Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 18421847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,11801278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 16301649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 19862028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the

Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances

which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles,
11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL
SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC., respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:p

The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, for brevity) filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon.
Zosimo Z. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. 92158 entitled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine Industrial Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity) and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in
the process, declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITC's Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 8908-01 and its appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Petitioner and
Intervenor and against the Respondent, as follows:
1) Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the following issuances relative to the
applications for importation of products from the People's Republic of China, to wit:
a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30, 1989 (Annex A, Amended
Petition);
b) Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);
c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-importer (Annex C, Id.);
d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);
e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule of Fees for the processing of
import applications (Annexes E, E-1., Ind.);
f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled Undertakings and expired export credits
(Annex Z, Supplemental Petition),
the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional; and,
2) Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that
may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without the requirements
prescribed in the above-mentioned issuances.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1
under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for
brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC
carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to
the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:
3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC
In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import application for goods and
commodities originating from PROC, it is declared that:
3.1 All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine products to PROC in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for. Such export
program must be carried out and completed within six (6) months from date of
approval of the Import Application by PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application for
importation from PROC without the accompanying export program mentioned above.
3.2 The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the following:
a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities and facilities to
carry out the export of Philippine products to PROC in his own name;
or
b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a legitimate
exporter (of Philippine products) who is willing to carry out the export
commitments of the IMPORTER under these rules. The tie-up shall
not make the IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but shall merely
ensure that the importation sought to be approved is matched one-toone (1:1) in value with a corresponding export of Philippine products
to PROC. 2
3.3 EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted by the improper
together with his Import Application are as follows:
a) Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.
b) Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).
c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter
IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). This form should be used if
IMPORTER has tie-up with an exporter for the export of Philippine
Products to PROC.
4. EXPORT GUARANTEE
To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried out in accordance with these
rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are required to submit an EXPORT PERFORMANCE
GUARANTEE (the "Guarantee") at the time of filing of the Import Application. The amount of the
guarantee shall be as follows:
For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.
For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.

4.1 The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing cash deposit; (ii)
Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC Form No. M-1007) or (iii) a Domestic Letter of
Credit (with all bank opening charges for account of Importer) opened in favor of
PITC as beneficiary.
4.2 The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be automatically forfeited
in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the required export program is not completed by
the importer within six (6) months from date of approval of the Import Application.
4.3 Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER is entitled to a (i)
refund of the cash deposited without interest; (ii) cancellation of the Bank holdout or
(iii) Cancellation of the Domestic Letter of Credit upon showing that he has
completed the export commitment pertaining to his importation and provided further
that the following documents are submitted to PITC:
a) Final Sales Invoice
b) Bill of lading or Airway bill
c) Bank Certificate of Inward Remittance
d) PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005
5. MISCELLANEOUS
5.1 All other requirements for importations of goods and commodities from PROC
must be complied with in addition to the above.
5.2 PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all import applications not in
accordance with the rules and regulations herein prescribed.
5.3 Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized representatives make any
false statements or fraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/Export Application, or
falsify, forge or simulate any document required under these rules and regulations,
PITC is authorized to reject all pending and future import/export applications of said
IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing any business with
SOCPEC through PITC.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic
corporations, organized and existing under Philippine laws, individually applied for authority to import from
PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers,
and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from PROC with
corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries and other similar goods. Firestone,
on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite, which it used for the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its
products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of
their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents,
such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. 3
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the
RTC Makati Branch 58. 4 The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering
PITC to cease from exercising any power to process applications of goods from PROC. 5 Hearing on the
application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.

Private respondent Firstone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2, 1992, 6 thus joining
Remington in the latter's charges against PITC. It specifically asserts that the questioned Administrative
Order is an undue restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing on the Preliminary Injunction was
sufficient to completely adjudicate the case, thus, the parties deemed it proper that the entire case be
submitted for decision upon the evidence so far presented.
The court rendered its Decision 7 on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITC's authority to process and
approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and
P.D. No. 1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President
Aquino.
The court observed:
Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITC's regulatory authority under the
Special provisions embodied in LOI 444 from the enumeration of power that it could exercise
effective February 27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it may now be successfully
argued that the PITC can no longer exercise such specific regulatory power in question conformably
with the legal precept "expresio unius est exclusio alterius."
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991, has empowered the
PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or promulgate the assailed Administrative Order. This fact, makes
the continued exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question unworthy of judicial approval.
Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an undue exercise of legislative power vested solely in the Congress of
the Philippines by Section, 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similar issuances by PITC suffer from
serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated in pursuance of an international agreement (the
Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippines and PROC), which has not been concurred in by at
least 2/3 of all the members of the Philippine Senate as required by Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987
Constitution, and therefore, null and void.
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in violation of Sections 1 and
19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and, an expanding productivity as the key to raising the equality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published,
contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which provides, that:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. . . .
Petitioner now comes to use on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 8 questioning the court's decision
particularly on the propriety of the lower court's declarations on the validity of Administrative Order No. 8908-01. The Court directed the respondents to file their respective Comments.

Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent, the submissions of the parties to the
present petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos' trip to Beijing, People's Republic of China (PROC), from April 25 to 30,
1993, a new trade agreement was entered into between the Philippines and PROC, encouraging
liberalization of trade between the two countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President, through
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of Trade and Industry and the
PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by PITC Board
Resolution Nos. 92-01-05 and 92-03-08. 9
In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issued a corporate Memorandum
10
instructing that all import applications for the PROC filed with the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer
be covered by the trade balancing program outlined in the Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew from the PROC, without being required
to comply anymore with the lifted requirement of balancing its imports with exports of Philippine products to
PROC. 11 In its Constancia 12 filed with the Court on November 22, 1993, Remington expressed its desire to
have the present action declared moot and academic considering the new supervening developments. For
its part, respondent Firestone made a Manifestation 13 in lieu of its Memorandum, informing the court of the
aforesaid developments of the new trade program of the Philippines with China, and prayed for the court's
early resolution of the action.
To support its submission that the present action is now moot and academic, respondent Remington cites
Executive Order No. 244, 14 issued by President Ramos on May 12, 1995. The Executive Order states:
WHEREAS, continued coverage of the People's Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444
is no longer consistent with the country's national interest, as coursing Republic of the PhilippinesPeople's Republic China Trade through the Philippine International Trading Corporations as
provided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order;
The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries to delete the
People's Republic of China from the list of countries covered by Letter of Instructions No. 444.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Five.
PITC filed its own Manifestation 15 on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted the arguments raised in its
Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees with Remington on the latter's submission that the case has
become moot and academic as a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01,
since respondent Remington had incurred obligations to the petitioner consisting of charges for the 0.5%
Counter Export Development Service provided by PITC to Remington, which obligations remain outstanding.
16 The propriety of such charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues, thereby maintaining the issue of
the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was abrogated by Executive fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trading balancing measures with PROC were lifted by
the President, Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no longer has force and effect, and respondents
are thus entitled anew to apply for authority to import from the PROC, without the trade balancing
requirements previously imposed on proposed importers. Indeed, it appears that since the lifting of the trade
balancing measures, Remington had been allowed to import anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of the outstanding obligations of the respondent for the charges relating
to the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service in favor of PITC, for the period when the questioned
Administrative Order remained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents freed from
it?

To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01, based on the arguments set up by the parties in their Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must
inquire into the nature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created under P.D. No. 252 17 dated August 6,
1973. P.D. No. 1071, 18 issued on May 9, 1977 which revised the provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and
powers of the said governmental entity were enumerated under Section 5 and 6 thereof. 19
On August 9, 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 444, 20
directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities), whether direct or indirect, between the
Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including
the People's Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. Under the LOI,
PITC was mandated to: 1) participate in all official trade and economic discussions between the Philippines
and SOCPEC; 2) adopt such measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
effective discharge of its functions under its instructions; and, 3) undertake the processing and approval of
all applications for export to or import from the SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444
xxx xxx xxx
II. CHANNELS OF TRADE
1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other centrallyplanned economy countries shall upon issuance hereof, be undertaken by or coursed through the
Philippine International Trading Corporation. This shall apply to the export and import of all
commodities of products including those specified for export or import by expressly authorized
government agencies.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all official trade and economic
discussions between the Philippines and other centrally-planned economy countries.
xxx xxx xxx
V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such measures and issue such rules
and regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions under these
instructions. In this connection, the processing and approval of applications for export to or import
from the Socialist and other centrally-planned economy countries shall, henceforth, be performed by
the said Corporation. (Emphasis ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Executive Order (EO) No.
133 21 reorganizing the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering the said department to be the
"primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the country's trade,
industry and investment activities" (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was made one of DTI's line agencies. 22
The Executive Order reads in part:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.

The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in Section 9 (c) of this
Executive Order that will perform their specific regulatory functions, particularly developmental
responsibilities and specialized business activities in a manner consonant with the Department
mandate, objectives, policies, plans and programs:
xxx xxx xxx
d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation, which shall be supervised by the
Undersecretary for International Trade, shall only engage in both export and trading on new or nontraditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector; provide a wide
range of export oriented auxiliary services to the private sector; arrange for or establish
comprehensive system and physical facilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution
of cargoes and other commodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for existing
institutions; promote and organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and industrial
establishments and collaborate or associate in joint venture with any person, association, company
or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of production, marketing, procurement, and other
relate businesses; and provide technical advisory, investigatory, consultancy and management
services with respect to any and all of the functions, activities, and operations of the corporation.
Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and
PROC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 23 (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make
joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade to US $600 US $800 Million by 1992, and
to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and exports
during the period, agreeing for the purpose that upon the signing of the Memorandum, both sides shall
undertake to establish the necessary steps and procedures to be adopted within the framework of the
annual midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol, in order to monitor and ensure the implementation
of the MOU.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989,
1990 and 1991, 24 under which was specified the commodities to be traded between them. The protocols
affirmed their agreement to jointly endeavor between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement to jointly
endeavor to achieve more or less a balance between the values of their imports and exports in their bilateral
trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the MOU and Trade Protocols with
PROC that PITC issued its now assailed Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 25 on August 30, 1989
(amended in March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to modify and amend the provisions of
LOI 444, which was issued by then President Marcos, both issuances being executive directives. As
observed by us in Philippine Association of Services Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 26
there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the Letter of Instruction
by way of an Executive Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the subject LOI 1190 was issued
by President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily empowered to exercise legislative powers,
whereas EO 450 was issued by Pres. Aquino when her transitional legislative powers have already
ceased, since it was found that LOI 1190 was a mere administrative directive, hence, may be
repealed, altered, or modified by EO 450.
We do not agree, however, with the trial court's ruling PITC's authority to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to the Special Provision of LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, have already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITC's power to engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly recognized and
allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is not limited only to new or non-traditional products and
markets not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is not indication in the law of the
removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations from

SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent
as to the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that "all laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations, or
other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no repeal of
the said powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between the issuances,
relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.
The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul the functions of the PITC. The DTI
was established, and was given powers and duties including those previously held by the PITC as an
independent government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was thereby attached to the DTI as
an implementing arm of the said department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of
government for the country's trade, industry and investment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for
intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. 27 In furtherance of this
mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the
government related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines
for the investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and product
export strategies which will guide the export promotion and development thrusts of the government. 28
Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the department's objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the said department as one of its line
agencies, 29 and given the focal task of implementing the department's programs. 30 The absence of the
regulatory power formerly enshrined in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the
limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost
the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such authority,
and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the supervision of, the Department of Trade
and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower court's ruling to the effect that the PITC's authority to process and approve
applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D.
1071 has been repealed by EO 133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the issuance of
the later presidential edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power to regulate the flow of trade between
the Philippines and PROC under the two countries' Memorandum of Understanding, a power which
necessarily flows from her office as Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the President intended
merely to reorganize the Department of Trade and Industry to cope with the need of a streamlined
bureaucracy. 31
Thus, there is not real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is, admittedly, a rearranging of
the administrative functions among the administrative bodies affective by the edict, but not an abolition of
executive power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the
absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is
possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them,
and to adopt a construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
provisions. 32 The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. 33
Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a
result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal within the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-

legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government. 34 Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret
and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of
private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
(Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate may even with new discoveries in technology and
electronics notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple with legislations and even judicial decisions aimed
at resolving issues affecting not only individual rights but also activities of which foreign governments or
entities may have interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations must be devised to suit these
changing business needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:
Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules, however, it was
soon clear that new governmental arrangements would be needed to handle the job of rule-making.
The courts, moreover, many of them already congested, would have been swamped if they had to
adjudicate all the controversies that the new legislation was bound to create; and the judges, already
obliged to handle a great diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to acquire the
knowledge they needed to deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.
So the need to "create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give them
broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included the power to issue
regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide cases powers that had
previously been reserved to the legislatures and the courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by
Administrative Agencies, p. 166)
The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the Administrative Order because no
grant of such power was made under the Trade Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The
Trade Protocols aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and goods which signatory countries
have agreed to trade. They do not bestow any regulatory power, for executive power is vested in the
Executive Department, 35 and it is for the latter to delegate the exercise of such power among its designated
agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power
ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasilegislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid
within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. .
..
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published
by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the
effectivity of the Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera 36 stated, thus:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
Rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e.,
P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V.
Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and private respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject
to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was never published, as mandated by
law, for its effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the amendments to the said Administrative Order
were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and strengthen trade relations with the
People's Republic of China. As declared by the President in EO 244 issued on May 12, 1995, continued
coverage of the People's Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the
country's national interest, as coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC as provided for under Letter of
Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade. 37
Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained atmosphere of trading between the
Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as to allow economic growth and renewed trade
relations with our neighbors to flourish and may be encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:
a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total
value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private respondents;
b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its
appurtenant rules; and,
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that may hereafter
be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without complying with the requirements
prescribed in the above-stated issuances.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126102

December 4, 2000

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No.
39193, which nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 261,
in Civil Case No. 64931. It also assails the resolution of the appellate court, dated August 13, 1996, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block
21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot:
1. (1) be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential
building will be constructed thereon,
xxx
6. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor advertising purposes
xxx
11. No single-family residential building shall be erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhave been
approved by the SELLER
xxx
14....restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025
when they shall cease and terminate1
These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The
ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of
Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty
Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a
single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 261. Docketed as Civil Case No. 64931, the complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial
structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the
commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the lot. The complaint was later amended to implead
Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp., which has a ten percent (10%) interest in the lot.
In his answer, Mathay III denied any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim
against the Hermosos.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay III moved to set
aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion.
Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
39193, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed
that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said
ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated on the title
it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were
agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
On March 25, 1996, the appellate court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders are hereby nullified
and set aside.
SO ORDERED.2
In finding for Mathay III, the Court of Appeals held that the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 effectively nullified the
restrictions allowing only residential use of the property in question.
Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it on August 13, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioner now submits that the "principal issue in this case is whether respondent Court of
Appeals correctly set aside the Order dated June 16, 1995 of the trial court which issued the writ of preliminary
injunction on the sole ground that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 nullified the building restriction imposing exclusive
residential use on the property in question."3 It also asserts that "Mathay III lacks legal capacity to question the
validity of conditions of the deed of sale; and he is barred by estoppel or waiver to raise the same question like his
principals, the owners."4 Lastly, it avers that the appellate court "unaccountably failed to address" several questions
of fact.
Principally, we must resolve the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it refused to apply MMC Ordinance No.81-01 to Civil Case No. 64931.
But first, we must address petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals "unaccountably failed to address"
questions of fact. For basic is the rule that factual issues may not be raised before this Court in a petition for review
and this Court is not duty-bound to consider said questions.5 CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 was a special civil action for
certiorari, and the appellate court only had to determine if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, unless vital to our
determination of the issue at hand, we shall refrain from further consideration of factual questions.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance. It avers that a
contractual right is not automatically discarded once a claim is made that it conflicts with police power. Petitioner
submits that the restrictive clauses in the questioned contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance. For one,

according to petitioner, the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of residential buildings.
Petitioner argues that even with the zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can voluntarily
agree to an exclusive residential use thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the condition imposing exclusive residential use was effectively nullified by the zoning ordinance.
In its turn, private respondent argues that the appellate court correctly ruled that the trial court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to subject the contract to the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. He avers that the appellate
court properly held the police power superior to the non-impairment of contract clause in the Constitution. He
concludes that the appellate court did not err in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in
excess of its jurisdiction.
We note that in issuing the disputed writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court observed that the contract of sale
was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The trial court
reasoned that since private respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect,
said ordinance should be given prospective application only,6 citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA
390 (1988).
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit.
Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.7 A later law which enlarges, abridges,
or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself8 and cannot
be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.9
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the
exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and
may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to those already in existence.10 Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to
the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.11 Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be
read into every contract.12 Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 we already upheld MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.
The trial courts reliance on the Co vs. IAC,14 is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was agricultural and Ordinance
No. 81-01 did not specifically provide that "it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously
acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature,"15 and stated
with respect to agricultural areas covered that "the zoning ordinance should be given prospective operation only."16
The area in this case involves not agricultural but urban residential land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected
the operation of the zoning ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial.
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual
stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch of
Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all
construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive
operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of
contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,17 nonetheless, stipulations in a contract
cannot contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."18 Otherwise such stipulations would
be deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to
Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are not only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the
applicable laws,19 they are also bound by their oath of office to apply the applicable law.20
As a secondary issue, petitioner contends that respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot in question, is a
total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred from questioning the conditions of said deed. Petitioner points
out that the owners of the lot voluntarily agreed to the restrictions on the use of the lot and do not question the
validity of these restrictions. Petitioner argues that Mathay III as a lessee is merely an agent of the owners, and
could not override and rise above the status of his principals. Petitioner submits that he could not have a higher

interest than those of the owners, the Hermosos, and thus had no locus standi to file CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 to
dissolve the injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City.
For his part, private respondent argues that as the lessee who built the commercial structure, it is he and he alone
who stands to be either benefited or injured by the results of the judgment in Civil Case No. 64931. He avers he is
the party with real interest in the subject matter of the action, as it would be his business, not the Hermosos, which
would suffer had not the respondent court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
A real party in interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit." "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.21 By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.22
Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent in this case is clearly a real party in interest.1wphi1 It is not
disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant to a valid lease. He is a possessor in the concept of a "holder of
the thing" under Article 525 of the Civil Code.23 He was impleaded as a defendant in the amended complaint in Civil
Case No. 64931. Further, what petitioner seeks to enjoin is the building by respondent of a commercial structure on
the lot. Clearly, it is private respondents acts which are in issue, and his interest in said issue cannot be a mere
incidental interest. In its amended complaint, petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment "ordering the demolition
of all improvements illegally built on the lot in question."24 These show that it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business
as "Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.," and not only the Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the courts decree.
Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger to a contract has no rights or obligations under it,25 and thus has no
standing to challenge its validity.26 But in seeking to enforce the stipulations in the deed of sale, petitioner impleaded
private respondent as a defendant. Thus petitioner must recognize that where a plaintiff has impleaded a party as a
defendant, he cannot subsequently question the latters standing in court.27
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25,
1996, as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921

April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.
52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an interisland vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the
young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to
leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young
couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City
where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could
stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old
Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his
drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical
violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive
respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out
as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the
Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was
convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they
decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor
children and prayed for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by
the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial
court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes,
on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was
collusion between the parties. 1wphi1.nt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed
late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the
birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal
property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly,
in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the
case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that
his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set
out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein
outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely
no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in
Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of
the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality

disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on
the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so
as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family6 that
the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship
with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In
these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322

October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment;
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.1wphi1.nt

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven
to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take
up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and
(2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires
the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx

xxx

xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document a written official
act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or
a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It
is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of
the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c)
Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d)
Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5"
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October
22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court
a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo
for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short),
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor
of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to
a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children
and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that
their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children
had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition
of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted

declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was
stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed
by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the
Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995
it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed
the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to
the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the
parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains
as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to
appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and
in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that
Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading
between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a
hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well
as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely
address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but
proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,
was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of
their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however
from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private
respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and
that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the
actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while
the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies
of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence
of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother
Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 124371

November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as
co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo
Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left
blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos
salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate
in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is
also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such
let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared
as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1wph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39

Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul
and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
(underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of
the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484

February 14, 1958

In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen, ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR,
petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, oppositors-appellees.
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for appellants.
Leopoldo M. abellera and Amado A. Munda for appellee Maria Heliuen Christensen Garcia.
Pedro P. Suarez and Oscar Breva for appellee Bernarda Camporedondo.
FELIX, J.:
From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of 1913,Edward E. Christensen, an American
citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the following year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located
in the municipality of Padada of the same province. At a certain time, which the lower court placed at 1917, a group
of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young
girl,Bernarda Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, thegirl and Edward E.
Christensen, who was also unmarried staring living together as husband and wife and although the records failed to
establishthe exact date when such relationship commenced, the lower court found the same to have been continous
for over 30 years until the death of Christensen occurecd on April 30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy
and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.
G. R. NO. L-11484.
Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of properties his will naming Adolfo Cruz
Aznar as executor was duly presented for probate in court and became the subject of Special Proceedings No. 622
of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will contains, among others, the following provisions:
xxx

xxx

xxx.

3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, andno descendantsexcept my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, now married toEduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the factthat she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor hasshe been at any time adopted to me, and who, from all information I have now resides
in Egipt, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED PESOS (P3,600)
Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trustfor said Maria Lucy Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the PhilippineNational Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100), Philippine

Currency per month until the the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon,
is exhausted.
8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPORENDONDO, now residing inPadada, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000), Philippine Currency.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA Lucy
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, andwheresover situated; of which I
may be possessed at any death and which mayhave come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime,Provided, honvever, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to
her decease having living issue, then, and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate, and if
so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest remainder and residue of my property, with the same force and effectas if
I had originally so given, devised and bequeathedit to her; and provided, further, that should be said Maria
Lucy ChristensenDaney die without living issue then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the
rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOIUSE
C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124 Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-half (1/2) to
the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CRISTENSEN, . . .
13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City, Philippines, my executor, and the
executor of this, my last will and testament.
. . . (Exh. A).
Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen Christensen Garcia and Bernarda
Camporendondo, the first contending that thewill lacked the formalities required by law; that granting that he had,
thedispositions made therein were illegal because although she and Lucy Christensen were both children had by the
deceased with Bernarda Camporendondo, yet she was given only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate valued
at $485,000 while Lucy would get the rest of the properties;and that the petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not
qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate because he had an interest adverse to thatof the estate. It
was therefore prayed by his oppositor that the application for probate be denied and the will disallowed; that the
proceeding be declared intestate and that another disinterested person be appointed as administrator.
Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-halfof the entire estate in virtue of her
relationship with the deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having lived together as husband andwife
continuously for a period of over 30 years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation should be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was dismissed by the probate court on the ground that shehad no right to
intervene in said proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional right that might be affected by
the probate of thewill, and likewise, she could not be allowed to establish her title and co-ownership over the
properties therein for such questions must be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this ruling of the
Court and in order to attain the purpose sought by her overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to
institute, as she did institute Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G.R. No. L-11483) which
we will consider and discuss hereinafter.
In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special adminsitrator of the estate after filing a bond for P5,000
pending the appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administrition were correspondingly issued to him
on May 21, 1953.
The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition. Helen Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental
opposition and motion to declare her an acknowledged natural child of Edward E. Christensen, alleging that shewas
conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda Camporendondo was living with the deceased as his
common-law wife; that she had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased;
thatahe had in her favor evidence and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father; and that she and Lucy had

the same civil status as children of the decedent and Bernarda Camporedondo. This motion was opposed jointly by
the executor and Maria Lucy Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the conception and birth of
Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be carrying relations with 3 different men; that during
the lifetime of the decedent and even years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing
disavowed relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used the surname Christensen illegally
and without permission from the deceased. Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to the deceased; and that the motion of said oppositor be
denied.
After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found that oppositor Maria Helen
Cristensen had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen
notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by him in his will, for such action must have been brought about by
the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he did not like. But taking into considerationthat such
possession of the status of a natural child did not itself constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of to
compel acknowledgment, the lower Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney toacknowledge the oppositor as a
natural child of Edward E. Christensen. Thewill was, however, allowed the letters testamentary consequently issued
toAdolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion of the decision requiring Lucy Christensen to
acknowledge Helen as a natural child of the testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to Us on the ground that the case
involves an estate the value of which far exceeds P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.
The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred in finding that the oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased EdwardE.
Christensen and in directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, recognizeddaughter and instituted heirs of the
decedent, to acknowledge the former assuch natural child.
Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the same
mother, Bernarda Camporedondo, during the period when the latter was publicly known to have been living as
common-law wife of Edward E. Chrisiensen. From the facts of the case there can be no question as to Lucy's
parentage, but controversy arose when Edward Christensen, in making his last will and testament, disavowed such
paternity to Helen and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. ln the course of the proceeding for the probate of the will
(Exh, A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to support her claim that she, Lucy,was a natural
child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to the hereditaryshare corresponding to such descendant. Several
witness testified in herfavor, including the mother Bernarda Camporendondo, her former teachers andother
residents of the community, tending to prove that she was known in the locality as a child of the testator and was
introduced by the latter to the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family portraits, greeting
cards and letters were likewise presented to bolster herassertion that she had always been treated by the deceased
and by Lucy herself as a member of the family.
Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate herclaim by introducing evidence to prove
that on or about the period when shewas conceived and born, her mother was carrying an affair with another
man,Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and even took the witness
stand to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to show that the defendant's solicitations for Helen's welfare and
the help extended to her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on the fact that on several occasions, the
deceased disclaimed any relationship with her (Exh. O-Daney, Exh. Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney, Exh. 8-Helen).
Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears indubitable that on or about the period when Helen was
born, Bernarda Camporendondo had established residence at her plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that although
Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising business, he spent the weekends with the
former and their child Lucy in the Christensenplantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage fitted himself
intothe picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's mother and the deceased weregenerally and publicly known to be
living together as husband and wife. Thismust have been the reason why Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934
providedfor her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the extentthat she was even enrolled as
an intern in an exclusive college for girls inManila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and
ineffect gaver her the attention and care that a father would only do to this offspring. We should take note that
nothing appears on record to show thatChristensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed Helen's paternity.
Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he andBernarda Comperodondo parted ways in

March, 1950, and apparently after Helentook sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite that
decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same andgot married to a man for Christensen
held no high esteem. We may state at hisjuncture that while it is true that herein appellants introduced witnesses
todisprove oppositor'r claim, the lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the witnesses while
testifying and could better gaugetheir credibility and impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria
Helen Christensen had established that she had been in continouspossessions of the status of a natural child of the
deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence on record, We see no reason to reverse said ruling.The testator'
lastacts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for human frailty and
parental arrogance maydraw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child orone who
displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In theconsideration of a claim that one is a natural child,
the attitude or directacts of the person against whom such action is directed or that of his family before the
controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated
occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that gives
rise to the right, in favor of the child, of coumpulsaryrecognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).
The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent,
to recognize oppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code for 2 kinds of
acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary and compulsory. In the first instance, which may be effected in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278,Civil Code), court
intervention is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the second, judicial pronouncement is essential, and
while it is true that the effect of a voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment onthe right of the child so recognized
is the same, to maintain the view of thelower Court would eliminate the distinction between voluntary acts and those
brought about by judicial dicta. And if We consider that in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of the
child and action for compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the instant case, the
situation would take absurd turn, for the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the
deceased without a properprovision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil Code only requires a declaration by the
court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who, if living, would be compelled to recognize his offspring
as such.Therefore, We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that
a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the
circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the
presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a
judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom the action is directed, are
bound to respect.
G.R. No. L-11483
Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Bernarda Camporendondo claimed in
her complaint 1/2 of the properties of thedeceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased.
She alleged as basis for action that she and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had lived and cohabitated as
husband and wife, continously and openly for a period for more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and
the deceased acquired real and personal properties through their common effort and industry; and that in virtue of
such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. As the executor refused to account forand deliver the
share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeated demands, she prayed the court that said executor be ordered
to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire estate of the deceased;to divide the same into 2 equal
parts and declare that one of them lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor denied the avermentsof the complaint, contending that
the decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were acquired through his own efforts;
thatplaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by the late Edward christensen
during his lifetime; that the personal relationship between plaintiff and the deceased was purely clandestinebecause
the former habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired the same in 1928; that she
also maintained relations with 2 other men; and that the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253
of the Civil Code as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired. Defendant thus
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum ofP70.000.00 representing actual,
moral and exemplary damages.
Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad submitted theirrespective memoranda, the lower Court
on August 25, 1954, rendered judgmentfinding that the deceased Edward Christensen and Bernarda
Camporendondo,not otherwise suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, lived together as husband and

wife without marital ties continously for over 30years until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2
childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired by either orboth of them through their work
or industry. Relying on Section 144 of theCivil Code which said court considered to have created another mode
ofacquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled to one-half of saidproperties as co-owner thereof in view of
her relationship with the deceasedand ordered the executor to account for and deliver the same by her. Fromthis
decision, defendant Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an appealto the Court of Appeals, but as the property
involved in the litigation exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated the case to Us for consideration.
It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the owner of certain properties, including
shares of stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general merchandising store in Davao City. It is also
undeniable that the deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married state, maintained relations as
husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a considerable number of years which the lower Court declared to
be until the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower
court's findings of fact, unless said finding is not supported by or totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence
on record, such finding must ofnecessity be modified to confrom with the evidence if the reviewing tribunalwere to
arrive at the proper and just solution of the controversy. In theinstant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed to
consider the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother
Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel or misunderstanding and parted ways as of March, 1950, a fact
which appelleewas not able to overcome. Taking into account the circumstances of this caseas found by the trial
court, with the modification that the cohabitation should appear as continuous from the early 20's until March, 1950,
the question left for our determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, byreason of such relationship, may be
considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired by the deceased during said period and thus entitledto one-half
thereof after the latter's death.
Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a certain kind of relationship brought about by
couples living together as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage, acquiring and bringingproperties unto
said union, and probably realizing that while same may not beacceptable from the moral point of view they are as
much entitled to theprotection of the laws as any other property owners, the lawmakersincorporated Article 144 in
Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their property relations. Said article read as follows:
ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership.
It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman thus living together must not
in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized during their cohabitation be
acquired through the work, industry, employment or occupation of both or either of them. And the same thing may
be said of whose marriages are by provision of law declared void ab intio. While it is true that these requisites are
fully met and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the deceased and herein appellee were already
estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of law governing the cessation of such informal civil
partnership, if ever existed, same may be considered terminated upon their separation or desistance to continue
said relations.The Spanish Civil Code which was then enforce contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the
records in the instant case failed to show show thata subsequent reconciliation ever took place and considering that
Republic ActNo. 386 which recognizeed such form of co-ownership went into operation onlyon August 30, 1950,
evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee's claim.
In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon the jurisprudence then obtaining on the matter.
As early as 1925, this Court already declared that where a man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment to
contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists and made the
pronouncement that each of them has an intereat in the properties acquired during said union and is entitled to
participate therein if said properties were the product oftheir JOINT efforts (Marata vs. Dionio G.R. No. 24449, Dec.
31, 1925). In another case, this Court similarly held that although there is no technical marital partnership between
person living maritally without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between them an informalcivil
partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest where the property is acquired through their
JOINT efforts (Lesaca vs. FelixVda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135).
Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint industry apparently in her desire
to tread on the doctrine laiddown in the aforementioned cases, would lead Us to believe that her help wassolicited or

she took a hand in the management of and/or acquisition of thesame. But such assertion appears incredible if We
consider that she wasobserved by the trial Court as an illiterate woman who cannot even remembersimple things as
the date when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when shecommenced relationship with the deceased, not even
her approximate age orthat of her children. And considering that aside from her own declaration, which We find to
be highly improbable, there appears no evidence to proveher alleged contribution or participation in the acquisition
of the properties involved therein, and that in view of the holding of this Courtthat for a claim to one-half of such
property to be allowed it must be provedthat the same was acquired through their joint efforts and labor (Flores
vs.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, * 50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We have no recoursebut reverse the holding of the
lower Court and deny the claim of BernardaCampredondo. We may further state that even granting, for the sake
ofargument, that this case falls under the provisions of Article 144 of theCivil Code, same would be applicable only
as far as properties acquiredafter the effectivity of Republic Act 386 are concerned and to no other, forsuch law
cannot be given retroactive effect to govern those already possessedbefore August 30, 1950. It may be argued,
however, that being a newly created right, the provisions of Section 144 should be made to retroact if only toenforce
such right. Article 2252 of the same Code is explicit in thisrespect when it states:
SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have ro retroactive effect.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirsof the deceased Edward Christensen
would be impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would succeed, the answer to such argument
wouldbe simply obvious.
With regard to appellant Aznar's contention that the lower Court erred in admitting the testimony of appellee
Bernarda Camporedondo dealing with facts that transpired before the death of Edward Christensen on the ground
that it is prohibited by Section 26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. We deem it unnecessary to delve on the same
because even admitting that the court a quo committed the error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the outcome
of the case in view of the conclusion We have already arrived at on the main issue.
On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the decision of the lower Court in case G.R. No. L-11484,
with the modification that MariaLucy Christensen Daney need not be compelled to acknowledge her sister Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia as a natural child of her father Edward E. Christensen, the declaration of the Court in this
respect being sufficient to enable her to all the rights inherent to such status.
The decision appealed from in case G.R. No. L-11483 is hereby reversed and another one rendered, dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.
Costs are taxed against appellants in G.R. No. L-11484 and against appellee Bernarda Camporedondo in G.R. No.
L-11483. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O.
CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney's fees for acts done in
the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by
evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still
be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in
favor of herein petitioner in the following manner: 3
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering them, jointly and severally the following:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete
payment thereof;
2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete
payment thereof;
3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;
4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;
5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;
6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;
7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;

8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;
9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete
payment thereof;
10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until
complete payment thereof;
11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:
1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00);
3. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
4. To pay the costs of suit.
The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In a Resolution 4 dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The following is the Court of Appeals' undisputed narration of the facts:
Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he
entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18,
1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places,
respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms which are itemized as
follows:
Date

3/25/86
6/8/86
7/10/86
2/1/87
3/22/87
4/26/87
5/17/87
8/8/87
12/13/87

Place
Winner
Grooms
1st
2nd
1st
1st
1st
3rd
1st
1st
1st

Stake Horse
Prize Claims
PCSO
Hansuyen
Stronghold
Kahala
Devil's Brew
Time to Explode
Stormy Petril
Starring Role
Star Studded
Charade

Racewinning
Training
200,000.00
40,000.00
200,000.00
100,000.00
200,000.00
40,000.00
20,000.00
200,000.00
250,000.00

30% Due
Withheld by
57,000.00
12,000.00
57,300.00
30,000.00
60,000.00
12,000.00
6,000.00
60,000.00
75,000.00

Net Amount

143,000.00
28,000.00
142,700.00
70,000.00
140,000.00
28,000.00
14,000.00
140,000.00
174,000.00

9/18/88

1st

Hair Trigger
TOTAL

200,000.00
1,450,000.00

60,000.00
4,293,000.00

140,000.00
1,020,700.00

[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits "A," dated July 3, 1986; "B" dated August 18,
1986; and "C," dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the
collection of the prizes due him. And [herein private respondents] consistently replied. (Exhibits 2
and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January 30, 1991; this case was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the summons on February 7,
Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that "if poses no more
objection to the remittance of the prize winnings" (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was
communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.]. 5
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioner's counsel, refused to accept the
prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman,
Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner,
since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). It held that it was Carrascoso's unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a
previous longtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware
that petitioner's winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso
had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. 6 It thus ordered the
PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso
to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.1wphi1.nt
While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of
the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed
no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued
on February 14, 1992, an Order 7 for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700. Accordingly,
on May 20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors: 8
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD
FAITH IN WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE['S] PRIZE[S];
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
In reversing the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former
PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It
noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained: 9

. . . Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further
instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the
prize winnings of the [petitioner], and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The
actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was
the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position and
serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a
possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.
The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly
replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2)
upon PCGG's subsequent advice to release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and
(3) he interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court
finally disposed as follows: 10
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.
On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995. Hence,
this petition. 11
Issues
Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO);
b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to
file an appeal brief;
c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of
action which was not appealed from by the respondents;
d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and
the law. 12
Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues:
Effect of PCSO's Appeal Brief
Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been
dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO
and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment
against Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The PCSO,
through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: "the impropriety
of the award of damages . . . ." This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO.
Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled
against Carrascoso only, and not against the government corporation.
Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have, been
dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was

no longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the
OGCC.
On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioner's racehorse winnings by Respondent
Carrascoso occurred during the latter's incumbency as PCSO chairman. According to him, he had honestly believed
that it was within the scope of his authority not to release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C.
Aquino's Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she decreed the following:
(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation;
(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or
concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer,
encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation, under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law.
Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the subject racehorse winnings, and
he was told that they were part of petitioner's sequestered properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief
that said winnings were fruits of petitioner's ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The
chairman of the PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings.
The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to "act
as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate
offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and . . . [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal
departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be
provided by law." 13 The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the latter, under its charter,
14 is a government-owned corporation. The government counsel's representation extends to the concerned
government functionary's officers when the issue involves the latter's official acts or duties. 15
Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the
government corporate counsel, this development does not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of
appeal of the trial court's Decision. The filing of an appellant's brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection
of an appeal. 16 Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not
prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, at
its sound discretion, exercise its equity
jurisdiction. 17 The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 18
What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the
lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him on appeal, 19 had filed an appeal brief on his
behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another
counsel and to file his own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure.
The former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the client's consent, and the
newly appointed attorney should formally enter his appearance before the appellate court with notice to the adverse
party. 20 But other than Carrascoso's manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a
change of counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective change of attorney
will not abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel.
All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing the appeal, since this
matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion exercised reasonably in accordance with
the doctrine that cases should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits.
Third Issue:
Scope of the Appeal
Before Respondent Court

Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals.
The errors assigned in the appellants' Brief, as quoted earlier, attacked only the trial court's (1) conclusion that
"defendants-appellants acted in bad faith" and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only
those parts relating to the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.
Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety and dismiss the original
Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the
Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily
related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. 21 The appellate
court has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter and those that are plain or clerical errors. 22
Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively recognized the confines of the
appeal, as it stated at the outset that "this appeal shall be limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision
other than the claims for race winning prizes." 23 The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood
together with the aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Court's review.
Consequently, what the assailed Decision "reversed and set aside" was only that part of the appealed judgment
finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It
did not annul the trial court's order for Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings,
because this Order had never been assigned as an error sought to be corrected.
On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the payment, as it so
manifested before the trial court 24 in answer to Petitioner Cojuangco's Motion 25 for the partial execution of the
judgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of
P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992. 26 Obviously and
plainly, the RTC judgment, insofar as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer subject to
appeal.
In any event, the Court of Appeals' discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as a party-litigant to the
instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the nonjoinder of the PCGG made the Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very
ground, or at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not have
legally done so anyway, because the PCGG's role in the controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the
trial court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the court a quo. 27
The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating to
Respondent Carrascoso's good faith which, the appellate court surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGG's
statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other
words, Respondent Court's view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a
mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.
Fourth Issue:
Damages
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that Respondent Carrascoso
acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. 28
We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of
Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support
Respondent Court's conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval: 29

A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display uncertainties in the
mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the
plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit "1") the first prize for the March 16, 1986 draw and the second
prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld to "avoid any possible
violation of your sequestration order on the matter" because while he is aware of the sequestration
order issued against the properties of defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent
and coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso
requested for a clarification whether the prizes are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative,
for instructions on the proper disposal of the two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the
trainer and the groom.
Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz
authorized the payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the amounts
due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood and appreciated in
the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly born legal creation and
"sequestration" was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were not sure as to the actual
procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of the said newly created office
should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly implemented without violating due
process of law. To the mind of their newly installed power, the immediate concern is to take over and
freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate families, close
associates and cronies. There is no denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business
associate of the former President. Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be
faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter,
on what to do with the prize winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey the instructions
subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso
had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the
powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the
surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft
case against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences
showing his good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the
first demand for the collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered
saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such payment. But the moment he
received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of plaintiff Cojuangco could already be
released, he immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to the execution
pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all the winnings due the plaintiff. . . .
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even
the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of
the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner. 30 He had acted upon the PCGG's statement that
the subject prizes were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction "to hold in a proper bank
deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco." 31 Besides, EO 2 had just been issued by then
President Aquino," freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his
wife, . . . their close friends, subordinates, business associates . . ."; and enjoining the "transfer, encumbrance,
concealment, or dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law." It cannot, therefore, be
said that Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in
the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. 32
Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the
grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. 33 The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce
be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable
under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxx xxx xxx
In Aberca v. Ver, 34 this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as follows:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek
to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political
stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that
certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or
imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our
commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which
reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.
"Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him
who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a
minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a
certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless
controls." 35
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. 36 To be liable, it
is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives
or good faith in the performance of one's duties. 37
We hold that petitioner's right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may
have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little
exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the
racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either.
The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process. 38 The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued
sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered. 39 The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been
invaded. 40 The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances taken into account. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner
nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., abroad on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107125

January 29, 2001

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas
and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated
the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless
and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep
bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down
(sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at the
irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of
the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera
butsaid that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by
the accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm
using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00
o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel)
Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They
cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the
evening when the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota
Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago,
Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer
each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his
companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After

one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldoand then they
decided to go home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front
seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the
accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway
at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon,
the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because
the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused
immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but he was
not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the
road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway
immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road
so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five
meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following
morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When
he regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him.
Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the
deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased
were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only
minor injuries to his head and legs.2
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution,
except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the
accident, the defense claimed that:
The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at about
30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger
jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly
swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right
edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the
incident (Exhibit "1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car
was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal
Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for
treatment.3
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066
in petitioner's favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the
crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.4
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. In
their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly
liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of
Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.5
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a
state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9
a.m. and 11 p.m."6 It found that petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,8 a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
"because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation."9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON
THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN
HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND
INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF
ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH
XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE
CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO
EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v.
GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME
WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE
FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or
reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial court
on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the
trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable
doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished
in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of
the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.1wphi1.nt
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act."10 When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense.11 This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements
must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.12 In the instant case, petitioner
had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his
discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court
of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that
no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the
appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against
petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of
having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.14 The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,16 where the civil action for
damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed
in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both
actions involve the same act or omission.17 The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court
of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's
negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor
recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did
not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue
that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into
play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court
that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really
negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict
of conviction."18 The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt
had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a
suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of
the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.19 He avers that since Manchester held that
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court
was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that
the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester
requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount of
indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in
the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the
damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak
of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was
governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.20 As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by
the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid
only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.21 Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of
Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 130362

September 10, 2001

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner,

vs.
MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1997, dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by herein petitioner as a consequence of the orders by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 166, in Civil Case No. 65026 for damages.
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial
director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporation's operation in the Philippines. Hernan
H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to
Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant,
respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" on
December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a "Personnel Announcement" which described respondents
as "persona non grata" and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two Informations against
Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.
On March 31, 1995, respondents fi1ed'a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 at the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein
petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
On October 23, 1995, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 65026 for respondents'
failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted in an order dated January 9, 1996.
IFFI filed a motion to reconsider said order. This was denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil complaint which it invoked before the court a quo. The
appellate court dismissed the petition. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
All told, the allegations of petitioner that the lower court has gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in issuing the orders complained of has not been substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1
IFFI's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for review, with petitioner alleging that the
Court of Appeals:

I
...GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONER
AND IN DENYING THE LATTER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE TO ENFORCE THE SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF PETITIONER
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE FOR THE ALLEGED "LIBELOUS" STATEMENTS OF ITS
FORMER EMPLOYEE.
B. AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT INCUR SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE,
BUT ONLY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. UNDER THE LATTER, AN EMPLOYER ONLY
BECOMES SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE UPON CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED EMPLOYEE AND
PROOF OF HIS INSOLVENCY.
C. WHILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES MAY PROCEED AGAINST HERNAN H.
COSTA UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, NO SUCH ACTION MAY PROCEED
AGAINST PETITIONER TO ENFORCE ITS SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY AS EMPLOYER UNDER THE
SAME ARTICLE.
II
...SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO FILE THE CIVIL CASE AGAINST
PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR ADMITTED FAILURE TO MAKE A RESERVATION AND
THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
III
...FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO RESERVE AND THEIR CONTINUED
PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE BAR THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST MR. COST A AND PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LITIS PENDENTIA, THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE
PETITIONER'S SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST BE DISMISSED.
B. THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE PETITIONER'S SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST BE
DISMISSED TO PREVENT FORUM-SHOPPING OR MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.2
Despite the foregoing formulation of alleged errors, we find that petitioner raises one principal issue for the Court's
resolution: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner's
employee?
In our view, respondents' suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.
At the outset, we are constrained to delve into the nature of Civil Case No.65026, respondents' complaint for
damages against IFFI. Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it treated said complaint as one to
enforce petitioner's primary liability under Article 333 of the Civil Code. It asserts that in so doing the appellate court
introduced a new cause of action not alleged nor prayed for in respondents' complaint. Petitioner argues that a
cause of action is determined by the allegations and prayer in a complaint. Respondents in their complaint did not
allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages. On the contrary, petitioner says the complaint was replete with
references that IFFI was being sued in its subsidiary capacity. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals could
not, on its own, include allegations which were not in the complaint, nor could it contradict the cause of action nor
change the theory of the case after petitioner had answered. While pleadings should be liberally construed, says the
petitioner, liberal construction should not be abused. Misleading the adverse party should be avoided. Further, it
avers that where allegations in the pleading are inconsistent, the pleader is bound by those most favorable to its
opponent,4 and consequently, respondents' complaint should not be treated as one to enforce IFFI's primary liability

as the appellate court erroneously did, considering that the complaint plainly adverts to the alleged subsidiary
liability of IFFI as the employer of Costa.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Court of Appeals was correct in treating the action as a civil action for
damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action that can proceed independently in accordance with
Art. 33 of the Civil Code.5 It was also correct when it recognized respondents' right to move directly against IFFI as
the employer of Costa, who had long fled the country, respondents added.
On this score, we find petitioner's contentions persuasive and respondents' position untenable. The well-established
rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action.6
A perusal of the respondents' civil complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing
IFFI in a subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.
First, respondents entitled the complaint, "MERLIN J. ARGOS AND JAJA C. PINEDA. v. MR. HERNAN COSTA, as
former Managing Director of IFF (Phil.), Inc., AND INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHILS.),
INC. ...in its subsidiary capacity, as employer of Hernan H. Costa." Although the title of the complaint is not
necessarily determinative of the nature of the action, it nevertheless indicates respondents' intention.7 The
designation of the nature of the action, or its title is not meaningless or of no effect in the determination of its
purpose and object.8
Second, paragraph 2 of the complaint expressed in categorical terms that respondents were suing IFFI in its
subsidiary capacity .It stated, "defendant IFFI is being sued in its subsidiary capacity as employer of Hernan H.
Costa, in accordance with the pertinent provisions under the Rules of Court, the Revised Penal Code and/or the
Civil Code of the Philippines."9
Third, respondents described the nature of such liability in paragraph 22: "... in case of his (Costa's) default,
defendant (IFFI) should be held subsidiarily liable as an employer of Hernan Costa. Defendant has the absolute and
sole power and authority in matters of company policies and management (Arts. 100, 101, 102 and 104 of the
Revised Penal Code)."10
Lastly, the prayer of the complaint reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court renders judgment against the
defendant, Hernan H. Costa and/or against defendant International Flavors and Fragrances (Phil.), Inc., in its
subsidiary capacity (subsidiary liability) as an employer...11
To reiterate, nothing could be clearer than that herein respondents are suing IFFI civilly in its subsidiary capacity for
Costa's alleged defamatory acts. Moreover, the appellate court could not convert allegations of subsidiary liability to
read as averments of primary liability without committing a fundamental unfairness to the adverse party.
Essential averments lacking in a pleading may not be construed into it, nor facts not alleged by a plaintiff be taken
as having no existence.12 Justice requires that a man be apprised of the nature of the action against him so that he
may prepare his defense. A pleading must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have
stated all the facts involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if material
allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to amend that those matters do not
exist.13 This is a basic rule in pleadings.14
Given the circumstances herein, could petitioner be sued for damages because of its alleged subsidiary liability
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code? In instituting the action for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
166, respondents seek to enforce a civil liability allegedly arising from a crime. Obligations arising from crimes are
governed by Article 116115 of the Civil Code, which provides that said obligations are governed by penal laws,
subject to the provision of Article 217716 and the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book IV of the Civil Code.
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code is also pertinent. It provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. In default of the persons criminally liable, employers engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly
liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties.17

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12
SCRA 308 (1964), we held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It
does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises
only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful
act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.18 Any action brought
against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.19
However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior,20 respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold
IFFI primarily liable for its employee's defamatory statements. But we also find that respondents did not raise the
claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to
enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in pending criminal cases
for libel, prematurely.
Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFI's primary liability under Art. 33
but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa, prematurely, we need not
delve further on the other errors raised by petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to
dismiss the complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while the criminal libel
cases against IFFI's employee, Costa, were pending before the metropolitan trial court. Nothing herein said,
however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might seek at the appropriate time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 7,
1997 and August 28, 1997, respectively, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The civil complaint for damages
filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against herein
petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULANCULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.
Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.
ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled
"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay
jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendantsappellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per
Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor
of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing
an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No.
87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that
the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought
to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural
minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed
by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess
of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying
petitioner' motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of
law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his family
residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4,
1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation
enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from
a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution.
It is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on
August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a
way that all family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy
prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family
Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head
of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If
the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and
lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153
of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner
and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of
this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed
to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the
sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro.
He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with
his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No
94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph
1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven,
they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's
civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by
the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants
stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that
after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in
Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to
the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages
not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision
states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in
a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or
in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only
one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under
Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7,
marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not
alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and
the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated
a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable
in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too
much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of
the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.
Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 10036 declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and
appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana Geronimo.
The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:
This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate of Graciana
Geronimo-Esman.
On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio A.
Esman and describing the latter as "husband of the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended
petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now
describing the latter as the "live-in partner of the deceased" after finding out that the marriage
between oppositor and the decedent was a "nullity for want of a marriage license".
It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She
was survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo, her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A.
Esman. . . . However, the husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the decedent is now being
questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent was
celebrated without a marriage license.
The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a judicial administrator is
whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman was valid.
Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and oppositor Antonio A.
Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the parties at the time the
marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract
(Exh. "I"); and that the marriage contract itself does now (sic) show the number of the marriage
license issued (Exh. "J"). Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to the
deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros
before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959.

On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions;
that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents (Exh. "I" and "J") would show that except for
the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque
were the same as the certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original
petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked
that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage
license number on the Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not
conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of
Pateros are printed by the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various
provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the
printing of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same
forms in the succeeding years.
Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the deceased and oppositor
were married. David Montenegro, an employee of the National Archives & Records Section, testified
that a copy of the marriage contract between Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo celebrated
on January 7, 1955, is on file with their office.
Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he was asked to
come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and stayed in Pasig as assistant priest of the parish of
Immaculate Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here, he came to know the spouses Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman whom he attended to spirituality, conducted mass for, gave
communion, and visited them socially. He had occasions to go to the couple's garment business,
Gragero Lingerie, and observed that the couple were quite close with each other and with the people
working in their business.
Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business testified that she was
aware of the marriage which took place between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; that
they lived together as husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig, after the wedding; and that is the
oppositor who has been successfully supervising the lingerie business after the death of Graciana
Geronimo.
Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in charge of all accountable
forms being taken in the fourteen (14) municipalities of the province of Rizal which include marriage
licenses; and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was taken by the
Municipality of Pateros way back in October 9, 1953.
Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila, testified that in the entry
of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no. 23 of book no. 2 and reg. no. 51, there is no
column for the marriage license; that they started putting the marriage license only in 1980; that they
have a copy of the questioned marriage contract in which the marriage license number is recorded;
and that the records of 1959 were lost during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage
contract to the archives section.
Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana Geronimo on January 7, 1955
in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage license no. 5038770; and that he was introduced by the
deceased to the public as her lawful husband. (Decision, pp. 1-3) 2
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:
It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do not bear the number of
the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositorappellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number could only serve to prove that the number
was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required
marriage license. On the other hand, the marriage license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January
7, 1955) does appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7 and sub-

markings). The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by the
petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in
question because there is nothing in the law which requires that the marriage license number would
(sic) be indicated in the marriage contract itself. 3
Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the marriage between Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce, the latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of
the estate of the former, the petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now posing the following question
in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites license is absent?"
Doubtless, the query has been framed so as to apparently present a question of law. In reality, however, the
question assumes that there was no marriage license, which is, of course, a factual contention. Both the trial court
and the public respondent found and ruled otherwise.
In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 4 which collated representative cases on the rule of conclusiveness
of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the exceptions thereto, we stated:
Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring,
therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, they must stand.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of endings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above exceptions.
On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the mind of the petitioner, we shall
proceed to discuss the issue regarding the alleged absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman because the copies of the
marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not state the marriage license number. The flaw in such
reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of the
marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7") where the marriage license
number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by
presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License
No. 5038770 was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was
sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus:
It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the Government like
the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the National Printing Office and are printed
with serial numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal
treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same
numbers used in the succeeding years when the same forms are again printed for distribution.
However, the distribution of the serially-numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.

This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant refused to
acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and
received by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later
used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another,
marriage license bearing the same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of
Pasig in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No.
503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was
used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3132) 5
At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the marriage license
number but certainly not the non-issuance of the license itself.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage
is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial
Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter
not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those
affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both
were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the
late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is
highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed
is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION
that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with
this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
5
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which

renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous
social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as
"a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family,
avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the fiveyear common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial
court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is
why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond
that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should
be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in
any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between
any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
26
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135216

August 19, 1999

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the
offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may
be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more consistent with the
facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon,
Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein Respondent] Pedro
Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract" excluded under the best
evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L.
MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed
Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his
claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil.1wphi1.nt
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled
"Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene
therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir.
Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages
(Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr.
Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the
original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as
secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed
Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer
thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record
existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said
contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit
executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss of the Marriage
Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage
Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose
Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he
was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one
"Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This belies the
claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of
records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192
issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which
declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the Order granting the
petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings
taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years
old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge
Moya's signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner
Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned
signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in handwriting
characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the "standard" signature" and concluded that the
questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented the
comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty.
Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the
thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of
significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics
between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the
signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the
legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract
as spurious and non-existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code
provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall
be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing
the marriage." Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a

recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by secondary
evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and subsequent loss of the original
instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the marriage contract
has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract.
Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.
With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting
the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in
the performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid examination of
two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge Moya's signature. The value of
the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or
false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility
of such expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the particular
witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on account of a mistake of
judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by substantial evidence on
record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material
facts were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case
nor there exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted
testimony and documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6
The Issues
In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob
was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondents adoption has not been sufficiently
established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a
direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between
Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage
license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11
Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took
place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly
executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be
adduced to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of
petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the
wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had
solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had
not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c)
the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin
L. Marino ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in
the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine
qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have
disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument
was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . .
which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the
execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact,
such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation
for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its
authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect
the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.
Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses
who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously
narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows]
the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place
or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the

document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to
satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in
court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and
documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities
suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between
Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
In that case, we said:
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held
to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied,
footnote ommitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad
v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its
place.25
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of
Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it
quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he
proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.32 Given the undisputed,

even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 we find that the
presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing
on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the
regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondents
handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the
trial court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate
courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the
truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge
Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court
examined the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an exception to the
general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned Order of Adoption.
To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for
Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge
Moya himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous.
He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the
following portion as proof:39
Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A: I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its context. Considered
with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered
the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.40
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he
was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued this Order
and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I cant make
out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.41

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he
could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document
shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent has not presented any to disregard the
Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea,
who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya
were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the
difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as
shown in the photograph as the capital letter "J".43
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without any
compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty.
Desiderio Pagui.44
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the
questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise,
both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.
Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.50 This Respondent
Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby
recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED
NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court
of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged
vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last
long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate,
or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that
they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment
but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former
only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this
is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio
marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he
did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing
for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his
point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the
lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage,
which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a
voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be

no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to
annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is
no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea
in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are
they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has
been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.
SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause
of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from
giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to
be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility
of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined
and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family,
and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its
decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for
four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist
at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2)
that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza,
Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,

Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged noncoitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in
actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that
no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
(Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows
that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the
relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an indepth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has
never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his
wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at
a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son,
Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together
as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)

Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to
run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita HidalgoSison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pretrial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings
"that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range
of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage.
If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to selfdestruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to
leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the

marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove
that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to
the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis
existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they
followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the
bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the
permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents

and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975

February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the
marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia
Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M.
Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their inlaws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family,
he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look
for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino
was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated
February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional
facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they
spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and
Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had
been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January
2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he
fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no
collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990,
the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be
null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this
declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied
the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27,
1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and
abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in
marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the
time of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The
defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his
family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code.
These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after
the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now
to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves.
Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the
more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to
dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL
AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:

"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and
a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such
obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff.
(Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of
the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by
preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20 as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was
arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of
the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the
policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22,
1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143376

November 26, 2002

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari
proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in
due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly
and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to
require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an
unwelcome imposition on the courts docket and an assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In
short, such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000
Decision1 and the May 22, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne
and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental,
Branch 51, a Complaint5 for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-8098. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint6 dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted
his Formal Offer of Exhibits7 dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)8 dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be
filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order9 denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
"[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert."10 After her Motion for
Reconsideration11 was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a
Petition for Certiorari,13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision

was handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.15
The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of
the [trial] courts discretion."16 Further, the "[p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been
resolved arbitrarily or without basis."17
Hence, this Petition.18
The Issues
In her Memorandum,19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present
her evidence, and when an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence
of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case, grounded on psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and
"2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals
wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in
Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14,
1995, 58 SCRA 17)?"20
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2)
in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and
jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross
insufficiency of respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper
remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,21 this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due
time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower
court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
"No appeal may be taken from:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx

xxx

xxx

"In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." 22
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
"SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require."23
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.24 In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this
wise:
"Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders
of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies."25
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to
determine whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a "patent
error" or grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out
his case or sustain the issue."26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a
verdict.27 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.28
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against
respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would
warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the
latters psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges
included Complaints for perjury,29 false testimony,30 concubinage31 and deportation.32 According to him, the
filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to
put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that this "is very abnormal for a
wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted
to the contrary."33
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him.
The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him.
To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but
also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary
offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:
"Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted
by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.34
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please elaborate
on this what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an
attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the
children see a doctor.35
xxx

xxx

xxx

"STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):

ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any
characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I call her up
by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with
some other things. So, I think that is all."36
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioners
personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of
procreative sexuality." None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.
In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."38 Said the Court:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."39
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,40 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with
each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about
the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage."41
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner "lacked the intention of procreative sexuality" is easily belied by the
fact that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged
"defect" was already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by
respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his
testimony are quoted thus:
"ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the
wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with
each other?
A. Yes.

Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering
on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle
marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and
give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be
harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, it
could have been solved.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and
Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were
incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each
other. They should not have got married.42
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both
are normal?
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are
like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels
had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.43
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?

A. Yes.44
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the
necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.45
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.46
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that could possibly be treated
or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert
testimony to establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him
by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have
done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion47 began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife
Leni is true, x x x."48 The expert witness testified thus:
"ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who
is the husband?
WITNESS
A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said,
he doesnt know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and
written psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?

WITNESS
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile."49
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to
him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character, not only
through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen hours50 of study of the
voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient
and methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been objected to, the objection
raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the
question of admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence
should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.51
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity
adequately.52 Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into
account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it
was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously,
grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts
rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the
parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.53 Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court
tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of
discretion.54
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at
bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders
maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial,
which would further clog the court dockets with another futile case.55
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the
alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151867

January 29, 2004

DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business
of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May
20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on
September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national
named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim
left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the
Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by
her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of AntiSocial Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON
L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime
of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52
of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.10
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that
the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is

implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of
psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondents
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman
Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court.1wphi1 We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in
this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.19 While we
sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh
it may be.20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136490

October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized
on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The
conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare
of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage
was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City
for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which
was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations,
they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would
see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake
and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave
their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the
military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they
were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him
in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house
and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where
her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x
x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity
which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the

Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only
to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because
the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA
should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in
order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of
the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx

xxx

xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,

was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.1wphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements
for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he
is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did
not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of
his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for
him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent
caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of
the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De
Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that
as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he
went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral
and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality
of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and
with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including governmentowned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137110

August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in
CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein
petitioner of bigamy as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime
of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
[the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen
(15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused."2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: "From the evidence
adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan
got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused
was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused
was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate
issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10,
1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between
accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium,
Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant
Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against
said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office,
accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City,

and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void.
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been
legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage
ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time
validly married to his first wife."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second
marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved."4
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt."6
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he
contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint
for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set
aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he
concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries9 of former Justice Luis
Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge.
But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v. Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an accused who married three
times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife
then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it
had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and
illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not
commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,12
which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death,
the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the
second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect
to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void
ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor
of the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior
existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her
first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence,
the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this
Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need
for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery
and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for
a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy."18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the
basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of
Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the
Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary.
Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of
the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null
and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS,
37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance,
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033)."20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is
now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be
charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21 which involved an administrative
Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a
second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family
Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view
on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure
a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant
had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution
of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative
relief from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this
point, which we quote hereunder:
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent
victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted

matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt
said testimonies.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief,
especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the
plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then
already living with another man.
"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of
her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they
are of her own willful making."25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,
respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower
court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married
on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with
one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail
of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some
of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and
effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void
marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being
void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that
private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another
woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no
dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage
should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the
absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied
the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground
that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar,
there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the
instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of
nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed
with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for
being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he
submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage.

Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition
should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage,
not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties
acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous
marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had
earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to
dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment
is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in
Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower
court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court
stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need
for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again.
In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with
private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held
that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable
marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his
marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the
provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed
out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment
of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the
affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared
void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of
a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy
added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the
other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity"
can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are
referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral
attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final
judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the
marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore,
trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are
brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the
right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof.
Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the
marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration
that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they
limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on
the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of
Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the
provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in
turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with
the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same
can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's
theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed,
the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the
need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question,
as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes
of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity

of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the
erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a
party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage
which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it
as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect
and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and
public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of
the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a
marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and
annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable
her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from
the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they
say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged
to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere
special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share
of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of
the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one
of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992
and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a
petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint,
private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two
children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and
wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a
criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the
authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a
womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he
presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the
family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept
donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with
banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private respondent's consent; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for
annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from
further dissipation. 1
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private
respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two children
during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did
not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the
"extreme animosities " between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it
is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that
petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him
to various women in media and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in
his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in
exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and
continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent presented four witnesses,
namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and
petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondent's

counsel. Private respondent likewise submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her
husband's relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and
copies of a prior a church annulment decree. 2 The parties' marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. 3
During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private
respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner's evidence on May 11,
1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the
ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. 4 The court
granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990. 5
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to
have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to
petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and
Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein judgment of
annulment be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was
contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby awarded to
the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment as
provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines. 6
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." 7 Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990. 8
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief
from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. 9
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from
judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. 10
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.
When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of
First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground
of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has
a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. 11 If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to
hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. 12
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become final and
executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the
decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due
process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right
to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies
his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reason." 13 In
his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the
Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for
treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14 The records, however, show that the former
counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the
same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was
taken therefrom. 15
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is
negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for
setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. 16
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioner's confinement and
medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any
reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial
court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial court was never
assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present
evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner, through counsel, actively
participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondent's
witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. 17
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases where there is no
other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available or adequate remedy. When a party
has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision
of the trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this
petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive
the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence. 19
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in
actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because
the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He contends that
when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance. 20
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. 21
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. 22 Hence, in
all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. 23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated. 24 Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 25
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one,
petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal
clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or
fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by
any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms.
Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he
could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact
that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and happy
family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner
and operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for
malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground
for annulment of his marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us. 26 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial
court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's
defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous. 27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and
EDUARDO C. PACETE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE, respondents.
Juan G. Sibug and Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioners.
Julio F. Andres, Jr. for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of
time to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17
March 1980 which, among other things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private
respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la
Concepcion.
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that
she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a
child named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 01
August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land,
fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name
and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an
amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of
twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. On 18
December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second motion for an extension of
another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only
for twenty (20) days to be counted from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was
mailed to defendants' counsel on 11 January 1980. Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05
February 1980, again filed another motion (dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted
from the expiration of the 30-day period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on
06 February 1980, the court denied this last motion on the ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . .
as first extension had expired." 1
The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence. 2 The court received plaintiff's evidence during the hearings held
on 15, 20, 21 and 22 February 1980.

On 17 March 1980, the court 3 promulgated the herein questioned decision, disposing of the case, thus
WHEREFORE, order is hereby issued ordering:
1. The issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of the marriage between, the plaintiff, Concepcion
(Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the herein defendants, Enrico L. Pacete, in accordance with the
Philippine laws and with consequences, as provided for by our laws;
2. That the following properties are hereby declared as the conjugal properties of the partnership of
the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, half and half,
to wit:
1. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. V-815 which is a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
Langcong, Municipality of Matanog (previously of Parang), province of Maguindanao (previously of
Cotabato province) with an area of 45,265 square meters registered in the name of Enrico Pacete,
Filipino, of legal age, married to Conchita Alanis as shown in Exhibits "B" and "B-1" for the plaintiff.
2. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20442, with an area of 538 square
meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 2650 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, situated in the
Poblacion of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, together with all its improvements, which parcel of land, as
shown by Exhibits "K-1" was acquired by way of absolute deed of sale executed by Amrosio Mondog
on January 14, 1965.
3. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20424 and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 803 (74), with an area of 5.1670 hectares, more or less, as shown by Exhibit "R", the
same was registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and the same was acquired by Enrico Pacete last
February 17, 1967 from Ambag Ampoy, as shown by Exhibit "R-1", situated at Musan, Kidapawan,
North Cotabato.
4. A parcel of land situated at Lanao, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, with an area of 5.0567 hectares,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 4332 (74), as shown by Exhibit "S", and registered in the name of
Enrico Pacete.
5. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9750, situated at Lika, Mlang, North
Cotabato, with an area of 4.9841 hectares and the same is covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74)
and registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and which land was acquired by Enrico Pacete from
Salvador Pacete on September 24, 1962, as shown by Exhibit "Q-1".
6. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9944, with an area of 9.9566 and
also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8608 (74) and registered in the name of the defendant Enrico
L. Pacete which Enrico L. Pacete acquired from Sancho Balingcos last October 22, 1962, as shown
by Exhibit "L-1" and which parcel of land is situated at (Kialab), Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato.
7. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9227, situated at Kiab, Matalam,
North Cotabato, with an area of 12.04339 hectares, more or less, and also covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8607 (74) both in the name of the defendant Enrico L. Pacete which he acquired last
October 15, 1962 from Minda Bernardino, as shown by Exhibit "M-1".
8. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9228, situated at Kiab, Matalam,
North Cotabato, with an area of 10.8908 hectares, registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and also
covered by Tax Declaration No. 5781 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete and which parcel of land he
acquired last September 25, 1962 from Conchita dela Torre, as shown by Exhibit "P-1".
9. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10301, situated at Linao, Matalam,
North Cotabato, with an area of 7.2547 hectares, registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and also
covered by Tax Declaration No. 8716 (74) also in the name of Enrico Pacete which Enrico Pacete
acquired from Agustin Bijo last July 16, 1963, as shown by Exhibit "N-1".

10. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12728 in the name of the defendant,
Enrico L. Pacete, with an area of 10.9006 hectares, situated at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato and
is also covered by Tax Declaration No. 5745 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, as shown on Exhibit
"O" and which Enrico Pacete acquired last December 31, 1963 from Eliseo Pugni, as shown on
Exhibit "0-1".
3. Ordering the Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-34243 covering Lot No. 1066,
issued in the name of Evelina Pacete, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, and ordering the
registration of the same in the joint name of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L.
Pacete as their conjugal property, with address on the part of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete
at Parang, Maguindanao and on the part of Enrico L. Pacete at Kidapawan, North Cotabato.
4. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. V-20101, covering Lot No. 77,
in the name of Eduardo C. Pacete, situated at New Lawaan, Mlang, North Cotabato, and the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name of (half and half) Concepcion
(Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete.
5. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-29890, covering Lot 1068,
situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 12.1031 hectares, in the name of Emelda
C. Pacete and the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name (half and half) of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete; and declaring that the fishpond situated
at Barrio Tumanan, Bislig, Surigao Del Sur, with an area of 48 hectares and covered by Fishpond
Lease Agreement of Emelda C. Pacete, dated July 29, 1977 be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the
joint name of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and her husband, Enrico L. Pacete, be
registered as their joint property, including the 50 hectares fishpond situated in the same place,
Barrio Timanan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
6. Ordering the following motor vehicles to be the joint properties of the conjugal partnership of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete, viz:
a. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-783; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T137-20561; Chassis No.
83920393, and Type, Mcarrier;
b. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-784; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T214-229547; Chassis No. 10D1302-C; and Type, Mcarrier;
c. Motor vehicle with Plate No. J-PR-818; Make, Ford; Motor No. GRW-116188; Chassis No. HOCCGPW-1161-88-C; Type, Jeep;
d. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-583; Make, Ford: Motor No. F70MU5-11111; Chassis No.
HOCC-GPW-1161188-G; Type, Stake;
e. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-584; Make, Hino; Motor No. ED300-45758; Chassis No.
KB222-22044; Type, Stake; and
f. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-585; Make, Ford: Motor No. LTC-780-Dv; Chassis No. 10F13582-K; Type, Stake.
7. Ordering the defendant Enrico L. Pacete to pay the plaintiff the sum of P46,950.00 which is the
share of the plaintiff in the unaccounted income of the ricemill and corn sheller for three years from
1971 to 1973.
8. Ordering the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, to reimburse the plaintiff the monetary equipment of
30% of whether the plaintiff has recovered as attorney's fees;
9. Declaring the subsequent marriage between defendant Enrico L. Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion to be void ab initio; and

10. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit. 4

Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.
Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have outrightly been dismissed, for, as also pointed out by private
respondents, the proper remedy of petitioners should have instead been either to appeal from the judgment by
default or to file a petition for relief from judgment. 5 This rule, however, is not inflexible; a petition for certiorari is
allowed when the default order is improperly declared, or even when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of
discretion attended such declaration. 6 In these exceptional instances, the special civil action of certiorari to declare
the nullity of a judgment by default is available. 7 In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally
sanctioned. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code, 8 and it is, in substance, reproduced in
Article 60 of the Family Code. 9
Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily explain the mandatory tenor of the law. In
Brown v. Yambao, 10 the Court has observed:
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in
case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon
the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the
Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the
proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to
provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of the
following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant
in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there
is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no
less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the
exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. 11 That other remedies, whether
principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with
any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings below, including the Decision of
17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146683

November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA,
LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and
ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case
No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and
its subsequent resolution3 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on
October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,7 the latter's
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the
store inside.9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia
Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11
another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand,
Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and
that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.14 Cirila
testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for
the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he
became bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from
his lot near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her
family with food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and
later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a
market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21

On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under
this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an
application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the
signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the
signature "Cirila Comille" in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A.
Comille" written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No.
7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A
" to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs
within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal.
As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of
Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3)
a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the
fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late Francisco
Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts, and
unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings being
predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or
possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and
their J urisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v.
Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,

surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.27 It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by
both parties, the general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent
together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one
roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct
indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a
business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,34 and the death certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's
common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's
lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for
collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that
Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiveremployee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36
It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would
thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111547 January 27, 1997

SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA,
REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO, MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF
CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
The instant controversy involves Lot C of the amended plan Psu-22983 Amd., situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-19175 issued in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on October 2, 1967. Some six years after
Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order granting
Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 88430 entitled "Trinidad
Estonina et al., plaintiffs -versus-Consuelo Garcia et al., defendants". Consequently, a notice of attachment was
inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance at the back of TCT No. T-19175 in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering
all the rights, title, interest, and participation that Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, may have in and
to the parcel of land covered by the said title.
As a result of a prior sale made by Santiago Garcia to Anselmo Balasoto of a sixty square meter portion of the said
parcel of land, TCT. No. T-19175 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 77215 was issued on July 25, 1975 in
the name of Santiago Garcia covering the remaining 213 square meters. TCT No. 77215 was in turn cancelled on
June 27, 1977 because of another sale purportedly made during his lifetime by Santiago Garcia to his wife's niece,
Ofelia Garcia, and TCT No. 82229 was issued in the name of the latter.
On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia, Remedios,
Elvira and Castor, all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying unto the spouses Celso
Atayan and Nilda Hicban (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Atayan for brevity) their "title, rights, interest and
participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229.
About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou
and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10) pro
indidviso share in the same parcel of land. On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia,
Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from his first marriage), and their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda,
likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-82229. 1
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430 against Consuelo Garcia,
execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-19175 (now covered by
TCT No. T-82229) on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a public auction where Trinidad Estonina
was the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 88430 before the then
Intermediate Appellate Court which, however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Thus, on February 29, 1984, the
Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision declaring "owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. T-82229 a
NULLITY and/or CANCELLED". Upon the finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the

Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married
to Paulino Estonina". 2
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of title
with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, impleading as defendants
therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Estonina for brevity),
Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R. Solidum, the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of
Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-82229. The complaint prayed:
that the sale at public auction of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 77215 . . . and the Sheriff's
final deed . . . be declared null and void; that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT No. T99961 in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina married to Paulino Estonina . . . ; that the plaintiffs be
declared owners of nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso interests, shares and participation in the parcel of
land covered by TCT No.
T-77215, . . . , and the Register of Deeds ordered to issue a new certificate of title corresponding
thereto; and that the defendants Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier and Edmund R. Solidum be
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs spouses and (sic) amount of P30,000 for attorney's
fees, P15,000 for litigation expenses incurred, P20,000 for moral damages and P15,000 for
exemplary damages . . . 3
In their amended answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the spouses Estonina claimed that:
the plaintiffs (spouses Atayan) had acted in bad faith in allegedly purchasing the parcel of land, they
being aware that it was the subject of a lawful and valid attachment; that there was no valid
extrajudicial settlement of agreement executed by the heirs of Santiago Garcia by which their rights
could have been adjusted and settled before doing anything with his property; that the deeds of sale
executed by his heirs were anomalous, fictitious and simulated intended to defeat the adverse
judgment rendered by the Court against them and the writ of attachment issued pursuant thereto as
they were derived from a falsified deed of sale purportedly executed by Santiago Garcia on June 23,
1967; that the property in question is presumed to be conjugal answerable for obligations and
liabilities of the conjugal partnership incurred during the existence of the partnership; and that the
plaintiffs were guilty of laches (pp. 90-99, rec.). 4
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. It found, among others, that the
property covered by TCT No. T-19175 and now covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired during the marriage of
Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in nature. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia
on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by
intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four out of the
subsequent marriage, and Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10)
each pro indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus, inasmuch
as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner
of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land. 5
Finding as such, the RTC held that what could be attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied on execution
and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the
property. Thus, the RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-99961 in the name of TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA, married to Paulino Estonina, and issue another one,
also in her name, married to the same person, stating therein that said person is the owner of the property therein
covered to the extent of 55% pro indiviso, and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs of Santiago Garcia pro
indiviso. 6
Both the spouses Atayan and the heirs of Santiago Garcia appealed to the herein public respondent Court of
Appeals. After a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals concluded that contrary to the
finding of the RTC, the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia,
but was the former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's
estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said
property each to the extent of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's onetenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in

execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430. On August
12, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-99961, covering Lot 2-C (LRC) Psd 223486, situated in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
issued in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, married to Paulino Estonina . . . , is hereby ordered
cancelled and nullified and the Register of Deeds of Laguna ordered to issue another in lieu thereof
covering the same parcel of land in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, widow, one-tenth (1/10) pro
indiviso share, and spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban, nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso share. 7
Aggrieved, the spouses Estonina filed this petition and raised the following issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals, in declaring the property in question as exclusive property of Santiago Garcia,
DISREGARDED the long established doctrine that the trial court's findings especially as to the
credibility of the witnesses should be respected.
II.
The Court of Appeals, in issuing the questioned decision, solely centered on the nature of the
property in question, and conveniently brushed aside the following legal issues raised on appeal
(thereby leading to an erroneous judgment), to wit:
(a) That the plaintiffs-appellant (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) have no cause of action
and/or lack cause of action against Estoninas (now petitioners). Assuming, arguendo that they have,
the same is now barred by laches. The same is true with the appellants Garcias (now also private
respondents). Hence, the title of Estonina should have been declared valid.
(b) That the plaintiffs-appellants (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) are not parties to Civil
Case No. 88430 where the writ of attachment was issued and which resulted in the execution
pending appeal. Hence, they cannot attack the validity of the execution in this proceedings
especially so when judgment therein had already attained finality.
III.
Consequently, by virtue of the foregoing errors, the Court of Appeals erred in not granting herein
petitioners' prayer that the trial court's findings be modified by upholding Estonina's title to the
property under TCT No. T-99961, and affirming in all other respect the order of the trial court. 8
The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court are deemed conclusive. 9 Thus, the jurisdiction of
this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is generally limited to the review and revision of errors of
law allegedly committed by the appellate court. As such, this Court is generally not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 10 This is, however, subject to several
exceptions, one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, as in this case, warranting a review by this Court of such factual findings. 11
In concluding that the parcel of land in question was the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, the trial
court relied solely on the fact that when TCT No. T-19175 covering the said land was issued, Santiago Garcia was
already married to Consuelo Garcia, thus giving rise to the presumption that the same was indeed conjugal. It found
the testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said property was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother
to be self-serving and completely disregarded the said testimony. And as regards the inscription at the back of the
TCT No. T-19175 that:
[t]he property described in this title is subject to the claims of the heirs of the deceased Eugenia
Clemente, within two (2) years from January 27, 1961, in accordance with the provision of Section 4,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 12

the trial court held that "there is no showing at all from said inscription that said property came from the
parents of Santiago Garcia." 13
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in taking the stance that the said land was the exclusive property of
Santiago Garcia, gave credence to the unrebutted testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said parcel of land was
inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother Eugenia Clemente and that it used to be part of a big tract
of land which was divided among Santiago and his sisters.
The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter, lead us to concur with the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago
Garcia. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all
property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 14 In the case at bench, the petitioners have
been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and
Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued,
Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married
to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the
property. The foregoing contention has no merit. In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals 15 we held that:
The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim in insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof
that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already erdsting . . . . It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by
Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to"
preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson . . . . In other
words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the
same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete. 16
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed part of his
estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. And as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the
one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the
disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10)
share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the
spouses Atayan. Worth reiterating is the basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of judgments
extends only over properties uncluestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff of a property
by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court only when the property
levied upon belongs to the defendant. 17 For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another
man's debts. 18
The right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership over the
properties seized is reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If property levied on be claimed by
any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his
title thereto or his right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of his right or title, and serve
the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer
shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of
the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of
the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by
the court issuing the writ of execution.

The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or the keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him
against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But
nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to
the property by any other proper action.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
As stated in the case of Sy v. Discaya, 19 this "proper action" would have for its object the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure
and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties
as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the
judgment creditor himself. Such "proper action", as above pointed out, is and should be an entirely separate and
distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit. 20
In the case at bench, the filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent action with the court other than the one
which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were strangers to Civil Case No. 88430. Such an independent
action cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court. 21 While it
is true that property in custody of the law may not be interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this
rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary
interests. But when the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not
apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's custody. 22
The foregoing puts to rest any and all questions raised regarding the propriety of the course of action taken by the
spouses Atayan in vindication of their claim over the land in question. Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan
are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual argument deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to
Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution over the land in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for
filing the "proper action" only in 1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing
another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the
sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 cannot be
considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over the disputed property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124642

February 23, 2004

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated November 27, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33585, as well as the Resolution2 on April 2, 1996 denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The impugned decision granted the private respondents petition for certiorari
and set aside the Orders of the trial court dated December 15, 19933 and February 17, 19944 nullifying the
attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp Investment Philippines under the name of petitioner Alfredo
Ching.
The following facts are undisputed:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00
from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President
Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an
interest rate of 14% per annum.5 As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching,
together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves
to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of
P38,000,000.00.6 The loan was subsequently renewed on various dates, the last renewal having been made on
December 4, 1980.7
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13,000,000.00
payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching,
executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981.8 This was renewed once for a period
of one month.9
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum
of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive
of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching,
Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 142729 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVIII.10 In its
application for a writ of preliminary attachment, the ABC averred that the "defendants are guilty of fraud in incurring
the obligations upon which the present action is brought11 in that they falsely represented themselves to be in a
financial position to pay their obligation upon maturity thereof."12 Its supporting affidavit stated, inter alia, that the
"[d]efendants have removed or disposed of their properties, or [are] ABOUT to do so, with intent to defraud their
creditors."13
On August 26, 1981, after an ex-parte hearing, the trial court issued an Order denying the ABCs application for a
writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court decreed that the grounds alleged in the application and that of its
supporting affidavit "are all conclusions of fact and of law" which do not warrant the issuance of the writ prayed for.14
On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court, in an Order dated September 14, 1981, reconsidered its
previous order and granted the ABCs application for a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P12,700,000.
The order, in relevant part, stated:

With respect to the second ground relied upon for the grant of the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte, which is
the alleged disposal of properties by the defendants with intent to defraud creditors as provided in Sec. 1(e) of Rule
57 of the Rules of Court, the affidavits can only barely justify the issuance of said writ as against the defendant
Alfredo Ching who has allegedly bound himself jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the defendant corporations
obligation to the plaintiff as a surety thereof.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary attachment issue as against the defendant Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff
of this Court to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching not exceeding P12,612,972.82 in value, which are
within the jurisdiction of this Court and not exempt from execution upon, the filing by plaintiff of a bond duly
approved by this Court in the sum of Twelve Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P12,700,000.00) executed in
favor of the defendant Alfredo Ching to secure the payment by plaintiff to him of all the costs which may be
adjudged in his favor and all damages he may sustain by reason of the attachment if the court shall finally adjudge
that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
SO ORDERED.15
Upon the ABCs posting of the requisite bond, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently,
summonses were served on the defendants,16 save Chung Kiat Hua who could not be found.
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 2250, at the same time seeking the
PBMCIs rehabilitation.17
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an Order placing the PBMCIs business, including its assets and liabilities, under
rehabilitation receivership, and ordered that "all actions for claims listed in Schedule "A" of the petition pending
before any court or tribunal are hereby suspended in whatever stage the same may be until further orders from the
Commission."18 The ABC was among the PBMCIs creditors named in the said schedule.
Subsequently, on January 31, 1983, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or motion to
suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 142729 invoking the PBMCIs pending application for suspension of
payments (which Ching co-signed) and over which the SEC had already assumed jurisdiction.19 On February 4,
1983, the ABC filed its Opposition thereto.20
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common
shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.21
Thereafter, in an Order dated September 16, 1983, the trial court partially granted the aforementioned motion by
suspending the proceedings only with respect to the PBMCI. It denied Chings motion to dismiss the complaint/or
suspend the proceedings and pointed out that P.D. No. 1758 only concerns the activities of corporations,
partnerships and associations and was never intended to regulate and/or control activities of individuals. Thus, it
directed the individual defendants to file their answers.22
Instead of filing an answer, Ching filed on January 14, 1984 a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the same ground
of the pendency of SEC Case No. 2250. This motion met the opposition from the ABC.23
On January 20, 1984, Taedo filed his Answer with counterclaim and cross-claim.24 Ching eventually filed his
Answer on July 12, 1984.25
On October 25, 1984, long after submitting their answers, Ching filed an Omnibus Motion,26 again praying for the
dismissal of the complaint or suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the July 9, 1982 Injunctive Order
issued in SEC Case No. 2250. He averred that as a surety of the PBMCI, he must also necessarily benefit from the
defenses of his principal. The ABC opposed Chings omnibus motion.
Emilio Y. Taedo, thereafter, filed his own Omnibus Motion27 praying for the dismissal of the complaint, arguing that
the ABC had "abandoned and waived" its right to proceed against the continuing guaranty by its act of resorting to
preliminary attachment.

On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce the amount of his preliminary attachment bond from
P12,700,000 to P6,350,000.28 Alfredo Ching opposed the motion,29 but on April 2, 1987, the court issued an Order
setting the incident for further hearing on May 28, 1987 at 8:30 a.m. for the parties to adduce evidence on the actual
value of the properties of Alfredo Ching levied on by the sheriff.30
On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the ABC and rendered the attachment bond
of P6,350,000.31
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside
the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were
acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment
Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing
guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she
was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties.32 She attached therewith a copy
of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.33
The ABC filed a comment on the motion to quash preliminary attachment and/or motion to expunge records,
contending that:
2.1 The supposed movant, Encarnacion T. Ching, is not a party to this present case; thus, she has no
personality to file any motion before this Honorable Court;
2.2 Said supposed movant did not file any Motion for Intervention pursuant to Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court;
2.3 Said Motion cannot even be construed to be in the nature of a Third-Party Claim conformably with Sec.
14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
3. Furthermore, assuming in gracia argumenti that the supposed movant has the required personality, her Motion
cannot be acted upon by this Honorable Court as the above-entitled case is still in the archives and the proceedings
thereon still remains suspended. And there is no previous Motion to revive the same.34
The ABC also alleged that the motion was barred by prescription or by laches because the shares of stocks were in
custodia legis.
During the hearing of the motion, Encarnacion T. Ching adduced in evidence her marriage contract to Alfredo Ching
to prove that they were married on January 8, 1960;35 the articles of incorporation of Citycorp Investment Philippines
dated May 14, 1979;36 and, the General Information Sheet of the corporation showing that petitioner Alfredo Ching
was a member of the Board of Directors of the said corporation and was one of its top twenty stockholders.
On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their Reply/Opposition to the motion to expunge records.
Acting on the aforementioned motion, the trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order37 lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion to Quash Preliminary Attachment, dated November 9, 1993, is hereby granted.
Let the writ of preliminary attachment subject matter of said motion, be quashed and lifted with respect to the
attached 100,000 common shares of stock of Citycorp Investment Philippines in the name of the defendant Alfredo
Ching, the said shares of stock to be returned to him and his movant-spouse by Deputy Sheriff Apolonio A. Golfo
who effected the levy thereon on July 26, 1983, or by whoever may be presently in possession thereof.
SO ORDERED.38

The plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order but denied the same on
February 17, 1994. The petitioner bank forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 33585, for the nullification of the said order of the court, contending that:
1. The respondent Judge exceeded his authority thereby acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of,
and granting a "Motion" filed by a complete stranger to the case.
2. The respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment
without any basis in fact and in law, and contrary to established jurisprudence on the matter.39
On November 27, 1995, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and setting aside the assailed orders of the
trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, hereby setting aside the questioned orders (dated
December 15, 1993 and February 17, 1994) for being null and void.
SO ORDERED.40
The CA sustained the contention of the private respondent and set aside the assailed orders. According to the CA,
the RTC deprived the private respondent of its right to file a bond under Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner Encarnacion T. Ching was not a party in the trial court; hence, she had no right of action to have the
levy annulled with a motion for that purpose. Her remedy in such case was to file a separate action against the
private respondent to nullify the levy on the 100,000 Citycorp shares of stocks. The court stated that even assuming
that Encarnacion T. Ching had the right to file the said motion, the same was barred by laches.
Citing Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court,41 the CA ruled that the presumption in Article 160 of the New Civil
Code shall not apply where, as in this case, the petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to
acquire the shares of stock. It held that the levied shares of stocks belonged to Alfredo Ching, as evidenced by the
fact that the said shares were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely under his name. Thus, according
to the appellate court, the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed orders. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated April 2, 1996.
The petitioner-spouses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, asserting that the RTC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders in their favor;
hence, the CA erred in reversing the same. They aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares
of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art.
160,42 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses,
in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.43 According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in
the pursuit of the petitioner-husbands profession or business.44 And, contrary to the ruling of the CA, where
conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation contracted by the husband, the wife should exhaust
her motion to quash in the main case and not file a separate suit.45 Furthermore, the petitioners contend that under
Art. 125 of the Family Code, the petitioner-husbands gratuitous suretyship is null and void ab initio,46 and that the
share of one of the spouses in the conjugal partnership remains inchoate until the dissolution and liquidation of the
partnership.47
In its comment on the petition, the private respondent asserts that the CA correctly granted its petition for certiorari
nullifying the assailed order. It contends that the CA correctly relied on the ruling of this Court in Wong v.
Intermediate Appellate Court. Citing Cobb-Perez v. Lantin and G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the private
respondent alleges that the continuing guaranty and suretyship executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching in pursuit of his
profession or business. Furthermore, according to the private respondent, the right of the petitioner-wife to a share
in the conjugal partnership property is merely inchoate before the dissolution of the partnership; as such, she had no
right to file the said motion to quash the levy on attachment of the shares of stocks.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the
levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; (b) whether or not the
RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
orders.

On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the right to file the said motion, although
she was not a party in Civil Case No. 142729.48
In Ong v. Tating,49 we held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of the defendant against whom a writ of
attachment has been issued by the court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the
property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court
which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon
application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the
sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more
specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the
court may then order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third
person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and cannot pass upon the question of the title to
the property with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the
sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimants proof does not persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right
of possession thereto, the claim will be denied by the court. The aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the
remedy of "terceria" by executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied on attachment
and serving the same to the office making the levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to
nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally separate and
distinct action from the former case. The above-mentioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be
resorted to by one third-party claimant without availing of the other remedies.50
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks
in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable
for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The
petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
On the second issue, we find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the RTC.
The private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the
legal purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the tribunal, being clothed with the power
to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the
tribunal acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.51
It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC acted
whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before certiorari will lie. A
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.52
After a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC did not
commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In
Tan v. Court of Appeals,53 we held that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with
funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are
presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not
appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome the same.54
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband
when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage
of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with
his exclusive money.55 The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of

Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the
petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.56 The private respondents reliance on the
rulings of this Court in Maramba v. Lozano57 and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Banzon58 is misplaced.
In the Maramba case, we held that where there is no showing as to when the property was acquired, the fact that
the title is in the wifes name alone is determinative of the ownership of the property. The principle was reiterated in
the Associated Insurance case where the uncontroverted evidence showed that the shares of stocks were acquired
during the marriage of the petitioners.
Instead of fortifying the contention of the respondents, the ruling of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate
Court59 buttresses the case for the petitioners. In that case, we ruled that he who claims that property acquired by
the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs to one of them as his personal
property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same. In this case, the private
respondent claimed that the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of stocks from the Citycorp Investment
Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It was, thus, the burden of the private respondent to prove that
the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband alone.
As held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion.
The CA, likewise, erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession,
pursuing a legitimate business. The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the
said account of PBMCI under Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code.
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3]60 of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement as security for the payment of the
loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private respondent in the amount of P38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,61 this Court ruled "that the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of
an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was
persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the
business of suretyship or guaranty."
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a
liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.62
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by
the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI,
solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal
partnership.63
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its
top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if
the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husbands career would be
enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They
cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.64

This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own
business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the term "obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Thus:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to
be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term " obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family
is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where
the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.65
The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-Perez and G-Tractors, Inc. are not controlling
because the husband, in those cases, contracted the obligation for his own business. In this case, the petitionerhusband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent
of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for review of the Decision 1 dated January
30, 1996 and the Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758,
affirming the Decision of the lower court and denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complainant 3 against her husband Judie
Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a
certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void. The
case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the trial court
rendered a Decision 4 dated September 9, 1992, disposing as follow: 5
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable
settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null void and of no effect;
2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the
remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs to
Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo, and
another sum of P379.62 representing one-half of the amount of realty taxes paid by defendants
Guiangs on Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests thereon computed from the
finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court, in its challenged
Decision, ruled as follow: 6

WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this
Court. No costs considering plaintiff-appellee's failure to file her brief despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution: 7
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration of Our decision in
this case of January 30, 1996, to be a mere rehash of the same issues which we have already
passed upon in the said decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb the same, this Court
RESOLVED to DENY the instant motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking
employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their
residence and the lot on which it stood. The circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision of Respondent
Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court as follows: 8
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were
married on December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by defendantsspouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also admitted by defendant Judie
Corpuz when he testified in court (tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although the latter says that they were
married in 1967. The couple have three children, namely: Junie 18 years old, Harriet 17 years
of age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age in August, 1990 when her mother
testified in court.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz
as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal,
South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo
who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The
consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee
fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn p. 6, February 14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot
No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The
latter have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22,
1992). They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to look for work
abroad, in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter.
She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila however, coming back to
Koronadal, South Cotabato, . . . on March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's departure for Manila to look for work in
the Middle East was with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; p. 10
Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal
dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel,
restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King's College, Bo. 1,
Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household help of, and staying
at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was
going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991.)
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining
one-half portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to
her mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet,
however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang
so that she [Guiang] would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).

4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the
sale of the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he
sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as "Deed of Transfer of Rights" (Exh.
"A") the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total
consideration of P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie
Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness.
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in
defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee
executed another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. "3"), this time with
Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner from whom the couple Judie and
Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot (Exh. "2"), who signed as vendor for a consideration of
P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale (Exh. "3-A"). The new sale (Exh.
"3") describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of
evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the
couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda
gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found.
She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already.
6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay
General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17,
1990). The case was docketed by the barangay authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for
"trespassing". On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable
settlement". In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet
and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they
are presently boarding without any charge, on or before April 7, 1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred
however to the Office-In-Charge at the time, a certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that
he could not do anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs.
Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26, 1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been
made, plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution
of the amicable settlement, filing the same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The proceedings [are] still pending before the said court, with the filing of the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent P600.00 for the preparation of the Deed
of Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having
assumed the remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. "3"); P100.00 for the
preparation of Exhibit "3"; a total of P759.62 basic tax and special education fund on the lot; P127.50
as the total documentary stamp tax on the various documents; P535.72 for the capital gains tax;
P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00; certification fee of P5.00. These expenses
particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs
were incurred for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409.

Ruling of Respondent Court

Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the
husband of the conjugal propety without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article 124 of the
Family Code. It also rejected petitioners' contention that the "amicable sttlement" ratified said sale, citing Article
1409 of the Code which expressly bars ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly those "prohibited or
declared void by law."
Hence, this petition. 9
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the following errors: 10
I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not declairing as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of
the Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution
of the "amicable settlement" by the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the findings of the Court a quo which
recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of private respondent over the
remaining one half (1/2) portion of the properly.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely
voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable sttlement with
them.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good
faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e.,
contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence,

intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their
conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus: 11
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma'am.
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem which arose
concerning the ownership of your residential house at Callejo Subdivision?
A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which arose regarding my
residential house and lot because it was sold by my husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was
correctly applied by the teo lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) (Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory
effect of the above provision in this wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article
166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnershit without the wife's consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however
is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said
alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband.(n)

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any
alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the
husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband
and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into without
the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a
valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3)
consent, 14 the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending
parties through the "amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private
respondent. The trial court correctly held: 15
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights
(Exh. "A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable settlement". The participation by some barangay
authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot
be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B") entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and
defendent spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh.
"A"). By express provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also
void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of Rights (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement"
(Exh. "3") are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. 16
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the
parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners
filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an
"amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does
not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the
effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret
this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147978

January 23, 2002

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner,

vs.
NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife's written consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the
Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door
apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was
interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso
Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses.1 Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate
broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps
relating to the properties.2 Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses.
She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity
of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker.3 After some bargaining, petitioner
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property and P2,100,000.00 for the
Makati property4 to be paid on installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively,
on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as follows5:
Taytay Property

Makati Property

P200,000.00

P300,000.00

12th month

700,000.00

1,600,000.00

18th month

500,000.00

6th month

This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.6 When petitioner pointed out the conjugal
nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale.7 The formal
typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real estate
broker and Edilberto met in the latter's office for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell.8 After
Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April
15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of
the real estate broker and an employee in Edilberto's office.9 The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal
affixing of his wife's signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions
of the contracts.10 To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and
Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.11 During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on
the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the
contracts.12
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal
affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out
of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration.13 Petitioner reminded

respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint
for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
A Motion to Dismiss14 was filed by respondents which was denied by the trial court in its Resolution of July 21,
1992.15
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim, alleging that it was an agreement between
herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject properties was still subject to the
approval and conformity of his wife Norma Camaisa.16 Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent to the
sale, her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner.17 The checks issued by petitioner were returned
to her by Edilberto and she accepted the same without any objection.18 Respondent further claimed that the
acceptance of the checks returned to petitioner signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject
properties.19 Respondent Norma denied that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the subject
properties and that she gave her consent and conformity to the same.20
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment21 asserting that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that
the wife's written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to
respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that under
Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of
the wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing
on TCT Nos. (464860) S-8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos.
295976 and 295971 of the Registry of Rizal.
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fees.
Costs against plaintiff.22
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On November 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of P50,000.00 as damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as such,
the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa
refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by respondent
spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of Appeals also stressed that the authority of the court to allow
sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases
where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property.
Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE
SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN

PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS.
CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS
OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER, RESPONDENT
MR. CAMAISA AND WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX "G" IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR MINOR
PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE
AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND
ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT CONTRACT OF SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF
THE PARTIES AND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403,
1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUD.23
The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in favor of respondent spouses
there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the contracts to sell between
petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that
there are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.24 A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no genuine
controversy as to the facts involved therein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and
respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and
the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Norma refused
to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for resolution in the trial court was whether or not the contracts to
sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were already perfected such that the latter could no longer back out
of the agreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring
ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to

sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.25
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell,
court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other
spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if
the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124
is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.26
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife's incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper considering that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the contract to sell
involving conjugal properties was valid without the written consent of the wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2000 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138497

January 16, 2002

IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 of the Court of Appeals that denied
a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the case against her
inclusion as party defendant therein.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec.
Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent alleged
that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the
latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the
total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his
family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
"It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since
1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other
motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant Lopez
and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not
solely through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not
nil, actual contribution from petitioner Relucio.
"In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the private respondent
and their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income or fruits there
from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred,
stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He placed substantial portions of these
conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.1wphi1.nt
"It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopez abandoned the privaterespondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away
properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership with the private-respondent and either
spent the proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two illegitimate
children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach of the private-respondent and their
four children.
"On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that
private respondent has no cause of action against her.

"An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some
of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
"Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of the
respondent Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was likewise denied in the Order dated May 31,
1994."3
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of
her motion to dismiss.4
On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition.5 On June 26, 1996, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration.6 However, on April 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.7
Hence, this appeal.8
The Issues
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting,
etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy.9
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings below. "A cause of action is an act
or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other."10 The elements of a cause of
action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.11
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or
proved.12
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief
does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.13
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings M-3630, we assays its
allegations.
In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized the causes of action
alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.

Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action
were all against her husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this
cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:
"If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx"
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons.
Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J.
Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.
In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband."14 The accounting of conjugal partnership
arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can
exist against petitioner on this ground.
Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the co-owned property
"acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]"15 and for the "dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]."
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and
petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The
issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him
with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to
surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.16 Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' own words, one by "an
aggrieved wife against her husband."17 References to petitioner in the common and specific allegations of fact in the
complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against
Alberto J. Lopez.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action for interference
with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."18 In this case,
petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one
without whom there can be no final determination of an action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an
accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and
dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property coowned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.

Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.20 In the context of her petition in the lower
court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged
conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in
the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with
respondent.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals.21 The Court
DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as against
petitioner.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109557

November 29, 2000

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying
reconsideration2 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring void the special
proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose
condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property
in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal,
business and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother
Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on
the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on
March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is
the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold,
petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25,
where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
prevent him from competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the
Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.
It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma
Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the
improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as Special
Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell
the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her
husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She
signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also
alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several
hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot
No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex "C") finding the
petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20,
1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel,
her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians.

"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that
it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition
filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are
governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated and unable to participate in the
administration of conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties;
and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and
covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings
standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in
Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been
rendered on the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in Spec.
Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument that the
petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal
properties was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such,
it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the
Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require
procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even if
Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the
basic requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective one. He further alleged that
under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these
rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal
properties through mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be
consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon
supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He
alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been
informed that it would be sold for much less. He also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the
Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the
said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal
partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash,
Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and hospital
bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on
installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians are his own sons who do not
charge anything for their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his motion for reconsideration
(Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the
provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on
"Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of

disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is "comatose without motor and mental faculties," the said
provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all
its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced
by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991,
Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale on the
grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of the
petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege
that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the decision in
Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex "I"). The
case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration and approving respondent Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said
court ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well
as its supplements filed by "oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so
holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly
observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her
decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the
personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition, belongs
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to
sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the
names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby
granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza,
as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is
directed to register the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering
the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,6 however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision.7
Hence, this appeal.8
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke,
a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage
their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article
124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos,

with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for
the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable
to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper
remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule
93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial
guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under
Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact
or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the
subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.9 In such
case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's
administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration
has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.1wphi1
Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to
show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial
court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due
process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.11 A
decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.12 "A decision is
void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard."13 "A void decision
may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting
such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked."14
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134100

September 29, 2000

PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,
respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt
which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We
reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The
lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond,
for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and
Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and
P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the
contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof,
leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of
the said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the
rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away
on December 1, 1988.2 She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that
"when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules."
This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease
contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of
her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this
reason, they were declared in default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to
pay private respondent the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the
costs of the suit.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss.
In its decision4 rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the defendant dies
before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the
action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as
defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was also named defendant in the complaint.
Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co. (Underlining
added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease.
The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract
has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one,
the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife
bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her
husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the
claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998.6 Hence this petition based on the
following assignment of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY,
19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL
OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY
CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL
INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN
THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.7
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before private respondent filed the
collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, 21 which
deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case and
the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now
provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file
this case against petitioner.

Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract binding
themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels)
is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted
by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.8
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved9 and debts chargeable
against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of
indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the
claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for
this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is
passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.11
Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any
property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.12
The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving
wife was sued in an amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted by her and
her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the
amended complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that the
plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in
this case, that since the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the
plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a
complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said
conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to
be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent
cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for
letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his
death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be granted to some other person.14
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and
Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against
any conjugal partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the
dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed an indemnity agreement
which became the basis of a collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the
Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an
ordinary action for the enforcement of the entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into
by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily
bound for its repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by

them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even
assuming the contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not
solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit against petitioner.1wphi1
Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of
administration18 or for the allowance of will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the
Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of
the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say,
such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not
to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of
the agreed rent in the amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them jointly or
solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply
that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so estates, or when
the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is
presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being
considered distinct from one another.20
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are two or more lessees, or in
this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees
refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor,
they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is
not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar, there
is no allegation that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease.
Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June
30, 1989, long before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more than two lessees or
sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case
reads:22
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three (3) years and two (2) months is
FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia
and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to
wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is
chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into
two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount
of P25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The complaint against

petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the
settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the
rent in the amount of P25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87,
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan
Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner)
received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner
failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster
her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage
license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which
was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees
in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of
the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as

in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according
to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded
in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig,
and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the
deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that
she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs.
This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract

marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article
147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only
one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death
benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of
her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest
in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed

to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should
govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of
psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the
other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51,
and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper
recording in the registry of marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the

liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired
by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions
on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null
and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed
by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for
the liquidation of the absolute community of property. 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code;
in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without
consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of
their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with
each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between commonlaw spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of
Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under

Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda
Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of
two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in
October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12,
1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his
year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court
found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he returned for
good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an
area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was
issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as
the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. 3 The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. 4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel
and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. 5 Two years later, on February 15, 1981,
Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get
back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their
names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She

added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after
declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of
Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at Poblacion,
Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house standing
therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa, San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736,
Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half
(1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736
in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this
decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the
donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina
Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be
settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July
22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby REVERSED and another one
entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffsappellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and
101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs. 7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering
the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of
Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher
A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent
court erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristopher A.

Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial
court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199. 8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court
denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action. Petitioner assails
the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no dispute that the transfer of
ownership from the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses
Cespedes, respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable
here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently
void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto
separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. 9
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store 10 but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of
age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price
of subject property, 11 there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148
of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In
any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would
still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland
should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise
agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and
the termination of the conjugal partnership." 12 Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. 13 The judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when
she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. 14

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, 15 for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out
to be better than those in legal union. 16
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate
is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making
pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the
decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession." 17
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in
the case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as
party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem.
18 The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar.
His mother, Erlinda cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds
that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need
for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has been
pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA
AYSON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 25, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued
pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate. Appellate Court, dated April 12, 1984, which modified the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in a land registration case 1 filed by private respondent
Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land
registration case; that such income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per
year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration
case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. 2
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros
was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of
possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the property in question
had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985,
issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having been received
by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land,
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise
had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are
brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and
void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court; that petitioners' claim for
damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private
respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had nothing
to do with the case as she was not married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any
proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an
order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of
the subject land to private respondents. 3
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that "earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful."
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in which they denied,
among other things, that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise but the parties was unsuccessful.
On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents'
answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. 4 Private
respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners' claims and thus tendered certain issues

of fact which could only be resolved after

trial. 5
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it dismissed the case
on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did
not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial court reads: 6
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, is
of the opinion and so holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that
the defendants in their answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to the amended complaint, specifically
denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R.
No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA 307), citing Rili vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the
party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof and that though the rule is that
failure to specifically deny the allegations in the complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admission
of said allegations, there is however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the
amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. This ruling is in accord with the provision of
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise with the defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was not verified as
provided in Article 151 of the Family Code. Besides, it is not believed that there were indeed earnest
efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the two feuding brothers, Gregorio and Augusto, both
surnamed Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, the same is not
necessary or jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al., petitioner, vs. Hon.
Arsenio M. Ganong, et al., respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977, is, to the mind of this Court,
not applicable to the case at bar for the fact is the rationale in that case is not present in the instant
case considering these salient points:
a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not a member of
the Hontiveros Family, is not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio also denied in their verified
answer to the amended complaint.
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right or interest in the land
that was litigated by Gregorio and Augusto, unlike the cited case of Magbaleta where it was shown
that a stranger to the family acquired certain right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at all of the name of
Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot 37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was
therein described as a widower. Moreover, Teodora was never mentioned in said decision, nor in the
amended complaint and in the amended motion for judgment on the pleadings that she ever took
any part in the act of transaction that gave rise to the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for
which they now claim some compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it hereby orders, the
dismissal of this case with cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. 7 Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. Petitioner contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH
THAT EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE WERE MADE PRIOR TO
THE FILING THEREOF AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT DENYING THE
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND ORDERING A TRIAL ON
THE MERITS.
Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should have brought this case on
appeal to the Court of Appeals since the order of the trial court judge was actually a decision on the merits. On the
other hand, even if petition for certiorari were the proper remedy, they contend that the petition is defective because
the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a respondent. 8
Private respondents' contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. As explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 9
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is
vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
only an error or question of law is involved. A similar provision is contained in Section 17, fourth
paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440.
And, in such cases where only questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari
which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of law have to
be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held that:
. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the correct mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary
appeal, or appeal by writ of error, involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal
except only if the appeal is taken in special proceedings and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which even the filing of a record on
appeal is additionally required. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely
questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated
hereunder) specified in Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42
and 45 of the Rules of Court.
By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on March 9, 1930
Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which provides:
2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment
of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that herein petitioner
adopted the correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court petition to review on
certiorari the decision of the Regional Trail Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 25528 and raising
therein purely questions of law.
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10
It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner's
complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the particular
matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed of and left nothing more to be done

by the trial court except the execution of the order. It is a firmly settled rule that the remedy against
such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari. That appeal may be solely on questions of law,
in which case it may be taken only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the
appeal should be brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this
Court should be by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from which an appeal can
be taken. It is final in the sense that it disposes of the pending action before the court and puts an end to the
litigation so that nothing more was left for the trial court to do. 11 Furthermore, as the questions raised as the
questions of law, petition for review on certiorari is the proper mode of appeal. These questions are: (1) whether
after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court could dismiss their complaint motu
proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code which provides that no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it appears from the complaint, which must be verified, that earnest efforts towards
a compromise have been made but the same have failed; and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These
questions do not require an examination of the probative value of evidence presented and the truth or falsehood of
facts asserted which questions of fact would entail. 12
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when no motion to that
effect was made by any of the parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
private respondents did not seek the dismissal of the case but only the denial of petitioners' motion. Indeed, what
private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the case even without a motion to that
effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog, 13 this Court mentioned these cases, to wit:
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff's right to be heard, except
in the following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to prosecute
his action for unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the
court; or if the court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.
Moreover, the trial court itself found that "judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that [private
respondents] in their answer . . . specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the
[rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. . . . " Necessarily, a trial
must be held.
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegation of the adverse party's pleadings, the court may, on motion of the party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court has the
discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. 15 When there are actual issues
raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and
assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render judgment based on the pleadings
alone. 16 In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to be resolved,
namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Ayson's participation and/or liability, if any to petitioners and (2) the
nature, extent, and duration of private respondents' possession of the subject property. The trial court,
therefore, correctly denied petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that, although it alleged that earnest
efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint was not verified for
which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.

The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts
made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them.
As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served. 17 Otherwise, mere suspicion
or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a
compromise but the parties' efforts proved unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is
later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus,
Art. 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not
exclusively among the family members. Citing several cases 18 decided by this Court, petitioners claim that
whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to
compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the
Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros
as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase
"members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. 19 As this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers
and sisters" as member of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case, then
Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brother-in-law") are not
listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the
Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family," we find no
reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that
petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. 21
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends
the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have reached in
this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this question. Courts do not pass upon
constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this decision.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on
June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054
pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears
that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on
March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and
herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on
September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the
land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero
sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012
was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on
November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora
Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the
late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of
the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;

(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees
for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the
estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and
nephew of said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of
the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following
documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture;
baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora
Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero;
certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana
Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and
the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her
alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of
proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records
referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place
of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented
for cross-examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by
herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and
insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to
meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are
two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question
regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of
each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that
the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first
place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place,
that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on
both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally
recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8
And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:

The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: "The contest
of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn
the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed,
and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action
to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter,
which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still
be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside
of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to
his memory. 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration
that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption
consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein
petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the
same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before
acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time
and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to
introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must
bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear
that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the
presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been
held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption
must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the
fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it
must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by
merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she
overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the
proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.

II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero,
whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the
baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and
several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as part
of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony
of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than
the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement
of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third
element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration
made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if
at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be
proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the
declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may
not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The
reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly
there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a
member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's
relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to
establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the
situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the
decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is
admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then
disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their
evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining
the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in
the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of
necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant
to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this
fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the
relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on
evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.
Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible
and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary
evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving
such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all
and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration
and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it
seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the
declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are
however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary that an
objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall
be treated as waived, 24 since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to
have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto,
or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver if the provisions of
the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection
to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27
Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is
a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners,
as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed
inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel
elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents: The
observations later made by private respondent in her comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds
therefor were already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony
of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the
legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may
be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are
Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and
Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia
Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of
Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his
daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that
herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller these can be deemed to have sufficiently established
the relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie
showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to
consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the
subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be
divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit
from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire

estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be
any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the
other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled
to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths
(3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are
deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence should have been, as it is
hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the
mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided onefourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118387

October 11, 2001

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE,
EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities
as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and
ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K.
LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented
by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CAG.R. SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents
Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions
filed by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers.
One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng.
The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee
(hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K.
Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against
all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and
docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge
Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of
Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy
of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting
the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of
spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita
K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl
named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from
becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit
relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners,
their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear
that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all
lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore,
before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his
children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be
published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not
suspicion.7
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct
an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report
that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following.
1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that
he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital
Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of
the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth
delivery" (refer to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY Annex I). Also, the age of the mother
when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH
SHIOK CHENG's age was then already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient
record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name
of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the
third child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE
TEK SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17
to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was
the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As
per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th
child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG
have stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother was
omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she
have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23
years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible
for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given
birth at that impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK
CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's allegation, she was born at their
house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.

7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of
KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from
28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on
22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the
mother is 48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only
39 years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK
CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already
impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per
diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN
SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the
mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is
in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of
making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd
family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been
necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the
legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in
petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674
on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and
filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and
(3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.9
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for
failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion.10 Then on
February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let this
petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th
Floor of the City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of
hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC.
No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the
Court setting the case for hearing was published in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive

weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the
clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the "Media Update" published on the aforementioned
dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been
served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the
private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements
for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
xxx

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SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge
Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners
averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners'
records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is
inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a
collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common
father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The
petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.13
Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October
28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15
Hence, this petition.
1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private respondents
seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a
completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a
declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress,
Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label private respondents' suits before the
lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
xxx

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As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . . , the proceedings are simply aimed
at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to
establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of
persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.17
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It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for
the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as
shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were
actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of
Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is
no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.19

Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the
leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor children as
stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although
recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the
characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
complied with. Thus we held:
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
'SECTION 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.'
'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.'
'SECTION 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.'
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1)
issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings."22 (Emphasis supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private
respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of
the order setting the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In
both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of
Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the

Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A
motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and
Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma
Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by
way of a special proceeding cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite
parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.23
(Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go
beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil
Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe
vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid
down in earlier cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule
108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil
Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same
would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we declared
null and void the portion of the lower court's order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation
of one of her children as appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect
such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties
to the case.
We explained in this wise:
"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to
the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings
taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are
sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.
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"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would
be changed from 'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that
the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as
to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive
rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code."31 (italics supplied).
Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only
requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished
from a summary proceeding. Thus:

"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under
a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon
the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted
upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a
special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see
that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition
three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as
parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The
civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the procedural
requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.
It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a seesawing of opinion
on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of
Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37
and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of
application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights,
such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor
filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner
Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the "non-observance of
the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the
Court held as follows:
'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding "marriages"
in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it
is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this
Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of
a marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov.
28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226,
Feb. 14, 1958).'
'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her
children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x
x .'
'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article
412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status from
married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate x x x '

"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from
"legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings."39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with
each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional
is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters
that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this
case that:
"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then
the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial
change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our
substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory
that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving
controversial issues."41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said that:
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised
Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure
judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant
to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a
procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the
matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of
the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive
rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code."43 (Italics supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation
that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its
domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and
the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this
question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore,
cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must
be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining
such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its ordinary
sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors from"44 while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute".45 The
provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of
the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register
may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further
than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also
nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may
affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412
from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory
construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to
any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article
412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected
and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The
obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil
register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries
of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said,
perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the failure to
delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or
innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary
proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies
that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar
cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity
for the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as Article
171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only
after his death.48
Article 171 provides:

"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab
initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We
ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another
alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50
We likewise held therein that:
"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is
not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latter's child at all x x x. ''51
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:
"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case
at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
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"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless
then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not
well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not

the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. "'53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years
had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in
December of 1992 and February of 1993.54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a
fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the
following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five
years from the time the right of action accrues."
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on
the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause
of action has arisen.55
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that is, the
act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago.
Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or right to sue accrued.
However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered
that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the
truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered
the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the
case of private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he
would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother's (Keh
Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions were aroused and
confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth
among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in
petitioners' birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents,
hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the
time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public
documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold
water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born
of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed by
private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal
and against defendants as alleged accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.57

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of
the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or
Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in
order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.58
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various
cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and
reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to
correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule
108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against
petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of
Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an
immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok
Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit
from their mother's estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept
that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. HCISED
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,
1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143256

August 28, 2001

RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C.
FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ,
WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ,
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
December 22, 1999 affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for
nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein
respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:3
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners of a
parcel of land located at Dagupan City covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and
the two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that
Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as
paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the late
Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1)
month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein
appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo
Fernandez and an estate consisting of the following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral
Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan.
Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street;
and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four (194) square
meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry
of Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood, G. I. roofing with a floor area of
154 square meters and 126 square meters of the first and second floor, respectively. Declared under
Tax Decl. No. 22- 592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and
allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;

To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez

74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez,
appellant's son over the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters including the building
and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the southwestern portion of the parcel of land described
as follows, to wit:
'A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan,
Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of
Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the
Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred and NinetyFour (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525
(T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh. "8", Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo,
Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K.
Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and
malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without
basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the total physical and
mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated,
colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts
purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the
deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property described in
the deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land
titles in their favor (Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the
beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband and wife blessed with
one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their lifetime.
(italics supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late
Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in question were all
made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties thereto and for value." (Records,
pp. 20-21, Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion
reads:4
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. "3 ), the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8"), the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the
house and lot in question;

3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child
of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the
spouses. Rodolfo's claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1) he only
reached high school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed
to present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected
people such as Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the
geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child; a pedigree may be admitted in
evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that entries in a family bible or other family books or charts,
engravings or rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree,5 (4) the certification
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no available information about the birth of
petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate
naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original
copy; (6) that Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available records of
baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo's baptismal certificate which was issued
in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the
deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which
rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's
judgment in its assailed decision dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez'
filiation with the deceased spouses. It found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism
stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights to back pay under
RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary
weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified,
but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that while the
application for back pay was a public document, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with
Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family
Code referred to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an application
for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897.
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May
17, 2000.6
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING
THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO
THE PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN

QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA,
AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY
CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB INTESTATO
TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '3'), THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO.
54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO
PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ
AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE COLLATERALLY
ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS, PARTITION,
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN THE
DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE
CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO
JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to the conjugal property of the
deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly
failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however,
that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo
Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not
be collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and independent action directly impugning such
filiation.
We are not persuaded.

It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents,
namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy. The
respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfo's right to the
deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that
one's legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents' claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that
Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals,7 which has a similar
factual backdrop is instructive:
"A careful reading of the above articles8 will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our
ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision
is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not well
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not
the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses
Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial
partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief9 filed before the trial
court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial court's ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the
deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by
the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight10 when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of
the trial court.11 We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's evaluation of the
evidence presented, thus:12
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo
Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a certification worded as follows:
"This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year
1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence, there is no available information about the birth
of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K.
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897
is a public document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation between him and the deceased
spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants' Brief). We do not agree.

It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
document nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V.
Fernandez, the herein appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer
to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the
recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
"SECTION 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave
rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document are conclusive evidence against
the contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the statements made therein. They constitute only prima
facie evidence of the facts which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal
certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts
certified to by the parish priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of the sacrament on the
day and in the place and manner set forth in the certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements
made therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing
Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs.
Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and certified to or the date written by him are
not shown to be false; but they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein by the interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and Comments,
vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K.
Fernandez filed said application on June 5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the
declaration and statement contained in the said application that concern the relationship of the applicant with
herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father,
Jose K. Fernandez the contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the
spouses openly and continuously until they died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and
privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname,
treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code
of the Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132
SCRA 590, possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a
ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued
by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating
therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized
on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1" Exhibits for the Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the
dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to
his kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is
one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case,
the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting
that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh.
"G"). Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not
constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant
did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated
August 31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void."

Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a
legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned13
pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in question was the conjugal property of the
late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982,
his estate consisted solely of pro indiviso of the conjugal property and the other half belonged to his wife
Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews
and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the decedent's estate while the share of the conjugal
property will still belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial court's order reconveying
the possession of the subject lot and building to respondents was contrary to the admitted facts and law since
respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to
the of the inheritance and the respondents to the other . In effect, pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the
surviving spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal property estate and of the remaining as share as heir
from her husband's estate. Thus, we find well taken the petitioners' assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial
partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents' having exclusive right
to the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right
to enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations than those established by law,14 which right she
exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of Generosa, to question the validity of the deed of sale since
the action for the annulment of contracts may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily.15
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract.
However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the contract
if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would
positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.16 As we have discussed above,
respondents are entitled to the of the entire conjugal property, i.e., lot and building; however considering that
widow Generosa, during her lifetime, sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been
deprived of their share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards
their share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the annulment of said deed of
sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null and void the deed of sale executed
between Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming
the trial court's findings that the deed was prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular
circumstances without however, particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.

Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because there was no consideration for the
sale. However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money
he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which
respondents failed to controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a contract has
sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.17 Under Art. 1354 of
the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not that of Generosa because she was
already bedridden with both legs amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence18 and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same;19 a burden
respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override the
evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.20
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only
sell her undivided share in the building but also the share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the
entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller
are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the share of the building together with
the respondents who owned the share therein.21
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to
be bereft of factual basis. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered
by him as he has duly proven.22 Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.23 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.24 The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that
he suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any documentary or other admissible evidence.
We also agree with the petitioners that the respondent court should not have awarded moral damages in the amount
of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be deleted for lack of factual
basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney's
fees, which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the share of the conjugal lot and building
of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is
concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez,
TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and
respondents as co-owners of the and shares respectively in the conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in
Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria
Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797
(90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse
Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial,
were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua
who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor
legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente
Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their
legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner
tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She
submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate
(Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming
her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses
reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to
prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the
late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetriciangynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77

years of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition
for letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court
of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another one entered declaring
that appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O.
Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the proceedings already
conducted therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special
proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of facts when it
failed to apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in
this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's theory that the instant case does not
involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn directly or indirectly, the
legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of private respondents
whose credibility and demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof,
than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in accord with law or with
applicable decisions of the supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of the husband or that
of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of
them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them
before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the
birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of
the husband except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of
his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was
unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of
the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed
in the preceding Article only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is
the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these
articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not
well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not

the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature
of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of
the parties as follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to
establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record
is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they
were of having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby,
and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved
her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that
she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and,
therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian,
admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years and was already about 36 years old
and still she has not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the
late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of
his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of
the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher,
helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through
law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that
her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter
and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys
but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that
Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby
as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and
come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge of the
lower court had to be held at her residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and
weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is
highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would
hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her
oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C.
Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have
been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth
certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates.
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a
week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become
pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby
Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and
asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty.
Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a
baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly
seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36
(the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure
that she is not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the
informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36

years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by
Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the
experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino
Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky
to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa
was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or
even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent times for people
who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as their
supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he
could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by
merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he
had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so
either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does
not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez
and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian,
after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL
CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a
witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who
prepared said document and that he signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p.
24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in said document,
unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and,
therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he
signed said document without understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant and
ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing
pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his
deceased sister and brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter and only
legal heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death,
would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only daughter
will inherit what is legally my own property, in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband
that any inheritance due him from my property when he die to make our own
daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not mean what he legally owns or his inherited
property. I leave him to decide for himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for
the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law.
Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee although
without any legal papers her properties when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa
the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly
their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.

Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her
brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their
(Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that
Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth
date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was
not negated by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of
Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been
signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up
the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private
respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting
evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente
Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's
father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138961

March 7, 2002

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,
respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. C.V. No. 453941 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional
rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943
before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious)
child of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.2 The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having been
"recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the
time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of
Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children
from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This
was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga,
from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far
East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon
Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with
him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the
Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her
three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr.
(Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth
certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce
him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.6

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon
together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in
Baguio.7 Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.8 During the occasion of William Liyaos last
birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as
his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still
make a good looking son."9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a
recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported
Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon
who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his
personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains
where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who
were godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of
Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids
lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations,
Maurita would sleep in the couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually
see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child
Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she
would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital
during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with
her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees
for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975 held
at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2)
daughters from his legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10 He then talked about his plan
for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian
Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita
attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of
blue and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime green14 as belonging to the
deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita
remembered having invited the couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while
exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her
marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire
cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house
when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her
neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at
Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see
Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from
1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon
how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food
for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon
Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and
Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter
abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live
with them up to the time of the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of
Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in
the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the
possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally
married.16 Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got
married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents
would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and
came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her
father would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had
trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He
believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough,
strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack
which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was
attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and
acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister,
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their
lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary
restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed
home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did
not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from
her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment17
of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company
garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers
alleged investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and
Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents,
clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told
by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs.
Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any
article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens
clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. They resided at
No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975.19
Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack
sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to
three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr.
Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control.20 Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr.
Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her
investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal
demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After
assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late
father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that
the laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were
displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from
1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00
oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as
night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was
able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in
September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of
Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On
December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the
table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao
died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket.
People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One

time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also
asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the
information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty.
Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said
that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty.
Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he
does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao,
Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian
Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased
William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.21
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased
William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with
the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of
petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner
as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather
than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof
that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in
relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for
the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased
William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William
Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any
evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and considering that his
signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent
proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or
Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate
solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William
Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn
his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate.22 The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based

on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a
policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.23
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code24 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to
have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation,"25 executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver
of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27 Impugning
the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor,
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the
late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.30 We
cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father
does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be
the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the
child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.31
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in
testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the
legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the
time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was
initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It

is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.1wphi1
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on
the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 142877

October 2, 2001

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their mother,
CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON,
JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT
CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the
illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of
succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992,
leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It
was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
"Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon
City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of
Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents
assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at
the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted
petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1wphi1.nt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed
an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in
fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and
that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status
as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain
the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners
for lack of cause of action and for being improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in
a special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically,
petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic
writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.2
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the
case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance
of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has ruled that
the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably
brought up in direct action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a
close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing the
civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open
and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.4 The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required.5 In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.6 Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgement.7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates
of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.8 this presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article
170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable,12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme
Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had
claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document. Signed by the acknowledging
parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's
illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their
respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.

The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e
whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration
of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.