Professional Documents
Culture Documents
23,
2015
An
Open
Letter
to
Members
of
Parliament
on
Bill
C-51
Dear
Members
of
Parliament,
Please
accept
this
collective,
open
letter
as
an
expression
of
the
signatories
deep
concern
that
Bill
C-51
(which
the
government
is
calling
the
Anti-terrorism
Act,
2015)
is
a
dangerous
piece
of
legislation
in
terms
of
its
potential
impacts
on
the
rule
of
law,
on
constitutionally
and
internationally
protected
rights,
and
on
the
health
of
Canadas
democracy.
Beyond
that,
we
note
with
concern
that
knowledgeable
analysts
have
made
cogent
arguments
not
only
that
Bill
C-51
may
turn
out
to
be
ineffective
in
countering
terrorism
by
virtue
of
what
is
omitted
from
the
bill,
but
also
that
Bill
C-51
could
actually
be
counter-productive
in
that
it
could
easily
get
in
the
way
of
effective
policing,
intelligence-gathering
and
prosecutorial
activity.
In
this
respect,
we
wish
it
to
be
clear
that
we
are
neither
extremists
(as
the
Prime
Minister
has
recently
labelled
the
Official
Opposition
for
its
resistance
to
Bill
C-51)
nor
dismissive
of
the
real
threats
to
Canadians
security
that
government
and
Parliament
have
a
duty
to
protect.
Rather,
we
believe
that
terrorism
must
be
countered
in
ways
that
are
fully
consistent
with
core
values
(that
include
liberty,
non-discrimination,
and
the
rule
of
law),
that
are
evidence-based,
and
that
are
likely
to
be
effective.
The
scope
and
implications
of
Bill
C-51
are
so
extensive
that
it
cannot
be,
and
is
not,
the
purpose
of
this
letter
to
itemize
every
problem
with
the
bill.
Rather,
the
discussion
below
is
an
effort
to
reflect
a
basic
consensus
over
some
(and
only
some)
of
the
leading
concerns,
all
the
while
noting
that
any
given
signatorys
degree
of
concern
may
vary
item
by
item.
Also,
the
absence
of
a
given
matter
from
this
letter
is
not
meant
to
suggest
it
is
not
also
a
concern.
We
are
grateful
for
the
service
to
informed
public
debate
and
public
education
provided,
since
Bill
C-51
was
tabled,
by
two
highly
respected
law
professors
Craig
Forcese
of
the
University
of
Ottawa
and
Kent
Roach
of
the
University
of
Toronto
who,
combined,
have
great
expertise
in
national
security
law
at
the
intersection
of
constitutional
law,
criminal
law,
international
law
and
other
sub-disciplines.
What
follows
and
we
limit
ourselves
to
five
points
owes
much
to
the
background
papers
they
have
penned,
as
well
as
to
insights
from
editorials
in
the
media
and
speeches
in
the
House
of
Commons.
Accordingly,
we
urge
all
MPs
to
vote
against
Bill
C-51
for
the
following
reasons:
1.
Bill
C-51
enacts
a
new
security-intelligence
information-sharing
statute
of
vast
scope
with
no
enhanced
protections
for
privacy
and
from
abuse.
The
law
defines
activities
that
undermine
the
security
of
Canada
in
such
an
exceptionally
broad
way
that
terrorism
is
simply
one
example
of
nine
examples,
and
only
lawful
advocacy,
protest,
dissent
and
artistic
expression
is
excluded.
Apart
from
all
the
civil-disobedience
activities
and
illegal
protests
or
strikes
that
will
be
covered
(e.g.
in
relation
to
interference
with
critical
infrastructure),
this
deep
and
broad
intrusion
into
privacy
is
made
worse
by
the
fact
there
are
no
corresponding
oversight
or
review
mechanisms
adequate
to
this
expansion
of
the
states
new
levels
of
information
awareness.
Concerns
have
already
been
expressed
by
the
Privacy
Commissioner,
an
Officer
of
Parliament,
who
has
insufficient
powers
and
resources
to
even
begin
to
oversee,
let
alone
correct
abuses
within,
this
expanded
information-sharing
system.
And
there
is
virtually
nothing
in
the
bill
that
recognizes
any
lessons
learned
from
what
can
happen
when
information-sharing
ends
up
in
the
wrong
hands,
as
when
the
RCMP
supplied
poor
information
to
US
authorities
that
in
turn
led
to
the
rendition
of
Maher
Arar
to
Syria
and
his
subsequent
torture
based
on
that
and
further
information
coming
from
Canada.
2.
Bill
C-51
enacts
a
new
terrorism
offence
that
makes
it
criminal
to
advocate
or
encourage
terrorism
offences
in
general
where
one
does
this
being
reckless
as
to
whether
the
communication
may
contribute
to
someone
else
deciding
to
commit
another
terrorism
offence.
It
is
overbroad,
unnecessary
in
view
of
current
criminal
law,
and
potentially
counter-productive.
Keep
in
mind
how
numerous
and
broad
are
the
existing
terrorism
offences
in
the
Criminal
Code,
some
of
which
go
beyond
what
the
ordinary
citizen
imagines
when
they
think
of
terrorism
and
all
of
which
already
include
the
general
criminal-law
prohibitions
on
counselling,
aiding
and
abetting,
conspiring,
and
so
on:
advocacy
or
encouragement
of
any
of
these
in
general
could
attract
prosecution
under
the
new
C-51
offence.
Note
as
well
that
gestures
and
physical
symbols
appear
to
be
caught,
and
not
just
verbal
or
written
exhortations.
In
media
commentary
and
reports,
there
have
been
many
examples
of
what
could
be
caught,
including
in
some
contexts
advocacy
of
armed
revolution
and
rebellion
in
other
countries
(e.g.
if
C-51
had
been
the
law
when
thousands
of
Canadians
advocated
support
for
Nelson
Mandelas
African
National
Congress
in
its
efforts
to
overthrow
apartheid
by
force
of
arms,
when
that
was
still
part
of
the
ANCs
strategy).
So,
the
chill
for
freedom
of
speech
is
real.
In
addition,
in
a
context
in
which
direct
incitement
to
terrorist
acts
(versus
of
terrorism
offences
in
general)
is
already
a
crime
in
Canada,
this
vague
and
sweeping
extension
of
the
criminal
law
seems
unjustified
in
terms
of
necessity
and
indeed,
the
Prime
Minister
during
Question
Period
has
been
unable
or
unwilling
to
give
examples
of
what
conduct
he
would
want
to
see
criminalized
now
that
is
not
already
prohibited
by
the
Criminal
Code.
But,
perhaps
most
worrying
is
how
counter-productive
this
new
crime
could
be.
De-radicalization
outreach
programs
could
be
negatively
affected.
Much
anti-radicalization
work
depends
on
frank
engagement
of
authorities
like
the
RCMP,
alongside
communities
and
parents,
with
youth
who
hold
extreme
views,
including
some
views
that,
if
expressed
(including
in
private),
would
contravene
this
new
prohibition.
Such
outreach
may
require
extreme
dialogue
in
order
to
work
through
the
misconceptions,
anger,
hatred
and
other
emotions
that
lead
to
radicalization.
If
C-51
is
enacted,
these
efforts
could
find
themselves
stymied
as
local
communities
and
parents
receive
advice
that,
if
youth
participating
in
these
efforts
say
what
they
think,
they
could
be
charged
with
a
crime.
As
a
result,
the
RCMP
may
cease
to
be
invited
in
at
all,
or,
if
they
are,
engagement
will
be
fettered
by
restraint
that
defeats
the
underlying
methods
of
the
programme.
And
the
counter-productive
impact
could
go
further.
The
Prime
Minister
himself
confirmed
he
would
want
the
new
law
used
against
young
people
sitting
in
front
of
computers
in
their
family
basements,
youth
who
can
express
extreme
views
on
social-media
platforms.
Why
is
criminalization
counter-productive
here?
As
a
National
Post
editorial
pointed
out,
the
result
of
Bill
C-51
could
easily
be
that
one
of
the
best
sources
of
intelligence
for
possible
future
threats
public
social-
media
platforms
could
dry
up;
that
is,
extreme
views
will
go
silent
because
of
fears
of
being
charged.
This
undercuts
the
usefulness
of
these
platforms
for
monitoring
and
intelligence
that
lead
to
knowing
not
only
who
warrants
further
investigative
attention
but
also
whether
early
intervention
in
the
form
of
de-radicalization
outreach
efforts
are
called
for.
3.
Bill
C-51
would
allow
CSIS
to
move
from
its
central
current
function
information-gathering
and
associated
surveillance
with
respect
to
a
broad
area
of
national
security
matters
to
being
a
totally
different
kind
of
agency
that
now
may
actively
intervene
to
disrupt
activities
by
a
potentially
infinite
range
of
unspecified
measures,
as
long
as
a
given
measure
falls
shy
of
causing
bodily
harm,
infringements
on
sexual
integrity
or
obstructions
of
justice.
CSIS
agents
can
do
this
activity
both
inside
and
outside
Canada,
and
they
can
call
on
any
entity
or
person
to
assist
them.
There
are
a
number
of
reasons
to
be
apprehensive
about
this
change
of
role.
One
only
has
to
recall
that
the
CSIS
Act
defines
threats
to
the
security
of
Canada
so
broadly
that
CSIS
already
considers
various
environmental
and
Aboriginal
movements
to
be
subject
to
their
scrutiny;
that
is
to
say,
this
new
disruption
power
goes
well
beyond
anything
that
has
any
connection
at
all
to
terrorism
precisely
because
CSIS
mandate
in
the
CSIS
Act
goes
far
beyond
a
concern
only
with
terrorism.
However,
those
general
concerns
expressed,
we
will
now
limit
ourselves
to
the
following
serious
problem:
how
Bill
C-51
seems
to
display
a
complete
misunderstanding
of
the
role
of
judges
in
our
legal
system
and
constitutional
order.
Under
C-51,
judges
may
now
be
asked
to
give
warrants
to
allow
for
disruption
measures
that
contravene
Canadian
law
or
the
Charter,
a
role
that
goes
well
beyond
the
current
contexts
in
which
judges
now
give
warrants
(e.g.
surveillance
warrants
and
search
and
seizure
warrants)
where
a
judges
role
is
to
ensure
that
these
investigative
measures
are
reasonable
so
as
not
to
infringe
section
8
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights.
What
C-51
now
does
is
turn
judges
into
agents
of
the
executive
branch
(here,
CSIS)
to
pre-
authorize
violations
of
Canadian
law
and,
even,
to
pre-authorize
infringements
of
almost
any
Charter
right
as
long
as
C-51
limits
bodily
harm,
sexual
integrity
and
obstruction
of
justice
are
respected.
This
completely
subverts
the
normal
role
of
judges,
which
is
to
assess
whether
measures
prescribed
by
law
or
taken
in
accordance
with
discretion
granted
by
statute
infringed
rights
--
and,
if
they
did,
whether
the
Charter
has
been
violated
because
the
infringement
cannot
be
justified
under
the
Charters
section
1
limitation
clause.
Now,
a
judge
can
be
asked
(indeed,
required)
to
say
yes
in
advance
to
measures
that
could
range
from
wiping
a
targets
computer
clear
of
all
information
to
fabricating
materials
(or
playing
agent-provocateur
roles)
that
discredit
a
target
in
ways
that
cause
others
no
longer
to
trust
him,
her
or
it:
and
these
examples
are
possibly
at
the
mild
end
of
what
CSIS
may
well
judge
as
useful
disruption
measures
to
employ.
It
is
also
crucial
to
note
that
CSIS
is
authorized
to
engage
in
any
measures
it
chooses
if
it,
CSIS,
judges
that
the
measure
would
not
be
contrary
to
any
Canadian
law
or
would
not
contravene
the
Charter.
Thus,
it
is
CSIS
that
judges
whether
to
even
go
to
a
judge.
There
is
reason
to
be
worried
about
how
unregulated
(even
by
courts)
this
new
CSIS
disruption
power
would
be,
given
the
evidence
that
CSIS
has
in
the
past
hidden
information
from
its
review
body,
SIRC,
and
given
that
a
civil-
servant
whistleblower
has
revealed
that,
in
a
parallel
context,
Ministers
of
Justice
in
the
Harper
government
have
directed
Department
of
Justice
lawyers
to
conclude
that
the
Minister
can
certify
under
the
Department
of
Justice
Act
that
a
law
is
in
compliance
with
the
Charter
if
there
is
a
mere
5%
chance
a
court
would
uphold
the
law
if
it
was
challenged
in
court.
Finally,
it
is
crucial
to
add
that
these
warrant
proceedings
will
take
place
in
secret,
with
only
the
government
side
represented,
and
no
prospect
of
appeal.
Warrants
will
not
be
disclosed
to
the
target
and,
unlike
police
investigations,
CSIS
activities
do
not
culminate
in
court
proceedings
where
state
conduct
is
then
reviewed.
4.
We
now
draw
attention
to
effectiveness
by
noting
a
key
omission
from
C-51.
As
the
Official
Opposition
noted
in
its
reasoned
amendment
when
it
moved
that
C-51
not
be
given
Second
Reading,
Bill
C-51
does
not
include
the
type
of
concrete,
effective
measures
that
have
been
proven
to
work,
such
as
working
with
communities
on
measures
to
counter
radicalization
of
youth
may
even
undermine
outreach.
This
speaks
for
itself,
and
we
will
not
elaborate
beyond
saying
that,
within
a
common
commitment
to
countering
terrorism,
effective
measures
of
the
sort
referenced
in
the
reasoned
amendment
not
only
are
necessary
but
also
must
be
vigorously
pursued
and
well-funded.
The
government
made
no
parallel
announcements
alongside
Bill
C-51
that
would
suggest
that
these
sort
of
measures
are
anywhere
near
the
priority
they
need
to
be.
5.
Finally,
the
defects
noted
in
points
1,
2
and
3
(information-sharing,
criminalizing
expression,
and
disruption)
are
magnified
by
the
overarching
lack
of
anything
approaching
adequate
oversight
and
review
functions,
at
the
same
time
as
existing
accountability
mechanisms
have
been
weakened
and
in
some
cases
eliminated
in
recent
years.
Quite
simply,
Bill
C-51
continues
the
governments
resolute
refusal
to
respond
to
10
years
of
calls
for
adequate
and
integrated
review
of
intelligence
and
related
security-state
activities,
which
was
first
(and
perhaps
best)
articulated
by
Justice
OConnor
in
a
dedicated
volume
in
his
report
on
what
had
happened
to
Maher
Arar.
Only
last
week,
former
prime
ministers
and
premiers
wrote
an
open
letter
saying
that
a
bill
like
C-51
cannot
be
enacted
absent
the
kind
of
accountability
processes
and
mechanisms
that
will
catch
and
hopefully
prevent
abuses
of
the
wide
new
powers
CSIS
and
a
large
number
of
partner
agencies
will
now
have
(note
that
CSIS
can
enlist
other
agencies
and
any
person
in
its
disruption
activities
and
the
information-sharing
law
concerns
over
a
dozen
other
government
agencies
besides
CSIS).
Even
if
one
judged
all
the
new
CSIS
powers
in
C-51
to
be
justified,
they
must
not
be
enacted
without
proper
accountability.
Here,
we
must
note
that
the
governments
record
has
gone
in
the
opposite
direction
from
enhanced
accountability.
Taking
CSIS
alone,
the
present
government
weakened
CSIS
accountability
by
getting
rid
of
an
oversight
actor,
the
Inspector
General,
whose
job
was
to
keep
the
Minister
of
Public
Security
on
top
of
CSIS
activity
in
real
time.
It
transferred
this
function
to
CSIS
review
body,
the
Security
Intelligence
Review
Committee
(SIRC),
which
does
not
have
anything
close
to
the
personnel
or
resources
to
carry
this
function
out
given
it
does
not
have
sufficient
staff
and
resources
to
carry
out
its
existing
mandate
to
ensure
CSIS
acts
within
the
law.
Beyond
staff,
we
note
that
SIRC
is
a
body
that
has
for
some
time
not
been
at
a
full
complement
of
members,
even
as
the
government
continues
to
make
no
apology
for
having
once
appointed
as
SIRCs
Chair
someone
with
no
qualifications
(and
it
turns
out,
no
character)
to
be
on
SIRC
let
alone
to
be
its
chair
(Arthur
Porter).
And,
as
revealed
in
a
recent
CBC
investigation,
the
government
has
simply
not
been
straight
with
Canadians
when
it
constantly
says
SIRC
is
a
robust
and
well-resourced
body:
its
budget
is
a
mere
$3
million,
which
has
flat-lined
since
2005
when
the
budget
was
$2.9
million,
even
as
its
staff
has
been
cut
from
20
in
2005
to
17
now.
Without
an
integrated
security-intelligence
review
mechanism,
which
should
also
include
some
form
of
Parliamentary
oversight
and/or
review,
and
with
especially
SIRC
(with
jurisdiction
only
over
CSIS)
not
a
fully
effective
body,
we
are
of
the
view
that
no
MP
should
in
good
conscience
be
voting
for
Bill
C-51.
Above,
we
have
limited
ourselves
to
five
central
concerns,
but
it
is
important
to
reiterate
that
some
or
all
of
the
signatories
have
serious
concerns
about
a
good
number
of
other
aspects
of
C-51
and/or
about
detailed
aspects
of
some
of
the
concerns
that
were
generally
expressed
in
the
above
five
points.
The
following
are
some
(but
only
some)
of
those
concerns,
in
point
form.
They
are
included
by
way
of
saying
that
signatories
believe
these
all
need
to
be
looked
at
closely
and
rigorously
during
House
of
Commons
committee
study
of
C-51,
now
that
it
has
passed
Second
Reading:
-
C-51
radically
lowers
the
threshold
for
preventive
detention
and
imposition
of
recognizance
with
conditions
on
individuals.
Only
three
years
ago,
Parliament
enacted
a
law
saying
this
detention/conditions
regime
can
operate
if
there
is
a
reasonable
basis
for
believing
a
person
will
commit
a
terrorist
offence.
Now,
that
threshold
has
been
lowered
to
may.
There
has
been
a
failure
of
the
government
to
explain
why
exactly
the
existing
power
has
not
been
adequate.
In
light
of
the
huge
potential
for
abuse
of
such
a
low
threshold,
including
through
wide-scale
use
(recalling
the
mass
arrests
at
the
time
of
the
War
Measures
Act
in
Quebec),
Canadians
and
parliamentarians
need
to
know
why
extraordinary
new
powers
are
needed,
especially
when
the
current
ones
were
enacted
in
the
context
of
ongoing
threats
by
al-Qaeda
to
carry
out
attacks
in
Canada
that
seem
no
less
serious
than
the
ones
currently
being
threatened
by
entities
like
ISIS
and
al-Shabab.
-
C-51
expands
the
no-fly
list
regime.
It
seems
to
have
simply
replicated
the
US
no-fly
list
rules,
the
operation
of
which
has
been
widely
criticized
in
terms
of
its
breadth
and
impacts
on
innocent
people.
Is
this
the
right
regime
for
Canada?
-
C-51s
new
disruption
warrants
now
allows
CSIS
to
impinge
on
the
RCMPs
law
enforcement
role,
bringing
back
turf
wars
that
were
eliminated
when
intelligence
and
law
enforcement
were
separated
in
the
wake
of
the
RCMPs
abusive
disruption
activities
of
the
late
1960s
and
early
1970s.
But,
even
more
important
than
turf
wars
is
the
potential
for
CSIS
behaviour
in
the
form
of
disruptive
measures
to
undermine
both
the
investigation
and
the
prosecution
of
criminal
cases
by
interfering
with
evidentiary
trail,
contaminating
evidence,
and
so
on.
-
C-51,
in
tandem
with
C-44,
permits
CSIS
to
engage
not
just
in
surveillance
and
information-
gathering
abroad,
but
also
in
disruption.
There
are
many
questions
about
how
this
will
work.
The
danger
of
lawlessness
seems
to
be
significantly
greater
for
CSIS
activities
abroad,
in
that
CSIS
only
needs
to
seek
approval
for
disruption
under
C-51
where
Canadian,
not
foreign,
law
could
be
breached
or
where
the
Charter
could
be
contravened
(with
Canadian
law
on
the
application
of
the
Charter
outside
Canada
being
quite
unclear
at
the
moment).
And
there
is
no
duty
for
CSIS
to
coordinate
with
or
seek
approval
from
the
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs,
such
that
the
chances
of
interference
with
the
conduct
of
Canadas
foreign
affairs
cannot
be
discounted.
Nor
can
we
ignore
the
likely
tendency
for
disruption
measures
abroad
to
be
more
threatening
to
individuals
rights
than
in
Canada:
for
example,
Parliament
needs
to
know
whether
CSIS
agents
abroad
can
engage
in
detention
and
rendition
to
agencies
of
other
countries
under
the
new
C-51
regime.
We
end
by
observing
that
this
letter
is
dated
February
23,
2015,
which
is
also
the
day
when
the
government
has
chosen
to
cut
off
Second
Reading
debate
on
Bill
C-51
after
having
allocated
a
mere
three
days
(in
reality,
only
portions
of
each
of
those
days)
to
debate.
In
light
of
the
sweeping
scope
and
great
importance
of
this
bill,
we
believe
that
circumventing
the
ability
of
MPs
to
dissect
the
bill,
and
their
responsibility
to
convey
their
concerns
to
Canadians
at
large
before
a
Second
Reading
vote,
is
a
troubling
undermining
of
our
Parliamentary
democracys
capacity
to
hold
majority
governments
accountable.
It
is
sadly
ironic
that
democratic
debate
is
being
curtailed
on
a
bill
that
vastly
expands
the
scope
of
covert
state
activity
when
that
activity
will
be
subject
to
poor
or
even
non-existent
democratic
oversight
or
review.
In
conclusion,
we
urge
all
Parliamentarians
to
ensure
that
C-51
not
be
enacted
in
anything
resembling
its
present
form.
Yours
sincerely,
Abell
Jennie
Attaran
Amir
Bakht
Natasha
Bangsund
Clayton
Beare
Margaret
Bhabha
Faisal
Bond
Jennifer
Bouclin
Suzanne
Boyd
Susan
Buhler
Sarah
Busby
Karen
Byers
Michael
Cameron
Angela
Chapdelaine
Pascale
Chartrand
Larry
Christians
Allison
Cossman
Brenda
Coughlan
Stephen
Crpeau
Franois
Cyr
Hugo
Dalton
Jennifer E.
Deckha
Maneesha
Desrosiers
Julie
Dietsch
Peter
Douglas
Stacy
Drummond
Susan
Duplessis
Isabelle
Farson
Stuart
Ferguson
Gerry
Findlay
Leonard
Flood
Colleen
Glinas
Fabien
Gilbert
Daphne
Girgis
Jassmine
Grant
Isabel
Grgoire
Marie Annik
Henderson
Sakej
Hernndez
Gleider I.
Hewitt
Steve
Hodgson
Louis-Philippe
Hoehn
Felix
Hughes
Jula
Hutchinson
Allan
Imai
Shin
Jackman
Martha
Johnson
Juliet
Johnson
Rebecca
Kalajdzic
Jasminka
Kamphuis
Charis
Keyes
John
Kianieff
Muharem
King
Jeff
Koshan
Jennifer
Larocque
Franois J.
Lafontaine
Fannie
Lampron
Louis-Philippe
LaViolette
Nicole
Leclair
Jean
Levy
Ed
Lewis
Brian
Liew
Jamie
Lu
Catherine
Macklin
Audrey
MacLachlan
Alice
Magnusson
Warren
Mahoney
Kathleen
Manikis
Marie
Manwaring
John
Marin
Michael
Mayeda
Graham
McIntyre
Sheila
M'Gonigle
Michael
Milton
Cynthia
Moon
Richard
Mossman
Mary Jane
Mumm
Claire
Mykitiuk
Roxanne
Noreau
Pierre
O'Toole
Darren
Panaccio
Penney
Steven
Reaume
Denise
Resnick
Philip
Robinson
Darryl
Robitaille
David
Rodgers
Sanda
Ryder
Bruce
Saberi
Hengameh
Sandborn
Calvin
Savit
Steven
Schulz
Jennifer
Scott
Dayna
Semple
Noel
Associate
Professor
of
Law,
Osgoode
Hall
Law
School,
York
University,
and
Graduate
Program
Director
Assistant
Professor,
Faculty
of
Law,
University
of
Windsor
Shaffer
Martha
Sheehy
Elizabeth
Sheptycki
James
Stewart
James
Stuart
Donald
Sylvestre
Marie-Eve
Tanguay-
Renaud
Tanovich
Franois
David
Tappolet
Christine
Templeton
Saul
Trapp
Kimberley N.
Van Harten
Gus
Vandervort
Lucinda
Waluchow
Wilfrid
Waters
Christopher
Pue
Wesley
Whitaker
Reg
Wiseman
David
Wood
Stepan