ADI2005 P-_/_-

BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD

Their quest for a idealistic utopia inevitably becomes apocalyptic fanaticism, as followers attempt to
bring the ideal into reality

Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)

Think of apocalyptic violence as a form of ultimate idealism, a Quest for spiritual Utopia. The word apocalypse derives from
the Greek term for "revelation" or "uncovering." In Judaism and Christianity, the apocalyptic revelation came from God and
concerned a powerful event. In Christianity especially, the event came to be understood as the end ofthe world itself, or as a prophecy
of that end. What gives these visions their allure is that such an end, involving untold vistas of destJ'uction, only foretold a new
beginning. All-consuming violence in obliterating a hopelessly corrupt world was, in fact, required for the hopeful and lofty
rebirth that was to follow.
Apocalyptic imagery exists in all the major religions. Since it is most specifically a part of Jewish and Christian doctrine, students of
religion have rightly warned against invoking Western assumptions when interpreting Islam.
But Islam contains its own versions of the apocalyptic, as in fact do secular proj ections of world destruction and recreation
found in extreme ideological movements like Communism and Fascism. Such ima2ery is part of a universal mythology of
death and rebirth. As the student of world mythology Joseph Campbell put it, "l)eath-and-rebirth, rebirth through ritual ... is
an extremely ancient I ideal in the history of culture." Spiritual rebirth is a goal so desirable that the annihilation of everything else
on its behalf may feel justified. A recent statement by an Islamist zealot offers an indication of how far one might go on behalf
of perfect spiritual renewal: "We believe in the principle of establishinghe Islamic moral and criminal code) even if this means the
death of all mankind."
Examples of apocalyptic violence are everywhere in the world, though not always recognized as such when they come from our
part of it. For instance, we think of Timothy McVeigh as a lone fanatic who in 1995 blew up the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, because he was enraged at his government. Such a characterization, however, neglects the
apocalyptic dimensions of his act. He felt himself to be one of many believers dedicated to bringing a new world into being. His
fervent hope was that in destroying a government building he would set off a chain reaction. Others, inspired by him,

Apocalyptic imagination does not have to be violent - we never expressed ours in that manner.
Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)

FROM TAME TO VIOLENT APOCALYPSE It is important to remember that historically the apocalyptic imagination has usually
been nonviolent in nature. Apocalyptic imagery provided assurance that God was in control of histOlY; that there was a "divinely
predetermined pattern of crisis. iudgment. and vindication"; that for those patient enough. a time of cleansing and rebirth was on
its way. Indeed, such apocalypticism is "the mother of all Christian theology," and apocalyptic visions, Christian or otherwise,
have flourished during times of great suffering. They have been powerful sources of hope for relief from pain. for the appearance
of God's iustice. for evil and suffering to give way to spiritual beauty and perfection.

SD
ADI2005 P /
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
MIMESIS KILLS HOPE

Mimesis fails true politics in that it closes off hope for a transversal approach to politics. This is
necessary for understanding alternity,·and changing guaranteed epistemologica1 failure.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509-
533]

What a monstrous lie his brain would have to invent to catch up with and explain state of his senses! Before exploring the
significance of aesthetic insights it is necessary to juxtapose them, if only briefly, to the prevailing wisdom of it scholarship.
One perhaps could, with Jacques Derrida, speak of two nmdamentally different approaches. The first seeks to discover a
truth or an originthat somehow escapes the necessity of interpretation. The second accepts or even affinns that representing the
political is a fonn of interpretation that is, by its very nature, incomplete and bound up with the values of the perceiver?
Much of it scholarship has, undoubtedly, been conducted in the fonner, mimetic mode of representation. The most
influential contributions to the discipline, particularly in North America, continue to adhere almost exclusively to social
scientific conventions. They uphold the notion of a neutral observer and a cOlTespondingseparation of object and subject. 1.
David Singer proudly announced during the behavioural revolution that 'there is no longer much doubt that we can make the
study of international politics into a scientific discipline worthy of the name'. Much has changed since then, of course, but
representation is still widely seen as process of copin2:which. ideally. erases all traces of human interference so that the
'artistic' end-product looks iust like the ori2:inal. Realism has made 'the real' into an obiect of desire, Hayden White
would say. Or, as one of the most influential contemporary methodology textbooks in political sciences states: 'the goal
is to learn facts about the real world'. Mimetic approaches do not pay enou2:h attention to the relationship between the
represented and its representation. Indeed, they are not really theories of representation. Thev are theories a2:ainst
representation. But political reality does not exist in an a priori way. It comes into bein2:only throu2:h the process of
representation. A political event, for instance, cannot determine from what perspective and in what context it is seen.
Our effort to make sense of this event can. thus, never be reduced to the event itself. This is why representation
'always raises the Question of what set of true statements we mi2:ht prefer to other sets of true statements'. It is a .
process throu2:h which we or2:anise our understandin2: of reality. Note as well that even if the ideal of mimesis-a
perfect resemblance between si2:nifier and si2:nified-was possible. it could offer us little political insi2:ht. It would
merelv replicate what is, and thus be as useless as 'as a facsimile of a text that is handed to us in answer to our
Question of how to interpret that text' .

5\
ADI 2005 p I
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
AL T: TRANSVERSAL DISSENT

Transversal dissent is a better agency to create true global change than analyses of state
behavior.

BLEIKER, 2000 [Roland; Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Ql,Jeensland,
"Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg 16]

Questions of a2ency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This
book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence 210bal politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic
treatise or a foreil!n policy decision. At a time when processes of 21obalisation are unfoldin2 and national boundaries
are becomin2 increasin21y porous, states can no lon2er be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs.
Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them.
They suggest, as mentioned I!lobal life is better understood as a series of transversal strul!l!les that increasinl!ly
above, that
chaIlen2e what Richard Ashley called 'the paradi2m of sovereil!n rsicl. Transversal strul!l!les, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to
established spheres of sovereil!ntv. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between
inside and outside. 18 And they have come to be increasinl!ly recol!nised as central aspects of I!lobal politics. James Rosenau is
among severa] scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of transversal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort
and play out the many contradictions at work in the global soene'.19

SL
ADI2005 P /
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD

LOCAL ACTS OF RESISTENCE CAN LEAD TO GREAT GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE

Bleiker 2000
(Roland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg. I)

Manifestations of popular dissent, such as street demonstrations, social movements and civil disobedience, have for long
occupied central positions in most political landscapes. The processes through which they exert human agency, however, have
recently undergone important transformations. In previous epochs, popular protests had a mostly local nature, that is, their
dynamic was one that directly opposed ruler and ruled. Bv the late twentieth century the nature of dissent has changed
fundamentallv. The presence of mass media can transform a local act of resistance almost immediately into an event of global
significance. Images of a protest march may flicker over television screens worldwide only hours after people have taken to the
'street. As a result, the protest soon takes on a much larger, trans-territorial dimension.

DISSENT IS KEY TO IMPACTING TRANSNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

Bleiker 2000
(Roland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg. I)

Dissent has become a significant transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspects of global politics. In fact,
dissent has become what could be called a transversal phenomenon - a political practice that not onlv transgresses national
boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct
of international relations.
The term transversal draws attention to various political transformations that are currently taking place. It has emerged in
response to a growing need to rethink the manner in which the domain of international relations has traditionallv been
conceptualised. David Campbell, for instance, argues convincingly that globalised life is best seen 'as a series of transversal
struggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or transnational relations'.2 The latter, he points out, !!.!:!:
modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currentlv being questioned. Bv contrast, to
conceptualise global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multi-layered interactions that
make up contemporary life. It is to recognise the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, capital - in shOlt, 'the increasing
irruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons'.3

56
ADI2005 p /
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD

The greatest movements began by not engaging in direct state politics

Bleiker 200 I
(Ronald, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics)

But there are still several missing links between an individualistic anarchist revival of la Boetie and a theo,·y of collective
resistance. Romantic dissent focuses on the primacy of the perceiver and the poetisation of political practice. This pushes
romantics, at least according to the influential opinion of Carl Schmitt, towards a situation in which conflicts are not
addressed, but deferred, subjectified, transplanted into a higher realm of aesthetic imagination.3! Some even claim that
romantic thought contains, by definition, a conservative co,·e.32 One can argue with such an interpretations, and I shall do so
later. What matters at this point however, is that the anarchist romantic generally does not seek political power, but despises
.and circumvents it. Thoreau engaged in the struggle around slavery by withdrawiDl! from the state that endorses this
repressive practice. He returned to the woods to Walden Pond, retreating into the ultimate source of the romantic world-view,
the Self. This anarchist form of individualism was subversive on many accounts, but it was perceived to lack the element of
immediate and direct social engagement. From theory to practice, from individual to collective action. Some of the later
romantics tried to add a more direct political dimension to the already subversive Thoreauean foundations. They shifted the
practice of withdrawing consent from detachment to engagement, and from individualism to collective action. With this move
arose a coherent tradition of popular dissent and an equally powerful assertion of human agency - one that came to influence
political dynamics in ever-more parts of the world.
The more la Boetie's legacy spread beyond national boundaries, the more it became intertwined with the emerging anarchist
movement. By the end of the nineteenth century leading anarchist historians, such as Max Nettlau and Ernst Victor Zenker,
portrayed la Boetie as an important intellectual precursor to the likes of Pierre Joseph Proud-hon, Mikhail Bakunin, Petr
Kropotkin, Max Stirner or Emma Goldman.33 One can, indeed, hear la Boetie's voice resonating in Stirner's claim that if the
labourer acts upon the insight that 'his' power is 'his' property, the state simply crumbles.34 By the eady twentieth century
several anarchists started to draw directly upon la Boetie. Gustav Landauer, one of the key figures in the German anarchist
movement, constructed his central arguments around a discussion of the Anti- One. Bart de Ligt, a prominent Dutch anarcho-
pacifist relied upon la Boetie, and so did Simone Weil in her unusual fusion of Anarchism, Marxism, Stoicism and Christian
mysticism.35 But to understand how radical popular dissent gained prominence in various parts of the world, we must reach
further back and observe what precisely occurred when la Boetie's intellectual legacy came of age during the transition from
the nineteenth to the twentieth century.

~
ADI2005 P /
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
AL T: AESTHETICS

Our project employs aesthetics in order to challenge mimesis.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30; No.3, pp. 509-
533]

Although most approaches to international political theory remain wedded to mimetic principles, an increasing
number of scholars are confronting the question af representation. One could, indeed, speak af an actual aesthetic turn.
To be more precise, this turn has been generated through two interrelated shifts in the production af knowledge about
world politics. The first occurred in the 1980s, when so-called postmodern scholars begun to challenge the positivist
foundations af international theory. It then became possible to recognise a number af ensuing political implications,
including the reproduction af cultures afviolence as well as their state-centric and masculine nature. A second and equally
si2nificant shift took place in more recent years. as various scholars have started to think throu2h the implications
of the postmodern critique. They beeun to explore different forms of insi2ht into world politics. includin2 those
that emeree from ima2es. narratives and sounds. such as literature. visual art. music. cinema and other sources
that extend beyond 'hi2h art' into popular culture. Of course, not all of the ensuing endeavours are necessarily
convincing. Nor do they supersede the need for more conventional social scientific inquiries. But aesthetic approaches have
initiated an important process of broadening our understanding of world politics beyond a relatively narrow academic
discipline that has come to entrench many af the political problems it seemingly seeks to address and solve. The key
challenge ahead consists of finding ways to reclaim the political value afthe aesthetic. To do so is no easy task, for the
modern triumph aftechnological reason has by and large eclipsed the aesthetic from our political purview. Overcoming the
ensuing construction of common sense would amount to far more than simply adding an additional, sensual layer of
interpretation. The aesthetic turn reorients our very understanding of the political: it engenders a significant shift away
IToma model of thought that equates knowledge with the mimetic recognition of external appearances towards an approach
that generates a more diverse but also more direct encounter with the political. The latter allows for productive interactions
across different faculties, including sensibility, imagination and reason, without any of them annihilating the unique position
and insight of the other.

5'5
ADI2005 P /
BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

Aesthetics is net beneficial as it is both accessible and allows space for alternatives,
while advancing a framework that challenges mimesis.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.
30, No.3, pp. 509-533]

First, for all their theoretical engagement with the later Wittgenstein, postmodern writings have fallen
short of recognising the practical significance of language games. Many postmodern texts remain buried in a
highly abstract and inaccessible language that has, at times, become as predictable as the practices they
seek to oppose. As a result, the critical insi2ht they may contain has failed to reach the broad audience
necessary to achieve social transformation. The issue is. of course. not easy. The innovative potential of
a text emerges precisely from its refusal to take existin2 linguistic conventions for granted. from the
attempt to search for new ways of speaking about issues that had been rendered un problematic
throu2h a series of worn out metaphors. But a text can. of course. not depart too radicallv from existing
linguistic conventions either: to do so would be to construct a private language that loses its social
dimension. The key task. then. is to walk a fine line between these two extremes; a challenge that
remains by and large unmet. A second and related shortcoming of early postmodern contributions is their
focus on criticising/deconstructing the shortcomings of dominant Realist and Liberal approaches to
international political theory. While essential at a time when there was little space for alternative knowledge,
this process of critique has nevertheless limited the potential of postmodem contributions. Discourses of
power politics and their framing of political practice cannot overcome all existing theoretical and
practical. dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox
approaches to IR. the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive
boundaries that were established through the initial framing of these debates.

t;h
ADI 2005 p /
BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

The deployment is necessary to engage gaps in the resolution.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.
30, No.3, pp. 509-533]

Whether in the form of images. narratives or sounds. aesthetics not only adds layers of perception
or sensation, but also promotes interactions among different faculties. Kant saw judgements of
the beautiful and the sublime as examples of instances where no faculty rules over others.
Aesthetic judgements are Questions of taste that take place somewhere in the 'middle between
understanding and reason'~ without either of these determining the rules for identifying the
object that is to be judged.8oIndeed, Kant went one step fi1l1herand granted the feeling of pleasure or displeasure its own constitutive status,
which is to say that it became irreducible to any other faculty. 8 1 But even though we perceive and judge a work of art through means that are constitutive, we
need to rely on other faculties, including reason, to process these perceptions and judgements. Even a visual image is never located in a separated
aesthetic realm. The perceived effects of a painting,. for instance, are clearly different rrom the process of understanding and judging them, yet alone
communicating the so-experienced sensation to others. The latter is a linguistic process. even though it originates
in and refers to a non-linguistic realm. This is why understanding art. or politics for that matter.
expresses an aesthetic relationship not only to a given object, but also to the 'history of its
effect'.82 Sensibility and imagination can offer an encounter with this history. They can reorient
our thoughts in a way that a mimetic process of recognition cannot. It is in this sense that a
work of art can serve as an example of thought that generates productive flows between
sensibility and reason, memory and imagination or between 'mind, body and soul, thought,
power and desire' .83

51
ADI 2K5
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REALISM BAD

A 1 +: li0 'Pi:::

Hope and Imagination are interconnected is needed to find a better path of life.

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

II write this book 10 a spirit of hope. tI0pe is alway~ bound

up with the reach of our imagination. We have the capacity
to probe painful truths in connection with all apocalyptic
viol~nce, and to make contact with the human suffering
i~yed. With such imaginative acts, we begin to take
small steps in alternative directions. That convictionj1as
!:JCenpart of all of my work on twentieth-century excess.
Here I think of an experience I had in the early stages
of my study of Nazi doctors. After my first set of inter-
views in Germany,
I went to see a friend of mine, an
----------------------
Auschwitz survivor who was keenly interested in the
work, As we sat over coffee, I said to him in a tone that
w~~ without a bit of self-pity: "I appreciate your
e~2co_I!.E?K~.::.~S~'!.t the truth is that I've begun to have
terrible dreams. In my dreams I'm behind barbed wire i~
some kind of a camp, Worse than that, my wife, and at
times my two children, are there in the camp with me."
-----,-------'-------------
My friend looked directly at me and answered in a
matter-of-fact tone' that was neither unkind nor especially
sympathetic, "Good, now you can do the st~dy." ~
telling me that unless I took in some sm" 11 part of the pct;U
of the victims, the work would h;Jvt>littlt> si[':ni f)c:ulce.

w ~
C;~
a
ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE p /
REALISM BAD

~ ~

Over time, that conversation took on broader meaning

for me. We need to bear witness, compassionately, to the
destructive ev.ents of our era if we are to embark on a

------:-----
~ore humane ~ourse. In that sense the researcher's task
extends ever outward.
.~

It is not that any study or set of

~rvations :can themselves bring about measurable
~change. Rath~r, su~ imaginative efforts enter into tIle
confusions and possibilities of collective consciousness. My
belief is that it takes a certain amount of critical and

e~pathic energy from many directions to enable any

society to begin to chart a wiser course. This is painfully
true of our re'sponses to large-scale killing and dyi nE' and
o~ attempts _ to interrupt that proces0 All this was
implicit in th~t little conversation ~ith my friend.

9\
~
ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE p I
REALISM BAD

/i \+~',s~ 0,-'( C{ T3clu{ ({ ss

OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO MAINTATIN AN ILLUSION OF
INVULNERABILITY WHICH PREVENTS THE SUPERPOWER AND WORLD
IT ACTS UPON TO BECOME DANGEROUSLY DESTABILIZED.
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)
pp 129-120
r ~t the hear;t of the superpower syndrome then is the need
to eliminate a'vulnerability that, as the antithesis-.2f omni po-
"" tence, contairis the basic con tr;:]~ of the syndrome. For
\vulnerabilit;~bn n_<=yer~eelirninated, either by a nation or
ill! indi";d~. In seeking its elimination, the superRo~r
finds itself 0[,1 a psychological treadmill. The idea .of vul-
nerability is i;tolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. ~_
tion is to maintain
I an illusion of invulllr:rtJkility But the
s~wer \:hen mn<:..-the danger of taking increasingly
9raconian ac:tions to sustain that illusion. For to do oth-
erwise would be to surrender the cherished status of
superpower. ,
Other nations have experiences in the world that
render them and their citizens all too aware of the essen-
tial vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influ-
enced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in
the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an
aspect of hl;man mortality. ]:'To such reality can be
acceptetl hy t/,nse clinging to a sense of omnipoten~. ~.
At issue is;the experience of death anxiety, which is the
strongest manifestation of vulnerability. Such a deep-
seated sense ot vllineraollll)l e<l II ::'Ulllt:LlIllCjut: aCKllUW1-
edged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at
times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that
there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. ~
those leaders nonetheless remain committed to elimi-
nating precisely that vulnerability-committed, that is, to
the illusory goal of invulnerability. When that goal is
repeatedly undennined-whether by large-scale terrorist
acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to
American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle
East~both the superpower. and the worJd it acts upon

may become dangerously destabilized.-J...1 ~1J

ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE p /
REALISM BAD

if

OCUV)

The objection of our "ownership of history" will allow us to rid ourselves of fabricated fear

-
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)
I To renounce the claim to total power would bring reliefnot
only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the
superpower itself. For to live out superpower syndrome is
to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to break
down. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine his-
tory, the United States is, in actuality, working against
itself, subj eeting itself to constant fail me. It becoIn,t::s a Sisy-
phus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable to
cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to
the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps the crucial step in rid-
ding ourselves of superpower syndrome is recognizing that
history cannot be controlled, fluidly or otherwise.
--
Stepping off the superpower treadmill would also
enable us to cease beinz ;1 nation ruled by fea:::

l\.enounClng qmnipotence might make our leaders-or at

l~st future leaders-themselves less fearful of weakness]

and diminish theIr 1l1ClInatlOnto 1l1still fear in their people
~~means of :enhst1l1g them for military efforts at ilh~ry
world hegerriony. Without the need for invulnerability,
everyone wotild have much less to be afraid of.
ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE p /
REALISM BAD

~ \\I
What we call the historical process ~gely unpre-
dictable, never completely manageable. All the mor~ at
a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of na tion-
alism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses.
I~ addition, t&ere has been a general decline in confidence
~I C _

in the nation state, and in its ability to protect its peopk1fO~

larger world J?roblems such as global warming or weapons
of~1ass-~tr~ction.
___ T_--;
The
.....--.
quick _but dangerous
.'.
substit~
the superpow:er, which seeks to fill the void with a global-
~d, militari~ed extension of American nationalism. The
traditiona ~tate whatever its shortcomings, could at
least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and
a.2articular people or cpmbination of peoples. The super-
power claims'to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lacks
legitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its
--"
l~aders glust struggle to 1ll:-1sk QLS.l!.j2,press
...". their own doubts
-,

_._._---~~
about any such legitimacy.
The
"- Amei"ican superpower is an artificial construct,
widely perceIved. as. illegitirrL,ne"-.whateve,r .the ac~uies-
cence it coerCes inothe~. Its reign is therefore inherently
unst;bk. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination

;~,,-~-----"<.=
marks the beginning of its decline. A - -"..,'"
large task for the
/'
world, and for Americans in particular, is the early reco..g-
_~tio~:~~_ hu.:::a~:..:::anage..:nent of that decline.)

~L.
~
ADI2KS
BRUSCHKE P /
REALISM BAD

A) r DeCoV)SfrUch'oln
ALTERNATIVE
WE MUST DECONSTRUCT POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND ITS DOMINANT
REPRESENT ATIONS OF THE WORLD TO FURTHER UNDERSTAND
FOREIGN POLITICS
Campbell 1992
(Davi~, Prof~ssor of Interna~ional P.olitics at the University of Newcastle, Writing
Secunty: Ulllte~_States Forelgn_Po~lcy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 7,8)
,
~or the most part, however, thes.e developments have been repre- ;'"
sented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during ':' ; .
the cold war. To be sure, they are not represented as being reducible to,
, Soviet behavior, I3ut these challen~es are represented as dangers lo~ed inl
I an external and anarc.hic environment which threaten the security of an \

~~at functioiis have difference, danger, and otherness played in '

internal and d~s{ic
;; constituting the identitsocietv, ofttffVia-reeOHfse.to-viOlenn;.-TliiSProvo-Kj'
of the Unit,," ~ta~....a.JnajDf actor in....IDt.. I:
\,national politics? To pose the question in these terms, however, is a little
ini!i-re'imiTig~( It is not intended to suggest either that it is a strict functional
requirement of American identity that difference and danger be articulated
as otherness, or that only certain groups or phenomena can be other. As
!:21L9.lllt_~.rgY.~~_,_~i~_!.~~£ES!:_ to ths"S2!lti ne.!.n.~11U1Lrb~!l~n d ",~.ls.;
repression of certain se~'-!.al.p..!'\!s.!iceUrLt~e ni~_~enth century~~s.:y"e.J~.
~f'L r:~tio!:!.'D!.tJ.b.£.!~§.!;ilivg.LQ.~-r.e}l.ujj,".ed,.b¥..
•.l.I.\l\-.!Jg~"Q,i"~=.iLQ.mWkl!iQ.!'\:,;,1l1~.

bourgeoisie wa~ i~ ~.not".iu_tb"c..m<k<LQ.J;..tl~p'h~eIJ.QQ..£t0!~"ti 19.

~atlOn, ut in the Rrocedural.§.Y.ste_ITI..th~<.?..'!g!l..~hich~~UC~.sbl;:'ill.Q.S
~~~~!.s..52flZ!$;.5L::J.!1-2£t~_~':>.l..~~~P~,.£~0.0.~the!. than
those targeted could have been the objects of surveillance and discw.lin~,
~~~£~§~h1Zh~~~~edEFn~£§n
t~~:~~~'"ac..s~i~~i,
In [his context, for the United States, the current perioA-in world
/.~, politics can be understood ..as being characterized
II by the representation of
J<j )-::. ncwe;T"chalienge;fn terms ofrraditwnal analytics, and the varie<rattemptsto
t"> C0iepla-Ce-one-en-cmy·'wl'tll(an')other."1
n conseilin~~:th~~argu~m"to-Bl:-I
'\"'," ",J, ~;JeheresuggesEnnar~~~L~.~~I~~~~~~~~e~~ \
.;c,'j' -=.hallenges; a~?~p~~~:~,.Ls~S~.Q~~.~~2;1~~~!.~I(J.'~WS;;:~'s~~R".t!}J1~·
\
- ',' ... t r:i!E£J:!~i'.~S~,~~!~~3;;,~,~.~~!!.~~1~,.!9..[,,~,gR~<?.h.s~~l.?~~~!b~,§~qi,lJ\fg~,«~i!.t19.l~H~§'
.
. 1 by which they are calculated as dangers, and the means by which they come
, i;"t-'f:
.•.• ,""< __ tto"jcotFler~·'>W~~:-:;~":"'-:!-I"·'>;~-":""f:"!~~'~r.?'-":~:.'~~·,"",~""l;:''''''!':=_1'o'.~~M:1""'~IM-'~:W-""""
__.I""'o"""'''''~''''''''__~''''''>·'>':>;.":j''''''''''''''''''''''~;:;:
__ ~.

(1) ('!;,j"·~~ing. the ,issue of th~ role dan~er and difference ~

.- constItuting the Identity of the UIIlted States lIIvolves 3. deconstructIOn of
.~t\ c.:?.!2..ventionalQolitical discourse and its sdf-presentatio~n,~t
.".-:"'- effected in the practice and analysis of both international relations and
~:;~ ~. forcign pol~n reorienting analy~~ from :he conc<:rn :v~th the inJIT1tio~~
"~Ot:~Wacts of pregiven subjects to the Qroblematlc.ofsubJectlvlty,: the argument
,\~
( as-. a political practice central to me constItutIOn, proauction,
:-:r--.: and main.-.c
"tv' .' teniiiceof Americ~a_llP(JJitical identi~y. In order to delineate more...p.a:.ci~.
" .'
~t~ th;7ei'a.iTonshfPbetween
'beiJ],g made here proposes foreign po.licy. and political
that. Unit~tes foreign iden~itV" thisunderstood
policy be ar~ument

, '-~t
,~~ conven!!onarVi~
'{Ji
IS predIcated upon a reconcepruahzatlon
international reJatio?sof understandmgs
indebted: most spegfj~econceptuahzat1on
~nd fo~eign .policy
to which
is deeply.,
the
of IdentItY and the state.
------'. '1 '

G~
ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE p I
REALISM BAD

A- \ t:Re'\
___U e{t Rfy l \'sVvJ
1'-.11
em bV'C1ce U1CfJ-Fi/f'V}c:e
We must reject realism and embrace a thinking based on acceptance of difference
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 4.5)

, commitment
"d"Uut thereto one are of them. ~ntrary
alternative ways totSL.!.hectaiC1h'i-IlLcpis.t=ic,.J;e.alislJ.1,
think, and this book exhibits ar
argue that as understanding, inv?l'::~,L~S.P}J£El!1,g,lb,s"}'))Jfilm!l\.~J.,hl"Eh~,~,S!:JE!,1.~~
~; ..;~~,~.~"
~·,.,~.t2<2",[:~~iIF~X;,:".t,r,l(2?s:!;r~GY~5;:i~,J:'!.l..JD\?J.~.sE~.~!:?'.,.~,~_!2S«W~.l!,}~;;;n?J;;~5.~.~),?~~

I
, , ~!2at there i~.,~~.o~!.Jl.DJ!; ...£,y,s~.Lg.52,.,.'£,Lg.~~;~;~!,;~~:
hl':;!:()[logr:.rphv, employ a mode of historical representation
Contrary to a narratlVlZlO
w ich self-
conscIOusly adopts a perspectIve. Anu contrary to the 10 IC of eXDlanation:-r
embrace a logic 0' II1terpretatlOn that acknowledges the improbability of
catalo in " calcularing, and specifying the 'real causcs,' and concerns itself
instead with considenn tIe mam cst po mca consequences of adoptiI?g
Olle mOl eo' ' 'p' ',' ' on over another.

As such, the argument being made here is parr of an emerging

dissident literature in international relations which draws sustenance from a
series of modern thinkers who have focused Oil historically specific modes of
discoursc rather than the supposedly independent realms of subjects and
objects. II Starting from the position that social and political life comprises" a
set of practices in which things are constituted in the process of dealing with
them, this dissent docs not(and does not desire to) constitute a discrete
methodolOgiC<ll sch601 claiming to magically illuminate the previously dark
ri:cesses of global l)()!itics. Nor is it the dissent of a self-confident and
singular figure claiming to know the error oLdl previous ways and offering
salvation from all theoretical sin. Rather, this form of dissent emer~es from
a dis Jaratc and sometimes divergent se;;;;~ of encounters"between the
~aditio!ls of internationa re anons an' themes increasingly prominent 111
other realms of social and olitical inc uirv. It i.' , .
celebmtes difference; the proliferation of perspectives, dimensions and

approaches to the very real dilemmas of global life. It is a form of dissent

WhICh celebrates the artlcularity and context-bound nature of judgements
. and assessments, not because it favors a so-ca e re attvlst retreat into the
i!1eommensura lIt 0 alternatives, but because it recognizes the universal-
.. ist conceits of all attempts to force difference mto t e straIt ac et of
,identIty. t IS a form of dissent s eptlca, ut not cynical - about the
"/~radltIOns 01 mternational relatiorrtand theIr e)anns of adequacy to reality. 1t
~s a form of dissent that is concerned not to seek a better fit between
:hought a?d the world, ,lane:uap'c .ann matt:r, prop,osltlon and facr. vn tl!e
ontrary, It a form of dlSSe 'uestIons the very way our problems
have been osed in these terms and the eonstramts WIt I .' ey 1ave

beencQnsidered,
historically and13_?
posgQle. focuses inste,adonthe way the world has ' been made
:=..Jj

(,ct
ADI 2005
BRUSCHKE
P-_/_-
REALISM BAD

AL T - experiencing animating guilt allows us to overcome the apocalyptic mentality and change the
world

Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)

Like Harry Truman facing his nuclear choice in 1945, most American soldiers sent into battle in Vietnam in those war years
of the late 1960s found themselyes thrown into an atrocity-producing situation for which they were utterly unprepared. But
what I also learned from Vietnam veterans-in the early 1970s I participated in psychologically intense "rap groups" with many
who had turned against the war and wished to examine their behavior in fighting it-was that people need not be
psychologically stuck forever in such moments. Men and women could experience what I came to think of as "animating guilt"
and use it as a means of reiecting the overall American mission in Vietnam and their own part in it. They could express
painful forms of self-condemnation without remaining fixed in a static. mea culpa stance. Rather. they were capable of leaving
both the atrocity-producing situation and the overall apocalvptic mission by transforming those guilt feelings into a sense of
responsibilitv in opposing the war and revealing its grotesque details to the American people-all the while insisting that our
leaders and our society acknowledge responsibility for what was being done in our name thousands of miles away.
More recently. Israeli soldiers, sometimes citing the American experience in Vietnam as a model. have similarly come to
oppose their war, their country's occupation of Palestinian lands and its army's brutal treatment of Palestinians, by refusing to
fight in the occupied territories. Calling their group Courage to Refuse. they declare: "We shall not continue to fight beyond the
1967 borders in order to dominate, expel. starve, and humiliate an entire people." They too have demonstrated an impressive
capacity to transform guilt feelings into expressions of responsibility in seeking to redirect their society toward a more humane
path.
Both groups had to overcome the psychic numbing associated with their countries' impulses toward violent purification and
allow previously suppressed compassionate feelings to surface. A further interesting parallel to these two situations can be
found in the animating guilt of people who were involved in the making of, or strategic planning for, atomic and hydrogen
bombs and were later able to become powerful and knowledgeable voices warning the world about nuclear dangers.

fat;
ADI2005 p /
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
AfT: PERM; REALISM KILLS LOCAL

Any inclusion of a realist approach necessarily reestablishes the destructive power order as
well as destroying the local.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509-
533]

To broaden our knowlede:e of the international does. however. require more than simply addine a few additional lavers of
interpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thoue:ht and action: a shift away from harmonious
common sense imposed bv a few dominant faculties towards a model of thou2:ht that enables productive flows across a
variety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter,
from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbine: thoue:ht towards approaches that add to our understandine:
and. indeed. force us to think into world politics and the tools available to pursue them. They have elevated a few select
faculties. reason in particular. and e:iven them the power to order all others. The result is the erasure of a crucial location of
political struee:les. the domain of representation. from our purview. This is why Waltz's otherwise commendable attempt to
move away from resemblance and recognition ends up in a science-driven process of abstraction that isolates a few select features
and produces generalities trom them. The problem here is not with abstraction per se for abstraction is an inevitable component of
any process of representation. 'We end up with abstraction whether we want "it" or not', Christine Sylvester stresses.41 But
Waltzian abstraction is obsessed with deduction, categorisation and scientific legitimacy. Rather than celebrating the diversity of
life and drawing from its sensual potentials, as abstraction in art seeks to do, the neorealist version 'blocks the construction of
people in international relations and hinders our view of states as more than the proverbial empty boxes'.42 The result is a narrow
and problematic form of common sense. This is why even the more moderate constructivist scholars rely on analytical tools that are
largely confmed to mimetic principles. Consider Wendt's highly indicative position that knowledge needs to be both systematic and
scientific to be of any value. He stresses that '[p]oetry, literature and other humanistic disciplines ... are not designed to explain
global war or Third World poverty, and as such if we want to solve those problems our best hope, slim as it maybe, is social
science'. Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of
the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry,
especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to tmderstand and engage the crucial problem of
representation. We need to employ the full register of hwnan perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world
politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate trom them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater
variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative
repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we
scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

0.0
ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE P /
REALISM BAD

Ad :PC'VYrl

AT: PERM
STATE-CENTRIC SOLUTIONS RECREATE THE STATE'S NEED TO
EMPOWER ITSELF BY CREATING THREATS
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 11,12)
-~ ~~.~r;:.g;?:~~_Q.Lths;!.s~~P'SSi,~5~_!~~!;~ .~~~I_'!,!12~~
understimd national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities which do non
j?ossess "p'reciis~rsive, stabie1(rentm'es~s'-aCOi~nce";-~l!rsta"i:e'r-afe:'
n~;'~k;';rb~~~;'T;ili;;;~~tte'nsl';;;';'"bet;~';;'~~the
various domains that need to be;
a igned for an 'imagined )olitical communit ' to come into being - such as
territoriality and the many axes of identity - and the deman t 1at such an
alignment is a response to (rather than constittJt1ve of) a prior ami stable
identIty. In other WOfdS', states are nev finish as enti· ,the ensi n
~1 the demands of i( entitv and the practices that constitute it ~
never be fully resolved, because the erforma' of identit can
never e u y revealed. 'Chis paradox inherent to s~ir be~~,,~~~
i.!Lpermaner;"t~1eed of rep,~~du~tio.~!;\!5!.I~J;;i£~L?_~~~~~~P,~:51~~m
~ and vanea-'pia~tIces that constituj£ the~ reali ty ,y~§. are (arid
!1a'ffi..lQJ?$).J1b:v~~~s of be.9omL~ For a sF'!-ts...~end its !2.rac"sLs!<s
of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscu rSIve'roUnaations;
Sta$i1CW5TII(:M5'€-dC31l1.5'3""""'-"--~--~"~--"-~--~~··-"':"'-"'"'"~""·~~·'·''.'.
~~~~'~i';;~";;;;;g't!le'crrlveto Ex the state's identity and contain challenges to
the state' s ~Rresef17~;~;;t;;;rTy=;;-r-;E'sorureTysuccee(r'KSlde"Tro'm
recog-;;Er~~t~I;';"t"·'~h~;';·i~;;~"aii"exc·eSr'Orbe;ngov'er~appearance tha t
cannot be contained by disciplinary practices implicated in state formation,
\\'ere it possible to reduce all being to appearance, and were it possible to
bring about the absence of movement which' in that reduction of being to
appearance would characterize pure security, it would be at that moment
that the state withers away34 Ai that point all identities would haye
congealed, all challengcs would ]~ve evaporated, and all need for dis~i-
---"
plmary authorIties.. -------------~._-----.
and their fields of force would have vanished. Should the
s.tatc project of securIty bc successful in the terms in whiQ.l.Li1j;ulrtjcul~d,
t!1Cstatc viotTIucease to eXlst.Secuflty as the absence of movement would'
~esult in death ViastasIs. IronIcally, then the in' .. of the state roject'ciT

~Ity
, . ·'lIing toidentity.~
slIccee , IS t . e guarantor of the state's continued success as an

Col
ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
P ----
/

A-d.~~R1/M
AT: PERM
REALISM CAN NEVER UNDERSTAND DIFFERENCES AS IT SUPERCHARGES
IDENTITY PREVENTING ANY UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 70-71)
Th~.s2.ral impetus behind the location of threats in the external-'
realm -;;mes fro 1;-the fact that the sovereign domain, for all its identifica-
iio';1'as :l\verr-orJCrcd and-;:;;'tio;al' entitY:-;sa:~-mucha site of anlbi~ui!~
·ijld§.~~·;;·~0:.~Y~:.~~2.~~~ili1-;;--~€ili~,lLI0TI;~i~~h~SI.:.f~l.~~-
Whe~ ~ •.,
speak of 'man' we arc refernng to more than Just Individuals or national
types; thc meaning of 'man' incorporates the form of the 'domestic' order,
the social relations of production, the various subjectivities to which they
give rise, the groups (such as women) who are are marginalized inJ:b.~
process; and the boundaries of legitimate social and political actionjIt is
easier to recognize the constructed character of 'man' in societies other than
our own (consider the attention given to 'socialist man')46 than to acknow-
ledge the centrality of this practice to the 'West. ,47 But the~, in
p rin ci pie at leas t, _a..!~:!~~~i,~!~~~.,2f.":y'~~jD=~~bi9.h
S\!QS;fy"...9.~nJJ.£;.J;i)"J.:!~.tLm~s~:
the poss ibi I ities are. 1 imi te~<l.\m!yJ?Y"JJ.lewP.J.i!r;.t.!S~4'u~:ll!~!!'JQG.4S,"9.11,J;.c.r.~<J,.HJ
d;·;1~eis:'ii;c'·~·'~;;~;,{6~!JI~~,,,.~E·i..,S9nG.c.\D~"e,~hiQiJe,g~.9y>,,~.b~,"JlniJs~«.§.t,~t~§,'
I~;;'iiTg'~;;'tro;1'~I\J'Naturalizati()n Service questionnaire. But such dangers are
_ ~_c()nd~~2
._-- ...•._
Hot objective
•. ..__
•... ... .•E2l.JiD,mlY~~~~R'f~';;$.V$.Ql m..~l.1.~
.~.J.'~~na.1.reaJm. Threats to identity are equally prevalent in the challenges to

hom?sexuality, and ~..!lJ.?port 1'0: social asownership

~~~9s:3re.Jhrej,llLtQJ2.~_G.9..D.:>1..Qs:J:f..sL on a par of
wi tlUL,
the reI~.t\.Qn.L2L£.!£-
for8gl1...£]~rn'y.
the don1inaiir'
~,~~rib~,:\1~, enframing of 'man' from within. For some, .. feminism'~
dOo!}L~!!lL:2~l~x,J_:!.!'iy~\!}~~l..~~"ism~"''\,y.!Jl<!.~jQ.rl,~pL
t),)£.~gJJ!,."e:;
!!~~2.~~ ...r,!:~,0,~,1,JLJI"Q.),lbl.s...~~sL'l~n. The interpretations of domestic
socIety resIstant to its inscription must be excluded from the internal reaJm:

belWee1l a domam of domestIc socIety, understood as an identity and a

i
>

'.In effect,of01"".
w~
domain differences,
~narchy, dm" mn"asboat oo",enod
oed understood
discontinuities, ;"'0 '" that
andamconflicts
once bigl!.o.us, '"'010<0 be
.il1detenniJ~;te, fOlllly\
might dlff,,,"c,
an~j.,,':
~1gerolls.' s,-,or11ismSf
which is to 'hide' exclllSlon'lSfrultclle<.f
the status by a second,
of the first (IS an exclusion. For thetheinscription
purpose 01'1
of\
domestic society to appear as llnproblematic, it is not possible for it to be
understood as having the status of one interpretation among many. All
interpretations that seck to expose the inscription of 'man' as a representa-
tion that should be historicized and problcmatized have themselves t.o be
excluded .. :::>

b'6
ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
P / --
,p.\()\ I v (,(VI
~. :: 'l1.?

AT: PERM
FOREIGN POLICY EXCLUDES AL TERNA TIVES OUTSIDE OF ITS PARADIGM
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 78,79)

r/" M0 rco ve r, i!~h e cQll'!:.9LQLF 0 rrignJ?9Ji£x..Jb"e_1Qgj.c""Qi.i(t~liitY..J12Q[~

::.s.1f..!J2.1?'§,N~Q_J.b\<.".p()Jitic£".()LL1C
, !.<:.~~~.i_~L,~_~. gati ()n.•.an rl..tllcM.thro.l1t\ttiQ!U2f ..Q.J;h.SE.'
ness. The claim is not that Foreign P{)Jicy constitutes state identity de lIOVO;
r;;t!1e'r, it is that Foreign Policy is concerned with the reproduction of all
d !h~_CO}2!.£!.!2'.D e Ill.2LS91;11~}lg~~
~!)~'..t!:~_~.i~!~,r.:~.~t.Xj!.Lt;.Q_~J~Y_s:J.Qfl.ru;..§..~a
t<;~._~n
to that identity. In other words, Foreign Policy does not operate in a domain
,\

ia~.t:;~~.~:~:;:~:J~~·pIi;~·.s.~~~l·.:iJ,\S~x:·:~:E~t~::~~~~~.:~:0,:::?~-i~:~~lii:~.:2~:~~~:;;:S~
op th
freeofer' practices.
en tr;;cl1 wcd
hi ch
connlj.K,lLi.n·1.\.fJ.!JXi.i!J;<;
•.q,!J.\1m.'J.tjy~y,.J?g§.~,!,hiJj!;j,\;,~J~R,~j,\4,~.n,ELty;
tingen ci e'S'-or-rc'slstai1CeS:'WhICFi;;~'en~;-~'~~ig;;-P~G~CY
.arlcrt1i·e"·li]ie;1.~i~~--,~'~-d
extensive ~Jatu r~ of tl}e'in£ern~.I' }~f1q,~~;{F.s[n_~I'
··_~.::_II.~~;'i"··~§~:~~~i:ii!l'~~:,:r.G~t'tEG:,~:p.i~ii~'i;,£.o:f¥r"~i~:~iii
.. iEi~":~!'~~~~:L~~~(:~~:
"y,.llLJ1],Q£~.qf.t~[ttb.?'.l1,n9"t,!1e,",?J,\i!XP's'I}£J..l"Q,y,,~h~"LSgS~~.~.~.,t~'
11.~1.!'~,\s.yh!X.•pr.m;,t\.\;.~,
tion of danger. -::.::::"
«"'''',:''~n,.',,,·,,,, ..•;.,.I''''.'·''·'':'' ,
. ' ... ' ,...,
I';> F ina Ily, '~g,:3\.\?(?.5;',S,-lW~~lc.!]1S.P.t_~1!.:!..9,!-!J.~LuR,t"Q~,"J,'-!;l$s!JpJ,9~"~,~~g~,~£,,.~b,~J,.~..!l<;
!)(JHE~,9~rX~.l?LS.9\~s.i~)g.,J}"rf!;wpaJ!G~$,,,Qt",E.m;~igX!J?9!,i~2: 1~...
..L~,~,~!,~"
.. 2.?L9,C;;,~~..,,_?~
identitythat are cl?af!x.d,;:}l;~l:.~.a_~~_d,
si,ng;~lar, and neat. Indeed, Ibiven the
in l1efeE1:ly'co'iltiilg(;i1t i9.~l]..ilii.\'y'h iC~:E1!j{,F3S!rr:§Ii!ie-lf~I§lnill:m:::~§Ji.iI~:a
a 6filaIn'.as .JI1tens"l\;s;.lU1!.L::4tGl1$j;Y,G,.i!~".th!t..ii!)),j;,s:;~.tb.s;~b,(~ill).!l,Q;[j£;'UiJ.Y~ b Iu rred,
r11ultii5Je:-aild"~'t;l;;1:J
'violent. Gloria Anzaldua offers a particularly con~p~m;;g
trJrmuEitl()';;':-'-""'~-'-""'''--

'~he 1I§'M~n border es ulla herida abierta [is an open wound] where the
..iliuS.!~d be(2ls.,~";:s~~_E~_r:.:.::.i.S
J:I:.i,[,sj,jY...2!:!,j,.g!J!.t~,;;;,-i;\ga.iQ~,ub..<:;.1.ir.~.L~_,mi.h!.\.',S'
..h~!~~SJ!Lh,:!I;;~'~Mg,g;i}l!l,_ll.]~.)J[S!?,!£2,\L
...8L.,.\,:Y.s?,.,,;,y..2.:L~.T.~,~~l~9_,.~~,.£~;~~,~.,~~~r.?
c;(~.~ ;5!~sJ~,~.~
. ~.~.~~X,;::.~~,.l;~)!,9;;~,.S\~.l~~!,I\C",j~PI~.$;,E~.,~<~:S
..~.SS,.t!£,
... .. ~.!~::.~~~_~~~s.~.!.~,l:;LS~,~~,~,
..Jt~",fr2~r~,J~ftt;,;
.•~!,~.HQg,m§b
u n~~I,Si,.!.<?', .•tU&\,n.!S;J~A§.,\l~,\!m<cj,!.I}g,J'!'Q.<:;",J!"Mr.&Q,~,"~~~
~~s~~~tf~~9~1::~~;~i;,~r~1ir~~~~!~i~,~&~~~r~~\~~
,",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,",,,,,,,,.'j·W;

Rather than L~iLJ1arrow wpographical line, borders are shifting horizons

;:;:;arked by ftuxand ambigu~ IJ And rather than cIea!'!ydemarc~tingt~
d il';iIity-'or"seT{an"a""o'rheG th ey~--;~-i;rt;~;;-i;;r~~e thr;~gh·_·ati1;rlc
relat;ons!i-jp'''wheri''tIle''preseiige-qrlh-q:§e''~
,----"'....."....-< ,~_ ho'areamoigu
"""'" ~.""'~.~ ous·"ancrTlffilnai
,"""'.,-_._"
,,-~,~~,..,
c:?,~f~~,~;~.~!D:'_~!}22£!S"g£,y.DiJi~.
r~,l?l::,;~!.:E~~i~~"'<;L~~!}~iE.E
'The d efi ni tlo n
of Jdent!ty, in nations and men ... depends for its accomplishment on the
recognition of that which is other, like, and Simultaneously other and like,
and on the abstract, objective understanding of the self that follows from

this recognition.,74 It i: the obiee~i.f~!1 ofl~,S.~S.!f""'> '

th~t".~~J.s.u.r,\.i3~
t::~,!~"2L2.~oJ.l,~~,.!!:~£,1:.9"ffiM;~!1.r.2l!.sLb;?1'£'~.;1£'~:
, r-r"1· .

Coq
ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE P-_/_-
REALISM BAD

A~ ~Reri hsVY) IneVfi C( 01t?

AT: REALISM INEVITABLE

REALISM CAN ONLY EXISTS BY DRIVEN FEAR
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 247)
Of course, my hope is that the force of this analysis will mollify if not
assuage some of these concerns. But it has to be recognized that such a
desire is limited - but not precluded - by the nature of the agonism that
exists between the logic of interpretation (which, outlined in the introduc-
tion, underpins this analysis) and the entailments of epistemic realism. It is
not a limit that is enabled by the incommensurability of paradigms, or some
such formulation, for this agonism is not something which can be resolved
on methodological or epistemological grounds. It is a limit commissioned by
the fact that each approach instantiates a different ethic. Epistemic realism
can be considered a commitment designed to contain what Richard

that either we have some sort of ultimate foundation for our knowledge or
we
Bernstein
are plunged
has called
into the
the void
'Cartesian
of the relative,
anxiety,' the
theirrational,
propositionthe which
arbitrary,
assertSlI1~
the"
nihilistic. As Bernstein notes, the search for a foundation and the anxiety it
inculcates is more than an effort to solve the problem of the basis for
knowledge and truth: 'It is the quest for some fixed point, some stable rock
upon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly
threaten us.' 10 However, this ethical impulse cannot be satisfied, partic-
ularly when we remind ourselves (as chapter two noted) that the culttrfeO
modernity necessitates external guarantees but has erased the ontological
preconditions for them. It was this situation, after all, which granted to fear'
and danger the capacity of securing that which could no longer be reasoned
into existence. As a result, epistemic realism is sustainable only through the
faith of its adherents believing that they are warding off a threat. In
consequence, it seems that the processes which were implicated in the rise
of the state are now replicated in the traditional discourses of the relatio"liSl
between srates. The evangelism of fear centered on death grounded the .
church's project of salvation; the evangelism of fear articulated in the
anxiety about an unfinished and dangerous world secured the state such that
security occupied the position of salvation; now the evangelism of fear
enunciated by those hoping to ward off 'foreign' intellectual influences
~s_to contain the instability of their representations of the world.-·

ID
ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE Ad. : Req \ isn'l
REALISM BAD
\Vlej. P ----
/

AT: REALISM INEVITABLE

TO BELIVE POLITICS IS ONLY RELATED TO THE STATE JUSTIFIES
P A TRIARCHICAL OPPRESSION AND COLONIZATION
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 252-253)

Our political.irnagination.hasJ2e.cnJ!!2poverished by the practices associated

withthcl;~·radigm.of.?overeignty. As discusseu~eof'
the sovereignty/anarch'y' di;ti~tioll works to contain contingency through
the instantiation of a sovereign presence which then acts as a regulative
ideal. In terms of the political field, this has meant that the idea of ~
po~cal'_~~.~.b.~~~~.YJ2§!HIled-by-.and n~b 'the st~' In
effect, the state has colonized our understanding of 'the political' by
obscuring those practices through which it has been 'fashioned in the
likeness of legislated fear,' and foregrounding in their place its claim to be
the source of authorized articulations of danger.2u Integral to this has been
the assumption that political modalities - slIch as strength, resolution,
boldness, will, vigilance, etc. - associated with the regime of Masculine/
feminine (discussed in the introduction) are the natural dispositions of
politics. But such a colonization and such an assumption is rendered
problematic by the retheorization of identity central to this study. More

specifically,. such ~._colonizatio~

understandmg----or is rendered
se·cllnty--Whlch-{..·•. ~..di:Tercnt
mergcSlfom the retheorizatlon
.. "-----" of

~ntity. ~

REALISM IS INSUFFICIENT TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS

Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 247-248 )
. O~ercome \:ith tl:is Cartesian anxiety, traditional scholarship in
l~ternatlOna~ r~lat~ons wIl! probably continue to forget the silences, omis-
SIOns and limitations of the traditional approaches and maintain that

epistemic realism rcsts on more than faith. But the ritual forgetting (whiCh
might be characterised as post-Cartesian amnesia) of the insights of diverse

l
scholars - such as Wittgenstein, Winch, Kuhn, Habern1as, Foucault and
Derrida, all of whom have in some way contributed to the logic 9.f

interpretation
ourselves from - the
can unfounded
only increase
but the ! 1 Besides,
anxi.ety. appeal
seductive only by exorc!5f~g
that SOCialand political
life has to be organised by recourse to either one option or another, and that

move
we cantowards
locate aa situation where we outside
secure foundation are equipped to dealandwith
of politics the issues
history, can~e of
life and death that we confront in ~~obal life .. --"

It
 ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE
ACJ.:· Rect Il'sm wovtj P /
REALIS1Vr RAD

AT: REALISM WORKS

POLITICAL DISCOURSE CAN NO LONGER UNDERSTAND THE
INDETERMANACY OF THE SYSTEM, IT CAN NO LONGER SOLVE NOR
PROVIDE SECURITY
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing
Security: United.~ates Foreign :policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 19,20) ,
. ~ ~The gl~)ba.liza~ionof c~~gencL!~,~;:~:.::;;~.~:::.".~:::~:s~~.~.,t=~den~~e.~ .-,
\ ~.l!
.._~qe.o.~m.2,!gHltX\ ..L~,~.S!.~.[,~,I~y~,SY","~.~Q.,-u,~~~X.ti!.!I.)JX,?D.Q.(J.J..J),2,~gS1~.:.,I:~:~~~~!J~,
~
! !!lese have been long Identified 111academIc IOternatlOnalrelatIOns literature
' ~nder the sigoe!('aiiafcfiY,' these cont~fi'Oinwl1iC1i conres tIlciT
,. understanding as globalized - can no lon~r fJecoot:une(rWTil\';nestab-IT;~d'~
, i~I.:"~Jl}!.£i.!iL~]]1d.~~I~U!~~!i2!l~P~g~!.~·ili-;;·~~.~~rW~Ls~~l?X~
of just being written as 'out there.' Security is not taGe found 'within~' This
ISmore tha;:;UStai-esullorii1terd;:p'~-;;°d~~-c~~~tfie-prollTera'tU;;;'--;;rtru;;a
ts, 0 r
the overflowing of domestic issues onto the world stage .tI~ convc1Ttiunal
response). This is an irru~ which renders all estab-
,J' I!,shed contain"~rs proble;nat!.~~Il~ irr~ption do;;-;wtSimpIY invol~e the'-
, mQX~f~EE"CQDl.f§Ji[!<D.l~JJ.QW,
.•..
q.!2S,
•• ~r2i~
i1tO'rIie .0 tfie'flJUt.,'rafhe:[I:lfie
effective rendering as!ln.Q~r~"9Ithose .doinaln:~ndtr;-;;r entailments, It
maRes"irttI~·~~'D.seTo"sp~;k
of pol;tTc;tocci:iri:i'ng"~;;;;;;ra([tstinct'lnSide'
.! ---:I_.t.. "":::.: I --~_._-_._-

, or 'outside' (such as a 'Third Worl§_"YllicJ2J.~~P~ii'!l!y'_beX~':l~

..~ur.bor.d~rs
;;n,j temporally backwarar-'wnell, for example, US. economic e0Icles
encourage 'Third World eX~.2.£.~~.'c!.!Lfones~I:_'?~_~ngel~swhere
rnanufacturers stamp their auto parts 'made in Brazil' and the clot~lI1ggooas
'~ 1 al\van' to attract lower tariffs; when the defffiJgfaph~t:...c:IJang~s
that have made non-wlute chIldren majorities in the Gi.rrrorrua and New
York school svstems, and will make whites a ni~nority in the Uni.ted States
byrhe year 2056; and when the poverty and poor health care 10 Harlem
makes the area a 'zone of excess mortality' with a death rate for black males
higher than their counterparts in Banglade~h,.ll ...
This globaIization of~'!:£';~!..S);',h~L1IJ~..u:P:If\tlQ,P.,.cl.~t£?JJ.,~!,!1~~~:.,,~~.~~
on Iy rencrerspru[;Tei§T'is..~heJ:.radi.tiooals.{.la.ti.;li\z#!.\?E~£,f0wer,.\sg~r..::.~es,
a IU!E...~~_.E:illiliif,JJj\!~tis~Li~:~L~i.~.~J~2.~£.!.Y.,,;l!1~~c!!2's~~!~;.~~:c~~c:~.
~;;hich have made those. sgatlahzatlOns of power INssI!?le. fhIS IS.wnar I"S
in can..tby,,,·tI1'e·'''l~';;~~;'~--;·;;f
-th-;-;;~;k~;;><;;"f"'Cert~hty"'"12~ The irr~Ip t~f
contingency opens u~e possiglllty ofobse~l!1at~~iW2L!&.i!~;
;;ow'se; - discourses abom prior, primary" and stable IdentitIes - ~ork !,O
....-.•-,--- ..th'c...J.
constlj:Jlte.. d.en.UtJ.G5._l!L':Y.l""
... 10 __
'e M••
name
"~ •••_,,thev OT)erate
••,,,,-,"_""" __ ••: .••
'''--Finally this erasure of certainty' brought on by the lffuptJon of
,
contingency has produced the rarefaction of politic~1discourse,'
. 'JT 0 ~ut .It
simply, while they retain some power, ~he conventional (and foun~atlonal)
cat<::gQ.{il<!u),L{)J:ds;.ciJ~ilie exhau ~te~j, Th eir !y'Q..~~n._Q.Q.!y~Q!)JJ,!l!lQ._Qy._
;;b)'uration_r~~~~E._~an_~ffir~a ti~~_~~y' can. ~u n.~~~::~~_e.2'.!.~!..SD ..S.s...~:d
· ..··".... ·-r·· ,'f'
IdenClty JY speCI ·Ylngexceptlo;~;~=•.....
. and excluslons-:tJut they are no longer
".,~~"",~=" •."~,.~1-,
..",,,~"_.~~
.."~•.~ ..,,".,_.~
. ~'~~~:
;~T~---"'~-r"r~'-I)"-Ortn1fermsof a onor and POSItIveIdeal. I:'..Vcnmore
.\n
'~~'~'1-------..
iiTi;;ort-a'o"tly"
r

time.
[--..---C Pol..
...
~_....-....._
..,.,."......--:-
i··-·-'.
.. I
e to .':D0 JI}.?~S,,~.~J.J2O<"""'_'''~''''~''_''';n.m);.''''''~'''~~=''~''d''''"~""""""""""f'(j
the (1~ •.ire to order has Itself become a source 0 aI}.g£L!!LQ1!.!"
tical.sI~lll~.~!ib..~P.s~52
.. '

h - ..-d f attunement..nlY..2.tm.~~lJJ.~~!£.~t.J.\R~.t.!,I:~~~~;',
normalizatIon, or mastery as tIle
Jases 0 actIOn, t e nee or --",_ .._d'~'-""'--''''''''''''''~'''~=='''''"--~''~'-'-''f
--""--'7"-''';:r-~''-''~''''''-: I' 't or ethiCS as a command; or 0
'.SOY-;;:r-"'gi1ty
technolOgIes
::.'Intever'il'a'd'Tt
.
'ereu:~-n{ and , territoriality
,,~,.' " ..,'. ",,:;;.~~
•....."'_..••.
---'~~~-~"-"-_.'---'
or or
"
·:·"E6~p."fo5Iill~:::;:~~[ity':">
er,
•.¥""...-~~,...,
-"',~~~.J,,,;: or
...•. nower
~,." ....••. as
...
a.~~.£."~"""""
'. aClt
l
as the contame r 0 f no.!.!E.!..c,i?~,.h?-~Jp.<~J,H:J".(;,~R~_=
1I".c-t'~'"'WM'''''''-''''V.,..,.,.".7>(.'.r~'''''

__
.•
~~"~"""""'_~"""''''"''~~'''''_'\

IL
ADI 2K5 P /__
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD

Ad:
EdJ \c i eVll- / [JJOif '?-S

AT: EMPIRICALLY EFFICIENT

JUSTIFICATION FOR COLD WAR ONLY LEGITIMIZES THREAT
CONSTRUCTION AND OTHERIZA TION
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 249-250)
We are now at an historical juncture where the demise of the Soviet Union
means that policy makers in Washington are looking forward to a new era in
international Lelations, the outlines of which they can barely discern. What
is clear, however, is that the optimistic view in which it was held that-the so=-----,
called post-cold war period would be a fundamentally different era in world .'
politics placed too much credence on the essential qualities of a suppose,~ly

a view was possible only because it ignored the debt that subjectivity owes
to otherness and the roleother
independently-existing the as
requirements
the basis forofanidentity play ofthreatst'suCh'\
assessment in giving rise to
discourses of danger. What the United States-led war in the Persian Gulf
demonstrates is that above all else the cold war was not based exclusively
upon an orientation towards the Soviet Union:-rnoeed-;-wlJatE!~nt
demonstrat;;a--=- particuriuly when considered in terms of the above analysis,
with its. consideration of the themes apparent in the 'discovery' of the New
World, the colonization of Ireland, the Puritan settlement in America, and
the subsequent moments of identity conflict from colonial times through to
the red scares of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries - was th.e....Jyay-tn.
w.h!.c~certain targets and techniques of exclusio~common to disparate
h~_torical moments. In each of those instances, for all that was specific to the-'
time and place, there was mor~Qften,.than-nQUUi.t;.!!se of <:.n~1angerment..
ascribed to the activities or-tile orher,_.a.J~ o'f-Internal challenge and ,
subversloil," a tendency to crimil}1J.liz.e..Qrmilitari~a wjlling~ss"F
to tightly draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between 'us' and 'thWl>' . '

(tnere~Jt:utIng
aiili1T~t.i_()IJ_..?ftfiese· 'dO;:;;-estic'
ratIons andandrepresentations
' m:ci~iteoo~inality),
to dangers and be
that could an .
located ,~"_0lC external realm sU~Qtions of SOYerelgnt~ere·"
<S.!.!~s~ined.Accordi~ly, the cold war was not ~ to one state or 01e
ideology:- The cold war was a powerful and perva.sive historical configuration
---
"of thediscucsive economy of identity/difference
-- operating in multiple sites,-.--

~be ~o_~i:...?X_'.Vhichis outli~Qg....th(;-ae-mise....Q[ its most rece1!LO.hj_~lLQfi\

0"~.!W.·_--",

13
 ADI 2K5
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
P ----/

A~~:~~e;V\all :k):"d ;,~( t' " ,-\ I'r', •, -"'

..
L o D,-, 1 .. 1/1..,
...., ·0 " ...., .,,-, ..( I \.\.'-·t I I ..J" I
<:

vd
The global dominance of the United States has lead them to claim "Ownership of History."

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

, ~)ut this "global empire" does not follow previolls imperial

models, say, of the British empire from the eighteenth to the
twentieth century. There is no American plan for leaving
elaborate bureaucracies in every country we dominate~
While all previous empires claimed some kind of noble mis-
sion, the new American mission contains a particularly fer-
vent rendering of vVilsonian altruism. The National
S<:;curityStrategy statement th;l t dW;ld ministration released
in September 2002 speaks ~randly of the American inten

tion "to extendthe benefits offreedom across the gl9be" and

I
"to help make :the world not just safer but better.."
- At the same time it makes clear that, into the foresee-
able future, I;\.merica intends to hold absolute military
dominance~dme might say omnipotence-on our planet:
"The United {States," as the National Security Strategy
puts it, "must and will maintain the capability to defea~
any
.. attempt by an enemy-whether state or non-state
actor-to im~ose its will on the United States, our alli~,
-;1' our friend~. We WIll maintain the forces sufficient to
support our pbligations, 'and to defend freedom. Our
~orces will be:strong enough to dissuade poten tial adver-
saries from PNrsuing a military buildup in hopes of sur-
passing, or egualing, the power of the United States.'~
Bookman
_. con:Curs with many observers in describing this
strategy as "a plan for permanent US military and eco-
nomic domination of every region of the globe."~
ADI 2K5

V
BRUSCHKE P /__
\\kkALISM
/\ BAD

Tk Bush. administration's projection of American

power extends not only over planet Earth, but through the
mIlItarization of space, over the heavens as well. Its strate-
gists dream of deciding the outcome of significant world
events everywhere. We may call this an empire ofjtuid world
control, and theIrs IS nothwg less than an inclusive claim to
fFle ownership; of history. It is a claim never made before
because never: before has technology permitted the imag-
imng ot such ;~nenterprise, however illusory, on the part of

a head ot state and ,hIS wner CIrcle ..•

The administration's strategic document quotes a

phras~ from one of the president's speeches concerning the
dangers we face "at the crossroads of radicalism and tech-
nology." What is Ineant by that phrase is the apocalyptic
marriage between ultimate zealotry and ultimate weapons
in our enemies, but the "crossroads" mentioned applies no
less to American policy, specifically as laid out in this doc-
ument. The administration's radicalism takes the form of
aggressively remaking the world in an American image.
Our unprecedented world dominance, made possible by
OLlr ul1lque mIlItary technology, becomes our means of
doing so. The fluidity of this version of imagined world
control is consistent with the Rumsfeld doctrine" of a fluid
military. The latter is to sustain the former. Technology
and f] uidity are counted upon to minimize American casu-
;llties and streamline war-making in general. (American
lcaders for instance claimed the victory in Iraq demon-
strates that, to win wars, we no longer have to engage in
saturation bombing of cities as in World War IIJ.j

1t;'
ADI 2KS
BRUSCHKE P /
REALISM BAD

Ad Cc>\c\ WC1V

AT: COLD WAR

WE NEED TO CONSTANTLY QUESTION THE NEED FOR USING REALIST
AND THREAT CONSTRUCTION TRAINS OF THOUGHT IN EMPIRICAL
EXAMPLES
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 34)
',/'The
_ cold war, then,
_~_.~ _ was
.. both a struggle which
-,-..,-'--'''-- --.. exceeded
.•. --- ..~,.-n- the ''"~-'''''
milita!y'
.•.
--' ''r,_
:h r:.~~
~~:f, t~:..S (;~~~: .. ,~~~,~~,~}"',~~,9,.~,,,;~E~;K~L~,,.~~!~,~;.,.;y~~L~.h,~lWX,,!J\l.1,1,\Q.);f.,,5?f
..~bJ.ef!t,-
6°. teI:tial ca[iama tes- ..re gard Ies~.52L£h£ir..?,.t;r,{jX~gU;hG.{j,g~city'"J;Q,."RS;,,'!,
were ~1(;·tt~J·"~s";t'th;·~~t':"·"t;;'~"tl~is se~~e, the collapse, overcoming, or
surrc;;dC';:"o(C)'I:;',t'(;rUj6'pfbragonists at this historical juncture does not mean
'it' is ovcr. T'hc cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if wc
recall that thc phrase 'cold war' was coined by a fourteenth-century Spanish
writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we
comc to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase denotes is a struggle
over identity: a struggle that is not context-specific and thus not rooted in
the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union.77 Besides, the United
States-Jed war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western
(and part.icularly American) ~nte~tive dispositi<.:..r::~~.~b-J.2.rS!;t~~mi~n..
the pos t-World War II. ir~.s.LI}.?J!Ql1ill..,,);,!lY,.iW.!lill~,P,t.,;;;,"~.iJ;t""J,1;1~,iL?~~JQ~§}l .!]
.~Il,~iY;~\;~,:QGni~lii~i[:9w;;~~L~~j,~!2.1,":~~~,~~;';~;~~2LI2,!l2,a,llKSLWJ?1l,~,~,§£K'!9SSL,t,2,,,~r
tl}.S"a,s,~i::!!,!~,~.~L,~,~*'?,5~,~b,~,£I.~~!:.~,fu~LQ,Li!)J~EQ,~~sh~I,IS,~1?S,,~!1~~.~;!£,:::9...:.,s.!g~,.,~h~
~~S\U!SL!s):!iLE0,U\S::E\~~S,,,a,lLl~~R,Qm(;$.,,,a!),,~t~!~!1,"~UEri:~~~;~.~,?"~~~~~,~~<?,,,~LI}9;". ..?~,
~.~E;;.~~sSl,~Y!.!!lfS!js.:,,;'!.~:LS,,~5.~'sS,~.~~,~ ..:~?,~t,b,2!:;"::;.::y,~!?.,,~~r,,.~£~~~~:;,t~.,~~,~
..~~.~te,
6r ons ideolo/'y .. A;.a~o~sequence, we ,need t?rethink the c,?!1ventionaI
u nders tand ;;;g.;r.' f~r~ign"'"p'oficy':'an(f"tj~~'l{i';'t~;i~i'ty' "of"t!1e' '~01ct" ;~~ 'i'~
P";-ifti c~ la'f' ...,.."y::::.,~".,....
. ,,::>,....,.,,,.,'.,,..
....."''' "."".,

1~
7Il/il
ADI 2KS
BRUSCHKE
REALISM BAD
P ----/

f\;) :T0i rf01t5

eX I' ,5-\-

AT: THREATS EXIST

Danger and threats are non-existent, they are socially constructed in an attempt to
maintain social order and justify exterminating the other
Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 2,3)
-,/'F urthermo re, the r~~_0:.iEs,?rprS!:~i nj'!}..lh.~_!!Lt.i~'l~~!2.!l2.L!4g,ng~!E
0 '
nOt' restricte~"t2 .•~tLS)ro,cess by which some risks come to beconsidered
"nl0f'c'iieri"6'U-s,than. oth ~-;;~A;1;;'[;p(j';:tantslte'orii1terpretanon"'ls'tEe-w~y T;;-
\vfilcfi"cer't;i'~~';;:;;'d';;:;-Z;{'~-;;presentationcrystallize around referents marked
as dangers. Qiven .~~_of.~~ous relationship b~~~!}.1lJl..~~s.",.mr.!:<Jat0J1
of dangSL.fl.JJJL.t.b.9,:SJbiective' incl<JenC'e-ofl)erlavwrsand factors thought to
ci)'nstrt~s.~.j!,., th~,,\.:~Il!)S:IhYJ~.!-fi?-4!Ii£uT~r-~isk-tc)~b;'~~p;~;"D"te(r;ll·'rc"iiTls"'o'f
a'lilf:lcteristics that are reviled in' the~'~~li;;;-;"iitysaid·;:o-Ge·.t.f{reat;~ea.C'an
l;e";;I~"i;;p~~Z;;';-i~';petL;s-t;-;;'i~~~'~;;~;'t;'t;-;;~~ordan'ge'r:"A's'r;;~';"~'h;p't~~~
w irrdemo!ls trarC:"0ie ab i ~!.£it£i~ri~~EI'ihlj;-g~~~~~§;;I; 12t.:!?:::.::Es
ive, dirty,
o r ~isb
.. .._h.'!~....9.£9I.u1i~ri!L~?
..~~:?
..~a,r......
~!S~~~~S,g~oLci.~.I:J~~~J!L.thS]Sjil.~:~L~an
expenencc.
····In ...thl;;·~ontext, ~t is also i,mporrant to note that there need not be an w • __ •__ ••••••• ·~_"". •••• _

action or event to provide_ili!<",gI.oJ.!!JJ.!.s ..f.Q.u~Q.iDJt;;JPJ:~..~!!Ji.QLtof da!l~£:. T~S...:~ .

mere existe ncs ...?L~.!l....ili~.!I!ati.Y.s
.....1J!.QJle_o£ ...h.\',':jDg,
..-th\',': ..,pJ:\<§J;D'!;~""Q.(.)Y.biG..h •. ~'ti:J/r,y
~~I§:£!:~[§I1§.u!!!IS!g.Q.Lj.gs!)J,iti..~"L:),l~Q2~~~jJS"~DS1JhV,li .•deJ1i;U.waE?;¥-\'L£,Q$;. ;~~:;.,-,
~ of a particular id~ntity~~e the tru~~:..~~~~tim;:~ ..l~ ;j;;k/')
...!2.'2.?ul?.~~
fr~duc~~~ ...~.Ederst!.t;2!22tL~L~..!;§.at. 61n conse.quence,. only in these'terms
It IS possible. to understand how some acts of mternatlOnal power pohtlCS Jr'!,
i:'
raise no~a whit of concern, while something as seemingly unthreatening as
the novels of a South American writer can be considered such a danger to
national security that his exclusion from the country is warranted. 7 For both
insurance and international relations, therefore, danger is the conseguence

an'dSequesters"'anideal
.,- calculation
of a....·~."""'--
...v.-· ..,,>.·,_.~"~
of the l<!~J1Ji~..9.Lj;h>;_.peQple...said
of a":;!.1J~~LlYb.iYJ)_gJ:!k££.iD$~Y.Y!;'!2.t~,
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