[G.R. No. 107345. January 27, 1994.

]
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and WILSON SIY, respondents.

DECISION

Bank (Interbank) intervened in the replevin case as creditors of YANKY. During the pre-trial
conference on 27 February 1984, RCBC moved for the sale at public auction of the replevin
chattels in order to prevent further depreciation of their value. Petitioner and the rest of the
intervenors agreed with the motion. On the same day, the trial court accordingly issued an
order granting the motion for the sale of the mortgaged properties at public auction and
directing that the proceeds of the sale be deposited in a government bank.
In compliance with the aforesaid order, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated 3
April 1984 announcing the public auction sale on 24 April 1984 of the chattels included in
the list of mortgaged properties mentioned in the notice.

In the auction sale, Lito Ramos was declared the highest bidder. Unfortunately, he failed to
remit the amount of his bid. As a consequence of his failure, another auction sale had to be
BELLOSILLO, J p:
conducted and rescheduled on various dates. Eventually, a public auction sale was held on
31 May 1984 at petitioner's warehouse, as evidenced by a Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated 21
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R.May 1984 of "Assorted Hardware for Cash." The highest bidder was respondent Wilson Siy
CV No. 28714 dated 23 June 1992 affirming the order of the trial court dated 22 January with a bid price of P60,000.00. After Wilson Siy tendered the amount of his bid, a Certificate
1986 in Civil Case No. 144269, BA Finance Corporation v. Yanky Hardware Co., Inc., forof Sale was issued.
replevin with damages or, in the alternative, for payment of P559,565.00 plus interest.
Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Auction Sale stating that it was not given an
On 15 June 1976, Yanky hardware Company, Inc. (YANKY, for brevity), applied for and was opportunity to participate in the sale and was deprived of its right to bid considering that the
granted by BA Finance Corporation a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting linewinning bid of P60,000.00 was insufficient compared to the proposed bid of plaintiff which
under which YANKY could from time to time discount with and assign its trade receivables to was willing to go up to P150,000.00; that since the other bidders criticized the representative
petitioner. To secure the payment of all its loans, YANKY executed a chattel mortgage over for not bringing cash for the public bidding, it was forced to put together P150,000.00 in bills,
its stock-in-trade or merchandise inventory in favor of petitioner. To guarantee those loans, and since the counting of the bills took some time, its representative arrived late for the
Antonio Ngui Yek Siem, President and General Manager of YANKY, executed a continuing bidding. prLL
suretyship agreement in favor of petitioner.
On 1 June 1984, the sheriff submitted a Sheriff's Report which detailed the factual
On various occasions, YANKY drew on that credit accommodation and executed in favor ofantecedents of the auction sale. The trial court then cancelled the auction sale.
petitioner separate deeds of assignment.
On 6 June 1984, private respondent Siy, as the highest bidder in the 31 May 1984 auction
In time, petitioner demanded from YANKY the payment of its accumulated obligations which, sale, filed his motion for reconsideration on the following grounds : (a) Petitioner was
as of 20 October 1981, had allegedly reached the amount of P559,565.00, or the delivery of afforded full opportunity to participate in the 31 May 1984 public auction sale; (b) The sale of
the mortgaged chattels for purposes of extrajudicial foreclosure.
the properties in the public auction was consummated, thereby vesting legal title to the
On 21 October 1981, petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance a complaint against movant as highest bidder who should not be deprived of such properties of such properties
YANKY and Antonio Ngui Yek Siem for replevin with damages or, in the alternative, payment without due process of law; and (c) The bid price of movant, contrary to the allegation of
of the amount of P559,565.00 plus interest. Petitioner contended that it had the right to takepetitioner, was not shockingly low and hence was not a ground to nullify the public auction
possession of the chattels described in the chattel mortgage or to be paid the total amount sale.
of the loans plus interest since YANKY had breached the conditions of the chattel mortgage In an order dated 20 June 1984, the trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and
by failing to pay the amounts secured thereby. cdll
modified its 1 June 1984 order holding that respondent Siy agreed to put up a surety bond
On 26 October 1981, the trial court ordered the seizure of all the merchandise and other subject to approval by the court to justify the release to him of the properties purchased at
personal properties described in the chattel mortgage. The sheriff accordingly seized auction.
chattels found in the premises of YANKY and later transferred them to petitioner's Respondent Siy submitted a surety bond of P140,000.00 after which, on 28 June 1984, the
warehouse. He then issued a sheriff's receipt dated 26 October 1981 containing a list of the sheriff was directed to deliver to Siy the chattels thus sold.
properties seized and a sheriff's return dated 4 November 1981. But on 5 November 1981,
the sheriff filed another report which, according to him, superseded the earlier list, stating Conformably with the above order, the sheriff delivered assorted hardware materials to Siy
therein that this list was arrived at after he and some of petitioner's employees had and submitted a Sheriff's Report on the properties actually delivered. However, the sheriff
conducted a reinventory of the replevied chattels in petitioner's warehouse.
subsequently informed the court that what he delivered to Siy were substantially less than
those listed in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated 3 April 1984.
YANKY and Antonio Ngui Yek Siem filed an answer claiming that since not all of their
obligations were due, petitioner had as yet no cause of action against them.
On 24 July 1984, private respondent filed his motion to compel delivery of certain chattels
sold in the auction sale but not delivered by petitioner to him. In an order dated 27 July
Meanwhile, YANKY came into deep financial difficulties. Rizal Commercial Banking 1984, the trial court directed petitioner to produce and/or account for the undelivered
Corporation (RCBC), China Banking Corporation (China Bank) and International Corporateproperties.

On 2 August 1984, petitioner manifested that the alleged undelivered chattels were thoseIn the third assigned error of petitioner, it argued that what should have been delivered to
listed in the inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report dated 5 November 1981, which list respondent Siy was the list of merchandise inventory appearing in the Sheriff's Receipt of 26
was not furnished petitioner prior to the auction sale.
October 1981 and not the list in the inventory report attached to the Sheriff's report on 5
November 1981. In the order of the trial court of 22 January 1986, the Court of Appeals
The trial court then appointed a commissioner to look into the matter. The first commissioner found that the Sheriff's Receipt of 26 October 1981, which petitioner insists to be the correct
rendered a report stating the petitioner should produce or account for certain undelivered list, had been superseded by the reinventoried list attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5
personal properties. Petitioner and the intervenor banks opposed this report and the court November 1981. On 28 September 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
disapproved it. A second commissioner designated by the trial court similarly reported that decision was denied.
not all of the properties mortgaged and sold at the public auction had been delivered to Siy
as highest bidder. This second report was approved by the trial court in an order dated 11 Hence, this petition imputing error to the Court of Appeals in not allowing petitioner's appeal
June 1985.
from the order of the trial court of 20 June 1984 which permitted the intervention of
respondent Siy and ordered the release of the properties purchased by the latter at the
Petitioner moved to reconsider the foregoing order, but without success. On 24 Septemberauction sale, and in affirming the order of the trial court of 22 January 1986 directing
1985, the trial court issued an order requiring petitioner to deliver the alleged missing petitioner to deliver to respondent Siy as highest bidder the properties appearing in the
chattels or their value.
inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981. LibLex
This time, Siy filed a motion for reconsideration contending that because petitioner was There is no merit in the petition. In its first assigned error, petitioner submits that the order of
depository of the chattels, it should be made liable to him for damages for having failed to 20 June 1984 was merely interlocutory hence unappealable, and that in appealing the final
deliver the chattels listed in the 27 October 1981 inventory.
order of 22 January 1986, it should be allowed to question the order of 20 June 1984
because its reversal will necessarily render null and void the final order of 22 January 1986.
On 22 January 1986, the trial court issued an order amending and/or modifying the order of
Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the intervention of respondent Siy
24 September 1985, and directed petitioner to deliver to Siy the properties appearing in the
as the legal requisites for intervention were not complied with, and in not setting aside the
inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981 minus the properties already
auction sale of 31 May 1984 which involved many irregularities, to wit : (a) The price of
delivered on 28 June 1984, and if this be not possible, to pay the equivalent amount thereof.
P60,000.00 realized in the bidding was grossly inadequate; (b) There was undue haste in
To determine the monetary value of these properties, the trial court appointed a committee
the conduct of the sale; and (c) The deputy sheriff conducted the sale in the absence of
chaired by Atty. Francisco Sanchez III, its Legal Researcher, and one representative each
petitioner or its duly authorized representative. cdrep
from the petitioner and the highest bidder, as members, to canvass the current price of the
subject properties and to make a report thereon.
In BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra, which involved the same parties, this
Court noted that the principal case filed with the trial court by petitioner against YANKY was
Twenty-three days after its receipt of the aforementioned order, petitioner filed its notice of
for replevin or, in the alternative, for collection of the amount of the loans, plus interest owed
appeal and a record on appeal which the trial court disapproved due to late filing. After
by YANKY. This Court likewise noted that the disputed order of 22 January 1986, subject of
denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a Petition
the present appeal, only directed petitioner to turn over to respondent Siy properties which
for Mandamus and Certiorari. But the appellate court dismissed the petition because the
had remained undelivered to the latter as highest bidder, a matter which was merely an
notice of appeal was filed late. Hence, petitioner filed a petitioner for review on certiorari with
incident of the principal case. However, this Court recognized therein that the order of the
this Court. LexLib
trial court was already final so far as it concerned the dispute between petitioner and
On 16 October 1989, in BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 2 we directed the trialrespondent Siy because it was to resolve the right of the latter to receive the disputed
court to approve the notice of appeal and record on appeal filed by petitioner because the properties to Siy. This is based on the settled rule that only a final order or judgment on the
same was actually filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days, the case being merits may be the subject of an appeal. A final order is defined as one which disposes of the
regarded as one falling within the term "other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed," whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
where the period of appeal is not fifteen (15) days but thirty (30) days, in accordance with done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand, an order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
Sec. 19, B.P. 129.
done upon its merits. 3
On 23 June 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the appeal from the order in
Civil Case No. 144269 which directed petitioner to deliver to respondent Siy certain Hence, the argument of petitioner that it can still question the order of 20 June 1984 while
properties appearing in the inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981. appealing the final order of 22 January 1986 is untenable. It may be true that the 20 June
The appellate court considered the first and second errors assigned by petitioner as moot1984 order allowed the intervention of respondent Siy and reversed the court's previous
and academic. In these assigned errors, petitioner questioned the 20 June 1984 order of theorder setting aside the auction sale by allowing him to put up a surety bond to justify the
trial which, in effect, permitted the intervention of respondent Siy by entertaining his motion release of the properties to him. However, upon submission by Siy of a surety bond with the
for reconsideration and allowing him to put up a surety bond to justify the release of the court, the latter issued a final order dated 28 June 1984, which was issued earlier than the
properties to him. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner could no longer appeal the 20final order of 22 January 1986. The order of 28 June 1984 directed the delivery of the
auctioned properties to respondent Siy.
June 1984 order because it was already way beyond the reglementary period to appeal.
Although the order of 20 June 1984 may be considered interlocutory as it required
something more to be done by respondent Siy, i.e., the filing of the bond, the subsequent
order of 28 June 1984 can be considered a final one which determined and settled the issue

on the validity of the auction sale and the right of respondent Siy as highest bidder to trial court ordered the sale of the properties mentioned in the "list of properties mortgaged"
acquire the properties he purchased. Petitioner should have appealed the 28 June 1984 appended to the chattel mortgage. llcd
order if it wanted to question the validity of the intervention of respondent Siy as well as the
auction sale. But it did not do so. Moreover, records show that after the issuance of the These properties also appear in the inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5
order of 28 June 1984 directing the delivery of the properties to Siy, the remaining November 1981. In compliance with the order of 27 February 1984, the sheriff issued a
proceedings in the trial court pertained only to the execution and implementation by the notice of sheriff's sale dated 3 April 1984 announcing the public auction sale on 24 April
sheriff of the order of 28 June 1984. Hence, when the deputy sheriff informed the court that 1984 of the chattels enumerated in the "list of properties mortgaged." This notice includes
what were delivered to Siy were less than those listed in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale, an enumeration of all the merchandise seized by the sheriff as shown in the Sheriff's Report
respondent Siy filed on 24 July 1984 a motion to compel delivery. The trial court even of 5 November 1981. On the basis of the foregoing, there is no doubt that the conclusions of
appointed a commissioner to investigate the matter and found that not all the properties soldthe Court of Appeals are fully supported by the evidence on record.
in the auction sale were actually delivered to the awardee. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
It may be worth to note that petitioner impliedly admitted the regularity of the auction sale of dated 23 June 1992 is AFFIRMED.
31 May 1984 when its manifested before the court on 2 August 1984 that the chattels
SO ORDERED.
allegedly undelivered to Siy were those appearing in the list attached to the Sheriff's Report
of 5 November 1981, which list was allegedly not furnished petitioner, without raising any
||| (BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107345, January 27, 1994)
issue as to the validity of the auction sale and the right of Siy as highest bidder.
[G.R. No. 73794. September 19, 1988.]
Petitioner cannot belatedly question the validity of the auction sale, It is estopped from
claiming that the bidding was not validly and regularly conducted after it had led the court
and respondent Siy, as well as the other parties to the case, to believe that the remaining
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL
PARKS
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST SPECIAL CASES DIVISION
unresolved issue after 28 June 1984 was the identification of the properties to be delivered
to Siy. Estoppel arises, as in this case, when one by his acts, representations or admissions,
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH PHILIPPINE
UNION
MISSION
OF
THE
SEVENTH-DAY
or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
ADVENTISTS, respondents.
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts. 4
SYLLABUS
In its third assigned error, petitioner contends that it had no knowledge of the reinventory
attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981 as it was not furnished copy thereof;
that what was sold to Siy in the auction sale of 31 May 1984 were pieces of "assorted 1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; AMENDMENTS ALLOWED BEFORE FINALITY TO
hardware" as indicated in the notice of sale of 21 May 1984 and which were on display MAKE JUDGMENT CONFORMABLE TO THE LAW. There is no question that courts
inside the warehouse of petitioner, and not those listed in the inventory attached to the have inherent power to amend their judgments, to make them conformable to the law
Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981.
applicable provided that said judgments have not yet attained finality (Villanueva v. Court of
First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Pinamalayan, Branch II, 119 SCRA 288 [1982]). In fact,
The issue raised here by petitioner involves a question of fact which is not reviewable by
motions for reconsideration are allowed to convince the courts that their rulings are
this Court in this petition. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court
erroneous and improper (Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 543-544 [1985]; Guerra
of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of
Enterprises Co., Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur (32 SCRA 317 [1970]) and in so doing, said
fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such
courts are given sufficient opportunity to correct their errors.
evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed, unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CORRECTION OF RESOLUTION REQUIRING DEPOSIT OF THE LARGE
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute AMOUNT IN LITIGATION, PROPER. In the complaint for interpleader, petitioner claims
serious abuse of discretion. 5
that it has no interest in the amount due from it and is willing to pay whoever is declared
In affirming the order directing the delivery of the properties sold to respondent Siy as entitled to the said amounts. The appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos
appearing in the new inventory of 5 November 1981, the Court of Appeals made theare involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable,
following factual findings in support of its decision : (a) The Sheriff's Report of 5 Novembernow accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very
1981 which contains the reinventory of the merchandise seized in the premises of YANKY essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in
expressly states that the earlier list of 26 October 1981 had been superseded by this new this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a
list; (b) On 4 November 1981, the sheriff notified the petitioner of a reinventory, which was grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said
actually conducted in petitioner's own warehouse; the petitioner's representatives were the amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
ones who inventoried and prepared the list of items actually taken from YANKY; and, the3. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the
original copy of the inventory list duly signed and verified by petitioner's representatives is inpresence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court
the possession of the latter; (c) Petitioner did not question the Sheriff's Report of 5 having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a
November 1981 for a period of almost three (3) years; and (d) On 27 February 1984, the

judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action identity of October 28, 1978 (Rollo, pp. 189-194). The amounts totalling about P984,110.82 paid by
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action (Arguson v. Miclat, 135 SCRA 678 [1985]; petitioner were to be considered as part of the 40% due private respondent under the Land
Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344 [1984]).
Development Agreement. All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership
over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNREVERSED DECISION IS CONCLUSIVE UPON PARTIES AND THOSE plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader (Rollo, pp. 169-179) against private respondent
IN PRIVITY WITH THEM. There is no argument against the rule that parties should not MISSION and Maysilo Estate, docketed as Special Court Case No. C-9556 of the then CFI
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan, alleging among others, that in view of the conflicting claims
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains of ownership of the defendants (herein private respondent and Maysilo Estate) over the
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or properties subject matter of the contracts, over which plaintiff corporation (herein petitioner)
estate (Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]).
has no claim of ownership except as a purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of
plaintiff corporation which has no interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the owners of said properties, the defendants
is the propriety of the grant of the motion for reconsideration without a hearing thereon and should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves (Rollo,
the denial of the motion for execution, while in the case at bar, what is assailed is the p. 177).
propriety of the order of respondent appellant court that petitioner EternalGardens should
deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a An order was issued by the presiding judge 2 requiring defendants to interplead on October
reputable bank to be designated by the Court. In fact, there is a pending trial on the merits in 22, 1981. MISSION filed a motion to dismiss dated November 10, 1981 for lack of cause of
the trial court which the petitioner insists is a prejudicial question which should first be action but also presented an answer dated November 12, 1981. The motion to dismiss was
resolved. Moreover, while there may be identity of parties and of subject matter, the Land denied in an Order dated January 12, 1982. The heirs of Maysilo Estate filed their own
Development Contract, there is no identity of issues as clearly shown by the petitions filed. answer dated November 11, 1981 and an amended answer dated October 20, 1983 thru the
estate's special receiver. The heirs of Pedro Banon filed an "Answer in Intervention with
Special and Affirmative Defenses" dated October 24, 1983, while Lilia B. Sevilla and
husband Jose Seelin filed their "Answer in Cross-claim" dated October 31, 1983 (Rollo, p.
DECISION
30). The heirs of Sofia O'Farrel y Patino, et al. filed their Answer in Intervention dated
November 10, 1983.
However, earlier on November 21, 1982, private respondent presented a motion for the
placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such
motion, the trial court 3 denied judicial deposit in its order dated February 13, 1984, the
This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to set aside thedecretal portion of which reads:
PARAS, J p:

two resolutions of public respondent First Special Cases Division of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 04869 entitled "North Philippine Union Mission of the
Seventh Day Adventists versus Hon. Antonia Corpus-Macandog, Presiding Judge, Branch
CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation,": (a) dated September 5, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 21-25) reconsidering its Decision1 of
February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48) and ordering petitioner to deposit whatever amounts
due from it under the Land Development Agreement, and (b) dated February 13, 1986
(Rollo, p. 27) denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration. cdll
Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North
Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short)
are corporations duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines.
They executed a Land Development Agreement (Rollo, pp. 179-182) on October 6, 1976
whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and
responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private respondent into a
memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and
price per lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive
40% of the net gross collection from the project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to
private respondent through a designated depositary trustee bank. On the same date private
respondent executed in petitioner's favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage (Rollo, pp.
183-186) on the lots with titles involved in the land development project. The deed was
supplemented by a Sale of Real Property with Mortgage and Special Conditions dated

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, all or the full amount the

plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation have already
paid the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventist is hereby ordered to deposit the same to this Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this order considering that real or true
owner of the subject properties in question, due hearing of this court
has yet to be undergone in order to decide as to who is the true owner
which is a prejudicial question. Hence the motion dated November 21,
1983 of the NPUM for the Eternal Gardens Corporation to deposit the
balance due and unpaid is hereby ordered denied and the opposition
thereto dated December 19, 1983 is hereby ordered granted.
"The contract between the Eternal Gardens Corporation and the North
Philippine Union Mission dated October 1, 1976 is ordered and
declared ineffective as of today, February 13, 1984 because the subject
matter of the sale is not existing between the contracting parties until
after the question of ownership is resolved by this court. The court will
order the revival of the contract if the North Philippine Union Mission will
win.
"If not, the declared winner among the intervenors will be the party to
enter into a contract of sale with the plaintiff as aforementioned." (Rollo,
p. 66).

Another order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13, 1984 order
and setting aside the order for private respondent's deposit of the amounts it had previously
received from petitioner, thus:
"WHEREFORE
IN
VIEW
OF
ALL
THE
FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS the order of February 13, 1984, is hereby ordered
amended, reconsidered and modified by this same Court as follows:
"(a) The order directing the NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION
CORPORATION OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS to deposit the
amounts it received under the implementation of the LAND
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT which is not questioned by the
plaintiff, Eternal Gardens, is hereby ordered set aside for the reason
that the titles to ownership, the North Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists on the lots subject-matter of the
aforesaid agreement is not established invalid, and the alleged titles of
intervenors are not proven yet by competent evidence;

"(b) The motion to require Eternal Gardens to deposit the balance under
the Land Development Agreement is likewise hereby ordered denied
considering the fact the aforesaid plaintiff had not denied its obligations
under the aforesaid contract; and
"(c) The trial or hearing is hereby ordered as scheduled to proceed on
November 29, 1984 and on December 6, 1984 at 8:30 in the morning
per order of this Court dated October 4, 1984 in order to determine the
alleged claims of ownership by the intervenors and all claims and
allegations of each party to the instant case will be considered and
decided carefully by this court on just and meritorious grounds." (Rollo,
p. 39)

dated October 6, 1978, it entered into with the North Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists." (Rollo. p. 68).
The heirs of the Maysilo Estate moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned order of
dismissal, the hearing of which was requested to be set on February, 28, 1985. However,
the trial judge, on February 14, 1985 issued the following orders:
"Considering Motions for Reconsideration filed, the Court resolves that
the same be GRANTED and instead of a hearing of the said motions on
February 20, 1985, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing on the merits shall be held."
(Rollo, p. 68)
In spite of the February 14, 1985 order, MISSION filed on March 6, 1985 a motion for Writ of
Execution of the resolution of January 28, 1985. This was denied on June 25, 1985. The
said court further set the case for pre-trial and trial on July 18, 1985.
It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus to the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of
Appeals), docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06696 "North Philippine Union Mission of the
Seventh Day Adventists, vs. Hon. Antonia Corpus-Macandog, Presiding Judge, Branch
CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation,
and Heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion." It was raffled to the Second Special Division.
MISSION assailed the February 14, 1985 and June 25, 1985 orders as violative of due
process and attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The petition was however dismissed in the decision of said Appellate Court, promulgated on
December 4, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, for want of merit the petition for certiorari and
mandamus under consideration cannot be given due course and is
accordingly, DISMISSED, without any pronouncement, as to costs. The
restraining order embodied in Our Resolution of July 31, 1985, is
hereby lifted." (Rollo, G.R. No. 73569 p. 232)

Said Orders were assailed twice in the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals) and The private respondent challenged the above decision in the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
73569. In its resolution dated June 11, 1986, the Supreme Court denied the petition for
in the Supreme Court as follows:
review on certiorari for lack of merit, as follows:
In G.R. No. 73569 it appeared that on January 11, 1985, MISSION filed a motion to dismiss
"G.R. No. 73569 (North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the
the Interpleader and the claims of the Maysilo Estate and the Intervenors and to order
Seventh Day Adventists vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.)
the Eternal Gardens to comply with its Land Management with MISSION.
considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the
On January 28, 1985, the trial court passed a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolved to DENY the same
reads:
for lack of merit." (Ibid p. 263)
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court, after a lengthy,
careful judicious study and perusal of all the stand of each and
everyone of all the parties participating in this case, hereby orders the
dismissal of the interpleader, and the interventions filed by the
intervenors, heirs of Pedro Banon, heirs of O'Farrel, heirs of Rivera,
heirs of Maria del Concepcion Vidal, consolidated with the Maysilo
Estate as represented by receiver Arturo Salientes, the heirs of Vicente
Singson Encarnacion, and Lilia Sevilla Seeling.
"This Court likewise orders the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial
Parks Corporation to comply with the Land Development Agreement

Said resolution has become final and executory on July 16, 1986. (Ibid p. 269)
Earlier in 1983, the heirs of the late spouses Vicente Singson Encarnacion and Lucila
Conde filed Civil Case No. C-11836 for quieting of title with Branch CXXII, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City, where petitioner and private respondent were named as defendants.
Said case is still pending in the lower Court.
In the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794, MISSION, herein private respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the then Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. No. 04869
praying that the aforementioned Orders of February 13, 1984 and October 26, 1984 of the
Regional Trial Court be set aside and that an order be issued to deposit in court or in a

depositor/trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the private September 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 270). On August 25, 1987, private respondent filed its
respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply to Opposition (Rollo, pp. 271-292).
be paid to whomever may be found later to be entitled thereto, with costs. (Rollo, G.R. No.
Petitioner filed its Supplemental Memorandum with Reply to Opposition (To Deferment of
73794 p. 38)
time to Make Deposit) on August 31, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 294-313) and a Sur-rejoinder on
The Intermediate Appellate Court, acting through its First Special CasesSeptember 1, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 304-315).
Division, 4 dismissed the petition in its decision on February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48). In
The main issues in this case are:
its Resolution 5promulgated on September 5, 1985, the Court however, reversed its
decision, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders its decision of February 27,
1985, and sets aside the questioned portions of the respondent Court's
orders of February 13 and October 26, 1984. The private respondent is
hereby ordered to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the
Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable
bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the depository
trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be found
entitled thereto. No costs." (Rollo, p. 25)
Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied for
lack of merit in a resolution promulgated on February 13, 1986, which states:
"The private respondent Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's resolution promulgated
September 5, 1985 requiring it 'to deposit whatever amounts are due
from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 . . .,'
which was strongly opposed by the petitioner North Philippine Union
Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists, is hereby denied for lack of
merit, reiterating as it does, the very same issues and arguments that
were passed upon and considered by the Court in the very same
resolution sought to be reconsidered." (Rollo, p. 27)
Hence, this petition.
On July 8, 1987, the Third Division of this Court issued the following resolution:
". . . the court RESOLVED to give due course to this petition and require
the parties to file memoranda.
"In the meantime, to avoid possible wastage of funds, the Court
RESOLVED to require the private respondent 6 to DEPOSIT its
accruing installments within ten (10) days from notice with a reputable
commercial bank in a savings deposit account, in the name of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, with the details to be reported or
manifested to this Court within ten (10) days from the time the
deposit/deposits are made, such deposits not to be withdrawn without
authority from this Court." (Rollo, p. 162).
Petitioner's Memorandum With Prayer for the Deferment of Time to Make
Deposit (Rollo, p. 218-236) was filed on July 14, 1987. Its prayer was granted for a
period of ten (10) days for the purpose, in the resolution of July 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 238).
Private respondent filed its Opposition to Deferment of Time to Make Deposit (Rollo, pp.
239-253) on July 24, 1987 to which petitioner filed its Reply to Opposition on August 4,
1987 (Rollo, pp. 256-267). Both were noted by the Court in its resolution dated

Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution of
February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the resolution of
September 5, 1985, that petitioner Eternal Gardens deposit whatever
amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a
reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court.
II
Whether or not the dismissal of AC-G.R. SP No. 06696 (North
Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists vs. Hon.
Macandog, et al.) by the Second Special Cases Division of the IAC
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73569
constitutes a basis for the dismissal of the case at bar on the ground
of res adjudicata.
I
There is no question that courts have inherent power to amend their judgments, to make
them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgments have not yet attained
finality (Villanueva v. Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Pinamalayan, Branch II,
119 SCRA 288 [1982]). In fact, motions for reconsideration are allowed to convince the
courts that their rulings are erroneous and improper (Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA
543-544 [1985]; Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur, 32 SCRA 317 [1970])
and in so doing, said courts are given sufficient opportunity to correct their errors.
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among
others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to
private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing to pay
whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. Such admissions in the complaint were
reaffirmed in open court before the Court of Appeals as stated in the latter court's resolution
dated September 5, 1985 in A.C. G.R. No. 04869 which states:

"The private respondent (MEMORIAL) then reaffirms before the Court

its original position that it is a disinterested party with respect to the
property now the subject of the interpleader case . . .
"In the light of the willingness, expressly made before the court,
affirming the complaint filed below, that the private respondent
(MEMORIAL) will pay whatever is due on the Land Development
Agreement to the rightful owner/owners, there is no reason why the
amount due on subject agreement has not been placed in the custody
of the Court." (Rollo, p. 227).

Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised is the propriety of the grant of the motion for
to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower reconsideration without a hearing thereon and the denial of the motion for execution, while
court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not in the case at bar, what is assailed is the propriety of the order of respondent appellant court
only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner that petitioner Eternal Gardens should deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the
under the Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).
Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the Court. In fact,
there is a pending trial on the merits in the trial court which the petitioner insists is a
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from prejudicial question which should first be resolved. Moreover, while there may be identity of
the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the parties and of subject matter, the Land Development Contract, there is no identity of issues
deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded on justice as clearly shown by the petitions filed.
and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in
litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately bePREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b) this case
decided as entitled thereto." (Rollo, p. 24).
(together with all the claims of the intervenors on the merits) is REMANDED to the lower
court for further proceedings; and (c) the resolution of the Third Division of this Court of July
The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and 8, 1987 requiring the deposit by the petitioner (see footnote No. 6) of the amounts contested
mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are in a depositary bank STANDS (the Motion for Reconsideration thereof being hereby
involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now DENIED for reasons already discussed) until after the decision on the merits shall have
accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of become final and executory. LibLex
the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the
Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse SO ORDERED.
of discretion which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts
||| (Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73794,
should be made to a bank approved by the Court. (Rollo, p. 25).
September 19, 1988)
Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turnabout, presently claiming in its
[G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.]
memorandum that there is a novation of contract so that the amounts due under the Land
Development Agreement were allegedly extinguished, and the requirement to make a
deposit of said amounts in a depositary bank should be held in abeyance until after the
LUISA LYON NUAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUAL, and
conflicting claims of ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTC-Caloocan City, has
ANITA NUAL HORMIGOS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
finally been resolved.
APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her behalf and as
guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY
All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, not
SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN,
only in the lower courts and in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where
WILFREDO GUZMAN, MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA
such deposit was required in the resolution of July 8, 1987 to avoid wastage of funds.
LYON DELAS PEAS, respondents.
II
The claim that this case should be barred by res judicata is even more untenable.

SYLLABUS
The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former
judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; ONCE IT BECOMES FINAL, MAY
first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT; EXCEPTIONS. In the case of Manning
(Arguson v. Miclat, 135 SCRA 678 [1985]; Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344International Corporation v. NLRC, (195 SCRA 155, 161 [1991]) We held that ". . ., nothing
is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
[1984]).
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
There is no argument against the rule that parties should not be permitted to litigate the respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate ( Sy Kao v. exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]).
void." Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
But a careful review of the records shows that there is no judgment on the merits in G.R. executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
No. 73569 and in the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794; both of which deal on mere incidents held for that purpose."
arising therefrom.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF AGGRIEVED PARTY. In the case at bar, the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality,

the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the
would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his court a quo. 3
authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties
in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that allOn July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom
Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary
the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her
rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a
judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share,
right, ownership and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within
DECISION
the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court. 4
CAMPOS, JR., J p:

On June 26, 1985, the trial court issued an order revoking the appointment of the three
commissioners and in lieu thereof, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. 5

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** dated February 22, 1990 of the On February 4, 1986, the said court issued an order appointing a Board of Commissioners
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14889 entitled "Emma Lyon de Leon, et al., plaintiffs- to effect the partition of the contested property. 6
appellees versus Luisa Lyon Nual, now deceased herein represented by Albert Nual, et
al., defendants appellants," dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming the trial court's On May 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the motion to quash order of execution with
order *** dated January 9, 1987 for the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as one of the heirs who preliminary injunction filed by Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition of the property
among the original party plaintiffs and defendants. 7
shall benefit from the partition.
On September 24, 1986, the Commissioners manifested to the trial court that in view of the
fact that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of Title, she
This case originated from a suit docketed as Civil Case No. 872 filed by Emma Lyon de could therefore be construed as one of the heirs. A ruling from the trial court was then
Leon in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarre and Kennysought. 8
Sabarre, Eduardo Guzman, Mercedes Lyon Taupan, Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon
Encarnacion and Dona Lyon de las Peas, (herein private respondents) against Luisa Lyon On September 29, 1986, the lower court issued an order directing the counsel of Emma
Nual, now deceased and herein represented by her heirs, Albert Nual and Anita Nual Lyon de Leon to furnish the court within five days from receipt thereof all the names the of
Hormigos (herein petitioners), for partition and accounting of a parcel of land located inheirs entitled to share in the partition of the subject property. 9
Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C. Lyon and May
Ekstrom Lyon, deceased parents of Helen, Dona, Luisa, Mary, Frank and William James.On October 1, 1986, the petitioners filed a manifestation praying that the court issue an
Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, formerly covered by Transfer order directing the partition of the property in consonance the decision dated December 17,
Certificate of Title No. 3141 in the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been in possession of 1974 of the trial court the order of said court dated May 28, 1986. 10
petitioner Luisa Lyon Nual since 1946 and that she made no accounting of the income
Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing the Board of
derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the partition and
Commissioners to immediately partition the said property. 11
delivery of their shares.
On January 3, 1987, the private respondents filed motion for clarification as to whether the
On December 17, 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance (now
partition of property is to be confined merely among the party plaintiffs and defendants, to
Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the
the exclusion of Mary Lyon Martin. 12
partition of the property but dismissing private respondents' complaint for accounting. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows: prcd
On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among the
"After a perusal of the decision of the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No.
plaintiffs and defendant. The parties shall make partition among
57265-R, where this case was appealed by the unsatisfied parties,
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to the Court's
there is a finding that Mary now Mary Lyon Martin is one of the
confirmation, should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the
legitimate children of Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom. (Page 3 of the
court shall appoint commissioners to make the partition, commanding
decision).
them to set off to such party in interest such part and proportion of the
property as the Court shall direct. Defendant is further ordered to pay
In view of this finding, it would be unfair and unjust if she would be left
plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000.00." 1
out in the partition of this property now undertaking (sic) by the said
court appointed commissioners.
On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 57265-R. The case was remanded to the court of origin for the ordered partition. 2
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows.

WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
court
appointed
commissioners is hereby directed to include Mary Lyon Martin as coowner in the said property subject of partition with the corresponding
shares adjudicated to her. LLjur

accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has long
become final and executory.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no legal impediment

to the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin by the court-appointed Board of
Commissioners as one of the heirs who shall benefit from the partition,
the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

In the ease of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 19 We held that ". . ., nothing is
more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void."

Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in Civil Case No.
872 ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
SO ORDERED." 13
3141 among plaintiffs and defendants has long become final and executory. Hence the trial
court has no jurisdiction to issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987 ordering the
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 14 of the aforesaid order was denied by the trialBoard of Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of said
court. 15
property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said Order, therefore,
resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision rendered in Civil Case No. 872.
On February 22, 1990 the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing petitioners'
appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
We find merit in the instant petition.

NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED." 16
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on June 6, 1990. 17

Petitioners filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals has decided Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court, for the executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose." 20
following reasons:
"1.) BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DIRECTING
THE
COURT
APPOINTED
BOARD
OF
COMMISSIONERS TO INCLUDE MARY L. MARTIN TO SHARE IN
THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION DESPITE THE
FACT, OVER WHICH THERE IS NO DISPUTE, THAT SHE HAS NOT
LITIGATED EITHER AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 872, IT HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO AMEND OR
MODIFY THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 872 AND THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED 28 MAY 1986 WHICH
HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and
executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority. LLpr

2.) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CATEGORICALLY

STATED THAT MARY L. MARTIN "NEVER LITIGATED AS ONE OF
THE PLAINTIFFS IN SAID CASE," AND HER ONLY PARTICIPATION
THEREIN WAS SIMPLY CONFINED "AS A WITNESS FOR
DEFENDANT-SISTER LUISA LY ON NUAL," AND TO ALLOW HER
TO SHARE IN THE PARTITION THIS LATE WITHOUT REQUIRING A
PROCEEDING WHERE THE PARTIES COULD PROVE THEIR
RESPECTIVE CLAIMS, IS TANTAMOUNT TO DENYING THE
NUALS OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 18

SO ORDERED.

The crux of this case is whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L.
Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she
was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and

The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil
Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the
parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 9, 1987 of the trial Court
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of
the trial court dated December 17, 1974 in Civil Case No. 872 is hereby REINSTATED.

||| (Nual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, April 06, 1993)
[G.R. No. 111985. June 30, 1994.]
INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORP.
and/or
TANGSOC, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR
COMMISSION, CONCORDIA DOS PUEBLOS
SANCHEZ, respondents.

SYLLABUS

LORENZO
RELATIONS
and LOLITA

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; RULE AND EXCEPTION ON THEIn the earlier case of Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83616, 1 this Court
MODIFICATION THEREOF AFTER ITS FINALITY. It is true that after a judgment has affirmed the finding of the NLRC that the petitioners are the employers of private
become final and executory, it can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. However, respondents and remanded the case for a determination of the validity of the quitclaim
this principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances transpire which render allegedly signed by the latter.
its execution impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of
justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailingIn its resolution dated February 3, 1992, 2 the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of Labor
circumstances (Seavan Carrier Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580) or wheneverArbiter Amado M. Solamo on February 26, 1987, ordering the petitioners to reinstate the
it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 164;Central private respondents (complainants therein) without loss of seniority rights and privileges,
Textile Mills vs. United Textile Workers Union, 94 SCRA 883). In the case at bar, the and to pay them back wages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, holiday pay, vacation and sick leave
modification of the judgment, rendered by the Labor Arbiter on 4 May 1993, is warranted by pay in the amount of P24,300 each, moral and exemplary damages of P10,000 each, and
the fact that the Bank had been placed under liquidation thereby permanently foreclosing attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
the possibility for the Bank to resume its business. Reinstatement of Galindez, as Cashier,
In view of the lapse of time since the promulgation of the decision, the NLRC likewise
therefore was rendered inappropriate considering the Bank's eventual closure.
directed the petitioners to pay the private respondents severance benefits equivalent to one
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED TO CASE AT BAR. Applying this exception to the case at month pay for every year of service computed from the date of their employment up to the
bar, we note with approval the following observations of the Solicitor General: It may be true promulgation of the resolution should reinstatement of the private respondents to their
that the amount of backwages and other benefits due to the private respondents as former position be no longer possible. 3
recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal import of the dispositive portion of the decision
subject of execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that at the time the This resolution became final and executory on March 9, 1992, and entry of judgment was
recomputation was made in 1992, five (5) years had already elapsed from the time the made on March 25, 1992.
Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on February 26, 1987. Thus, a recomputation was The private respondents meanwhile had filed on March 20, 1992, an ex parte motion for
necessary to arrive at a just and proper determination of the monetary awards due the issuance of a writ of execution with manifestation that from February 26, 1987, up to the
private respondents. Indeed, the back wages and other benefits awarded by Arbiter Solamo present, they have not been reinstated and thus were entitled to back salaries for the said
to each of the private respondents in the amount of P24,300.00 correspond merely to the period and until actual reinstatement shall have been made. cdrep
period between their illegal dismissal on April 26, 1986, up to the time of the rendition of the
decision on February 26, 1987. There is no dispute that from April 26, 1986, to this date, the Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez thereupon directed the Fiscal Examiner of the
private respondents have not been reinstated nor has payment of the monetary awards Arbitration Branch to compute the actual amount that the private respondents should
decreed by the NLRC been made them.
receive. In a report dated March 22, 1992, 4 Fiscal Examiner Renrico N. Pacamo found that
each of them was entitled to P175,964.84, representing three years back wages, ECOLA
3. ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF PLEADINGS; RULE IF MADE BY ORDINARY MAIL OR BY under Wage Order No. 6, 13th month pay, legal holiday pay, vacation and sick leave pay
PRIVATE MESSENGERIAL SERVICE. On the issue of the timeless of the petitioners' and other privileges under the collective bargaining agreement likewise for a period of three
motion for reconsideration, we find that the NLRC correctly applied the rule that where a years. In addition, the private respondents should also be awarded moral and exemplary
pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service, it is deemed filed on the damages of P10,000 each and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary
day it is actually received by the court, not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the award. In sum, the petitioners were held liable to the private respondents for the total
messengerial service. As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, (209amount of P387,122.65.
SCRA 55 [1992]): The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private
letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and Both the petitioners and the private respondents filed their respective objections to this
that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the computation. Meanwhile, the Executive Labor Arbiter transferred the case to Labor Arbiter
private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
Leon P. Murillo, who thereafter issued an order dated November 19, 1992, 5 concurring with
the computation of the Fiscal Examiner Pacamo.
4. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; RULE IN THE FILING THEREOF IF LAST DAY FALLS ON A
SATURDAY. The 10th day for filing the motion for reconsideration was June 26, 1993,The Commission, on appeal of the computation, only made a slight modification of the
which fell on a Saturday. The last day for filing would have been the following business day,amount of the award and directed the petitioners to pay the private respondents the sum of
June 28, 1993, which was a Monday. The petitioners' counsel claims he was able to deliver P375,795.20. 6 The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners through JRS-Butuan,
the pleading to JRS-Butuan on June 26, 1993, but the motion for reconsideration reached a private letter-forwarding company, reached the NLRC a day late and was denied on
the Commission on June 29, 1993, or a day late.
August 31, 1993, mainly for tardiness. 7
In this petition now before us, the NLRC is faulted with grave abuse of discretion for merely
modifying the award of damages and denying the motion for reconsideration. LLjur
DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

On the first issue, the petitioners submit that the NLRC decision of February 3, 1992, which
affirmed in toto the order of Arbiter Solamo and remanded the case for immediate execution
need not be recomputed because the monetary awards due the private respondents had
already been determined and fixed in the said order. It is argued that to allow the decision of

Arbiter Murillo to prevail and sizably increase the monetary award to the private respondents On the issue of the timeless of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, we find that
would in effect allow an arbiter to change a decision of the Commission that has become the NLRC correctly applied the rule that where a pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by
final and executory. Arbiter Murillo's duty, it is stressed, is limited to the ministerial act of private messengerial service, it is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the
executing the NLRC decision.
court, not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the messengerial service.
We disagree.
It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be modified
or otherwise disturbed. However, this principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust and it therefore
becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize
the disposition with the prevailing circumstances." 8
The general rule is indeed, that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, said judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered or
modified. That principle, however, admits of exceptions as in cases
where, because of supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the
higher interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize
the disposition with the prevailing circumstances (Seavan Carrier
Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580) or whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascualvs. Tan, 85 Phil
164; Central Textile Mills vs. United Textile Workers Union, 94 SCRA
883). In the case at bar, the modification of the judgment, rendered by
the Labor Arbiter on 4 May 1993, is warranted by the fact that the Bank
had been placed under liquidation thereby permanently foreclosing the
possibility for the Bank to resume its business. Reinstatement of
Galindez, as Cashier, therefore was rendered inappropriate considering
the Bank's eventual closure. (Emphasis supplied). 9
Applying this exception to the case at bar, we note with approval the following observations
of the Solicitor General: 10
It may be true that the amount of backwages and other benefits due to
the private respondents as recomputed, is not in harmony with the
literal import of the dispositive portion of the decision subject of
execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that at the time
the recomputation was made in 1992, five (5) years had already
elapsed from the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on
February 26, 1987. Thus, a recomputation was necessary to arrive at a
just and proper determination of the monetary awards due the private
respondents.

As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC: 12

The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private
letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing
thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the
court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the
date of filing of that pleading.
The 10th day for filing the motion for reconsideration was June 26, 1993, which fell on a
Saturday. The last day for filing would have been the following business day, June 28, 1993,
which was a Monday. The petitioners' counsel claims he was able to deliver the pleading to
JRS-Butuan on June 26, 1993, but the motion for reconsideration reached the Commission
on June 29, 1993, or a day late. cdll
At any rate, the respondent Commission noted that the motion contained no substantial
matters to warrant the reconsideration sought and could have been denied just the same on
that ground.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions of the respondent NLRC dated
May 31, 1993, and August 31, 1993, are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is
so ordered.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
||| (Industrial Timber Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111985, June 30, 1994)
[G.R. No. 79425. April 17, 1989.]
CRESENCIANA
ATUN ESQUIVEL,
and
LAMBERTO ESQUIVEL, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL M. ALEGRE,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch II, 5th Judicial
Region, Legaspi City and TEOTIMO ALAURIN, VISITACION MAGNO
& SPS. WILFREDO ENCINAS & PATROCINA ENCINAS, respondents.

R. Aquende Raeses for petitioners.

Otilio Sy Bongon for respondents.

Indeed, the back wages and other benefits awarded by Arbiter Solamo to each of the private
respondents in the amount of P24,300.00 correspond merely to the period between their
illegal dismissal on April 26, 1986, up to the time of the rendition of the decision on February
26, 1987. There is no dispute that from April 26, 1986, to this date, the private respondents
have not been reinstated nor has payment of the monetary awards decreed by
the NLRC been made them. cdll

Florante C. Dris collaborating counsel for petitioners.

SYLLABUS

A similar action was taken in the recent case of Sampaguita Garments Corporation 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; AMENDED JUDGMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL
v. NLRC, 11 where this Court upheld the nullification of a decision of the NLRC ordering theJUDGMENT DISTINGUISHED; CASE AT BAR. There is a difference between an
reinstatement of an employee after her conviction of the same offense of which she was amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment,
the lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and renders the amended
absolved in the administrative case.

and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amendedThe questioned order of July 21, 1987 (Rollo, p. 10) reads, as follows:
and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision
"For utter lack of factual and legal basis, and considering further that
(Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 [1964]; Sta. Romana v. Lacson, 104
this case was already terminated and decided against the plaintiffsSCRA 93 [1981]). Following the Court's differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an
movants by the affirming decision of the Supreme Court, the motion of
amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or
plaintiffs-movants dated July 3, 1987 is hereby DENIED."
extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or
adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It
does not replace that which it supplements (Aznar III, et. al. v. Bernard, et. al., G.R. No.The dispositive portion of the questioned order of August 6,1987 (Rollo, p. 11) also reads as
81190, May 9, 1988). In the instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the follows:
original decision but only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The
"WHEREAS, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
supplemental decision cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no
DENIED. This shall be a final Order on the same incident."
declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties. It only declared the
supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of the defendants in the original The antecedents of the case are taken from G.R. No. L-38826 which was promulgated by
complaint, "such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding the Court on June 27, 1975 (Rollo, p. 46) and are quoted as follows:
upon them . . ."
"It appears that in the action of ejectment (Civil Case No. 990 of the City
2. ID.; ID.; FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT; WRIT OF EXECUTION; SHALL ISSUE
Court of Legaspi City), petitioners secured a judgment ordering
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. The original decision became final and executory on October
respondents to vacate a parcel of land, with an area of 201; square
6, 1986. In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution,
meters situated in Legaspi Port, Legaspi City and known as Lot No. 57
the issuance of which is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus (Nuez v. Court of
of Plan MSI-V-11535-D of the Cadastral Survey of said City. In said
Appeals, 152 SCRA 197 [1987]; Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37944, June 30, 1988;
ejectment case, respondents claimed prior and continued possession of
Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, G.R. No. 45875, June 30, 1988). The issuance of an order of
the land in question, and with respect to Original Certificate of Title No.
execution is the ministerial duty of the lower court once the judgment of a higher court is
28 of the Register of Deeds of Legaspi City on which petitioners based
returned to it and it is without jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher
their action, respondents alleged that the same was secured through
court (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). The writ of execution must,
fraud. Upon this decision being appealed to the Court of First Instance,
however, conform to the judgment which is to be executed (Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA
the same was affirmed, the court holding that the evidence of prior
400 [1982]).
possession in favor of petitioners was so strong that the action for
annulment of petitioner's (Teotimo Alaurin) title (Civil Case No. 4602
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNNECESSARY WHERE PREVAILING PARTY ALREADY IN ACTUAL
filed by the Republic of the Philippines at the instance of respondents)
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. The restraining order issued by respondent court on
was only a mere weak attempt to annul an existing certificate of title in
June 8, 1987 restored the status quo between the parties before May 23, 1987. There was
favor of which the presumption of law is clearly on its side. Eventually,
no need for the issuance of a writ of execution. The respondents who won the case were
this decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
already in actual possession of the property in question (Respondents' Memorandum, Rollo,
Appeals, said appellate court holding that Civil Case No. 4602 is 'a
p. 258) in accordance with the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 4883 and in consonance
contingency which may not be taken into consideration in deciding the
with paragraph No. 2 of the joint manifestation of the parties embodied in the decision of the
issue of who has prior possession. Respondents' attempt to have the
Court in G.R No. L-38826. As a consequence, respondent judge did not commit any grave
case appealed to the Supreme Court did not prosper, and so, the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion of petitioners
ejectment decision became final and executory." LLjur
herein to take possession of the property in question, in his order of July 21, 1987 and
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.
The judgment having become final and executory on July 25, 1973, the City Court of
Legaspi ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of its judgment
(Rollo, p. 123) However, before the decision could be executed, petitioners, the spouses
Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto Esquivel filed against respondents Teotimo Alaurin and
DECISION
Visitacion Magno and the City Sheriff, Civil Case No. 4883 on August 24, 1973 for
reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary injunction, injunction,
before the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch I, (Respondents' Memorandum, Rollo, p.
245). The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction having been granted by the court a
PARAS, J p:
quo (Rollo, p. 104), the respondent spouses and Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court to set aside the order granting the writ, docketed as
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside, nullify and declare invalid the order of G.R. No. L-38826 (Respondents Memorandum, Rollo, p. 246). Meantime, on July 1, 1974,
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 4883, dated July 21, 1987 denying petitioners' motionCivil Case No. 4602, the case filed by Republic against private respondent Teotimo Alaurin,
dated July 3,1987 and the order of August 6, 1987 denying petitioners' motion forwas dismissed (Rollo, p. 47).
reconsideration of the order of July 27, 1987.

During the hearing of the petition, the parties agreed to file with the Court a Joint The supplemental complaint was admitted by the court a quo in its order dated January 12,
Manifestation which when filed was embodied in the decision of the Court promulgated on 1979 and on motion of respondents herein in that supplemental complaint, supplemental
June 271 1975 (Rollo, p. 46), as follows:
defendants were declared in default (Rollo, p. 17).
"The PARTIES, assisted by their respective counsel, unto the
Honorable Supreme Court respectfully set forth:
"1. That during the hearing of the above-entitled case on November 25,
1974, the parties agreed to the suspension of the consideration of the
petition for certiorari. Instead the parties agreed to have Civil Case No.
4883 entitled Cresenciana Atun, et al. versus Teotimo Alaurin, et. al.,
before the Court of First Instance of Albay, tried on the merits.
"2. That after a decision is rendered in Civil Case No. 4883, the winning
party shall possess the land in litigation - that is, if plaintiffs win (private
respondents herein) they shall be entitled to the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Albay, otherwise,
plaintiffs shall immediately vacate the premises and the defendants
(petitioners herein) restored to the possession of the land in litigation.
"3. That the parties pray that a directive be issued by the Honorable
Supreme Court to Branch II, Court of First Instance of Albay (Branch I
of the same Court where Civil Case No. 488s assigned for hearing has
no presiding Judge) to expedite the trial of Civil Case No. 4883,
preferably to hear and decide the case within ninety (90) days from
notice."

On July 31, 1979, the court n quo rendered a decision on the supplemental complaint
declaring the supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of herein private
respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, such that whatever is the result of the
appealed case shall be legally binding them (Rollo, p. 17). This dispositive portion of the
decision reads, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are
successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion
Magno such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be
legally binding upon them, with costs against supplemental
defendants."
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision in the supplemental complaint declaring private
respondents Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas as successors-in-interest of
private respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, said private respondents filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals praying that: (1) the petition be given due
course; (2) after hearing on the merits, the decision in Civil Case No. 4883 entitled
Cresenciana Atun, et. al. v. Alaurin, et, al., be declared final and executory; and (3) the
decision against supplemental defendant spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia
Dasmarinas be declared null and void (Rollo, p. 29).

The appellate court dismissed the petition in a decision promulgated on November 18,
In view of the joint manifesto, the Court dismissed the case and ordered the trial court to 1982. The dispositive portion of the decision (Rollo, p. 29), states:
expedite the trial of Civil Case No. 4883 and to try and decide the same within ninety (90)
days from notice. The Court also ordered the transfer of the case from Branch I of the Court
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs."
of First Instance of Albay which had no presiding Judge then, to Branch II, enjoining the
judge therein to comply with the decision, and the parties, to observe the agreement The decision became final and executory on December 20, 1982 (Rollo, p. 36).
embodied in the aforequoted joint manifesto (Rollo, p. 49).
On the other hand, the appeal of herein petitioners of the decision of the trial court
On October 29, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, rendered a decision in promulgated on October 29, 1975 in the original complaint for reconveyance with nullity of
Civil Case No. 4883 dismissing the case and dissolving the preliminary injunction issuedjudgment, damages and preliminary injunction was docketed in the appellate court as ACG.R. CV No. 01896. On March 10, 1986 the appellate court rendered a decision (Rollo, G.R.
earlier (Rollo, p. 107), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
74339, p. 47) affirming the appealed decision, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed.
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
costs against plaintiffs-appellants."
hereby dissolved.
On January 19, 1976, herein petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The record of appeal wasThe motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners herein was denied by the appellate court
filed in due time (Rollo, p. 30). They were, however, directed to amend their record on in a resolution dated April 14, 1986, for lack of merit (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 52).
appeal in an order dated April 14, 1978 but before they filed their amended record on Consequently, the case was raised to the Court for the second time in G.R. No. 74339 in a
appeal, on May 10, 1978 petitioners filed a motion for permission to serve supplemental petition for certiorari, also filed by petitioners herein (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 11).
complaint in pleading the spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, the two
other private respondents herein (Rollo 30). The amended record on appeal was only filed On July 2, 1986, the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit (Rollo, G.R. No.
on August 24, 1978 after several extensions granted by the court a quo. On July 20, 1979,74339, p. 58). The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner herein (Rollo, G.R. No.
private respondents filed a notice to disapprove the record on appeal and for execution of 74339, p. 63) was also denied by the Court in a resolution dated September 17, 1986
judgment which was denied by the court a quo, in its order of August 15, 1979 (Rollo, p. wherein the Court resolved "to DENY the Motion for lack of merit, and this denial is FINAL"
(Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 102). The decision of the Court became final and executory on
31). LLphil
October 6, 1986 (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 100).

On October 16, 1986, petitioners herein moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of The original complaint for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary
respondent court's supplemental decision as affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.injunction in Civil Case No. 4883 decided by respondent court on October 29, 1975 arose
09754-P (Rollo, p. 39) which was granted by the trial court in its order of October 2, 1986 from Civil Case No. 990 for unlawful detainer filed by the spouses Teotimo Alaurin and
(December 2, 1986 according to petitioners, Rollo, p. 54), "it appearing further that the Visitacion Magno, private respondents herein, against the spouses Cresenciana Atun and
decision rendered in this case has already become final and executory." It directed theLamberto Esquivel, petitioners herein, in the City Court of Legaspi which rendered a
Branch Clerk of Court to issue the corresponding writ of execution upon receipt of proof of decision in favor of private respondents herein, the spouses Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion
payment of the corresponding sheriffs fee. (Rollo, p. 41). LexLib
Magno. Said decision was affirmed by respondent court herein, the Court of Appeals and
finally by the Supreme Court. The question of prior possession of the land in question was
Armed with the said order of respondent courts, on May 23, 1987 petitioner herein raised and passed upon in that case which had already become final and executory when
Cresenciana Atun, claiming to be the prevailing party, took possession of the property in Civil Case No. 4883 was filed in the Court First Instance of Albay. LLphil
question (Rollo, pp. 15; 133).
In Civil Case No. 4883, petitioners herein anchored their action for reconveyance on their
On May 25, 1987, a motion for contempt was filed by private respondents herein, the claim of prior possession but this matter had already been resolved in favor of private
prevailing parties in Civil Case No. 4883, against petitioners herein, praying among others,respondents herein and therefore, conclusive on respondent court in Civil Case No. 4883
that respondent court: (1) immediately order petitioners herein appear in court and be, being res judicata as to the issue possession de facto (Ang Ping, et. al. v. Regional Trial
ordered to desist from doing contemptuous acts complained of in order to maintain status Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]. Trial on the merits was held on all the other aspects of the case
quo before this contempt charge; and (2) hold petitioners herein in contempt of court (Rollo, after which judgment was rendered by respondent court which proved to be unfavorable to
p. 132), but it was dismissed and denied by respondent court in an order dated June 51, petitioners herein.
1987 (Rollo, p. 43). A restraining order was however, issued by the Court of First Instance of
Legaspi City, Branch X, on June 8, 1987 which according to the Sheriff's return was served After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners herein filed their notice of
personally on petitioners herein who declined to vacate the premises subject of the appeal but due to the opposition of private respondents herein notice of appeal but due to
restraining order (Rollo, p. 62). Upon motion of the new owners of the subject premises the opposition of private respondents herein, to the non-inclusion in the record on appeal of
(Rollo, p. 124), the same branch of the court issued its order of June 10, 1987 ordering the certain pleadings, order and decisions which they claimed are relevant to the disposition of
Station Commander of the INP, Legaspi, "to assign two (2) policemen to help the sheriff the appeal, petitioners herein were ordered by respondent court to amend their record on
implement the restraining order of this Court dated June 8, 1987, and to use force, if appeal to satisfy the objections of the private respondents who are the original defendants in
necessary, should the defendants still refuse to abide by the above-mentioned Order" Civil Case No. 4883 (Rollo, p. 30). In the meantime private respondents transferred the
(Rollo, p. 61).
property in question to the spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, the two
other private respondents herein, evidenced by an inscription of a Deed of Absolute Sale
On July 3, 1987, petitioners herein, filed a motion with respondent court praying among dated April 19, 1970 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 28 on November 2, 1976
others, that an order be issued: (1) ordering private respondents herein to reconvey to (Rollo, p. 38). Petitioners must have learned of the sale before they could file their amended
movants the property in question, and directing the City Register of Deeds to cancel TCT record on appeal which must have prompted them to file a motion for supplemental
No. 311 in the name of Encinas, for having been obtained through fraud, hence, null and complaint against the vendees of the property in question, the spouses Wilfredo Encinas
void; and (2) allowing petitioners herein to immediately take possession of the property in and Patrocinia Dasmarinas which was admitted by respondent court. As borne by the
question, it being in accordance with the agreement of the parties in a manifestation records of the case, respondent court ruled in favor of herein petitioners in the supplemental
submitted and approved by the court (Rollo, p. 16). Respondent court denied the motion incomplaint which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
the question order of July 21, 1987 (Rollo, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the decision of respondent court in the supplemental complaint revised
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners herein on August 6, 1987 (Rollo, p. 54), the decision in the original complaint tantamount to an amendment or reversal of said
which motion was likewise denied by respondent court in its equally questioned order of the original decision of respondent court penned by a previous presiding judge therein
same date which respondent court denominated as final order on the same incident (Rollo, (Petitioner's Memorandum, Rollo, p 181).
p. 221).
Hence, the instant petition filed with the Court on August 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 4).
The claim is without merit.
In the resolution of March 14, 1988 the court resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition;
and (b) to require the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an
thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the
The sole issue is whether or not the decision rendered by a trial court in supplemental factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision
complaint modified the decision of the same branch of the court in the original complaint and which supersedes the original decision (Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333
amounts to a amendment of the original decision.
[1964]; Sta. Romana v. Lacson, 104 SCRA 93 [1981]). Following the Court's differentiation
of a supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental
The question must be answered in the negative.
decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name
denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement

exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements (Aznar III, is without jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court (Ang Ping v.
et. al. v. Bernard, et. al., G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988). Cdpr
Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). The writ of execution must, however, conform to
the judgment which is to be executed (Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 [1982]) which is
In the instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision but this instant case, is the dispositive portion of the original decision in Civil Case No. 4883.
only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The supplemental decision cannot
stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration of the respective rights The restraining order issued by respondent court on June 8, 1987 restored the status
and duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental defendants as successors-in- quo between the parties before May 23, 1987. There was no need for the issuance of a writ
interest of the defendants in the original complaint, "such that whatever is the result of the of execution. The respondents who won the case were already in actual possession of the
appealed case shall be legally binding upon them . . ." (Rollo, p. 28).
property in question (Respondents' Memorandum, Rollo, p. 258) in accordance with the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 4883 and in consonance with paragraph No. 2 of the
The part of the supplemental decision which petitioners claim to have revised the original, isjoint manifestation of the parties embodied in the decision of the Court in G.R No. L-38826.
quoted as follows:
As a consequence, respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion of petitioners herein to take
"In the light of the foregoing testimony of the witnesses presented by
possession of the property in question, in his order of July 21, 1987 and petitioners' motion
supplemental plaintiffs together with the documentary exhibits
for reconsideration of aforesaid order.
supporting the allegations of the supplemental complaint, the Court
finds that the evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining
preponderantly sufficient to justify and warrant a judgment in their
order issued by respondent court on June 8, 1987 is made permanent.
favor." (Rollo, p. 28).
SO ORDERED.
There can be no other interpretation of the above statement of respondent court than that all
documentary and testimonial evidence prescribed by supplemental plaintiffs, petitioners ||| (Esquivel v. Alegre, G.R. No. 79425, April 17, 1989)
herein, sufficiently prove that when supplemental defendants entered into the contract of
[G.R. No. 59284. January 12, 1990.]
absolute sale with the original defendants, they already had full knowledge of the
controversy between supplemental plaintiffs and the original defendants in Civil Case No.
4883 such that they must be adjudged as successors-in-interest of original defendants
JUANITO CARDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. PABLO S. SINGSON, Judge of
Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno. This interpretation is borne by the statement of
Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, ROMULO G.
respondent court at the end of the paragraph preceding that which petitioners herein claim
MADREDIJO, Executive Sheriff of Maasin, Southern Leyte, PONCIANO
to have revised the original decision, which states:
ALVAREZ and CIRILO ALVAREZ, respondents.
". . . One thing, however, clear is that both supplemental defendants are
successors-in-interest of Teotimo Alaurin. The prayer for reconveyance
of the property in question cannot be justified in the light of the decision
Jose Batiquin for petitioner.
of Hon. Jose C. Razo." (Rollo, p. 28)
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.
It must be pointed out that the dispositive portion itself of the supplemental decision is clear
and unambiguous. It does not make any declaration or pronouncement that may be taken to
have revised or amended the original decision. All that it declares is that the supplemental
SYLLABUS
defendants Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are successors-in-interest of
defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such that whatever is the result of the
appealed case shall be legally binding upon them.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 443 CHAPTER IV, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190);
PREVAILING PARTY ENTITLED TO WRIT OF EXECUTION WITHIN FIVE YEARS FROM
Petitioners herein pursued their appeal of the original decision with the Court of Appeals DATE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT. Under Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No.
which can be interpreted to mean that they themselves did not believe that the supplemental 190 of the Code of Civil Procedure the counting of the five (5) year period to enforce the
decision had amended the original decision of respondent court. Unfortunately for them, the Judgment starts from the entry of judgment and not from its promulgation.
appellate court found the appeal without merit. Petitioners herein then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of the appellate court which 2. ID.; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR RECORDS NOR
petition likewise did not prosper.
PREJUDICE VESTED RIGHTS. No presumption of regularity in the performance of the
duties of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals can apply to the instant case. There is no
The original decision became final and executory on October 6, 1986. In general, the record whatsoever whether in the appellate court or in the court below of any entry of
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is judgment in Civil Case No. 1853. Presumptions cannot substitute for the records, much less
a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus (Nunez v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 197prejudice vested rights.
[1987]; Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo Bun Tiong v.
Sayo,G.R. No. 45875, June 30, 1988). The issuance of an order of execution is the 3. ID.; JUDGMENT; NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT AS HELD
ministerial duty of the lower court once the judgment of a higher court is returned to it and it IN LICHAUCO v. TAN PHO, (51 Phil. 862). The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was

recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 where an order or judgment opposition thereto within the same period from receipt of the memorandum. Plaintiffs
actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. submitted their memorandum on August 18, 1980. Defendants did not submit their
There is no doubt that such an entry operates to save proceedings had before it was made. memorandum nor submitted their reply to written interrogatories (Rollo, pp. 42-45). Cdpr
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTRY THEREOF NOT ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS WHERE A PARTY On May 4, 1980, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion to defer the consideration of the motion for
GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO OPPOSE MOTION. The lower court's action decreeing execution on the ground that in the April 22, 1980 hearing they allegedly discovered that no
the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc was not done arbitrarily nor capriciously. Theentry of judgment had been made and that nobody could tell whether parties or their
petitioner was already allowed to oppose the motions in open court and was even required counsel received a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. (Rollo, p. 41) Plaintiffs
to submit a memorandum to support his position. The petitioner, however, failed to submit a therefore, prayed for the recording of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Book of
memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient evidence to support his claims over theEntries of Judgment.
properties in question.
On July 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order that "a nunc pro tunc judgment be entered
5. ID.; ID.; WHEN FINAL AND EXECUTORY, SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT THERETO, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545". For
NOT PROPER. Well settled is the rule that a judgment which has become final and the satisfaction of the judgment it likewise ordered the issuance of a writ of execution (Ibid).
executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or
mistakes. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to On July 21, 1981, the writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of
execute the final judgment, as in this case. (Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, 165 Southern Leyte or his deputies to enforce and execute the decision of the trial court as
modified by the appellate court.
SCRA 470).
The February 7, 1938 decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte reads as
follows, viz:
DECISION

PARAS, J p:

"En sue virtud, se dicta sentencia declaranda a los demandantes con

derecho a la mitad de la parcelas A, B, C y D y se ordena al Albacea
que haga entrega de la mitad de diches parcelas a los demandantes,
declarando al demandado Juan Cardoza dueno de las parcelas E, G y
H, y sobreseyendo la demanda con respecto a las parcelas F, I y J, sin
especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas.

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking
"ASI SE ORDENA."
(a) to annul and set aside the writ of execution dated July 2, 1981 issued by respondent
Judge Pablo S. Singson in Civil Case No. 1853 entitled: Juana Corollo, et al. v.
Juan Cardoza et al.; (b) to restore to petitioner possession of the three parcels of land in On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision promulgated on
controversy; and (c) to nullify the proceedings leading to the issuance of the order and writ December 6, 1939, provides as follows, viz:
of execution.
"In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
with the modification that Urbano Cadabos is ordered to deliver to the
It appears on record that in a Motion for Execution of Judgment dated August 29, 1979, Atty.
plaintiffs one-half of parcel I. There is no pronouncements as to costs."
Adelino B. Sitoy as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 entitled: "Juana Corollo,
Silvestre Corollo, Severino Corollo, Ponciano Alvarez, Cirilo Alvarez, Candido Alvarez, Leon
On July 29, 1981, Sheriff Romulo Madredizo served a copy of the writ of execution on
Ageroy, Bustico Agero, Demandantes Contra Juan Cardoza, Por si y Como Administrator de
petitioner Juanito Cardoza through his wife and son at Sta. Cruz, Maasin, Southern Leyte.
los bienes de Eulalia Cardoza, Urbano Cadabos, Magdalena Ordiz y Miguel Galos,
Trinidad Malbas who was in actual possession of parcel I was also served a copy of the writ
Demandados" prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution in the aforesaid case. The
on July 30, 1981 (Rollo, p. 50).
motion alleged that a decision dated February 7, 1938 of the Court of First Instance,
Maasin, Leyte which was affirmed with modification in the decision of the Court of Appeals inOn July 31, 1981, Juanito Cordoza's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration and to hold
CA G.R. No. 3545 promulgated on December 6, 1939 had long been final and executory. in abeyance the execution of the writ. Accordingly, the implementation of the writ was held in
Plaintiffs allegedly acquired knowledge of the appellate court's decision only in November abeyance.
11, 1974 because before the death of their original counsel in 1944 they were not informed
of the said decision. Attached to the motion is the certification dated January 9, 1979 of the On September 14, 1981 the heirs of the original defendants filed a manifestation to the
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte to the effect that the record effect that they interpose no objection to the issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment. The
does not show that plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Francisco Zialcita and defendants' counsel weremanifestation was filed by Rustico Cardoza, the son of the late original defendant
furnished a copy of the decision. Also the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals issued a Juan Cardoza, who also represented the late original defendant Magdalena Ordiz and the
Certification dated August 23, 1979 that the record of the case in C.A. G.R. No. 3545 was grandchildren of the deceased original defendant Miguel Galos. The children of the original
burned during the liberation of Manila in 1945 (Rollo, pp. 39-40)
defendant Urbano Cadabos, namely: Honorato, Camilla and Basilio all surnamed Cadabos
except Basilio whose surname is Calapre by reason of the judicial adoption joined in the
In an order dated September 4, 1979, the trial court directed the plaintiffs movants to submit said manifestation (Rollo, pp. 78-79). LexLib
their memorandum within fifteen days and for the defendants oppositors to file their

On October 14, 1981 the trial court reinstated its order dated July 6, 1981 and directed theissued by him in Civil Case No. 1853. Likewise the respondents were required to file their
issuance of an alias writ of execution (Rollo, p. 49). The trial court opined that courts arecomment within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution (Rollo, p. 52). LLphil
given wide latitude in allowing the issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment.
On the other hand, private respondents alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge
On November 11, 1981 respondent Sheriff executed the writ and personally delivered todid not usurp the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when he issued the July 6, 1981 Order
plaintiffs the property subject matter in Civil Case No. 1853. Rustico Cardoza was furnishedbecause the Court of Appeals, that decided CA G.R. No. 3545 and failed to leave any record
a copy of the writ on November 23, 1981. On November 26, 1981 Juanito Cardoza wasof entry of judgment was different from the present Court of Appeals as the former which
informed of the formal turn over of the property and was furnished a copy of the writ of was created under Commonwealth Act No. 3 on February 1, 1936 (Amended by
execution (Rollo, p. 50).
Commonwealth Act Nos. 259, 425 and 639) was abolished under Executive Order No.
37 dated March 10, 1945; that in the exercise of its function as court of law and equity and
On November 26, 1981, Petitioner appeared before the trial court in compliance with the as the final repository of the decision transmitted by the defunct appellate court, the trial
summons directing him to appear and explain why he should not be declared in contempt ofcourt correctly made the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc; that despite the lapse of about 40
court for harvesting the coconuts in parcels A, B and C, the land in question. In the hearing, years, execution is still in order because under Section 443, Chapter IX ofAct No. 190 or
petitioner was personally served the writ of execution and the respondent judge directed him the Code of Civil Procedure the counting of the five (5) year period to enforce the Judgment
to desist from harvesting the coconuts and to explain in writing why he should not be starts from the entry of judgment and not from its promulgation; that except for original
declared in contempt of court.
plaintiffs Ponciano Alvarez and Cirilo Alvarez, all the other original plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
1853 are all dead; that it is not true that petitioner had been the owner and possessor of the
On January 8, 1982 herein petitioner Juanito Cardoza filed the instant petition for certiorari,subject property for 45 years; that Tax Declaration No. 16832 covering parcel "A", Tax
mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In his petition he alleged inter Declaration No. 18307 covering parcel "B" and Tax Declaration No. 18301 covering parcel
alia that the respondent judge usurped the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when it issued "C" previously in the name of Pablo Corollo were cancelled and transferred in the name of
the Order of July 6, 1981 directing that 'a non pro tunc judgment be entered pursuant to theJuanito Cardoza only in 1964 and 1965. Private respondents therefore prayed for the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case C.A. G.R. No. 3545' because under Sectiondismissal of the petition.
10 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, its issuance is the ministerial duty of the Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals; that the trial court erred in granting the application for The decisive issues to be resolved in the instant case are (1) whether or not the decision of
issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment because plaintiffs' inaction to move for the executionthe trial court as modified by the Court of Appeals can still be enforced and (2) whether or
of the Judgment 40 years after its promulgation is a ground for its denial; that private not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it made the entry of
respondents have not adduced evidence to overcome the regularity in the performance of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued the writ of execution.
official function so that it can be presumed that the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals
made the entry of judgment; that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he On the issue of whether or not the judgment of the trial court dated February 7, 1938 in Civil
deprived petitioner of his property without due process of law; that petitioner acquired the Case No. 1853 as modified by the Court of Appeals in the decision promulgated on
land from his aunt Eulalia Cardoza who executed on April 13, 1935 her last will and December 6, 1939 can still be enforced, the answer is in the affirmative.
testament in the Visayan dialect; that after the death of Eulalia Cardoza her last will and
testament was probated on February 25, 1936 in special proceeding No. 1781 of the then Under Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil
Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte and as a legatee, petitioner received the four (4) Procedure which took effect on September 1, 1901, the prevailing party in a civil action is
parcels of land identified as parcels A, B, C, and D from the Court-appointed administrator entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five years from the
Juan Cardoza; that as owner he paid the real property tax and caused the issuance of taxdate of its entry. The counting of the five-year period starts from the entry of judgment and
declarations in his name; that when plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 received a copy of the not from its promulgation.
decision they agreed to receive parcel D, the biggest land, instead of getting one-half of the
four parcels of land; that his uncle Juan Cardozaprevailed upon petitioner to turn over parcelNo presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the Clerk of Court of the
D to the plaintiffs; that assuming that the respondent Judge can issue a writ of execution 40 Court of Appeals can apply to the instant case. There is no record whatsoever whether in
years from the rendition of the Judgment, nonetheless, it could not deprive petitioner of the the appellate court or in the court below of any entry of judgment in Civil Case No. 1853.
one-half portion of the four (4) parcels of land decreed to him in the judgment sought to be Presumptions cannot substitute for the records, much less prejudice vested rights.
implemented.
Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court of equity, the trial court correctly made
the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545. In so doing, the lower court merely ordered the
Petitioner, therefore, prayed for the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatoryjudgment of the Court of Appeals to be executed.
injunction to direct public respondents to restore to him the three (3) parcels of land and to
The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho,
recall the writ of execution.
51 Phil. 862 where an order or judgment actually rendered by a court at a former time had
On February 18, 1982, the First Division of this Court issued a resolution directing public not been entered of record as rendered. There is no doubt that such an entry operates to
respondents to restore to petitioner possession of the three (3) parcels of land. Also, save proceedings had before it was made. LLphil
respondent Judge was enjoined from further proceeding or enforcing the writ of execution
Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the lower court's action decreeing the entry of a
judgment nunc pro tunc was not done arbitrarily nor capriciously. The petitioner was

already allowed to oppose the motions in open court and was even required to submit a C.Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao Oriental and chattel mortgages over pieces of
memorandum to support his position. The petitioner, however, failed to submit a machinery and equipment.
memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient evidence to support his claims over the
Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied to interest, service
properties in question.
fees and penalty charges. This left petitioners, by PDCP's computation, with an outstanding
Finally, well settled is the rule that a judgment which has become final and executory can no balance on the principal of more than P10 million as of May 15, 1983.
longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. In such a
situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to execute the final judgment,By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and
as in this case. (Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, 165 SCRA 470).
damages. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 82-8088, was dismissed by the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
CFI. HAEDCT
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cardoza v. Singson, G.R. No. 59284, January 12, 1990)
[G.R. No. 150134. October 31, 2007.]
ERNESTO
C. DEL ROSARIO and
DAVAO
TIMBER
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. FAR EAST BANK &
TRUST
COMPANY 1 and PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:

On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) set aside the CFI's dismissal of the
complaint and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the loan agreement
between DATICOR and PDCP.
PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to this Court where it was docketed as G.R. No. 73198.
In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from petitioners (the receivables)
to its co-respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) under a Deed of
Assignment dated April 10, 1987 5 for a consideration of P5,435,000. The Deed of
Assignment was later amended by two Supplements. 6
FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) dated December 8, 1988 whereby petitioners agreed to, as they did pay
FEBTC 7 the amount of P6.4 million as full settlement of the receivables.
On September 2, 1992, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 73198 8 affirming in
toto the decision of the IAC. It determined that after deducting the P3 million earlier paid by
petitioners to PDCP, their remaining balance on the principal loan was only P1.4 million.

Petitioners thus filed on April 25, 1994 a Complaint 9 for sum of money against PDCP and
FEBTC before the RTC of Makati, mainly to recover the excess payment which they
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch "65" (sic) 2 having, by Decision 3 ofcomputed to be P5.3 million 10 P4.335 million from PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC.
July 10, 2001, dismissed petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 00-540 on the ground ofres The case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was raffled to Branch 132 of the Makati RTC.
judicata and splitting of a cause of action, and by Order of September 24, 2001 4 denied
their motion for reconsideration thereof, petitioners filed the present petition for review On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC rendered a decision 11 in Civil Case No.
94-1610 ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 million, 12 to bear interest at
on certiorari.
12% per annum from April 25, 1994 until fully paid; to execute a release or cancellation of
From the rather lengthy history of the present controversy, a recital of the following material the mortgages on the five parcels of land in Mati, Davao Oriental and on the pieces of
facts culled from the records is in order.
machinery and equipment and to return the corresponding titles to petitioners; and to pay
the costs of the suit.
On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and respondent Private
Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement under As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent FEBTC, the trial court dismissed it for
which PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign currency loan of US $265,000 and a peso lack of cause of action, ratiocinating that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC was not
loan of P2.5 million or a total amount of approximately P4.4 million, computed at the then subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, FEBTC not being a party thereto.
prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with the peso.
From the trial court's decision, petitioners and respondent PDCP appealed to the Court of
The loan agreement provided, among other things, that DATICOR shall pay: (1) a service Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50591.
fee of one percent (1%) per annum (later increased to six percent [6%] per annum) on the
outstanding balance of the peso loan; (2) 12 percent (12%) per annum interest on the peso On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a decision 13 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, holding that
petitioners' outstanding obligation, which this Court had determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be
loan; and (3) penalty charges of two percent (2%) per month in case of default.
P1.4 million, could not be increased or decreased by any act of the creditor PDCP.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land one situated in
Manila (the Otis property) which was registered in the name of petitioner Ernesto The CA held that when PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount payable to it by
DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC, irrespective of any stipulation

that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR notReplying, 22 FEBTC pointed out that PDCP cannot deny that it benefited from the
having been a party thereto, hence, not bound by its terms. cASEDC
assignment of its rights over the receivables from petitioners. It added that the third party
claim being founded on a valid and justified cause, PDCP's counterclaims lacked factual
Citing Articles 2154 14 and 2163 15 of the Civil Code which embody the principle of solutio and legal basis.
indebiti, the CA held that the party bound to refund the excess payment of P5 million 16was
FEBTC as it received the overpayment; and that FEBTC could recover from PDCP thePetitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 23 to which FEBTC filed its
amount of P4.035 million representing its overpayment for the assigned receivables basedopposition. 24
on the terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general principle of equity.
By Order of March 5, 2001, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment for lack
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its complaint only the amount of P965,000 from of merit. 25
FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a relief different from or in excess of that prayed
On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the assailed Decision dismissing petitioners'
for.
complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action. It recalled that
Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the payment of P1.4 petitioners had filed Civil Case No. 94-1610 to recover the alleged overpayment both from
million had no basis, DATICOR's obligation having already been paid in full, overpaid in fact, PDCP and FEBTC and to secure the cancellation and release of their mortgages on real
when it paid assignee FEBTC the amount of P6.4 million.
properties, machinery and equipment; that when said case was appealed, the CA, in its
Decision, ordered PDCP to release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to pay P965,000
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages itwith interest, which Decision became final and executory on November 23, 1999; and that a
was holding over the Mati real properties and the machinery and equipment, and to return Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was in fact submitted on
the corresponding certificates of title to petitioners. And it ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners August 8, 2000, hence, the issue between them was finally settled under the doctrine of res
the amount of P965,000 with legal interest from the date of the promulgation of its judgment. judicata.
FEBTC's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied, and so was its
subsequent appeal to this Court.
The trial court moreover noted that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC clearly stated
On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a Complaint 17 againstthat the "pending litigation before the Supreme Court of the Philippines with respect to the
FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess payment of P4.335 million. 18 The case wasLoan exclusive of the Receivables assigned to FEBTC shall prevail up to the extent not
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540, the precursor of the present case and raffled to Branchcovered by this Agreement." That statement in the MOA, the trial court ruled, categorically
143 of the RTC.
made only the loan subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, hence, it was with the
parties' full knowledge and consent that petitioners agreed to pay P6.4 million to FEBTC as
In its Answer, 19 FEBTC denied responsibility, it submitting that nowhere in the dispositive consideration for the settlement. The parties cannot thus be allowed to welsh on their
portion of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it held liable to return the whole contractual obligations, the trial court concluded.
amount of P5.435 million representing the consideration for the assignment to it of the
receivables, and since petitioners failed to claim the said whole amount in their original Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the trial court held that FEBTC's payment of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1610 as they were merely claiming the amount of P965,000 amount of P1,224,906.67 (P965,000 plus interest) to petitioners was in compliance with the
from it, they were barred from claiming it.
final judgment of the CA, hence, it could not entertain such claim because the Complaint
filed by petitioners merely sought to recover from FEBTC the alleged overpayment of
FEBTC later filed a Third Party Complaint 20 against PDCP praying that the latter be made P4.335 million and attorney's fees of P200,000.
to pay the P965,000 and the interests adjudged by the CA in favor of petitioners, as well as
the P4.335 million and interests that petitioners were claiming from it. It posited that PDCP Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 26 of the July 10, 2001 decision of the trial court was
should be held liable because it received a consideration of P5.435 million when it assigned denied by Order of September 24, 2001.
the receivables.
Hence, the present petition.
Answering 21 the Third Party Complaint, PDCP contended that since petitioners were not
seeking the recovery of the amount of P965,000, the same cannot be recovered via the third In their Memorandum, 27 petitioners proffer that, aside from the issue of whether their
party complaint.
complaint is dismissible on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action, the
issues of 1) whether FEBTC can be held liable for the balance of the overpayment of
PDCP went on to contend that since the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. P4.335 million plus interest which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in Civil Case
50591 had held that DATICOR has no cause of action against it for the refund of any part of No. 94-1610, and 2) whether PDCP can interpose as defense the provision in the Deed of
the excess payment, FEBTC can no longer re-litigate the same issue.
Assignment and the MOA that the assignment of the receivables shall not be affected by
this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, be considered.
Moreover, PDCP contended that it was not privy to the MOA which explicitly excluded the
receivables from the effect of the Supreme Court decision, and that the amount of P6.4 Stripped of the verbiage, the only issue for this Court's consideration is the propriety of the
million paid by petitioners to FEBTC was clearly intended as consideration for the release dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-540 upon the grounds stated by the trial court. This should be
and cancellation of the lien on the Otis property. cDEHIC
so because a Rule 45 petition, like the one at bar, can raise only questions of law (and that

justifies petitioners' elevation of the case from the trial court directly to this Court) which
must be distinctly set forth. 28 DHSCEc
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on the doctrine of res judicata, reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order whichappears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Underscoring supplied)

(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action. 34
There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case No. 94-1610 (that
rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not only did it dispose of the
case on the merits; it also became executory as a consequence of the denial of FEBTC's
motion for reconsideration and appeal. 35
Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on the
merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. 36 To recall, it was ruled that:
(1) DATICOR overpaid by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC was bound to refund the excess payment
but because DATICOR's claim against FEBTC was only P965,000, the court could only
grant so much as the relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further claim against DATICOR
because its obligation had already been paid in full. Right or wrong, that judgment bars
another case based upon the same cause of action. 37
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, it cannot be
gainsaid that the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought by petitioners to recover an
alleged overpayment of P5.3 million P965,000 from FEBTC and P4.335 million from
PDCP.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by the same petitioners, was for the
recovery of P4.335 million which is admittedly part of the P5.3 million earlier sought to be
recovered in Civil Case No. 94-1610. This time, the action was brought solely against
FEBTC which in turn impleaded PDCP as a third party defendant.

The above-quoted provision lays down two main rules. Section 49 (b) * enunciates the firstIn determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the application of the rule
rule of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by judgment," which statesof res judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to
that the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes thesustain the second action would suffice to authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in
parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving which the forms or nature of the two actions are different. 38 Simply stated, if the same facts
the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal. 29
or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that
Stated otherwise, "bar by former judgment" makes the judgment rendered in the first case the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action.
an absolute bar to the subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to It bears remembering that a cause of action is the delict or the wrongful act or omission
the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which mightcommitted by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 39
have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.30 It is in
this concept that the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used as a ground forIn the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly
a motion to dismiss in civil cases. 31
receiving and refusing to return an amount in excess of what was due it in violation of their
right to a refund. The same facts and evidence presented in the first case, Civil Case No.
The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47 (c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of 94-1610, were the very same facts and evidence that petitioners presented in Civil Case No.
judgment." This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or 00-540.
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein Thus, the same Deed of Assignment between PDCP and FEBTC, the first and second
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim supplements to the Deed, the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC, and this Court's
or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. 32 It refers to a situationDecision in G.R. No. 73198 were submitted in Civil Case No. 00-540.
where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters
actually determined or which were necessarily included therein. 33
Notably, the same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support of their allegations for,
and defenses against, the recovery of the P4.335 million. Petitioners, of course, plead the
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior judgment," viz:
CA Decision as basis for their subsequent claim for the remainder of their overpayment. It is
well established, however, that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a
(a) finality of the former judgment;
different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as herein
petitioners are doing, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
action shall not be twice litigated. 40 ITScHa
and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and cHaCAS

In fact, authorities tend to widen rather than restrict the doctrine of res judicata on theCARPIO, J p:
ground that public as well as private interest demands the ending of suits by requiring the
parties to sue once and for all in the same case all the special proceedings and remedies to
The Case
which they are entitled. 41
This is a petition for review 1 of the Decision 2 dated 24 September 2003 and the
This Court finds well-taken then the pronouncement of the court a quo that to allow the re-Resolution dated 16 January 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73663.
litigation of an issue that was finally settled as between petitioners and FEBTC in the prior
The Facts
case is to allow the splitting of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4 of
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court reading:
On 25 July 1997, respondents Angelito Estur, Juan Ofalsa, and Rolando Ereve
(respondents) filed an amended complaint 3 for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of legal
SEC. 4. Splitting of a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more
holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay against Lincoln Gerald, Inc.
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
(Lincoln) and petitioner Dominic Griffith (petitioner).
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (Emphasis and underscoring
Lincoln, a corporation owned by the Griffith family, is engaged in the manufacture of
supplied)
furniture. Respondents alleged that petitioner, the Vice President for Southeast Asia
Operations, managed the corporation.
This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. 42 Because the
On 4 October 1999, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen (Labor Arbiter Layawen) decided the
plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first
case in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relies; he
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered with the following rulings:
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover
for the same wrong or injury. 43
1. Dismissing the complaint of complainant Angelito Estur for illegal
dismissal for lack of merit.
Clearly then, the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 operated as a bar to Civil Case No.
2. Ordering respondent(s) to pay Angelito Estur his 13th month pay for
00-540, following the above-quoted Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
the (sic) 1996 in the amount of PHP7,930.00, but dismissing his other
claims for insufficiency of evidence.
A final word. Petitioners are sternly reminded that both the rules on res judicata and splitting
of causes of action are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity
3. Declaring the dismissal of complainants Juan Ofalsa and Rolando
of suits interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. 44 Re-litigation of matters already settled by
Ereve [illegal], and ordering respondents to pay them their backwages
a court's final judgment merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness
from the time of their dismissal up to the rendition of this decision. Due
and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier
to the apparent strained relationship between complainants and
cases. 45
respondents, the latter are directed to pay complainants their
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the RTC, Branch 143,
for every year of service.
Makati dismissing petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 00-540 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

4. Their money claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED. 4

||| (Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 150134, October 31, 2007)
[G.R. No. 161777. May 7, 2008.]
DOMINIC GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. ANGELITO
OFALSA, and ROLANDO EREVE, respondents.

DECISION

ESTUR,

JUAN

Lincoln filed a notice of appeal on 9 November 1999 but failed to file the required
memorandum of appeal. On 6 July 2001, the decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen became
final and executory, and the first writ of execution was issued on 2 October 2001.
In February 2002, petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution dated 7
January 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno (Labor Arbiter Reyno) directed against
him and Lincoln. The first alias writ of execution orders the sheriff:
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the
premises of respondent(s) Lincoln Gerald, Inc. and/or Dominic G.
Griffith located at #7 Sheridan corner Pioneer streets, Mandaluyong
City or anywhere respondents may be found in the Philippines and
collect the total amount of Php590,828.00 representing their
backwages, separation pay and 13th month pay plus execution fee in

the amount of PhP5,408.00 and to turn over the said amount to this
Office, for further disposition to the complainants. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)

At the outset, it should be stressed that the 4 October 1999 decision of Labor Arbiter
Layawen, finding Lincoln and petitioner solidarily liable to respondents, became final and
executory on 6 July 2001. Petitioner, however, persists in challenging Labor Arbiter
Layawen's decision by insisting that the judgment debt should have been the sole liability of
On 19 February 2002, petitioner filed a motion to quash the first alias writ of Lincoln. Petitioner maintains that the writ is defective because it makes him personally liable
execution. 6 Petitioner alleged in his motion that he was unaware of the labor case filed for the judgment debt even though he was only a corporate officer acting in good faith and
against him because he was Lincoln's Vice President for Southeast Asia Operations only within the bounds of his authority. The inclusion of petitioner in the writ as solidarily liable
until 17 September 1997. Petitioner contended that the addition of the execution fee in thewith Lincoln for the backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay of respondents does
writ in effect modified Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision, and thus nullified the writ. not make the writ defective. On the contrary, the writ is in accord with the terms of Labor
Furthermore, petitioner maintained that as an officer of Lincoln, he was not personally liableArbiter Layawen's decision which the writ seeks to enforce.
to pay the judgment debt because he acted in good faith and within the bounds of his
authority. Labor Arbiter Reyno denied the motion in an order dated 24 April 2002. Petitioner Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision is already final and executory and can no longer be the
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) subject of an appeal. Thus, petitioner is bound by the decision and can no longer impugn
denied on 16 July 2002.
the same. 8 Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a decision that has attained finality can no
longer be modified even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
On 11 September 2002, Labor Arbiter Reyno issued a second alias writ of execution against or law. 9 The doctrine of finality of judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo: 10
petitioner and Lincoln.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality
On 4 November 2002, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
application for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
dismissed the petition in its Decision dated 24 September 2003, and subsequently denied
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing
Hence, this petition for review.
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded
The Court of Appeals held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Labor Arbiter's order. The appellate
that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts
court cited Section 19, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (NLRC Rules)
must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there
which prohibits motions for reconsideration of any order or decision of a Labor Arbiter.
would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of
However, when a motion for reconsideration is filed, it shall be treated as an appeal
courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law
provided that it complies with the requirements for perfecting an appeal. The Court of
and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
Appeals held that petitioner's motion to recall the first alias writ of execution cannot be
controversies with finality. 11
treated as an appeal.
While petitioner can no longer challenge the decision which has become final and
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that the addition of the execution fee did not modify executory, he can question the manner of its execution especially if it is not in accord with
the decision because the NLRC Rules and the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment the tenor and terms of the judgment. 12 As held in Abbott v. NLRC: 13
(Sheriff Manual) 7 provide for the inclusion of the execution fee which shall be collected
In Sawit v. Rodas and Daquis v. Bustos, we held that a judgment
from the losing party.
becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial
Lastly, the appellate court found no evidence which would substantiate petitioner's claim that
declaration. Accordingly, finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the
as of 17 September 1997, he was no longer connected with Lincoln. There was no evidence
lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. In
that there was a change in the situation of the parties.
such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a
writ of execution; and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty, compellable
The Issue
by mandamus.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the NLRC
In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the order of Labor Arbiter Reyno,
decision itself but the manner of its execution. There is a big difference.
denying the motion to quash the writ.
While it is true that the decision itself has become final and executory
and so can no longer be challenged, there is no question either that it
The issue revolves on the validity of the first alias writ of execution dated 7 January 2002,
must be enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any
issued by Labor Arbiter Reyno.
deviation therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal. 14
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.

In his motion to quash the writ, petitioner alleged that the writ was a nullity because it
modified the 4 October 1999 decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen by including the amount of
the execution fee in the writ.
The inclusion of the execution fee is not a modification of the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Section 6, Rule IX of the Sheriff Manual provides that the execution fee shall be charged
against the losing party, thus:
SEC. 6. Sheriffs/Execution Fees. Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall
be provided at the beginning of the month with a cash advance of five
hundred pesos only (P500.00) for transportation expenses which shall
be liquidated at the end of the month with a statement of expenses and
itinerary of travel duly approved by the Commission or Labor Arbiter
issuing the writ.

In the National Labor Relations Commission, the sheriff or duly

designated officer shall collect the following execution fees which
shall be charged against the losing party:
(1) For awards less than P5,000.00 P200.00;
(2) P5,000.00 or more but less than P20,000.00
P400.00;
(3) P20,000.00 or more but less than P50,000.00
P600.00;
(4) P50,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00
P800.00;
(5) P100,000.00 or more but not
P150,000.00 P1,000.00;

exceeding

(6) P150,000.00 the fee is plus P10.00 for every

P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00.

MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondents.

[G.R. No. 125475. August 14, 1998.]

H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, respondents.

Chavez, Laureta & Associates for Marina Properties Corporation.

Camacho & Associates for H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc.

SYNOPSIS
The cases under consideration are two separate appeals from the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) of June 27, 1996 in CA-GR. SP No. 37927 which affirmed with modification
the Order of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 5462 which, in turn, affirmed in
toto the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in the case filed
by H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (Carlos) against MARINA Properties Corporation (Marina)
for specific performance with damages. The records of the case reveal that Carlos filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against Marina with the HLURB, alleging,
among others, that it has substantially complied with the terms and conditions of the
contract to purchase and sell, having paid more that 50% of the contract price of the
condominium unit built on a parcel of land at Asiaworld City, Coastal Road, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. Moreover, Marina's act of canceling the contract was done with malice and
bad faith. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the Office of the
President but sustained Marina as regards the award of actual damages, finding that no
evidence was presented to prove the P30,000.00 award as monthly rental for the
condominium unit. Hence, this appeal. AaIDCS

The Supreme Court finds the decision of the Court of Appeals proper and correct. The Court
upholds the findings of the appellate court that Marina's cancellation of the contract to buy
and to sell was illegal. It is very clear that Carlos had already paid P1,810,330.70, or more
than 50% of the contract price of P3,614,000.00. Moreover, the sum Carlos had disbursed
amounted to more than the total 24 installments. In addition since the cancellation was done
Clearly, the inclusion of the execution fee does not make the writ of execution defective.
not through a notarial cancellation, as explicitly required by Section 24 ofPD 957, the
cancellation was void. The Court likewise agrees with the conclusion of the appellate court
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 September 2003 that the award of P30, 000.00 as actual damages for unearned monthly rental income was
and the Resolution dated 16 January 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.arbitrary because no proof was submitted by Carlos to substantiate the recovery. In view
73663.
thereof, the Court denied the petitions in these consolidated cases and affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
The sheriff or duly designated officer shall be administratively
liable in case of failure to collect the execution fees without any
justifiable reason. (Emphasis supplied)

||| (Griffith v. Estur, G.R. No. 161777, May 07, 2008)

SYLLABUS

[G.R. No. 125447. August 14, 1998.]

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; GROUNDS
THEREFOR. Under our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a

trial court may move for reconsideration thereof on the following grounds: (a) the damages adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as is duly proved.
awarded are excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or (c) the Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
decision is contrary to law. A motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
to appeal, unless the motion is pro forma. This is now expressly set forth in the last conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. As the Court of
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appeals correctly found here that no proof was submitted by H.L. CARLOS to substantiate
the recovery of actual damages in the form of monthly rentals, the deletion of such award
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRO FORMA MOTION; ALTHOUGH A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was but appropriate.
MAY MERELY REITERATE ISSUES ALREADY PASSED UPON BY THE COURT, THAT BY
ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE IT PRO FORMA AND IMMATERIAL; CASE AT BAR. A6. ID.; OBLIGATION AND CONTRACTS; SALES; AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO
motion for reconsideration based on the foregoing grounds is deemed pro forma if the sameBUYERS OF REAL ESTATE ON INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS (R.A. 6552); IN ORDER TO
does not specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by the EFFECT THE CANCELLATION OF A CONTRACT TO BUY AND TO SELL, A NOTARIAL
evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legalCANCELLATION MUST FIRST BE HAD; CASE AT BAR. The Court likewise uphold the
provisions. It is settled that although a motion for reconsideration may merely reiteratefinding thatMARINA's cancellation of the Contract To Buy and To Sell was clearly illegal.
issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma and isPrior to MARINA's unilateral act of rescission, H.L. CARLOS had already paid
immaterial because what is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. . . . We P1,810,330.70, or more than 50% of the contract price of P3,614,000.00. Moreover, the sum
are thus unable to hold that MARINA's motion for reconsideration was merely pro forma.H.L. CARLOS had disbursed amounted to more than the total of 24 installments, i.e., two
Our review of the records reveals that said motion adequately pointed out the years' worth of installments computed at a monthly installment rate of P67,024.22, inclusive
conclusions MARINA regarded as erroneous and contrary to law and even referred to of the downpayment. As to the governing law, Section 24 of P.D. 957 provides: SEC. 24.
findings not supported by evidence as well as jurisprudence to sustain MARINA's claims. AsFailure to pay installments. The rights of the buyer in the event of his failure to pay the
to the justification proffered by the Office of the President that it had already passed upon installments due for reasons other than failure of the owner or developer to develop the
the issues raised by MARINA in its motion, plainly, the authorities cited above readily refute project shall be governed by Republic Act No. 6552. Then among the requirements of R.A.
such a position. EaTCSA
No. 6552, in order to effect the cancellation of a contract, a notarial cancellation must first be
had. Therefore, absent this, MARINA's cancellation of its contract with H.L. CARLOS was
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 1-91; AN AGGRIEVED PARTY IS void.
ALLOWED ONE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION OR
FINAL ORDER. It may be pointed out that under Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 dated
27 February 1991 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated 16 May 1995, which
took effect on 1 June 1995, an aggrieved party is allowed one motion for reconsideration of
DECISION
the assailed decision or final order before he may file a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. All told, MARINA's motion for reconsideration was but proper under the adjective
rules extant in this jurisdiction.
4. ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; A PARTY IS NOT GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN DAVIDE, JR., J p:
IT SIMULTANEOUSLY FILED A CASE TO ENFORCE A CONTRACT BEFORE THE HLURB
AND A SUM OF MONEY CASE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; CASE AT BAR. We resolve here two (2) separate appeals from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals of 27
The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant consideration. H.L.June 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37927, which affirmed with modification the 15 March 1995
CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued MARINA before the HLURB toOrder 2 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5462 which, in turn, affirmed in
enforce their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum shopping is the act of a party against toto the 14 June 1993 decision 3 of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (andin the case filed by H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (hereafter H.L. CARLOS)
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action against MARINA Properties Corporation (hereafter MARINA) for Specific Performance with
of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the Damages and docketed as REM-A- 1179. 4
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the
The factual antecedents, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
party. Contrary to MARINA's assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint was hardly a duplication of
Civil Case No. 89-5870 which was filed to collect the sum of money corresponding to unpaid
Petitioner Marina Properties Corporation (MARINA for short) is a
billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil case was, therefore,
domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate
totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before the HLURB. For this reason,
development. Among its projects is a condominium complex project,
neither could there have been splitting of a cause of action.
known as the "MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT"
5. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGE; ACTUAL DAMAGES; TO BE RECOVERABLE, IT MUST NOT
ONLY BE CAPABLE OF PROOF, BUT MUST ACTUALLY BE PROVED WITH A
REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY; CASE AT BAR. We agree with the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the award of P30,000.00 as actual damages for unearned
monthly rental income starting from March 1990 until the delivery of the property to H.L.
CARLOS was arbitrary. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to

consisting of 10 building clusters with 31 housing units to be built on a

parcel of land at Asiaworld City, Coastal Road in Paraaque, Metro
Manila. The area is covered by T.C.T. No. (121211) 42201 of the
Registry of Deeds of the same municipality.

The construction of the project commenced sometime in 1988, with

respondent H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (H.L. CARLOS for brevity) as
the principal contractor, particularly of Phase III.

As an incentive to complete the construction of Phase

III, MARINA allowed H.L. CARLOS to purchase a condominium unit
therein known as Unit B-121. Thus, on October 9, 1988, the parties
entered into a Contract to Purchase and to Sell covering Unit B-121 for
P3,614,000.00. H.L. CARLOS paid P1,034,200.00 as down payment,
P50,000.00 as cash deposit and P67,024.22 equivalent to 13 monthly
amortizations.
After paying P1,810,330.70, which was more than half of the contract
price, H.L. CARLOS demanded for the delivery of the unit,
but MARINA refused. This prompted H.L. CARLOS to file with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 a complaint for damages
against MARINA, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5870.
Meanwhile, on April 20, 1990, MARINA wrote H.L. CARLOS that it was
exercising its option under their Contract to Purchase and to Sell to take
over the completion of the project due to its (H.L. CARLOS')
abandonment of the construction of the Phase III project.
In a letter dated March 15, 1991, H.L. CARLOS inquired
from MARINA about the "turn-over status" of the condominium
unit. MARINA replied that it was cancelling the Contract to Purchase
and Sell due to H.L. CARLOS' abandonment of the construction of the
Phase III Project and its filing of baseless and harassment suits
against MARINA and its officers.
Forthwith, H.L. CARLOS filed the instant complaint for specific
performance with damages against MARINA with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), alleging among others, that it
has substantially complied with the terms and conditions of the Contract
to Purchase and Sell, having paid more than 50% of the contract price
of the condominium unit; and that MARINA's act of cancelling the
contract was done with malice and bad faith. H.L. CARLOS prays
that MARINA be ordered to deliver to it the subject unit, accept the
monthly amortizations on the remaining balance, execute the final deed
of sale and deliver the title of the unit upon full payment of the contract
price. Also, H.L. CARLOS prays for the award of actual and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, MARINA claimed that its cancellation of the Contract to
Purchase and Sell is justified since H.L. CARLOS has failed to pay its
monthly installment since October 1989 or for a period of almost two (2)
years; that H.L. CARLOS abandoned its work on the project as of
December 1989; and that the instant case should have been
suspended in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 89-5870 for
damages in the Makati RTC involving the same issues. dctai

On February 21, 1992, the HLURB, through Atty. Abraham N.

Vermudez, Arbiter, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the cancellation of the subject
Contract to Sell as null and void and ordering
respondentMarina Properties Corporation as follows:
1. To turn over the subject condominium unit to herein
complainant, accept monthly amortization[s] on the
remaining balance and to execute the final deed of
sale and deliver title/ownership of the subject
property to the complainant upon full payment of the
contract price.
2. To pay complainant actual damages of P30,000.00 per
month commencing from March 1990 until the
delivery of the subject property and the amount of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as and by
way of attorney's fees.
4. To pay to this Board the amount of P5,000.00 as [an]
administrative fine.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
In ruling for H.L. CARLOS, the HLURB Arbiter held:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's position that the case
is a complex one is more imaginary than
real. Clearly, the cancellation of the subject
'Contract to Purchase and to Sell' was in
violation of Republic Act No. 6552, otherwise
known as the 'Realty Installment Buyers'
Protection Act,' which prescribes the
procedure for cancellation of installment
contracts for the purchase of subdivision lots
and/or condominium units.
In the case at bar, the complainant
had already paid P1,810,330.70 or more
than 50% of the contract price of
P3,614,000.00 and more than the total of
two years (24 months) installments
computed at the monthly installment of
P67,024.22, inclusive of the downpayment,
which is more than 24 installments.
Under R.A. 6552, notarial cancellation of the
installment contract becomes effective only
upon payment of the cash surrender value

to the purchaser, which however respondent

did not do.

MARINA filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals ascribing the following errors to
the Office of the President:

Respondent's cancellation of the

subject contract was clearly illegal, void and
cannot be sanctioned.

(1) In sustaining the award of actual damages for unrealized profits in

favor of private respondent H.L. CARLOS which were
unliquidated, speculative and patently unreasonable;

Neither can this Office find merit in

respondent's contention that this case
should be suspended because of the
pending civil case between the parties, said
pending case, Civil Case No. 89-5870 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
Metro Manila, was filed by the same
complainant herein against the same
respondent for collection of unpaid billings in
the amount of about P10,000,000.00.

(2) In declaring the motion for reconsideration filed by MARINA "proforma" and depriving it of the right of appeal, and

On the other hand, this Office find

that respondent's act in cancelling the
subject installment sales contract without
following the provisions of R.A. 6552is an
unsound real estate business practice for
which respondent is fined the sum of
P5,000.00.
As to damages and attorney's fees
claimed by complainant and borne out by
the records, this Office finds that respondent
should be held liable for unearned rental
income
of
P30,000.00
per
month,
commencing from March 1990 when the
condominium unit should have been
delivered until actual delivery thereof, and
attorney's fees of P50,000.00, both amounts
to be deducted from the unpaid balance due
on the subject condominium unit.
Likewise, for its wanton breach of
the subject contract, respondent is ordered
to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 as an example for the public
good, deductible from the balance due on
the subject condominium unit.
xxx xxx xxx
Whereupon, MARINA interposed an appeal to the Board of
Commissioners of HLURB (First Division) which affirmed the assailed
decision.
On further appeal to the Office of the President, the decision of the
Board of Commissioner (First Division) was affirmed.
MARINA filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 5

(3) In not dismissing the case on the grounds of litis pendentia, forumshopping and splitting a single cause of action. 6
The Court of Appeals sustained MARINA as regards the award of actual damages, finding
that no evidence was presented to prove the P30,000.00 award as monthly rental for the
condominium unit. However, as to the pronouncement of the Office of the President
that MARINA's motion for reconsideration was merely pro-forma, the Court of Appeals noted
that MARINA did not raise any new issue in its motion for reconsideration. In the same vein,
respondent court ruled that MARINA was not deprived of its right to appeal.
The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside MARINA's assertion that the complaint should
have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia thus:
The requisites of lis pendens as a ground for dismissal of a complaint
are: (1) identity of parties or at least such representing the same
interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted as prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity in both cases is
such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata to
the other case.
There is no dispute that the case at bench and Civil Case No. 89-5870
for damages at the Makati RTC involves the same parties although in
the civil case, the officers of MARINAhave been impleaded as codefendants. While the first requisite obtains in this case, the last two are
conspicuously absent.
It will be observed that the two cases involve distinct and separate
causes of action or rights asserted. Civil Case No. 89-5870 is for the
collection of sums of money corresponding to unpaid billings and labor
costs incurred by H.L. CARLOS in the construction of the project under
the Construction Contract agreed upon by the parties. Upon the other
hand, the case at bench is for specific performance (delivery of the
condominium unit) and damages arising from the unilateral cancellation
of the Contract to Purchase and to Sell byMARINA.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are also different. In the civil case, H.L.
CARLOS prays for the award of P7,065,885.03 representing unpaid
labor costs, change orders and price escalations including the sum of
P2,000,000.00 as additional compensatory damages. In the instant
case, H.L. CARLOS seeks not only the awa[r]d of actual and exemplary
damages but also the delivery of the condominium unit upon MARINA's
acceptance of the monthly amortization on the remaining balance, the
execution of a final deed of sale and the delivery of the title to the said
private respondent. LibLex

MARINA's claim that the present complaint should be dismissed on the

ground of splitting a cause of action, deserves scant consideration. The
two complaints did not arise from a single cause of action but from two
separate causes of action. It bears emphasis that H.L. CARLOS' cause
of action in the civil case stemmed from the breach by MARINA of its
contractual obligation under the Construction Contract, while in the
case at bench, H.L. CARLOS' cause of action is premised on the
unilateral cancellation of the Contract to Purchase and Sell
by MARINA. 7
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the Office of the President but
deleted the award of actual damages. As such, the parties sought redress from this Court by
way of separate petitions.

A motion for reconsideration based on the foregoing grounds is deemed pro forma if the
same does not specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported
by the evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or
legal provisions. 13 It is settled that although a motion for reconsideration may merely
reiterate issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro
forma and is immaterial because what is essential is compliance with the requisites of the
Rules. 14 Thus, in Guerra Enterprises, Co. Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur, 15 we ruled:
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed,
one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and
improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the
movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the
court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing
party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new
trial. We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a
ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (c) of Section 1 of Rule
37.

In G.R. No. 125447, MARINA asserts that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in finding that
petitioner should turn over the subject condominium unit to H.L. CARLOS and accept
monthly amortizations on the remaining balance; and (2) in not ordering the dismissal of the
case on the grounds of litis pendentia, forum-shopping and splitting of a single cause ofOn this note, it has also been fittingly observed that:
action.
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 125475, H.L. CARLOS contends that the Court of Appeals merely delay the proceedings, and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional
gravely erred in: (1) finding that the award of actual damages equivalent to P30,000.00 inmatters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts should be slow to declare
unearned monthly rentals was not sustained by evidence; (2) in not declaring that the the same outright as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro formamotions has a direct
petition for review was filed out of time and fatally defective for lack of verification and bearing upon the movant's valuable right to appeal. It would be in the interest of justice to
certification by MARINA Properties, and in not declaring the decision of the Office of the accord the appellate court the opportunity to review the decision of the trial court on the
President final and executory; and (3) in not dismissing MARINA's appeal as without merit. merits than to abort the appeal by declaring the motion pro forma, such that the period to
appeal was not interrupted and had consequently lapsed. 16
MARINA's motion to consolidate both cases was granted in a resolution dated 27 January
1997. 8
We are thus unable to hold that MARINA's motion for reconsideration was merely pro forma.
Our review of the records reveals that said motion adequately pointed out the
We first address the lone procedural issue of the timeliness of the petition for review filed conclusions MARINA regarded as erroneous and contrary to law, and even referred to
by MARINA with the Court of Appeals and the supposed lack of verification and certification. findings not supported by evidence as well as jurisprudence to sustain MARINA's claims. As
We find without merit the allegation that MARINA's petition for review before the Court of to the justification proffered by the Office of the President that it had already passed upon
Appeals was filed out of time as MARINA's motion for reconsideration (of the order of the the issues raised by MARINA in its motion, plainly, the authorities cited above readily refute
Office of the President) was found to be pro forma and, therefore, did not stop the running ofsuch a position.
its period to appeal.

It may be pointed out that under Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 dated 27 February 1991
MARINA filed its Motion for Reconsideration 9 on the last day of its . period to appeal,and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated 16 May 1995, which took effect on 1
specifically, on 3 May 1995. However, the motion was ; found by the Office of the President June 1995, an aggrieved party is allowed one motion for reconsideration of the assailed
to be pro forma as "the issues of litis ; pendentia in, forum-shopping and splitting of a cause decision or final order before he may file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. All
of action as well as the issue of unliquidated, speculative and unreasonable damages raisedtold, MARINA's motion for reconsideration was but proper under the adjective rules extant in
therein were basically the same issues raised and discussed extensively in the Appeal this jurisdiction.
Memorandum and which were already weighed, discussed and considered by this Office inThe charge of a lack of verification or certification in MARINA's petition before the Court of
its Order dated March 15, 1995." 10 As a consequence, the Office of the President declared Appeals is baseless. Even the most cursory of reviews will disclose that such may be found
its decision final and executory.
on pages 30 and 31 of the Petition. 17
Under our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a trial court may We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the award of P30,000.00 as
move for reconsideration thereof on the following grounds: (a) the damages awarded are actual damages for unearned monthly rental income starting from March 1990 until the
excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or (c) the decision is delivery of the property to H.L. CARLOS was arbitrary. Article 2199 of the Civil Code
contrary to law. 11 A motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered
appeal, unless the motion is pro forma 12 This is now expressly set forth in the lastby him as is duly proved. 18 Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. 19 Courts

cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and ||| (Marina Properties Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125447, 125475, August 14,
amount of damages. 20 As the Court of Appeals correctly found here that no proof was 1998)
submitted by H.L. CARLOS to substantiate the recovery of actual damages in the form of
[G.R. No. 160406. June 26, 2006.]
monthly rentals, the deletion of such award was but appropriate.
The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant consideration. H.L.
SPS.
DOLORES
MIRANDA
PROVOST
and
JEAN
CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued MARINA before the HLURB to
PROVOST, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.
enforce their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum shopping is the act of a party against
VICTOR RAMOS and FE A. RAMOS, respondents.
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the
DECISION
party. 21 Contrary to MARINA's, assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint was hardly a
duplication of Civil Case. No. 89-5870 which was filed to collect the sum of money
corresponding to unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the
civil case was, therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before the
HLURB. For this reason, neither could there have been splitting of a cause of action.
QUISUMBING, J p:
Anent the absence of litis pendentia, the Court of Appeals' meticulous analysis of this issue The instant petition seeks the annulment of the Decision 1 dated February 13, 2003 of the
leaves no room for improvement and we adopt it as our own.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57008 and its Resolution 2 dated August 27, 2003,
We likewise uphold the finding that MARINA's cancellation of the Contract To Buy and Todenying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court reversed the Decision 3 dated
Sell was clearly illegal. Prior to MARINA's unilateral act of rescission, H.L. CARLOS had December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28,
already paid P1,810,330.70, or more than 50% of the contract price of P3,614,000.00.in Civil Case No. 573, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated February 19, 1999 of the
Moreover, the sum H.L. CARLOS had disbursed amounted to more than the total of 24 Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No. 212.
installments, i.e., two years' worth of installments computed at a monthly installment rate of The antecedent facts are as follows.
P67,024.22, inclusive of the downpayment.
Private respondents, spouses Victor and Fe Ramos, are the owners of a parcel of land
As to the governing law, Section 24 of P.D. 957 22 provides:
surveyed as Lot No. 12542, Case 15, Cad. 473 situated in Putingbalas, Tupsan
Grande, 5Mambajao, Camiguin. The spouses' lot was donated to them by Nicolasa Yap
SEC. 24. Failure to pay installments. The rights of the buyer in the
Vda. de Abao on October 24, 1994. Adjacent to the lot is a parcel of land surveyed as Lot
event of his failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than
No. 12543, C-15, Cad. 473 owned by petitioner Dolores Miranda Provost. She bought it
failure of the owner or developer to develop the project shall be
from Rosario Abanil.
governed by Republic Act , No. 6552.
Then among the requirements of R.A. No. 6552, 23 in order to effect the cancellation of aSometime in May 1992, the Provosts constructed a fence separating the two lots. In 1994,
contract, a notarial cancellation must first be had. 24 Therefore, absent this, MARINA'sthe Ramoses, believing that the Provosts encroached on a portion of their lot, demanded
the return of the encroached area but the latter refused. The Ramoses thus had a relocation
cancellation of its contract with H.L. CARLOS was void.
survey and the relocation survey showed that the fence was indeed on their land.
In conclusion, cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations,
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer,The Provost spouses disagreed, arguing that the cadastral survey plan used had been
dealer, broker or salesman fall under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. 25 It is incumbent upondisapproved by the DENR Regional Office for being defective and was replaced with a
said administrative agency, in the exercise of its powers and functions, to interpret and apply correction survey of Barangay Tupsan, Mambajao. Under the correction survey, Lot No.
contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages 12542 with an area of 4,402 square meters was surveyed as Lot No. 13436, Cad 473,
Module 2, but with a reduced area of 3,845 square meters, and Lot No. 12543 with an area
whenever appropriate. 26 LLphil
of 1,774 square meters as Lot No. 12769, Cad 473, Module 2 with an increased area of
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these consolidated cases, G.R. No. 125447 and G.R. No. 2,634 square meters. Upon request of petitioners Provosts, another relocation survey was
125475 are DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 27 June done using the approved cadastral survey plan. This relocation survey showed that the
fence was within petitioners' property.
1996 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner in each case.
SO ORDERED.

On December 26, 1994, the Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages and with prayer for preliminary injunction before the MTC. They
alleged that the Provosts encroached on 314 square meters of their lot. The MTC dismissed
the complaint and held that the Ramoses failed to prove their ownership and possession of
the disputed area. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by

the Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a disapproved survey
plan. IcTCHD

4. That there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law open to petitioners, except this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 7

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
RTC decision and ordered the Provosts to vacate the area, remove the fence, and pay At the outset, we note that this case involves an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
damages, to wit:
Thus, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not proper.
Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition as one proper for review under
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
Rule 45.
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No.
Simply, the main issue in this case is whether petitioners (Provosts) encroached on the
573 entitled, "Spouses Victor Ramos, et al. vs. Jean Provost, et al."
property of private respondents (Ramos spouses).
is reversed and set aside and in lieu thereof, another one is entered:
Private respondents anchor their claim on the deed of donation and an old survey plan,
(a) ordering respondents to vacate and surrender the
while petitioners base theirs on the deed of absolute sale and the corrected survey
encroached area of 314 square meters to the petitioners and
plan.cEAIHa
to remove their fence;
Petitioners aver that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it held that they
(b) to pay petitioners the following amounts:
encroached upon the Ramoses' property since the frontage (points 7, 8 and 9) in the old
survey plan of the Ramoses' property was the same frontage in the new survey plan and the
(1) the amount of P6,355.82 as actual damages;
fence was constructed at point 8 of the cadastral plan. They argue that the points of the
frontage of respondents' property in the old and new survey plan are similar but with
(2) the amount of P500.00 per annum as reasonable rentals of
different technical descriptions on measurements and bearings, thus the location of the
the encroached area;
frontage in the two surveys cannot be identical. More so, under the approved survey plan,
the fence was constructed at point 9, which is point 4 of their lot and clearly within their
(3) the amount of P35,500.00 as attorney's fees plus
property. They posit that the Court of Appeals did not bother to check the technical
P1,500.00 as traveling expenses every hearing;
descriptions and instead relied on the testimony of the engineer who conducted the
relocation survey using the technical description on the disapproved survey plan. They
(4) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
maintain that private respondents were unable to establish the identity of their property,
since they relied on a disapproved survey plan. Moreover, the contested area was
(5) the amount of P500.00 as litigation expenses and to pay
previously occupied by Asterio Aboc, a tenant of Rosario Abanil.
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 6
Hence, this petition for certiorari where petitioners argue:
1. That respondent Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of its
jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of private respondents outside of the
issue raised in the decisions of both the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in insisting on the technical
description of the erroneous and disapproved survey of private
respondents' land as the basis for its findings that petitioners had
encroached the land of respondents.
3. That the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in merely denying in a
cavalier manner petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration as mere
refutation of its own findings, without stating the legal basis for the
denial in direct violation of the provisions of the second paragraph, of
Section 14, of the 19[8]7 Constitution of the Philippines, that no petition
for review or motion for reconsideration of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis [therefor].

Private respondents, on their part, state that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in continuous and open possession as owners, as evidenced by the tax declarations
and that petitioners did not deny points 7, 8 and 9 of respondents' property. They insist that
the Provosts encroached on their land as the fence was constructed at point 8.
The Court of Appeals in reversing the RTC decision reasoned that the petitioners had no
right to move the common boundary such that the area of the adjoining lot was reduced to
3,552 square meters. It further held that they could not validly claim ownership over the area
of 2,327 square meters since they bought only 1,774 square meters, and that the correction
survey plan was under protest as it would prejudice private respondents. 8
We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of
ownership or accion reivindicatoria. 9 Section 8, Rule 40 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case brought on appeal from the MTC which,
even without jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the
instant case, the MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of
jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based
on the findings of the MTC.
Now, on the main issue, we sustain the decision of the RTC.
Significantly, the parties do not deny that a correction survey was made
in Barangay Tupsan; that the survey plan was approved on February 16, 1994; and that the

area of the private respondents' property under the corrected survey plan was reduced to Camiguin, Branch 28 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual
3,845 square meters, while that of petitioners' was increased to 2,634 square meters.
damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees are deleted.
In an action to recover under Article 434 11 of the Civil Code, the claimant must (1) establishNo pronouncement as to costs.
the identity of the property sought to be recovered and (2) rely on the strength of his title and
not on the weakness of defendant's claim. It is also settled rule that what defines a piece of SO ORDERED.
land is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in the description but
||| (Spouses Provost v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160406, June 26, 2006)
the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 12
In this case, we find that private respondents failed to identify the property they seek to
recover. They relied on the old survey plan, the technical descriptions of which did not
indicate the accurate measurements and limits of their property. The technical descriptions
under the old cadastral survey plan cannot be the basis to delineate the boundaries of the
lots or determine their respective areas for the obvious reason that it was not approved. In
fact, a relocation survey plan 13 of Lot No. 12542, attached to the complaint as Annex "B"
and presented in evidence by the petitioners as Exhibit "1", reveals that the area of the lot is
still subject to verification and final computation.

[G.R. No. 169793. September 15, 2006.]

VICTORIANO
M.
AMIGO, respondent.

ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs.

NIEVES

DECISION

Moreover, private respondents failed to prove open, continuous and adverse possession of
the disputed area. That their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
owners since World War II based on the early tax declarations, is insufficient to delineate
boundaries. 14 Also, they admitted that Asterio Aboc is the tenant of Rosario This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAAbanil. 15 They merely claimed that a portion of the land where Aboc's house was once G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial
built, is part of their property. Such claim without further proof of title does not suffice toCourt of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
define the boundaries of the adjoining lots. It thus appears clearly that the contested area
was part of Abanil's lot sold to petitioner Dolores Provost. aSTECA
The antecedent facts are as follows:
As held in Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 16 when the records do not showPetitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1, consisting
that the land subject of the action for recovery has been exactly determined, such action of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting
cannot prosper, inasmuch as respondents' ownership rights in the land claimed do not of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way,
appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.
Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square
meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on
Considering that there is already an existing correct and approved cadastral survey plan January 18, 1982. On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay.
of Barangay Tupsan, and absent any showing that the same is erroneous, that plan should After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of
be the basis to delineate the boundaries.
Waiver 2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law,
herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the
Additionally, however we find the RTC's award of actual damages for P10,000; attorney's land into two lots 3 and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18, 1996. 4
fees for P10,000; and litigation expenses for P5,000, without legal and factual basis; hence,
the awards must be deleted.
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion
of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano
An award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses is proper when the court deems it just Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and Tand equitable that attorney's fees and litigation expenses should be recovered, and when 256651 were issue to petitioner.
the civil action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith. The award of attorney's fees as damages is the exception rather than the Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter 5 dated Febuary 1, 2001
rule. It is not to be given to the defendant every time the latter prevails. The right to litigate is demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry
of great consequence that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on
mistakenly unless, of course such party acted in bad faith. In this case, we could not award February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the absence of showing of gross and evident vacate the subject property. Thereafter, on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint 6 for
bad faith in filing the action. 17
ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030. In his Answer, respondent
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2003 of the alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated August 27, 2003 are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,

land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was
tainted with irregularities. 7
On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which reads:
WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M.
ENCARNACION and against the defendant NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as
follows:
a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of
land described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T256651 he is now occupying and surrender it to the plaintiff; DETACa
b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorney's fees, and
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per
month from February, 2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him
is surrendered to the plaintiff.
COSTS against the defendant.
SO ORDERED. 8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on
the ground that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the
case, this Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof. Costs against
plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED. 9

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either

that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio),
which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real
right of possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional
Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action
for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper
Regional Trial Court. 13
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action
to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time
of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person.
These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any time within one
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. 14 Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted
for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the
proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper
Regional Trial Court. AEDCHc

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review 10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court beforeAfter a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the Court of
the Court of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in this case isaccion
Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED
to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:

Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.

Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. 15 On its face, the complaint must show enough
ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 16

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the
property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He
filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the
respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it is
true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby
The petition lacks merit.
making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last
demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a
are:
[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND
NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER. 12

portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his
complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the
petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of
an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the
one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also
refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause
of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 17

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is
tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the
case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall
no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on
the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without
prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice. 19

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30,
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the
occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is
ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion publiciana and not one underAFFIRMED. ATcaID
the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court:
No costs.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the
SO ORDERED.
owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of
possession, they should present their claim before the regional trial
||| (Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006)
court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before
the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful
[G.R. No. 137122. November 15, 2000.]
detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property,
the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been
in physical or material possession of the same for more than one year
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE
by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. 18
COURT OF APPEALS, BERNARDO, DOMINADOR, HERMOGENA

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:

The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985
but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner
filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed an accion
publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

LUCIA, and MARIA GATCHALIAN, and the HEIRS OF GREGORIO

GATCHALIAN: ROLANDO, CONRADO and ARTURO, all surnamed
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

Arturo S. Santos for private respondents.

However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.

Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial;
lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the
lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits,
the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case
may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial
Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the
merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of
reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of
amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of
justice.

SYNOPSIS
Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against
petitioner herein and other co-defendants. After a protracted litigation, the trial court
dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the claims had been barred by the statute of
limitations and laches. Private respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court. The respondents filed a notice of
appeal, and the trial court gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. However, the records were not transmitted to
the appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic notes. Thereafter, the
respondents instead filed a motion for new trial since reconstitution of the missing
stenographic notes was no longer possible. Petitioner opposed the motion. However, the
trial court granted the motion for new trial. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals, insisting that the trial court erred in holding that the petitioner was barred from
assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting the motion for new trial. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner was stopped by laches in
assailing the notice of appeal which had been given due course by the trial court. Hence this
petition.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and granted this petition. periods has the effect of rendering final the judgment of a court, and an appellee's failure to
Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal of the appeal at an file a motion for dismissal of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record
earlier time acting upon the assumption that the appeal was filed on time relying on the to the appellate court does not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection.
order of the trial court that the notice of appeal had been filed within the reglementary
period. The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL; INTENDED TO AVOID A CLEAR CASE OF
appellate court and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of INJUSTICE; CAN BE INVOKED ONLY IN HIGHLY EXCEPTIONAL AND JUSTIFIABLE
its having been filed out of time. The respondents did not attempt to explain the reason for CASES. The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in equity which,
the delay and instead blamed the petitioner for its failure to assail the timeliness of the broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle intended to
avoid a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right.
appeal.
Estoppel, like its counterpart, must be inequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it
can easily become a convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is not
understood to be a principle that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but, as it concededly is,
SYLLABUS
a mere exception from the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked
only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD;
EFFECT OF FILING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION AND THE 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION ON LEGALITY THEREOF MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF
DENIAL THEREOF. In Lacsamana vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court has ruledTHE PROCEEDINGS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. A motion contesting a late
that in an ordinary appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial appeal may be filed before the appellate court even after the transmittal of the records
court to the regional trial court, and from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals in therein. The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the
actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional trial court, the fifteen-day period forappellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of
appeal prescribed by Section 39 of B.P. 129 and Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules isits being out of time. A recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry with
interrupted or suspended by a motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed. If the motionany assumption or conclusion that it has been filed. Strangely, respondents did not
for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period contempt to explain the reason for the delay and would, instead, lay the blame on petitioner
from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for extension of time for its failure to assail the timeliness of the appeal. It may here be worthwhile to reiterate the
to file such a notice of appeal is neither required not allowed. This rule has beenpronouncement in Galima vs. Court of Appeals than an error by counsel in ascertaining the
substantially reproduced in Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. appeal period will not arrest the finality of the judgment.
Accordingly, when respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on the last day of the
fifteen day prescribed period for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied,
they only had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration, within which to perfect their appeal, i.e., excluding the day of receipt and
including the next day. Since respondents had received a copy of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on 28 November 1989, the filing of notice of appeal on 07
December 1989 came much too late for by then the judgment has already become final and
VITUG, J p:
executory.

DECISION

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHOULD BE PERFECTED IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE PERIOD In a decision, dated 18 May 1998, the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 46385, entitled
PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND FAILURE TO DO SO RENDERS JUDGMENT FINAL AND "Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., vs. the Honorable Luis R. Tongco, et. al.," dismissed
EXECUTORY; RATIONALE. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the a petition for certiorari and mandamus brought by petitioner against the Honorable Luis
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo, andTongco in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 155,
the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and executory. A fundamental of Pasig City.
precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for
being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderlyThe factual and case antecedents were synthesized by the appellate court in its assailed
discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than oncedecision. cDSAEI
been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of
appeals. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary On 04 June 1975, respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of
period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, land against petitioner Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., and its co-defendants United
and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court concerned to order execution of the Housing Corporation, Victorino Hernandez, heirs of Aurelio de Leon, and heirs of Nicolas
judgment. After the judgment has become final and executory, vested rights are acquired by Gatchalian.
the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of After a protracted litigation, the trial court, through then Presiding Judge Efricio B. Acosta,
the resolution of the case. Not being a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a dismissed the complaint in a decision, dated 17 June 1983, thusly:
statutory privilege, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby dismisses the
accordance with rules provided therefore. A failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
complaint of the plaintiff for lack of merit and having been barred by the

statute of limitations and by laches. The counterclaim of the defendants

are likewise dismissed for lack of evidence." 1
Respondents received a copy of the decision on 04 July 1983. On 19 July 1983, the
last day of the prescribed fifteen-day period for appeal, private respondents filed a
motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. The motion was denied by the trial court in
its order of 03 October 1989. A copy of the order was received by respondents on 28
November 1989.
On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a notice of appeal and, on 11 December 1989, the
trial court gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals. The records of the case, however, were not transmitted to the
appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic notes. On 23 April 1996, the trial
court required the parties to appear in conference. Almost a year had lapsed but the missing
stenographic notes were still not submitted to the trial court.
On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a motion for new trial for the retaking and
presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that the reconstitution
of the missing stenographic notes was no longer possible considering that the court
stenographers who had transcribed the testimony of witnesses by then since retired from
the service, their whereabouts unknown.

The Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision, dated 18 May 1998, dismissing
the petition on the ground that petitioner was estopped by laches from assailing the notice of
appeal which had meanwhile been given due course by the trial court. The appellate court
explained:
"It is undisputed that petitioner filed the motion to dismiss appeal after
almost eight years the respondent court gave due course to
respondent's notice of appeal. Petitioner did not raise the issue of the
timeliness of the appeal at the time the notice of appeal was filed by
respondents on December 7, 1989. During the conference on April 23,
1996 for the completion of the record, petitioner remained silent on the
issue. Instead, it voluntarily asked for time to locate the missing
transcript of records to be submitted to respondent court, which
petitioner never accomplished without explanation. It was only after
respondents filed on February 28, 1997 a motion for new trial for the
retaking or presentation of testimonial evidence that petitioner started
questioning the appeal essayed by respondents.
"Obviously, petitioner is estopped by laches from assailing the notice of
appeal which has long been given due course by respondent court. The
motion to dismiss appeal was filed too late." 3
In its instant petition, petitioner argues that

On 22 April 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to the
motion for new trial filed by respondents contending that the appeal was filed out of time and
that the remedy for new trial could not be availed of since it was filed long after the
reglementary period to appeal had lapsed.
The trial court, in its order of 16 July 1997 resolved the incidents in this wise; thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for New Trial prayed
for by the plaintiffs being based on meritorious grounds is hereby
GRANTED.
"Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by defendant Manila
Memorial Park is hereby DENIED for being moot and academic and
barred by laches.
"Further, considering that the Motion For New Trial filed by plaintiff has
been favorably acted upon for the above reasons, the Notice of Appeal
interposed by plaintiff on December 7, 1989 is hereby declared
MOOTED." 2
The trial court ratiocinated that the final resolution of the case could not be held in
abeyance indefinitely nor could petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal still be
entertained after their having waited for eight years before raising the issue.

"I.
"THE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
WELL-ENTRENCHED RULE IN THIS JURISDICTION THAT THE
PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY
LAW IS JURISDICTIONAL AND AS SUCH IT CAN BE ASSAILED AT
ANYTIME. TSCIEa
"II.
"THE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER IS ALREADY ESTOPPED BY LACHES FROM
ASSAILING THE TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
"III.
"THE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO HAVE THE CASE TRIED ANEW ON THE
MERITS CONSIDERING." 4

Anent the first assigned error, petitioner maintains that compliance with the reglementary
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but to no avail, the trial court's order of 16 July 1997. period for perfecting an appeal is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional, and it is thus
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appealsnever too late to assail the timeliness of an appeal. Respondents, upon the other hand,
insisting that the trial court had acted capriciously and whimsically, as well as with grave urges the Court to sustain the assailed decision asseverating that in view of the meritorious
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in holding that it was barred character of their appeal, a stringent application of the rules would defeat substantial justice.
from assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting respondent's motion for new trial
The petitioner has it.
long after the decision of the trial court had already become final and executory.

Concededly, respondents received on 04 July 1983 a copy of the decision of the trial court, The Court is not unmindful of highly exceptional cases where it has allowed a relaxation of
dated 17 June 1983, dismissing its complaint. Conformably with Section 39 of B.P. 129, likethe rules on the application of the reglementary periods of appeal.
Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, respondents had up to 19 July 1983
within which to file an appeal. On said date, respondents, instead of filing their notice of In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 15 the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice
appeal, moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The motion for reconsideration was of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant
denied by the trial court in its order of 03 October 1989, and a copy of the order was Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only
received by respondents on 28 November 1989. Respondents failed to file a notice of file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 16 the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite
appeal until 07 December 1989.
the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to
In Lacsamana vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 the Court has ruled that in an ordinarylose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been
appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial court to the devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 17 a tardy
regional trial court, and from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals in actions or appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been
proceedings originally filed in the regional trial court, the fifteen-day period for appeal judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had
prescribed by Section 39 of B.P. 129 and Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules is interrupted orthe effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the
suspended by a motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed. 6 If the motion for new trialappellee. 18 These instances indeed constituted exceptional circumstances that would
or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period from notice of hardly find parallel elsewise.
denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for extension of time to file such a
notice of appeal is neither required nor allowed. 7 This rule has been substantiallyNot being a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege, the right
to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with rules provided
reproduced in Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus:
therefor. 19 A failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period has the effect of
"Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
rendering final the judgment of a court, and an appellee's failure to file a motion for dismissal
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record to the appellate court does
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection. 20
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
Should petitioner be now held estopped from assailing the timeliness of the appeal after the
notice of the judgment or final order.
lapse of almost eight years from the time the notice of appeal was approved by the trial
"The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
court on 11 December 1989? Citing Dequito vs. Lopez 21 and Carillo vs. Allied Workers'
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
Association of the Philippines, 22 respondents would contend in the affirmative.
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed."
Accordingly, when respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on the last day of the
fifteen day prescribed period for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, The cases invoked are not squarely applicable.
they only had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration, within which to perfect their appeal, i.e., excluding the day of receipt andIn Dequito, defendant-appellees moved to dismiss the appeal after plaintiff-appellant
including the next day. 8 Since respondents had received a copy of the order denying their Dequito had filed his appeal brief with the appellate court and solely on the ground that the
motion for reconsideration on 28 November 1989, the filing of the notice of appeal on 07 record on appeal did not disclose on its face that the appeal was timely perfected. Similarly,
December 1989 came much too late for by then the judgment had already become final and in Carillo, petitioners had already submitted their brief when the respondents tried to
question the timeliness of the appeal, and there was no showing that the appeal was
executory.
interposed beyond the reglementary period for its filing. In the instant case, respondents had
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not not once denied that their appeal was, in fact, interposed beyond the prescribed period.
only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo, and the failure to perfect that appeal
renders its judgment final and executory. 9 A fundamental precept is that the reglementaryThe doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in equity which, broadly defined,
periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle intended to avoid a clear case of
interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. Theinjustice. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its
strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, counterpart, must be unequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can easily become
particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals. 10 The finality of aa convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is not understood to be a principle
judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but, as it concededly is, a mere exception from the
perfected, 11 and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, 12 and it becomes thestandard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional
ministerial duty of the court concerned to order execution of the judgment. 13 After theand justifiable cases. 23
judgment has become final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party.Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal of the appeal at an
Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also earlier time acting upon the assumption, albeit erroneously, that the appeal was filed on time
the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the relying on the order, dated 11 December 1989, of the trial court declaring that the notice of
case. 14
appeal had been filed within the reglementary period. Neither can the conduct of petitioner's
counsel during the conference called by and held before the trial court be regarded as a

waiver of its right to contest the seasonableness of the appeal. A motion contesting a lateto do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both
appeal may be filed before the appellate court even after the transmittal of the records statute and procedural rules.
therein. 24 The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the
appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD TO APPEAL; ORDER OR JUDGMENT WHEN DEEMED FINAL.
its being out of time. A recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry with An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
it any assumption or conclusion that it has been timely filed. 25 Strangely, respondents didappealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
not attempt to explain the reason for the delay and would, instead, lay the blame on nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
petitioner for its failure to assail the timeliness of the appeal. cDTHIE
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
It may here be worthwhile to reiterate the pronouncement in Galima vs. Court of
Appeals 26 that an error by counsel in ascertaining the appeal period will not arrest the 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES THE FINAL ORDER WHICH FINALLY DISPOSED
finality of the judgment.
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A CASE; CASE AT BAR. In the recent case of Quelnan
Given the foregoing, the Court sees no further need to resolve the other issues raised in the v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
petition.
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
Appeals is SET ASIDE.
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should
SO ORDERED. ISAcHD
have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
||| (Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137122, November order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it
was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
15, 2000)
which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where
[G.R. No. 141524. September 14, 2005.]
we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the
final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the
aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
VICTORIANO,
JACOB
OBANIA
AND
DOMINGO
CABACUNGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE; DELAY IN THE FILING OF AN APPEAL; WHEN MAY BE
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
EXCUSED. In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
of Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental
the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that
Mindoro, respondents.
every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. In de la Rosa v. Court of
Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be
Romualdo M. Jubay for petitioners.
followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the
Miguel M. Gonzales Rosemarie M. Osoteo and Antonio M. Chua for Land
appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside
Bank of the Phils.
technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been
oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Jose Rico P. Domingo for private respondents.
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not
meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add
that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
SYLLABUS
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and
the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; RIGHT TO APPEAL; A STATUTORY procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just
PRIVILEGE AND MAY BE EXERCISED ONLY IN THE MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE and proper disposition of his cause.
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW. First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FRESH PERIOD RULE. The Supreme Court may promulgate
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one whoprocedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,

43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons,
DECISION
for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the CORONA, J p:
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this
"fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the orderDevelopment, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
final order or resolution.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; 15-DAY APPEAL PERIOD COUNTED FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare
OF JUDGMENT OR FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their Philippines, respectively.
motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3
of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, berespondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to
does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened thedismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The originalbecause there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription
which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases
with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we In an order 2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of noticeorder of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998,
of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration 3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
1998).
Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal 4 and paid the appeal
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW 15-DAY PERIOD MAY BE AVAILED OF ONLY WHEN fees on August 3, 1998. CTEaDc
EITHER A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED;
CASE AT BAR. To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from eight days late. 5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. 6
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on
Appeals.
July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration
on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
days, as already discussed.
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on
July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only
five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. 7

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE
15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 9
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should
court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:
have filed their notice of appeal. HESAIT
Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It
(P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
and executory. 8
appeal. 10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, 11 as
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was amended, provides:
denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
Sec. 39.Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
I
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight
hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. . . .
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
SEC. 3.Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS' APPEAL IN CIVIL
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
days from the notice of judgment or final order.
II
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS'
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998
of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on
AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID
the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action. 12
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE
41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO
THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M.
MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST
AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS
RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22,
1998.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V.
IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THEREBY
IGNORING
THE
PECULIAR
FACTS
AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion
for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order
which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion
for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not
yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., 13 the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the
order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was
filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal.
But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the on Judicial Reorganization 20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d' etre behind the amendment
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the was to shorten the period of appeal 21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of
Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal.
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as itSeldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, 22 and only in very exceptional
was what ended the issues raised there.
instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan, 23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised
al. 14 where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion forthe lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July
1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in theIn de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require
Rules.
litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness
period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time? aHCSTD
and justice.
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order toIn setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application
18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15- were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we
day appeal period. 15 It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied,
day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal uponthere always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the
under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. 25
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision ofThe Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole
the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to
cases, 16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 27 43 28 and 45, 29 the Court allows
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
jurisdictional. 17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. HcTIDC
and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law. 18
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read: days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Sec. 3.How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving
upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty
(30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion
to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending
shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day
of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the
day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the
denial of said motion. 19 (emphasis supplied)

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies 31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. 32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BPRules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be

construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. 33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above 1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of REQUIREMENT FOR THE TIMELY PERFECTION THEREOF; EXCEPTION; WHEN NOT
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. Forgetfulness is neither accident, mistake or excusable
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
negligence which would warrant justification for the one (1) day delay in filing the notice of
appeal. We quote with approval the citation made by movant in the case of Philippine Air
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortenedLines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 300, 302-303, viz.: ". . . The excuse offered by respondent
the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural
opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of
which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in common-place excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29
with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
whimsical exercise of judgment as is a grave abuse of discretion." Consequently, the
liberality extended to respondent National Power Corporation in considering the tardiness of
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day filing notice of an appeal as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional rule on the
appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) orrequirement for the timely perfection of an appeal cannot be given consideration. And, as
from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
petitioner again correctly contends, falling foursquare to the situation presented is our ruling
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from in Velasco vs. Ortiz, et al., 184 SCRA 303, 310: "Fourth. Neither a mistake of law . . . nor the
receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order fact that the delay in the filing of the appeal bond was only one day, nor both of these
(the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, circumstances together, are legal justifications for non-compliance with the rule. If mistake of
the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decisionlaw were excusable, the law would be unenforceable. That is why it is expressly provided
becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule that 'ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone from compliance therewith (Art. 2, Civil
Code). If, without justification, transgression of the deadline fixed by the rule for perfecting
41, Section 3.
an appeal may be sanctioned, the public policy behind the rule would necessarily have to be
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the abandoned, and the litigants would be at a loss to know exactly when they may obtain
order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appealexecution of judgments or consider the case terminated. On the other hand, when the law
fixes thirty days, we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. 34
stretched to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is forgotten or
buried in the growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot
IAC 35 since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.
fix a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application. We do not agree that 'the
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remandedends of justice would be better subserved' by allowing an appeal presented 'only one day
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. THcEaS
late.' On the contrary, these considerations militate against it: (1) The orderly administration
of justice would suffer a drawback if the period for perfecting appeals be rendered uncertain,
No costs.
as it would be, by sanctioning such transgression of the deadline. (2) The appealed decision
is presumed by law to be just and correct, and therefore the denial of the appeal does not
SO ORDERED.
necessarily imply an injustice to the appellant. (3) The right to appeal is a purely statutory
right, and he who wants to exercise it must comply with the statute." With the foregoing
||| (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005)
jurisprudence as bench mark, the Court is compelled to conclude the same, as in Bank of
America, NT and SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., et al., 230 SCRA 9, 15-16, to wit: "The case at bench,
[G.R. No. 128421. October 12, 1998.]
given its own settings, cannot come close to those extraordinary circumstances that have
indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not be overlooked that the
TRANS INTERNATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS;
timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court cannot(sic) trifle
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and
with." cdasia
GILBERTO A. PASTORAL,respondents.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. It is not enough that the delay be excusable, one
added requisite is that the intended appeal be "impressed with merit." The Court perused
the record and find confirmation in the fact that respondent NAPOCOR never, at any time in
SYLLABUS
the trial court or in the respondent court, alleged, much less demonstrate; that the intended
appeal is meritorious. It was the respondent court which unilaterally considered that the
supposedly anomalous amount awarded in the decision of the trial court as a factor that

warranted such relaxation. On second look, obviously given the presumption of validity and Thus, respondent court said:
correctness of the decision of the trial court, this would be indulging in speculation that
"The Supreme Court has pointed out that a lower court should not be
should not be allowed. The Court notes that in the decision of the trial court, it said: "On
cited as having acted with grave abuse of discretion simply because it
plaintiff's claim for damages, while the Court is hesitant in granting the same because
has correctly but strictly applied the rules (Castro vs. CA, supra).
defendant Napocor is a government agency, however, it acts by and thru its defendants
However, in this case, We hold that the denial of the notice of appeal,
officer and is consequently bound by their acts. And unfortunately, the plaintiff's claim for
filed one day late despite the valid excuse presented before it, which
damages are all substantiated by the testimonies as well as documentary evidence
excuse was not found to be incredible or concocted, was arbitrary and
presented and identified by plaintiff's witness, namely: Mr. Syed Hasim Zaide, Miss Erlinda
amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge,
Cross and Myrna Magdaluyo in the hearing of this case." Apparently, there was basis for the
being in clear disregard of established precedents enunciating a liberal
award of damages. Hence, it is premature to speculate on the merits of the aborted appeal,
policy towards invocation of the right to appeal as an essential part of
since such a speculation would be wanting in factual basis. TAECSD
our judicial system." 1

RESOLUTION

MARTINEZ, J p:

Now, petitioner prays that we again review the facts and circumstances on record to
determine whether the respondent court's application of the exception instead of the general
rule measures up to the extraordinary circumstances held sufficient in the decisions of the
Court.
After a meticulous re-examination of the background facts, We find that the respondent
court was in error, thus, we reconsider our earlier decision and grant the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner has filed this motion for reconsideration of the decision dated January 26, 1998,
We are constrained to agree with petitioner that the reasons relied upon by the respondent
denying the petition, on the ground that:
court for the relaxation of the rule of the timeliness in the perfection of an appeal in this case
"SAID DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND
are not as compelling as was our previous assessment. The stringent rule can be relaxed
CIRCUMSTANCES ON RECORD AND/OR IS CONTRARY TO THE
only when the demands of substantial justice so warrant. As correctly argued by petitioner,
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE TO THE MATTER IN
thus:
CONTROVERSY "
". . . that may be done only when, in the varying but consistent
In essence, movant posits the view that while the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the
language of jurisprudence, 'to do so would serve the demands of
timely perfection of an appeal is subject to well-recognized exceptions, the circumstances
substantial justice and in the exercise of (our) equity jurisdiction' (Pacific
reflected in this case do not come close to the exceptional circumstances that could justify a
Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., 161 SCRA 122,
turn about from the otherwise strictly followed general rule.
130), or, when there are 'strong considerations of substantial justice'
(Vda. de Crisologo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 158 SCRA 236);
Upon perusal of the motion for reconsideration and the comment thereto filed by the public
or, 'on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the
respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, we have been persuaded to take a
ends of justice and preventing a grave injustice' (Paramount Vinyl
second look at the facts and circumstances obtaining herein.
Products Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., 190 SCRA 525, 534); or, 'on
grounds of substantial justice and equity, the delay must, however, be
For a better perspective of the case at bar, we go back to the petition for certiorari filed
excusable and the appeal must be impressed with merit' (Acena vs.
before the respondent court, which, as in petitions of this nature, the focus of the inquiry
Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 623, 630). Some such strong and
invariably is whether or not the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
compelling reasons are exemplified in Republic vs. CA, 83 SCRA 453,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to
where the six-day delay in the filing of a record on appeal was excused
respondent National Power Corporation's appeal. The threshold issue posed for resolution,
because, among others, there were involved serious issues of
therefore, is whether or not, in view of the facts and circumstances obtaining as spread out
jurisdiction and the application of defenses like prescription, statute of
on the record, private respondent's tardiness in the filing of the notice of appeal from the trial
limitations and laches against the Republic which would place
court's decision may be considered as an exception to the general rule that failure to appeal
technicality over substance if the dismissal of the appeal is upheld; in
on time is fatal.
Ramosvs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, where the four-day delay was
justified because the plaintiff's lawyer died and the decision was served
We upheld the respondent court when it ruled that the failure of the National Power
directly upon plaintiff who still had to engage the services of a new
Corporation to file the appeal on time falls under the exception to the general rule despite
counsel to take the appeal on her behalf; in Siguenza vs. Court of
the fact that the perfection of an appeal within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory
Appeals, 137 SCRA 570, where the delay in the filing of the record on
but also jurisdictional. Resultantly, the respondent court opined that, in denying due course
appeal was overlooked and this Honorable Court opted to already
to respondent's appeal and directing the issuance of a writ of execution, the respondent
decide the case on the merits inasmuch as, on its face, the appeal
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
appeared to be impressed with merit; in Cortes vs. Court of Appeals,

161 SCRA 444, where the seven-day delay in the filing of the notice of
appeal was excused because the party's counsel, who was appointed
RTC Judge, failed to file a withdrawal of appearance such that notice of
the decision was still served upon him and it was only after he returned
to his former law office from his station that he learned of said decision
and also only after a new counsel was engaged that the notice of
appeal was filed; and, in Orata vs. IAC, 185 SCRA 148, where the delay
was likewise overlooked and this Honorable Court resolved the case on
its merits because, in addition to the basic merits of the main case, the
petition embodied circumstances that warranted heeding the petitioner's
plea for justice." 2

aforesaid illness which incapacitated me from reporting to work on

August 26 & 27, 1996." 4
Petitioner makes a rather strong case that the respondent court (and we add, this Court)
erred in concluding that the one-day delay in the filing of the notice of appeal was sufficiently
explained.

Upon perusal of the aforequoted affidavit, we overlooked or otherwise failed to consider the
failure of Ronald Lapuz to comply with the strict instruction of Atty. Collado, respondent
Napocor's counsel, for the immediate delivery to his secretary of any order in the case. It
might be true that when he received the copy of the order, it was already 4:54 p.m., Friday.
Yet, there is nothing on record or in the affidavit that Atty. Collado or the latter's secretary
was no longer in the office. Lapuz states that he placed the order inside the drawer of his
table believing that he could give the order the next succeeding working day (Monday). But
However, a re-examination of the reasons advanced by private respondent National Power then, Ronald Lapuz could have at least given the order to the secretary of Atty. Collado the
Corporation to justify the tardiness of their filing the notice of appeal before the trial court, following day, Saturday, since there is no showing that Saturday was a non-working day,
cannot be catalogued under the aforecited exceptions to the general rule.
and consequently said denial order could have been transmitted on said day to Atty. Collado
or his secretary.
The respondent court said that "the notice of appeal was admittedly filed one (1) day late."
However, it was convinced "that under the circumstances of the case, the delay of one (1) Furthermore, absent in the record is any independent proof of the alleged indisposition of
day in filing the appeal is justified and should be excused by the court a quo . . ." TheRonald Lapuz. To his affidavit, he attached an approved leave of absence form for two (2)
reasons for this, the respondent court so holds, was due to the big amount involved in the days (Monday and Tuesday) to prove that he was absent on those days due to illness.
case; and, that "the one (1) day delay arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident. However, there is no medical certificate to attest to the fact of illness, thus, there is no
. . ." 3
competent supporting proof of the alleged extraction of three front teeth.
In justifying the one (1) day delay, the respondent court took into account the affidavit of Another capital sin of Ronald Lapuz is his admission that he "forgot to deliver immediately
Ronald Lapuz, the receiving clerk, pertinent portions of which is quoted as follows:
the copy of the order . . .," despite the instruction of Atty. Collado for him to "immediately
deliver to his secretary any order" in this case. Forgetfulness is neither accident, mistake or
"xxx xxx xxx
excusable negligence which would warrant justification for the one (1) day delay in filing the
notice of appeal. We quote with approval the citation made by movant in the case of
2. On August 23, 1996 at 4:54 p.m. Friday, I received a copy of the
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 300, 302-303, viz.:
Order dated August 2, 1996 issued by the RTC-Branch 101, Quezon
City, entitled Trans International vs. NPC, et al;
". . . The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his failure
to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal
3. Since it was already almost 5:00 p.m., I placed the said order inside
Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the
the drawer of my table together with some other documents;
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail
to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of
4. On August 26, 1996, that was Monday I was unable to report to the
Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common-place excuses,
office because of severe pain in my front jaw as a result of the
in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither
extraction of my three front teeth, causing severe pain in my body;
credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal,
L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L- 19457, 17
5. I forgot to deliver immediately the copy of the Order to Atty. Collado
December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment as is
nor to his secretary on August 23, 1996, despite his instruction to me to
a grave abuse of discretion." 5
immediately deliver to his secretary any order in this
case, Trans International vs. NKPC, et al, RTC-Quezon City and Sps.
Consequently, the liberality extended to respondent National Power Corporation in
Lim vs. NPC, et al RTC-Lingayen as it was already almost 5:00 p.m.
considering the tardiness of filing notice of an appeal as an exception to the mandatory and
and believing that on the next succeeding working day, I could report to
jurisdictional rule on the requirement for the timely perfection of an appeal cannot be given
work, but incidentally, I got sick and was able only to report on August
consideration. And, as petitioner again correctly contends, falling foursquare to the situation
28, 1996 as per hereto attached copy of my approved sick leave;
presented is our ruling in Velasco vs. Ortiz, et al. 184 SCRA 303, 310:
xxx xxx xxx
"Fourth. Neither a mistake of law . . . nor the fact that the delay in the
filing of the appeal bond was only one day, nor both of these
7. My failure to deliver the said order to the secretary of Atty. Wilfredo
circumstances together, are legal justifications for non-compliance with
Collado on the next working day, August 26, 1996 was due to my
the rule. If mistake of law were excusable, the law would be
unenforceable. That is why it is expressly provided that 'ignorance of

the law does not excuse anyone from compliance therewith (Art. 2, Civil
Code). If, without justification, transgression of the deadline fixed by the
rule for perfecting an appeal may be sanctioned, the public policy
behind the rule would necessarily have to be abandoned, and the
litigants would be at a loss to know exactly when they may obtain
execution of judgments or consider the case terminated. On the other
hand, when the law fixes thirty days, we cannot take it to mean also
thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in
one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two
days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is
forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the
alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the
solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on
reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application.
We do not agree that 'the ends of justice would be better subserved' by
allowing an appeal presented 'only one day late.' On the contrary, these
considerations militate against it: (1) The orderly administration of
justice would suffer a drawback if the period for perfecting appeals be
rendered uncertain, as it would be, by sanctioning such transgression of
the deadline. (2) The appealed decision is presumed by law to be just
and correct, and therefore the denial of the appeal does not necessarily
imply an injustice to the appellant. (3) The right to appeal is a purely
statutory right, and he who wants to exercise it must comply with the
statute." 6
With the foregoing jurisprudence as our bench mark, we are compelled to conclude, as we
did in Bank of America, NT and SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., et al., 230 SCRA 9, 15-16, to wit:
"The case at bench, given its own settings, cannot come close to those
extraordinary circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation from
an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness
of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court
cannot(sic) trifle with." 7

however, it acts by and thru its defendants officer and is consequently

bound by their acts.
And unfortunately, the plaintiff's claim for damages are all substantiated
by the testimonies as well as documentary evidence presented and
identified by plaintiffs witness, namely: Mr. Syed Hasim Zaide, Miss
Erlinda Cross and Myrna Magdaluyo in the hearing of this case." 9
Apparently, there was basis for the award of damages. Hence, it is premature to speculate
on the merits of the aborted appeal, since such a speculation would be wanting in factual
basis.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision dated January 26,
1998, is GRANTED, and the Court hereby SET ASIDE the decision dated October 21, 1996
and the resolution dated January 31, 1997 of the respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No.
41977. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 9420960 is hereby declared as having attained finality in due course, in consequence of which
the said court may issue such orders as it may deem proper and appropriate in the
premises.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421 (Resolution), October 12, 1998)
[G.R. No. 82789. November 21, 1991.]
NARCISO KHO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CAMACHO, SHERIFF OF
QUEZON CITY, and HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, respondents.

Emilio P. Ramos for petitioner.

To hold otherwise, as we did, after a conscientious review of the factual milieu of this case, Camacho and Associates for respondents.
would disturb a well-entrenched ruling that could make uncertain when a judgment attains
finality, leaving the same to depend upon the resourcefulness of a party in concocting
implausible excuses to justify unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the law
SYLLABUS
that the period for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
One other thing. It is not enough that the delay be excusable, one added requisite is that the
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; TRIAL COURT; NOT AUTHORIZED TO
intended appeal be "impressed with merit." 8 We perused the record and find confirmation in
DISALLOW AN APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT
the fact that respondent NAPOCOR never, at any time in the trial court or in the respondent
INVOLVED; PROPER FORUM. The Court was no less explicit and emphatic when it
court, alleged, much less demonstrate, that the intended appeal is meritorious. It was the
declared in the case of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. 70681, October 16, 1985, 139 SCRA
respondent court which unilaterally considered that the supposedly anomalous amount
320, 325-326, that: "We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only question of law
awarded in the decision of the trial court as a factor that warranted such relaxation. On
or both question of fact and law, this question should be left for the determination of an
second look, obviously given the presumption of validity and correctness of the decision of
appellate court and not by the court which rendered the subject decision appealed from . . .
the trial court, this would be indulging in speculation that should not be allowed. We note
Respondent Judge erred in dismissing said appeal on his misconception that the same
that in the decision of the trial court, it said:
involves only a question of law and based on this reasoning, disallowed petitioner's appeal
because it was not made to the Supreme Court. . . . "By dismissing the appeal on the
"On plaintiffs claim for damages, while the Court is hesitant in granting
ground that it was misdirected because the case was resolved by it on a pure question of
the same because defendant Napocor is a government agency,
law, the trial court committed a grave error. Respondent Judge should have allowed the
Intermediate Appellate Court to decide whether or not the petitioner's appeal involves only a

question of law and not arrogate unto himself the determination of this question. His error incheck issued to him and furnished both the drawer and the bank with said statement so that
dismissing petitioner bank's appeal becomes even more obvious considering the provisionsthe bank could place on the check "under alarmed," instead of merely informing petitioner.
of Section 3 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is specifically provided that 'where
the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not Petitioner also refused to issue new checks maintaining that the closure of Manila Bank (in
dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear which he had an outstanding deposit of P581,571.84 which was more than enough to cover
the cost of the five checks) was beyond his control and therefore he was in no financial
statement of the grounds therefor.'"
position to pay Camacho unless and until his money in that beleaguered bank was
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT REQUIRED TO APPROVE A NOTICE OF APPEAL. Respondent released. Cdpr
Judge should have sustained his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of
Appeals to certify the case to the proper tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had Contending that petitioner's answer failed to tender a genuine issue, Camacho moved for a
absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the present rules, his role judgment on the pleadings which respondent Judge Leviste granted in his order of February
is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but 12, 1988. In said order, respondent Judge directed petitioner to pay Camacho P57,349.00
"minus the P10,000.00 pertaining to the lost check, or a total of P47,349.00 with interest at
not a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court.
the legal rate of 6% from June 2, 1987, until fully paid, with costs or attorney's fees." 2
3. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. The
obligation to pay P57,349.00 in attorney's fee is admitted. The appropriate checks in On February 25, 1988, petitioner seasonably filed a notice of appeal stating that he was
payment therefor have been issued. However, one check was misplaced through theappealing the February 12, 1988 order to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Judge duly
creditor's fault while the other five were dishonored because the drawee bank has ceased to approved said notice in his order of February 29, 1988.
operate. A perusal of petitioner's answer convinces us that the judgment on the pleadings
was proper. In that pleading, petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the useless On the other hand, despite the reduced money judgment, Camacho made no move to
checks and gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank where he had deposited his contest the award. Instead, he filed a motion/manifestation praying that petitioner's notice of
lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of his. In effect, what petitioner was saying appeal be stricken off the record as a mere scrap of paper.
was that Camacho should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a Acting on the aforesaid motion, respondent Judge issued the assailed order of March 29,
sufficient controversion of the material allegations in the complaint.
1988 setting aside the previously approved notice of appeal and adopting Camacho's view
that the proper remedy from a judgment on the pleadings was a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. Said order reads:
DECISION

FERNAN, C .J p:

"In view of the Motion/Manifestation dated March 1, 1988, which this

Court finds with merit, . . ., this Court believing that only questions of
law are involved, hence the proper remedy should be a petition for
certiorari, there being no question of fact presented by the pleadings
and the order in Summary Judgment, the order of this Court approving
the notice of appeal is hereby cancelled and a new order is hereby
made that said notice of appeal is disapproved." 3

The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether respondent Judge Oscar L. Leviste of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, grossly abused his discretion when he
issued the questioned order of March 29, 1988 which cancelled his previous order Hence this petition for certiorari.
approving a notice of appeal.
The Court has readily observed two very glaring errors committed by respondent Judge
Leviste. First, he listened to Camacho who could not even distinguish between a petition for
The facts are as follows:.
certiorari and a petition for review on certiorari. Secondly, he pre-empted a prerogative that
In payment of attorney's fees resolved against him, petitioner Narciso Kho, a businessman,legally pertains to the Court of Appeals when he disapproved petitioner's notice of appeal
issued in favor of private respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho six (6) postdated Manila Bank"believing that only questions of law are involved."
checks in the total sum of P57,349.00. One of the checks, in the amount of P10,000.00, was
lost by Atty. Camacho who promptly notified petitioner. When the other five (5) checks were In E. Razon, Inc. vs. Judge Moya, No. L-31693, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 41, the
negotiated by Camacho with the Philippine Amanah Bank, the same were returned Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, held: LexLib
uncleared because Manila Bank had been ordered closed by the Central Bank.
"Concededly, issues that involve pure questions of law are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. However, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Because of petitioner's refusal to replace the Manila Bank checks or pay his
Court does not authorize the Trial Court to disallow an appeal on the
obligation, Camacho instituted an action for a sum of money against petitioner before
ground that there is no question of fact, but only a question of law,
respondent trial court. 1
involved." 4
In his answer, petitioner alleged that he was under no obligation to replace the lost check for
P10,000.00, arguing that Camacho should have executed a sworn statement that he lost the The Court was no less explicit and emphatic when it declared in the subsequent case
of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. 70681, October 16, 1985, 139 SCRA 320, 325-326, that:

"We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only question of law
or both questions of fact and law, this question should be left for the
determination of an appellate court and not by the court which rendered
the subject decision appealed from . . . Respondent Judge erred in
dismissing said appeal on his misconception that the same involves
only a question of law and based on this reasoning, disallowed
petitioner's appeal because it was not made to the Supreme Court . . .
"By dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was misdirected
because the case was resolved by it on a pure question of law, the trial
court committed a grave error. Respondent Judge should have allowed
the Intermediate Appellate Court to decide whether or not the
petitioner's appeal involves only a question of law and not arrogate unto
himself the determination of this question. His error in dismissing
petitioner bank's appeal becomes even more obvious considering the
provisions of Section 3 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is
specifically provided that 'where the appealed case has been
erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the
appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and
clear statement of the grounds therefor.'"

SO ORDERED
||| (Kho v. Camacho, G.R. No. 82789, November 21, 1991)
[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.]
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO
and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

Maria T . M. Leviste for petitioners.

Roberto B. Arca for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

Thus, following the above pronouncements, what respondent Judge should have done 1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; PARTY WHO DID NOT APPEAL FROM THE
under the circumstances was to sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE RIGHT OF
the Court of Appeals to certify the case to the proper tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge WAY, BARRED FROM RAISING THE SAME. With respect to the first issue, herein
Leviste had absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the presentpetitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the
rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are
appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of
the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already
the trial court. 5
been laid to rest. For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
Nonetheless, although a procedural error was committed by respondent Judge in petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
disapproving petitioner's notice of appeal, to require him to give due course to the appealtrial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no
and then elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q-52014 to the Appellate Court will serve no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
useful purpose and will only delay the resolution of an otherwise open-and-shut case. The whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may
records before us are sufficient to enable us to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the
pleadings and to terminate this case once and for all.
decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance an argument that he may deem
necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed,
and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by
the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court
The obligation to pay P57,349.00 in attorney's fees is admitted. The appropriate checks in
solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of
payment therefor have been issued. However, one check was misplaced through the
reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative
creditor's fault while the other five were dishonored because the drawee bank has ceased to
reliefs.
operate. llcd
2. CIVIL LAW DAMAGES; RECOVERY OF DAMAGES; REQUISITES. The mere fact
A perusal of petitioner's answer convinces us that the judgment on the pleadings was
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant
proper. In that pleading, petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the useless checks
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
and gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank where he had deposited his lifetime
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
savings had been closed through no fault of his. In effect, what petitioner was saying was
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely
that Camacho should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a sufficient
part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. In order that a
controversion of the material allegations in the complaint.
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
Finding no reversible error in the judgment on the pleadings rendered by respondent Judge such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
Leviste, the Court considers the same as the final adjudication on the respective rights of concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured
the parties.
in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded, it is not sufficient to
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, certiorari is hereby DENIED. No costs.

state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
suffering. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, considered as a mere consequence of community life. The proper exercise of a lawful right
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as maycannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to
or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another,
not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
no cause of action arises in the latter's favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby
is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
3. ID.; ID.; DAMAGES DISTINGUISHED FROM INJURY. There is a material distinction resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
DECISION
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
4. ID.; ID.; DAMAGE OR LOSS WHICH VIOLATE NO LEGAL DUTY TO OTHER PERSON,
BORNE BY THE INJURED PERSON. Many accidents occur and many injuries are
inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no REGALADO, J p:
legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed
with modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8,
wrong. cdll
1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1
5. ID.; PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS; REQUISITES. Contrary to the claim of
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of
private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R.
right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the
be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof. 2
acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, (2) The acts
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
of Appeals, are as follows:
6. ID.; ID.; RIGHT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OWNERS ENCLOSE AND FENCE THEIR
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico
PROPERTY. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public
Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners,
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro
owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."cdll
contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as
vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be
7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LAWFUL ACTS DONE BY
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein.
PERSON ON HIS PROPERTY. At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was
Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going
not subject to any servitudes. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the
to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
defendants Cristino and Brigida Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. Hence, prior to
Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is)
said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing
that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D").
and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and
As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two
exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by
possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum
meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to
absque injuria. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property,
P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously
according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As
mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in
a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his
width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it
own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage
is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a
or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss isdamnum absque injuria. When
meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length
the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
has to be traversed.
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants

occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff
Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said
tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see
the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the
first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was
first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her
adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit "I-Santoses and Custodios,
Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that
the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant
Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because
there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having
(at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants
were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their
footwear were even lost. . . . 3 (Italics in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents
the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With
the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the
grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot
obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That
decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be
reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an
appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of
the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary
to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can
assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a
quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to
maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or
modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages
has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show
that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part: Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action
permanent access ingress and egress, to the public street;
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action,
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the
since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent
wrong. 8
use of the passageway.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. 4
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. 9
Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is
causing it. 10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some
grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some
Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand
pain and suffering. 11
(P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000)
Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is
affirmed to all respects. 5

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion forconsequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must
reconsideration. 6 Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, andan act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. 12
whether or not the award of damages is in order. prLL

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. 13 If, as mayrespondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does
SO ORDERED.
not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. 14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the ||| (Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, February 09, 1996)
claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
[G.R. No. 92591. April 30, 1991.]
abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)
CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT
The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. 15
OF APPEALS and WILLIAM SAMARA, respondents.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes
in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those Romeo G. Carlos for private respondent.
established by law. 16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence
their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or
fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
DECISION
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their
favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
The Court is beset with the issue involving two defendants in a case for recovery of a sum of
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and
money where the trial court adjudged them to be jointly and severally liable as judgment
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said
debtors to pay the plaintiff but who are now required, as a result of a modification on appeal
right. LLcd
by only one of them, to pay substantially different amounts while being solidarily liable.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
As a prefatory note, this is the second time the petitioner has gone to this Court but the
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
issues raised at the first instance are distinct from the one at bar.
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have
been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent William Samara, an American
petitioners is damnum absque injuria. 17
who does business in the Philippines, against petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Citytrust) and a foreign bank, Marine Midland Bank, N.A.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his
(hereinafter referred to as Marine Midland).
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in The facts as established by the trial court show that plaintiff-private respondent Samara
a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or anpurchased on December 10, 1980 from defendant petitioner Citytrust Bank Draft Number
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When23681 for US $40,000.00, the payee being Thai International Airways and the corresponding
the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the bank in the United States or the drawee, defendant Marine Midland. On December 23,
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can 1980, Samara executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to
complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be inform Marine Midland about the order through telex. Citytrust transmitted the message to
considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19
Marine Midland the next day and followed it up with a cable, which the latter bank
acknowledged to have received on January 14, 1981 stating in its receipt that it has noted
the stop-payment order and has not paid the bank draft. Citytrust credited back Samara's
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will account for U.S. $40,000.00 due to the non-payment. After seven months or on July 3,
lie, 20 although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been 1981, Citytrust re-debited Samara's account for U.S. $40,000.00 upon discovering that
invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the Marine Midland had already debited Citytrust's own account for the same amount allegedly
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's on December 22, 1980. Despite the alleged discovery, however, there is evidence to show
favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts canthat Marine Midland informed Citytrust through a letter of the non-payment or nongive no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to encashment of the bank draft as of August 4, 1981. It is also shown that Marine Midland
achieve a lawful end by lawful means. 22

even confirmed in a telex letter dated August 31, 1981 that the bank draft had not been paid
as of that date.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the Decision

appealed from except paragraph 1 thereof which is hereby modified to
read as follows:

Based on the above findings, the trial court brushed aside Marine Midland's contention that
it had already paid the bank draft of Samara on December 22, 1980 or before it received the
1. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the
stop payment order. The trial court was not convinced regarding the denial of the
sum of US $40,000.00, plus six percent (6%) interest per annum from
confirmation made as to the non-payment of the bank draft since the time it received the
July 3, 1981 until full payment is made, and the sum of Ten Thousand
stop payment order. Marine Midland was held bound by its letters admitting knowledge of
(P10,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees." (Rollo, pp 45-46)
the stop payment order and compliance with it. The trial court also overruled the ground
relied on by Citytrust in re-debiting Samara's dollar account, i.e., the discovery that Marine About a month and a half later or on April 10, 1989, this Court, through its First Division,
Midland debited Citytrust's account before the stop payment order was given by Samara, denied the petition in G.R. No. 82009 for lack of merit. In response to the allegation that the
prescriptive period for filing an appeal was also suspended as to the petitioner when cothis being unjustifiable.
defendant Marine Midland filed a motion for reconsideration, the Court ruled that the rights
Hence, a decision was rendered on March 4, 1986, the dispositive portion of which and liabilities of the two defendants are not so interwoven as to show similarity in defenses
reads: prcd
and warrant reversal of the judgment as to both. This Court stressed specifically the finding
of the appellate court that although the petitioner and Marine Midland were solidarily liable,
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
only the latter was ultimately held responsible for damages because it was the one ordered
to reimburse the petitioner for "whatever amount" the petitioner will be made to pay the
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the
plaintiff by reason of the judgment. (See Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 171
sum of US $40,000.00, plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum
SCRA 758 [1989]. Moreover, in filing a motion for reconsideration, Marine Midland was in
from July 3, 1981, until full payment is made, and the further interest of
fact acting only for itself. Regarding the second issue, we held that respondent Samara is
twelve percent (12%) per annum on the accrued interest from
entitled to immediate execution when the trial court decision became final and executory as
December 23, 1980 up to the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1983,
to the petitioner. In overcoming the petitioner's argument that execution pending appeal of
inclusive; Exemplary damages in the sum of One Hundred Thousand
its co-defendant should not be allowed to prevent an absurd result in case of possible
Pesos (P100,000.00) and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
reversal, we held that the law is clear that a final judgment must be executed against a
(P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and costs;
defeated party. Since both defendants are jointly and severally liable, it is irrelevant whether
or not the co-defendant would be absolved.
2. Dismissing the defendant's counter-claims for lack of merit;
3. Ordering defendant Marine Midland to reimburse defendant Citytrust
of whatever amount the latter will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason
of this judgment and costs." (Rollo, pp. 29-30).

Some four months later or on August 7, 1989, the Supreme Court declared the decision in
G.R. No. 82009 to be final and executory. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied.

Only Marine Midland filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied. The On September 28, 1989, Samara filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted
petitioner did not do anything except to move for a reconsideration of an order of executionon October 23, 1989. The petitioner assailed the Order of Execution before the Court of
Appeals on November 6, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19176. The trial court was upheld and
of the judgment against it which was granted.
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
The petitioner and Marine Midland filed separate appeals. The petitioner's appeal was,
however, dismissed on December 15, 1987 for having been filed out of time or fifty-one (51) Hence, the instant petition was filed on March 29, 1990 which raises the main issue of
days after (i.e., May 7, 1986) it received a copy of the trial court decision on March 17, 1986. whether or not the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in ruling that the
liability of the petitioner should be based on the original decision of the trial court and not the
A motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied by the Court of Appeals.
modified one. cdphil
On February 26, 1988, the petitioner questioned before the Supreme Court the dismissal of
its appeal. That case was docketed as G.R. No. 82009 where the petitioner raised theThe private respondent contends that the petition is barred by res judicata alleging that the
following issues: (1) whether or not the timely appeal of Marine Midland inured to petitioner's issue in the case at bar had already been raised, passed upon, and judicially determined by
benefit; and (2) whether or not plaintiff-private respondent Samara was entitled to immediate this Court in G.R. No. 82009.
execution even assuming the petitioner's appeal was indeed filed out of time.
It is our considered opinion that the issue here is distinct from the ones raised earlier. In the
While the petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of the appeal was still pending before present petition, the Court is faced with the issue of the propriety of the execution of
this Court, the Court of Appeals on February 23, 1989 affirmed the trial court decision with judgments in favor of private respondent Samara who is entitled to recover on execution:
modification consisting of a reduction of the rate of interest and attorney's fees, as well as against the petitioner, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 12% compounded interest per
the exclusion of exemplary damages. Thus, the dispositive portion of the decision of the annum, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 attorney's fees of P50,000.00 and costs; and
as against Marine Midland, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 6% simple interest per
appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 14128 reads: cdrep
annum, and attorney's fees of only P10,000.00.

We are less concerned now with the issues of whether or not a co-defendant's appeal
inures to the benefit of another who failed to appeal on time and on the right of a judgment
creditor to immediate execution of a final and executory judgment since such issues have
become moot and academic.
It is worthy to note that the Court was not apprised of the February 23, 1989 decision of the
Court of Appeals until after we had promulgated a decision denying Citytrust's petition for
certiorari to review the dismissal of its own appeal. We were so notified through Citytrust's
motion for reconsideration of our decision in G.R. No. 82009. It is a sad fact, however, that
the motion did not present sufficiently compelling grounds to convince the Court to rule
otherwise on the issues presented in G.R. No. 82009 which pertain to the validity of the
dismissal of the petitioner's appeal.

defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to promptly inform

Citytrust that the demand draft Citytrust issued was really paid by
Marine Midland on December 22, 1980. For its part, Marine Midland
alleged that Citytrust did not properly advise it of the actual
circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the draft and of the
receipt by the latter of the stop-payment instructions. The rights and
liabilities of both parties concerned are not so interwoven in such a
manner that their defenses are similar and that a reversal of the
judgment as to one should operate as a reversal to the other.
Furthermore, a perusal of the decision appealed from shows that
Marine Midland, though jointly and severally liable with petitioner, is the
one ultimately held responsible for the damages incurred by the private
respondent inasmuch as the trial court ordered 'defendant Marine
Midland to reimburse defendant Citytrust of whatever amount the latter
will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason of this judgment and costs.'"
(Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra at page 765)

The present petition was given due course in line with our settled rule that while a decision
has already become final and executory and can no longer be challenged, the manner of its
execution can be reviewed by proper appeal (Abbot v. National Labor Relations The Court is of the considered view that it was the trial court judgment that created a joint
Commission, 145 SCRA 206 [1986]). It is not only the difference in the issue raised that and several obligation to pay the private respondent certain sums. No solidary liability as
makes us allow this petition. It is also because of a different Court of Appeals decision (this between them existed from the drawer-drawee relationship in the draft transaction.
time in CA-G.R. SP No. 19176) that is the subject of our review. The petitioner now assails
the affirmation of the order of execution based on the trial court judgment in spite of the The joint and several obligation imposed by the lower court had a three-fold purpose: (1) to
modified judgment which reduced the liability of co-defendants to pay private respondent. declare the prevailing party to be entitled to recover damages on account of the prejudice
What bothers the private respondent is the similarity of the arguments used by the petitioner which resulted from the acts of the co-defendants; (2) to give the prevailing party the right to
in all the pleadings filed with this Court in G.R. No. 82009 and in the present petition.
proceed against either one of them to recover the amounts awarded to him; and (3) to
impress upon Marine Midland its ultimate liability to fully reimburse the petitioner Citytrust
The Court reiterates what it has held in the Abbot case:
consistent with the finding that the proximate cause of the injury to the private respondent
was the wrongful deed of Marine Midland. Cdpr
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court judgment, however, does not alter the fact that the respective defenses of the
co-defendants are distinct on trial and even on appeal. Citytrust and Marine Midland were
not in privity with each other in a transaction involving payment through a bank draft. A bank
draft is a "bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon its correspondent bank, . . . issued at the
solicitation of a stranger who purchases and pays therefor" (Kohler v. First National Bank,
289 P 47, 49, 157 Wash. 417 [1930]). It is also defined as an "order for payment of money."
(Polotsky v. Artisans Savings Bank, Del. 180 A. 791, 792, 7 WW. Harr 142 [1935]). In the
case at bar, Citytrust from which the private respondent purchased the bank draft, was the
The petitioner alleges that the appellate court decision dated February 23, 1989 has drawer of the draft through which it ordered Marine Midland, the drawee bank, to pay the
superseded and rendered functus oficio the March 4, 1986 decision of the trial court invokedamount of US $40,000.00 in favor of Thai International Airways, the payee. The drawee
by the private respondent and is applicable not only to Marine Midland but also to thebank acting as a "payor" bank is solely liable for acts not done in accordance with the
petitioner. LibLex
instructions of the drawer bank or of the purchaser of the draft. The drawee bank has the
burden of proving that it did not violate. Meanwhile, the drawer, if sued by the purchaser of
The Court does not agree with this allegation which hinges on the petitioner's insistence that the draft is liable for the act of debiting the customer's account despite an instruction to stop
it can benefit from a reversal or modification of a judgment even if it has lost its own appeal. payment. The drawer has the duty to prove that he complied with the order to inform the
We do not depart from our earlier analysis in G.R. No. 82009 that the rights and liabilities of drawee.
the petitioner and Marine Midland are not so interwoven in such a manner that their
defenses are similar as to readily warrant an operative effect upon a party who failed to The fact that the petitioner previously filed a cross-claim against Marine Midland does not
appeal.
make the former a party in the latter's appeal where all reliefs granted to the plaintiff and or
to the petitioner who was a co-defendant are up for review. The rights and liabilities of
As found by this Court in G.R. No. 82009:
Citytrust as a defensive cross-claimant, which alleged that the proximate cause of the injury
to the plaintiff was the wrongful action of Marine Midland, have already been litigated before
"It must be noted that two defendants, Marine Midland and Citytrust,
the trial court which ordered full reimbursement in favor of Citytrust. Until petitioner Citytrust
filed cross claims against each other in their answer. Citytrust alleged
appeals for the review of the trial court decision either in part or in toto, its rights and
that the proximate cause of the injury should be attributed to coobligations as pre-determined cannot generally be affected by an appeal of a co-defendant.
"In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the
decision itself but the manner of its execution. There is a big difference.
While it is true that the decision itself has become final and executory
and so can no longer be challenged, there is no question either that it
must be enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any
deviation therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal." (pp. 209210)

The respondent appellate court made this clear in its decision dated February 23, 1989,
when it stated that even assuming that the petitioner may be considered an appellee, "such
a standing was only with respect to the cross-claim against (appellant Marine Midland) and
not with respect to its (petitioner's) liability in favor or private respondent Samara", the
judgment on which had already become final and executory as to the petitioner. The
petitioner cannot now present a subverted interpretation of what the appellate court meant.
The Court examines the execution of judgment rendered in favor of private respondent
Samara from a perspective which shows a glaring disparity between the amounts which
each of the two judgment debtors are bound to pay despite: (1) their being held jointly and
severally liable, and (2) the right of one of them to be reimbursed for the whole amount of
whatever it is obliged to pay.

"It must be noted that it was the appellant's certifications and repeated
reaffirmation of non-payment of the bank draft that led defendant
Citytrust to re-credit appellee's account. Also, the appellant negligently
failed to implement the stop payment order upon receipt. It tarried in
actually executing it until January 13, 1981. Furthermore, it was the
appellant's debiting of the account of the defendant-Citytrust which also
led the defendant Citytrust to again debit the appellee's dollar account
despite prior acknowledgment of the nonpayment of the draft. No doubt,
it was the appellant's actuations that triggered the whole mess.
Therefore, the lower court correctly ordered the appellant to reimburse
defendant Citytrust of whatever amount the latter may pay the appellee
by virtue of its judgment." (Rollo, p. 44)

A judgment may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on the same side as between Considering the above circumstances, the Court will not allow the absurd situation where a
themselves such that questions of primary and secondary liability between joint tort-feasors co-defendant who is adjudged to be primarily liable for sums of money and for tort would be
may be determined. (Montgomery v. Blades, 9 SE 2d 397, 217 NC 654 [1940]). This rule charged for an amount lesser than what its co-defendant is bound to pay to the common
reaffirms that principles of joint and several liability have survived so that the plaintiff is creditor and allowed to collect from the first co-defendant. Such a situation runs counter to
entitled to recover the entire judgment from a single defendant even though thethe principle of solidarity in obligations as between co-defendants established by a judgment
responsibility of that defendant for personal injury is of a lesser extent. (Gorelick v.for recovery of sum of money and damages. Substantial justice shall not allow Marine
Department of State Highways, 339 NW 2d. 635, 127 Mich. App. 324 [1983]). LexLib
Midland, which is the source of the injury afflicted, to be unjustly enriched either by the direct
execution against him of the judgment for the reduced amount or by the indirect execution
A review of the trial court judgment and the appellate court judgment here shows that the by way of reimbursement at a later time. cdphil
only difference is the amount of damages in paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the
March 4, 1986 decision as restated and reduced in the February 23, 1989 decision. All other Additionally, the Court notes the modification made by the respondent court which ordered
orders of the trial court were affirmed by the respondent appellate court. The joint and not only Marine Midland (the appellant therein) but both "defendants jointly and severally" to
several obligation to pay the private respondent and the right of the petitioner to be pay the new amount. Though, as a matter of procedure, the modification shall be applied
reimbursed are retained. The problem now lies in interpreting the said modification as only to the appellant, substantial justice and equity also demand that we re-interpret the
likewise reducing the total amount which can be executed against the petitioner.
decision to refer to petitioner Citytrust as well. There exists a strong and compelling reason
to warrant an exception to the rule that a judgment creditor is entitled to execution of a final
If we go by a literal procedure, execution against petitioner Citytrust would be based on the and executory judgment against a party especially if that party failed to appeal. (Olacao v.
March 4, 1986 decision. However, the Court can not close its eyes to the inexplicableNational Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38 [1989]; Quigui v. Boncaros, 151 SCRA
situation where private respondent Samara would be given a choice of executing his claim 416 [1987]; Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 148 [1990])
for US $40,000.00 plus bigger interest (compounded), exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees from petitioner Citytrust, or US $40,000.00 plus a smaller sum inclusive of simple WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 19176 dated
interest and reduced attorney's fees from Marine Midland. Even if it is admitted that Citytrust January 18, 1990 as well as the resolution denying reconsideration are hereby REVERSED
would anyway be reimbursed for the whole amount which Citytrust may be ordered to pay, and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ordered to effect execution of its judgment subject to the
such reimbursement would be a circumvention of the appellate court's judgment that Marine modifications supplied by the Court of Appeals in its judgment on February 23, 1989.
Midland is liable only for the modified sum.
SO ORDERED.
There are two final judgments arising from one and the same basic claim of Mr. Samara.
The obligations arising from the same stop payment order on the same U.S. $40,000.00 ||| (Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92591, April 30, 1991)
bank draft are sought to be enforced by the two conflicting final and executory judgments.
[G.R. No. 132197. August 16, 2005.]
We cannot enforce one judgment while allowing a violation of the other. We apply basic
principles of justice and equity.
It is clear from the records that "the draft was not paid or cashed before the receipt of the
stop payment order by the appellant (Marine Midland)" but was certainly paid at some other
date as evidenced by a reconciliation entry showing a debit of the corresponding amount in
the books of Marine Midland. (See Rollo, pp. 40 and 42). Furthermore, there was substantial
evidence to show that Marine Midland is the one actually responsible for the personal injury
to the private respondent. The respondent court made the following findings, to wit:

ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS,
INC., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH
ONG, respondents.

Ernesto L. Abijay and Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioners.
Edgar F. Gica for respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

SYLLABUS

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY IN NATURE; TECHNICALITIES OR DETAILS OF PROCEDURE

SHOULD BE CAREFULLY AVOIDED. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that
they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468.
1.REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL; FILING OF MOTION FOR By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the
RECONSIDERATION DEEMED AN EFFECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DEFECTIVE properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents
NOTICE OF APPEAL. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving
affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of
Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in
remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of
3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the
right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Rules of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment
Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defectivecomplaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz justifies a more liberal approach, thus: . . . The
Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and
for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be
the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure
Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear thatshould be carefully avoided.
respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF POSSESSION IS PRIMORDIAL WHILE THE ISSUE OF
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS; PROPER OWNERSHIP IS GENERALLY UNESSENTIAL. The issue involved in accion
MODE OF APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. Petitioners reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion
invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and
validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an
the two cases are different. De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of
Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a ownership is generally unessential.
decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of
the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY ONLY SEEKS TO RECOVER PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of PROPERTY; CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WILL NOT
appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
DEPRIVE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION. Neither the allegation in
petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents
3.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; AN ALLEGATION THAT THE sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of
DEFENDANT IS UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDING POSSESSION FROM THE PLAINTIFF IS the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of
DEEMED SUFFICIENT WITHOUT NECESSARILY EMPLOYING THE TERMINOLOGY OFclaiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of
THE LAW. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents'
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case
the relief sought. Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners'of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all
possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The
possess by virtue of any express or implied contract. The emphasis placed by the Court of mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC
Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter. In Javelosa v. Court of
the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENDING ACTIONS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DEED
withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally OF SALE AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND QUIETING OF TITLE ON THE
settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfullySAME PROPERTY WILL NOT ABATE THE EJECTMENT CASE; RATIONALE. Even if
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion
the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to implywould be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case
possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in Ganadin
source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being v. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not
withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals, we held that a simplematter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration
allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana, this Court ruled that
the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of
possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; isthe deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible
already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity

of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the
and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.
lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it
appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LOWER COURT'S ADJUDICATION OF OWNERSHIP IS MERELYrespondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed
PROVISIONAL. In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the fact that of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be
respondents had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute annulled by respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC
sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. 2 Per record, this case is still pending resolution.
Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law
to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision
the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over
bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoingpossession thereof to petitioners.
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC's decision in
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this inits entirety.
the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez when it ruled: We must stress, however, that before us is
only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they
the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As filed a motion for reconsideration.
such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional,On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to
and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action respondents' notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration
between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought dated 9 May 1997, 3 and granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending
seasonably before the proper forum. The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership appeal.
cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the
occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of thecase as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the
validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set
for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the aside.
property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has
already become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether
the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable
by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the
DECISION
possession of the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
TINGA, J p:

The following sequence of events is undisputed:

In a Decision 1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals
overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the
aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision.

(1)On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision

affirming the judgment of the MTC.

The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the
complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise
acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26
January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote
respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged.

(3)On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the

RTC. SAcaDE

(2)On

28 April 1997, respondents

aforementioned decision.

received

copy

of

the

(4)On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997
decision.
(5)On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.

(6)On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned

23 June 1997 Order.
(7)On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their
motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to
file their Petition for Review.
(8)On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals
their Petition for Review.

P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the
adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion
and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and
in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period
for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt
of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC,
period could not have been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not
Reconsideration because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the
Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested theirtimely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the
intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 4 Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which wasfiling of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for
given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing aMotion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started Appeal.
running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to
1997.
run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. AMotion for
Respondents, in their Comment, 5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 MayAdditional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting
1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsiderationand the ten
the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for
refused to subscribe respondents' position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Review on time.
Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal.Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz 7 that once a notice of appeal is filed,
The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:
it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual
circumstances in the two cases are different.
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on
May 8, 1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for
Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby
approves, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious,
is GRANTED. 6 (Emphasis in the original.)

De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a
notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of
appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is
considered as if no appeal was interposed.

Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether
the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it tookproperly cognizable by the MTC.
cognizance of respondents' position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean
that the RTC was correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barredThe MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed
of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of
by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?
Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful
detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there
is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of
Section 1.How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to
unlawful detainer.
appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.

The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
xxx xxx xxx
3.That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T.
No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which
is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue.
Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto attached as
Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part
hereof;
4.That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said
lots;
5.That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant
Elizabeth Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been
living in the house constructed on said lots;
6.That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel,
wrote defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots
and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt
of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and
made an integral part thereof;
7.That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still
refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of
said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;
8.That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the
plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned
rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month
xxx xxx xxx 8

express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by
defendant. 12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals, 13 we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still
refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of
said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; 14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have
allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless,
they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots.
Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the
complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient
for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo
dela Paz v. Panis. 15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 16 of the Rules
of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment
complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz 17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of
public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in
nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be
restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure should be carefully avoided. 18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the
annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to
question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this
case.

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being
an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly
sought. 9
claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession was their Comment, 19 respondents maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal
originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of
virtue of any express or implied contract. IASEca
ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands,
and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to
qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on This contention is not tenable.
the matter.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, 10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or
there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or
detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that thepossession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. 20
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 11
Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment

as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in

respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for
their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a
that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim
recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the
ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to
necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of
determine in an action for unlawful detainer. 28
possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of
the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss
the third assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6
conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of the
ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. 21 ThisMunicipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against
Court in Ganadin v. Ramos 22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of respondents.
possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending
actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting SO ORDERED.
of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.
||| (Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. v. Spouses Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005)
In Drilon v. Gaurana, 23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title
over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest
the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the
rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible
entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and
the relief prayed for are not the same. 24

[G.R. No. 115104. October 12, 1998.]

MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. and
OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, respondents.

In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had
previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one
ofpacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid
SYLLABUS
reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of
ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
1. REMEDIAL
LAW;
SPECIAL
CIVIL
ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; MOTION
FOR
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
RECONSIDERATION, REQUIRED; EXCEPTIONS. It is settled that the writ
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. This
rule, however, is not without exceptions when the questions raised before this Court are the
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez 26 when it ruled:
same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this
We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination
Court, is no longer prerequisite. This rule is subject however, to exceptions among which are
of ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue
the following, namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest
of possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
is involved; 3) in case of urgency; and (4) when the questions raised before this Court are
thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the
the same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by, the court
ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial
below. cdasia
courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. The issues raised by petitioners in
is brought seasonably before the proper forum. IECcaA
this petition are substantially the same as those asserted by them in their Motion to Dismiss
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. Appeal, dated February 14, 1994, before the Court of Appeals. The argument that
respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners' mineral areas under Presidential Decree
No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and submitted by petitioners for resolution by the
appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a motion for reconsideration
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
before the Court of Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments. For this reason, we
hold that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal to the allowance of
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of
their action.
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DOES IT LIE. The writ of certiorari lies when a court, in denying a
accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW RAISED IN CASE AT BAR. The first four arguments
advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has,
underPresidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 2l.9 hectare mining areas
where petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises the
issue of whether the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading
under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are legal
questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the probative weight of the
evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on the given state
of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals
committed grave error in ruling otherwise. cDTHIE

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated April 12, 1994, of the Tenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42120, denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss the appeal of private respondent from a ruling of the trial court. 1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 16, 1992, respondent Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for
expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and
OmicoMining & Industrial Corporation. The complaint, entitled "Philex Mining Corporation
v. Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc., et al.," was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-CV0727. prLL
Based on 53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of
petitioners' mining areas
where
the
latter's
"Macawiwili claims"
are
located.
Philex Mininglikewise moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining) from the mining areas sought to be expropriated.
Although a temporary restraining order was initially issued by the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Branch X, on November 11, 1992, it denied respondent's application for a
preliminary injunction.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court, acting on the motion of petitioners, dismissed the
complaint of Philex Mining. In its resolution, the trial court stated: 2
To better appreciate the incident submitted for resolution, a review of
the antecedent facts which gave rise to this case is in order.

The decision of the Supreme Court dated October 2, 1991 in

Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia, 202 SCRA 222 upheld the decision
of the then Minister of Natural Resources which was affirmed by the
Office of the President. This decision recognized the possessory rights
of defendants Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims located at
Tuba and Itogon, Benguet as against Poe Mining Association and
plaintiff herein Philex Mining Corporation as operator. However, on the
surface of 21.9 hectares of these mining claims awarded to
defendants Macawiwili and Omico, we find improvements of the plaintiff
consisting of a network of roads, a motorpool facility, a tailings dam and
three bunkhouses. The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Cordillera Administrative Region (DENR-CAR), in
pursuance of the Supreme Court decision is poised to order the
removal or demolition of plaintiff's improvements and to hand
possession of the area to defendants Macawiwili and Omico. Plaintiff,
while admitting the possessory rights of defendant mining companies,
stresses that the improvements already existing thereon are vital to the
conduct of its mining operations particularly, its Nevada claims. Thus, it
came to court seeking the expropriation of this area pursuant to Section
59 of Presidential Decree No 463. prcd
The conflict between the plaintiff and defendant mining companies
spans a period of almost 23 years until finally, it reached the Supreme
Court, the final arbiter of all disputes. The Supreme Court has spoken
and it has awarded to defendants Macawiwili and Omico the portion
sought to be expropriated by the plaintiff.
Can this Court now grant to plaintiff the right to expropriate the very
land which has been denied it by the decision of the highest court of the
land?
This Court believes not. To do so would not only be presumptuous of
this Court but a patent defiance of the decision of the highest tribunal.
The plaintiff states that the expropriation is necessary in order for it to
continue with the operation of its Nevada claims. The improvements
now existing on the land sought to be expropriated consists of a
network of roads constructed sometime in 1958, a motorpool facility
built in 1963, a tailings dam and three (3) two-storey concrete
bunkhouses. It is thus clear that these improvements have been
existing for quite sometime now. Aware that these improvements are
essential to their mining operations, plaintiff should have initiated
expropriation proceedings long before it even started putting up said
improvements. Why exercise the right of eminent domain only now that
the land has been adjudged in favor of defendant mining companies by
no less than the Supreme Court? It seems the plaintiff, mindful of the
Supreme Court decision, would now look for avenues of escape to
evade the repercussions of such a decision. What it has not achieved
through the decision, it tries to gain through the power of eminent
domain. Clearly, this is forum-shopping, plain and simple. Stripped of all
its legal niceties, this expropriation proceeding is patently a last ditch
effort on the part of the plaintiff to overcome the adverse effects of the
Supreme Court decision.

Can this Court countenance such a procedure under the guise of the
legal process of expropriation?
No. To agree to it would be to encourage forum-shopping which is
abhorred as mere will no longer be any end to any litigation. LLjur
Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that its right to expropriate is distinct and
separate from the rights of Macawiwili and Omico under the Supreme
Court decision, anchoring said right on Section 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 463 which states:
SEC 59. Eminent Domain. When the claim owner or an
occupant or owner of private lands refuses to grant to another
claim owner or lessee the right to build, construct or install any
of the facilities mentioned in the next preceding section, the
claim owner or lessee may prosecute an action for eminent
domain under the Rules of Court in the Court of First Instance
of the province where the mining claims involved are situated.
In the determination of the just compensation due the claim
owner or owner or occupant of the land, the court shall appoint
at least one duly qualified mining engineer or geologist to be
recommended by the Director as one of the commissioners.
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends either with an
order of dismissal or an order of condemnation. The second phase of
the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken"
(Municipality of Bian vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al., 180 SCRA 576
as quoted in National Power Corporation vs. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 9419399, February 25, 1992, 206 SCRA 520).

Going to the first stage of the expropriation proceeding in the case at

bar, the question is: Is the right to expropriate granted
to mining companies under Section 59 of P.D. No. 463 an absolute
right?
An examination of Presidential Decree No. 463 would readily show that
Section 59 upon which plaintiff asserts its right to expropriate is found
under Chapter XI with the heading "Auxiliary Mining Rights". From the
title alone, it would seem that the right to expropriate is not an absolute
one but a mere auxiliary right. The right of eminent domain granted
to mining companies is given in aid of its mining operations and not as
a matter of right. Thus, it should be construed strictly against
the mining company seeking the right. Thus, taking into context the
antecedent facts arising from this case, is it proper for plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain?
Absolutely not. But, granting arguendo that the right of expropriation
can be awarded to plaintiff, a bigger question arises on whether
a mining company
can
expropriate
land
belonging
to

another mining company. It would be absurd if not ridiculous. In the first

place, the land would no longer be subject to expropriation.
Expropriation demands that the land be private land. When the
Supreme Court awarded the possessory rights over the land subject of
this case to defendants Macawiwili and Omico, it has stripped said land
of its private character and gave it its public character, that is, to be
utilized for mining operations. Although property already devoted to
public use is still subject to expropriation, this must be done directly by
the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the
delegate (Constitutional Law by Isagani Cruz, 1989 edition, page 64).
Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is not a specific grant of
authority given to plaintiff but a mere general authority which will not
suffice to allow plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. llcd
The plaintiff also states that it does not question the mining rights of
defendant mining companies over the area as it is only interested in the
surface rights as this is where its improvements are located. But this is
an illusory dream which cannot be given reality by this Court. It is a
well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not
only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace
above it to a reasonable height (Art. 437, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The surface area cannot be segregated from the subjacent minerals.
There is no dividing line between the surface and what is underneath
that one can categorically state that one belongs to the plaintiff while
the other forms part of the property of the defendant mining companies.
For that is in effect what the plaintiff wants, just the surface area where
its improvements are. It would be like dismembering a human body of a
lady and awarding the upper part including her bosom to someone
while giving the lower part to another, making it a useless proposition to
either one. For how can defendant mining companies operate
their mining claims when the surface belongs to somebody else and for
that matter, how will the plaintiff improve the surface area without
affecting what is underneath?
As the Supreme Court stated in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, No. L-43938, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228: "Under the (no
conflict) theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be
planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with
the miningoperations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he
destroys the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can
the miner, go without encroaching on each other's right? Where is the
dividing line between the surface and sub-surface rights? The Court
feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural."
All told, it is clear that plaintiff has not shown that it has the right to
expropriate the land subject of this case. Moreover, that land has been
placed out of its reach by the Supreme Court decision when it awarded
it to defendants Macawiwili and Omico. Both plaintiff and defendants
are engaged in mining, and the Supreme Court has adjudged
defendant mining companies to be the owner of the land. This Court

now, on the ground of the exercise of the power of eminent domain,

cannot and will not overwhelm said decision by awarding it to plaintiff.
As the other motions have become moot and academic, this Court will
no longer delve into them. However, as to the motion for reduction of
deposit, the Court will make its last point. In the case of National Power
Corporation vs. Jocson, supra, the Supreme Court made this
pronouncement: "Presidential Decree No. 42 requires the petitioner, to
deposit with the Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its
branches or agencies, 'an amount equivalent to the assessed valued of
the property for purposes of taxation'. This assessed value is that
indicated in the tax declaration. P.D. No. 42 repealed the provisions of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and any other existing law contrary to or
inconsistent with it. Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67 insofar
as the determination of the provisional value, the form of payment and
the agency with which the deposit shall be made, are concerned. P.D.
No. 42, however effectively removes the discretion of the court in
determining the provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount
equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is
required for that purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the
property sought to be condemned".
Thus, the plaintiff is right in depositing the assessed value of the
property as appearing on the tax declaration of defendant Macawiwili as
the provisional value of the land sought to be expropriated While this
case remains pending, the plaintiff may then withdraw the balance of
the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) from the Philippine National
Bank after deducting the provisional value of the land amounting to
Forty Eight Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P48,600.00).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendants Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Mining Co., Inc.
and Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation is granted. This case is
hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied. It then appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
On February 16, 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only
questions of law were involved and, therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court.
However, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion in a resolution, dated April 12, 1994.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.

law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of
such tribunal, board or officer.
With some modifications, Rule 65, 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly
provides:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. 3
It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of
certiorari is sought. llcd
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion
for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it
an opportunity to correct its assigned errors. 4
This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Pajo v. Ago and Ortiz 5 we held:
Respondent contends that petitioners should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order in question, or asked for the dissolution of
the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, before coming to us.
This is not always so. It is only when the questions are raised for the
first time before this Court in a certiorari proceeding that the writ shall
not issue unless the lower court had first been given the opportunity to
pass upon the same. In fine, when the questions raised before this
Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised in and
passed upon by, the court below, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this
Court, is no longer prerequisite.

Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner In Locsin v. Climaco 6 it was stated:
should have filed a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to
When a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and
correct itself.
submitted to a lower court, and the latter has decided the question, a
motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary as a condition
Rule 65, 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court in part provides:
precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari in this Court.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
And in Central Bank v. Cloribel, 7 it was explained:
exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

It is true that Petitioner herein did not seek a reconsideration of the

order complained of, and that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari
will not be entertained unless the respondent has had, through a motion
for reconsideration, a chance to correct the error imputed to him. This
rule is subject, however, to exceptions, among which are the following,
namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public
interest is involved; and 3) in case of urgency. These circumstances are
present in the case at bar. Moreover, Petitioner herein had raised in
its answer in the main case and in the rejoinder to the memorandum of
the Banco Filipino in support of the latter's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction the very same questions raised in the Petition
herein. In other words, Judge Cloribel has already had an opportunity to
consider and pass upon those questions, so that a motion for
reconsideration of his contested order would have served no practical
purpose. The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an
exercise in futility. prLL

questions of law, the appeal shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not
being reviewable by said Court. So, too, if an appeal is attempted from
the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead of by petition for
review, the appeal is inefficacious and should be dismissed.
Thus, judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to
be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional
trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the
Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law.
This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
distinguishes the different modes of appeal from Judgments of regional trial courts as
follows:
Modes of appeal.

The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are substantially the same as those asserted
by them in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated February 14, 1994, before the Court of
Appeals. The argument that respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners' mineral
areas under Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and submitted
by petitioners for resolution by the appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To
further file a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals would simply be to
repeat their arguments. For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file a motion for
reconsideration is not fatal to the allowance of their action.

(a) Ordinary appeal.The appeal to the Court to Appeals in cases

decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

We therefore come to the main question: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Appeal? We find that it did.

(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

To begin with, the writ of certiorari lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 8 By "grave abuse of
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are
discretion" is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts
perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. 9
in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals,
whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused it discretion in denying their
motion to dismiss the appeal. According to petitioners, respondent's appeal raises onlyThe rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus
questions of law and, therefore, it should be brought to the Supreme Court by means of a be summarized as follows:
petition for review on certiorari and not, as Philex Mining did, by bringing an ordinary appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that the question whether respondent has a right
(1) Original Jurisdiction In all cases decided by the regional trial
to expropriate petitioners' mining areas under 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is a
courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, appeal may
question of law.
be made to:
On the other hand, Philex Mining maintains that the issues raised in its appeal are factual
and, therefore, the appellate court is the proper forum for the ventilation of such issues.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which is based on the Resolution of the Court En Banc in
UDK-9748 (Anacleto Murillo v. Rodolfo Consul), March 1, 1990, provides in 4(c)
thereof: prLL
c) Raising issues purely of law in the Court of Appeals. or appeal by
wrong mode. If an appeal under Rule 41 is taken from the regional
trial court to the Court of Appeals and therein the appellant raises only

(a) Court of Appeals where the appellant raises questions of

fact or mixed questions of fact and law, by filing a
mere notice of appeal. LLphil
(b) Supreme Court where the appellant solely raises
questions of law, by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction

All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or repetitious suits, is not resorted to in the
appellate jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed present case since respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners' mining areas, not as
questions of fact and law, shall be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
operator of the Poe mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada mining claims. 16
The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are
questions of law or of fact.
(4) Respondent's expropriation of the land will not divide the surface from the subsurface for
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
the reason that respondent seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
Pigoro heirs, have over the 21.9 hectare area. 17
litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondent's alternative cause of action, even on the
question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as
assumption that respondent does not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an
to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact
alternative statement in a pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of the
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
other alternative statements. 18
alleged facts. 10
Respondent's assignment of errors 11 before the appellate court should therefore beThe first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of
considered in order to determine the nature of the questions therein raised. Respondent whether it has, under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9
hectare mining areas where petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other hand, its
Philex Mining argued before the Court of Appeals:
final argument raises the issue of whether the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of
A. The trial court erred in finding that Philex has no right to
action in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of Court are applicable to special civil
expropriate; P.D. 463 expressly grants to Philex, as operator of
actions. These are legal questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the
the Nevada claims, the right of eminent domain.
probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the
law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the
B The trial court erred in finding that Philex cannot expropriate land
subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The
belonging to a mining company; Section 59 in relation to
Court of Appeals committed a grave error in ruling otherwise. prLL
Section 58 of P.D. 463 allows an operator of amining claim to
expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the challenged resolution of the Court of Appeals
by other persons or claim owners.
is SET ASIDE, and the appeal of respondent Philex Mining is DISMISSED.
C The trial court erred in finding that Philex is attempting to subvert the
Supreme Court decision and is engaged in forum-shopping.
Philex is merely exercising its rights under the law.
D The trial court erred in finding that the expropriation of the land will
divide the surface from the subsurface. prcd
E The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Philex's alternative
cause of action was disregarded.
The respondent's arguments may thus be summarized as follows:

SO ORDERED.
||| (Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115104, October 12, 1998)
[G.R. No. 109834. October 18, 1996.]
CECILE SAN JUAN DITCHING and MA. CORAZON I. SAN
JUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ADRIANO
MOTAS, respondents.

(1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 463. expressly grants
respondent the right to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by
Manalo, Puno, Gozos, Jocson & Placido for petitioners.
other persons once the conditions justifying expropriation are present. The power of eminent
domain expressly granted under Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not inferior to theErnesto M. Maiquez for private respondent.
possessory right of other claimowners. 12
(2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to
SYLLABUS
another mining company.
Pursuant
to
the
ruling
laid
down
in Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic, 13 land covered by mining claims may be the subject of
expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the power of eminent domain only means that
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO FILE
the court may inquire into the necessity of the expropriation. 14
PETITION FOR REVIEW MUST BE FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF
(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. In Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had set the allowable extension to file petition for
Court's decision in Poe Mining v. Garcia. 15
review with the Court of Appeals at fifteen (15) days. . . . And in the same case, the Court

explicitly ruled that a motion for extension must be filed within the reglementary period of5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT
appeal. . . . It should be observed that in this case, it was not only the petition which was WEIGHT ON APPEAL; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. We shall not pass upon and
filed late, but also the motion for extension of time. This distinguishes the instant case from consider the other issue raised by petitioners, challenging the factual findings of the trial
those cited by petitioners. It is obvious and unarguable (and it was not onlycourt as to the existence of the tenancy relationship. Otherwise, we would be violating that
in Lacsamana that this Court held) that a motion for extension of time to file a petition should time-honored and oft-reiterated rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
be filed prior to the expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law, and beyond dispute, if the great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of
motion for extension is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e., the fact are not supported by evidence . . . Petitioners have utterly failed to show any such
reglementary period to appeal), then there is no longer any period to extend, and the compelling reason. And equally as significant, they are asking us to review a judgment
judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory. The error of which had long since become final and executory something we cannot and ought not
herein petitioners and their counsel goes into the very validity of the appeal, and cannot do.
simply be brushed off as an honest mistake in computing the period to appeal.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TIMELY PERFECTION OF APPEAL IS A JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT; REASONS. It should be stressed that a lawyer has the responsibility of
DECISION
monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal. He cannot escape
from the rigid observance of this rule which is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with as
"mere technicality" to suit the interest of a party. The rules as to periods for filing appeal are
to be observed religiously, for it is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a PANGANIBAN, J p:
statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. "These
rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
If a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with respondent Court of
period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
Appeals was filed more than fifteen days from receipt of the order assailed, should the
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business."
petition itself, when subsequently filed, be rejected outright for being filed late? On the other
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement. If an
hand, should the merits of the case be looked into first to ascertain whether to allow
appeal be not taken within the reglementary period, the judgment becomes final and the
relaxation of the strict application of the rules?
court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it has no alternative but to order the execution
of the final judgment.
Assailed in this petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision 2 of respondent Court of Appeals 3 promulgated August 25, 1992, and its
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISCOMPUTATION OF APPEAL PERIOD BY COUNSEL IS NOT
Resolution 4 of April 16, 1993, denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. In the
AN EXCUSABLE ERROR; CASE AT BAR. Although this Court had in a number of
assailed Decision, respondent Court dismissed their petition for review for being filed late,
instances relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice, there is no reason to do so in
considering that their motion for extension was filed twenty (20) days from their receipt of
this case. Quite beyond cavil, the delay incurred by petitioner's counsel was simply
the order of the trial court.
inexcusable. As correctly cited by private respondent, this Court has already held that "(a)n
erroneous application of the law or rules is not an excusable error." At this juncture, we
The Antecedent Facts
deem it useful to reiterate this Court's ruling in Galima, for the guidance of members of the
bar and bench alike, that "the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest The antecedent of the present petition was an ejectment case 5 filed in July 1989 with the
the course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive and Municipal Trial Court in Calamba, Laguna by herein petitioner Ditching and Zonette San
executory character of the judgment would be left to the whim of the losing party, when it is Juan Bacani, seeking to eject herein private respondent Motas and another occupant
to the interest of everyone that the date when judgments become final should remain fixed named Vidal Batalla from the lot owned by the petitioner and her co-owners. Said case was
tried under the old Rules on Summary Procedure.
and ascertainable."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF LATE APPEAL PROPER ALTHOUGH PRIMA FACIEThe Municipal Trial Court found that the plaintiffs in said ejectment case were co-owners of
MERITORIOUS; CASE AT BAR. The respondent Court cannot also be faulted for stating parcels of land situated at Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna covered by various transfer
in its resolution dated June 23, 1992 that the petition filed with it was prima certificates of title. However, in 1975, a contract of tenancy entitled "Kasunduan Buwisan sa
facie meritorious, only to dismiss it thereafter for being filed out of time. Where no timely Sakahan" was entered into by private respondent Motas and Dr. Eduardo San Juan, the
appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the legality of the allowance of the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. Then, in 1978, respondent Motas constructed his
appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court. Further, the house on the lot covered by TCT No. 57823 without the consent of petitioners, who, upon
respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground that it waslearning of such fact, demanded that he vacate the property. The last demand to vacate
filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition did not carry with it any having been made in September 1988, and respondent Motas having refused to vacate,
assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed. Under Section 1(a) of Rule 50 of the petitioners lodged a complaint at the barangay level, but no amicable settlement was arrived
Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio or on motion of the appellee mayat, hence the suit for ejectment.
dismiss the appeal for, inter alia: "(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that
For his part, respondent Motas alleged that he could not be ejected from his tenanted
the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these rules." ESHAcI
landholdings (including the lot where his house was located) because of the existing
tenancy agreement, and that he had been giving rentals/shares to petitioners' overseer who

without justifiable reason stopped receiving said rentals or share of the harvests, forcing
respondent Motas to deposit the same with a bank. 6

rights of defendants as tenant. Their claim that they never intended

defendants to be their tenants cannot be given merit."

After due consideration of the pleadings and evidence presented, the Municipal Trial Court As expected, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. In
found that there existed a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent Motas.order to resolve the same, Judge Eleuterio Guerrero set the case for clarificatory hearing on
Then, based on Section 24 of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Reform Code, asAugust 30, 1991, on which date a representative from the Register of Deeds of Laguna
amended, which provides that "(t)he agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in (Calamba Branch) appeared and testified on the records and/or other papers and
the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the documents relative to the ownership and/or disposition of the land subject of the
effectivity of (RA 3844), which shall be considered as included in the leasehold," the MTC controversy. 11
held 7 that the portion of the land where respondent Motas' house was erected was
considered included on the leasehold, hence the "ejectment" case was actually a tenancy Afterwards, Judge Eleuterio Guerrero issued an order dated January 8, 1992 granting
reconsideration and setting aside his earlier order, thus: 12
case over which it had no jurisdiction. The court thus dismissed the case.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, 8 which rendered a
decision 9 dated June 28, 1991, in Civil Case No. 1607-90-C affirming in toto the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court made the following findings supporting
the existence of a tenancy relationship: 10
"In the case at bar, the fact appears to be uncontroverted that plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) became the registered owners of the property
mentioned in the complaint only on May 8, 1978. This is quite evident
from a reading of a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57823
(Annex 'D' of complaint). Moreover, the land sought to be recovered by
them clearly appears to be a part of a larger tract of land identified as
Lot 1416 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-266142, the latter being
also a portion of Lot 1416-X-2, Psd 58615, LRC Rec. No. 8418.
Furthermore, this Court's analysis of the other Transfer Certificates of
Title attached to the complaint as Annexes 'A' to 'C', and 'E' to 'I',
inclusive, will clearly show that the parcels of land mentioned and
described in the same certificates of title issued in the names of
plaintiffs and their co-owners are the results of a previous subdivision of
Lot 1416-X. Since Annexes 'A' to 'C' and 'E' to 'I' appear to have been
issued to the plaintiffs and their co-owners also on May 8, 1978, there is
no doubt at all that the parcels of land covered by such titles, including
the land in question, came from one (1) tract of land.

The foregoing circumstances appear to be very significant because

plaintiffs never denied, much less controverted the fact that defendants,
more particularly Adriano Motas (private respondent herein), have
occupied a much bigger parcel of land belonging to Dr. Eduardo San
Juan as tenants of the latter. Neither did plaintiffs dispute the
defendants' claim that the land in question was a part and parcel of Dr.
Eduardo San Juan's land being tenanted by defendants.
On the other hand, there is sufficient and uncontroverted proof offered
by defendants that they have been tenants of Dr. San Juan's land since
1972; and that on October 7, 1975, defendant Motas even executed
Annex '1' with Dr. San Juan, plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest.
Plaintiffs' contention that defendants are not tenants of the property in
question has no leg to stand on. Having succeeded Dr. Eduardo San
Juan on the same property, they are bound to observe and respect the

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds merit to plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for

Reconsideration and accordingly the decision of this Court dated June
28, 1991, is hereby reversed and set aside and another judgment is
rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellees and/or any persons claiming rights
under them to vacate immediately the premises of the land owned by
plaintiffs-appellants located at Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, and
to surrender possession thereof to the latter; and
2. Defendants-appellees are further ordered to pay the costs."
On March 5, 1992, Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero who took over as presiding judge of
Branch 34 issued another order (this time upon motion for reconsideration of respondent
Motas) reversing the earlier order of Judge Eleuterio Guerrero, as follows: 13
"The rule on the exercise of the Appellate Jurisdiction by Regional Trial
Courts mandates that cases appealed from the Metropolitan Trial Court
'be decided on the basis of theentire record of the proceeding had in
the Court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court' (vide.
Sec. 22, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129). The fact that the Court then
presided by the Hon. Eleuterio Guerrero conducted hearings and
admitted testimonial evidence to clarify points on the decision of the
Court a quo, is beyond the purview of the rule. This being the case, the
motion for reconsideration must perforce to be GRANTED.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated January 8, 1992 is hereby
ordered RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the Order of the
Municipal Trial court dated June 14, 1990 is AFFIRMED en toto."
On April 13, 1992, petitioners filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of fifteen (15) days from April 18, 1992, or up to May 3, 1992, within which to file a
petition for review, alleging the following material dates: 14
"2. On March 5, 1992, the said court issued an Order adverse to herein
petitioners, a copy of which was received by petitioners thru counsel on
March 17, 1992, please see Annex 'A'.

3. From the adverse order, petitioners filed a Motion for

Reconsideration on March 27, 1992 which was denied by the court per
Order of even date.
4. The Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was
received by petitioners thru counsel on April 3, 1992, please see Annex
'B', thus, petitioners have until April 18, 1992 within which to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
5. That petitioners will file a petition for review on certiorari of the said
adverse order.
6. Due however, to volume and pressure of work from equally important
cases, undersigned cannot file the petition within the time allowed by
law, thus, needs a period of fifteen (15) days from April 18, 1992 within
which to file said petition."

". . . (1) whether or not respondent Adriano Motas is a tenant of that

parcel of land covered by TCT No. 57923 (and) (2) whether or not the
dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by the Court of Appeals
notwithstanding its merit, is valid."
Disregarding for the nonce the factual nature of the first issue raised, and the rule of long
standing that only questions of law may properly be raised in petitions for review
oncertiorari such as this, we shall first determine whether the respondent Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petition before it, seemingly on "sheer technicality." If the answer is
in the affirmative, then regardless of the merits of the petitioners' cause, assuming it to be
meritorious, the judgment of the RTC having become final and executory, then this appeal
may no longer be entertained.
Petitioners allege that the late filing of the motion for extension and the petition was due to
their counsel's "honest mistake in computing the period appeal." Citing cases 17decided by
this Court, petitioners allege that respondent Court committed serious error and "grave
abuse of discretion" in dismissing the petition on a mere technical ground. 18

In response thereto, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting extension and
stating: 15
On the other hand, private respondent alleges that petitioner's failure to file their petition on
time due to mistake of counsel was "not excusable." Likewise citing numerous
"Petitioners' motion for an extension of fifteen (15) days from April 18,
cases, 19 private respondent alleges that this Court has consistently held that "perfection of
1992 up to May 3, 1992 within which to file a petition for review is
an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement and failure to do so
GRANTED, conditioned upon the timeliness of said motion." (Emphasis
renders the questioned decision or decree final executory and no longer subject to
ours)
review." 20
The petition was filed on April 29, 1992.

The Court's Ruling

Finding the petition to have been filed late as can be readily ascertained from the recitationThe petition before us is plainly without merit
of material dates, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with the following
In Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
discussion:
Court, 21 this Court had set the allowable extension to file petition for review with the Court
"It is crystal clear from the foregoing undisputed facts that from March
of Appeals at fifteen (15) days, to wit:
17, 1992 the date petitioners received the order of March 22 (should be
"3. APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF
'05'), 1992 (Annex A, petition), to March 27, 1992 when they filed their
APPEALS.
motion for reconsideration of said order, ten (10) days were consumed.
From April 3, 1992 the date petitioners received the order denying their
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from
motion for reconsideration up to April 13, 1992 when they filed their
the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, another ten (10)
court and municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of
days had elapsed. A total of twenty (20) days had already run from the
Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of
time petitioners received a copy of the questioned order up to the time
BP No. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court
they actually filed on April 13, 1982 their motion for extension of time to
through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of
file the petition. Clearly, the order of March 22 (should be '05'), 1992
the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for
had already become final and executory when petitioners filed on April
extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also
13, 1992 their motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of
For this reason, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
Appeals. The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a
review except to dismiss it. (Sumbilo vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 232)."
motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial
court, the movant has only (the) remaining period within which to file a
Their motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision having been denied by the
petition for review. Hence, it may be necessaryto file a motion with the
Court of Appeals, petitioners hastened to this Court.
Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review.
The Issues
(Emphasis supplied)
The issues initially presented by petitioners in the petition before us were subsequently
simplified and re-stated in their memorandum thus: 16

And in the same case, the Court explicitly ruled that a motion for extension must be
filed within the reglementary period of appeal:

"6) PERIOD OF EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR

REVIEW.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision (August
26, 1986), an extension of only fifteen days for filing a petition for review
may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases.

being filed out of time. 28 Where no timely appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final,
and the legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court. 29 Further, the respondent Court was not precluded from
dismissing the petition on the ground that it was filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of
the merit of the petition did not carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely
filed.
Under Section 1 (a) of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu
proprio or on motion of the appellee may dismiss the appeal for, inter alia:

The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding
docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal.
Copies of the motion for extension of time and of the subsequent
petition for review must be served on the regional trial court on the
adverse party." (Emphasis supplied).

"(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal
was perfected within the period fixed by these rules."

Having disposed of the foregoing issue, we shall not pass upon and consider the other issue
raised by petitioners, challenging the factual findings of the trial court as to the existence of
the tenancy relationship. Otherwise, we would be violating that time-honored and oftreiterated rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are
It should be observed that in this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported
also the motion for extension of time. This distinguishes the instant case from those cited by by evidence. 30 Indeed, we recently held in Sintos vs. Court of Appeals 31 that:
petitioners. It is obvious and unarguable (and it was not only in Lacsamana that this Court
held) that a motion for extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the
"The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by
expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law, and beyond dispute, if the motion for extension
the trial court on the basis of evidence directly available to it and such
is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e, the reglementary period
finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling
to appeal), then there is no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be
reasons (Macaraeg v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 259 [1989])."
appealed from will have become final and executory. The error of herein petitioners and their
counsel goes into the very validity of the appeal, and cannot simply be brushed off as an
Petitioners have utterly failed to show any such compelling reason. And
honest mistake in computing the period to appeal. It should be stressed that a lawyer has equally as significant, they are asking us to review a judgment which had long since
the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal. become final and executory something we cannot and ought not do.
He cannot escape from the rigid observance of this rule which is jurisdictional and cannot be
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioners having
trifled with as "mere technicality" to suit the interest of a party. The rules as to periods for
failed to show that respondent Court committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision.
filing appeal are to be observed religiously, for it is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the
Costs against petitioners.
right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply
with the rules. "These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal SO ORDERED.
within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of ||| (Ditching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109834, October 18, 1996)
judicial business." 22 Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is
a jurisdictional requirement. 23 If an appeal be not taken within the reglementary period, the
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998.]
judgment becomes final and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it has no
alternative but to order the execution of the final judgment. 24
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in
Although this Court had in a number of instances relaxed this rule in order to serve
his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V.
substantial justice, there is no reason to do so in this case. Quite beyond cavil, the delay
incurred by petitioner's counsel was simply inexcusable. As correctly cited by private
AGUSTIN, respondents.
respondent, this Court has already held that "(a)n erroneous application of the law or rules is
not an excusable error." 25
Estelito P. Mendoza and Virgilio C. Manguera for petitioner.
At this juncture, we deem it useful to reiterate this Court's ruling in Galima, for the guidance
of members of the bar and bench alike, that "the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law Offices for private respondent.
period will not arrest the course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment.
Otherwise, the definitive and executory character of the judgment would be left to the whim Amador C. Casino, Collaborating counsel for private respondent.
of the losing party, when it is to the interest of everyone that the date when judgments
become final should remain fixed and ascertainable." 26
SYNOPSIS
The respondent Court cannot also be faulted for stating in its resolution 27 dated June 23,
1992 that the petition filed with it was prima facie meritorious, only to dismiss it thereafter for

Private respondent Nestor Agustin was administratively charged for inter alia graveINFLEXIBLE RULE. Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of
misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director of the Department of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
Public Works and Highways before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Graft Investigator jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and
found him guilty of the charge and henceforth issued a resolution ordering his dismissal consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on
from the service. The resolution was approved by the Ombudsman, but on motion for November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional
reconsideration, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero set aside the resolution and rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the
exonerated private respondent. cdasia
case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall
explain. Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act ofdepartments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the
1989) which vests appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of the Office of courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
the Ombudsman as it infringes the constitutional proscription against laws increasing the thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body,
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advise and consent.
it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a
case before them for judgment.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT EX MERO MOTU MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF LACK OF
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates JURISDICTION AT ANY POINT IN THE CASE WHERE THE FACT IS DEVELOPED.
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases While courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogentlypleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks
give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdictionunconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that
of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's
SYLLABUS
own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any
point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SECTION 27 OF R.A. 6770; OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989. determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. HCEcaT
We will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 27 OF R.A. No. 6770 SPECIFIES THAT APPELLATE
decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS TO BE EXERCISED OVER "FINAL
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, suchJUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF LOWER COURTS," COMPOSING THE INTEGRATED
as from an incident in a criminal action. EScHDA
JUDICIAL SYSTEM. The very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL FALLS UNDER THE orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does
JURISDICTION OF BOTH THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends
OMBUDSMAN; CASE AT BAR. After respondents' separate comments had been filed, that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the
the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been seriouslySupreme Court or the Court of Appeals, as specific provision to that effect is included in the
considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No
jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated
the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5,
of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant toArticle VIII of the Constitution.
the amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all
adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were 6. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PRECLUDE
made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office APPEALS FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE SUPREME COURT VIA RULE 45.
of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court. It could thus be possible that in the same Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the Revised
administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one couldRules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This differs from the former Rule
way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to
and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or
of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to
questions of law. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; RULE THAT A CHALLENGE ON review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courtsenumerated in
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS MUST BE RAISED BY A PARTY TO THE CASE; NOT AN Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are

now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. EDATSI
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
7. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS NOT A QUESTION OF
ACQUIESCENCE BUT AN ISSUE OF CONFERMENT. The submission that because this 11. ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme
Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, thatCourt, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of
fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court
contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates
not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which
law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies ofis affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the
some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant
hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and whenhas a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without
that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the
remedy. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SUPREME COURT CAN RULE ON MATTER SUA SPONTE WHENof Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the
ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS INVOLVED. Private respondent invokes the rule that Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural
courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the caseand not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested
can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that
there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional remedy. Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases
question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when itsapplicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar,
appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although itwhen its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex
could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be
Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the sustained. EaHIDC
resolution of the present case.

DECISION
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS; SECTION 27 OF R.A.
6770 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST LAWS INCREASING
THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT. Taking all the foregoing
circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of theREGALADO, J p:
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increasesPetitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently"Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to 0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from
give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdictionRegional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). cda
would unnecessarily burden the Court. IDScTE
I
10. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; RULES PRESCRIBED FOR THE PRACTICE It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner
AND PROCEDURE OF LOWER COURTS; TEST WHETHER PROCEDURAL OR Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
SUBSTANTIVE. It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business.
or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power,Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro
and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one contextManila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he
and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive iswas administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those
jurisdictional system. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justlyinterceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant
when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted provisions:
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
Sec. 14. Restrictions. . . . No court shall hear any appeal or
threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letterapplication for remedy against the decision or findings of the
complaint dated July 24, 1995.
Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section
xxx xxx xxx
19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree
No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of
promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding
xxx xxx xxx
private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. (1) Administrative investigations by
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct
and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent
moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new
counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case
was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now
challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) 1 pertinently provides that

27

of Republic

Act

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

No.

procedure and consistent with due process. . .

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. All provisionary orders
at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the

Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt
of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the
by filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten (10) days from receipt of the
charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal
allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the
the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory
creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including those
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of rules with respect to the availability or non-availability of appeal in administrative cases,
procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, thatsuch as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on
the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafterconstitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this
engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is
07. As correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of
al. 3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 4 were original actions for certiorarithe courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before
under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced by a petitionthem for judgment. 12
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et
al., 6 Olivas vs.Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 7 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised
et al., 8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, 9 which were for certiorari, prohibition and/orin the pleadings, 13 the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not
mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs.Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikelypreclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that
denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer forit lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding
ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
Aniano Desierto, et al. 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari.
constitutionality of the statute. 14
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues
therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. 15 The
and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case
answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statementswhere that fact is developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its
in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 17
and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved
only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
incident in a criminal action.
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact,
which does not appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative
liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private
respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36
of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9,Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service
Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of
Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are
appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the
proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while
the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought
to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation
of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting
decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No.

thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMBAdm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor
V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,'
which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave
misconduct, among others."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is
allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No.
6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its
Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two
comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the
aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling
in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R.
No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its
former Circular No. 1-91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked
and involved in this case, and the foregoing legal considerations appear
to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate
jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard
thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further
proceedings in this appellate review. cdasia

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT

their position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by
filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.

Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly
states:
SEC. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A person desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of
the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals
from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict
the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as
we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but,
then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on
certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now
IV
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21
the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary"
Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned
quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high
adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the
criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of
appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate
the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent
jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since
constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionallySection 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise,
mandated but statutorily-created body.
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court's Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by
appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that
certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in
this Court already has jurisdiction.
administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service Commission,
and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now
developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in
applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since
a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved
the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. *
and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision cited by
petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27
exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composingof Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it
the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous.
hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue
agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to,
provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the
matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No.
the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review
and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
under Rule 65.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revisedPrivate respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
Rules of Civil Procedure 19 preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of

judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on
raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise
by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the
xxx xxx xxx
constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
passing upon the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private
Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the
respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be
Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30,
absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable
Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence
assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely
in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed
one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in
the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme
this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court
Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review,
supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under
adding that they should be appeals on certiorari. 27
review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and
the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever
the question.
referred to this Court for its advice and consent. 28
V

VI

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogentlybe taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 23 was intendedThere is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate
to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdictionrule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and
would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24
purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether
Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
factual
settings,
but
also
because
those
isolated
cryptic
statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
jurisdiction.
another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Actquestion of great difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, privatepragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional
respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No.system.
6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B.
No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, wasIn determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate was informedprocedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same wasis whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the rule deals merely with procedure. 32
deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court,
was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the

Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now
SYNOPSIS
be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This
is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made orThis is a special civil action case under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a Leonila Rueda against public respondent Office of the Ombudsman for its failure to uphold
particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, the existence of probable cause to hold public respondents City Prosecutors liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The records reveal that Florencio V. Rueda,
hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. 34
husband of herein petitioner, underwent surgical operation at the UST Hospital for the
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by a surgeon, Dr. Domingo Antonio,
Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Jr. and an anaesthesiologist, Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes. However, six hours after the
Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural surgery, Florencio died of complications of unknown cause. Petitioner sought the help of the
and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body and its finding was that Florencio's death
right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. A formal
complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was then filed before the Manila City
remedy . 35
Prosecutors Office. In said office, petitioner's case was transferred from one prosecutor to
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one another who came out with contradictory recommendations. When the case was transferred
court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicableto Senior State Prosecutor Arizala, the latter resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any
to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at bar, when itswrongdoing. Aggrieved petitioner filed graft charges against Prosecutors Guerrero,
invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi,Macaraeg and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes in the Office of the
the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained. Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence. cda
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), togetherThe Supreme Court ruled that in exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the
with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman acted within his power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the
the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid prosecutors, and the Court will not interfere with the same. Being the proper investigating
Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from theauthority, the Ombudsman should have inquired into the successive transfer of the case
Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of nofrom one prosecutor to another which could hardly qualify as "standard operating
further force and effect. llcd
procedure." The instant petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by
the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a
petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
SYLLABUS
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem
necessary and proper.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 Constitution; OMBUDSMAN; POWERS AND
SO ORDERED.
FUNCTIONS THEREOF. Preliminarily, the powers and functions of the Ombudsman
have generally been categorized into the following: investigatory powers, prosecutory
||| (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
power, public assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain information, and function to
adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. As protector of the people, the Office of
[G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997.]
the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials" and "to investigate any act or omission of any public
official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." dctai
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFRED L. PASCASIO,
RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., Honorable
2. ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; CONSTRUED. In this regard, "grave
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, all of the Office of the Ombudsman;
abuse of discretion" has been defined as "where a power is exercised in an arbitrary or
JESUS F. GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A.
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to
ARIZALA, all of the Office of the City Prosecutor,
amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
Manila,respondents.
contemplation of law.
Acosta, Rueda-Acosta & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINED AND

EXPLAINED IN THE CASE AT BAR. Probable cause has been defined as "the existence
of such fact and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecution, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted." "Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of

the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or is not to be blamed if she finally decides to accuse the City Prosecutors at the end of the
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so." The term does not mean actual line for partiality under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Nor may she be entirely
and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and faulted for finally filing a petition before this Court against the Ombudsman for grave abuse
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether of discretion in dismissing her complaint against said City Prosecutors on the ground of lack
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act of evidence. Much as we sympathize with the bereaved widow, however, this Court is of the
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for theopinion that the general rule still finds application in instant case. In other words, the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. SEcAIC
respondent Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding against filing
the necessary information against public respondents of the Office of the City Prosecutor.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; FOUR ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE CASES. "In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called The following facts are borne out by the records.
medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a
victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical
which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must operation at the UST Hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was
prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbatwhich a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital. 2
action caused injury to the patient." Hence, there are four elements involved in medical
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI
5. ID.; SECTION 3(E) OF THE Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; FACTS REQUIRED. ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in
The City Prosecutors were charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 whichadministering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo
requires the following facts: "1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless
official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his
public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding series of events
inexcusable negligence; and 4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or anywhich we shall try to disentangle. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M.
private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to suchIsrael, who had to inhibit himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the
doctors. As a result, the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was,
parties." dctai
however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and
jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor
Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held
criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
DECISION
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos
Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the
case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus,
ROMERO, J p:
the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte faceoccurred
again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead,
May this Court review the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman? The general rule has a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for
been enunciated in Ocampo v. Ombudsman 1 which states: LLjur
reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.
"In the exercise of its investigative power, this Court has consistently
held that courts will not interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the
averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form and substance or if he
otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may
proceed with the investigation of the complaint if, in his view, it is in due
and proper form."

Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor

Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong" continued when the case was again
assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be
included in the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the
recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior
State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any
wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg
Does the instant case warrant a departure from the foregoing general rule? When a patientand City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
dies soon after surgery under circumstances which indicate that the attending surgeon and
anaesthesiologist may have been guilty of negligence but upon their being charged, a seriesAggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
of nine prosecutors toss the responsibility of conducting a preliminary investigation to each Act No. 3019 3 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality
other with contradictory recommendations, "ping-pong" style, perhaps the distraught widow

in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. prosecution in support of the charge. 10
In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman toIn the instant case, no less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there
review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprovewas indeed negligence on the part of the attending physicians in administering the
the same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, anaesthesia. 11 The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the
refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors veracity of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible
liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investigation,
research, evaluation and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors
Preliminarily, the powers and functions of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized are not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a technical matter, especially
into the following: investigatory powers, prosecutory power, public assistance function, when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a party's accusation and
authority to inquire and obtain information, and function to adopt, institute and implement defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.
preventive measures. 4
A word on medical malpractice or negligence cases.
As protector of the people, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty
"to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" and "to
"In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical
investigate any act or omission of any public official when such act or omission appears to
malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 5
claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a
there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may
health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do
exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section I, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. 6
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
In this regard, "grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as "where a power is exercised
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and
the patient." 12
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by, or in contemplation of law. 7
Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury
and proximate causation.
From a procedural standpoint, it is certainly odd why the successive transfers from one
prosecutor to another were not sufficiently explained in the Resolution of the Ombudsman. Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physicianBeing the proper investigating authority with respect to misfeasance, non-feasance and patient relationship was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect
malfeasance of public officials, the Ombudsman should have been more vigilant andrepresented that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
assiduous in determining the reasons behind the "buck passing" to ensure that no surgeons practicing in the same field, they will employ such training, care and skill in the
irregularity took place.
treatment of their patients. 13 They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that
any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
Whether such transfers were due to any outside pressure or ulterior motive is a matter of circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
evidence. One would have expected the Ombudsman, however, to inquire into what could performance, by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health,
hardly qualify as "standard operating procedure," given the surrounding circumstances of constitutes actionable malpractice. 14 Consequently, in the event that any injury results to
the case.
the patient from want of due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held
answerable in damages for negligence. 15
While it is true that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and is often the only
means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function is merely to determine the Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia,
existence of probable cause. 8 Probable cause has been defined as "the existence of suchthe necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquiturto the
fact and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts plaintiff, have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable
within the knowledge of the prosecution, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia.16 Essentially, it
which he was prosecuted." 9
requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical
community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question
"Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well negligently departed from this standard in his treatment. 17
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two
thing is so." The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absoluteinquiries: whether the doctor's actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable these were the proximate cause of the patient's injury. 18 Indeed here, a causal connection
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a is discernible from the occurrence of the victim's death after the negligent act of the
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant

the filing of the appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED, without
entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not conductprejudice to the filing of an appeal by the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice assailing
the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It appears that the cause of the the dismissal of her criminal complaint by the respondent City Prosecutors. No costs.
death of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with
the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote SO ORDERED.
was readily available to counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might
produce. 19 Why these precautionary measures were disregarded must be sufficiently||| (Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141, September 05, 1997)
explained.
[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.]
The City Prosecutors were charged with violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which requires the following facts:
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and
BIENVENIDO
"1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official
ARICAYOS, respondents.
functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private
party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to such parties." 20

Isagani M. Jungco for petitioner.

Sebastinian Office of Legal Aid for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

This is a case of an illegal dismissal filed by private respondent Bienvenido Aricayos

Why did the complainant, petitioner in instant case, elect to charge respondents under the
against St. Martin Funeral Home. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral
above law?
Home declaring that there was no employer-employee relationship that existed between the
While a party who feels himself aggrieved is at liberty to choose the appropriate "weapon parties, and therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the National
from the armory," it is with no little surprise that this Court views the choice made by the Labor Relations Commission rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision
and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. After the
complainant widow.
motion for reconsideration of the herein petitioner was denied, it filed before this Court the
instant petition for certiorari. cdasia
To our mind, the better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been The Court, instead of going to the merits of the case, discussed the mode of judicial review
to appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the with respect to decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission pursuant to the
Secretary of Justice under the Department of Justice's Order No. 223, 21 otherwise knownprovisions of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the Philippines) and Batas
as the "1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From Resolutions in Preliminary Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended by Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of
In remanding this case to the Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that while it does not wish to
which provides:
intrude into the congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, it further
observed that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to the court which,
"Section 1. What May Be Appealed. Only resolutions of the Chief
not being a trier of facts, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for
State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and
appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in
that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
Section 4 hereof."
aspect of the constitutional protection to labor.
What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223
states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution." On Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals
the other hand, "He may motu propio or on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright thefrom the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and
refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
appeal on specified grounds." 22
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within hishierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. aECTcA
power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will
not interfere with the same. cdlex

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; REGLEMENTARY PERIOD;
SIXTY DAYS DESPITE LAPSE OF THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR FINALITY OF THE
DECISION OF THENLRC. . . . the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion
for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule
has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously,
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed
as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations
if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employeremployee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to
the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the
evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a
period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner. 4

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate
appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER DECISIONS OF THE NLRC. denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
from theNLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth
be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with
of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. SAEHaC
respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find
their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and
Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now
DECISION
stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.

REGALADO, J p:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
petitioner St. MartinFuneral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name
included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment
by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was
formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from
the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took
over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in
the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to
show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2 Cdpr

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established
in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were
expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the
President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is
the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for
program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof
also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to
the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for
appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended
by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall
decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that
such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof
by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court
has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts
to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though
no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation
of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this

Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as
a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed
the reglementary .period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although
the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as
contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129
originally provided as follows:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A.
No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial

agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the

Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals
must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice."
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower
appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of
B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by
a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and
hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to
paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasijudicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of
purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over
decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original
action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now
grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications
of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . ." This would necessarily contradict
what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of

the NLRC 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from
the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary
implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the
Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of
B. P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned
amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is
illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe,
since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court
for that matter. LibLex
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R A. No. 7902
persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations
on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did
intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by
the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended
mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has
been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No.
1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his
sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded
its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was
expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but
also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg.
129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual
issues to the Court of Appeals.However, whatever benefits that can be
derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the "decisions
and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals."
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally,
extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the
decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission

to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.

(Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload
of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of
review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice
Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which
present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact
and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may
wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the
discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the
Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic rights and
additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr.
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago.
I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute
the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to
the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons
we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights
requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee
Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings
transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase " THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So
that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor
Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House,
this was also deleted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the

amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495
was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on
third reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495
and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier
discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review
of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the
opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the
process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On
the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be
advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed
to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all
the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the
findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly
affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the
axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not
be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records
will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be
dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of
the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a
growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of

fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions;
and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases
as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all
such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the
relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez,
et al.25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may
be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or
is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be
stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of
this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED,
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views
and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
||| (St. Martin Home v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998)
[G.R. No. 156081. October 19, 2005.]
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN
RAFAEL
PEREZ
DE
TAGLE,
WILSON GO, respondent.

DECISION

SOBREPEA, and
JR., petitioners, vs.

QUISUMBING, J p:

Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the
preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the
For our review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated September 2, 2002 of the Court of contract was not executed nor were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, countered
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, as well as its Resolution 2 dated November 12, 2002,petitioners, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were present. They
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The appellate court dismissed the petition averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell
for review under Rule 43 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for being an erroneous under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. They further denied that FEPI ever
mode of appeal from the Resolution 4 of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary hadmade any written nor oral representation to Go that it is the owner, pointing out
modified the Resolution 5 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in I.S. No. PSG that Go failed to positively identify who made such misrepresentation to him nor did Go say
where the misrepresentation was made. According to petitioner, there being neither deceit
00-04-10205 and directed the latter to file an information for estafa against petitioners.
nor misrepresentation, there could be no damage nor prejudice to respondent, and no
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).
probable cause exists to indict the petitioners. Petitioners likewise insisted that they could
not be held criminally liable for abiding with a cease-and-desist order of the DAR.
On October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila
Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop severalIn his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case.
parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of theHe argued that the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI's
Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred that
residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said ProjectFEPI could not disclaim ownership of the project since the contract described FEPI as
Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public. owner without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI appearing in the
contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere developer.
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured
approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for
The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. estafa, thus:
Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of
Wherefore, the case for estafa, under Articles 316 and 318 of the
P1,291,200 and a last installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn,
Revised Penal Code, filed against the respondents Ferdinand Santos,
FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owner's
Robert [John] Sobrepea, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase
Rafael Perez de Tagle, Jr. is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 8
price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the The City Prosecutor found no misrepresentation stating that, (1) the Contract to Sell did not
property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The latter demanded fulfillment of the terms mention FEPI as the owner of the property; (2) since no Deed of Sale had been executed by
and conditions of their agreement. FEPI balked. In several letters to its clients, includingthe parties, then petitioners are not yet bound to deliver the certificate of title since under
respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some both the Contract to Sell and Section 25 9 of Presidential Decree No. 957,10 FEPI was
claimants who opposed FEPI's application for exclusion of the subject properties from the bound to deliver the certificate of title only upon the execution of a contract of sale; and (3)
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPI's hands werethe City Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is the HLURB, which has exclusive
tied by a cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Said jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving the sale of lots in commercial
order was the subject of several appeals now pending before this Court. FEPI assured its subdivision including claims involving refunds under P.D. No. 1344. 11
clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the
Go appealed the City Prosecutor's Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in
properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor.
turn reversed the City Prosecutor's findings, and held, to wit:
Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPI's statements and he made several demands
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The
upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his
City Prosecutor of Pasig City is directed to file an information for estafa
demands. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
defined and penalized under Art. 316, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code
(HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 6and
against respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepea,
318 7 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City
Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr. and
against petitioners as officers of FEPI. The complaint for estafa averred that the Contract to
report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. EASIHa
Sell categorically stated that FEPI was the owner of the property. However, before the
HLURB, FEPI denied ownership of the realty. Go alleged that the petitioners committed
SO ORDERED. 12
estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the
development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were impossible to The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa under
accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registeredArticle 316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, pointing out that the elements of the offense
under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as were present as evidenced by the terms of the Contract to Sell. It ruled that under the
owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him Contract, the petitioners sold the property to Go despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its
the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner. IDTcHa
owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract and
had accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts. Thus, FEPI was

exercising acts of ownership when it conveyed the property to respondent Go. Acts toTo our mind, the sole issue for resolution is whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a
convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property are acts of strict ownership. Furthermore, proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor
nowhere did FEPI mention that it had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true owner of to file an information in a criminal case. In the course of this determination, we must also
the property. Clearly, petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasiownership after the perfection of the contract and the payment of the purchase price. Since judicial function.
a corporation can only act through its agents or officers, then all the participants in a
Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43 covers rulings of the
fraudulent transaction are deemed liable.
Secretary of Justice since during preliminary investigations, the DOJ's decisions are
Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos deemed as "awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasiand Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions", and its prosecutorial offices are
since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, considered quasi-judicial bodies/officers performing quasi-judicial functions.
which was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of
Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the trial Respondent counters that the herein petition is a dilatory tactic and emphasizes that
court deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review was "injunction will not lie to restrain criminal prosecution."
resolved. HATEDC
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the
On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in this wise: Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals
or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition, HAVING
Justice is not among the agencies 16 enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43.Inclusio unius est
NO MERIT, is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND ORDERED
exclusio alterius.
DISMISSED, with cost to Petitioners.
We cannot agree with petitioners' submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasiSO ORDERED. 13
judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed probable cause.
of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies
only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasiinformation or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.
judicial proceeding, thus:
Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the motion was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RULE 43 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT BE
AVAILED OF TO APPEAL THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. 14

(2) THE DOJ SECRETARY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND PROBABLE

CAUSE AND RESOLVED TO FILE AN INFORMATION FOR
ESTAFA UNDER ART. 316, SEC. 1 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE AGAINST PETITIONERS, CONSIDERING THAT: (A)
Petitioners did not pretend that they, or FEPI, were the owners
of the subject property; (B) FEPI need not have been the
owner at the time the Contract to Sell was furnished to
respondent Go; (C) There was no prejudice caused to
respondent Go; (D) There is no personal act or omission
constituting a crime ascribed to any of the Petitioners,
therefore, there can be no probable cause against them; and
(E) There was no deceit or even intent to deceive. 15

[t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the

guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication
nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal. 18
Though some cases 19 describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. 20 A quasi-judicial body is as an organ
of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. 21 A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and
their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions.

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. Law Office for petitioners.
decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa The Solicitor General for respondents.
is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel for intervenors.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners' petition for review.
Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want
us to reverse the findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under
Rule 43 from the court a quo failed. This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no
basis to review the DOJ's factual findings and its determination of probable cause.

SYNOPSIS

The alleged farmer-beneficiaries strikers protested the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office
First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covers the judgments, of the President (OP), which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from
orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court agricultural to agro-industrial institutional area. This led the OP, through then Deputy
or any authorized court and should raise only pure question of law. The Department ofExecutive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier decision after it had already become
Justice is not a court.
final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion only to
Also, in this petition are raised factual matters for our resolution, e.g. the ownership of the the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to
subject property, the existence of deceit committed by petitioners on respondent, and qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
petitioners' knowledge or direct participation in the Contract to Sell. These are factual issues
and are outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. The cited questions requireThe petitioners now seek to annul and set aside the "Win Win" Resolution and to enjoin
evaluation and examination of evidence, which is the province of a full-blown trial on the respondent Secretary Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the
said Resolution.
merits.
Second, courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the The crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-Win"
offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient Resolution issued by the OP on its earlier decision involving the same subject matter, which
in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the had already become final and executory? TASCDI
complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. 22 The decision whether to dismiss a
complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, The rules and regulations governing appeals to the OP are embodied in Administrative
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. 23 Findings of the Secretary of Justice are notOrder No. 18, which provides in Section 7, that: "Decisions . . . become final after the lapse
subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. 24 In this case, petitionersof 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailingthereof is filed within such period: . . .
jurisprudence. DACaTI
When the OP declared the decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as the first
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, dated September 2, 2002 and re-open the case or modify the decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the OP has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
November 12, 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
Costs against petitioners.
Section 7 of AO No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court mandate that only one
motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the decision of March 29, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005)
[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998.]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF
BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
HON.
RENATO
C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY
OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.

Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,
1996 decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; ERROR OF JUDGMENT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ERROR OF
JURISDICTION. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries
extraordinary writ of certiorari. aHcACT
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential
2.ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RULE AGAINST candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause." LLjur
FORUM SHOPPING IS VIOLATED. The test for determining whether a party has violated
the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision 1 of the Office of the President (OP),
adjudicata in the action under consideration.
issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to
3.ID.; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; DEFINED; MOVANTS IN CASE AT BAR ARE NOT agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest isExecutive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution 2 on
a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become
avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from afinal and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to
mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining
Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
are not real parties in interest. ADSIaT
But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
4.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; APPEALS TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RULE
GOVERNING THEM. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of theThe above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul
President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No 18. Section 7 thereofand set aside the "Win-Win" Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D.
provides: "SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, exceptGarilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Winfiled within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be Win" Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases." It is further provided for insame subject matter, which had already become final and executory?
Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as
practicable."
follows:
5.ID.; THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT MODIFIED A
DECISION WHICH HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. When the 1.This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned
Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23 1997 declaring the Decision of by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC),
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion forone of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No.
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more 2.In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in
Section 7 ofAdministrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted 3.In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform
to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the land value at P2.38 million. 4
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision
of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re- 4.NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which hadthe DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. cDAEIH
ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from
pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders." 5
DECISION
5.Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for
P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed
MARTINEZ, J p:
on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to

nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank
on the valuation of the subject property.

6.The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering
the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order
dated March 31, 1992;" (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Director's memorandum, dated May
21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the
Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC's subject property to the DAR
until further orders." 6
7.The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened
in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC. 7
8.In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, 8 dated January 7, 1993, designating
certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones
where the subject property is situated.
9.What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29,
1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:
"Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on
March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying
144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an
opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality,
provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
"Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may
authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land
area and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.
"On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee
approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the
instant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in
behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).
"Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial
Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its
Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and SocioEconomic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said
Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial
area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to
have the following components:
"1.The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes
the following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education;
Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library,
Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development Complex
which covers an area of 24 hectares;

"2.Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn

processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice
processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice;
cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies;
processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices;
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system;
commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about
67 hectares;
"3.Forest development which includes open spaces and parks
for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo
estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
"4.Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project
covering an area of 20 hectares.
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4,
1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon
Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise
favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of
Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the
Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive
Director, signing 'By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ,' Office of the
President Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of
DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
"In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial
Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S.
Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO
OBJECTION to the proposed conversion 'as long as the development
cost of the irrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be
replenished by the developer . . .' Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente
Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in
question 'as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in
terms of outside investments that will come and employment
opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up . . .'
"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation
held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director
Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary
Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.
"Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on
November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its
powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No.
6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the
conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and,
instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and

directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the

following grounds:
"1.The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility;
"2.The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA);
"3.The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered
by NCA is not applicable;
"4.There is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries;
"5.The procedures on how the area was identified and
reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference to
Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of
1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993. LLjur
"A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on
January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an Order
dated June 7, 1995)." 9
10.Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property." 10
11.Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed 11 the order of denial to the Office of
the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same
would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12.To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995,
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction, 12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13.Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential
Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a
memorandum 13 to the President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation
that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for
the conversion of the land.
14.Also, in a memorandum 14 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable
Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with a
request that the President "hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in
question."
15.On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution 15 ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition.
At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General,
manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in the processing stage of the
applications of farmers-claimants" and has agreed to respect status quo pending the
resolution of the petition. 16

16.In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996,
reversing the DAR Secretary's decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
"After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon
which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that
the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao,
Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great
opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the
area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the
other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not
even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime
agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention
that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an
irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property
(as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower
portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not
irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by
the Philippine Packing Corporation.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on
withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it
to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early
as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB
correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject
property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until
after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a
Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR
Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan
City, to 'desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering
petitioner's land.

"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing
family has already contributed substantially to the land reform program
of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija
in the 70's and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of
Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not
received 'just compensation' up to this time.
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible
compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water
as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the
land is not tenanted as already stated.
"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the
subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the
very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in
the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language

of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for
any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to
convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
"WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal
mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various
government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated
November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian
Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED." 17
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18.On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996,
NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject
land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School. 18
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found
out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary
Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed
by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the
cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137
farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19.Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint 21 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others.
The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 22 and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, 23 restraining the DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20.Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order 24 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres denying DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29,
1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
21.The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997
Order of the President.
22.On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was
challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the
injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23.On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front
of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On
October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC

property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case
No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144hectare property be set aside. 25
24.President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve
their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding
Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the
controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem. 26
25.On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing
the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the
President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29,
1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
"1.NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only
with respect to the approximately forty-four (44)
hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway,
as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
"2.The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares
traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be
suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right
of way to said portion from the highway provided in
the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the
DAR and other concerned government agencies are
directed to immediately conduct the segregation
survey of the area, valuation of the property and
generation of titles in the name of the identified
farmer-beneficiaries.
"3.The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to
carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
"4.The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further
directed to expedite payment of just compensation to
NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered
by the CARP, including other lands previously
surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
"5.The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render
full assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform
in the implementation of this Order.
"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers
on October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof
since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
"SO ORDERED." 27

A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich ofIt is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of
Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24,any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, 38 including the Office of the
1997 28and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition President, 39 may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for
(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a review 40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.),resolution,41 whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D.fact and law. 42
Garilao.
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 29 was filed by alleged farmer-inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were resolution is "patently illegal" 43 and was issued with "grave abuse of discretion" and
"previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144- "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" 44 when said
hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed 30 by theresolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long
petitioners. LLjur
become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error
of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43.
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original
of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done.
hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political
decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March
"SEC. 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
1997 . . ." 31 Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. . ." 32 They availed of this
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
extraordinary writ of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
remedy in the ordinary course of law." 33 They never filed a motion for reconsideration of
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
the subject Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
futile exercise to seek a reconsideration . . ." 34
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be
dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1)The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition
for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2)The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing the present
petition; and
(3)Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the
motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.

xxx xxx xxx."

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in
which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. 45
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed
illegal act "may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court." The proper court
where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
"SEC. 4.Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought
to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,
in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)"

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or
not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. 35 On the other hand, anerror of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasijudicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 36 This error is correctable only by the Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, 46 prohibition 47and
mandamus. 48 But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. 37
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or

omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals,
unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this
matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., 49 through now Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
". . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well
as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction)
is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
(formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals
(formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those 'in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.' This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals." (Citations omitted)

"Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again,
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case
from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when
they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking
judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the
questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a)
a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with
the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition
filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent
cases,
namely: 50 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., 51 Torres vs. Arranz, 52Bercero vs. De
Guzman, 53 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. 54 As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
". . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket."
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice 55 and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed
resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of
Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is
well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals: 56

"There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in

one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits
filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in
the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this
case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of
an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This
specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
"The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145
SCRA 34), . . . and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of
litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
'There thus exists between the action before this Court and
RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such
parties represent the same interests in both actions, as well
as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, ofauter action
pendant.'" 58

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is character whenever practicable."
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used documents which
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted
was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for
to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of
the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that
seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of the Office of the President
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision
dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases
of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in rewere instituted.
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed byalready become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 60 we held:
real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex "I" in their motion a Master List
of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
"Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the
Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same
DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified
can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our
farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are
jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
those purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other words,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or
(1956), Ipekdijna Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interestmeans
No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' interest over
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as
having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503]."
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. 61 This is a fundamental principle
in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and
We rule in the negative.
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
"SEC. 7.Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly
shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final
stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a 1918 case, 63 is "a lawless thing, which can
after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
head." 64
period.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases."
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged
(Emphasis ours)
farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs. LLjur

No. 56744 on the merits. Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same with utmost
deliberate dispatch. AIDTSE

SO ORDERED.
||| (Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998)
[G.R. No. 142261. April 5, 2000.]
GOVERNOR
MANUEL
M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.

SYLLABUS

RESOLUTION

From the pleadings filed by the parties and after oral argument held on April 5, 2000, the
petitioner represented by Atty. Augusto G. Panlilio, the respondent Ombudsman represented
by its Chief Legal Counsel, and the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Interior and Local Government represented by the Solicitor-General, and after due
deliberation, the Court finds that the respondents failed to establish the existence of a law
mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative
case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The immediate implementation
of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus premature. cdll

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH EXISTENCE OF A LAW MANDATING WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective immediately the petitioner
THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF A DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN to the position of Governor of the Province of Pampanga. This case is hereby remanded to
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE. After due deliberation, the Court finds that the respondents the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal in CA-GR. SP No. 56744 on the merits.
failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same with utmost deliberate dispatch.
the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one
This is without prejudice to the promulgation of an extended decision. llcd
year. The immediate implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is
thus premature. WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective SO ORDERED.
immediately the petitioner to the position of Governor of the Province of Pampanga. This
case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal in CA-GR. SP||| (Lapid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261 (Resolution), April 05, 2000)