The creation of the other is an important weapon in the arsenal of those wishing to pursue

aggressive nationalist agendas. By amplifying differences and downplaying similarities it is possible to

create divisions along nationalist and ideological lines. While also fuelling polemics, these policies create
jingoistic communal entities that then, to defend their own interests, unite in opposition to another nation
or community. Carl Schmitt defined politics in terms of necessary antagonistic ontological entities.
Pakistani national identity seems largely rooted in defining itself as anti-India, or more accurately, the
antithesis of India. But the nation of Pakistan lacks the benefit of a national history to legitimize it by
backing up its individualitya major fault, according to Spinoza, who wrote that a cohesive history in the
form of either superstition or literature is essential to building a strong national spirit. Pakistan has
struggled to create a surrogate history from which to draw a national consciousness and substantiate its
claim of being India's opposite, but it cannot spell out its own history without discussing its hated
neighbour. This constraint seriously hinders its ability to create a past which either denies the existence
of India or explains the historical non-existence of Pakistan.
Post-partition, there was a concerted effort on the part of both the Pakistanis and the Indians to create
a gulf between their respective cultures and languages. This effort is evident in the linguistic isolationism
that separated Hindi from Urdu. The Persianization of Urdu is an essential clue to understanding
Pakistan's desire to bring itself closer, in all socio-lingua-cultural regards, to the Middle East. Such a shift
would grant Pakistan legitimate Muslim state status despite its not being either a sheikdom or a center of
Islamist thought. Strained relations with Iran and the lack of non-religious ties have hindered this
westward shift. Furthermore, the existence of an intelligentsia of post-colonial elites firm in their
commitment to the ideals of the empire has not allowed the complete radicalization of Pakistan in line with
its western neighbours, keeping the country very much out of the Middle Eastern camp. The looming
presence of the largest of all post-colonial entities of elitismthe armyis an additional roadblock in
Pakistan's desired route towards the Gulf region.
The army has played a key role in crystallizing Pakistani nationalism in its aggressive propagation
(among the masses and the polity) of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. This has, more than any other single
attempt at solidifying Pakistani consciousness, succeeded in uniting the nation and orienting it in
opposition to India. Kashmir has provided the fillip that has taken Pakistan into numerous wars and
defined its foreign policy for many years. It has forced the world to focus on Pakistan, granting it attention
which its socio-economic level would not otherwise garner. Additionally, the collective cooperation of the
Pakistani proletariat in fighting the War on Kashmir has bound the loose fibers of the young nation into a
cohesive slingshot directed primarily at India. Just as a present-day coming of the Messiah would end
belief in the truth of Judaism and Christianity, the realisation of Pakistan's desires for Kashmir might
cause the destruction of Pakistani unity, forcing an implosion of even Pakistan's strongest institutionthe
army, headed by Pakistan's president, General Musharraf.
This is the possibility which complicates current diplomatic negotiations with India. General Musharraf
is well-aware of the importance of a conflict in Kashmir in fuelling the people's support for the army. At the
same time, he is under pressure from all diplomatic frontsin particular the United Statesto find a
solution to the conflict. The United States has even attempted to provide Pakistan with monetary and
military incentives to this end, exchanging these things for a permanent end to any army or
administrational support to terrorist groups operating against India. The recent sale of F-16s to Pakistan
after years of lobbying and back-door diplomacy is a testament to US resolve to both maintain the
legitimacy of General Musharraf and ensure the support of Pakistan in the war on terrorism. The General
cannot rely on such continued support from the United States, however, unless he cooperates in the post9/11 anti-terrorism effort. Support for a non-negotiating Pakistan is even less likely in light of US policy
toward Indiain Secretary Rice's words, the desire to "make India a superpower."
The people of Pakistan undoubtedly face a similar problem to that of their President. Do they choose
to weaken their nationalist emotion in the short run in favor of peace with their neighbour, or do they
instead continue to live with an antipathy-based feeling of nationalism? Resolving the tenuous nature of

Pakistani nationalism means assenting to the reality of its shared history with India. While this may be a
pill too bitter to swallow for a lot of Pakistanis and Indians, in the long run the benefits of this cooperation
will harmonize the conflict of identity which now hinders non-war, non-oppositional, non-falsehood, and
most importantly, non-Kashmir-based resolution of national consciousness.