sociologist will look at this very same forest in a completely dierent
manner, certainly if he follows in the methodological footsteps of Weber and
such very general historical studies (a) are unavoidably normative and metaphysical, and (b) claim to establish semi-natural-scientifically certain laws of development. Both points of critique apply also to Wells and Buckle and certainly to
Toynbee. Toynbee has been criticized extensively by historians. See for a perceptive and sympathetic survey of his work: Harry Elmer Barnes, Arnold Joseph
Toynbee: Orosius and Augustine in Modern Dress, in: Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.),
An Introduction to the History of Sociology, 1948, (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1958, 5th ed.), pp. 717736. Very general historical studies, focusing on large
units of research, are still en vogue, albeit much less metaphysical and semi-natural-scientific than the above mentioned histories. See for example Paul Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to
2000, 1988, (London: Fontana Press, 1989, 4th ed.). Cf. also the perceptive book
review by the Dutch historian Jan Romein, De graal der geschiedenis. De stand
van het vraagstuk der historische wetten, (The Grale of History. The State of the
Issue of Historical Laws), 1947, in: Jan Romein, Historische lijnen en patronen, (Historical
Lines and Patterns), (Amsterdam: Queridos Uitgeverij, 1976), pp. 327352.
74
Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1970, 2nd and enlarged ed.).
255
75
Rickerts ideas about value-freedom (Wertfreiheit), freedom-from-value-judgments
(Wertungsfreiheit), value-relatedness (Wertbezogenheit) and the methodological relating of
256
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257
77
This appendix is a German translation of a French essay with the title Les
quatres modes de lUniversel en histoire which appeared in the Revue de synthse historique, Paris, April 1901. Heinrich Rickert, Anhang in: Grenzen, pp. 737766.
258
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citoyen, the Dutch state, American society, etc. This is very dierent
in Natural Science, where the general is not a means but an end.
Natural Science treats individual and particular objects as specimens
(Exemplare) of general, generic concepts (Gattungsbegrie). It may be
objected that such concepts are employed for the sake of prediction
of an individual evente.g. an eclipsebut even then the generic
concepts concerned constitute a general natural law about the occurrence of the eclipse without any values or norms involved. These
general, generic concepts come about by the combination or unification
of all that is similar in the particular objects of Natural-Scientific
research. There is no relating to values and thus no understandable
meaning involved here, for the simple reason that the objects under
scrutiny are not value-related.
Secondly, the historian can, of course, not conceptually cover all
the individual events and persons drawing his scientific curiosity and
interest. Reality, past and present, consists of a vast and incalculable multitude of people, things and events. Even if the historian
restricted himself to human events and beings, he would still have
to deal conceptually with a pluriformity which is so complex and
versatile that he could not possibly cover all of them adequately. He
is in need of a criterion of selection by which he can determine
which situations and events are essential and which are not. Historically
essential then is what possesses in society a general significance which
can only be determined by general valuesi.e. values that are significant
to a majority of people, not just to one or more single individuals.
The historian will relate the many events, processes, persons and
things which he encounters in reality to such general values and
through this value-relation he will determine what is historically
significant and what is not. This, Rickert acknowledges, is, of course,
not the objectivity and certainty with which the physicist formulates
mathematical laws, but it still is far remote from the contingency
of the value-relatedness of a particular individual human being.
Meanwhile, after the historian has thus determined what is valuewise significant, he is also able to determine what is particular and
individual, in the sense of unique and unrepeatable. An example
(which is not Rickerts) may clarify this point: writing the biography
of John Calvin a historian will focus on those particular details of
his life only which relate to general values, like the values of the
Reformation and the so-called Puritan Ethics. Petty details of Calvins
life, such as the color of his eyes or the names of his grandchildren
259
(if he had any), may have an entertainment value but are scientifically
irrelevant.78
Thirdly, science is a systematic enterprise and history as a scientific
endeavor will not be satisfied with an enumeration of individual facts
and data, adding them all up to a mere bric-a-brac.79 There are in
reality, as we experience it, no absolutely isolated objects and processes.
Everything is related somehowas we have seen, reality is a heterogeneous continuum. Each historical object stands in a coherent
context and is particular and individual within this context. This too
is something general. However, the nature of its generality is very
dierent from that of Natural Science. As we have seen before, in
Natural Science individual and particular objects are specimens
(Exemplare) of a generic concept (Gattungsbegri ), whereas in history
(Cultural Science) they are parts of a totality which is more than
just a composition of constituent parts, but in its turn a part of a
larger totality. Or, in other words, the meaningful context of the historical object is a Sinngebilde which itself is a historical individuum.
Robespierre, for instance (and this is again not Rickerts example),
is as a historical individual only understandable in the context of the
terrorist phase of the French Revolution.
Incidentally, Rickert emphasizes that the individual conceptualization of history does not automatically mean that, as is often said,
single personalities make history, and that therefore history is essentially the scientific study of great personalities. This is not what the
concepts individual and individualization mean. The historian as
the representative of Cultural Science par excellence focuses on objects,
events, collectivities and single persons in so far as they are particular, specific and unique (unrepeatable) due to their relationship to
values which are then and now held to be valid and relevant.
Individual persons, and great personalities like Caesar or Napoleon
are often the objects of historical research, but so are material objects,
like the Kohinoor or the papal tiara, and historical events, such as
the French Revolution or the Battle of Waterloo. They are in a
sense the bearers of important, generally respected or acknowledged
260
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80
Rickert, Grenzen, pp. 746749. Rickert states expressedly that this approach is
not at all what is usually called history of Great Men. Allegedly great men like
Napoleon or Bismarck are logically and methodologically only relevant by their historical relationship to shared (general) values. History is moved neither by individuals, nor by mass movements. Cf. Heinrich Rickert in his response to Ferdinand
Toennies in his essay ber die Aufgaben einer Logik der Geschichte, (On the
Tasks of a Logic of History), in: Archiv fr Philosophie, II. Abteilung: Archiv fr systematische Philosophie, Neue Folge. VIII. Band, 2.Heft, (Archive for Philosophy. Section
II: Archive for Systematic Philosophy, New Series, Volume VIII, Book 2), 1902,
p. 151f.
81
Jacob Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien. Ein Versuch, 1860, (Stuttgart:
Alfred Krner Verlag, 1976). The sub-title Ein Versuch (An Essay, or An Attempt)
261
262
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84
Jos de Mul provides a helpful survey of the various developments and additions of Diltheys theory of Verstehen in his PhD-dissertation De tragedie van de eindigheid.
Diltheys hermeneutiek van het leven, (The Tragedy of Finiteness. Diltheys Hermeneutics
of Life), (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1993), pp. 319340. This is not the place to discuss all this in detail. For this brief excursus on Diltheys ideas of Verstehen I have,
guided by De Muls dissertation, relied on the posthumously published fragments
in the third chapter of Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den
Geisteswissenschaften, (The Construction of the Historical World in the Humaniora),
1926, B. Groethuysen, ed., Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VII, (Collected Publications, vol.
VII), 1958, (Stuttgart: Teubner Verlag; Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973,
6th ed.). pp. 191294; in particular pp. 205220. Rickert, it should be noted, appreciated and incorporated parts of Diltheys historical psychology. Discussing, for example, Diltheys analysis of ancient Roman metaphysics of the will, exhibited in
particular in Roman law, he called it extraordinarily impressive (ungemein eindrucksvoll).
Cf. Heinrich Rickert, Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur. Ein Geschichtsphilosophischer
Versuch, (Kant as Philosopher of Modern Culture. An Essay in Historical Philosophy),
(Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1924), p. 65. But he then went on criticizing Diltheys
alleged psychologism: ibid., p. 68.
263
85
86
87
264
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created the work of art. As to the latter, Dilthey gives the example of the
performance of a play in a theatre. A spectator who is not trained in literature can still immerse in the action on stage without thinking of the
playwright, but also the literary expert can live spell-bound during the performance. (Note Diltheys use of the verb live through!) It is in both cases
an understanding Nacherlebena living through subjectively of what happens
on the stage. The beholders understanding focuses on the coherence of
the actions on stage, the characters of the roles, the interconnecting of
moments which determine the fatal turn of the performed drama. Yes,
only then will he enjoy the full reality of the exhibited extract from life.
Only then will in him fully be realizes a process of understanding and experiencing as the poet intended to generate in him.88
Dilthey then comes to the vitalist conclusion that Erleben, the life-experience, transcends the cognitive concepts of scientific thought. Life and living first, thought and thinking next. LifeLeben, Erlebenis like a fludum
or aroma, functions, certainly in the case of the Geisteswissenschaften, as a
sort of background music: Erleben can never be solved in concepts, but its
dark, deep tones accompany, if only softly, all the conceptual thinking in
the Geisteswissenchaften.89
In Rickerts opinion such typically geisteswissenschaftliche ideas of understanding and empathy or introspection have caused much confusionwhich, we may add, they still do up till this very day. Rickert
phrases his critique with mild irony: the theories of Verstehen are as
diverse as the meaning of the word.90 We should avoid indulging
in the abstruseness and the mysteries of the geisteswissenschaftlichen
Verstehen.91 He then develops his own intriguing theory of understanding (Verstehen), explaining (Erklren) and empathy or introspection (Nacherleben), while he acknowledges that this theory is not definitive
but consists only of but first attempts to arrive at an understanding
of understanding.92 And, as we shall see, in the end his own conception of Verstehen is not really that dierent from Diltheys!
88
Ja nur dann wird er die volle Realitt des hingestelleten Ausschnittes aus dem
Leben geniessen. Nur dann wird sich in ihm voll ein Vorgang des Verstehens und
Nacherlebens vollziehen, wie ihn der Dichter in ihm hervorbringen will. Ibid.,
p. 212.
89
Nie kann Erleben in Begrie aufgelst werden, aber seine dunklen, tiefen Tne
begleiten, wenn auch nur leise, alles begriiche Denken in den Geisteswissenschaften.
Ibid., p. 331.
90
die Theorien des Verstehens sind so mannigfaltig wie der Sinn des Wortes.
Rickert, o.c., p. 558.
91
das Schwelgen in dem Tiefsinn und in den Geheimnissen des geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehens. Ibid., p. 559.
92
Nur um Anstze zum Verstehen des Verstehens handelt es sich. Idem. Rickert
develops his ideas about explaining, understanding and empathy in Ibid., pp. 557611.
265
Although Dilthey, as we saw, denied this himself, Rickert maintains that he and others after him saw and applied understanding
in psychological terms, namely as empathy (Nacherleben) with regard
to what other people in the present or the past experienced or felt
inwardly. Rickert quotes Dilthey in a footnote, where he defines
Verstehen as the knowledge of something inside (ein Inneres) which comes
to us from outside signalsi.e. from expressions. What is something inside?, Rickert then asks. After all, everything depends on
that. We know how meaningless the concept something inside is.93
When it comes to understanding, Rickert is, of course, particularly
anxious to avoid metaphysics and psychologism, both of which were
rather popular in his days, as we have seen in Chapter Two. He
admits nevertheless that Cultural-Scientific understanding (Verstehen)
does indeed stand in opposition to Natural-Scientific explaining
(Erklren), and must somehow incorporate empathy (Nacherleben). It
needs considerable logical and conceptual virtuosity to then avoid
the trap of psychologism and to refuse to fall back on metaphysics.
Rickert has, I think, not been altogether successful in this. Let us
try to reconstruct the main line of his respective arguments.
We must, to begin with, repeat a basic notion which we discussed
earlier. Both the body and the psyche (Seele) belong to empirical
(experienced) reality which is the proper domain of Natural-Science
and its generalizing conceptualization. Psychology then is, according
to Rickert, predominantly a representative of generalizing NaturalScience. There is, however, still another kind of reality which cannot be experienced and observed, and which is therefore not a
sensual, empirical reality. It is the non-empirical world which is valid
or not valid (Geltung). This is the non-sensual, non-empirical world
(die unsinnliche Welt) of values and meanings. Our spoken words, for
instance, can be heard and their sound waves can be measured natural-scientifically, but their meaning and significance cannot be sensually experienced, nor scientifically measured. They make sense (are
meaningful and thus valid) or they are senseless (meaningless, invalid).
Now these non-empirical values and meanings are not psychological realities, since the psyche or soul belongs together with the body
to the empirical world, nor are they metaphysical realities, floating
93
Was ist ein Inneres? Darauf kommt doch alles an. Wir wissen, wie nichtssagend
der Begri des Inneren ist. Ibid., p. 560, note 1.
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267
94
It is interesting to remember once more the approach of so-called cliometrics
which investigates archives natural-scientifically (statistically) and searches for general regularities (laws) with the aim to explain rather than to understand the workings of a societal and economic configuration like slavery.
95
Obviously, historians, archeologists in particular, will also often need to explain
things in a Natural-Scientific manner, as for example in the case of the chemical
compositions of food remnants, found in archeological sites, or, in these days, in
the case of the genetic (DNA) composition of bones in human skeletons. This is
the domain of explaining (Erklren) which for claritys sake is disregardedat the
moment.
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we understand completely and immediately, and which for that reason are
familiar. (This is similar to Diltheys elementary form of understanding.)
Yet, at the same time, they may strike us as being strange, preventing
any feeling of empathy. This paradox of familiar and strange is illustrated by Rickert with the help of the following example. After World War
I a German expresses his satisfaction about the Peace of Versailles.96 One
thing is clear, Germans in the 1920s did understand immediately the unreal
meaning (den irrealen Sinn) of these words. They knew, in particular, without any reflection the meaning of the familiar words Peace of Versailles.
The reaction could indeed be: I know what you mean. But having experienced this war, most Germans in Rickerts days, including, we may assume
safely, Rickert himself, would at the same time find the statement rather
strange. They may respond by saying: I know what you mean, but find
your statement strange. We encounter here, Rickert argues, the distinction between the understanding of the unreal (non-empirical) meaning of the
words and the empathy (or, in this case the lack of empathy) with the real
(empirical) psychic processes within the other.97 Now, if they do not angrily
dismiss the other and turn their back on him, his fellow-Germans could,
of course, make an eort to understand the psyche of the other who
expressed these words. To him who expresses these words, they are not at
all strange but on the contrary rather lively (lebendig), to his fellowGermans they are not, or in any case, not yet lively at all. They had at
least initially great troubles to empathize (Nacherleben) with what to him was
lively.
Now if they were historians, they might try to overcome this gap between
their own psyche and the strange psyche of the other who expressed
his satisfaction about the Peace of Versailles. However, it is only possible
to know and understand directly ones own psyche, whereas there is no
direct road from ones own psyche to that of another. There is only the
indirect road via the understandable meanings and meaning configurations
269
This is similar to George Herbert Meads theorem of the taking the role or
position of the other. See my De theorie van het symbolisch interactionisme, (The Theory
of Symbolic Interactionism), (Amsterdam: Boom Meppel, 1973), pp. 7385. As we
saw also in Chapter Three there are, despite Rickerts dislike of Pragmatism, distinct similarities between some basic theorems of Mead and Rickerts epistemology
and methodology.
98
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psyche could be known or understood directly, that however the psyche of others could not be understood without mediation.99 As dierent
as individual human beings may be, Scheler argues, they nevertheless all share the same kind of psychological constitution. But although
corporeal sensations like erotic lust or physical pain are often similar, they are yet never identical. As to their kind and degree of intensity such bodily sensations are experienced by each of us personally
and dierently. However, psychological sensations like grief or sorrow, joy and happiness are not only similar but also identical. We
can immediately empathize with the psychological sorrow or joy of
someone else. Rickert questions this. Schelers argument, Rickert
points out, suers from the psychologistic error which fails to acknowledge that the human psyche and its processes are empirical and real
phenomena which we cannot immediately, without mediation, enter
into, just as we cannot directly get at the things and processes of
the objective world around us. Psycho-physical sensations such as
lust, or pain, or joy in others cannot directly be understood but only
reached at through the mediation of related meanings and meaning configurations which in their turn, as we saw before, are related
to generally valid values.
We do not feel precisely what someone else feels, when he is in
grief, or experiences pain or joy. But we do know what grief, or
lust, or joy, or pain means since such psychological processes are
related to non-empirical values which are deemed to be valid. Grief ,
pain or joy are value-laden phenomena with a position in our
general culture. When it is said it was one joy, one grief, one delight
that got hold on the population,100 we realize that each individual
alone experiences his or her private joy, grief or delight, as far as
these are psychological (empirical) realities. The experience is private and individual, but the understandable meaning of such a national
joy, or grief, or delight is related to a objectively valid value (e.g.
the nation), virtually shared by the entire population. Incidentally,
Rickert, we saw in Chapter Three, is aware of the fact that there
will always be dissidents who evaluate such national sentiments not
positively, e.g. as a laudable patriotism, but negatively, e.g. as a
100
271
102
272
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and normative value-judgments with regard to the values and valuejudgments of their objects of research. Natural scientists too are, of
course, not just in their personal lives but also in their research,
related to values, truth in particular. Moreover, science and research
are values too, objectified values, or in Rickerts terminology, cultural goods. Scientists are related to these values, loyal to and dependent on these goods. They even in some cases believe in Science as
in a kind of religious or ideological substitute. It is called scientism.
But these values and value-judgments of the natural scientists do
obviously not stand in any relationships to any values of their objects
of research, as is the case in Cultural Science, since the objects of
natural-scientific research are simply value-free, value-indierent.
What is at stake here is the logical and methodological nature and
dierences of value-relatedness (value-relationship) as a fact, the relating to values as a practice and the abstaining from value-judgments
as a methodological rule or norm. In the debates on the so-called
value-freedom of the social sciences fact, practice and norm are usually mixed up.
Cultural Science, we have seen before, in contrast to Natural
Science is characterized methodologically by the fact that it not only
focuses on what is individual, particular, or unique, but also reduces
the complexity of reality as a heterogeneous continuum by constantly
referring, or relating to values, because by means of this relating to
values (Wertbeziehung) the essential and relevant is separated from the
inessential and irrelevant. Moreover, as we also saw before, the historian as the representative par excellence of Cultural Science is enabled
to focus on what is individual, particular or unique because he relates
his objects of investigation to values. Only he who, or that which is
related to values, can logically be singled out from the irrational
chaos of facts, objects, and living beings as individual, particular,
unique.
There are, obviously, various kinds of value-relationship which,
incidentally, Rickert does not always distinguish sharply enough. To
begin with, there is the sociological fact that the objects of historical investigationhuman beings, events, works of art, organizations
or institutionsare always related to values. If the historian wants
to investigate the life and works of Erasmus or Napoleon in order
to write their biographies, he will have to study their cultural contexts, their contemporary sets of values, norms and meanings to
which they are positively or negatively related. This is the value-
273
relationship of the object of historical research. However, the historian himself is, of course, also related to his own contemporary values, norms and meanings which, needless to say, will dier significantly
from those of Erasmus or Napoleon. This is in both cases the factual, sociologically determined, past and present value-relationship
(Wertbezogenheit). To formulate it somewhat bluntly, value-relatedness
(or value-relationship) is a fact like gravity. It is senseless to deny it,
or to revolt against it.
Secondly, there is the act of relating objects of investigation to
values by the historian (Wertbeziehung) which Rickert defines as a theoretical act in contrast to the practical act of expressing a normative value-judgment (Wertung). The latter is not just a relating to
values, but a practical (political, religious, aesthetic, etc.) evaluation
of present or past realities. Rickert stresses the fact that the theoretical relating of objects to values remains within the domain of
scientific determination of facts and it is for that reason that he calls
relating to values theoretical. But the expression of normative valuejudgments (evaluations, Wertungen) in terms of praise and reproach
departs from the domain of science, belongs rather to the atheoretical world of religious, political, artistic, etc. practice. It is for that
reason that he calls value-judgments practical. Or, in other words,
it is a fact that people acknowledge certain values as valid values
and try to produce in relation to these values cultural goods. In
his research the historian separates relevant facts from irrelevant
ones in accordance with this relating to values of the people under
investigation.
Yet, he is not concerned with the question whether these values
are objectively valid: The value-relating procedure (. . .) must therefore
be separated (. . .) as sharply as possible from the evaluating procedure. That means, values are only relevant for history in so far as
they are de facto evaluated by subjects and in so far as, therefore,
certain objects are to be considered de facto as cultural goods.103 To
give an example from after Rickerts death, it is for an historian as
a cultural scientist irrelevant what the validity of Hitlers worldview
103
Rickert, Das wertbeziehende Verfahren (. . .) ist also (. . .) auf das schrfste vom
wertenden Verfahren zu trennen, und das heisst: fr die Geschichte kommen die
Werte nur insofern in Betracht, als sie faktisch von Subjekten gewertet und daher
faktisch gewisse Objekte als Gter betrachtet werden. Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft,
p. 112. Italics by HR.
274
CHAPTER FIVE
and its values was or is. These values are only historically relevant
in so far as they were evaluated positively or negatively, and deemed
valid or invalid between 1933 and 1945 by Nazis and anti-Nazis,
and in so far as the Nazi party NSDAP and the resistance movements had developed into cultural goods, i.e. objectified crystallizations of the Nazi and anti-Nazi values. All this is, of course,
notwithstanding the possibility, or even the human obligation, to disclaim Hitlers worldview morally in strong terms, and thus to judge
it morally invalid. But one has then made a logical transitiona
metabasis eis allo genosfrom the scientific (theoretical) to the moral
(atheoretical) realm. The historian ought to be conscious of such a
logical transition.
Even if in the eyes of the historian (i.e. in his own experience of
values, norms and meanings) none of the values under investigation
carry any validity, the fact remains that the practical relating to the
values, expressed in value-judgments by the people under investigation, assists the historian to separate the scientifically relevant from
the scientifically irrelevant. That is to say, without practical valuejudgments on his part, but by theoretically exhibiting the value-relatedness of his objects under investigation, the historian can determine
what is and what is not relevant and significant. Or, in other words
still, it is through his theoretical relating to the values and the valuejudgments of the people under investigation that historical individua
emerge.104 For example, historians will generally agree that the events
called French Revolution have been significant and important for
the further political, social and cultural development of France and
Europe, and that therefore these events are in their individuality,
particularity and uniqueness historically essential and relevant. Yet,
historians will not be able to prove scientifically that the French
Revolution has fostered or injured the political, social and cultural
developments of France and Europe in terms of progress or decline.
Those are normative, practical value-judgments which ought to be
kept out of any scientific enterprise.105 In fact, in the world of values and normative value-judgments there exists no objective validity
but a permanent conflict about what is deemed to be positive or
negative.106
104
105
106
Ibid., p. 113.
Ibid., p. 114.
Idem.
275
CULTURAL-SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY
All this leads to a complex set of questions about the objectivity of
Cultural Science in general and history as a Cultural Science in particular. Does all this not end up in historicism and relativism?107
Although he criticizes him as the journalist of science whose thought displays a constant, restless fluctuation, a crowding of questions upon questions, a dropping of problems once taken up and a failure to keep apart
historical and systematic problems, Karl Mannheim (18931947) sees the
voluminous study Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922) by Ernst Troeltsch
(18651923) as the main source of inspiration for his own theory of historicism.108 In fact, he follows Troeltsch when he claims that historical
knowledge can only be acquired, if the historian occupies an ascertainable
intellectual position (Standort) (. . . .) harboring definite aspirations regarding
the future and actively striving to achieve them. Only out of interest which
the presently acting subject has in the pattern of the future, does the observation of the past become possible. The trend of historical selection, the
form of objectification and representation becomes understandable only in
terms of the orientation of present activity.109 But also the objects of historical research must be seen in terms of their sociological positional determination (Standortgebundenheit).110 Troeltsch, Mannheim relates with approval,
rejected neo-Kantian epistemology because of its alleged formalistic conception of the knowing subject, but he obviously failed to notice Rickerts
theory of the value-relatedness of both the subject and the object of historical research which comes close to his own positional determination . . .
Mannheim broadens Troeltschs theories considerably, defining historicism as something more than just a scientific methodology. Historicism in
Mannheims view is a worldview (Weltanschauung), a way of life and a state
of consciousness which came into being, he adds, after the religiously
determined medieval picture of the world had disintegrated and when the
subsequent Enlightenment, with its dominant idea of a supra-temporal
Reason, had destroyed itself.111 Mannheim attacks neo-Kantian, allegedly
formalistic epistemology in favor of a clearly vitalistic standpoint. Historicism
107
Cf. Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert. Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, UK: The MIT Press, 1988). It discusses primarily the problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences as analyzed and allegedly
not at all solved by Rickert and Weber.
108
Karl Mannheim, Historicism, 1924, in: Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology
of Knowledge, transl and ed. By P. Keckskemeti, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1952), pp. 84134; quotation: p. 98 (slightly altered by me in accordance with the
German original text, ACZ).
109
Ibid., p. 102.
110
Ibid., p. 103.
111
Ibid., p. 85.
276
CHAPTER FIVE
does not only see and experience every segment of the spiritual-intellectual world as in a state of flux and growth, it also seeks to derive an ordering principle from this seeming anarchy of changeonly by managing to
penetrate the innermost structure of this all-pervading change.112
Rickert, of course, would object to the vitalistic core of Mannheims historicism and would probably have joined Karl Popper who radically criticized the historicists faith in historical laws and its utopian social engineering,
both of which are scientifically unacceptable and indefensible.113 In Die
Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (The Problems of the Philosophy of History),
1924, Rickert devotes a small section to historicism which he labels an
absurdity (ein Unding) since it is couched in relativism and skepticism. That
must end up in a radical nihilism which always dissolves itself, because it
also has to annihilate itself.114 He is convinced that a philosophy of history
which wants to avoid the nihilism of historicism needs the concept of
progress. The past must not only be mediated and reconstructed but also
critically evaluated in terms of what ought to be (was sein soll). That, of
course, comes close to metaphysics which, as he always has emphasized,
has no place in a scientific philosophy oriented towards the empirical reality.
The historian is related to the values of his own cultural context and
will approach the objects under investigation in terms of this valuerelationship. As a result, a historian will not and cannot be valuefree in the sense of Natural Science. In fact, Rickert admits, he will
often subject his objects and their values and value-relationships to
normative (positive and/or negative) value-judgments which are, of
course, not his private opinions because those are not very interesting and relevant. They are rather judgments that relate to the leading cultural values of his days. Historians will often relate and refer
to these leading values of their cultural environment in order to
express the historical importance or significance of historical events
and processes. In other words, such judgments related to the shared
Ibid., p. 86.
Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 1957, (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1969), pp. 6471: Piecemeal versus Utopian Engineering. By his one-sided
(very critical) focus on Karl Mannheim who identified historicism with a sociology
of knowledge, Popper wrongly attacked and radically rejected this type of sociology. Cf. Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) which refutes
from the start Mannheims approach and takes Alfred Schutzs phenomenology as
theoretical frame of reference. Being the positivist he was, Popper would probably
also have rejected this type of sociology though, but could not have accused it of
either historicism or holism.
114
Heinrich Rickert, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, (Heidelberg: Carl Winters
Universittsbuchhandlung, 1924), pp. 129132: Der Historismus und seine berwindung. Quotation: p. 129.
112
113
277
115
278
CHAPTER FIVE
Ibid., p. 173.
Cf. Bruno Latour, Science in Action, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1987). It is a detailed study of what goes on in laboratories and other centers of scientific research.
116
117
279
was in fact right and Boyle wrong, or the other way around, but rather
assumed the role of strangers vis--vis the community of Boyle followers,
and next studied the debate and in particular the arguments and actions
of the Boyle camp from this assumed standpoint: We have said that we
shall be setting out by pretending to adopt a strangers perspective with
respect to the experimental program; we shall do this because we have set
ourselves the historical task of inquiring into why experimental practices
were accounted proper and how such practices were considered to yield
reliable knowledge. As part of the same exercise we shall be adopting something close to a members account of Hobbess anti-experimentalism. That
is to say, we want to put ourselves in a position where objections to the
experimental programme seem plausible, sensible, and rational.118 (Rickert
would have applauded such a heterological approach!)
The interesting part of this contrary methodology is the fact that the
mechanisms of power of an established and authoritative in-group like the
Boyle experimentalists, are being demonstrated, while the belief in the selfevident nature of the experimentalist truth is being questioned. Both historians set out to break down the aura of self-evidence surrounding the
experimental way of producing knowledge. (. . . .) Of course, our ambition
is not to rewrite the clear judgment of history: Hobbess views found little
support in the English natural philosophical community. (. . . .) Giving other
circumstances bearing upon that philosophical community, Hobbess views
might well have found a dierent reception.119 This gives an important
clue of what objectivity is all about in the cultural-scientific context of historyin this case the history of science. As in a thought experiment both
historians assume the position of a stranger to the experimentalist community, then the texts and facts of the debate are carefully studied from
an outsiders point of view. That yields fruitful insights and knowledge of
the working of power and authority within an in-group that is certain of
the self-evidence of its truth. Boyle was wrong, Hobbes was right? That
is not what these historians set out to prove. All they did was to question
the taken-for-granted assumption that Hobbes was an ignoramus in respect
to the experimentalist issue, and beyond that to lay bare the mechanisms
of power and authoritarianism of an in-group of believers. Actually, Shapin
and Shaer apply to historical research the principle of democratic justice
formulated as hearing the other side. They hope in this way to come
closer to an objective evaluation of the past.
That the accounts of a stranger entail epistemological objectivity was
argued convincingly by Georg Simmel in his short essay on The Stranger.
Simmel claimed that the stranger s outsider-position entails both objectivity
118
Steven Shapin, Simon Schaer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and
Experimental Life, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 12f.
119
Ibid., p. 13. The Latin text of Hobbess attack on Boyle Dialogus Physicus de
Natura Aeris was, according to Shapin and Schaer, never translated and read by
his critics. Simon Schaer translated it and added it to his and Shapins book.
280
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120
Georg Simmel, The Stranger, in: Kurt H. Wol (ed. and transl.): The Sociology
of Georg Simmel, (London: The Free Press of Glencoe; Collier-Macmillan, 1964), pp.
402408; quotation: p. 405.
121
die kommen und gehen wie die Wellen im Meer. Kulturwissenschaft und
Naturwissenschaft, p. 165.
122
Rickert does not use the concepts intersubjectivity and intersubjective but I think
they do adequately cover what he meant to say about cultural-scientific objectivity.
281
123
See his monograph Probleme, chapter 3: Die Geschichtsphilosophie als
Universalgeschichte, o.c., pp. 121156.
124
Dem unbedingt allgemeingltigen Gesetz der Natur, das die generalisierenden
Wissenschaften suchen, muss dann der unbedingt allgemeingltige Wert entsprechen,
den unsere Kulturgter mehr oder weniger realisieren. Ibid., 169f.
125
das Verhltnis der Wissenschaft zur Geltung und Systematik der Werte enthlt
schwierige Probleme. Ibid., p. 169.
282
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(Naturphilosophie).126 Sciences always operate empirically, never metaphysically. However, the scientific disciplines adhering to the methods of Cultural Science are permanently in danger of falling back
on naturalism (or neo-positivism) which is, as we saw before, the
belief that Natural Science is the only legitimate scientific approach
to reality. It entails, of course, a radical denial of the world of meanings, values and norms which is in itself rather ideological, metaphysical and thus unscientific. But Rickert also wanted to avoid the
opposite error which claims that social reality cannot be investigated
in a generalizing, natural-scientific manner because human beings
are not only value-related, but also conscious and free. They are
individuals whose thoughts, emotions and acts ought not to be
explained in terms of natural-scientific laws of causality (Erklren), but
can allegedly only be understood (Verstehen) in an empathic manner.
We have seen how Rickert accepts the notion of empathic understanding (of the values of the subjects under historical investigation),
but rejects any metaphysical connotations, since metaphysics can
never be part of empirical and specialized, scientific investigations.
All that belongs to the domain of philosophy, or the philosophy of
history.
Since we focus in this chapter on the logic and methodology of
history and related cultural sciences, we will not deal with Rickerts
endeavors in the domains of metaphysics. Much of it has been covered already by the former chapter. There is one final issue we still
must discuss: Rickerts dealing with the idea of causality in Cultural
Science.
CAUSALITY IN CULTURAL SCIENCE
Rickert, we saw in the Introduction and in the second chapter, is
often in opposition to fashionable ideas and theories, and discusses
them, as it were e contrario, in order to be able to clarify his own
thinking. Causality in history, or in Cultural Science is, in his day
particularly, a hotly debated issue giving rise to conceptualizations
and methodological propositions which he takes apart analytically
126
See the last part of Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begrisbildung, entitled
Naturphilosophie und Geschichtsphilosophie, ibid., pp. 624736.
283
without compromises, often operating on the sharp edge of his logical raiser blade.
So, in the tradition of Geisteswissenschaft it has been popular to
claim that causality has no place in it, since human beings are free
and therefore not caught in the webs of cause and eect.127 Consequently, its approach is allegedly not causal, i.e. its focus is
not causally on origins, but teleologically on ends. In this teleogical
focus man is defined as being essentially free. Needless to say that
Rickert rejects such metaphysical juxtapositions. Often, he argues,
the concept of freedom is, together with that of casualness (Zuflligkeit),
dished up as the opposing counterpart of causality. Freedom is then
reduced to something like causelessness (Ursachlosigkeit) which is philosophically not very helpful. One may believe in freedom as a kind
of transcendent freedom of the will, but it is logically very hazardous to apply such a concept to an empirical science like history,
let alone to found its methodology upon it. History as a specialized
cultural science can admittedly not apply the generalizing concepts
and methods of Natural Science, but that is the case not because its
objects of investigation, human beings, are allegedly free creatures,
but because these creatures must be investigated and understood in
their individuality, particularity and uniqueness. Causality is logically
not the issue, the generalizing method is! As we saw before, history
as a Cultural Science is characterized by the individualizing approach,
not by the alleged fact that it focuses on human freedom. Thus, the
idea that history is concerned with free individuals which is then
contrasted to Natural Science whose objects and processes are causally
conditioned, does logically and methodologically not make sense.128
It is not an empirical but a metaphysical idea.
Much confusion around the idea of the causal method which he
calls a meaningless catchword,129 are caused, according to Rickert,
by the erroneous identification of the concept of empirical causality
with that of conceptual, law like regularity (Gesetzmssigkeit). There is an
127
This is not the place to discuss in depth Max Webers theory of culturalscientific causality which he interprets in terms of causal imputation which he links
to rational ideal types. See e.g. Max Weber, Knies und das Irrationalittsproblem,
in: Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, o.c., pp. 42145, particularly pp. 127.
Rickerts echo, as discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, is loud and clear in
these logical considerations of Weber.
128
Rickert, Grenzen, p. 378.
129
Rickert, Probleme, p. 48.
284
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130
131
132
Idem.
Weber, Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 234238.
Ibid., pp. 190214.
285
Ibid., p. 237.
wir kennen nur eine empirische Wirklichkeit, die das einzige Material der
naturwissenschaftlichen sowohl als auch der historischen Disziplinen bildet, und die
allgemeinen Formen dieser Wirklichkeit, z.B. die Kausalitt, mssen fr die generalisierenden ebenso wie fr die individualisierenden Wissenschaften von Bedeutung
sein. Rickert, Grenzen, p. 373.
133
134
286
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of the specialized investigation, the historian will impose certain limits on his investigation of the synchronic connections. But there are,
secondly, also and at the same time, the diachronic developments of the
investigated historical objects which were caused by former objects
that in their turn were again caused by previous objects. Here too,
one could in principle continue the causal lines of development ad
infinitum, as in an endless regression, moving from stage to stage of
development, until one hits the absolute origin of all these developing objects. This will also not make much sense in an empirical,
specialized historical investigation. Historical regressions in time will
also be limited in accordance with the main issues and themes under
investigation.135
There is, of course, a formidable problem here: what precisely are the limits of the synchronic extension and the diachronic regression? Where does,
for instance, the historian who investigates the Russian October Revolution,
end his scrupulous investigations of all the synchronic and diachronic facts
and processes which bear causally upon this particular object of research?
Rickert argues that it depends on the main issue or theme of his specialized investigation. But that is still rather arbitrary, since in that case the
limits were in the end rather individually determined, as it is the historian
himself who decides that certain facts do no longer contribute heuristically
to his investigation of this particular issue or theme under investigation.
It would be more in the line of his main course of argumentation, if
Rickert referred here also to the dominant, intersubjectively valid values of
the historians time and society. It is, after all, this set of values which assists
him in separating the relevant from the irrelevant data. It is simultaneously
this set of values which will determine where the heuristically fruitful limits of the synchronic and diachronic network of causal strings lie. In the
case of the October Revolution, for example, the historian of the 1970s,
operating in what then was called the Cold War, will focus on dierent
individual facts and dierent causal (synchronic and diachronic) networks
of facts than the historian of today. Likewise a German historian of today
will investigate the fateful years 19331945 with a dierent focus than his
colleagues from the 1950s and 1960sapart from the fact that there were
and still are dierences in view between historians from West- and historians from East-Germany. Today, German historians will (and do) pay more
attention to the suering of the German people after 1943, than their predecessors would do (or dared to do) thirty or twenty years ago.
287
mutually dierent, must contain, according to Rickert, some innovation, i.e. something new and not yet existing.136 They are thus only
individual, particular, and uniquethat is, historically interesting and
significant facts. This shows once more that history cannot be molded
by the generalizing concepts and laws of Natural Science. As we
have seen before, Rickert dismisses theories about the laws of history, as the cultural-scientific equivalents of the laws of nature, as
unscientific, metaphysical constructions which are usually not free
from ideological, political value-judgments. Yet, this is not to say
that Cultural Science could not conceptually construct lawful regularities of historical developments.
At this point Rickerts arguments become very complex and admittedly rather abstract, if not vague, which is, of course, due to the
fact that he apparently introduces now in the logical realm of history as the prime example of individualizing Cultural Science a
clearly generalizing concept like the laws of development. He has
argued up till now that, unlike such disciplines as psychology or sociology, history could not apply conceptual generalizations. History,
he claimed earlier, is a radically individualizing kind of Cultural
Science. How does he solve the apparent contradictions which emerge,
when he introduces the notion of laws of development?
The following theorem of Weber is, I think, quite enlightening. Arguments
of cause and eect in the cultural sciences, he argues, appertain to rules
and regularities. There are five logically dierent, yet corresponding historical facts which have relevance with regard to causality. He takes Goethes
love letters addressed to Frau von Stein as example. (1) To begin with, the
objectively observable fact of the paper Goethe used is, of course, historically irrelevant. But there is another fact which is historically important,
namely the content of these letters, i.e. the expressions of Goethes feelings
towards the lady, i.e. the actual meaning (Sinn) of these letters which can
be analyzed and interpreted scientifically. These sentiments must have had
a tremendous impact on Goethes literary personality and it is scientifically
relevant to reconstruct the eect of this on the poets creations. Weber does
not formulate it thus, but he refers, of course, to the Realgrund which the
literary historian will try to uncover. (2) Let us assume, Weber continues,
that there is no such impact on Goethes creations. In that case, these intimate letters still bear historical relevance, because they will provide a unique
insight into his way of life and into his particular view of life. In other
words, these letters are historically relevant as Erkenntnisgrund, as a means
136
Ibid., p. 46.
288
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to acquire knowledge of Goethes view of life and the world. (3) But, given
Goethes status and position, the contents of these letters may also throw
light on the typical way of living in certain circles of the German society
of those days. They then function as an epistemological means to acquire
knowledge about the characteristic cultural habitude of those circles in those
days, distinct from the ways of life in other times and in other societies.
The letters are then placed, as it were, in a cultural-historical causal
configuration. (4) However, it is possible that these letters reveal cultural
characteristics which go beyond the particular features of Goethes time
and society, which are actually quite generally relevant and can be used
as material for a cultural psychology or social psychology which, being sciences, aim at analytical, abstract and generalizing regularities (laws). In
this approach the individual and unique sentiments and experiences of
Goethe are in themselves irrelevant. They are only relevant as a means for
the acquisition of scientific generic concepts (Gattungsbegrie). (5) Finally, if
all of these four instances are irrelevant it is still possible that a psychiatrist, interested in the psychology of eroticism, subjects these letters to his
brand of investigation. Goethes letters to Frau von Stein may function in
that case as an ideal typical example of a type of erotic behavior which,
Weber adds, can without doubt be compared to Rousseaus Confessions.137
In view of Rickerts theory of cultural objectivity, causality and generalization these five constructed stages from the highly historically-individual
to the very general-natural-scientific is, I think, quite enlightening.
289
139
In Grenzen Rickert was still very explicit about this. Cf. ibid., pp. 376384. In
Probleme (1924), as we will see later, he apparently changed his mind on this issue.
It is interesting to observe that he did not incorporate this change in the revised
5th edition of Grenzen, which came out five years after publication of Probleme.
140
Ibid., p. 376.
290
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291
CONCLUSION
Generalizing, value-free Natural Science and individualizing, valuerelating Cultural Science are the ideal typical, logically constructed
extreme ends of a continuum on which the empirical natural and
social sciences operate. Sometimes they come very close to the one
extreme, as in the case of history which Rickert well-nigh identified
with Cultural Science, although it too carried generalizing elements
as we just saw when we discussed the laws of historical development. Most empirical, specialized natural sciences, on the other hand,
operate close to the other extreme, Natural Science, but here too
there are exceptions, as in the case of evolutionary biology which,
according to Rickert, works with individualizing, historical concepts.
Contrary to the advocates of a Geisteswissenschaft he positioned psychology close to the Natural Science pole of the continuum, arguing that materially the human being is a psycho-physical unity of
mind-and-body and that formally, i.e. logically, nothing stood in
the way of psychologists approaching this mind-and-body in a generalizing, natural-scientific manner. Modern psychologists do not have
to adhere to behaviorism and similar exact schools in psychology,
to agree with him wholeheartedly.
Yet, it remains questionable within the terms of Rickerts own
continuum of sciences to pin down one single discipline to one of
the two logical extremes, as he does in the case of history as an
almost exclusively Cultural Science and psychology as an almost
exclusively Natural Science. As to the empirical natural sciences,
developments since Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg have indicated
that Rickerts definition of the material object of natural-scientific
research in terms of mechanically moving things is old-fashioned,
while his exclusive positioning of the contemporary natural sciences
on the logical extreme of Natural Science is no longer possible. The
extremes are, maybe more than he was aware of, indeed non-empirical ideal types, formal and abstract limes concepts. Historians can
legitimately try to move from the one end of Cultural Science to
as is for instance illustrated by the so-called unintended consequences and the elective anities (Wahlverwandtschaften) which played such a big role in Max Webers
cultural sociology. See my De relativiteit van kennis en werkelijkheid. Inleiding tot de kennissociologie, (The Relativity of Knowledge and Reality. Introduction to the Sociology
of Knowledge), (Amsterdam: Boom Meppel, 1974), on the logic of elective anity:
pp. 137142.
292
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the other end of Natural Science, as has been tried by the proponents of so-called cliometrics.144 Likewise, psychologists can legitimately
develop their discipline as an historically and culturally oriented discipline. There are, of course, scores of historical-psychological studies belonging to the Cultural Science pole of Rickerts continuum.
Let me give just one, rather unconventional example. Although admittedly strongly criticized by most psychologists and historians, an interesting case is presented by the Dutch psychologist J. H. van den
Berg in his Metabletica or Theory of Changes (1956) which bore the
telling sub-title: Principles of a Historical Psychology. It is an unconventional, at times rather fanciful and capricious study of often very
subtle changes in the consciousness of Western men and women
changes which Van den Berg connects with societal transformations.145
This leads to another point of possible criticism. Rickert warns
against generalizing historical studies which tried to demonstrate the
existence of long-term regularities as the equivalents of naturalscientific laws. They would inevitably end up in metaphysical and
ideologically normative visions which would not have any scientific
value and validity. As we saw, he refers to Oswald Spenglers Decline
of the West as a telling example, and could have added Arnold
Toynbees A Study of History as well. History in particular, he emphasizes time and again, is an individualizing discipline and should not
try to imitate the generalizations of Natural Science, lest it drifts o
into muddy metaphysics. Yet, his friend and colleague Max Weber,
for instance, did also design a grand sociological theory of socio-economic change, in which he defined the modernization of the Western
world as a process of increasing rationalizationa process which he viewed
as an ever broadening and deepening disenchantment.146 As the
Cf. Robert W. Fogel, Stanley L. Engerman, o.c.
J. H. van den Berg, Metabletica of de Leer der Veranderingen, 1956, translated as
The Changing Nature of Man. Introduction to a Historical Psychology, (New York: Delta
Books, 1983) An application of this theory to the changes in our attitudes towards
the human body is J. H. van den Berg, Het menselijk lichaam. Een metabletisch onderzoek, (The Human Body. A Study in Metabletica), (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1959).
The theory was also applied to socio-psychological and sociological transformations
in J. H. van den Berg, Leven in meervoud. Een metabletisch onderzoek, 1963, translated
as Divided Existence and Complex Society, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1974). The
neologism metabletica which Van den Berg coined for his brand of historical
research, is derived from the Greek verb metaballein which means to change, to
transform.
146
Cf. Max Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Abriss der universalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, (Economic History. Outline of the Universal Social and Economic
144
145
293
encompassing and generalizing approach of Weber clearly demonstrates, attempts to arrive at a universal history do not necessarily
have to end up in unscientific metaphysical vistas. The fascinating
aspect of Webers methodology is indeed that he moves back and
forth on the continuum of the generalizing and the individualizing
approaches to reality.
Another interesting example of a historical, cultural-scientific sociology which
tries to demonstrate a long-term development in a generalizing manner
without drifting o into metaphysics is Norbert Eliass celebrated study of
the process of civilization which he published prior to World War II but with
which he gained fame only several decades later. Starting at the end of
the Middle Ages in the courtly society of absolutism but then developing
further into the circles of the urban bourgeoisie, a process got hold of men
and women in which they increasingly learned to curb bodily and psychical impulses. Burping, defecating, urinating, making love, etc. were gradually and ever intensively banned from public life, the threshold of shame
was heightened, children were imbued with a constraint from outside
(Fremdzwang) which had to grow into an inner constraint (Selbstzwang) behind
the heightened threshold of shame. Beyond these psychological transformations, Elias demonstrates in two volumes packed with often minute historical (quite individual) data, how also fundamental sociological and
political-scientific changes occurred. The social relationships between human
beings became long, thin and abstract chains of interdependencefrom
clans, to villages, to cities, to regions, to nations, to nation-states, to continents. Likewise, organizations and institutions transformed radically in the
direction of multinational and supranational bodies in which communication and power relations altered in proportion.
In short, Elias combines the individualizing historical approach with a
generalizing approach without ending up in metaphysical and ideological
quicksand.147
294
CHAPTER FIVE
295
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INTRODUCTION
If we try to determine what the eect of Rickerts philosophy has
been on the thoughts and publications of fellow philosophers and
philosophically interested social scientists, we run into considerable
problems. In fact, due to reasons given in the Introduction, there
was little if any eect. However, it is also hard to find out what the
impact of his writings were in the days of his widespread fame, i.e.
the decades around 1900. The reason is that in those days scholars
were not supposed to burden their publications with quotes of and
references to fellow scholars. Apparently, the reader was supposed
to be well read and to know without such references who was actually
being discussed and, more indicatively, who was intentionally ignored.2
1
Often one learns more from the mistakes of important scholars, than from the
correct ideas of nullities. Max Weber, Energetische Kulturtheorien ( Energetic
Cultural Theories), in: Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 1922,
(Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1968), p. 425.
2
An exception is the previously mentioned, small study by Sergius Hessen,
Individuelle Kausalitt. Studien zum transzendentalen Empirismus, (Individual Causality.
Studies on Transcendental Empirism), (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1909) which
can be read as a helpful introduction to Rickerts transcendentalism. As we have
seen, Rickert was enamored by the label transcendental empirism for his brand
of philosophy. A more recent exception is presented by Guy Oakes, Weber and
Rickert. Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,
1988). This monograph is restricted though to the issue of cultural objectivity and
comes to the conclusion that both Rickert and Weber failed to present a sound
theory of objectively valid values. Oakes in his turn, it seems to me, fails to understand the neo-Kantian distinction between absolute, formal, universal (objective)
values which in value-judgments are imposed on contingent, concrete and particular contents. These judgments are subjective but carry the relative objectivity of
intersubjectivity. Incidentally, Oakes presentation of Rickerts philosophy of values
lacks lucidity and remains rather far removed from Rickerts texts.
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Georg Simmel, for instance, does not refer to any fellow philosopher in his book on the logic and methodology of history in which
he developed ideas which sometimes come very close to those of
Windelband and Rickert, but also deviate from them significantly.3
The first edition was published in 1892, prior to Windelbands famous
inaugural address and to Rickerts Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
Begrisbildung. However, Simmel published a second edition of his
book in 1905 after he had read Die Grenzen. Actually, he practically
re-wrote the book, adjusting his ideas at several points to those of
Rickert.4 But once more, Rickert is not mentioned at all, nor is
Windelband.
In this concluding chapter we shall discuss in some broad outlines
Rickerts impact on four disciplines: general philosophy (mainly Georg
Simmel), legal philosophy (mainly Lask and Radbruch), history (mainly
Huizinga) and sociology (mainly Weber and Mannheim). It is the
purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the influence of Rickerts theories of knowledge, values and natural-scientific and cultural-scientific
methods. However, as we shall see, this influence did not consist of
an uncritical adoption of Rickertean ideas and theorems, but was
rather the inspirational factor of a critical debate with his neo-Kantian
standpoints. Rickert, so much has hopefully become clear in the former chapters, was not a kind of guru, like Hegel or Heidegger, who
was viewed and adored as the founder of a school which would
attract crowds of admirers and followers, who would propagate almost
religiously his ideas and doctrines. Upon his death in 1936 he did
not leave an ideological worldview which would warm the hearts
and inspire the moods of faithful followers. On the contrary, like his
colleague and friend Max Weber, he was rather the Socratic type
of intellectual that invites one to think critically about our thinking
and our thoughts, about our values and value-judgments, about our
collective constructions of reality. Neither was Rickert a teacher who
educated his students and readers by means of orderly composed,
yet in the end platitudinous textbooks. In his lectures and in his
books which, as we saw in the Introduction, were actually also lec-
3
Georg Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, (The Problems of the Philosophy
of History), 1892, (Mnchen, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1923, 3rd ed.).
4
Cf. Anton M. Bevers, Dynamik der Formen bei Georg Simmel, (Dynamics of Forms
in Georg Simmels Work), 1982, translated from the Dutch original by F. E.
Schrader, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), p. 47f.
RICKERTS ECHO
299
tures, he confronted his audiences with an ongoing process of thinking in the hope that they would join him in what he himself experienced as the demand and the joy of thinking. In philosophy, the
social sciences, and the study of law, as we shall see in this chapter, his impact was often indirect. It had the character of an echo,
rather than that of a loudspeaker. He triggered critical debates, rarely
called forth emotional and thus uncritical cries of adulation and
admiration.
The fact remains though that ever since roughly the First World
War it has apparently not been fashionable to mention his name. If
it comes to issues like the logical demarcations of the natural and
the cultural sciences, or the logical dierences of facts and values,
Sein and Sollen, etc., philosophers and social scientists either disregard them, due to a neo-positivist, or an existentialist, or any other
anti-epistemological worldview, or refer to Windelband and Weber
rather than to Rickert. In any case, in the remainder of this chapter I shall try to indicate in some main outlines what Rickerts echo
has been in various debates on epistemology, logic of the social sciences, and legal philosophy. It may be superfluous to remind the
reader that the following sections will discuss the various theorists
exclusively with respect to the impact Rickert had on their thinking
and writing. This discussion will therefore not even come close to a
true insight into their work.
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
Georg Simmel (18581918) was a personal friend of both Rickert
and Max Weber, and admired by them for his intellectual brilliance
and philosophical depth. It would be preposterous to assume an intellectual dependence of Simmel on the neo-Kantian philosophy of
Windelband, Rickert, or on the methodological and sociological
theories of Weber. In general philosophy, methodology, logic of
the social sciences and sociology Simmel developed ideas and theories which were idiosyncratic and highly original.5 But he always
5
Simmel developed his methodology and logic mainly in his publications on the
philosophy of history. See next to the previously quoted Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie the following two essays: Das Problem der historischen Zeit (The Problem
of Historical Time) and Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens (On the Essence
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maintained a close intellectual, though critical tie with the neoKantians of the South-West German School. Rickert and Weber in
their turn were admirers of Simmels publications, but also quite critical as to his continual sliding o into metaphysical speculations.
Rickert in particular rejected Simmels endeavor to reconcile neoKantian epistemology and logic on the one hand and vitalism
(Lebensphilosophie) on the other.6
Indeed, the essence of Simmels thinking is an ongoing attempt
to reconcile Kants critical epistemology, as it was elaborated in particular by Windelband and Rickert on the one hand, and the philosophy of life (vitalism), as it was formulated in particular by Nietzsche,
Schopenhauer and Bergson.7 Or, more precisely, Simmel rejects the
of Historical Understanding), in: Georg Simmel, Brcke und Tr (Bridge and Door),
essays on history, religion, art and society edited by M. Landmann, (Stuttgart:
Koehler Verlag, 1957), pp. 4359 and 5986. I made gratefully use of Bevers previously quoted discussion and analysis of Simmels work, especially of the second
chapter, o.c., pp. 4777 which discusses Simmels theory of knowledge against the
background of Windelband and Rickert (ibid., pp. 3145). For Simmels ahistorical sociology of forms see ibid., pp. 7297 and his philosophy of life, ibid., pp.
141174. In chapter 5 Bevers gives a comparative analysis of Simmels sociology
of forms and Webers understanding sociology, ibid., pp. 120140. Rickerts influence
in the philosophy of his days was, of course, larger than just in Simmels publications. His thoughts and ideas penetrated often in special philosophical problems.
An example is Sergius Hessen, Individuelle Kausalitt, o.c. I restrict the present discussion to Simmel, since he was intellectually of the same stature as Rickert.
6
Simmels metaphysical vitalism was very obvious in his Lebensanschauung. Vier
metaphysische Kapitel, (Vitalistic Worldview. Four Metaphysical Chapters), (Mnchen,
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922). Rickert, as we shall see, did subject Simmels
vitalistic ideas to a critical, yet rather sympathetic discussion in his Die Philosophie
des Lebens. It is indicative though that he limited his discussion to this swan-song of
Simmel which he wrote while he was dying of cancer of the liver. He ignored
Simmels less metaphysically loaded publications, which was, I think, a bit unfair.
Weber was reported to abstain from any critical publications since he feared this
would impede Simmels professorial career in Germany. In fact, not only Simmels
unconventional philosophy but also anti-Semitic forces prevented a regular professorship in one of the major universities. It was not before 1914, four years before
his death and at the start of the First World War, that he was appointed regular
professor at the university of Strasburgnotably, in the centre of the Western front
of the war! See for the anti-Semitic, academic opposition to an appointment of
Simmel in Heidelberg, to a second professorship next to the one of Rickert:
K. Gassen, M. Landmann (eds.), Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel. Briefe, Erinnerungen,
Bibliographie, (Book of Gratitude. Letters, Recollections, Bibliography), (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 1958), p. 26f.
7
Cf. Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus (Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche. A Cycle of Lectures), (Mnchen and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot,
1920). Schopenhauer, according to Simmel, is the philosopher of hopelessness, boredom, grey uniformity, aimlessness, whereas Nietzsche, on the contrary, represented
RICKERTS ECHO
301
302
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RICKERTS ECHO
303
absolute as in the case of Rickerts transcendental philosophy of values, but always relativei.e. in mutual relations, reciprocities, and
opposites. Needless to add that Rickert sees the concept of relationism as a sham play of words. In his view, Simmel has not
avoided the logical mortal sin of relativism.
It is as if Simmels conceptualization is in its essential elements a
continuous and critical debate with Rickerts logic and philosophy
of values. There is, for example, Rickerts typically Kantian distinction of values and reality with which Simmel expressedly disagrees.
We saw in Chapter Four how Rickert tries to define the dierence
of facts and values. The negation of a fact, he argues, is nothingness, in the sense of non-existence, but the negation of a value is
not nothingness but a counter-value. It can be proven that the unicorn does not exist. It may function as a symbol or a myth, but as
an animal, a horse with a single pointed horn, the unicorn is nonexistent. The denial of truth, however, is falsehood, of honesty is
dishonesty, of a god is a devil, of beauty is ugliness, of lust is pain,
etc. Simmel finds this problematic and in three dierent letters to
Rickert he formulates his diculty with this theorem which he labels
the negation problem (Negationsfrage). He repeats his objection formulated as a question three times with rather long intervals, which
indicates that he did not receive a satisfactory answer while the issue
keeps haunting him.9 In the first letter he formulates the negation
problem as follows: The abrogation of something existing, you say,
leaves behind a nothingness, but the negation of something valid,
would result in a positive nonsense. Now if I did understand you
correctly, the sentence A does not exist, means so much as the
sentence that A exists is false; the existence of A must not be acknowledged. And indeed, how could a thought abrogate an existence? It
can indeed only abrogate the thought of this existence, only the judgment that A exist.10 In that case, Simmel continues, there are the
following alternatives: (1) The judgment A exists is indeed false. But
9
See K. Gassen. M. Landmann (eds.), o.c., 8.IV.10, pp. 104106; 3.IV.16,
p. 115f.; 15.IV.17, pp. 117119.
10
Die Aufhebung einer Existenz, sagen Sie, hinterlasse ein Nichts, die eines
Gltigen hinterliesse positiven Unsinn. Wenn ich Sie nun richtig verstanden habe,
so bedeutet der Satz: A existiert nichtsoviel wie: der Satz, dass A nicht existiert,
ist falsch, die Existenz von A soll nicht anerkannt werden. Und in der Tat, wie
sollte auch ein Gedanke eine Existenz aufheben? Er kann allerdings nur den Gedanken
dieser Existenz, nur das Urteil, dass A existiert, aufheben. Ibid., p. 104f.
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then the only thing that happens is the simple fact that an error is
corrected. If the judgment refers to something valid, i.e. to a value,
the outcome is something non-valid and thus as non-existent as in
the case of the judgment that A as a fact does not exist. (2) The
judgment A exists is in fact true. In that case its negation reaps
the same nonsense as when we deny the truth of 2 + 2 = 4. The
same holds true for a statement about the truth of validity, i.e. of
a value: its denial is nonsensical. Simmel then asks Rickert, if he
made an error in calculation, and elaborates his argument in greater
detail.11
Rickerts reaction, if he wrote one, is not known but we may
assume that he has pointed out that the denial of a true statement
about a value, or its validity, would not be nonsensical but reap a
counter-value. In any case, six years later Simmel returns to the
problem of negation. He had read Gegenstand der Erkenntnis and agrees
now with Rickert, when he distinguishes being and value by saying
that the abrogation of being results in nothingness, while the denial
of value reaps a counter-value. Also that the abrogation of sense
(Sinn), results not in nothingness but in nonsense (Unsinn). But then
a new problem emerges: why would follow from this similarity of
formal structure, that sense was a value? Could they not be two categories which act in an analogous manner without the one being
subordinated to the other? Is it possible, Simmel asks, to draw conclusions about their mutual relationship, if two concepts demonstrate
the same structure with regard to a third concept (in this case the
denial, the abrogation)? Why would sense not be an autonomous
phenomenon that has much in common with value, without being
a kind of superior concept (Oberbegri ) which is superimposed on
value? Please, he adds, enlighten me.
Apparently Rickert did and Simmel refers to his answer one year
later. He begins by saying that on the negation issue still a lot could
be said back and forth, but he doubts if that would be very fruitful. He nevertheless goes on saying once more that he does agree
on the distinction of being and validity. Yet, he confesses that some
explanations Rickert gave in an answering letter are still not clear
to him. Rickert has answered, and Simmel quotes him verbatim,
that he had not doubted that the negation of sense could possibly
11
RICKERTS ECHO
305
lead to nothingness, but on the next page, Simmel goes on, he wrote
that the connection with a meaningful configuration (Sinngebilde) results
never in a mere nothingness, but leads to another meaningful configuration which does belong to something. Simmel does not want
to engage in quibbling, but he is seized by the suspicion that Rickert
is quite ambiguous in his use of the notion of negation (abrogation).
It is as if the dierence of the nothingness in the case of being and
of something in the case of validity which the negation leaves behind
in facts and values respectively, is not only determined by the negated
(abrogated) content but also by the logical structure of the negation
(abrogation) itself. It is as if negation (abrogation) in the one case is
something else than in the other case. Regretfully, we do not know
how Rickert responded to this question which, as abstract as it is,
refers to a corner-stone of his philosophy of values. In fact, his
definition of the dierence of facts and values in terms of negation
or abrogation, remains rather questionable.
Like Windelband and Rickert, Simmel is not in favor of psychologism and shares their and Webers contempt of the historian
and philosopher Karl Lamprecht who based the philosophy of history on psychology.12 This notwithstanding Simmel too has a distinctly psychological view of the philosophy of history. He claims
right at the start of his Die Probleme der Geschichtswissenschaft that history is the history of psychic processes, i.e. of impulses, voluntaristic acts and emotional reflexes, otherwise it is just a play of puppets.
The object of history as a scientific discipline consists of the imagination, the will and the feeling of personalities. That is, the objects
of history are souls.13 Even such historical studies of seemingly material objects, like the building of the Saint Peters Cathedral or the
construction of the Gotthard tunnel are only of interest to the historian as investments of psychic events, as passage points of human
12
In a letter to Rickert, dated April 25, 1913, Simmel refers to an essay by
Lamprecht and exclaims: One really puts ones head in ones hands and asks oneself, if such a thing is at all possible or just a bad dream. (Man fasst sich wirklich an den Kopf und fragt sich, ob so etwas berhaupt mglich oder ein bser
Traum ist.), K. Gassen, M. Landmann (eds.), o.c., p. 111.
13
Georg Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (The Problems of the Philosophy
of History), o.c., p. 1. This book which he re-wrote many times is extremely hard
to read and to understand due to its very condensed and abstract style of arguing.
It is my experience that the book gets obscurer and abstruser the more intensively
and closer one reads and re-reads it.
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will, intellect and emotion.14 Rickert and certainly Weber would reject
this exclusive position of psychology within the domain of the historical discipline, since it strongly smacks of psychologism. The building of a cathedral and the construction of a tunnel are, of course,
as much economic processes, but it would be an inadmissible materialism to found the history of these phenomena exclusively on economics. It would be inadmissible because it would be an unscientific
metaphysics, as is illustrated by Marxist historical materialism. Indeed,
psychologism is as much metaphysical as is sociologism or economism.
Simmels psychological predisposition is also illustrated by his theory of understanding (Verstehen).15 He distinguishes three kinds of
understanding: psychological, factual and historical. Psychological
understanding is, according to Simmel, not a direct kind of empathy
by which one projects ones own inner feelings and thoughts on the
mind and soul of other human beings. This notion of understanding
as projection is a variant of the representational logic (Abbildungslogik)
which Simmel dismisses.16 Human beings are psychologically too
complex and volatile, they are in addition too individually unique
to be able to comprehend them adequately by means of such an
empathic understanding. Moreover, experience learns that we are
able to understand in others what we ourselves have not experienced. If this were not the case, history as a scientific discipline
would not be possible. One does not have to be Caesar or Luther
in order to understand Caesar and Luther.17 Simmel then argues
that psychological understanding is only possible because we are able
to experience ourselves and the others as coherent personalities. When
we encounter someone else we are able to construct from fragmentary elements like a word, a gesture, an emotional expression, a
coherent image of his or her personality. This image enables us to
understand the other psychologically, although it may not be forgotten that the image is a construction, a type which does not cover
Simmel, ibid., p. 4f.
On Simmels theory of Verstehen, see ibid., pp. 35. I made use of Bevers
lucid treatment of Simmels theory of understanding: Bevers, o.c., pp. 5662.
16
See Simmel, o.c., p. 39f., 53 where he dismisses the nave realism of representational epistemology.
17
Ibid., p. 84. Weber uses the same sentence in his Wissenschaftslehre, o.c., p. 100.
Simmel, it seems to me, contradicts himself on this point when he claims earlier
that someone who never loved someone, will never be able to understand a lover,
that a choleric person will never understand a phlegmatic one, that a weakling will
never understand a hero. Ibid., p. 39.
14
15
RICKERTS ECHO
307
18
308
CHAPTER SIX
which have led to the creation of this play. This comes close to psychological understanding. In historical understanding we search for
certain psychological causes of historical phenomena. Or, in other
words, we do not have to identify with Goethe as an individual in
order to understand his Faust, but if we want to understand how
this play came about we will have to arrive at an understanding of
Goethes motives which, of course, are embedded in the cultural
environment he lived and worked in.
Thus, Simmel does not merely incorporate elements of Rickerts
logic, methodology and philosophy of values, but rather seems to
engage in an ongoing, critical debate with his intellectual and personal friend. The main dierences between the two are (a) Rickerts
dismissal of vitalism and its alleged irrationalism; Simmels incorporation of vitalism in his philosophy and dismissal of the alleged
intellectualism of the neo-Kantian logic; (b) Rickerts banishment of
psychology from philosophy, defining it as one of the empirical sciences, methodologically determined by the Natural-Scientific approach
to boot; Simmels incorporation of psychology in his philosophy of
history and theory of understanding; (c) both work with Kants distinction of form and content, but to Rickert forms are non-empirical,
transcendent realities; to Simmel forms are empirical components
of the content of life, as was demonstrated in his sociology of
forms. But there are distinct similarities also, two of which stand
out in particular: (a) both Rickert and Simmel stress the logical
dierence of theoretical concepts and empirical reality, of thought
and experience, of facts and values, and reject representational logic
(although it seems to return through the backdoor in Simmels philosophy); (b) there is a great similarity between Rickerts heterothesis and heterology on the one hand and Simmels logic of reciprocity
(Wechselwirkung) on the other.
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
The most gifted and in his days generally respected student of
Windelband and Rickert was Emil Lask (18751915), who tragically
fell in battle at the beginning of the First World War.19 He studied
19
Lask was Rickerts favorite student, whom he acknowledged as an inspiring
colleague. See his exceptionally personal commemoration in the Preface of the third
RICKERTS ECHO
309
310
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RICKERTS ECHO
311
Ibid., p. 209.
Ibid., p. 213. It is interesting to relate this view to the cognate theory of Josef
Esser, Vorverstndnis und Methodenwahl, (Pre-understanding and Choice of Methods),
1970, (Frankfurt a.M.: Athenum Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1972). Lasks view
also reminds one of the phenomenological view of Alfred Schutzs methodology.
See e.g. Alfred Schutz, Common-Sense and Scientific interpretation of Human
Action, in: Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality, (The Hague:
Martinus Nijho, 1962), pp. 348.
22
23
312
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empirical sciences but as the science which derives its normative concepts from the pre-scientific norms of daily life.24
The echoes of Windelband and in particular Rickert are obvious
by now. Lask would deserve more attention than this, but let us
transfer to the neo-Kantian tones and colors of the philosophy of
law of his friend Radbruch.
The philosopher of law, state minister of justice during the Weimar
Republic and university professor of criminal law and philosophy
(twice at Heidelberg) Gustav Radbruch (18781946), was strongly
influenced by the neo-Kantianism of the Baden School, in particular by Windelband, Rickert and Lask. He mentions these names in
his posthumously reprinted Rechtsphilosophie (1950), but in particular
Rickerts philosophy of values has had a heavier imprint on his ideas
than a brief footnote justifies.25
Radbruch opens the first chapter, headed Reality and Value, by
the statement that in reality, i.e. the shapeless raw material of our
experiences, reality and value are mixed up. We experience people
and things that are tied to values or unvalues, but we are not aware
of the fact that these values and unvalues stem from us the beholders, not from the things and people we behold. The first act of our
mind is to separate our I from reality, to confront it and to separate it from values. We are able to confront reality without relating
it to values which then present the realm of nature, because nature
is nothing else then reality stripped of values. Inversely, reality can be
24
Ibid., p. 217. Two critical annotations seem in order here. Lask should have
added at this point religion and theology as phenomena which are very similar to
jurisprudence and law in that they too derive their normative values (and thus their
significance) from empirical, pre-theological religious values and norms. Moreover,
these pre-scientific legal and religious norms and values suggest strongly the existence of natural law and natural religion.
25
Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, (Stuttgart: Koehler Verlag, 1950). This 4th
edition was edited by Erik Wolf who wrote an informative introductory essay on
Radbruchs life and work: Gustav Radbruchs Leben und Werk, ibid., pp. 1778.
In law and criminology adequate causal imputation is, of course, a crucial issue.
Radbruch wrote a brief monograph about it which influenced Max Webers thinking about the subject. See Gustav Radbruch, Die Lehre von der adquaten Verursachung,
(The Doctrine of Adequate Causal Imputation), (Berlin: J. Guttentag, Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1902). Cf. Max Weber, Objektive Mglichkeit und adquate Verursachung in der historischen Kausalbetrachtung, (Objective Possibility and Adequate
Causal Imputation in the Historical Observation of Causality), in: Max Weber,
Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, (Collected Papers on the Logic of the
Sciences), 1920, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1968, 3rd ed.), pp. 266290.
RICKERTS ECHO
313
27
314
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28
Ibid., p. 123f. Although he claims to have constructed this theory in the spirit
of Kants philosophy, John Rawls does not mention Radbruchs crucial idea of justice in his A Theory of Justice, 1971, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1977).
29
Nicht dies wird behauptet, dass Wertungen nicht durch Seinstatsachen verursacht, vielmehr dass sie aus ihnen nicht begrndet werden knnen. Ibid., p. 99. Karl
Mannheim, Historicism, in: Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge,
translated by Paul Kecskemeti, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 125
and passim.
RICKERTS ECHO
315
316
CHAPTER SIX
33
Johan Huizinga, De taak der cultuurgeschiedenis, (The Task of Cultural
History), ibid., pp. 3595. Quotation on p. 69.
34
Cf. his short but very critical review of Karl Lamprecht, Einfhrung in das historische Denken, (Introduction to Historical Thought), (Leipzig: Voigtlnder, 1912),
in: Ibid., p. 233f. He sees Lamprecht as the representative of the opinion that history ought to be vindicated by the suzerainty of natural science which claims that
its norms of exactness represent the only test of true science. Ibid., p. 69.
RICKERTS ECHO
317
or the reader to imagine something by means of his power of imagination.35 In quoting these sentences, Huizinga omits the two sentences about the words (i.e. concepts) which carry general meanings
and are not suitable to forge aesthetic images of reality.36 He would
probably range this under the concept of concepticity.37 Moreover,
Huizinga does obviously not notice the little word bisweilen, i.e. at
times, or sometimes. This indicates that it is sometimes unavoidable
for the historian to call upon the power of imagination of his audience, but he should not make a habit out of it.
Huizinga then elaborates his idea of imagination and calls it quite
romantically historical sensation or historical contact.38 It is a kind
of emotional connection with the past, a sentiment which is similar
to but not identical to the enjoyment of art, or a religious experience, or a shiveriness in nature, or a metaphysical sensation. The
object of this historical sensation does not consist of human figures,
or human lives, or human thoughts which one believes to perceive.
There are no clear pictures, everything is vague. Streets, houses,
fields, sounds and colors, moving and moved peopleit can all be
summoned in this historical sensation. This contact with the past is
accompanied by an absolute conviction of truth and authenticity. It
can be aroused by a line from a charter or a chronicle, by an
engraving, some sounds from an old song. It is not an element which
the author deposits in his work by distinct words. It lies behind not
within the history book. The reader carries it towards the author, it
is his response to his call.39 Huizinga then comes close to aesthetic
impressionism when he concludes that the historical sensation is
carried out in the sphere of the dream, a seeing of elusive figures,
a hearing of words half understood.40 Rickert would label all this
Der Historiker sucht daher die Vergangenheit in ihrer Individualitt uns
anschaulich wieder zu vergegenwrtigen, und das kann er nur dadurch tun, dass
er es uns ermglicht, das einmalige Geschehen in seinem individuellen Verlauf
gewissermassen nachzuerleben. Zwar ist er bei seiner Darstellung, wie alle Wissenschaft,
auf Worte angewiesen, die allgemeine Bedeutungen haben, und durch die daher
niemals direkt ein anschauliches Bild der Wirklichkeit entsteht. Aber er wird in der
Tat den Hrer oder Leser bisweilen auordern, durch seine Einbildungskraft sich
etwas anschaulich vorzustellen. Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschafi, o.c.,
p. 95.
36
Huizinga, l.c., p. 70.
37
This is also in Dutch a neologism: begrippelijkheid. Cf. Huizinga, ibid., p. 73.
38
Ibid., p. 71.
39
Ibid., p. 71f.
40
Ibid., p. 72.
35
318
CHAPTER SIX
intuition and, as we have seen, he was not averse to it, but rather
saw it as a precondition instead of, as Huizinga seems to view it, as
an essential component of the historians methodology.
But then, suddenly, Huizinga turns around and returns to a more
Rickertian style and content of thinking and writing. He admits that
historical imagination and sensation are just parts of historical understanding and knowing. The aim of the historian, he writes, is not
subjecting to moods, but making understandable connections.41 He
formulates it as in a programme: Each work of history constructs
connections, designs forms in which reality of the past can be understood. History creates the sense of understanding mainly through the
meaningful arrangement of facticity, and only in a very restricted
sense by the determination of strict causalities. The knowledge it
brings about gives answer to questions as what? and how? and
only exceptionally to questions as through what? and why?.42
History then is, according to him, always the designing of the past,
and at the same time a comprehending and understanding of a
meaning which one searches in the past. But then, he adds, history
itself is like philosophy, or literature, or law, or natural science a
spiritual form by means of which we try to understand the world.
The main dierence with the other spiritual forms is its focus on
the past. It tries to understand the world in and by the past.43 He
then formulates his famous definition of history: History is the spiritual form by which a culture takes stock of its past.44
The distinction of form and content is constitutive to Kants philosophy and to the philosophy of Rickert. Without referring to this
source, Huizinga too applies it to the study of history. In order to
understand the past, he argues, the historian must try to see its forms
and its functions.45 He does not refer to him at this point, but his
theory of historical design by means of a continuous focus on forms
and functions (which he not very felicitously calls morphology)
reminds one strongly also of Georg Simmel. Each event, Huizinga
argues, which is conceived of by the historian presupposes a certain design of the material of the past, a cognitive summarizing of
41
42
43
44
45
Ibid.,
Idem.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
This
p. 73.
p. 99.
p. 102.
is elaborated on ibid., pp. 7578, 98103.
RICKERTS ECHO
319
some data from the chaotic reality into a conception.46 Just like
Rickert, he grounds these conceptions in everyday life experience:
Historical thought is but a continuation of the general thought-life
itself.47 It leads him to an anti-nominalistic conclusion: each pristine
reflection about history applies ideas which in fact shape the past.
The historian can from the start possess vernacular concepts like
parliament, world war, capitalism, religious faith, etc.
Cultural history in particular is in possession of such formal concepts, and the great cultural historians have, often unconsciously,
always been great historical morphologists. Huizinga mentions
Burckhardt as an example. His celebrated study of Renaissance culture, Huizinga comments, may have been too vague, simply because
Renaissance cannot be understood as a clear form, but the single
forms which he discussed and analyzed, such as fame, mockery, wittiness, family life, etc. maintain the value of a masterpiece beyond
praise. It testifies to an unequalled sense of Forms.48 His own famous
study of the waning of the Middle Ages has in the meantime equaled
the fame of Burckhardts book on Renaissance culture. It testifies to
the very same sense of forms, which, incidentally, is expressed explicitly by its subtitle.49
Thus, there is not a direct and substantial impact of Rickerts philosophy on Huizingas methodological reflections. Their aestheticism
is alien to Rickerts transcendentalism and reminds one more of
Benedetto Croces philosophy of history than of Rickerts highly rational ideas. Yet, Huizingas ideas do reverberate with several of Rickerts
methodological conceptions and of those of Windelband and Simmel
as well. But then, Huizinga does not excel in logical and methodological virtuosity, to phrase it mildly, and at some points he distinctly misunderstands and misinterprets Rickerts philosophy. This
is the case, as we saw, when he injects vitalistic and romantic notions
in Rickerts texts. In a book review, to give another example, he
remarks en passant, that Rickert defends a cleavage between the natural and the cultural sciences which in the mean time has allegedly
Ibid., p. 76.
Idem.
48
Ibid., p. 77.
49
Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages. A study in the Forms of Life and
Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, 1929,
transl by F. Hopman, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954).
46
47
320
CHAPTER SIX
been bridged.50 This misinterprets the logically constructed and reciprocal (heterological) nature of Natural Science and Cultural Science.
As we have seen in the former chapter the two types of scientific
conceptualization function in Rickerts view as the heterologically
correlated extremes of an analytic continuum. This is not a cleavage at all. On the contrary, Rickert opens a way out of the fruitless opposition of Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft and its equally
fruitless methodological quarrel.
SOCIOLOGY
Karl Mannheim (18931947) acquired fame as one of the founders
of the sociology of knowledge,51 but was, certainly in his younger
days in Budapest, also a general philosopher who was mainly interested in the role of values and in epistemological, logical and methodological problems. As a young man he belonged to a group of
philosophers around Georg Lukcs (18851971) who to the surprise
of his friends changed in December 1918 in one week from a rather
conservative, Hegelian Saul into a radical Marxist Paul.52 He even
served in 1919 as peoples commissar for education in the soviet
republic of Bela Kun (18861939) which was only in power for three
months. The group around Lukcs met monthly before the Kunrevolution, discussing mainly issues of culture and cultural sciences.
They were mockingly called Szellemkek which literally means Spirits.
This referred to their focus on Geist and Geisteswissenschaft, in opposition to the neo-positivistic sociologists who rather put nature and
the natural sciences on a pedestal.53 After all, Lukcs studied in
51
RICKERTS ECHO
321
Kettler, ibid., p. 5 and p. 43. It explains, Kettler argues, Lukcss on first sight
strange cross-over from a rather conservative Hegelian and partly neo-Kantian position to a radical Marxism. In their conservatism the Spirits rejected the capitalist
culture of the bourgeoisie they belonged to by origin.
54
This standpoint, remarkable for a politically rather orthodox Marxist, was in
all probability inspired by Max Weber who in his Wissenschaftslehre once called Marx
a great thinker (den grossen Denker), but the model of an infra-structure versus
a dependent super-structure this fundamentally wrong and scientifically completely
worthless analogy (diese grundschiefe und wissenschaftlich ganz wertlose Analogie).
Max Weber, Wissenschaftslehre, p. 204 and p. 316. See also p. 253. Politically, this
emphasis upon culture is not without danger, in particular when it is linked to the
culture of an historical culture. As we have seen in the Introduction, Rickert claimed
in 1934 that after World War I Germanys entire culture was once more in danger and that therefore no German who wanted to work within Germanys culture,
should resist the main direction of the national-political cultural aims. Cf. Heinrich
Rickert, Grundprobleme der Philosophie, o.c., pp. 222224.
55
In view of Mannheims rejection of the separation of science and value-judgments of the neo-Kantians and his project to unify socio-political, socio-ethical and
sociological studies which he further elaborated in Frankfurt, it is safe to see him
as one of the founding fathers of the Frankfurt School, next to Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno.
322
CHAPTER SIX
RICKERTS ECHO
323
wenn man bedenkt, dass die Klassifikation sich in der theoretischen Ebene
abzuspielen hat, dass wir also das Wesen niemals in seiner angenommenen ontischen
Unmittelbarkeit und Totalitt, sondern stets nur von einem gewissen Gesichtspunkte
aus theoretisch erfasssen knnen. Mannheim, ibid., p. 157.
58
extrem formalistische Methodologismus, ibid., p. 159.
59
Ibid., p. 159f.
57
324
CHAPTER SIX
RICKERTS ECHO
325
Ibid., p. 153f.
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge,
translated and edited by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, 1936, (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World. A Harvest Book, n.d.). The book was first published in German
in 1929, but the English edition of 1936 was substantially enlarged by Mannheim
with the assistance of Wirth and Shils.
63
Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Studies in Modern Social
Structure, 1940, transl. by Edward Shils, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960,
10th ed.). This is an enlarged edition of an earlier German one, published in
Holland in 1935. It should be noted that the reconstruction referred to in the title
pertains to the period after World War I. Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time.
Wartime Eassays of a Sociologist, 1943, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947).
61
62
326
CHAPTER SIX
RICKERTS ECHO
327
since the social obligation can now be reasonably tested. An additional advantage is that the sociological conception opens the door
to reforms, while the traditional absolute and authoritarian conception hampers reform.68
It stands to reason that regarding social policy and social ethics
Mannheim feels intellectually more at home in Marxs philosophy
than in Rickerts and Webers neo-Kantian logic and methodology.
In his view there is a double advantage to the Marxian view of man
and society. First, it places knowledge and reality in historical dimensions, and second, it posits, as a methodological a priori, the unity
of theory and praxis, i.e. of science and politics. Although Mannheim
never converted to Marxism and his political convictions gradually
developed in the direction of a liberal type of social democracy, as
is documented among others by Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction,
his sociology of knowledge departed gradually from a neo-Kantian
to a Marxist position. This was apparent in particular in his wellknown doctrine of the Seinsverbundenheit des Wissens which meant the
basing of all knowledge in the surrounding social circumstances and
groups of men. They are, in a sense, the infra-structure to which
the super-structure of knowledge is causally related.69 He added to
this social determination of knowledge the ongoing influence of history, calling for a historicist interpretation of history and society.70
Idem.
It is probably a remnant of the preoccupation with mind and culture of the
Budapest group around Lukcs, when Mannheim defines the infra-structure of knowledge, c.q. culture, primarily in sociological not in economic terms.
70
Cf. Karl Mannheim, Historicism, 1924, transl. by P. Keckskemeti, (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 84133. Mannheims historicism was criticized
by Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 1957, (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1969). He singled out Mannheims alleged holism regarding societal reform
by means of utopian planning, opposing it by his own anti-holistic idea of piecemeal engineering. Cf. Piecemeal versus Utopian Engineering: ibid., pp. 6470. For
a sociological critique see Robert K. Merton, Karl Mannheim and the Sociology
of Knowledge, in: Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1949, (New
York: The Free Press of Glencoe; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964, 9th ed.), pp.
489508. He remarks with some latent irritation that Mannheim never clarifies how
this determining relationship between knowledge and social structure ought to be
conceived precisely. And he adds: This lacuna leads to vagueness and obscurity at
the very heart of his central thesis concerning the existential determination of
knowledge. Merton, ibid., p. 498. This is, of course, not the place to elaborate all
this in more details. See my De relativiteit van kennis en werkelijkheid, Inleiding tot de kennissociologie, (The Relativity of Knowledge and Reality. An Introduction to the
Sociology of Knowledge), (Amsterdam: Boom Meppel, 1974), pp. 145150.
68
69
328
CHAPTER SIX
71
72
RICKERTS ECHO
329
73
Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, Part V: Planning for
Freedom, o.c., pp. 239368.
74
See my De relativiteit van kennis en werkelijkheid, o.c., pp. 143155, where I also
discuss Theodor Geigers impressive critique as laid down in his Aufgaben und Stellung
der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft, (Tasks and Position of the Intelligentsia in Society),
(Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1949), chapter three: The social task of the intelligentsia.
The Polish-American sociologist Florian Znaniecki takes exception to Mannheims
relatively socially free-floating intelligentsia by arguing that intellectuals are only
freed from productive labor because they cater ideas and theoretical reflections to
specific social circles which are willing to support them. In other words, they play
social roles which in society are considered to be relevant. See his The Social Role
of the Man of Knowledge, 1940, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968).
330
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75
An early and well-nigh classic survey is Alexander von Schelting, Max Webers
Wissenschaftslehre, (Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1934). Cf. Talcott Parsonss Review of
Alexander von Scheltings Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre , in: American Sociological
Review, 1 (1936), pp. 675681. Also Thomas Burger, Max Webers Theory of Concept
Formation. History, Laws, and Ideal Types, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
Press, 1976).
76
Cf. Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert. Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988). Peter-Ulrich Merz, Max Weber
und Heinrich Rickert, (Knigshausen: Neumann, 1997).
RICKERTS ECHO
331
332
CHAPTER SIX
80
Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, (Collected Political Papers), 1958,
(Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1971).
81
Marianne Weber, o.c., pp. 494502. See also on this legal aair Arthur Mitzman,
The Iron Cage. An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber, (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1970), pp. 287290 which is, however, based on Marianne Webers account.
82
Max Weber, Politik als Beruf , 1918, ibid., pp. 505560; Wissenschaft als
Beruf , Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 582613. See Politics as a Vocation and Science as
a Vocation, in: H. H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, translators and editors, From Max
Weber. Essays in Sociology, 1946, (New York: Oxford University Press. A Galaxy Book,
1962), pp. 77156.
83
This is a paraphrase of the exceptionally rare metaphysical exclamation in the
last sentence of Webers swan-song Science as a Vocation, l.c., p. 613.
RICKERTS ECHO
333
84
85
den jungen, gesunden und frohen Max Weber, Rickert, ibid., p. 225.
See ibid., p. 226.
334
CHAPTER SIX
This is not a convincing explanation of Webers rather intensive exertions in the logic and methodology of the social sciences, nor does it explain
the obvious duality in his substantive sociological studies. The essays in the
sociology of religion, namely, are distinctively based on an individualizing
Cultural-Scientific mode of conceptualization, whereas the chapters of the
unfinished General Sociology, as compiled posthumously in the two volumes of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft were intended as exercises in a generalizing, ahistorical Natural-Scientific mode of concept formation. Rickert misses
this point, and refers recurrently to Weber as the representative of a generalizing Natural-Scientific sociology, as if he were a kind of German Comte.
Moreover, as I shall argue below, Weber provides a considerable addition
to Rickerts logic, when he introduces the ideal types (Idealtypen) as generalizing (Natural-Scientific) concepts as a means to arrive at an understanding
and causal explanation of historical, meaningful social interactions and institutions. That is, on Rickerts continuum Weber operates not just at the
Natural-Scientific, generalizing pole, but also at the Cultural-Scientific, individualizing one. In his sociology, Kulturwissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft, a
heterological dualism which Weber adopted from Rickert, are successfully
and impressively integrated.
Weber, as is well known, adopts Rickerts distinction of value-relevance, or value-relatedness (Wertbeziehung, Wertbezogenheit) and the
scientific norm to abstain from normative value-judgments (Werturteile).
He puts it in position in his famous essay on the meaning of the
so-called value-freedom of sociology and economics, which actually
means abstaining from value-judgments.86 Consequently, both Rickert
and Weber do in their philosophy and methodology leave no room
for a normative worldview (Weltanschauung). Rickert emphatically
defines his own systemic philosophy of values, aiming at a theoretical (scientific) conceptualization of reality-in-toto, not as a worldview
but rather as a worldview theory (Weltanschauungslehre). The equivalent
of the latter is, in Webers methodology, the value-analysis (Wertanalyse)
which is a theoretical analysis of the values to which the scientist is
86
Max Weber, Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit der soziologischen und konomischen Wissenschaften, (The Meaning of the Value-freedom of the Sociological
and Economical Sciences): Wissenschaftslehre, o.c., pp. 475526. The concept Wertfreiheit
(value-freedom), which is put between quotation marks, means in fact Wertungsfreiheit,
i.e. conscious abstaining from normative value-judgments. It is unfortunate that
Weber used value-freedom in the title of this essay, because it has led to numerous, yet unnecessary misunderstandings. Again, the cultural sciences are, due to the
fact of value-relevance, never free from values. But given this fact it is, in Webers
and Rickerts view, a scientific norm (and thus value!) to abstain from normative
value-judgments for the duration of ones scientific research and teaching.
RICKERTS ECHO
335
related. Yet, both realize that human beings do livethink, feel and
actin terms of a normative worldview, or in vernacular terms a
personal philosophy of life (Lebensanschauung) which must have a prescientific impact on their thinking and writing. It is my contention
that this implicit view of life and the world can be reconstructed
more easily from Webers writings than from Rickerts. The reason
for that is that Rickert has, as we saw in Chapter Two, a stronger
aversion to vitalism (Lebensphilosophie) than Max Weber. On the other
hand, as we saw also, Rickert does object to vitalism philosophically,
but obviously in a sense also sympathizes with it. He would, in all
probability, have agreed with his friends implicit worldview, although
he might have deemed it too gloomy in its tragic conception.
Epistemologically, Weber is in many respects a neo-Kantian and
is as averse to easy metaphysical reflections as Rickert. However,
there is in Weber, stronger than in Rickert, an implicit influence of
Nietzsches vitalistic and tragic worldview.87 As is well known, Nietzsche
viewed life primarily as an irrational, directionless, absurd stream in
which human beings try to create some sense and order by means
of reason and consciousness. It is a tragic worldview which however
is, unlike Schopenhauers view of life and the world, not gloomy and
fatalistic, but light-hearted, though at times rather cynical. There is
no hope in life since history and the universe are aimlessly driven
by biologically-blind impulses which embody a fate which the ancient
Greeks called Moira.
Weber is too rational and level-headed to participate in Nietzsches
pathos, but stands in closer connection to Nietzsches worldview than
Rickert does. One Nietzschean element in particular recurs in his
methodological and sociological theories: human history and life in
all their complexitiesi.e. cultureconstitute, if measured by the
standards of scientific rationality, an irrational chaos of convictions,
emotions, subjective experiences of meaning, subjective values and
norms. It is, as if he assigns to culture the characteristics of Kants
thing-in-itself. But he combines it with Rickerts definition of cultural
significance in terms of particularity, or better individuality. At times,
he even slips o into quite dramatic reflections, for example when
87
In what follows now I make use of an earlier, Dutch publication: De relativiteit
van kennis en werkelijkheid. Inleiding tot de kennissociologie, (The Relativity of Knowledge
and Reality. Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge), (Amsterdam: Boom
Meppel, 1973), pp. 120126.
336
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88
Endlos wlzt sich der Strom des unermesslichen Geschehens der Ewigkeit entgegen. Immer neu und anders gefrbt bilden sich die Kulturprobleme, welche die
Menschen bewegen, flssig bleibt damit der Umkreis dessen, was aus jenem stets
gleich unendlichen Strome des Individuellen Sinn und Bedeutung fr uns enthlt,
historisches Individuum wird. Es wechseln die Gedankenzusammenhnge, unter
denen es betrachtet und wissenschaftlich erfasst wird. Die Ausgangspunkte der
Kulturwissenschaften bleiben damit wandelbar in die grenzenlose Zukunft hinein,
solange nicht chinesische Erstarrung des Geistesleben die Menschheit entwhnt neue
Fragen an das immer gleich unerschpfliche Leben zu stellen. Ibid., p. 184. English
translation by E. A. Shils, H. A. Finch: Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social
Sciences, (New York: The Free Press, 1949), p. 84f. This volume, which contains
only three essays from Webers Wissenschaftslehre, should be used with care, as its
translations are not always correct. In a few instances printing errors distort the
arguments, as in those instances, where causal is printed as casual.
89
nicht etwas, dass wir eine bestimmte oder berhaupt irgend eine Kultur
wertvoll finden, sondern dass wir Kulturmenschen sind, begabt mit der Fhigkeit und
dem Willen, bewusst zur Welt Stellung zu nehmen und ihr einen Sinn zu verleihen.
Weber, ibid., p. 180.
RICKERTS ECHO
337
90
ber diesen Gtter und in ihrem Kampf waltet das Schicksal, aber ganz gewiss
keine Wissenschaft. Ibid., p. 604.
91
Ibid., p. 613.
92
Denn wissenschaftliche Wahrheit ist nur, was fr alle gelten will, die Wahrheit
wollen. Ibid., p. 184. Italics by MW.
338
CHAPTER SIX
RICKERTS ECHO
339
a conceptual order which cannot compete with metaphysical or religious orders, but remain strictly analytical and framed by scientific
insights and theories. But as meager as this rationality may be,
if one compares it to metaphysical worldviews like Marxism, or
vitalism, or existentialism, it is in principle able to avoid both cynical resignation and religious surrender. It is on purpose a minimal
worldview.
This minimal worldview comes closest to scientism, although it
lacks the self-confident attitude of most scientists. After all, Weber
believes that science and scientific concept formation constitute the
appropriate forms of knowledge for such a minimal worldview. Science
is unable to provide objective meaning and can never promise to
arrive at the definitive truth about objective reality. Actually science itself is not a worldview or prophecy, but a profession. It can
not tell us how to live, what to think, what to do and what to feel.
It can also not tell us, as for instance Marxism does, what the good
direction of history could be. Weber would not believe in Mannheims
utopia and planning for freedom. But science can help us to master irrationality by means of analytical concepts and empirical research,
creating an analytical order and a logical meaning. What is needed
are not utopian visions or prophetic statements but a pragmatic vocational ethos. It sounds like Kants kategorischer Imperativ, combined with
the Puritanical Berufsethik and Goethes Forderung des Tages (Demand
of the Day): We want to draw the following lesson: that yearning
and awaiting alone leads to nothing, and that we do it dierently:
go to work and do justice to the Demand of the Dayhumanly
as well as vocationally.95
Finally, in Webers concept formation the category of chance or
possibility plays a dominant role. Sociological phenomena are often
defined in terms of the chance that. Power, for example, is the
chance some person or group of persons can realize his or its own
will, if need be against the will of others.96 It is not improbable that
he applies such a probabilism also to his philosophical thought. There
Ibid., p. 613.
Cf. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie,
(Economy nad Society. Outline of the Understanding Sociology), chapter III, Typen
der Herrschaft (Types of Rule), 1956, J. Winckelmann, ed., (Kln. Berlin:
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964), vol. I, pp. 157222. Definition first sentence on
p. 157.
95
96
340
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is no text which can prove this, but it is quite feasible that Weber
consciously or unconsciously believes or hopes that the rational,
scientific order imposed on the irrationality of realitythat is the
order of the artificial, constructed ideal typesapproaches possibly an
objective and absolute order and truth. Or, is it, after all, not possible that there exists an elective anity (Wahlverwandtschaft) between
this transcendental Order and Truth on the one hand and the
humanly constructed, rational, analytical order and truth of science?
Weber, it must be noted, does not argue in Platonic terms and consequently will not view empirical truths and orders as emanations of
a metaphysical Truth and Order. In any case, he remains loyal to
the philosophy of Kant, who after all viewed the categories God,
freedom and immortality of the soul as possibilities and chances, as
ideas rather than metaphysical realities.
Weber is in agreement with Rickert (and Simmel) when he rejects
the realism (or naturalism) of the so-called representational logic
(Abbildlogik) which measures the adequacy or truth of concepts and
theories by their capacity to provide a picture which resembles reality. Weber in particular emphasizes the fact that it is the business
of science to understand and explain reality by means of rational
concepts. Scientific rationality stands in opposition to the irrationality of reality. If the scientific concepts represented irrational realities
they would be irrational which is unscientific. However, it is obvious that common-sense experience indicates that realitythe thoughts,
emotions, actions and interactions, the institutions and organizationsis not totally irrational. This piece of ontology is important
in order to understand the logic of Webers ideal types. Reality is,
ontologically speaking, a mixture of rationality and irrationality, a
kind of ball of wool in which the rational and irrational threads are
entangled. A simple introspection can illustrate this point: our thoughts
and emotions are often indissolubly entangled. It is the purpose of
science to disentangle the rational and the irrational threads. Weber
introduces for that purpose his well-known (and often misunderstood)
idea of the Idealtypen, the ideal types, or reine Typen, the pure types,
which are ideal in the Kantian sense of pure, i.e. analytic, rationally constructed, if one wants artificial. They are, to formulate it
somewhat bluntly, not pictures of reality, but conscious distortions
of it. Yet, they are not the ideological or utopian distortions of
Mannheim because these are normative concepts, whereas Webers
ideal types are analytical concepts. The basic idea of which is that
RICKERTS ECHO
341
97
Weber distinguishes rational evidential Verstehen (rational evidentes Verstehen)
and intuitive experiential Verstehen (einfhlend nacherlebendes Verstehen): Begri
der Soziologie und des Sinns sozialen Handelns, (Concept of Sociology and of
the Meaning of social action), in: Wissenschaftslehre, o.c., p. 543f. This is not the
place to elaborate more extensively on Webers conception of Verstehen.
98
Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 1957, (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1969), p. 140f. The last point, Popper continues without referring to Weber,
indicates that there is, despite his emphasis upon the unity of method, a dierence
342
CHAPTER SIX
upon the unity of the scientific method which does not allow for a distinction between Natural Science and Cultural Science, Popper introduces
surprisingly a methodological dierence which is very similar to the one
Rickert introduced and Weber adopted. There are important dierences
between the natural and the social sciences, Popper argues, such as the
diculty to conduct experiments or apply quantitative methods, but they
are only dierences of degree rather than of kind. He then suddenly introduces an important dierence, referring to the possibility of adopting, in
the social sciences, what may be called the method of logical or rational
construction, or perhaps the zero method. By this I mean the method
of constructing a model on the assumption of complete rationality (. . . .)
on the part of all the individuals concerned, and of estimating the deviation of the actual behavior of people from the model behavior, using the
latter as a kind of zero co-ordinate.99 Popper does not mention Weber,
although his formulation would be identical to that of Weber, if one substituted ideal type for zero method. Rickert and Weber would also be
happy to learn that Popper emphasizes that neither the principle of methodological individualism, nor that of the zero method of constructing rational models, implies in my opinion the adoption of a psychological method.
On the contrary, I believe that these principles can be combined with the
view that the social sciences are comparatively independent of psychological assumptions, and that psychology can be treated, not as the basis of all
social sciences, but as one social science among others.100 And: The zero
method of constructing rational models is not a psychological but rather a
logical method.101
Popper then also comes close to the neo-Kantian position of Windelband
and Rickert regarding the dierence between generalizing sciences and individualizing history, when he writes: I wish to defend the view, so often
attacked as old-fashioned by historicists, that history is characterized by its interests in actual, singular, or specific events, rather than in laws or generalizations. (. . . .)
The situation is simply this: while the theoretical sciences (what are meant
are sociology, economic theory, political theory as distinct from social, economic and political history, ACZ) are mainly interested in finding and testing universal laws, the historical sciences take all kinds of universal laws
for granted and are mainly interested in finding and testing singular statements.102 Like Rickert, but unlike Weber, Popper identifies sociology and
between the natural and the social sciences. Popper apparently had read Webers
Wissenschaftslehre, since he mentions the book in a footnote on p. 145. It is therefore the more remarkable that he does not refer to Webers theory of the idealtypes at all.
99
Ibid., p. 141.
100
Ibid., p. 142.
101
Ibid., p. 158. See for Poppers anti-psychologism also his The Open Society and
Its Enemies, 2 vols., 1945, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), vol. 2, chapter
14, The Autonomy of Sociology, pp. 8999.
102
Ibid., p. 143f. Italics by KP. For a comparison of Popper, Rickert and Weber
RICKERTS ECHO
343
economics with ahistorical Natural Science, and fails to see that these and
other social sciences can also be conducted historically as Cultural Sciences.
Cultural sociology is not social history, nor is cultural (institutional) economics economic history.
see Malachi Haim Hacohen, Karl Popper. The Formative Years 19021945, 2000,
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 471476.
103
Max Weber, o.c., p. 542. He continues this definition by defining action as
human behavior which carries a subjectively intended meaning. It is social action
when it is related to the behavior of others. One may draw the conclusion that
Weber views verstehende sociology as Symbolic Interactionism. There are indeed
similarities between Weber and George-Herbert Mead. Cf. my De theorie van het
Symbolisch Interactionisme, o.c., pp. 172219. It is in this context also interesting to pay
attention to the humanistic coecient of Florian Znaniecki: On Humanistic Sociology.
Selected Papers, edited by R. Bierstedt, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1969), pp. 135171. Rickerts value-relevance also plays a dominant role in Znanieckis
theorem of the humanistic coecient. See also my De theorie van het symbolisch interactionisme, o.c., pp. 9698.
344
CHAPTER SIX
agreement with Rickert who in his book on the demarcation of ahistorical Natural Science and historical Cultural Science writes: Individualizing or historical social science is certainly also possible as
generalizing or natural-scientific social science.104 But he adds, as we
have seen before, that a Natural-Scientific history (historical science)
is impossible, which we criticized, since the continuum would logically leave room for such a history, as paradoxical as a ahistorical
history may be. We mentioned cliometrics as an example of such a
Natural-Scientific historical endeavor.
Although Rickert mentioned Webers sociology several times as an
example of a generalizing, natural-scientific discipline, he suddenly
retreats from that position in a footnote and acknowledges the double logical nature of Webers approach. He sees Webers essays on
the sociology of religion as examples of an individualizing, historical sociology which dier logically from the generalizing, ahistorical
chapters in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft:
The economy and the societal institutions and powers are presented
(in Economy and Society, ACZ) on purpose not historically but in a
generalizing manner. (. . . .) The same scholar thus presents scientifically
the same material in logically dierent ways. In that respect Max
Webers sociological work demonstrates in its totality the conceivably
best confirmation of our methodology. Not only Webers methodological
investigations which consciously link up with my book (i.e. die Grenzen,
ACZ), but also the factual treatment of societal life demonstrates, why
only along the road which we have followed, an insight into the logical structure of the really existing empirical sciences can be acquired.
If one starts from factual distinctions in the material, or if one sticks
to the distinction of nature and mind, one will never come to terms
with the logical problems of the social sciences.105
RICKERTS ECHO
345
CONCLUSION
Weber once distinguished two types of intellectuals: Stohuber and
Sinnhuber, i.e. the collector of material data and the collector of meaning.1 The data collector is like an intellectual bookkeeper who collects and organizes data mindlessly, the meaning collector searches
restlessly for understandable meaning and significance. Rickert, remaining even in this respect loyal to his heterological habitude, is in a
sense indeed a Stohuber, the data being primarily theoretical concepts, but one misreads and misinterprets his work, if one fails to
discover that he certainly was also, and in my view predominantly,
a Sinnhuber! He is indeed an at times irritating collector of concepts,
in particular when he tries to catch intellectually the world-in-toto by
means of a philosophical system built up diligently and consistently
by logical, abstract, formal, and thus empty categories. His systematic philosophy ending in the metaphysics of an allegedly full-filled
totality does not carry the pretensions of the Hegelian grandiloquent
philosophy which claimed to represent the end of history, and the
fulfillment of the good direction of it. Rickerts metaphysical end station is not much more than a postulate, a possibility, consisting of
symbols, metaphors, or even allegories, not of solidly scientific concepts. It is actually just a philosophical dream with the features of
a surrealistic painting. However, despite his emphasis upon the openness and flexibility of his system, it still carries all the characteristics
of a product of material collecting.
But he is at the same time a Sinnhuber, and a virtuoso at that. He
is permanently and restlessly in search of meaningful and significant
concepts which help us to grasp cognitively and to understand emotionally the world we live in. In fact he is driven by what he once
called, as we have seen in the last chapter, the Socratic Logosfreudigkeit,
the joy of rational thinking, the sheer pleasure of forging meaningful and significant theories. And he does so in a playful, heterological manner. Paul Hazard once wrote about Pierre Bayle (16471706),
the play of pro and con was for him a supreme pleasure.2 It takes
1
2
348
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
349
350
CONCLUSION
good (and their counterparts) are formal, abstract and absolute. They
constitute the object, the Gegenstand, of knowledge and the proper
aim of philosophical concept formation. If the verdict is that this is
old-fashioned, so be it. Yet, the criterion should rather be, if it is
realistic to define philosophy as a science which transcends the empirical (natural and cultural) sciences, and places them in a systematic
conceptual order.
This answers another critical question. Rickert, we have seen in
the foregoing chapters, defends the statement that philosophy should
be systematic. In the former century it has become fashionable to
deny the possibility and even the need of a philosophical discipline
which aims at an overarching, theoretical system. Particularly vitalism (Philosophie des Lebens) in all its variations has claimed that systems render thoughts and theories abstract and lifeless. The real
reality, according to this view, is life, vitalitywhatever that may
be. This position is rather questionable, because it would be strange
to call for a lively mathematics or a vitally relevant astrophysics,
chemistry, or physics of particles. But the moment we focus on the
socio-cultural sciences the call for vitalistic realism arises loudly and
clearly. As we have seen in the second chapter, Rickert dismisses
this rather irrational approach as being scientifically worthless. It may
satisfy emotions, but does not enlighten our minds and contribute
to our knowledge and understanding of socio-cultural reality. Vitalism,
in other words, feels realistic and may indeed be aesthetically relevant and gratifying, but in terms of a structured knowledge and
rational understanding of reality, it is rather counterproductive and
thus not at all realistic.
As to the argument that philosophy cannot and should not even
try to be systematic, this has become a fashionable clich with
a doubtful content. In the former century we have witnessed the
linguistic turn in philosophy, which has admittedly brought an
impressive innovation in the philosophical discipline. However, this
Wittgensteinean innovation, which has been the main cause of the
emergence and distribution of analytic philosophy, has by now grown
rather stale and even dogmatic, which is, incidentally, the ultimate
fate of most socio-cultural and intellectual innovations. Certainly in
the Anglo-Saxon world analytic philosophy has deteriorated into a
dominant paradigm which carries the features of a well-nigh medieval
scholasticism, although the latter was highly systematic, whereas most
analytic philosophers abhor the idea of a philosophical system.
CONCLUSION
351
Wittgenstein was still the virtuoso of the condensed, aphoristic statements. But his followers generally lacked his virtuosity and often
excelled in seemingly profound, yet in reality often superficial observations. Nevertheless, analytic philosophy often determines paradigmatically, what is philosophically acceptable and sound, thus
fashionable, and what is not. One thing in particular is characteristic of this philosophical current, namely its anti-systematic animus.
The production consists predominantly of articles and, though hesitantly, of essays, not of systematic treatises.
Meanwhile, however, many former adherents of analytic philosophy have turned away from its scholastic rationalism and embraced
one or the other European philosophical trend, such as French deconstructionism, phenomenology, or the neo-vitalism of Heideggers ontology. Richard Rorty is a telling example. His often brilliantly formulated
observations, made public in essays on, among others, Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault and writers like Kundera
and Dickens, are not meant any longer to enlighten our minds, but
to gratify aesthetically our moods.6 In any case, there is now a bewildering array of currents and fashions which have one thing in common: the anti-systematic animus based on concept formations which
are more aesthetic than cognitive, more ontological (if not metaphysical) than epistemological. It is often labeled loosely and therefore inadequately as post-modernism. This is actually a label for
dieremt currents of thought which have one thing in common: the
aspiration to render philosophy lively, emotionally gratifying. In
view of these currents of thought outside analytic philosophy, Rickerts
treatise on vitalism is still very much up-to-date.
Nietzsche is once more the towering model-philosopher for many
today. Rickert and certainly Weber admired this great thinker who
excelled above all in intellectually sharp and often witty aphorisms.
But Rickert in particular believes that philosophy should be more
than an rhapsodic accumulation of aphorisms. It should try to formulate a systematic view of reality. As we have seen, he finds it the
task of the (natural and cultural) sciences to analyze and scrutinize
6
Cf. Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers, (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For his aesthetic approach in which irony
plays a dominant role and literature is deemed more valuable than (traditional) philosophy: Contingency, irony, and solidarity, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
352
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
353
facts. Rickert sees it indeed as a virtual reality that has sur-real features. This surreal reality can only be thought as a postulate, or
maybe even only be dreamed as a dream. It is, of course, hard to
fathom, if one sticks to the empiricism which is natural and legitimate in the empirical (natural and cultural) sciences. But if one
searches for a systematic philosophy that transcends the specialized
compartmentalization of reality, it stands to reason, Rickert believes,
to complete the system by such a virtual and surreal Fourth Realm.
Can Rickerts philosophy also be rendered meaningful by attributing the formal value of truth to it? Rickert, as we have seen, ties
the value of truth to that of reality. A statement about reality is true,
if it demonstrably pertains to realityi.e. the reality of the experienced and perceived sense-data. This is, of course, a distinctly positivistic position. A statement about an allegedly existing unicorn is
not true, because no human being has ever experienced (seen,
heared, smelled, touched) a unicorn. It simply is not a real sensedatum and thus is the statement about the existence of the unicorn
false. This identification of reality and truth poses a considerable
problem, because it is correct in the case of theoretical (scientific)
statements, but cannot be applied to atheoretical (non-scientific) statements, such as the statements of mythology or the doctrines of theology. In medieval legends and myths the unicorn did exist, and it
did function in the medieval mythological view of the world. We
may trust that those who narrated the unicorn myths, knew perfectly well that this mythological animal did not really exist, but it
occupied a functional, heuristic position in the contemporary mythological view of the world. Or, to give another example, Socrates and
Plato knew, of course, that Poseidon, god of the seas, did not really,
in the flesh, live and roam around in the surrounding seas. Poseidon
was a mythological symbol, not an empirical fact. We encounter
here Freges previously discussed distinction between meaning (Sinn)
and significance (Bedeutung). The medieval unicorn or the Greek god
Poseidon were meaningful, but scientifically speaking insignificant.
There is, in other words, a theoretical truth which ties the idea of
truth to that of reality and renders statements about reality significant.
However, there is also an atheoretical truth as in the case of mythological or theological statements. The atheoretical truth is not significant
but it is meaningful. Theoretical truth can be proven or disproved
empirically, and is a matter of rational knowledge. A-theoretical truth,
on the other hand, is a matter of belief and not of rational knowledge.
354
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
355
356
CONCLUSION
Rickert was worried in particular by the onslaught of the irrationalists in philosophy, the vitalists who following Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche put Life on a metaphysical pedestal, or declared Being or
Dasein as the prima causa of all that exists. Today he would certainly
point at the intellectualism of analytic philosophy which elevated
Language to a metaphysical level, where philosophers turn around
and around in rather dogmatic and highly abstract circles. A closely
related fashion, he certainly would add, is French deconstructionism
which has lifted the Text to a well-nigh metaphysical status, from
where it absorbs meanings, values, and the human subject into intellectual obscurantism. And there are, of course, also the structuralists which have proclaimed Structure as the definitive phenomenon
absorbing and neutralizing in particular the changes and transformations of history and human culture. Life, Being, Language, Text,
Structurethey embodied the fashions of philosophical thought in
the twentieth century. But as is the fate of fashions, they come, they
rule, they grow stale and they just fade away, leaving their true
believers in confusion, despair, or fits of ironic laughter.
The most sensible reaction may be to bury oneself intellectually
in one of the philosophical specializations, and to forget the original task of philosophy, formulated in Ancient Greece, namely to try
to understand reality, i.e. the world as it is experienced by us human
beings. It may be sensible, but it hardly testifies to intellectual courage.
It is also rather despondent, since it lacks what Rickert calls
Logosfreudigkeit, the joy of rational thinking and concept formation.
Most of such philosophical specialists are Stohuber, intellectual bookkeepers who may well be virtuosos in their craft, yet totally miss
the features of the Sinnhuber, the philosopher who searches for meaningful knowledge of the world we live and work in. Maybe the most
attractive element of Rickerts philosophical endeavors is the heterological interplay within his mind and mood of the Stohuber and
the Sinnhuber. Rickerts philosophy has not been and will never become
the core of a fashionable school of thought. He will not emotionally warm the moods of young people, and it needs hard work and
concentration to catch his thoughts, concepts and theories cognitively. But it is my experience that a confrontation with Rickert does
in the end enlighten the mind. He even warms ones mood because
of his Logosfreudigkeit. His joy of concentrated and consequent thinking, his pleasure in forging meaningful concepts and theories, has a
CONCLUSION
357
catching impact on the one who seriously sets out to read and understand him.
However, there remains one great fault in Rickerts philosophical
system. It is in a sense a magnificently planned building with a solid,
epistemological foundation and maybe a groundfloor and a first floor,
consisting of the formal values and the meaning bestowing acts. But
after the completion of the first volume of his General Philosophy,
he got stuck. In the planned second and third volume he wanted to
complete the system with a grand cultural philosophy. His death in
1936 prevented him from executing this plan. But reading the basic
ideas which he published in a summarizing manner at the end of
his life, it is questionable whether we miss much by this intellectual
abortion. As we have seen before, at the end of his life Rickerts
philosophical thought drifted o in a rancunous and reactionary
direction which was intensified upon the fateful events in Germany
after 1933. This stands in sharp contrast to the transition from neoKantian transcendentalism to an interdisciplinary cultural philosophy
by Ernst Cassirer who, as we have seen in the Introduction, designed
an indeed grand and impressive cultural philosophy in his justly
famous philosophy of symbolic forms and his essays on man and on
the state. Cassirers twenty five volumes of collected works present
a towering building of epistemological, cultural philosophical and
even political thoughts and theories. Rickerts books and articles
which in the coming years will be re-published in fifteen volumes
by the Rickert Research Intstitute at the University of Duesseldorf,
present an equally impressive, yet unfinished intellectual construction. However, the conclusion must be that in all probability Rickert
has been unable to finish his philosophical system in an acceptable
manner due to the reactionary and rancorous mood that sadly overshadowed his brilliant mind at the end of his life.
In which direction should Rickerts unfinished system have been
completed? It should have been, I think, a combination of constructivism and institutionalism. In neo-Kantian philosophy in general and
Rickerts transcendental philosophy in particular there is the basic
idea at work that the world we live in is not a reality-in-and-of-itself
which reveals itself to us and next directs and controls our cognitive
and active interventions. This reality is, on the contrary, in a sense
made by us, constructed by our structured sensations and perceptions,
by our formal concepts, and through them by our value-oriented
358
CONCLUSION
7
Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise
in the Sociology of Knowledge, (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
8
I elaborated these ideas in greater detail in my The Institutional Imperative. The
Interface of Institutions and Networks, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000).
9
Anton C. Zijderveld, The Abstract Society. A Cultural Analysis of Our Time, (New
York: Doubleday, 1970; Harmondsworth, Middleses: Penguin Books, 1972); On
Clichs. The Supersedure of Meaning by Function, (London, Boston: Routledge & kegan
Paul, 1979). For a brief methodological explanation see: Appendix, ibid., pp.
106113.
CONCLUSION
359
10
John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, (New York: The Free Press,
1995), p. XII.
11
I have once called this our staccato culture, i.e. a culture which lacks an
ongoing legato, and is caught in compartmentalizations, driven predominantly by
emotions, moods, senses. Anton C. Zijderveld, Staccato cultuur, flexibele maatschappij en
verzorgende staat, (Staccato Culture, Flexible Society and Caring State), (Utrecht:
Lemma, 1991).
12
Pigmei Gigantum humeris impositi plusquam ipsi Gigantes vident. Robert K.
Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants. A Shandean Postscript, (New York: A Harbinger
Book; Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965), p. 3.
360
CONCLUSION
13
Torniamo allantiche e ser un progresso. I found this quote in a brochure
about a contemporary Dutch composer: Emile Wennekes, Tristan Keuris, (Amsterdam:
Donemus, 1995), p. 2.
INDEX OF NAMES
Adorno, Theodor W. 8, 19,197, 228,
321
Angelelli, Ignazio 97
Anscombe, G. E. M. 19
Apollinaire, Guillaume 50f
Arendt, Hannah 195
Aristotle, 88, 252
Aron, Raymond 348f
Ayer, A. J. 92f, 135, 150
Baer, Karl E. von, 232
Bacon, Francis 221
Barnard, F. M. 224
Barnes, Harry 254
Barth, Karl 186
Bast, Rainer A. 10, 166, 198
Bauch, Bruno 8, 51
Bayle, Pierre 347
Becher, Erich 227f, 322
Bendix, Reinhard 302
Benjamin, Walter 8
Benn, Gottfried 45, 72, 85
Berg, J. H. van den 292
Berger, Peter L. 196, 235, 276, 358
Bergson, Henri 13, 15f, 36, 45, 49,
54, 65, 68f, 71, 79, 225, 300
Berkeley,George 88, 90f, 104, 109,
111
Berlin, Isaiah 205, 222224
Berman, L. 239
Berns, E. 135
Bevers, Anton M. 59, 298, 300, 302,
306
Bierstedt, Robert 343
Bismarck, Otto von 3
Blackmore, Susan 62
Blcher, Gebhard L. von 253
Blumer, Herbert 211
Bohr, Niels 291
Bois-Reymond, Emil 233f
Bos, T. 99
Bourdieu, Pierre 16
Boyle, Robert 88, 90, 278f
Brahe, Tycho 221
Brecht, Bertolt 206f
Brentano, Franz 23, 95, 128, 202,
235
Breton, Andr 50
Brouwer, L. E. J. 208
Buckle, Henry T. 253f
Burckhardt, Jacob 260f, 319
Burger, Thomas 13, 330
Caesar, Julius 259, 306
Calvin, Jean 258
Carnap, Rudolf 18, 150f, 169172,
181, 234, 240
Carr, H. Wilson 225
Cassirer, Ernst 24f, 93, 118f, 127,
357f
Chekhov, Anton 206
Chirico, Giorgio de 354
Cioran, E. M. 176
Cohen, Hermann 24f
Cohn, Jonas 9
Collingwood, R. G. 27, 222, 224f
Copernicus, Nicolaus 88, 219, 221,
348
Coser, Lewis 60
Croce, Benedetto 225f, 248, 250, 319
Curtius, Ernst R. 12
Dahrendorf, Ralph 239
Dalen, Dirk van 208
Dal, Salvador 354
Danto, A. 163
Darwin, Charles 16, 6065, 67f, 79,
193, 354
Dawkins, Richard 62
Democritus 89
Denker, Alfred 17
Derrida, Jacques 135f, 351
Descartes, Ren 88f, 91, 99, 106,
222f, 247
Dickens, Charles 351
Dilthey, Wilhelm 13, 15, 23f, 45f, 47,
129, 181, 225f, 230, 235, 248251,
262265, 267f, 271, 349
Durkheim, Emile 358f
Einstein, Albert 60, 79, 291
Eliade, Mircea 186
Elias, Norbert 188, 293
Engerman, Stanley L. 256, 292
362
INDEX OF NAMES
Epicurus, 89
Ers, J. S. 326
Esser, Josef 311
Eucken, H. 8
Farias, Victor 16
Faust, August 7f, 12
Feitzer, James H. 234
Fetzer, J. H. 26
Fichte, Johann G. 1, 8
Finch, H. A. 336
Flach, W. 24
Fogel, Robert W. 256, 292
Foucault, Michel 135f, 351
Frege, Gottlob 8, 18, 23, 95, 97,
127, 147, 155, 161f, 164, 166, 168,
194, 353
Freud, Sigmund 16, 36, 152
Friedrich, Otto 9, 51
Fukuyama, Francis 198
Galilei, Galileo 88, 219, 221
Gassen, K. 300303, 305, 309
Gay, Peter 50
Geertz, Cliord 223
Gehlen, Arnold 82f, 103, 359
Geiger, Theodor 173, 329
George III, King 257
Gerth, H. H. 332
Gianturco, Elio 222f
Gibbons, Julie 7
Glockner, Hermann 79, 12, 117,
331
Goethe, Johann W. 1, 147, 149, 204,
224, 287f, 332, 339
Goretti, Maria 222
Grevenstein-Kruse, Anne 152
Groethuysen, Bernhard 46, 249, 262
Habermas, Jrgen 17f, 229
Hacohen, Malachi H. 342
Haeckel, Ernst 231
Hahn, H. 150
Harnack, Adolf von 186
Hartmann, Nicolai 15, 85
Harvey, J. W. 186
Hazard, Paul 347f
Hegel, G. W. F. 5, 21, 27, 58, 94,
147, 157, 166, 172, 182f, 198, 247,
298
Heidegger, Martin 6, 9, 16f, 27, 36,
47, 50, 58, 61, 82, 147149, 298,
351
Heimsoeth, H. 26
INDEX OF NAMES
Lotze, Hermann 147
Luckmann, Thomas 196, 235, 276,
358
Lundberg, George A. 239
Luther, Martin 306
Mach, Ernst 123, 209
Mahler, Gustav 76
Malthus, Thomas R. 61
Mandelbaum, Maurice 49
Mann, Golo 2, 6, 11, 13
Mann, Thomas 67, 252
Mannheim, Karl 14, 29, 160 235,
241, 275f, 298, 314, 320330, 339f
Marx, Karl 321
Matthiae, K. 162
Mead, George Herbert 114f, 210f,
224, 269, 343, 358f
Meinong, Alexius 8, 180, 235
Merton, Robert K. 189, 327, 359
Merz, Peter-Ulrich 330
Mill, John Stuart 155f, 177
Mills, C. Wright 332
Mitzman, Arthur 332, 338
Mommsen, Theodor, 307
Mondrian, Piet, 191
Morgenbesser, S. 163
Morgenstern, Christian 59
Moyaert, P. 135
Mul, Jos de 23f, 249f, 262f
Musil, Robert 139, 144
Nagel, Ernest 156, 205
Napoleon 253, 259f, 272f
Natorp, Paul 8, 24f, 94
Neurath, Otto 18, 150
Newton, Isaac 88, 90, 222f
Neyman, Jerzy 348
Nietzsche, Friedrich 9, 13, 15f, 35f,
45, 47f, 49, 55, 6669, 76, 79f, 153,
157, 173, 183, 205, 300, 335, 337f,
351, 356
Oakes, Guy 10, 13, 27, 275, 297,
330f
Ollig, H.-L. 24, 31, 310
Ostwald, Wilhelm 63
Otto, Rudolf 8f, 186
Paetzold, H. 25
Palyi, M. 293
Parsons, Talcott 330
Paton, H. J. 25
Pawlow, Iwan 238f
363
Pfeier, Frau 12
Philipse, Herman 95
Plato 7, 8688, 147, 164, 172, 177,
252, 353
Plessner, Helmuth 82f, 359
Popkin, Richard H. 159
Popper, Karl R. 143, 151, 177, 199,
276, 281, 327, 341343
Puccini, Giacomo 76
Pyrrhus of Elis 159
Quine, Willard Van Ormen 234f
Radbruch, Gustav 8, 14, 29, 187,
298, 309, 312315
Ramming, Gustav 331
Ranke, Leopold von 232
Rawls, John 314
Rehberg, K.-S. 82
Rickert, Franz 79, 11f, 208
Rickert, Heinrich J. passim
Rickert Verburg, Marianne 8, 17,
5869, 117, 180
Ristow, H. 162
Rodin, Gustave 76
Romein, Jan 254
Rntgen, Wilhelm C. 284
Rorty, Richard, 10, 17f, 135, 351
Rothacker, Ernst 8
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 66
Ruiter, W. de 123
Russell, Bertrand 18, 163, 216
Safranski, Rdiger 2, 16
Saner, Hans 331
Sasse, H. 45
Schaer, Simon 278f
Scheler, Max 8, 13, 15, 45, 59, 69,
82f, 269f
Schelling, Friedrich W. J. von 1, 247
Schelsky, Helmuth 3
Schiller, Friedrich 1f, 224
Schleiermacher, Friedrich 1
Scholem, Gershom 8
Schnberg, Arnold 191
Schopenhauer, Arthur 9, 13, 15f, 54f,
62, 68f, 106, 155, 170, 176, 300,
335, 338
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 294
Schutz, Alfred 172, 198, 229, 240,
276, 311
Scruton, Roger 99
Searle, John R. 136, 358f
Seidel, Hermann 10
364
INDEX OF NAMES