LEGAL ETHICS

COLLECTION OF
CASE DIGESTS

OVERVIEW

LEGAL

ETHICS

INTRODUCTION
1. Alawi v. Alauya
2. In Re: Garcia
3. Cayetano vs Monsod
4. Phil Lawyers Assoc vs Agrava
5. In Re: Al Argosino
6. In Re: Dacanay
7. Catu v. Rellosa
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process.
1. Bongalonta v. Castillo
2. Moreo v. Araneta
3. Abella v. Barrios
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in
an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
1. Ulep v. Legal Clinic
2. Villatuya v. Tabalingcos
CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts.
1. Khan v. Sambillo
2.
3.
4.
CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in development of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform
and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
1.
2.
3.
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well as
in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating
information
regarding
the
law
and
jurisprudence.
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official duties.
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1. PCGG V. Sandiganbayan
2.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support t he activities of
the integrated bar.
1. In Re: Meling
2. In Re: Edillion
3. Catu v. Rellosa
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
1. Santos vs. Llamas
2.
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.

LEGAL

ETHICS

ALAWI VS ALAUYA 268 SCRA 69 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Link
>
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/am_97_2_p__
1997.html
TAGS: #Sharia #feelingattysaSharia
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and
used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In
connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President
of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had
resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative
complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation
of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion
that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to
which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers
the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use
the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular
Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this
Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
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ETHICS

Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors,"
in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Notes:
This is in relation to the definition of Attorneys at law (Introductory
Chapter).
Attorneys at law That class of persons who are by license,
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and
liabilities are developed by law as a consequence. ( Cui vs Cui)
An attorney at law is a person admitted to practice law in his
respective state and authorized to perform both civil and
criminal legal functions for clients, including drafting of legal
documents, giving of legal advice, and representing such
before courts, administrative agencies, boards, etc. (Blacks
Law Dictionary)
Attorney at law is synonymous with counselor at law, lawyer,
attorney, counsel, abogado and boceros

IN RE: GARCIA 2 SCRA 985 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Link
->
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/aug1961/garcia_1961.html
Tags: #spain #socialnastudentsaspain
FACTS
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino
citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes"
for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied
and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho";
and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and
LEGAL

ETHICS

the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to

practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations.
ISSUE
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the
Philippine Bar.
HELD
The court resolved to deny the petition. The applicant cannot
invoke the provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise
of Profession between the RP and Spain. Said treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws
of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on
the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the
legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain
could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the
reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to
repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines.
CAYETANO VS MONSOD
Tags: #practiceoflaw #anythinglegalrelated
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner
filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void
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ETHICS

because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced

law for the last ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . .
for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty.
Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
NOTES
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use In any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA
G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
Tags: #exampagmaytime #patent #naabogadonalangmagexamgihapon

LEGAL

ETHICS

FACTS:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director
issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957
an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The
petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations
and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely
or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific
and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice
so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time
that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc.,
constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the
patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court but also embraces all other matters
connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts
and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.
LEGAL

ETHICS

In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was
charged with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of
one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing"
conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On
February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application was
granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar
exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed
to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take
the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred
that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his
probation period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE:
Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and
be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and
to the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is
a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission
to the profession of law.

LEGAL

ETHICS

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written

manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of
Camaligan from notice.
NOTES:
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance
so far as the general public and proper administration of justice
is concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired
into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those
who would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed
of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated at the time of the application for
permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly
at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take
the attorney's oath of office.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW of
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
Tags: #Balikbayan
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
LEGAL

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10

Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,

Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
Issue:
WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES
Held:
Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twentyone years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege
to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from
this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
o the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
o the payment of professional tax;
o the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh
the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and
o the retaking of the lawyers oath.
DECISION: GRANTED.
Catu vs Rellosa
Tags:
FACTS:
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11

Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio

Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate
which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District
of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties,
having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to
arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner,
thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner
filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on
the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer
when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as
punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong
barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to
Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was financially
distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient
ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as
an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713.
Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent
committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the
latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension
from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the
transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.
HELD:
No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer
who has left government service and in connection to former
government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was
an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within
the purview of the said provision.
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12

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713

which governs the practice of profession of elective local government
officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and
employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to
RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective
officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members
and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice
his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have
procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of
his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure
of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to
obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing
the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules
which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the
exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he

disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oathand/or for
LEGAL

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13

breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code

of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby
found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a
lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the
meaning of the word delicadeza.
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M.
CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, Respondents.
Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation
Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija,
members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to
wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer
Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece
of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of
the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel
in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil
case for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note,
also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the
said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In
this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to
file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was
received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in
favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued
and the same property previously attached by complainant was
levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these
three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso
LEGAL

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14

Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP
receipt number.
Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio
Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate
the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might
obtain in the civil case he filed.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the
following findings and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta
and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which
Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful
reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in
favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in
said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio
Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in
favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e.
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate
the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand
on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in
their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No.,
respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for
using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number
of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of
Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it
was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining
to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty.
Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of
her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded
duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP
membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the
courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent
Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.
Held:
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15

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It

is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo
guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath
and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
CANON 1
MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA
A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005
Facts:
Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his
indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were
dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is
drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director
for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this
case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the
Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a
Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further
made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending
the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document.
Issue:
Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of
checks drawn against a closed account.

Held:
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The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at
the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co
v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing
worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one
years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the
instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found
guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has
been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously
committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise
involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more
severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, the review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed
on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.
Abella vs Barrios
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals involving a Labor Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch
which the respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five
(5) months, complainants motion remained unacted, prompting him
to file a Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no
action until the complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of
the monetary award thereof after the latter asked from the former
how much would be his share. Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of
execution but the employer of the complainant moved to quash the
said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein
complainants monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it
modifies the DECISION of the CA. Complainant now filed the instant
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange
for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give
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benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainants employer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of
the Code.
HELD:
YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter
1 of the Code, delineate the lawyers responsibility to society: Rule
1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from
engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or
proceeding or delaying any mans cause for any corrupt motive or
interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in
government service, enjoining them from using ones public position
to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with
public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only
when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.
The infractions of the respondent constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper
or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment."
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or
gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.However, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been
disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes the Court from
duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court
deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount
of P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondents transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future.
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ULEP vs LEGAL CLINIC

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A'
and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law. The advertisements
complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through
The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa
Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the
Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the
legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein
before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication
of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
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services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and

electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that
the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John
R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the
respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of practice of
law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is
that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and
so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
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of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what

its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and
so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused
to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as
in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of
law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA,respondents.
G.R. No. L-77691
August 8, 1988
SARMIENTO,J .:
Facts:
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The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon

City for which he is the registered owner. He secured loans from L and
R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of
land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the
firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in question
after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private
respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure
and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after the filing of
the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation entered into
a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured
another year for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were
the attorneys fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private
respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came to
finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the attorneys
fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by
petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem
the parcels of land and to register the same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels
of land to his name but without prior notice, the properties were
already registered under the petitioners name. The private
respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said
adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties
consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The
private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the
Court of appeals which ruled over the same.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the
said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of
respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him any
loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in
the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his
interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath
to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his]
clients."
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The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not
a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a
fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice,
eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking
of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and
certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man
for money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own
shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot
overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable
for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other.
ALMACEN
FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of
Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein
asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme
Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity. His clients he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts unjust
judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
of hypocrisy.
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the
cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that people may know
of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that:
a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future
and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve
our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled
Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On
June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty
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days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the
latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment.
For lack of proof of service, the trial court denied both motions. To
prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first
motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already
perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court
of Appeals.
HELD:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.
Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further
orders.
166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a
Lawyer
FACTS
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution.
The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist
Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from
investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a
newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on
the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is
a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course.
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Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The

Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez
stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was
only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize
the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may
have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not
less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to
ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the
justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office.
Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for
the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled
to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer
and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes
duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the
Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the
judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority
of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his
criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements,
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particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme

Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice
of law.

VILLATUYA vs TABALINGCOS
FACTS
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on
December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In
a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment,
which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the
respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The
commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position
papers.
In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1,
2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as
financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate
rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to 50,000 for every Stay
Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition
to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients.
Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a
result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions
from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not
pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged
in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial
consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge
of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing
two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his
first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted
that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather
an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial
consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there
was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of
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fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He

proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful
solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint
Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President
for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of
gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative
value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.
Respondent informed the Commission that he filed Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were
Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation;
and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having
married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against
respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first
charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative
of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal
services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the
case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement
between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from
clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer
involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
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Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients. (RULE 2.03)

In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and
ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of
clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was
breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful
occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such
a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with
the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can
be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is
of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant
that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial
and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a
means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is
sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to
continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities
in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled
in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service
to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for
the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of
law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through this Court.
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In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the

complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the
latters first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied
entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to
vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent
entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom
we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that
good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at
all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his
private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands
a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so
that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar
respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
KHAN vs. SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published
which reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number].
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Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it

was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty.
Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that
similar advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty.
Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did
not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed
against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it
was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement
because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the
prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the
primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a
secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should
subordinate their primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist
he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still
considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise
disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be
proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a
reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly
publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar.
PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al.
GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.)
FACTS
Matter is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
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abstract principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on

how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the matter
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1
of then President
Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos and others referred
to as dummies of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means
of taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly
thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed
with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
seeking to, among others, nullify the
writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the
comments thereon, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper
disposition.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their
counsel Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986
during the administration of former
President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present
appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of
stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs
afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
proscribing former government lawyers
from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
ISSUES:

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Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel

for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
The petition is denied.
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning
of matter referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention
made by the former government
lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal
Opinion 342, defined matter as
any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation
and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Beyond doubt, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in
the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with
the said banks liquidation and
Rivera-Pascual vs. Spouses Lim
Facts na related for ethics kay sale man ang case
#bar matter no 1922 #nocanons
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion's
counsel to submit within five (5) days from notice his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of
Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and
Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping. 18 Apparently,
Consolacion's counsel failed to indicate in the petition his
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as
required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of
Consolacion's verification and certification against non-forumshopping failed to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion's
identity apart from her community tax certificate.

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Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to

comply, the CA issued a Resolution 19 on October 15, 2009
dismissing the petition.
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the abovementioned Resolution. However, the counsel for the petitioner failed
to comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19, 2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the
Resolution dated July 1, 2009, despite receipt of the notice
thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

In Re: Meling
FACTS:
Atty. Froilan R. Melendres filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a petition to disqualify Haron Meling from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him appropriate disciplinary penalty
as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the petition, Melendrez alleged that Meling did not disclose in
his petition to take the 2002 Bar Examination that he has 3 pending
criminal cases before the MTCC, Cotabato City and that he has been
using the title Attorney in his communications despite the fact that
he is not a member of the bar.
(Applicable Rule 7.01 but this was just given by the OCB from their
Findings and Recommendationso please see their resolution in the
pdf file.)
ISSUE:
WON Melings act of concealment constitutes dishonesty.
HELD:
Yes. Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a
Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character. The requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.
The standard form issued in connection with the application to
take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that
he or she " has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law , rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any
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court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral

turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her which was not followed by Meling.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases,
the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or
affect the good moral character of the applicant. Meling's
concealment speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character
and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a
member of the Shari'a Bar.
SO, he was barred from taking an oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys and was suspended in the Sharia Court. But the issue
about the concealment was rendered moot and academic since the
defendant was not able to pass the 2003 Bar Examination.
In Re: Edillon
TAGS: #membershipfees
FACTS:
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978 for his
refusal to pay membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Since then, he has sought reinstatement, invoking his
state of health, his advanced age and the welfare of former clients
who still rely on him for counsel.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Edillon should be reinstated.
HELD:
Yes. In Re: Edillon
FACTS: Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978 for
his refusal to pay membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Since then, he has sought reinstatement, invoking his
state of health, his advanced age and the welfare of former clients
who still rely on him for counsel.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Edillon should be reinstated.
HELD: Yes. Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with
condition. Failure to abide entails loss of such privilege. Considered
in addition was the 2 years Atty. E. was barred from practice, and the
dictum of Justice Malcolm that the power to discipline, especially if
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amounting
to
disbarment,
should
be
exercised
preservative and not on the vindictive principle

on

the

. Failure to abide entails loss of such privilege. Considered in

addition was the 2 years Atty. E. was barred from practice, and the
dictum of Justice Malcolm that the power to discipline, especially if
amounting
to
disbarment,
should
be
exercised
on
the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle

Santos v Llamas AC No. 4749 January 20, 2000

FACTS:
Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a lettercomplaint dated February 8, 1997 to this Court. He alleged that Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas for number of years had not indicated the
PROPER professional tax receipt (PTR) and IBP Official Receipt
Number, date and place of issuance in his pleadings. Atty. Llamas
claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it clear in his ITR that he
had only limited practice of law and his principal occupation is
farming. And being a senior citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of RA 7432 in the payment of taxes. Thus he honestly
believed that such exemption includes his payment with IBP.
Nonetheless, despite such belief, he was ready to tender such
payment.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Llamas violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he misrepresented to the public and courts that he had paid IBP
dues and the data of its payment.
HELD:
Yes. Atty Llamas is guilty of violating CPR which provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.1 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
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Moreover, these acts according to the Court merit the most

severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of law, the penalty of one year from the practice of law or
until he has paid the IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate, was
imposed upon Atty. Llamas.

SOCORRO ABELLA SORIANO AND SABINO PADILLA, JR.,

petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAVID
C. NAVAL AND DEOGRACIAS REYES, respondents.
FACTS
On October 27, 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Naga City a complaint against Socorro
Abella-Soriano for "Declaration and Recognition of Real Right under
an Implied Contract of Services, Reformation of Instrument and
Damages" which alleged two causes of action. The trial court granted
Socorro's motion to dismiss with respect to the first cause of action
because of the pendency of an ejectment case between the same
parties, but denied the same insofar as the second cause of action
was concerned. It denied the motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Padilla. It
granted the "Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint" filed by
Deogracias and Rosalina. It denied the Motion to Dismiss the
Supplemental Complaint filed by Socorro. The trial court then ordered
Deogracias and Rosalina to pay the deficiency in the docket fees and
it was faithfully complied by Deogracias and Rosalina. Atty. Padilla
filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration for Various Orders of
the Trial Court," but it was denied by the trial court. During the pretrial conference, Socorro and Atty. Padilla did not appear
during the scheduled hearings. Later, Socorro was declared in
default and Atty. Padilla was adjudged guilty of direct
contempt. Thus, Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition except the Orders pertaining to the
supplemental complaint. Hence, both parties filed the instant
petition.
The Court ruled that Deogracias and Rosalina merely paid the amount
of the docket fees computed by the Clerk of Court. They were in good
faith and relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. In Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, private respondent, like Deogracias
and Rosalina in the case at bar, demonstrated willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. Thus, that
the trial court was vested with jurisdiction. However, the Court found
that Deogracias and Rosalina's supplemental complaint" contained
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matters entirely different from and even contrary to the cause of

action stated in the original complaint. Hence, the Court agree with
the Court of Appeals that the trial court should not admit the same.
The Court further ruled that a litigant may not demand that a judge
inhibit himself. Specially so in this case where there is a finding of fact
that "respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides
partiality from impartiality". Besides, the test for determining the
propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant
was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. In this case, there was no
such deprivation. On the other hand, we find that Atty. Padilla's
innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be
considered contumacious. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position
in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of
contempt. The decision of the Court of Appeals with modification that
the order finding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt of
court and imposing five (5) days imprisonment was set aside.
LESSONS:
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; A
LITIGANT MAY NOT DEMAND THAT A JUDGE WILL INHIBIT HIMSELF
FOR OTHER REASONS NOT STATED IN THE RULES OF COURT. For
any other reason, a litigant may not demand that a judge inhibit
himself. Specially so in this case where there is a finding of fact that
"respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides
partiality from impartiality. Besides, the test for determining the
propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant
was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. In this case, there was no
such deprivation.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE EXERCISED ON PRESERVATIVE, NOT
VINDICTIVE PRINCIPLE. [W]e find that Atty. Padilla's innuendoes are
not necessarily, disrespectful to the court as to be considered
contumacious. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case
under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt
that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt. Courts
must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must
be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie
curiae. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt
must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and
on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts
must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; SNIDE REMARKS OR EVEN SARCASTIC INNUENDOES DO
NOT NECESSARILY ASSUME THAT LEVEL OF CONTUMELY. Snide
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remarks or even sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that

level of contumely actionable under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Judges generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty
and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a
reproof. In the natural order of things, when a case is decided, one
party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both sides are equally
confident and sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party
whose action or view fails. It is human nature that there be bitter
feelings which often reach to the judge as the source of the supposed
wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate
everything which appears as but a momentary outbreak of
disappointment.
11.LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY; LAWYERS MUST NOT OBSERVE TEMPERATE
LANGUAGE. Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for
words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing
cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language. While judges must exercise patience,
lawyers must also observe temperate language as well. At this
juncture, we admonish all lawyers to observe the following canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read: "Canon 8. Rule
8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. "Canon 11 A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." A
lawyer is an officer of the Court, bound by the law. It is a lawyer's
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
12.ID.; ID.; LAWYER MUST MAINTAIN RESPECTFUL ATTITUDE TOWARDS
THE COURTS. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. It is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to support
the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor. This is not to say that
courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an officer of the court,
a lawyer may criticize the court. He must do so in a bona fide
manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of the courts and of the
judges thereof on the other. Unnecessary language which jeopardizes
high esteem in the courts, or creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration is proscribed.
13.ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINE AND SELF-RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE
BAR EVEN UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE
ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. It may happen that counsel
possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the judge who
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38

presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims
infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decision. Nevertheless,
discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice.
Malicious attacks on courts have in some cases been treated as libel,
in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground for
disbarment. However, mere criticism or comment on the correctness
or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court
in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated.

FRANCISCO V. UEM MARA (CONTEMPT OF COURT)

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleged that he is a taxpayer and
resident of Cavite. He claimed that he instituted this suit in the RTC in
his behalf and in behalf of the other users of the Coastal Road which
is the principal road connecting Metro Manila and Cavite. 6
Private respondent UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) is a
corporation duly organized and validly existing under Philippine laws.
It was incorporated by two Malaysian entities, namely, United
Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) and Majlis Amanah Rakyat
(MARA). 7
In a "manifestation and motion (in compliance with the Honorable
Court's resolution dated August 2, 2000 requiring submission of
memorandum) with motion to cite in contempt of court" dated August
15, 2001, petitioner prayed that private respondent UMPC and its
counsel be cited in contempt for misrepresenting to the Court
that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of UMPC.
EHASaD
HELD
We now rule on the motion to cite in contempt filed by petitioner
against UMPC and its counsel, Castillo and Poblador Law Offices,
particularly Atty. Napoleon J. Poblador and Atty. Manuel Joseph R.
Bretaa III. Petitioner alleges that they should be cited for contempt
for misrepresenting to the Court in their memorandum dated
November 17, 2000 that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of
UMPC when in fact the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC) had
already bought their shares. 45 UMPC stated: TaHDAS
87.Contrary to petitioner's malicious assertions, the Republic of the
Philippines and public respondent PEA selected private respondent
(then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM) based
on established guidelines of the national government on joint venture
agreements between government agencies and the private
sector. . . . Private respondent, therefore, could only assume, as it
reasonably assumed, that these government agencies performed
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39

their functions in accordance with law and only after scrutinizing the
qualifications of private respondent's stockholders UEM and MARA.
88.Private respondent is more than qualified to be the joint venture
partner of public respondent PEA based on the track record of its
aforementioned stockholders.
88.1MARA is an instrumentality or corporate agency of the Malaysian
government. The Malaysian government specifically designated
MARA to realize its agreement with the Philippine government "to
pursue and enter into joint and cooperative development
undertakings." (cf., Annex "D," supra).
88.2On the other hand, UEM is a Malaysian company publicly listed on
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE") since 1975. It has an
authorized capital stock of RM500,000,000 or approximately
P5,000,000,000.00. It is one of Malaysia's largest engineering, design
and construction groups with direct and indirect interests in five (5)
publicly listed companies on the KLSE. . . . 46 (Emphasis supplied)
In their comment on the motion, Attys. Poblador and Bretaa stated
that they had nothing to do with the sale of UEM and MARA of their
283,744 shares in UMPC as other law firms, namely, Castillo Laman
Tan Pantaleon & San Jose Law Offices representing UEM and Sycip
Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Offices representing CRC were
involved. The sale was approved by the TRB on November 18, 1999.
47
We do not think that UMPC and its counsels should be
sanctioned for contempt.
Counsels can be held in contempt of court 48 for making false
statements in the pleadings they file 49 tending to mislead the Court
and to degrade the administration of justice. We cannot see any
deliberate falsehood or misrepresentation in the aforequoted
statements of Attys. Poblador and Bretaa. On the contrary, they
truthfully indicated that UEM and MARA were the former stockholders
of UMPC. This is the clear import of the phrase "then represented by
its stockholders MARA and UEM." This also implied that they had been
replaced as such. Besides, the ownership structure of UMPC as a
party in this case was never material to the issue for resolution which
is the issuance of a writ of injunction for the collection of toll fees.
Hence, the Court was not deceived in any way.
Petitioner also insists that they be cited in contempt for showing
disrespect and resorting to offensive language against RTC Judge
Guadiz, Jr. when they stated:
Despite the obvious legality of the project, petitioner, either by sheer
arrogance or a malicious refusal to acknowledge the truth that the
[MCTEP] and the imposition of toll fees for the use of the Coastal
Road are legal and above board initiated what is no more than a
nuisance suit and secured from an insufficiently-informed judge
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an illegal writ of preliminary injunction which public respondent, the

Honorable [CA], subsequently reversed. 50 IcTaAH
Attys. Poblador and Bretaa, in their defense, countered that there
was nothing insulting or disparaging in describing someone as
"insufficiently informed." This was not intemperate language
amounting to vilification. 51
They are correct. In criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it
is done in good faith:
While the Court recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and
justices in the performance of their functions, "it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges (or justices) thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts." 52
We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is
disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. Besides,
[it] is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of
court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings
and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges however are
enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for
retaliation or vindictiveness. 53
Therefore, we deny petitioner's motion to cite in contempt for lack of
merit.
MONTECILLO V. GICA
See pineda, page 167 under canon 11, rule 11.03
Regala v. sandiganbayan
See pineda, page 239 under canon 15

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