Reclaiming Nubra Locals Shunning Pakistani Influences

Senge H. Sering
August 17, 2009

The liberation of Turtuk block and Siachen glacier in 1971 and 1984 respectively eliminated any
threats that could have come from Pakistan having a contiguous border with China along the crest of
the Karakoram Range and endangering Indias sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir. Today, they form
part of the Nubra sub-division of Leh district.
Nubra is sandwiched between the Ladakh and Karakoram mountain ranges. It borders the Gangche
district of Baltistan (POK) to the west, while both Xinjiang (Chinese occupied East Turkestan) and
Shaksgam (Chinese occupied Baltistan) lie to the north. For centuries, Chinese, Russians and later the
British traversed this valley to reach the legendary Silk Route and access the markets of Central Asia
and India. For commercial reasons, the people of Baltistan too used Nubra valley to reach Yarkand,
Hotan and Tibet.
The loss of Turtuk block and Siachen was detrimental to Pakistani expansionist motives, which
considers Kashmir its jugular vein and desires its complete occupation. The advent of Afghan Jihad in
the early 1980s eventually helped Pakistan Islamize the Kashmiri struggle and perpetuate a proxy war
upon India. In order to expand the scope of militancy to other parts of Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistans
notorious secret agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) introduced Jihad to the peaceful region of
Ladakh especially in the Muslim parts of Kargil and Turtuk. Subsequently, training camps were
established in Gilgit and Baltistan. From Baltistan, the militants crossed into Ladakh. The rough terrain
of Ladakh helped these miscreants reach the Kashmir valley without being noticed.
The people of Gilgit and Baltistan resisted establishment of militant training camps and the use of
Baltistan as the launching pad for infiltration into India. Pakistani militants have never been fair with
the people of Gilgit and Baltistan. Locals still talk about the genocide of 1988 when the militants
attacked Gilgit and massacred innocent people. On their way out, they abducted hundreds of women.
Eleven years have passed and no one knows what happened to those women. Further, locals also
knew that by allowing their land to become the launching pad for militancy, they were inviting the
unwanted wrath of the Indian army. In case war broke out, it was the land and people of Baltistan and
Ladakh which were going to suffer the damage and not Pakistan. Given this background, the locals
demanded that all the camps should be closed and militants should be moved out. In one incident,
people of Skardo town engaged in armed skirmishes with the militants that led to imposition of
curfew. In Gilgit, the locals managed to kill some militants who threatened the lives and property of
the people. Despite this stiff resistance from the locals, the ISI continued its operation from Gilgit and
Baltistan into Ladakh.
After losing Siachen glacier, the then president of Pakistan, General Ziaul Haque, once said that it was
not worth for Pakistan to spend so many resources on the defence of this glacier since not even a
blade of grass grows there. Yet, Pakistan has persisted with attempts to recapture Kargil, Turtuk and
Siachen. No doubt, the loss of Siachen glacier created threats for Pakistans as well as Chinese
strategic interests in Xinjiang and Central Asia. The finale came in the shape of the Kargil war in 1999
when both militants as well as Pakistans regular army i.e. Northern Light Infantry Regiment, attacked
Kargil and Turtuk sectors of India. Like the previous three wars, Pakistan also lost this war to India.
More than four thousand soldiers of Northern Light Infantry Regiment as well as hundreds of militants
lost their lives during this war. Indian army also lost many soldiers in this uncalled-for incident. During
the Kargil war, the people of Turtuk played a major role. For over a year, intrusion of militants from
this sector went undetected as the locals not only failed to inform the Indian army but some were also
suspected of harboring Pakistani agents.
Repeated exchange of hands of these areas between India and Pakistan has raised doubts about the
loyalty of the people of Turtuk block, who themselves are confused and uncertain about their future.

Every time Pakistan makes an attempt to capture Turtuk, which it lost to India in 1971, locals fear
their destiny changing once more. There are those, still alive, who fought in the Pakistan Army against
India and now live in Nubra as Indian citizens. The issue does not end here. Half the villagers and their
relatives still live in Baltistan as refugees; they failed to reach back to their villages before the
ceasefire blocked all travel and communication. Sixty two years on, they still desire to be reunited with
their loved ones on the Indian side.
The very same weary people sometimes become tools in the hands of ISI. The agents offer money, or
promise to provide an opportunity to meet their separated relatives, or provoke the locals in the
name of Islam and helping the cause of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Locals feel that refusing to
support ISI may also hurt the lives of their stranded relatives in Baltistan. A university student from
Turtuk whom I met in Delhi said, We have heard that ISI agents harass and physically torture those
Baltis who refuse to provide help. Pakistani army has made many attempts to recapture our villages.
If they succeed, then they might also punish those among us who resisted providing support to the
ISI. After all, our relatives who still live in Baltistan are at their mercy.
In Pakistan, most of the refugees are treated poorly and still await allocation of land to build their
homes. Those who lost their land to wars have not received any financial compensation. There are no
refugee centers built for them. Many families subsist on charity and panhandling in Skardo town.
Educational and health facilities are unavailable to their children and women. Many face torture and
the charge of disloyalty to Pakistan, as they were once Indian citizens. During the Kargil war, I
interviewed several people of Chorbat and Saltoro valleys. They complained of injustices by Pakistani
armed forces and militants who despised them of being non-Muslims (Shias and Nurbaxshis are
considered infidels by the Wahhabi militants). A taxi driver confessed that their lives and property are
at risk if they do not show support to the militants. In 1999, militants shot and injured a woman in
Skardo town for refusing accommodation to them. Further, a local contractor informed that militants
use local vehicles to transport supplies to the LOC, but that the drivers or the vehicle owners are
usually not paid for their service. In Chorbat and Saltoro sector, women do sheepherding. They
become regular target of sexual harassment by Pakistani forces. Sexual assault on local women is
used as a tool to create fear and force locals to engage with the militants.
With rampant poverty and lack of direction, they get exploited by the ISI agents. The jobless youth
are offered porter jobs with the armed forces advancing to the high passes along the LOC. There they
are ordered to cross into Ladakh and carry weapons with them. Those who refuse, like the porters of
Henzel village, get killed at the border by the ISI agents. Under these conditions, the poor villagers on
both sides of the LOC have very little choice but to comply with the demands of ISI personnel.
During the Kargil War, Indian army suspected some residents of Turtuk of helping Pakistani militants. A
door to door search operation involving both soldiers and police personnel led to confiscation of huge
caches of sophisticated and heavy weaponry. The arms were hidden in the high pastures to facilitate
the militants in capturing mountain peaks and passes over the Turtuk sector. In total, twenty four
locals were arrested and sent to Leh district jail. Among them were shepherds, farmers, jobless youth
as well as some government employees. Later, when they were acquitted and declared innocent, the
government employees were also reinstated to their jobs.
The people of Turtuk are still uncomfortable answering questions related to this incident. In a
conversation with some of those who were arrested, one said, The incident was a grave mistake. It
was the darkest chapter of our lives and we want to put it behind us and never look back. We are
thankful to the Indian army and police for pardoning us. According to them, militants planned to
capture the Turtuk block and Siachen glacier. But the operation failed to materialize. The locals say
that out of fear, they stored the weapons but when they were told to fight alongside the militants
against the Indian army, the villagers did not comply. The weapons which arrived from Baltistan were
smuggled as hunting guns with better range and accuracy. The villagers told Dr. Ravina Aggarwal that
many among those who possessed guns even did not know how to operate them.

A government employee who was also arrested, said, Our relatives from Baltistan, residing as
refugees in Khapulo and Skardo valleys, informed us through the agent that their survival in Baltistan
is endangered if we did not cooperate with the militants. He further said that some relatives were
very hopeful that very soon Turtuk block will be unified with Baltistan and all divided families will also
be reunited.
Abdul is a native from Nubra. Some of his friends were among those arrested. During a conversation
he said that Pakistani agents lured uneducated and poor shepherds who regularly traveled to high
pastures with their livestock. When they accepted the hunting weapons, they could not understand
the consequences and complexities in the context of the Kargil War. Some of them were offered
money, while others were provoked in the name of Muslim brotherhood and Jihad to remain compliant.
Those who refused to accept the weapons were harassed by the ISI agent. Once the Kargil war began,
villagers got suspicious of those bringing guns from Baltistan and informed the local police of the
weapon stockpile.
Times have changed and the people of Turtuk have also learnt from their mistakes. Incidents like the
Mumbai carnage and growing influence of Taliban in Pakistan have made them realize that extremism
and militancy are cancerous for the peaceful existence of humans. Abduls friends are of the view that
Mumbai carnage was an attack on the whole country. It was the biggest aggression by Pakistan after
the Kargil war. The activities of ISI and its accomplices have made loyalty of the Indian Muslims to
India questionable. Pakistan is willing to sacrifice Indian Muslims for its own selfish expansionist
designs. This exposes Pakistans claim as the guardian of Muslims. Abduls friends claim that even
today, Taliban work for the ISI. Taliban are a danger for the entire humanity. We fear more attacks on
places like Turtuk if Taliban become stronger in Pakistan. Those who kill innocent people including
religious minorities like Shias cannot be Muslims. We condemn such killings which occur with the
approval of Pakistani government. Pakistan exploits religious sentiments of people like us to advance
its political agenda. In the end, Pakistani regime will not resist from getting us killed if that will help
them capture Jammu & Kashmir.
The natives of Turtuk are aware of the fact that people of Gilgit and Baltistan are denied their political
and cultural rights. One of Abduls friends opined, In the twenty first century, it is very shameful that
people of Gilgit and Baltistan lack basic political rights. In Ladakh we have the Hill Council and political
autonomy. We also heard about the murder of Mr. Asad Zaidi, a prominent Balti politician. I believe
that Pakistan has failed to provide security to the people of Gilgit and Baltistan. If Pakistan is not
willing to give basic human rights to the locals, then it should vacate these regions and let the locals
decide about their future.
The people of Turtuk have redirected their attention and energies to promote socio-economic
development of their village. The local youth join the Indian Army and in this way safeguard their
valley from infiltrators. The locals strongly support Indian initiatives like Operation Sadbhavana (OS)
which has alleviated poverty and created jobs. Through OS, locals receive qualitative health and
educational facilities. The Goodwill school provides computers in classrooms. Through OS, the village
has a hospital, lady doctors, dental section, an X-ray unit, a pathology lab and free medicines. These
facilities are a distant dream for the residents of Chorbat and Saltoro across the LOC, where more
than 30,000 people live.
Dr. Leena Parmar writes that those few locals who once supported Pakistani agenda of extremism and
militancy are now actively engaged in removing them. Lt. Gen. Arjun Ray of Indian Army who
oversees the OS claims that Ladakh is a militancy free zone. Do we see a day dawning on the
Kashmir valley when the locals will shun support to Pakistani infiltrators and ISI accomplices?
http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/ReclaimingNubraLocalsShunningPakistaniInfluences_SHSering_
170809.html

Talibanization of Gilgit-Baltistan and Sectarian Killings

Senge H. Sering
October 19, 2009

The authorities in Gilgit-Baltistan were not quite done celebrating the proclamation of the
Empowerment and Self-governance Ordinance of 2009 1, when a bomb rocked Gilgit town on
September 27 sparking off the latest bout of Shia-Sunni riots. 2 Gun battles in the aftermath of the
blast have led to the death of more than twelve people, including Raja Ali Ahmed Jan, a prominent
leader of the Pakistan Muslim League. 3 The incidents, culminating in a short-lived peace in this
Pakistani occupied Shia region of Jammu & Kashmir, have led to the detention of several civilians as
well two policemen. Some of the arrested are allegedly linked to those who assassinated Deputy
Speaker Asad Zaidi and his companions in Gilgit in April 2009. 4 Zaidi was the third-most high profile
Shia politician, after the revered clerics Agha Ziauddin 5 and Allama Hassan Turabi, to become the
target of sectarian violence a menace that has troubled Gilgit-Baltistan socially and economically,
since the 1970s. Agha Ziauddins death in January 2005 caused widespread clashes leading to a sixmonth long curfew and emergency, and loss of more than two hundred lives. Allama Turabi, shot dead
in Karachi on July 14, 2006, hailed from Baltistan and was the President of Tehrik Jafaria of Pakistan
(TJP). His death has been termed as detrimental to Shia rights movement in Pakistan. 6
In the sequence of events, as one looks back, eighteen people including the Director of the Agriculture
Department of Gilgit7 died in 2008 as a result of Shia-Sunni clashes. However, by far, 2009 has seen
more sectarian killings than the previous two years put together. It started in the middle of February
when two Shias were killed in an attack on a van in Gilgit. 8 Then, on June 17, ISI personnel arrested a
Shia political activist, Sadiq Ali, and tortured him to death. 9 Two months later, when the leader of the
banned anti-Shia political party Sipah-e-Sahaba of Pakistan (SSP), Allama Ali Sher Hyderi was killed in
Sindh, riots broke out in Gilgit leading to the closure of markets and heavy gun battle between Shias
and Sunnis.10 In September, two Sunni Pashtuns and three native Shias were killed in Gilgit while a
bus with Shia passengers coming from Baltistan was torched, causing several casualties. 11
For centuries, people of Gilgit-Baltistan, professing various religions, co-existed in amicable conditions.
It was only after Pakistans annexation of these regions in the seventies that anarchy began. First,
authorities abrogated the State Subject Rule, the law that until then protected the local demographic
composition, and encouraged Pakistani Sunnis to settle in Gilgit town. This illegal governmentsponsored settlement scheme damaged the social fabric and provoked religious feuds that continue to
simmer. Pakistan created a political vacuum and a law and order crisis, once princely states and timetested administrative structures of Gilgit-Baltistan were abolished. While Islamabad refused to
delegate powers to local Shias by establishing viable a modern political structure, the despotic military
rulers maintained ad-hoc policies to govern the region with an iron fist. It was during the same time
that Pakistan embarked on its well-rehearsed divide and rule policy to paralyze local society. It
exploited ethnic and religious fault-lines to weaken the natives in their demands for genuine political
and socio-economic rights. Government-led Shia-Sunni and Shia-Nurbaxshi riots caused acute sociopolitical polarization in Skardo during the early 1980s. Events like these forced members of the local
intelligentsia like Wazir Mehdi, the only Law graduate of Gilgit-Baltistan from Aligarh University, to
admit that unification with Ladakh and Kashmir brought culture and civilization to the region while
opting for Pakistan has resulted in the arrival of drugs, Kalashnikovs and sectarianism. On occasion,
agencies employ religious leaders to fan hatred. In one such incident, intelligence agencies released a
Punjabi cleric, Ghulam Reza Naqvi, from prison to be sent to Gilgit to keep the pot of sectarian
violence boiling. His release was granted after negotiations with SSP, which also got their leader
Maulana Mohammad Ludhianivi freed from jail. 12A watershed in the history of Gilgit-Baltistan causing
permanent trust deficit was reached in May 1988 when tribal Lashkars, after receiving a nod of
approval from General Zia, massacred thousands of Shias in Gilgit and abducted local women. The

intention was to undertake demographic change by force in this strategically located region
sandwiched between China, the former Soviet Union and India.
The recent killings of Shias in Gilgit-Baltistan may also hinder the election process for the GilgitBaltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) that will take place in November of 2009. With the newly
proclaimed self-governance ordinance, GBLA is expected to legislate on 66 articles pertaining to socioeconomic and administrative issues. While local political institutions are evolving towards achieving
genuine autonomy, the Sunni minority fears that the Shias would gain a majority in the assembly,
which the former sees as a direct attack on its long term political and socio-economic interests in the
region. The authorities intend to exploit similar insecurities to consolidate control over Gilgit city,
which is not only the largest settlement in the region but also the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan. As the
regional ballot is nearing, authorities may resort to electoral engineering to create a hung assembly,
thereby stripping GBLA of the mandate to pass laws. The past experience of reorganization of
constituencies along Shia-Sunni lines has also enabled Sunni candidates to gain a majority in various
constituencies.
Gilgit city is divided into two constituencies Gilgit-1 and Gilgit-2. Until a decade ago, voters from
both constituencies sent Shia members to the local Council. The demographic change has turned the
tide in favor of the Sunnis; in 2004, voters of Gilgit city returned Sunni candidates as winners. Shias in
Gilgit-1 were further marginalized when the major Shia settlement of Nomal was transferred to Gilgit4, thereby tilting the population balance. Since then, contests between Shia and Sunni candidates
have remained neck to neck. 13 The tipping point is the vote bank in the Amphari neighborhood with a
mixed Shia-Sunni population where sectarian polarization will help the Sunni candidate gain a lead.
Likewise, in Gilgit-2, the settlement of Pathans and Punjabis has changed the demography and this
one-time Peoples Party (PPP) stronghold supported Hafiz Rehman of PML in the 2004 elections, which
he won by a small margin of 500 votes. 14 The voters list released recently shows more than a 80 per
cent increase in voters numbers in Gilgit-1 (from 28,146 to 47,835) and Gilgit-2 (from 34,517 to
62,048) in just five years.15 Of these, a majority are Pakistani settlers who will impact election results
in favor of Sunni candidates. The government is planning to increase the number of GBLA seats after
the November elections and the above-mentioned additional voters in Gilgit city will lead to an out of
proportion representation for Sunnis in GBLA. Such interference from Pakistan will only lead to further
sectarian clashes and deaths.
Although sniper shooting has remained the primary method of sectarian killings, owing to Taliban
influences bomb blasts are also becoming common. In May 2009, a bomb blast occurred in Baltistan,
which led to the arrest of two Sunnis and recovery of explosive-making material and hand
grenades.16 Later in July, a bomb was hurled at Bagrot Hostel, Gilgit, killing two and injuring several
other Shia students.17 In April 2009, an Al Qaeda member, Abdullah Rehman, threatened to bomb a
four-star hotel in Baltistan. 18 Many Taliban who escaped from Swat and adjoining areas found shelter
among Sunni extremists in Gilgit. 19 Analysts fear that locals may benefit from the Taliban expertise in
the field of bomb and suicide jacket making. Local youth is also susceptible to converting to the
extremist Islamic ideology and joining the suicide bomber club as a result of Taliban influences. The
fact that more than 300 suspected terrorists were expelled from Gilgit in October 2008 highlights fears
that the Taliban presence in Gilgit-Baltistan is widespread. 20 Successful Talibanization of GilgitBaltistan means more Shia deaths and continued arrival of Taliban in large hordes, which will hasten
demographic change and hurt local cultural identity and ethnic solidarity. The ongoing military
operation in Waziristan against Taliban and Al Qaeda may also create greater problems for GilgitBaltistan as Shia soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment will be in direct confrontation with
those who perpetuated the Shia genocide in Gilgit in 1988.
1.

1.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI16Df01.html

2.

2.http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=87717

3.

3.http://pamirtimes.net/2009/09/28/pml-leader-raja-ali-ahmad-jan-shot-dead-in-konodas-gilgit/

4.

4.http://pamirtimes.net/2009/04/21/asad-zaidi-deputy-speaker-nala-shot-dead-in-gilgit/

5.

5.http://pakistantimes.net/2005/01/14/top1.htm

6.

6.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allama_Hassan_Turabi#Early_life

7.

7.http://hunzatimes.wordpress.com/2008/12/27/five-of-a-family-killed-in-gilgit-attack-updated-news-news/

8.

8.http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=40756234671

9.

9.http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2009/3193/

10.

10.http://pamirtimes.net/2009/08/17/violent-protests-in-gilgit-over-murder-of-ali-sher-hyderi/

11.

11.http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/pamir-times/854fb8cae3214331a32604745d595c27

12.

12.http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C05%5C21%5Cstory_21-5-2006_pg3_1

13.

13.http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg449/icg449.pdf (pp:16)

14.

14.http://pakistantimes.net/2004/10/14/top2.htm

15.

15.http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87988&Itemid=2

16.

16.http://dardistannews.wordpress.com/2009/05/

17.

17.http://pamirtimes.net/2009/05/23/bomb-blast-at-hostel-in-gilgit-city/

18.

18.http://weeklybaang.blogspot.com/2009/04/weekly-baang-karachi-voloum-02-issue-08_3275.html

19.

19.http://dardistannews.wordpress.com/2009/06/02/taliban-hiding-in-gilgit-baltistan-operations-in-gb-asianhuman-rights-commission-press-release/

20.

20.http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/nwfp/300-suspectedpeople-expelled-from-n-areas-gilgit

http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TalibanizationofGilgitBaltistanandSectaria
nKillings_SHSering_191009.html

Pakistans Double Standard on Kashmir makes Indo-Pak CBMs

Counterproductive

Senge H. Sering
January 28, 2010

At a time, when President Zardari is demonstrating a lack of political will to make peace with India and
is talking about waging a 1000-year war over Kashmir, a civil society gala at New Delhis India
International Centre kicked off the first Indo-Pak Peace Conference of 2010. The conference was
expected to shape future Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the neighbours and promote

a discourse on contested issues. Indo-Pak CBMs mainly revolve around the Kashmir issue, which is
termed by Pakistan as the primary cause of enmity with India. In the post-Kargil period, the two
countries have signed more than seventy Kashmir-related CBMs, but very few have actually been
implemented.
At the conference, four participants were invited from Jammu & Kashmir to share their views. Both
Mehbuba Mufti and Sajjad Lone emphasized on resuming Indo-Pak dialogue and opening the LoC to
allow commercial activities and tourist flow, which can help bring economic empowerment to the
people. They also proposed demilitarization on both sides of LoC and strengthening of local political
institutions to enhance regional autonomy. Lone proposed an integration of the state at economic and
humanitarian levels as a prelude to substantial talks on Kashmir in future. On the other hand, Yasin
Malik talked about tripartite dialogue involving India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu & Kashmir.
While prescribing a strong role for Pakistan in the Kashmir talks, he also advocated an independent
Kashmir an idea which has failed to attract audiences in both countries. The session on Kashmir
concluded with the representative of the minority Pandits accusing the separatists especially JKLF for
their exodus from the valley, which has led to loss of cultural identity and political and economic base
for their community.
There was unanimity among the participants that all ethnic and religious groups within the state
should be treated equally and with respect to ensure an amicable solution to the dispute. Lones
proposal of involving the people of Gilgit-Baltistan in the talks and opening Kargil-Skardo road may be
the starter in that direction. While India has allowed free travel and trade across the LoC benefiting
the people of Kashmir valley and Muzaffarabad, the onus is now on Pakistan to undertake similar CBMs
for the people of Astore, Gurez, Baltistan, Kargil and the Nubra valleys. This can also help mitigate the
blame of double standards on Pakistan, which supports one particular ethnic group in Kashmir valley
to advance its own strategic interests, while showing indifference towards the problems and concerns
of other stakeholders. The leaders of Gilgit-Baltistan and Ladakh consider opening historical trade
routes indispensable to bring commercial breakthrough and economic revolution for the povertystricken masses of their region. The same routes can also help reunite more than 10,000 divided
family members of these regions.
Like the way Pakistan supports reunification of Kashmir valley and Muzaffarabad, it can also allow
reunification of Gilgit-Baltistan and Ladakh. This can happen only if Pakistan withdraws its troops and
civilian administrators unilaterally from its occupied parts of the state which also include GilgitBaltistan. Pakistans withdrawal is a precondition set by the United Nations to embark on a just
Kashmir solution. In 1948, the UN gave Pakistan 90 days to vacate these areas of Jammu & Kashmir
and her failure to comply with the UN resolutions has since then stalled the peace process and led to
invalidation of a possible plebiscite which could have allowed the locals to express their wishes. Since
Pakistans illegal presence in Gilgit-Baltistan allow her to generate revenues from resource
exploitation, it has vested interests in stalling the peace process and prolonging the impasse on
Kashmir. At the moment, Islamabad has given a free hand to the Lahore Chamber of Commerce &
Industry and business groups of the Peoples Republic of China to exploit the resources of GilgitBaltistan, which violates UN resolutions and tightens Pakistans grip on the region.
The conference resolution suggested several modules, which mostly focus on the needs of the people
of Kashmir valley, but can be extended to benefit the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan and Ladakh as well.
It suggests that Kashmiris should be allowed to live and work in Pakistan if they wish so but doesnt
take into consideration the fact that the same privilege is the right of the people of PoK if they wish to
live and work in India. While the resolution mentions restoring Article 370, it fails to demand from
Pakistan the restoration of state subject rule in Gilgit-Baltistan, and provision of genuine autonomy to
the locals there. Abrogation of state subject rule in Gilgit-Baltistan in 1975 has led to the change of
local demography in Pakistans favour that needs immediate consideration. It is the responsibility of
both India and the people of Jammu & Kashmir to suggest mechanisms to counter such illegal

Pakistani policies. Further, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan should have access to Jammu & Kashmir by
making available to them the same travel documents currently used by the people of MirpurMuzaffarabad. The conference could have also included a CBM allowing the students of Gilgit-Baltistan
to study in India, and the political representatives of Gilgit-Baltistan to fill their share of the seats
currently sitting vacant in the Kashmir Legislative Assembly, Srinagar.
In addition, Pakistan can let the people of Gilgit-Baltistan participate in consultations on modalities of
the CBMs. It can also abandon the policy of imposing proxy representatives, like the federal ministers
claiming to represent the region and suppressing local voices during the discourses. Since the proxies
toe the Pakistan government line on Kashmir and promote the Pakistani agenda of political impasse,
their presence at the conferences will not yield any results. In this context, Kashmiri separatists can
help make this distant dream come true if they abandon decades-long self-styled title of the sole
representative of the Kashmiri people for themselves and address concerns of various communities
through intra-state dialogues. The people of Gilgit-Baltistan should be allowed to engage with the
members of different working groups that India has established. Such a policy can help establish joint
working groups covering the interests of the entire state. Akin to the proposals of the Indian working
groups on Kashmir, Pakistan can delegate genuine autonomy to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Since
both Pakistan and India claim the state in entirety, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan should have access to
carry direct talks with Delhi, which the leaders of Kashmir valley currently enjoy vis--vis Pakistan.
It is a dichotomy that while both Kashmiri separatists and Pakistan continuously accuse India of failing
to implement the CBMs, Pakistan continues unilateral support to the separatist-militants to forward its
strategic interests in the region, which also threatens Indias territorial integrity. Recent militant
attacks in Srinagar strengthen certain views that Pakistani support to extremism and separatism has
not died despite its claims of promoting peace in the region. Her policy of granting the Kashmiri
militants the exclusive right to represent the entire state has alienated other groups from the political
process. Such tendencies have forced the minorities to reject the outcomes of the peace conferences,
which invites further complexity to the issue. An impasse will linger unless Pakistan realizes this
problem and acknowledges the legitimate right of other stakeholders during the peace talks. Jammu &
Kashmir in its entirety comprises of the Kashmir valley, Jammu province, Mirpur-Muzaffarabad
districts, Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral valleys. Although the separatists come from the valley; it
occupies only 11 per cent of the total landmass of Jammu & Kashmir and houses less than 30 per cent
of the states population. Further, a significant segment of the valley-inhabitants is ethnically nonKashmiri like the Gujjars, Bakarwals and Paharis who vehemently oppose militancy. Further, the
Kashmiri speaking populace belonging to mainstream political parties also reject separatism. Owing to
such tendencies, the separatists remain a small minority who resort to violence to impose their will
upon the rest of the stakeholders.
In order to increase leverage of Kashmiri separatists, Pakistan claims Jammu & Kashmir to be
ethnically and religiously homogenous despite its multi-cultural and religiously diverse background.
Nonetheless, the residents of Jammu & Kashmir can be divided into three branches of Punjabi, Dardic
and Tibetan ethnic groups. Among them, the Dogras, Paharis, Hindkowals, Gujjars and Bakarwals
speak Punjabi dialects; Kashmiris, Kishtwaris, Thalichis, Shins and Chitralis speak Dardic dialects;
while Baltis, Purikis, Ladakhis and Changpas speak Tibetan dialects. In addition, the state is home to
Tatar-Mongols, Turgesh-Mongols, Burushus, Tajiks and Pashtuns. On religious basis, the diversity is
manifested by Sunnis, Shias, Nurbaxshis, Ismailis, Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs. Based on such
diversity, resource-rich and strategically-located tracks of Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral valleys
continue to oppose militancy and promote a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute. These valleys
cover more than 85 per cent of landmass of Jammu & Kashmir and are home to approximately two
million people. Further, the importance of these valleys as transit routes to Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Tibet and China enhances their geo-political importance and further their claims during peacediscourses. Separatism which originated in the Kashmir valley finds negligible support among these
groups and many among them desire reunification of the state and withdrawal of Pakistani forces.

While Pakistans lop-sided policy towards a specific group in a socially diverse state threatens political
rights of minority stakeholders, who are treated like bystanders during the peace process, India on the
other hand has adopted a consistent and holistic approach to the CBMs on Kashmir. It looks at the
issue as a constitutional matter owing to the fact that the Maharaja of Kashmir sealed the fate of his
state in favour of India by the virtue of the letter of accession. India believes that an amicable solution
to the lingering dispute may come soon if participation of all stakeholders is ensured during the peacetalks. Even when successive Pakistani constitutions consider Jammu & Kashmir outside the territorial
limits of Pakistan, it continues to claim itself as a party to the dispute and expects an instant
resolution on Kashmir before embarking on other CBMs. Over the years, many of these CBMs have
been used by Pakistan to win over a specific constituency of Jammu & Kashmir, like the separatists of
the Kashmir valley, which compels other stakeholders to question Pakistans sincerity towards a
peaceful solution to the chronic dispute.
Since the issue is very complex and chronic, we cannot expect an instant solution, but at the same
time the proposals of economic integration presented by Sajjad Lone will remain unimplemented due
to the double standard of Pakistani Establishment which has a myopic view of Jammu & Kashmir to
advance its strategic interests; exploit the resources; and use against India as a bargaining tool. For
the last four decades, Pakistan has maintained a policy of ethnic and religious divide in Gilgit-Baltistan
which has weakened the society and tightened Islamabads grip on the people there. The state and its
people cannot afford further division and weakening of society due to Pakistani policies. With the help
of continued dialogues, a policy framework at the broader regional level has to be devised, which
recognizes the right of peaceful co-existence for all the residents of the state. Such CBMs can help
bring the fractured state and its people closer and enhance political understanding. Opening LoC will
help create economic interdependency and advance regular interaction. This will help diffuse sectarian
and ethnic differences, enhance social cohesion, and allow all stakeholders to arrive at a political
consensus without any prejudice to the social diversity. This cannot happen if the issue remains
hostage in the hands of a few individuals who impose themselves upon others as sole representatives.
The leadership of the Kashmir valley needs to change its attitude and speak for the interests of their
own people rather than protecting Pakistani interests. In the past, they failed to condemn Pakistan for
human rights violations in Gilgit-Baltistan; for awarding more than 20,000 square kilometres of
Jammu & Kashmir to China in 1963; for stealing water and mineral resources of Gilgit-Baltistan and
building dams for the benefit of Punjab; and also failed to reach out to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan
and acknowledge their right to participation during the dialogues. Again there are issues that need to
be dealt with in a holistic manner but remained hostage to internal problems of the Kashmir valley
thus ignoring the overall wellbeing of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. The valley leaders can also help
diffuse constraints by separating valley-related micro socio-economic and political matters from the
broader national and regional issues, which generally do not come under the purview of Jammu &
Kashmir dispute.
The Indo-Pak peace conference concluded with a pledge to uphold democracy, but failed to
demonstrate it by limiting its invitation only to representatives from the Kashmir valley and ignoring
other stakeholders. This reinforces the view that certain elements from the valley will continue to
direct the discourse on Kashmir and therefore the impasse will also continue. At a critical juncture of
history, when Pakistan is making efforts to annex Gilgit-Baltistan, denying her natives the right of
participation during such conferences will harm the political interests of Kashmir as well that of South
Asian region. There are lessons to be learnt from this conference for both countries as well as
conference organizers. Unnecessary focus on one ethnic group, which projects its agenda through
violence, will only marginalize others who support a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute. A policy
needs to be adopted which puts the interests of all ethnic and religious groups of Jammu & Kashmir
before the vested interests of Pakistani proxies.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistansDoubleStandardonKashmirmakesIndoPakCBMsCounterproductive_shsering_280110.html

IDSA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

Expansion of the Karakoram Corridor: Implications and Prospects

Senge H. Sering
IDSA Occasional Paper No. 27
2012

China has huge and long-term presence in Gilgit-Baltistan and is building extensive road, bridge and
telecom networks to sustain it. The drivers compelling China to develop Karakoram Corridor are
diverse and mainly pertain to its economic, strategic and political ambitions. However, the projects,
which currently serve the strategic and economic interests of the investor, need to promote interests
of the local people and enhance their decision-making power and control over project revenues on
priority basis. Growing Chinese interference in local affairs will create friction among different
stakeholders and lead to instability in Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese and Pakistani control over resourcerevenues may be a short-term tactical move, but will fail to provide any long-term strategic gains. The
role that locals see for China in Gilgit-Baltistan is firstly, to withdraw from the occupied valleys of
Shaksgam, Raskam, Shimshal, and Aksai- chin; secondly, to refrain from getting involved in the affairs
of J&K including Gilgit-Baltistan; and thirdly, to persuade Pakistan to withdraw
from PoK including Gilgit-Baltistan.This can help bring peace and stability to
South Asia.

About the Author

Senge H. Sering was born in Shigar, a valley in the disputed region of GilgitBaltistan. He finished his degree in textile engineering from University of
Engineering and Technology, Punjab and Masters in Development Studies from
University of East Anglia, U.K. During the 1990s, he worked as a cultural activist
and helped revive the indigenous script in Baltistan. He also helped establish a
non-profit organisation in the Shigar valley to promote education and health
services for the local women. Later, he joined a project of Aga Khan Foundation
and worked in the monitoring, evaluation and research department. During that time, he was also
associated with Baltistan Cultural Foundation. In 2009, he was selected as a visiting fellow to the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Currently, he is managing the Institute for
Gilgit Baltistan Studies based in Washington DC. He is also the member of the board of directors of the
Gilgit - Baltistan National Congress.

http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/ExpansionoftheKarakoramCorridor.html

Terror Outfits Build Presence in Gilgit-Baltistan

The Pakistani Taliban has named a native from the Himalayan region of GilgitBaltistan as its new spokesperson.
By Senge Sering
January 06, 2015

Khalid Balti, a resident of Gilgit-Baltistan, has been chosen as the new spokesperson of
Pakistans Taliban (TTP). He was selected to replace Shahidullah Shahid, who left to
join the Pakistan based affiliates of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIS). Naming
a local is evidence of the Talibans growing interest in the strategically located GilgitBaltistan region.
Khalid Balti, who identifies himself as Mohammad Al-Khorasani, was born in Thogmus
Village in the Gangche district in Gilgit-Baltistan. He left for Karachi in 1994 after
studying at a local religious school, though his wife and four children continue to live in
Baltistan. Balti is considered a religious scholar whose previous affiliations with several
madrassas in Karachi include Jamiat-ul-Rasheed, Jamia Banoria, and Jamia Farooqia.
His expertise in publishing and association with the Talibans Umer media led to his
prominence and his appointment is a diplomatic move by the Taliban to use cultural
competency to fortify their stronghold in adisputed region that is claimed by both India
and Pakistan. Moving forward, it is expected that his understanding of local sectarian
dynamics between Shia, Sunni, and Sufi Nurbakhshia will serve in recruitment efforts.
Defense and political analysts who are familiar with Gilgit-Baltistans connections with
Afghan and Kashmir Jihad are not surprised by the Talibans attempt to put this region
on the international terror map. Given the geopolitical dynamics and Gilgit-Baltistans
shared borders with Chinas Xinjiang Province, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the Indian
region of Ladakh, it was not a matter of if it was going to happen but how soon. In the
last two years, the Taliban has been involved in sporadic attacks in Gilgit-Baltistan,
killing dozens, including local minorities, military officials, and tourists. The group has
also attacked and bombed local girls schools to show its opposition to female education.
Like the Taliban, ISIS also stands to gain in Gilgit-Baltistan, a potential point of
convergence between affiliated militant groups from Central Asia, Afghanistan,
Xinjiang, Kashmir, and Pakistan. The rugged mountainous terrain and sparse
population of Gilgit-Baltistan is conducive to the staging of militant forays into India,
which the plains of Punjab lack. Control over Gilgit-Baltistan also allows critical access
to the minerals and precious gems of the region as well as trans-Asian trade between
Pakistan, China, and Central Asia. This access to financing and leverage represents a
game changer in the Taliban and ISISs mission to establish viable states.

The Taliban and ISIS stand to benefit from an existing terror infrastructure and
residual local sympathy for the Kashmiri and Afghan mujahideen. Despite opposition
from local Shias, Pakistan employed religious extremism as a tactic to counter Indian
control in Kashmir which led to militants from across the nation rushing in to establish
training camps and seminaries in Gilgit-Baltistan. They further mushroomed during the
Afghan-Soviet War when China-funded Uighur fighters and Afghans used GilgitBaltistan as a staging ground. Ideology, loyalty to the Pakistani military and poverty
persuaded many local youth to participate, creating a critical mass.
This historical context is important in understanding why ISIS, in order to grow its
influence in South Asia, is interested in establishing relationships with Pakistani
terrorist organizations such as the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and political
organizations such as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) and Jamat-e-Islami. These
organizations, as well as the Ikhwanul Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood), share the
ideology of Maududi, Hasan al-Bana, and Syed Qutub that is best summarized
by Jamat-e-Islamis statement, It is very necessary to welcome the announcement of
the establishment of Islamic caliphate by the ISIS because Islamic caliphate is the
aspiration of every Muslim and there has never been a disagreement on the issue among
the Muslims in any period of history. This statement is an indication of widespread
political support for ISIS in South Asia.
The recent reconciliation between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Middle East will further
consolidate their South Asian affiliates. According to an official report, ISISs recently
formed 10-member strategic planning committee is negotiating with local militant
organizations including Mullah Omars loyalists. The report also warns of plans to target
military installations, government buildings, and the Shia community and there is a
strong indication that a Taliban-ISIS crescent of control is emerging with its epicenter in
Northern Pakistan. As Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and ASWJ have a strong presence in GilgitBaltistan, their potential collaboration with ISIS is a concern for the region where the
majority Shias are their prime target.
Collaboration between the Taliban and ISIS in establishing a stronghold in the Northern
Areas of Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan is a concern not only for locals but for the political
stability and growth throughout the entire region. Given increased linkages occurring
among terror networks, so too must India, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan set aside
chronic territorial d