Art. 1161.

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal
laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
Larry V. Caminos, Jr. v. People of the Philippines
Tinga, J. 8 May 2009
SV: Caminos, who was driving straight through Ortigas Avenue, collided with the vehicle
driven by Arnold Litonjua. The latter was turning left at the intersection of Ortigas Avenue
and Columbia Street. Caminos was charged with Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage
to Property. TC found him guilty and ordered him to pay P140k, the cost of the repairs to
Arnolds car as reported by his father.
SC ruled that Caminos was indeed guilty. He was driving at a much higher speed than he
claimed which resulted in the collision. His claim that Arnold was likewise negligent was not
a defense. At best it would only have made applicable the rules governing award of
damages where concurring negligence exists. However, in this case, Caminos did not even
try to present evidence to rebut the claim that repairs to the car would cost P140k, as such,
the award of the TC must stand.
FACTS:
- 21 June 1988: at about 7:45pm, two vehicles collided at the intersection of Ortigas Avenue
and Columbia Street in Mandaluyong.
a) A Volkswagen driven by Arnold Litonjua was turning left at the intersection.
b) A Mitsubishi Super Saloon driven by Caminos which was going straight, coming from
the opposite direction, (company driver of Fortune Tobacco, Inc.) rammed into the
side of Arnolds vehicle
c) The view of both drivers was obstructed by the center island flower bed.
d) A sketch was made by a patrolman, which sketch was signed by both parties. He also
prepared a Traffic Accident Report (TAIR).
- Caminos was charged with Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property.
a) Arnolds version: his vehicle was at full stop at the intersection when the collision
occurred, his car not having passed the median line of the island. His father also
claimed that the repairs to the car would cost P140k.
b) Caminos claims that it was Arnolds fault. He also claims that he was only on second
gear and was going at around 25-30 kph.
PROCEDURE:
- TC convicted Caminos and ordered the payment of the amount necessary to repair Arnolds
vehicle (claimed to be P140k).
- CA affirmed, and found that Arnold was reckless as he neglected to look, his line of sight
not having been blocked.
ISSUE: Was Caminos guilty of reckless imprudence? YES.
HELD: Petition dismissed.
REASONING:
1) The evidence showed that Caminos was speeding when the incident occurred. Speeding is
indicative of imprudent behavior.
In prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the following elements:
a) That the offender has done or failed to do an act
b) That the act is voluntary

c) That the same is without malice

d) That the material damage results; and
e) That there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender.
The evidence on record negates Caminoss contention that he was moving slowly.
a) The report of the patrolmen indicated that Caminoss speed was beyond what is
lawful
b) The extent of the damage to Arnolds car could only have been caused by a vehicle
hitting it at a higher speed than 25-30 kph
Speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise such
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered on the road. More precaution is necessary when driving at an intersection as
against driving elsewhere in a street or highway.
Likewise, where the view at an intersection is obstructed, prudence would dictate that he
take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the intersection or othwerwise use
reasonable care to avoid a collision.
2) Right of way is not determined by who first approached the intersection but by the
imminence of the collision when distance and speed of vehicles are considered.
Right of way is governed by Sec. 42 of RA 4136:
Section 42. Right of Way.
a When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same
time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle
on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle
traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise
have hereunder.
b The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall
yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to
the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the
driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to
turn as required in this Act. x x x.
Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not
absolute in terms. It is subject to the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of
intersection.
If two vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time where it
would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver
approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their
courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, the driver of the vehicle approaching
from the left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.
The rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on
approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead
stop, but he is merely required to approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so
that he may yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his right.
3) In a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person who was
injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accuseds vehicle collided
does not constitute a defense.

Proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his
automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accuseds
culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Even if we were to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent, at best, it will only
determine the applicability of several other rules governing situations where concurring
negligence exists for the purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the award of
damages in favor the private offended party.
4) Caminos did not exert efforts to present countervailing evidence disproving the cost of
the damage sustained by Arnolds car. Thus, the award ordered by the TC must stand.
Digested by Aaron Legaspi