Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 159357

April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and
the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the
form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules
of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench
and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June
12, 2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
(Branch 49).4
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner
Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive
Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as corespondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of
a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate
for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified
candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive
portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before
the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as
follows:
"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to
clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof.
The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is
required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit
that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to

take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive
interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7
The Antecedent Proceedings
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political
party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,8 specifically on the
separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring
the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:
"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer],
a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike
Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period
and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the
Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that
there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of
advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to
Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao
Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked
for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order
by submitting his Memorandum. x x x.
"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration
filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao
Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the
motions to dismiss x x x."9
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition,
because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has
raised only a question of law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised
in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the
historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some
point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a
clear violation of the separation clause."11
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive
portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review.12
This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments. In the same Resolution, the
Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the
opportunity to comment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14

The Issues
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:
"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was
proper and valid;
"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition
for declaratory relief;
"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for
declaratory relief;
"4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein
respondent is ripe for judicial determination;
"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory
relief of herein respondent."15
During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:
"A. Procedural Issues
"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a
cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for
Declaratory Relief?
"B. Substantive Issues
"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?
"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they
be banned from campaigning against said candidates?"
The Courts Ruling
The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.
Procedural Issues:
Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief,
provides in part:

"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder."
Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by
a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.16 The essential requisites of the action
are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17
Justiciable Controversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish
before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest
between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened to be
violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere
speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an
actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.18 The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing
controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further,
the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by
the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its
rights, the law or the Constitution.
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,19 what exactly has he done that
merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the
SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing in this respect."
His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28,
2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been
actively involved in partisan politics.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x
x."20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious
leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse
a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened
endorsement "will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever
beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;]21 and "pos[ing] a clear
and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and
reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of
elections,"22 which would then be violative of the separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does
not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any
indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an
electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular
candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable
right.
Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any
threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights that are legally demandable and enforceable23 cannot be exercised when there is no
actual or threatened violation of a legal right.
All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in paragraph 9
hereof be resolved."24 In other words, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether
the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices
violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for
a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened
violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory
opinion.25
Cause of Action
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of
action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need
not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by one party against
the other.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief
should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written instrument), a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is "the
constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for
elective office or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified
candidate."26According to petitioner, this subject matter is "beyond the realm of an action for
declaratory relief."27 Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition
fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the
court a quo.
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights
of another, causing injury to the latter.28 Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.29
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright
dismissal.30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of
action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that
an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a breach or violation
should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the
former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest,
supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it "has thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of
the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and
in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x."32
Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not
only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain.33 The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue
and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or
incidental interest in the question raised.34
To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the "[p]laintiff in
a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but
seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding [their]
future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the
usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in
order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that
the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded."35
SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely, as
discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents
below) might actively participate in partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength of its
faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the
government."36
During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all
strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan
politics. They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger the issue
raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon
which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even
granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was
nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not
even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January
28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be
jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act.37 Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.38
Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a
religious leader to endorse, or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a specific
candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy";39 it has failed to
establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show
"not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way."40 They must demonstrate
that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are
lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.41
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.42 A taxpayers action may be
properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.43 In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that
taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political
party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of
the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation
that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said
respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of
suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayersregistered voters" is too general44 and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our
jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too
vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.45
Transcendental Importance
In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal
standing, considering that "the issues raised are of paramount public interest."
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition
raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the
people.46 Recently, after holding that the IBP had nolocus standi to bring the suit, the Court
in IBP v. Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents."48
Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS
Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people. The issue did not simply concern a
delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the governance
of our country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it
had never been decided before.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve
the constitutional issue despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the
abbreviated proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the
parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications
that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would
exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be
futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance
of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates the elementary procedure49 that must be
followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.50
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a
complaint51 (or petition, in a special civil action) that does not allege the plaintiffs (or
petitioners) cause or causes of action.52 A complaint or petition should contain "a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
claim or defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.54
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk
of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants or the
respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer55 within 15 days, unless a different
period is fixed by the court.56 The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is
not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the
relief applied for.57 The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an
answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.58
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10)
days from service.59 A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading
responded to.60
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse
partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading
(except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or
crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has
been served, move for a summary judgment in its favor.62 Similarly, a party against whom a
claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any
time, move for a summary judgment in its favor.63 After the motion is heard, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.64
Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendant
may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments
on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.65 After the hearing, the
court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the
pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the
reasons therefor.66
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period
originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed
from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the
defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the
amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.67

After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,68 which is
a mandatory proceeding.69 A plaintiffs/ petitioners (or its duly authorized representatives)
non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the
action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte,
and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.70
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect
as failure to appear at the pretrial.71 Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an
order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by
the parties regarding any of the matters considered.72 The parties may further avail
themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in which the parties shall adduce their respective
evidence in support of their claims and/or defenses. By their written consent or upon the
application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the
issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by
the parties.75 The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it
would if held before the court.76
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a written
report on the matters referred by the parties.77 The report shall be set for hearing, after which
the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or
recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before
the commissioner or the court.78
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The
decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and
filed with the clerk of court.79
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court
in the instant case.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition
immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained no statement of ultimate facts upon
which the petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from
the court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as
a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.80 As already discussed earlier,
the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact81 or of any specific violation of the
petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to
a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief could be sought and
adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should
have been dismissed at the outset.
Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their
respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to
Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period, an
Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.82 SJS filed a Rejoinder

to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were
"several scheduled settings, in which the "[c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions of
the parties."83 The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not
disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an
Order84 dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly
thereafter was another Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.
In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:
"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the
memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for
resolution."86
Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the
Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did
not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16.
There was not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of
the legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of
these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the
parties memoranda. But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly and
squarely, the trial court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately
proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.
Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to file their answers.
For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those
answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner
and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed
to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG,
which was entitled to be heard upon questions involving the constitutionality or validity of
statutes and other measures.87
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court was
utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted
with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of
the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief
must still follow the process described above -- the petition must state a cause of action; the
proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision
must adhere to constitutional and legal requirements.
First Substantive Issue:
Fundamental Requirements of a Decision

The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the basis therefor."88
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure similarly provides:
"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him and filed with the clerk of court."
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads
as follows:
"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by
the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
"x x x

xxx

x x x."

Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative
Circular No. 1, prompting all judges "to make complete findings of facts in their decisions,
and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented.
They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the
facts from which such conclusions are deduced."
In many cases,89 this Court has time and time again reminded "magistrates to heed the
demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution." The Court, through Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,90discussed at length the implications of this
provision and strongly exhorted thus:
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded
by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X
and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on
the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision."

In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:

"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must
set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves
many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason
or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. x x x."
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information
on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court.92
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure
that their decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and
legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of
facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of the courts findings as to the
probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and
the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional
provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length
opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly
stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the
trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the
distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important,
what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings
and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld
for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial
court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can
it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such
circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if
there is no point of factual comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called
Decision. The importance of such portion was explained in the early case Manalang v.
Tuason de Rickards,94 from which we quote:
"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of
the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles
the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the
existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be
confusing."
The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of
the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the

trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its final
statement says, "SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to
label its issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact decided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailed
Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition finally resolved by the
statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads:
"Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of
the separation clause."95
We cannot agree.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was
allegedly contained in the text of the original Decision. The Court, however, held:
"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the
dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where
there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must
prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while
the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing." (Italics in the original)
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and
embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that
statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion
of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to
the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the
constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.97
Parts of a Decision
In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the
case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each
issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion.
The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue,
especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.98
An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal
factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases -- particularly those concerning public
interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject
matters -- a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific
nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the
important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or
significance. It may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle.
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a
good decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the first
instance, this part states whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting
of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part describes the
specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the
plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal
or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the
dispositive portion of the assailed decision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in
determining the nature and the gravity of the offense for which the accused may be found
culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from or graver than
that charged.
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a
question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying
circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.
To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the
proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious
irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellate
court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be
useful to mention the fact of the appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary
query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.
Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating
the consolidation of the records of the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after
entry of final judgment.
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of
how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo.
2. Statement of Facts
There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or
reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the testimony of each
witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual
theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized
according to the judges best light. Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts
accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions
are. Finally, through a combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each
witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of the facts.
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the
defense, in the interest of fairness and due process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions
of the parties must follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases,
depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The
plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a
reading of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and
conclusions should be explained.

On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and
correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved may partly explain why the reviewing
court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely, the
lower courts patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a
better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for
resolution usually involve questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction;
hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few exceptions, factual
issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts by the
lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material factual
antecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should
be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a
certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or concludes
otherwise.
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as
mentioned in the appellants brief, may be reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to
avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court failed to
consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the
appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main
issue, these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if
deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases
are given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is
generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of
jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or
unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which
depends the determination of the question properly raised.
4. The Courts Ruling
This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint,
petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential
to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several issues, each one of them should be
separately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties
should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to
substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific
crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifying
circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the
court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being
held for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the

accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date
when the accused were set free.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the
complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The
following test of completeness may be applied.First, the parties should know their rights and
obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative
contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the
issues.Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the proper relief. The "proper
relief" usually depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their
rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain
from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be
present and plainly identifiable in the decision. Depending on the writers character, genre
and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a
fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the
decision must be clear, concise, complete and correct.
Second Substantive Issue:
Religious Leaders Endorsement
of Candidates for Public Office
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly
deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue
to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our
country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and
the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there
might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough
factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS
Petition and the assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon
for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no
factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in
the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical
question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond
the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.99
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it
made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally
inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just
modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount
question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality

of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights
of the parties concerned."100
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed
June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and
recommend whether the trial judge may, after observing due process, be held
administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Marti