COURSE OUTLINE

LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS (LLB 247N)

Part I
INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
A.

Public office and public officers

Article XI, 1987 Constitution

Section 1. Public office is a public trust . Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2(b), R.A. 3019
Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding
subparagraph.
Article 203, Revised Penal Code
Art. 203. Who are public officers. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and
the preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election or appointment by competent need is not yours.authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform
in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Notes:
PURPOSE OF DISCIPLINE
- Dishonesty as ground for dismissal need not be committed in the performance of duty.
- If a public officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, he or she may be dismissed.
- Even if said defects of character are not connected with his or her office, they affect his
or her right to continue in office.
- The purpose of discipline is not punish, but to improve public service and preserve
public confidence in government. (Remalona v. CSC)
BUT A RESIGNED PUBLIC OFFICER CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINE BECAUSE IT DOES
NOT SERVE ITS PURPOSE
- It is error to interpret CSC MC No. 38 that administrative case may be filed against a
resigned public officer for as long as the act complained of was committed in service.
- Otherwise, public officers who have long been separated from service may still be
subject of administrative cases.
- This defeats the purpose of discipline, which is not to punish, but to public service and
preserve public trust in government. (Ombudsman v. Andutan)
Public office as defined by Mechem
A public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power , an individual is
invested with sovereign functions to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICE
a.Must be created by law or an ordinance authorized by law
b.Be invested with some sovereign functions of government to be exercised for public

interest
c. Functions must be defined, expressly or impliedly by law
d.Function must be exercised directly by an officer directly under the control of the law
e.Have some permanency or continuity, not temporary or occasional
CHARACTERISTICS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE
1.Public office is a public trust.
a. It is created in the interest and for the benefit of the public.
b. The officers are public servants.
c. They are mere agents and not rulers of the people.
d. As such, they have no contractual or proprietary right to an office.
2.No one has a vested right to a public office.
a. A public officer cannot claim injury if placed under preventive suspension because
he has no vested or absolute right to a public office. (Carabeo v CA)
b. Suspension of a public officer without prior notice and hearing does not violate
due process because he has no proprietary or contractual right to it. (Cornejo v.
Gabriel)
c. More so if the appointment does not specify the station, the employee may be reassigned if exigency requires, provided it does not reduce rank, status or salary.
(Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas)
Except: if the terms of the law that takes it away is unclear.
Facts: Segovia is appointed Justice of the Peace. But later, a law was passed that
justices shall be appointed to serve until they reach 65 y/o only. When he reached
65. Noel replaced him.
Held: The law must be applied prospectively only. Even if he has no vested right
to the office, he has some right that cannot be taken away by law which terms are
unclear. (Segovia v. Noel)
3.Public office is not a property.
Facts: during pendency of an election protest, the protestee died. He was
substituted by his widow to pursue his counterclaim for damages.
Held: The substitution is not proper. Public office is personal to the incumbent and is
not a property which passes to his heirs. (Abeja v. Tanada)
Facts: a municipal president was suspended by the governor while his administrative
case for misconduct was ending without opportunity to be heard.
Held: prior notice and hearing are not a requisite to suspension because the holder
has no proprietary and contractual interest on a public office. (Cornejo v. Gabriel)
Except: when the issue is which of the two persons is entitled to the public office. In
which case, a public office may be considered property within the protection of the
due process clause. That if one is deprived of title to the office, it should be properly
litigated before the courts. (Segovia v. Noel)
4. Public office cannot be inherited.
Facts: during pendency of an election protest, the protestee died. He was
substituted by his widow to pursue his counterclaim for damages.
Held: The substitution is not proper. Public office is personal to the incumbent and is
not a property which passes to his heirs. (Abeja v. Tanada)
Concerned Citizens of Laoag City v Arzaga AMO No. P-94-1067, January 30,
1997
Facts: 2 anonymous letters were addressed to judge Federico Llanes charging Bienvenido
Arzaga and Alfredo Mauricio, both process servers of the office of the clerk of court, with
influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and manipulation of bonds by
using the same property for different cases. These letters were forwarded to Judge Agnir
who made no definite recommendation in his report except leaving it to the court

administrator to determine whether on the basis of such criminal record alfredo boy
mauricio deserves to stay in the service of the judiciary. The office of court administrator
recommended that the charges against the 2 respondents be dismissed for lack of merit
which the court adopted but referred the case against Mauricio to Judge Agnir for further
investigation as to how he managed to be appointed as a process server despite previous
conviction. Apparently, Mauricio was a utility worker and was promoted to the position of
process server. He disclosed his conviction of crime of frustrated murder and that he was on
probation in his application. He was asked about his other criminal charges and why he did
not indicate it in his application, he simply said what it asked was conviction and not
charges. Judge Agnir strongly recommended the immediate and summary dismissal from the
service. It was recommended by the Deputy Court Administrator that he be declared
notoriously undesirable and be considered resigned from service. But it was further
recommended that he be reemployed in the government service other than the judiciary.
Held: In reviewing the aforesaid report and recommendation submitted for the Court's
consideration, we find the foregoing observations to be correct. We, nonetheless, find the
penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator to be very light.
Consequently, we adopt the investigating judge's recommendation for respondent's
dismissal from the service, the same being warranted and justified by the facts attendant to
the instant case.
:Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant
must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.
No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public
trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. In addition, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide that every public
servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest.
:By his acts and misdeeds, respondent has undermined the public's faith in our courts and,
ultimately, in the administration of justice. The same make him unfit as a court
employee. His employment must therefore be terminated at once. Court personnel must
adhere to the high ethical standards of public service in order to preserve the Court's good
name and standing.
:Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the conduct required of court personnel,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
Fernandez v Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Fernandez was serving as director of the office of personal inspection and
audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as director of the office of personnel relations.
While they were serving, a resolution was signed by public respondents Sto Tomas and
Ereneta, chairman and commissioner respectively. Chairman Sto Tomas expressed the
determination of the commission to implement the resolution during the General assembly
of the officers and employees of the commission. Petitioners instituted this petition
contending that
Issue: WON the resolution violated petitioners constitutional right to security of tenure
Held: Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices,
something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created
those public offices in the first place:
:The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term
"public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure

of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. We consider
that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the
law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization"
introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination
of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers
and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative
Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission,
meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of
the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization
regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the
legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the
organization," as the need [for such changes] arises . Assuming, for purposes of argument
merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes
contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is
necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17
earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of
such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"),
but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the
1987 Revised Administrative Code
:Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from their positions in the
OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot,
without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.
:We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a
specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a
person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of
Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so
forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the
other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
:Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter,
in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:
:It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous
positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in
the Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent
assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been
effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful
cause. It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any violation of the
constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they retained their
positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their
new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to
serve at the Commission's Head Office.
Notes:
ELEMENTS OF A PUBLIC OFFICER
To be a public officer, one must be:
1.Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or
performing in said government or any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class, and
2.that his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform
public duties must be by:
a. direct provision of law;
b. popular election; and

c. appointment by competent authority

CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
a.Executive officers- those whose duties are mainly to cause the laws to be executed
b.Legislative officers- those whose duties relate mainly to the enactment of laws
c. Judicial officers- those whose duties are to decide controversies between individuals
and accusation made in the name of the public against persons charged with a
violation of a law
d.Ministerial officers- those whose duty is to execute the mandate, lawfully issued, of
their superiors.
e.Officer de jure- one who has the lawful right to the office in all respects, but who has
either been ousted from it, one who has never actually taken profession.
f. Officer de facto- one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and
yet is not the officer in point of law.
REQUISITES TO BE CONSIDERED A DE FACTO OFFICER
Necessity of office
- There must be a created office. No de jure or de facto officer without the office to fill.
Color of title or general recognition and reputation
- May consist in election or appointment
- Holding office after expiration of term
- Acquiescence by the public in the acts of officer for such length of time as to raise
presumption of colorable right
Laurel v Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts: President Aquino issued AO 223 constituting a committee for the preparation of the
national centennial celebration of 1998. Subsequently, president Fidel Ramos issued EO 128
reconstituting the committee and renamed it as the National Centennial Commission.
Appointed to the chair was VP Salvador H.Laurel.
:Subsequently, PhilippineCentennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created which
Laurel was among the 9 incorporatots, who were also its first 9 directors. Petitioner was
elected expocorps CEO. Senator Ana Coseteng then delivered a privileged speech
denouncing the alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial
exposition project. The blue Ribbon committee and several other were tasked to investigate.
The senate blue ribbon committee filed with the secretary of the senate its final report
recommending the prosecution of Salvador Laurel for violating the rules on public bidding,
relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK(Asia Construction and development
corporation); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the notice to proceed to AK to
construct the Freedom ring even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material
injury to the government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the
funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in
violation of the anti-graft law. The saguisag committee recommended further investigation
and indictment. The Evaluation and preliminary Investigation bureau issued a resolution
finding probable cause to indict Laurel and Pena for conspriing to violate section 3e of RA
3019
Issue: WON the national centennial commission is a public office and WON petitioner, as
both chairman of the NCC and of Expocorp, is a public officer as defined under the anti-graft
and corrupt practices act Yes
Held: Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public
officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem,
a recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,

for a given period, either fixed by

law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions
of
the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested
is a public officer.
:The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position
as an office.
:Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC
Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did
not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
:The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country,
either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.
:Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government?
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as
legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
:We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The executive function,
therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
:The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry
them into effect.
:Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla that the holding by a
municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner
argues that the holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100 th
birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national
governments proprietary function.
:Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the
Court cautioned that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the
true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of
a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the
Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the surrounding circumstances plus the
political, social, and cultural backgrounds could produce a conclusion different from that in
Torio:
:Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and
petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
:That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of
the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the
office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary
office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.Hence, the office of
petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a
lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.
:Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body
make said commission less of a public office. The term office, it is said, embraces the idea
of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot
ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a
continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract,
which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties

pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though
the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment
from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer.
:At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as
indispensable, for, if the other elements are present it can make no difference, says
Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the
office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
behavior.
:Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation
for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act
No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman.
:It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly
limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of
determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Segovia v Noel, 47 Phil. 543
Facts: Vicente Segovia was appointed justice and continuously occupied until having passed
65, he was ordered by sec of justice to vacate the office and since that date, pedro Noel, the
auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice of peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Segovia filed a quo warrant proceedings inquiring as to the right of pedro noel to occupy the
office of justice and to oust him. Pedro Noel interposed this on the ground that it did not
allege facts to constitute a cause of action since RA 3107 was constitutional and Segovia
being 65 yrs old had automatically ceased to be a justice of the peace.
:Petitioner contends that RA 3107 section is unconstitutional as it impairs the contractual
right of the petitioner to an office
Issue: WON the portion of RA 3107 which provides, that justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they reached the age of 65 years,
should be given retroactive or prospective effect
Held: It is a fundamental principle that a public office cannot be regarded as the
property of the incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.
:.. It was this section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof
the following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of
the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace
having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his
office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice," was left
unchanged by Act No. 3107.
:A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and
never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
:The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New
York decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be
disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right
is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated."
(People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new constitutional
provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial
offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to persons in office at the
time of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec.
389.)
:The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329).

In that case, the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under
consideration not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided "that the present judges of Courts
of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the GovernorGeneral, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new
appointments of judges of Courts of First Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature
to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.
:The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives
no indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing
rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code, while
leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace to hold
office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions expressly making the law
applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly
indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the law an
interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.
:Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso added
to section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that
justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is not
applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act
No. 3107 went into force. Consequently, it results that the decision of the trial court is
correct in its findings of fact and law and in its disposition of the case.
Cornejo v Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 (1920)
Facts: The suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal seeks to have the provincial
governor and the provincial board of the province of rizal temporarily restrained from the
investigation of the charges filed against him pending resolution of the case and to have an
order issued directed to the provincial governor commanding him to return the petitioner to
his position as municipal president of pasay. The provincial governor answered that he
investigated the complaints. Counsel for the petitioner argued that petitioner has been
deprived of an office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having an
opportunity to be heard in his own defense. Respondents reply that they merely complied
with the requirements of the law.
:The important fact is that the law, in permitting a provincial governor temporarily to
suspend a municipal officer, makes no mention of a formal hearing of the charges.
Held: In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial governor, all that he can do
before the presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand the officer or to suspend
him temporarily from office. In the latter case the provincial governor's action is not a
finality. The law is especially careful to guard the rights of officer charged with
maladministration in office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions of the
law and notwithstanding long official practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal
officer, without an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, is in contravention of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning due process of law.
:It is but fair, in ordinary cases, that a public official should not be removed or suspended
without notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. But not permitting our
judgment to be unduly swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and recalling
again that the courts have ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is further only
fair to mention certain exceptions to the due process of law rule , which would seem to
include the instant case.
:The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding
and not with a judicial proceeding While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon
different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it
may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not

essential to due process of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings affecting

the life, liberty or property of the individual without any hearing can easily be recalled.
Among these are the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of
property in tax cases; the granting of preliminary injunction ex parte; and the suspension of
officers or employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an
investigation.
:Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States,
that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of
due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs. Beckham
([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the
effect that public offices are mere agencies or trust, and not property as such." The
basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a
popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the
people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right
to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and
holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents.
: Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the person suspended. It
was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the governor could, under section 15 of
the executive article of the Constitution, suspend an officer for neglect of duty in office
without giving previous notice to the officer of the charge made against him.
:We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him by
the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the Governor under the
statute above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office.
:The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the State. It was taken
under a valid statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court has
held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should have before suspension by the
Governor was a matter for the state legislature to determine, having regard to the
constitution of the State.
:Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure prescribed by the law an
injustice might be done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even as to
cases before the courts, but in this as in all other instances, the presumption always is that
the law will be followed and that the investigation and the hearing will be impartial.
:The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly delay the hearing is also without
much force. The same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of any judicial
officer. The presumption, again, is that every officer will do his duty promptly, and if he does
not, certainly a remedy can be found to make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us
expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days within which the provincial
governor must lay the charges before the provincial board, which must be heard by the
latter body within fifteen days. Of more compelling force is the suggestion from the other
side that the public interest might suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension
until after the hearing.
:Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of section 2188 of
the Administrative Code are clear and that they do not offend the due process of law clause
of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law without fear or
favor.

Abeja v Taada
Facts: Evelyn Abeja and Rosauro Radovan were contenders for the office of the municipal
mayor. Latter was proclaimed to which petitioner filed an election contest. Motion after
motion was filed. Rosier Radovan died but was substituted by Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama
and, surprisingly, by his surviving spouse, Ediltrudes Radovan. Petitioner filed a motion to
determine votes, to proclaim winner and to allow assumption of office. Judge Federica

Tanada, the successor of Judge Lopez (who was the judge in the election protest case but
was later on reassigned) denied the motion of Abuja saying that it was premature on the
ground that until after the 36 counter-protested precincts have been revised, the court could
not render a valid decision. Petitioner then asked, which the court issued, a TRO enjoining
respondents from continuing with the revision of the ballots in the 36 counter-protested
precincts.
:Petitioner contends that the revision of the counter-protested precincts filed has already
been abandoned by the failure to pursue the same, right after the revision of the 22
protested precincts. Petitioner also argue that the case was deemed submitted for decision
upon submission by the Board of Revisors of the Report on the Revision of the 22 protested
precincts. (smaller font not really relevant to our topic)
Issue: WON the substitution was proper
Held: In the case at bar, private respondent unreasonably failed to cause the revision of the
counter-protested precincts despite being afforded ample time to do so and must be
deemed to have abandoned it.
:We also find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow,
Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for
damages. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which
passes to his heirs" The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counterclaim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death
terminated his right to occupy the contested office
Javier v Sandiganbayan, G.R.No. 147026-27, 9-11-09
Facts: RA 8047 Book Publishing industry development act was enacted into law. To achieve
the purpose of the law, the National Book Development board was created under the
administration and supervision of the office of the president. Petitioner was appointed to the
governing board as a private sector representative for 1 yr. She was also the president of the
book suppliers association of the Philippines. She was issue by the office of the president a
travel authority to attend the Madrid international book fair and was allowed her travelling
expenses but she was not able to attend. The resident auditor advised petitioner to
immediately refund the cash advance considering that her trip was cancelled but she failed
to do this. Later, the Executive director of the NBDB and COA filed a complaint against
petitioner for malversation of public funds and properties. The ombudsman found probable
cause to indict petition and recommended the filing of the information and she was then
charged. The cases were filed before the sandiganbayan. During arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty and delivered the money subject of the criminal cases.
: Petitioner then filed a motion to quash saying that the information did not charge her as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
sandiganbayans jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee
and that she belongs to the governing board only as a private sector representative, hence,
she may not be charged under the RA 3019 before the sandiganbayan or under any statue
which covers public officials. She also claimed that she does not perform public functions
and is without any administrative or political power to speak ofthat she is serving the
private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as participant in the
government's book development policy.
Held: The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine
book publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047,
which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry
as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve
this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation.
:A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the
nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and

conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public officer
:Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the
NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to
enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from
the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the
meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it
that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts
collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing
members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the
implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry.
:Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or
appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing
Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private
person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also
of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall
receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually
attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law,
the nature of one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still
considered a public officer.
:On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by
direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be
a public officer.
:Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of
R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public
functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any
rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and
promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was
supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
:In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. The next question for the Court to resolve
is whether, as a public officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
:Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs to
the employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase all other national and local
officials classified as Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. > w/in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
Azarcon v Sandiganbayan, 268 sCRA 747
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business. His services
were contracted by Paper industries corporation of the philippines (PICOP). Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
formers premises. A warrant of distraint of personal property of Jaime Ancla was issued. The
warrant of garnishment was issued to Alfredo Asarco ordering him to transfer the property in
his possession owned by Ancla. He signed receipt for goods, articles and things seized
under authority of the National Internal revenue, assumed the undertakings specified int he
receipt. He promised that he would faithfully keep, preserve and protect the goods that were
seized. Incidentally, petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of
PICOP and requested him to prevent the truck from being taken out of the PICOP concession.

But by the time the order to bar the trucks exist was given, however, it was too late.
Thereafter, along with co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Asarco was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property.
:Petitioner contends that he was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was
being charged with malversation under art 217 of the RPC. The sandiganbayan still found
him accused beyond reasonable doubt
Issue: Does the sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged
with malversation of public funds as a principal after the said individual had been designated
by the BIR as a customdian of distrained property? Did such accused become a public officer
and therefore subject to the graft courts jurisdiction as a consequence of such designation
by the BIR?
Held: The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint
charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
:The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public
officers:
: Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively
distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. The next logical query is
whether petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. We answer in the
negative.
:The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck
allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in
possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated petitioner a
depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, a public officer.
:We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply
because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here.
While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached
property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act
of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his
back taxes, property which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was
clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the
judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public official.
However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require petitioner Azarcon to
sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer.
: Thus, although the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, x x x
the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive
branch will still be limited to that conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication in
its enabling act. Hence, (a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers
as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
Corollarily, implied powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of
lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced
therein, nor are not incidental thereto.For to so extend the statutory grant of power would
be an encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.It is true
that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a
constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve a distrained property, However,
we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such

requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot
be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues
that Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code x x x defines the individuals covered by the term
officers under Article 217 x x x of the same Code. And accordingly, since Azarcon became
a depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became a public officer who can be
prosecuted under Article 217 x x x.
:The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads: Officers included in the
preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who,
in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds,
revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached,
seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual.
:The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge
any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined
in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized
with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it
expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed
a public officer.
:After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon
and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before
and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The
Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of this case is of no moment since (j)urisdiction cannot
be conferred by x x x erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction. As aptly and
correctly stated by the petitioner in his memorandum: From the foregoing discussion, it is
evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as
depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and
Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the
prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being
similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well
as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Serana v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, Jan. 22, 2008
Facts: Hanna Serana was a senior government scholar of the UP. She was appointed by
President Estrada as a student regent of UP. Petitioner discussed with president estrada the
renovations of the vinzons hall annex in UP. Petitioner with her siblings and relatives
registered with the SEC the Office of the student regent foundation, inc (OSFRI). 15 million
was allocated to the OSFRI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation, the source of
the funds were from the office of the president. The renovations failed to materialize and so
the succeeding student regent, Kristine Bugayong filed a complaint for malversation of
public funds with the office of the ombudsman which was later docketed with the
sandiganbayan. She was charged with estafa together with her brother.
:Petitioner moved to quash the information claiming that the sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as a UP student
regent. She also argued that the money came from president estrada & not the government;
As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity; that she was a
simple student & did not receive any salary as student regent
Issue: Can the Sadiganbayan try a government scholars accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds? Yes
Held: Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among
those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,

petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
:Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
be called upon to define a public officer. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: A
public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The right to hold a public office under our
political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only
because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring
it. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary.
:Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,We held
that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher,
its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provision of law.
:Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
:Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
:Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. The administration of the UP is a
sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created
for profit.
:Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office. According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to
act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the
BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a
private capacity and not in relation to public office.
:In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing

the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x.
:Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
did not quash the information based on this ground.

Go v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007

Facts: In Agan vs PIATCO, the court declared null and void the 1997 concessions agreement
and other contracts entered into for being contrary to public policy. By the aforementioned
contracts, the government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of
NAIA III. Subsequently, Ma cecilia Pesayco, corporate secretary of asias emerging dragon
corporation, filed and charged several persons in connection with the NAIA III project. The
office of ombudsman then filed with sandiganbayan charging Vicente Rivera, then DOTC
secretary, and petitioner go, chairman and president of PIATCO, with violation of ra 3019.
:Petitioner Go contends that he could not be charged under ra 3019 because he is not a
public officer and neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf
of the government.
Held: Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers
and private persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
:Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft laws application extends
to both public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in
part that: SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts
or omissions enumerated.
:The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public
officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner
Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the
offense thereunder.
:The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan is instructive. In the said case, Gregorio Singian,
Jr., a private person who was then Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI),
together with some officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), was charged with violation
of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with the loan accommodations that the said
bank extended to ISI which were characterized as behest loans. Singian thus illustrates that
private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
:The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is
applicable to the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may
lead thereto.
:In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in
his case because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a
public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary. The case against both of them
is still pending before the Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Gos case are,
therefore, not exactly on all fours as those of the former First Ladys case as to warrant the
application of the Marcos ruling in his case.
:Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime
which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as
the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once

established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the
act of all."
B.
Kinds of public officers
De jure
De facto
Sampayan v Daza, G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992
Facts: Petitioners, residents of the northern samar, filed a petition seeking to disqualify
respondent Raul Daza, incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise his functions of
his office on the ground that he is a ground holder and a lawful permanent resident of the
US. They allege that he has not renounced his status as a permanent resident by any act or
declaration. Petitioners then sought to disqualify Daza from running the the recent elections
and that their present petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by Daza.
Dana denied the fact that he was a permanent resident and that if he was, he had long
waived the status when he returned to the Philippines.
:Petitioners contend that he should be disqualified from exercising the functions of his office
for being a permanent resident alien of the US at the time when he filed his CoC
Held: We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that
they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction
of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners
challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have
been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the
election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after
Daza's proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent
since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts
already consummated. Fourth, as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be
made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are
as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled
to emoluments for actual services rendered.
General Manager of PPA v Monserate, G.R. No. 129616 April 17, 2002
Facts: Juleta Monerate started as a bookkeeper in the port of management office. She was
then promoted as cashier then as finance officer. She was then appointed to the position of
manager. Her appointment was protested by petitioner Ramon Anino, the 2nd to respondent
for the position. The PPA appeals board sustained the protest and rendered ineffective the
appointment. She then appealed to this saying that the proceedings were irregular because
she was not notified of the hearing nor was she informed of the reasons behind her
replacement. Meanwhile, the PPA order officially reassigned her to the position of
Administrative officer which was petitioner's former position which was also lower than her
previous position as a finance officer. She appealed with CSC protesting against petitioners
Aninos appointment but was dismissed. CA later reinstated her & now she is claiming for
backwages.
Issue: WON respondent Monserate is entitled to backwages after being reinstated
Held: The challenged Court of Appeals Decision ordered the reinstatement of respondent
without awarding backwages. This matter becomes controversial because respondent
assumed the lower position of Administrative Officer during the pendency of her protest

against petitioner Aninos appointment to the contested position. Also, petitioner Anino
retired from the service on November 30, 1997
:In this respect, while petitioner Aninos appointment to the contested position is void, as
earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his
incumbency. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly
exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such
appointment or election may be irregular. In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled
that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the
salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure , even though he
(the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title . A de facto
officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to
the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his
wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, this
Court allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services rendered but
only when there is no de jure officer, thus: x x x in cases where there is no de jure
officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office,
and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to
the office.
:In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his
wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office,
even if he occupied the office in good faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied
squarely on the present case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed
under protest the position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988,
which position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments,
salary and other compensation attached to such office. While her assumption to said lower
position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an
abandonment of her claim to her rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full
backwages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to
backpay differentials for the period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer
up to the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such
backpay differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the positions of
Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino
corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of
his retirement on November 30, 1997.
C.
Who may be public officers: eligibility and qualifications
Who prescribes qualifications
Time of possession of qualifications
Frivaldo v Comelec, 257 SCRA 731
Facts: Juan Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of governor of Sorsogon in
the May 1995 elections. Raul Lee, another candidate, prayed to have Frivaldos disqualified
from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines. The Comelec disqualified Frivaldo and proclaimed Lee as the winner despite
Frivaldo having garnered the highest votes. Frivaldo alleged that on june 30 1995 at 2pm, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation
under pd 725 in September 1994 had been granted. As such, when he received the order for
the reconvening of the votes to proclaim lee as the winner, which he received on june 30 at
530, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation of frivaldo as governor. This
decision was reversed holding that Lee did not garner the highest number of votes thereby
his proclamation is annulled; and that Frivaldo be proclaimed as the governor having
garnered highest votes and having reacquired his filipino citizenship by repatriation on june
30 1995 under the provisions of pd 725, and thus qualified to hold office of governor.

Held: The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: Sec. 39.
Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or , in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
:in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to
reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born
citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to
escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace
and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space,
wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services
to his people.
:Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed,> From the above, it will be noted that the law does
not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
:Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien,
i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions
only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to
be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. (Qualifications of Elective officials and not Qualifications of candidates meaning
the qualifications are only required when he is already an elective official-the day
term of office begins)
:But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for
that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be
a "registered voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration. > The answer to this problem again lies
in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification
to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a
redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen
first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require
that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e.,
the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x

where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote
actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this "qualification." In
other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else > It
is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
:There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned
from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m.,
June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath
of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the
candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judiciallydeclared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible
:But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
:Lee contends that the courts 2 rulings declaring Frivalod an alien have also become final
and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these judicial pronouncements of his
political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from
running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines." >Indeed, decisions declaring
the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship
under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
- Disclaimer: I think this was overturned, If im not mistaken. I remember sir saying that you
need to possess all qualifications at the time you file your certificate of candidacy.
- : THIS IS NOT A PRECEDENT that he did not have his qualifications at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy. THIS IS A SPECIAL CASE. DO NOT USE IT IN YOUR ANSWERS.
(based from my old notes)
Usual qualifications
Article VI, Sections 2 & 6, 1987 Constitution
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators who shall be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
1
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is 2at least twenty-five
years of age, 3able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, 4a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a 5resident thereof for a period of not
less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article VII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of
office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed
from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.
Article IX(B), (C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with
proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Section 22, Book V, EO 292
SECTION 22. Qualification Standards.(1) A qualification standard expresses the minimum
requirements for a class of positions in terms of education, training and experience, civil
service eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required for successful performance.
The degree of qualifications of an officer or employee shall be determined by the appointing
authority on the basis of the qualification standard for the particular position.
Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in
the career service, as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in the adjudication
of protested appointments, in determining training needs, and as aid in the inspection and
audit of the agencies personnel work programs.
It shall be administered in such manner as to continually provide incentives to officers and
employees towards professional growth and foster the career system in the government
service.
(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards shall be
the responsibility of the department or agency, with the assistance and approval of the Civil
Service Commission and in consultation with the Wage and Position Classification Office.
Article III, Section 5, 1987 Constitution
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Maquera v Borra, G.R. No. L-24761, Sept. 7, 1965
Facts: RA 4421 was enacted which required all candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices to post a surety bond equivalent to 1 yr salary or emoluments of the
position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared
winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his
certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office.
The Comelec, in compliance with the said RA, decided to require all candidates for president,
vp, sentor and members of the HOR to file surety bond. The Comelec also required every
candidate to pay the premium chared by the bonding companies.
:It was contended that the effect of RA 4421 would prevent or disqualify from running for
president, vp, senator or HOR, who although having the qualifications prescribed by the
constitution, cannot t file the surety bond, owing to failure to pay the premium; that is
likewise had the effect of disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective officers,
persons who, although possessing the qualifications prescribed by law, cannot pay said
premium or do not have the property essential
Held: Republic Act No. 4421 has, accordingly, the effect of imposing property qualifications
in order that a person could run for a public office and that the people could validly vote for
him. That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying
the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies
necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon
the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal

opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of
poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office; and That the bond required in
Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the
necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given in connection
with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
Social Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs G.R. No. 157870, November 3,
2008
Facts: the constitutionality of section 36 of the Comprehensive dangerous drugs act was
questioned insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public officers,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
:Petitioner SJS sought to prohibit the dangerous drugs board and the PDEA from enforcing
the certain paragraphs of section 36 of the RA on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm on the grounds that: 1. They constitute undue delegation of legislativee power when
they give ununbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they
can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
Held: In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out
that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to
meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution and that Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge
the Constitution.
:Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
:In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution
:Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to
be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be
hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
:It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the
provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be

accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular
section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory,
necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to
can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever. (Pimentel case)
:(SJS case) The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary
and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a
random and suspicionless arrangement. (reason not relevant to our topic)
:Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices
is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
:The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the
backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is
to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
:Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. private sector
:Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other
laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required
to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility
and efficiency.
- SC said for students, mandatory because it does not really go into the privacy, valid because
it was random and suspiciousness and does not make one a suspect; for the inmates, not
valid, because there is already chance or suspicion that they are; in private sector, valid
but there were parameters that result of drug test should not be disclosed to the public
and respect self-privacy confidentiality clause and this was also random; employees in
the government- the appointive- if we validate the right of private er and conduct
random drug test, with more reason we validate right of government to issue random drug
test
Disqualifications
Under the Constitution
Under the Local Government Code
Omnibus Election Code
Other laws

Effect of pardon
Article 36, Revised Penal Code
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.chanrobles virtual law library
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.chanrobles virtual law library
Monsanto v Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
Facts: Salvacion Monsanto was convicted of complex crime of estafa thru falsification. While
her motion for reconsideration was pending, President Marcos extended to her an absolute
pardon which she accepted. And by reason of said pardon, she wrote to the Calbayog city
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistance city treasurer
since the same was still vacant. The Finance ministry ruled that she may be reinstated
without necessity of new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the
absolute pardon. Petitioner sought reconsideration stressing that the full pardon bestowed
on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date
of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension. But her reconsideration was denied ruling that petitioner was not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
appointment to her former position, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for
the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.
:Petitioners basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by
reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated
or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty
of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained
suspended. More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it
was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has
declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same
Issue: WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the chief
executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment?
Held: Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties
remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision
correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office.
:Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act
of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and
not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which
delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.
:The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only
upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus,
petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High
Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of
final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case,
it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the

character of finality.
:In Pelobello v. Palatino, We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts
on the various consequences of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal
v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction
:To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded
as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not
erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash
out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
:The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's
innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act,
including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him
from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and
the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though
pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may
regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it
places no restraints upon him following his conviction.
:A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
:Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive
declared her not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v.
Hazzard, we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number of
pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial
system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very act of
forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the
most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability
of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad
character, which has been definitely fixed.
:In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to
give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that
pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should
be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the
past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a
pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the
mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
:Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor. Pardon
granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence
(which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of
the privilege.

:Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in
full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore
a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of
the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
:The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who
is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
:For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility
from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that
when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which
was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability
for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing
her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
Garcia v Chair of CoA, G.R. No. 75025, 9-14-93
Facts: Petitioner was a supervising lineman but was later dismissed on the ground of
dishonestly He was later tried for qualified theft but he was acquitted. He sought
reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal if the criminal case but this was
denied. He then pleaded to the president of the Philippines for executive clemency which
was granted. Petitioner then filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries
effective from the date of his dismissal from the service. But this was denied on the ground
that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries
and that he has not been reinstated in the service. It appears that petitioner was recalled
but records do not show whether his reinstatement was to the same position.
Issue: WON he is entitled to the payment of backwages after having been reinstated
pursuant to the grant of executive clemency
Held: Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to
extend executive clemency under the following circumstances: Except in cases of
impeachment or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.
:He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
:From among the different acts of executive clemency spelled out above, the clemency
granted to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive pardon
:Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual to whom
it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have firmly established the general rule that
while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in
the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it
does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the

penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense.
But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender
has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
:But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms
this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found
guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly
commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his
criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.
:In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court
of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The
acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind
the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his
reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission.
:The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency
itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his
reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies
that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he
is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
:Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to
back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to
make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service.
To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give
justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the
charges against them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
:Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any
criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the
direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department
over which the President, as its head, has the power of control. The President's control has
been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the judgment of the
former for the latter." In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief
Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner
and relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the petitioner from the
service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.
:After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also served as
basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have left his
office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges
that accrued to him by virtue of the office held, including back wages.
D.

Formation of relations

By election
By appointment
Central Bank v CSC, G.R. No. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
Facts: The promotions board of the central bank, with a representative of the cdc in
attendance, deliberated on the filling up of the vacant position of the assistant bank
physician of the central bank. It found Dr Jordan as the only next-in-rank employee. On the
other hand, it appears that respondent Borja filed an application for the position of medical
director in central bank which he was hired for. Dr Jordan was then designated to act as
assistant bank physician to which Broja protested contending that he was more qualified
than she. The Merit systems board found the appeal meritorious and ruled that Borja should
have bee the one appointed as assistant bank physician. But the decision was set aside and
Dr. jordans appointment was confirmed. Borja appealed with CSC who set aside the
decision of the MSB and directed the appointment of the private respondent Borja to the
contested position.
:Petitioner contends that the csc acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in revoking the
appointment of Dr. Jordan and in directing the issuance of the appointment in favor of Dr.
Borja when all the while the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were certified by the Promotions
Board and a representative of the Civil Service Commission who was present in the
deliberations of the same board. Petitioner Bank added that the power of the Commission is
limited to determining whether or not the appointee has the appropriate eligibility and
qualification and that once such qualification was certified, the Commission is duty bound to
attest to the appointment.
Issue: May the CSC disapprove an appointment and require the appoinment of another
person whom it believes is more qualified for the position?
Held: It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample discretion in the
selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. This is a
management prerogative which is generally unhampered by judicial intervention. Within the
parameters of this principle, the right to select and appoint employees is the prerogative of
the employer which may be exercised without being held liable therefor provided that the
exercise thereof is in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
under valid agreements and provided further that such prerogatives are not exercised in a
malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.
:There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with the power of
appointment.
:Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has the final authority
on appointments. But the situation has changed under the new law, Presidential Decree No.
807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, wherein the Commission is not
authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind
of appointment to be extended. The authority of the Commission is limited to approving
or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the law governing the Civil
Service.
:Private respondent anchors his protest on the ground that he is more qualified than the
appointee. It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for
a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
:Private respondent alleges, however, that the power of appointment is not absolute and

that the Commission is empowered to approve or disapprove the same, citing Section 9(h) of
Article V of the Civil Service Decree and Section 4 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
83-343. This is correct As noted earlier, the appointment is subject to verification by the
Commission as to whether or not the appointing authority complied with the
requirements of the law, otherwise, it may revoke the appointment . However, to
conclude that the Commissioner may also direct the appointment of individuals other than
the choice of the appointing power is certainly not contemplated by the law.
:From the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission has the authority to check whether or
not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment must be approved; if not it should be disapproved.
No other criterion may be employed by the Commission when it acts on an appointment.
:Thus, when as in this case, it is not disputed that the appointee, Dr. Jordan, is qualified for
the contested position, the Commission exceeded its power in revoking her appointment on
the ground that private respondent is more qualified. The Commission cannot substitute its
will for that of the appointing authority.
:It must be stressed that the law does not impose a rigid or mechanical standard on the
appointing power. The appointing person enjoys sufficient discretion to select and appoint
employees on the basis of their fitness to perform the duties and to assume the
responsibilities of the position to be filled. As earlier ruled in Reyes vs. Abeleda, at least
sufficient discretion, if not plenary, should be granted to those entrusted with the
responsibility of administering the offices concerned, primarily the department heads.
They are in the position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office
thus vacated. Unless the law speaks in mandatory and peremptory tone, there should be full
recognition of the wide scope of such discretionary authority. The power of appointment is
essentially a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.
Appointment distinguished from designation
Santiago v CoA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Teodoro Santiago was a state auditor in the COA who was detailed with the
MIAA. Petitioner was later on designated as the acting assistant general manager for finance
and administration. He served in this capacity and collected the differential salary and
received his compensation until he was transferred to the presidential management staff
under COA. He then later retired after working in in the government for 44 years. In
computing the retirement benefits, COA used a different basis as what GSIS used to
compute. COA disagreed with the GSIS computation. Petitioner then requested for
recomputation based on what he claimed as his highest basic salary rate but this was
denied.
Held: We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of the petitioner's
occupying the second position in the MIAA and receiving additional compensation for his
services therein. As the Solicitor General observed. "What the petitioner was receiving from
the MIAA was the additional compensation allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which,
in turn, is allowed under Section 8, Paragraph B, Article IX of the Constitution.
:In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, this Court held that double appointments are not prohibited as
long as the positions involved are not incompatible, except that the officer or
employee appointed cannot receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law. The additional compensation received by the petitioner is not
an issue in the case at bar because of its express approval by the COA and the admission
of the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.
:The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9
(Highest basic salary rate as the basis for computation of the retirement pay) because he
was not appointed to the second position in the MIAA but only designated thereto. It is
stressed that under the said provision, "the compensation of salary or pay which may be
used in computing the retirement benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed

by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment." The petitioner's additional salary
was fixed not in a duly approved appointment but only in a designation.
:Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no substantial distinction
between appointment and designation. He cites Mechem, who defines appointment as "the
act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the individual, who is to exercise the functions of a given office." He also
invokes Borromeo v. Mariano, where this Court said that "the term "appoint," whether
regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or
designation of an individual.
:Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and
designation. While appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment (or election). A person may also be
designated in an acting capacity, as when he is called upon to fill a vacancy pending the
selection of a permanent appointee thereto or, more usually, the return of the regular
incumbent. In the absence of the permanent Secretary for example, an undersecretary is
designated acting head of the department.
:As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho: Appointment may be defined as the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law
of additional duties on an incumbent official.. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature.
:Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term
"appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other
words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 966. We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation,
especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate "compensation
for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be conferred by a
permanent appointment. A contrary reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of
the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to extend the maximum
benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and
efficient service in the government.
:As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration in the office order issued by
Secretary Reyes on August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled either
by permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second
position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the
Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for his designation
thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on
Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional
compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his
highest basic salary rate.
Sevilla v Santos, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992
Facts: Petitioner has been in government service since 1949. His last appointment was last
assistant city engineer of palayan city which he discharged until he was designated as
acting city engineer of cabanatuan. During the Edsa revolution and the people power, the
OIC mayor of canabatuan appointed defendant appellant Nerito Santos as the city engineer
of canabantuan. Petitioner as informed of this but since he was on leave at the time,
memorandum was received on his behalf. A few months later, petitioner sevilla was
designated as the acting district engineer of pasay city. He served in that capacity until he

was removed from the office of the new secretary of the DPWH. Petitioner then returned to
cabanatuan and filed a petition for quo warranto against Nerito Santos. The lower court
reinstated petitioner seville but CA reversed this decision and ruled that by accepting
another office, seville in effect voluntarily surrendered his former office and was thereby
precluded form maintaining a quo warranto action.
:Seville argued that being the presidential appointee, he could not be removed from offfice
by an OIC mayor.
Issue: WON an officer who was appointed to an office in an acting capacity bring a quo
warrant action against the permanent appointee to the position?
Held: An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good only until another
appointment is made to take its place (Austria vs. Amante. 79 Phil. 784). Hence, petitioner's
right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary . It
lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as the permanent city engineer of
Cabanatuan City on August 18, 1986.
:Petitioner was the incumbent city engineer of Palayan City when he was designated as
Acting City Engineering of Cabanatuan City. There is a difference between an appointment
an appointment and a designation. Appointment is the selection by the proper authority of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of an office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, upon a person already in the public
service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election. A mere "designation" does not
confer upon the designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies
in an "acting" capacity only. Thus did this Court made such a distinction:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with
its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen
unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the
other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official . . . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative
in nature.
:Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding
of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered
only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on
the person named.
:Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot
sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. . . Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
:Consequently, the designation of petitioner as Acting City Engineering of Cabanatuan City
merely imposed upon him the additional function of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City on
top of his regular duties as City Engineer of Palayan City. He may claim security of tenure as
City Engineer of Palayan City but he may not lay such a claim to the position of City
Engineering of Cabanatuan City for he holds no appointment to the latter office.
:The power of appointment is essentially discretionary. Its exercise may not be
controlled by the courts. The choice of an appointee from among qualified candidates or
applicants is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom,
convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the head of
office concerned for he is familiar with the organizational structure and environmental
circumstances within which the appointee must function. The appointing authority in this
particular case is the Mayor of Cabanatuan City (B.P. Blg. 337 or the Local Government Code
which provides that "the city engineer shall be appointed by the city mayor, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations"). The appointment of Santos by OIC City Mayor Vergara

was valid and binding for it was confirmed by the Minister of Public Works and Highways,
and approved by the Civil Service Commission.
:An action for quo warranto may be commenced by "a person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another" (Sec. 6, Rule 66,
Rules of Court). Inasmuch as the petitioner does not aver that he is entitled to the office of
City Engineer of Cabanatuan City and that Nerito L. Santos is a mere usurper of said office,
the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner's action for quo
warranto. Petitioner's ouster upon, and by virtue of, Santos' appointment as City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City, was not illegal for the petitioner's right to discharge the functions of Acting
City Engineer of Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a permanent appointment to the
same office was made in favor of the private respondent, Engineer Nerito L. Santos.
Next-in-rank rule
Santiago Jr. v CSC, G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989
Facts: Then customs commissioner Tanada extended a permanent promotional appointment
as customs collector to petitioner Narciso Santiago. This was approved by the csc.
Respondent Leonardo Jose filed a protest with the Merit System Promotion Board mainly on
the groudn that he was next-in-rank to the position of the collector of customs. But
santiagospromotional appointment was upheld on the ground that the next-in-rank rule was
no longer mandatory (among other grounds). But the Jose appealed to the board who
deicded to revoke Santiagos appointment and directed that Jose be appointed in his stead.
Held: We need only recall our previous ruling in Taduran vs. Civil Service Commission stating
that there is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide
is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified,
and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other
modes of appointment.
:One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the
higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed.
The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the
appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. As provided for in
Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 83- 343: Section 4. An employee who holds a next-in- rank
position who is deemed the most competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil
service eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion shall be promoted to the
higher position when it becomes vacant. However, the appointing authority may promote an
employee who is not next-in-rank but who possesses superior qualifications and competence
compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the minimum requirements for the
position.
:explained the reasons behind petitioner's appointment > On the other hand, after the
February revolution, the Protestee was immediately designated by the undersigned as Chief
of a task force which has been credited with the seizure of millions of pesos worth of
smuggled shipments. Each one was duly recorded, not only in the official files, but also in
the media. For the services, the undersigned saw fit, not only to promote the Protestee but
also to designate him as my special assistant. It may likewise be mentioned that Protestee
has been the recipient of citations awarded by the Customs Commissioner for the two
consecutive years 1984 and 1985, for exemplary performance of official duties, particularly
investigation and prosecution. More specifically, the latest citation commends the Protestee
for his pivotal role in the seizure and forfeiture of an ocean-going vessel upheld by the
Supreme Court, which constituted a first in the history of this Bureau.
:The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide
latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-inrank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary
to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is
granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment

:The case of Meram vs. Edralin (L-71228, September 24,1987, 154 SCRA 238) is inapplicable
to the factual situation herein. In said case, we affirmed the appointment of the next- in-rank
because the original appointee's appointment was made in consideration of political, ethnic,
religious or blood ties totally against the very purpose behind the establishment of
professionalism in the civil service.
:True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do
not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification (paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D.
No. 807). However, consistent with our ruling in Luego vs. CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986,143
SCRA 327), "all the commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved . No other
criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the
decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper
authorities. ...To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply
because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in the appointing authority)."
Discretion of appointing authority
Lapinid v CSC, G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Renato Lapinid was appointed by Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. Respondent Juanita
Junsay protested this appointment contending that he should be designated as terminal
supervisor in view of his preferential right. He went to the CSC and challenged the
appointment there under the same grounds. The CSC found the protest meritorious and
directed that Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as termnal supervisor.
Lapping moved for reconsideration but this was denied.
Held: In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, this Court declared: The issue is starkly simple:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter?
:Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
:Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and
the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone
rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except
to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority
to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent
was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely in the city mayor.
:Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals this Court said: The only function of the Civil
Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it
finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise
satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
:The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or
appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in
an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age,
number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but

so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition,
prospects for the future, and best interests, of the service. Given the demands of a certain
job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the Office concerned provided the legal
requirements for the office are satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.
:We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil Service
Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither
does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices e xcept only to
ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination
of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be
preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It
cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and
much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.
:Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel.
While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the
selection itself of the appointeetaking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personalityis the prerogative of the
appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review
under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
Luego v CSC, G.R. No. L-69137, Aug. 5, 1986
Facts: Petitioner Luego was appointed as administrative officer. His appointment was
described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary subject to final action taken
in the protest filed by Felicia Tuozo and another employee. Later, after the hearings, the CSC
found that private respondent Tuozo was better qualified that the petitioner for the position
and directed that Tuozo be appointed to the position of administrative officer.
Issue: Is the CSC authorize dot disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appoint and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter?
Held: The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service
Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
:The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the
Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
:As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case: It is well settled that the
determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested
by law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service Commission. The
Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not
authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind
of the appointment to be extended.
:Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the
appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly
held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to
assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
:It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of
another officer or body, like the Commission on Appointments under 1935 Constitution.
:
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article V
of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power to "approve" and
"disapprove" appointments.
:However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it
clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to
be employed by the Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or
"disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities.
:Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and
the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition
alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointmen t. To be sure, it
had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on
the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
:In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner, the Commission was probably
applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies,
which provides that "whenever there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank,
preference shall be given to the employee who is most competent and qualified and who has
the appropriate civil service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable, however, because neither of
the claimants is next in rank. Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil
Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees,
reinstatement, re-employment, or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate
eligibility.
E.

Assumption and term of office

Borromeo v Mariano, 41 Phil. 322
Facts: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as judge of the 24th judicial
district. He duly qualified and took possession of the office. Later, he was appointed judge of
the 21st judicial district and Fermin Mariano was appointed judge of the 24th district. Judge
borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the 21st
judicial district.
Issue: WON a judge may be appointed or designated to another district without his consent?
-- No
Held: Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the
Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66,
148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the night.
(Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the
affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance
may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than
their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.)
The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular
attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another

district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only
if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious
misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)
:To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be recalled
that the law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first instance are
detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, "no judge
of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is
commissioned."
:The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of
public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things.
Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the
sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in
these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L. 423.) If, therefore,
anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when
once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an
appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge
of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be
made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the language of the
proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of
public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of
one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing
him from his district.
:.. But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of the Philippine Islands to
another, without his consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to conceive
how this power could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A
judge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by the
insistence of the disgruntled party, be removed from one district, demoted, and transferred
to another district, at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of the judicial officer.
The only recourse of the judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect, would
be to vacate the office and leave the service. Unless we wish to nullify the impeachment
section of the Administrative Code, and thus possibly to encroach upon the jurisdiction
conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Organic Law, section 155 must be interpreted so
as to make it consistent therewith.
:As an instance of the latter class of decisions, in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr.
Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, said: ..It is clear . . . that each department is bound
to preserve its own existence if it live up to the duty imposed upon it as one of the
coordinate branches of the government. Whatever a person or entity ought to do or must do
in law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the power to maintain its
existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that end, courts may do or order done.
But the right to live, if that is all there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right to
breathe does not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore, courts have not only the
power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective
for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do all
things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their
integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice .
This is clear; for, if the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if
any one of them may be seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then
independence disappears and subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to
control, and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given
life to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can take it away or render it
useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything really essential for the
administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of
the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign power, permit
themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their creator did not itself

subordinate them.
:For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in
the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of
the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of
public officers, leave from for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance
may be made a judge of another district only with his consent.
:It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of
the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our
judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same.
Doctrine of holdover
Abas Kida v Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Facts: RA 6734 the law creating ARMM was passed. RA 9333 was subsequently passed by
congress to reset the ARMM regional to the 2nd monday of august 2005 and on the same
date every 3 years thereafter. Comelec begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted cocs but in 2011, RA 10153 was enacted resetting the ARMM elections to may
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. The law was
impugned on the ground because of its unconstitutionality. Petitioners challenged the grant
to the president of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials util the officials elected under the may 2013 regular election shall have
assumed office.
Held: To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No.
9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be
held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order
to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054,
until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) to hold special elections
in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs,
pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office.
:We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress
could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
:Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC: It is not competent for the
legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official
term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that
period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time
:In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows: It has been broadly stated that
the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which
is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution.
:Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of
the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its

mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be respected until the
Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional
process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate
from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. If at all,
Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.
:In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed
term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
:If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Congress cannot also create a new
term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively
an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is
a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
:Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension
beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
:Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember
that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or
implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.
:Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
F.Code of Conduct: R.A. 6713
Carabeo v CA, G.R. No. 178000 and 178003, Dec. 4, 2009
Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint with the office of the ombudsman against
Carabeo, OIC of the office of treasurer. It was alleged that his net worth drastically increased
and that he had numerous properties that he failed to disclose in his Statements of assets
and liabilities which was in violation of section 8a of ra 6713. Private respondents prayed
that the ombudsman issue an order filing the appropriate criminal informations against
Carabeo, to institute the appropriate cases against him for same violations, for dishonesty
and grave misconduct. This was approved. Meanwhile, Carabeo was detailed to the DOFs
bureau of local government finance at the DOF central office. He claimed that his detail
violated the TRO earlier issued which enjoined the enforcement of his preventive
suspension. Caribou appealed to this but the CA dismissed it and held that the preventive
suspension decreed by ombudsman is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to
insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation, which did not require prior
notice and hearing.
Issue: WON Ca committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction in not considering the complaint against Carabeo a violation of section 10 of RA
6713 which entitles Carabeo to be informed beforehand and to take necessary corrective
action

Held: Carabeo claims that the complaint against him involves a violation of Section 10, RA
6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
which entitles him to be informed beforehand of his omission and to take the necessary
corrective action.
:Section 10 of RA 6713 provides: Section 10. Review of Compliance Procedure. - (a) The
designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the
review of statements to determine whether said statements which have been submitted on
time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a determination is made that a
statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual
and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.
:While Section 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for corrective measures, Carabeo is charged not
only with violation of RA 6713, but also with violation of the Revised Penal Code, RA 1379,
and RA 3019, as amended, specifically Sections 7 and 8 thereof, which read
:In Ombudsman v. Valeroso, the Court explained fully the significance of these provisions, to
wit: Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be
suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in
the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and
minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. Unexplained matter normally results from non-disclosure or
concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and employees are mandated to
file, are the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers and
employees in the government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in
the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to verify
undisclosed properties and wealth.
:Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 that prior notice of the
non-completion of the SALN and its correction precede the filing of charges for violation of
its provisions. Neither are these measures needed for the charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, which Carabeo presently faces.
:Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed decision.
Part II
POWERS, DUTIES, PRIVILEGES & PROHIBITIONS
A. Source of power
Article II, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.
B. Scope of authority
Doctrine of necessary implication
Lo Cham v Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636, 638 (1946)
Facts:
Sec.168 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, provides that
the Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney
in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority as might be exercised by the
Attorney General or the Solicitor General.

Pursuant to such, Lo Cham, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, acting Chief, Medico-Legal
Section in the DOJ, was temporarily detailed to assist the City Fiscal of Manila, with the same
powers and functions of an Assistant Fiscal, by the Acting Secretary of Justice. He signed and
filed the information in three cases at bar after conducting preliminary investigation. The
defendant's attorney filed a motion to quash due to his lack of authority to sign information.

Issue:
Whether or not Lo Cham has the power to sign the information.

Ruling:
Yes.
It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule of statutory
interpretation that provisions should not be given a restricted meaning where no restriction
is indicated. Just as the express enumeration of persons, objects, situations, etc., is
construed to exclude those not mentioned, according to a well-known maxim, so no
distinction should be made where none appears to be intended. This is not an arbitrary rule
but one founded on logic. Was it the purpose of the legislature to confine the work to be
performed by the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal to certain duties in the fiscal's office
and deny him others? If it was, the law does not say so, and one would be at loss to know
what duties were conferred and what were not. It is fair to presume that if the legislature
had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal, to sign informations, make
investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or indicated its intention by
clear implication. We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those
referred to are the most important and outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually
needs aid.
The signing of complaints, making investigations, and conducting prosecutions are
not sacrosanct that only Presidential appointees or one expressly empowered by law may be
permitted to assume such functions. A lawyer invested with the same authority as an
Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed to be competent to be entrusted with any
of the duties devolving on a prosecuting attorney, due to the higher standard of training and
experience required.

Note:
Scope of duties of a public office:
a. Those essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was
created; or
b. Those, although incidental, or collateral are germane to and serve to promote the
accomplishment of the principal purpose.

The subject functions are inherent in the power to assist a prosecuting attorney, for these
are engrained in the office/designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed
on the appointee should be deemed to be in addition to the powers inherent to the
appointment.

C. Kinds of authority
Discretionary
Ministerial
Aprueba v Ganzon, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000
Facts:
Aprueba and Modoc filed a petition for mandamus against the City Mayor of Iloilo,
alleging that they are owners and operators of a cafeteria when respondent city mayor
ordered his policemen to close it for alleged violation of city ordinance as they did on same
date despite their protest; that when petitioner Aprueba saw respondent, he was informed
that the store could only be reopened if petitioners paid all their back accounts; that after
paying the back accounts, respondent still refused to allow reopening of the store and
instead chided him for working against respondents candidacy in the last elections; that
respondent told petitioner Aprueba to comply with health rules and regulations which he did;
that respondent told him later that the store space would be used as an extension (bodega)
of the city health office; that petitioners have no delinquency in rentals and have complied
with health rules and regulations and it is the ministerial duty of respondent to allow them to
operate the cafeteria and refreshment parlor business; that in refusing them to reopen their
business, respondent unlawfully excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right they
are entitled to, or unlawfully neglected performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; that respondents acts were
motivated by, personal and selfish considerations and intended to persecute, harass, and
ridicule his political enemies; that petitioners as a result suffered moral damages and
incurred attorneys fees in the sum of P5,500.00.
Petitioners prayed that a preliminary mandatory injunction issue commanding
respondent to order the reopening of the cafeteria and allow petitioners to operate their
business, and pay P5,500.00 as damages and attorneys fees and P5.00 daily from October
1, 1960 until reopening of the cafeteria.
Issue:

Whether or not the CFI correctly dismissed petitioners petition for mandamus.

Ruling:
Yes.
In refusing to grant mandamus, the trial court premised its action on the fact that
petitioners occupancy of stall 17-C in question in Iloilo City market is but a privilege which
the respondent mayor may or may not grant, but not a duty enjoined upon him by law, by
reason of his position. Note also that the refusal of respondent to allow reopening of the
cafeteria is predicated on the provision of Section 10 (m) of the City Charter which states:

SEC. 10. General duties and powers of the Mayor.The mayor shall have immediate
control over the executive functions of the several departments of the City, and shall have
the following general duties and powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(m) To grant and refuse municipal licenses and to revoke the same for violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance
are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the
business for which the same have been granted is carried out, or for any other good reason
of general interest.
Moreover, the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the permit (after the
implied lease contract expired) rested on the sound discretion of respondent and refusal on
his part to grant the continuance of the privilege (especially after petitioner Apruebas
alleged violation of city ordinance by allowing co-petitioner Modoc to operate business in
stall 17-C) cannot be the subject of an action for mandamus. In a long line of decisions, this
Court had held that mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of
a public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. The privilege of operating a market
stall under license is always subject to the police power of the city government and may be
refused or granted for reasons of public policy and sound public administration. Such
privilege is not absolute but revocable under an implied lease contract subject to the
general welfare clause.

First Phil. Holdings Corp. v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 88345, February 1, 1996
Facts:
PCGG prays for the return, reconveyance, accounting and restitution -with damages - of
certain funds and properties which were allegedly acquired by private respondents through
abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment. The herein petition states that
part of these funds and properties are some 6,299,177 sequestered shares of stock in the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) which were allegedly acquired by the
respondent spouses, as beneficial owners, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended, and therefore subject to forfeiture in favor of the Republic for being
unexplained wealth. Said shares were allegedly purchased from petitioner by respondent
Romualdez using respondents Equities and Narciso as his dummy buyers, with no or
negligible cash out.
Petitioner filed its own Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint in
Intervention in said Civil Case No. 0035 pending before respondent Court, alleging that the
PCIBank shares were obtained x x x by means of fraud and acts contrary to law, morals,
good customs and public policy, as well as in breach of fiduciary duty and thus their
acquisition thru a deed of Sale of Stocks and Escrow Agreement dated May 24, 1984 is
either voidable or void or unenforceable on any of said grounds. Petitioner also alleged that
the purchase price of P47,243,827.50 was extravagantly low as the book value at the time of
sale was P104,755,313.51 at P16.63 per share. To pay this P47 million, Equities borrowed
the exact same amount from SOLOIL, alleged to be another Romualdez front, which in turn
borrowed the same, using the facilities of PCIBank itself. Petitioner therefore asked in its
proposed Complaint in Intervention that said shares be returned to it.
Respondent court denied petitioners petition.

Narciso manifested that he has no personal claim or interest to any and all (of) the
shares of PCIBank. He affirmed that respondent Romualdez is the owner of Trans Middle East
(Phils.) Equities, Inc., which in turn owns the disputed shares.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment[10] submitted on August 8, 1989, stated that
petitioner did not have a legal interest to intervene because (t)he judgment would merely
render defendant Benjamin Romualdez and his corresponding co-defendants personally
obligated to either return or reconvey said shares of stock to public respondent, Republic of
the Philippines or to pay to it the full value thereof with interest. The execution or
implementation of the (said) judgment would not bar petitioners cause of action, if any, to
declare void the Sale of Stock and Escrow-Agreement dated May 24, 1984.
Issue:

Whether or not the writ of mandamus may be issued to compel respondent Court to
grant the Motion for Intervention when it should be found out that petitioner has legal
interest in the case and respondent Court has jurisdiction over the same.
Ruling:
Yes.
In resolving to deny petitioners motion for intervention, respondent Court abused its
discretion because, clearly, the question of ownership of the shares under sequestration is
within its jurisdiction, being an incident arising from or in connection with the case under its
exclusive and original jurisdiction. Indeed, as held in the above-mentioned cases, the
respondent Court has jurisdiction to entertain both complaints and answers in intervention
over properties under sequestration by the PCGG. With the denial of its intervention,
petitioner is deprived of a remedy in law to recover its property alleged to have been taken
illegally from it.
As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2(b), intervention shall be allowed in the exercise of
discretion by a court. Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary
act. But where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue.
These exceptions were recognized by this Court in Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, et al., [20] as
follows:
Although, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the performance
of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed
by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other, yet it is not accurate to say that
the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case
is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of authority.
In Antiquera vs. Baluyot, et al.,[21] such exceptions were allowed, because the
discretion must be exercised under the law, and not contrary to law.
D. Rights and privileges
Right to office
Right to compensation
Article VI, Section 10, 1987 Constitution
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
Article VII, Section 6

The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President
and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during
their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
Article VIII, Section 10
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Article IX-B, Section 8
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any
kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation.

CSC v Richard Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, Aug. 9, 2011

Facts:
The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was
charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio
Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement (Masasamang tao
ang mga BOD at General Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of
Directors (Board); four of the respondents subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance.
The dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondents act of claiming overtime pay
despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time record for three working
days.
The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct,
he stressed that three of the four witnesses already retracted their statements against him.
On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never failed to log in and log out. He
reasoned that the lack of record was caused by technical computer problems. The
respondent submitted documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three
days that the CMWD questioned.
GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration
of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board,
found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from
the service.
CSC: absolved respondent of two charges (it did not find factual basis to support the
charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty) and ordered his reinstatement.
In ruling that the respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC held:
Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct for his alleged utterance of such
maligning statements, MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL MANAGER.
However, such utterance, even if it were true, does not constitute a flagrant disregard of
rule or was actuated by corrupt motive. To the mind of the Commission, it was a mere
expression of disgust over the management style of the GM and the Board of Directors,
especially when due notice is taken of the fact that the latter officials were charged with the
Ombudsman for various anomalous transactions.
In ruling that the charge of dishonesty had no factual basis, the CSC declared:
Based on the records of the case, the Commission is not swayed that the failure of
Cruz to record his attendance on April 21 and 22, 2007 and May 5, 2007, while claiming

overtime pay therefor, amounts to dishonesty. Cruz duly submitted evidence showing his
actual rendition of work on those days. The residents of the place where he worked attested
to his presence thereat on the days in question.
The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules
for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but did not
order the payment of back salaries.
The CMWD and the respondent separately filed motions for reconsideration against
the CSC ruling. CMWD questioned the CSCs findings and the respondents reinstatement.
The respondent, for his part, claimed that he is entitled to back salaries in light of his
exoneration from the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC denied both
motions.
CA: Applying the ruling in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[8] the CA found merit in the
respondents appeal and awarded him back salaries from the time he was dismissed up to
his actual reinstatement. The CA reasoned out that CSC Resolution No. 080305 totally
exonerated the respondent from the charges laid against him. The CA considered the charge
of dishonesty successfully refuted as the respondent showed that he performed overtime
service. The CA thereby rejected the CSCs contention that the charge of dishonesty had
been merely downgraded to a lesser offense; the CA saw the finding in CSC Resolution No.
080305 to be for an offense (failing to properly record his attendance) entirely different from
the dishonesty charge because their factual bases are different. Thus, to the CA, CSC
Resolution No. 080305 did not wholly restore the respondents rights as an exonerated
employee as it failed to order the payment of his back salaries.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent Cruz is entitled to back salaries after CSC ordered his
reinstatement to his former position, consonant with its ruling that the latter is only guilty of
violating office rules and regulations.
Ruling:
Yes, but for the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the
respondent is not entitled to any back salaries.
The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending
appeal, of a government employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently
exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Courts starting point for this outcome is the no
work-no pay principle public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render
service. We have excepted from this general principle and awarded back salaries even for
unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the
constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law; To deny these employees their back salaries
amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the charge that
led to their dismissal or suspension.
The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. x x x.
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
(italics ours)
This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it
does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our established rulings hold
that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension as the law
itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee
may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the
charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning behind these conditions
runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the
pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a
fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be
compensated.
The Court held that a government employee, who was suspended from work pending
final action on his administrative case, is not entitled to back salaries where he was
ultimately removed due to the valid appointment of his successor. No exoneration or
reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in this case; thus, the question of back
salaries after exoneration and reinstatement did not directly arise. The Court, however,
made the general statement that:
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service, and the justification for the
payment of salary during the period of suspension is that the suspension was
unjustified or that the official was innocent. Hence, the requirement that, to entitle to
payment of salary during suspension, there must be either reinstatement of the suspended
person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement impossible.
We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during
the period he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his
former position. The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty
against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive showing
malice on the part of the respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC
found that the charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the respondents evidence showing
that he rendered overtime work on the days in question.
We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA
affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondents entitlement
to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CAs conclusion that the two conditions to
justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty
of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and
log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to
render overtime work) that he was charged with.
The second condition was met as the respondents committed offense merits neither
dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.
In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by
the CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive
suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending
investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries per our ruling in Hon.
Gloria: it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him.
In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when
an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges
which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.
Presidential immunity from suit
Doctrine of official immunity
Farolan v Solmac Mktg., G.R. No. 83589, 3-13-91
Facts:
Ramon Farolan, Acting Commissioner of Customs and petitioner Guillermo Parayno,
Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division were sued in their official

capacities as officers in the government. They were held personally liable for damages for
detaining the goods of Solmac which as irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done
in the regular performance of their official duties.
Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an
importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically
known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05.
The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in
December, 1981. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent
SOLMAC for its authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the
bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for
polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the importation
were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. 6 In other
words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee respondent
SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented
polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B.
Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the
BOI and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject
importation.
Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or not the subject
importation may be released. The BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but
that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. Counsel
for respondent Solmac asked for the release of the importation but such was not released,
however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them first.
Counsel of the respondent prayed for the unconditional release of the subject
importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
RTC ordered the release of the importations immediately without drilling of holes,
subject only to the normal requirements of the customs.
Solmac appealed decision to the CA for ordering of damages. CA, in turn, ordered
petitioners, solidarily and in their personal capacity, to award damages to respondent
Solmac.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners acted in good faith in in not immediately releasing the
importations and are liable to pay respondent Solmac damages.
Ruling:
No.
We defined good faith as "refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud,
and its absence should be established by convincing evidence."
We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and
convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record
is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the
report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated January 25, 1982
that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film
scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material, whose importation
to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under the LOI.
It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the
subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on many
occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject
importation might be released.

It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin,
Vice-Chairman Tordesillas, and Governor Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in
agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject of the various importations of
Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs.
The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek
final clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. This
resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of
such importations. The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates
bad faith. Thus the trial court's finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not
immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this
matter is correct. It is supported by substantial evidence on record, independent of the
presumption of good faith, which as stated earlier, was not successfully rebutted.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties
of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution,
and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar,
prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines
regarding the disposition of the various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and
polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film
products were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented
polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to meet local demands,
hence, their importation was restricted, if not prohibited under LOI 658-B. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot be said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import
goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public
officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to
implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully complied with.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the
release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film
scraps, 20 contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and
Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to
see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in
making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever
damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all,
is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public
officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 21 After all, "even under the law of public officers,
the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.
In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty
has been regularly performed applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite
et solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was
private respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. We are not
persuaded that it has been able to do so.
Tuzon v CA, G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992
Facts:

In March 14, 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, unanimously

adopted Resolution No. 9, wherein the municipality has embarked in the construction of
Sports and Nutrition Center, and as a fund-raising scheme, to help finance the construction
of the project, it solicits 1% donation from the thresher operators who will apply for a permit
to thresh within the jurisdiction of this municipality, of all the palay threshed by them to help
finance the continuation of the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building. To
implement the resolution, petitioner Lope C. Mapagu, then incumbent municipal treasurer,
prepared an agreement document for signature of all thresher/owner/operators applying for
a mayors permit.

Soon thereafter, private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the
municipal treasurers office to pay the license fee of P285.00 for thresher operators. Mapagu
refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayors permit. For his
part, Mayor Domingo Tuzon, the herein other petitioner, said that Jurado should first comply
with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. Jurado
ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee by postal money order to
the office of the municipal treasurer who, however, returned the said amount. The reason
given was the failure of the respondent to comply with Resolution No. 9.
On April 4, 1977, Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan a special
civil action for mandamus with actual and moral damages to compel the issuance of the
mayors permit and license. On May 31, 1977, he filed another petition with the same court.
This time for declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the implementing
agreement) for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants
were the same respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Camalaniugan.
RTC: resolution is valid and NO malice on the part of the mayor and treasurer.
CA: resolution is valid but attended by malice on the part of the mayor and treasurer,
and awarded damages to Jurado.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the refusal on the part of the petitioners in granting the license is
unjustified and constitutes bad faith.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are liable in damages.
Ruling:
1. No.
The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Art. 27 of the NCC. 1
According to Phil. Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, the provision presupposes that the refusal
or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or
inexcusable negligence. In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor
Tuzons refusal to act on the private respondents application was an attempt to compel him
to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the
mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly
negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners
singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the
petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit and
license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurados business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record
discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the
municipality without discrimination or preference.
The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners acts, he was
prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom,
as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have
taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later
challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he
could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante
that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners wrongful act. He could have opted
for the less obstinate but still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.

1. Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative
action that may be taken.

2. No.
The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative
action
that
may
be
taken.
It has been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the "bribery system,
where the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his
duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak." 7 Official inaction may also be due to plain
indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service. According to Phil.
Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 8 the provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a
public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence.
In any event, the erring public functionary is justly punishable under this article for whatever
loss or damage the complainant has sustained.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzons refusal to act
on the private respondents application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to
obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal
treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the
permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners
singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the
petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit and
license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurados business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record
discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality
without discrimination or preference.
The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their authority
and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree
that it was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring
it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the
appellate court said there was nothing wrong with it). As executive officials of the
municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the
Sangguniang
Bayan
or
annulled
by
the
courts.
. . . As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally
liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority,
and
in
line
of
his
official
duty.
. . . It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor
does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages.
(Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99).
Preference in promotion
Leave of absence
Retirement pay
E. Prohibitions
Sections 2(3), 8, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution

Section 2 (3). No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause provided by law.
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law,
nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or
title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation.

Part III
Liabilities of Public Officers
A. Presumption of good faith & regularity
Sections 38 and 39, Administrative Code
SECTION 38. Liability of Superior Officers.(1) A public officer shall not be civilly
liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear
showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a
period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period if none is fixed, shall
be liable for damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to such other
liability as may be prescribed by law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates,
unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of.
SECTION 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee
shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his
duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are
contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under
orders or instructions of his superiors.

Farolan v Solmac Mktg., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991

Facts:
Ramon Farolan, Acting Commissioner of Customs and petitioner Guillermo Parayno,
Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division were sued in their official
capacities as officers in the government. They were held personally liable for damages for
detaining the goods of Solmac which as irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done
in the regular performance of their official duties.
Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an
importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically
known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05.
The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in
December, 1981. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent

SOLMAC for its authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the
bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for
polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the importation
were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. 6 In other
words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee respondent
SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented
polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B.
Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the
BOI and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject
importation.
Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or not the subject
importation may be released. The BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but
that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. Counsel
for respondent Solmac asked for the release of the importation but such was not released,
however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them first.
Counsel of the respondent prayed for the unconditional release of the subject
importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
RTC ordered the release of the importations immediately without drilling of holes,
subject only to the normal requirements of the customs.
Solmac appealed decision to the CA for ordering of damages. CA, in turn, ordered
petitioners, solidarily and in their personal capacity, to award damages to respondent
Solmac.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners acted in good faith in in not immediately releasing the
importations and are liable to pay respondent Solmac damages.
Ruling:
No.
We defined good faith as "refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud,
and its absence should be established by convincing evidence."
We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and
convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record
is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the
report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated January 25, 1982
that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film
scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material, whose importation
to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under the LOI.
It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the
subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on many
occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject
importation might be released.
It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin,
Vice-Chairman Tordesillas, and Governor Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in
agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject of the various importations of
Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs.
The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek
final clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. This
resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of
such importations. The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates
bad faith. Thus the trial court's finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not

immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this
matter is correct. It is supported by substantial evidence on record, independent of the
presumption of good faith, which as stated earlier, was not successfully rebutted.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties
of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution,
and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar,
prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines
regarding the disposition of the various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and
polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film
products were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented
polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to meet local demands,
hence, their importation was restricted, if not prohibited under LOI 658-B. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot be said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import
goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public
officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to
implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully complied with.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the
release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film
scraps, 20 contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and
Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to
see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in
making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever
damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all,
is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public
officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 21 After all, "even under the law of public officers,
the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.
In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty
has been regularly performed applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite
et solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was
private respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. We are not
persuaded that it has been able to do so.
Tuzon v CA, G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992
Facts:
In March 14, 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 9, wherein the municipality has embarked in the construction of
Sports and Nutrition Center, and as a fund-raising scheme, to help finance the construction
of the project, it solicits 1% donation from the thresher operators who will apply for a permit
to thresh within the jurisdiction of this municipality, of all the palay threshed by them to help
finance the continuation of the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building. To
implement the resolution, petitioner Lope C. Mapagu, then incumbent municipal treasurer,
prepared an agreement document for signature of all thresher/owner/operators applying for
a mayors permit.
Soon thereafter, private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the
municipal treasurers office to pay the license fee of P285.00 for thresher operators. Mapagu
refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayors permit. For his
part, Mayor Domingo Tuzon, the herein other petitioner, said that Jurado should first comply
with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. Jurado
ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee by postal money order to
the office of the municipal treasurer who, however, returned the said amount. The reason
given was the failure of the respondent to comply with Resolution No. 9.

On April 4, 1977, Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan a special
civil action for mandamus with actual and moral damages to compel the issuance of the
mayors permit and license. On May 31, 1977, he filed another petition with the same court.
This time for declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the implementing
agreement) for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants
were the same respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Camalaniugan.
RTC: resolution is valid and NO malice on the part of the mayor and treasurer.
CA: resolution is valid but attended by malice on the part of the mayor and treasurer,
and awarded damages to Jurado.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the refusal on the part of the petitioners in granting the license is
unjustified and constitutes bad faith.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are liable in damages.
Ruling:
1. No.
The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Art. 27 of the NCC. 2
According to Phil. Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, the provision presupposes that the refusal
or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or
inexcusable negligence. In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor
Tuzons refusal to act on the private respondents application was an attempt to compel him
to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the
mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly
negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners
singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the
petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit and
license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurados business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record
discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the
municipality without discrimination or preference.
The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners acts, he was
prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom,
as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have
taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later
challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he
could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante
that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners wrongful act. He could have opted
for the less obstinate but still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.

Phil. Racing Club v Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-11910, 9-31-60

Facts:
In a race held at the Sta. Ana Hippodrome belonging to the Philippine Racing Club,
the competing horses went off to a faulty start. When the barrier was lifted, one of the
horses turned around and blocked the three horses at its left thus enabling the three horses

2. Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative
action that may be taken.

on the right side to run ahead and gain a good lead. The official starter signaled the
stewards indicating that the race should be cancelled. However, it was left unheeded and
the steward told the starter to shut up.
When the winning horses as well as the corresponding dividends were announced,
the betting public showed its disapproval of the result. A commotion resulted which reached
the knowledge of the Commission on Races, which includes respondent Bonifacio. The
commission held the stewards to do an on spot investigation and finding that indeed there
was a faulty start, the former announced to the public of the cancellation of the race. While
the investigation was on going, the holders of the winning tickets were able to cash them
while those of the losing were to be refunded.
Plaintiff PRC commenced this action alleging that the Commission acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction when they ordered the cancellation of the race and the return of the
bets of those losing ticket, said acts having caused PRC moral damages for having placed
their reputation under public suspicion. Commission countered that they did so merely
pursuant to their official duties as members of the Commission on Races and after
conducting an on the spot investigation at which plaintiffs and its employees were heard,
and hence they cannot be held liable for damages.
CFI find for plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision finding that the race started in a very
faulty manner and for that reason the Board of Stewards which had the authority to suspend
or cancel the race under the rules and regulations on the matter should have decreed its
cancellation as was so insistently recommended by the official starter.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commissioners should be held liable.
Ruling:
No.
It would, therefore, appear that in every horse race the rule requires that there be a
board of judges who should determine the result of the race and whose decisions are final
and unappealable. In addition, the rule requires that there be a board of stewards which
among others, is given the power to "annul any race before the horses reach their
destination if in their opinion there is a bad start or any other incident takes place that
makes such action necessary" (as translated). Hence, there are two groups of officials who
act in every race whose functions are different from the other: the board of judges and the
board of stewards. The judges determine who the winners are, their decision being final and
irrevocable; the stewards, on the other hand, are given the power to annul any race if in
their opinion there is a bad start or some good reasons exist justifying it. And over these
officials we have the Commission on Races which is charged with the duty to supervise their
action and the performance of their duties in connection with the races.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the action taken by the Commission on Races
cancelling or annulling the race held on July 23, 1950 for the reason that there was a faulty
start on the part of some horses was in excess of the authority granted to it by law. It is true,
as already stated, that the Commission on Races has the supervision over all horse races
and over all race officials and employees having connection with their operations, but such
power of supervision cannot be extended to functions which belong to other officials as
delimited by law. As defined by this Court, supervision only means overseeing or the power
or authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It is different from control
which includes the power to alter, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer may do in
the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the superior for that
of his subordinate (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6] 2884). This power of
control has been withheld from the Commission.
However, considering that respondents have acted in their official capacity in the honest
belief that they had such power as in fact they acted on the matter only after an on the spot
investigation, we hold that they cannot be held liable for damages. In this sense, the
decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. As a rule, a public officer, whether
judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable to one injured as a consequence
of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official
duty. In order that acts may be done within the scope of official authority, it is not necessary
that they be prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or requested by
a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they have more or less connection
with such matters, or that they have more or less connection with such matters, or that they
are governed by a lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the officer is
acting. Under this principle, state building commissioners who, in obedience to a statute,
discharge one who has been employed to construct a state building, take possession of the
work, and place it in the hands of another contractor, are not liable to the former contractor
in damages, since in so doing they are merely acting in the line of their duty. An officer is
not personally responsible for the necessary and unavoidable destruction of goods stored in
buildings, when such buildings were destroyed by him in the lawful performance of a public
duty imposed on him by a valid and constitutional statute.x x x
xxx
xxx
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. Where an officer is invested with discretion and
is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him, he is sometimes
called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is actually given immunity from liability
to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however
erroneous judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of
the officer's authority, and without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.

B. Kinds of liability
Nonfeasance
Misfeasance
Malfeasance
Test to determine if offense was committed in relation
to the office
Crisostomo v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152389, 4-14-05
Facts:
On 19 October 1993, Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail
guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba (Renato), a
detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. The Information alleged that Crisostomo
conspired with his co-accused, Dominador C. dela Cruz (dela Cruz), Efren M. Perez
(Perez), Raki T. Anggo (Anggo), Randy A. Lumabo (Lumabo), Rolando M. Norberte
(Norberte) and Mario Calingayan (Calingayan), all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in
murdering Renato. The Information reads in full:
That on or about the 14th day of February 1989, in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Pat. Edgar T.
Crisostomo, a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position
and thus committing the offense in relation to his office, conspiring, confederating and
conniving with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail, namely:
Dominador C. dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M.
Norberte and Mario B. Calingayan, with intent to kill and with treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength and with the aid of armed men or employing means to weaken the defense
or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack and assault one Renato Suba, a detention prisoner, with the use of

rough-surfaced instruments, including fist blows, inflicting upon him serious injuries causing
his internal organs to be badly damaged such as his liver, messentery and stomach resulting
to the death of said Renato Suba to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
Prosecution:
On 13 February 1989, Renato was detained at the municipal jail in Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya for allegedly hitting the head of one Diosdado Lacangan. The following day, 14
February 1989, at 5:00 p.m., Renatos brother Rizalino Suba (Rizalino) visited him at the
municipal jail. Renato asked Rizalino to bring him blanket, toothbrush, clothes and food.
Rizalino left the municipal jail that day at 5:20 p.m. At that time, Renato was in good
physical condition and did not complain of any bodily pain. Renato was 26 years old, single,
and was employed in a logging concession.
At 9:00 p.m., a barangay councilman informed Rizalino that policemen assigned at the
Solano municipal jail wanted Rizalino to go to the municipal building. Rizalino arrived at the
municipal jail at 9:10 p.m. and saw his brother Renato already dead on the floor outside his
cell.
Renato was detained alone in the third cell, one of the four cells at the municipal jail.
Although each of the four cells had an iron grill door equipped with a padlock, the doors
were usually left open. The keys to the padlocks were with the jail guard. There was a
common front door, which no one could enter but the jail guard. Only one jail guard at a
time was assigned at the municipal jail. Crisostomo was the one on duty at the time of the
death of Renato. At no time was Renato brought out of the cell during his detention on 13
February 1989 until his death in the evening of the following day. Crisostomos position in
relation to the cell where the victim was killed was such that Crisostomo as jail guard could
have heard if not seen what was going on inside the cell at the time that Renato was killed.
There are unexplained discrepancies in the list of detainees/prisoners and police blotter.
The list of detainees/prisoners dated 20 February 1989 shows that there were eight
prisoners on 14 February 1989, including Renato, but after Renatos death, only six were
turned over by Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard. On 15 February 1989, nine
prisoners/detainees were on the list, including Renato who was already dead. However,
the police blotter shows that only six prisoners were under custody. The persons who were
detained with Renato at the time of his death were released without being investigated by
the Solano police.
Renato did not commit suicide. His body bore extensive injuries that could have been
inflicted by several persons. The exhumation and autopsy reports ruled out suicide as the
cause of Renatos death. The deafening silence of the inmates and the jail guard,
Crisostomo, point to a conspiracy. Crisostomos guilt is made apparent when he jumped bail
during trial.
Defense:
The presentation of evidence for Crisostomos defense was deemed waived for his
failure to appear at the scheduled hearings despite notice.
Calingayan, Crisostomos co-accused, was the sole witness for the defense. Calingayan
was only 16 years old at the time that he was charged with the murder of Renato.
Calingayan denied killing Renato.

Calingayan was detained at the Solano Municipal Jail on 12 February 1989 because his
brother-in-law, Patrolman Feliciano Leal (Leal), also a jail guard, had him arrested for
pawning some of the belongings of Leal. Leal told Calingayan that he had him detained for
safekeeping to teach him a lesson.
Renato was detained on 13 February 1989.
detained for hitting somebodys head.

Calingayan learned that Renato was

There were four cells at the municipal jail. Calingayan was detained with five other
inmates in the second cell. Renato was detained alone in the third cell. The four cells had
their own separate doors with padlocks but each door was always open. It was up to the
inmates to close the doors. A common door leading to the four cells was always padlocked
and no one could enter the door without the jail guards permission. The jail guard had the
keys to the cells and the common door. Only one jail guard was assigned to guard the cells.
Crisostomo was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato died.
Calingayan was in jail for three days or until 15 February 1989. Calingayan last saw
Renato alive between 5 to 6 p.m. of 14 February 1989. Just as Calingayan was about to take
a bath after 6 p.m., he saw Renato lying down. One of the inmates asked for Renatos food
because he did not like to eat his food. After taking a bath, Calingayan went back to his cell
and played cards with his three cellmates whose names he could not recall. Calingayan did
not leave his cell during the four hours that he played cards but one of his cellmates went
out.
Calingayan discovered Renatos body on 14 February 1989 between 9:00 p.m. to 10:00
p.m. Calingayan went to the fourth cell, where the comfort room was located, to urinate.
While urinating, Calingayan saw at the corner of the cell a shadow beside him. A bulb at the
alley lighted the cell. Calingayan ran away and called the other inmates, telling them that
the person in cell number four was in the dark place. The other inmates ran towards the
place and shouted si kuwan, si kuwan. Crisostomo was in the room at the left side from
where Calingayan was detained, about fifteen meters away. Upon hearing the shouts,
Crisostomo opened the main door. Once inside the cell, Crisostomo instructed the inmates
to bring down Renatos body that was hanging from the iron bars of the window of the cell.
At that time, Calingayan did not notice what was used in hanging Renato but when the body
was brought outside, Calingayan saw that Renato had hanged himself with a thin blanket.
The four cells are not similar in area and size. The cell where Renato stayed is the
smallest. The cells are separated by a partition made of hollow blocks as high as the
ceiling. The four cells are in one line so that if you are in one cell you cannot see what is
happening in the other cells. The inmates could go to any of the four cells in the prison but
they could not get out of the main door without the permission of the jail guard. The
comfort room is in the fourth cell, which is also open so that the inmates would not anymore
ask for the key from the office of the jail guard.
The blanket that Renato used to hang himself was tied to the iron grills of the window of
the cell. The window is small, only about two feet by one and one-half feet with eight iron
bars. The window is nine feet from the floor.
No other person was admitted on 14 February 1989. Calingayan does not have a grudge
against Renato. He could not recall if there was any untoward incident between Renato and
the other inmates. The Solano police investigated Calingayan the next morning.

SB: The Sandiganbayan found sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict Crisostomo

and Calingayan of murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Crisostomo committed the crime in relation to his office, thus giving
Sandiganbayan the jurisdiction to try his case.

Ruling:
Yes.
Crisostomo insists that there is no direct relation between the commission of murder
and Crisostomos public office. Crisostomo further contends that the mere allegation in the
Information that the offense was committed in relation to Crisostomos office is not sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. Such allegation without the specific factual
averments is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of Crisostomos official duties.
Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable provision of law
is Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 (PD 1861), which
took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended provision reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a)

Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(2)
Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed
by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Crisostomo would have the Court believe that being a jail guard is a mere incidental
circumstance that bears no close intimacy with the commission of murder. Crisostomos
theory would have been tenable if the murdered victim was not a prisoner under his custody
as a jail guard. The function of a jail guard is to insure the safe custody and
proper confinement of persons detained in the jail. In this case, the Information alleges
that the victim was a detention prisoner when Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired with the
inmates to kill him.

Indeed, murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public office. No
public office will ever be a constituent element of murder. When then would murder or
homicide, committed by a public officer, fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan? People v. Montejo[7] provides the answer. The Court explained that a
public officer commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while
performing, though in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot
commit the offense without holding his public office. In such a case, there is an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the accused. If the information alleges the
close connection between the offense charged and the office of the accused, the case falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People v. Montejo is an exception
that Sanchez v. Demetriou recognized.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will stand or fall on this test:
Does the Information allege a close or intimate connection between the offense charged and
Crisostomos public office?
The Information passes the test.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo a public officer, being then a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat,
taking advantage of his public position and thus committing the offense in relation to his
office conspired, confederated and connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the
Solano Municipal Jail to kill Renato, a detention prisoner.
If the victim were not a prisoner, the Information would have to state particularly the
intimate relationship between the offense charged and the accused public officers office to
vest jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. This is not the case here. The law restrains the
liberty of a prisoner and puts him under the custody and watchful eyes of his jail guard.
Again, the two-fold duties of a jail guard are to insure the safe custody and
proper confinement of persons detained in the jail. The law restricts access to a prisoner.
However, because of the very nature of the work of a jail guard, he has access to the
prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard, could not have conspired with the inmates
to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a jailer.
The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a detention prisoner, a crime that
collides directly with Crisostomos office as a jail guard who has the duty to insure the safe
custody of the prisoner. Crisostomos purported act of killing a detention prisoner, while
irregular and contrary to Crisostomos duties, was committed while he was performing his
official functions. The Information sufficiently apprised Crisostomo that he stood accused of
committing the crime in relation to his office, a case that is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, not the Regional Trial Court. There was no prejudice to Crisostomos
substantive rights.
Esteban v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 146646-69, 3-11-05
Facts:
Ana May (more like, Chena Mae) was a casual employee at the City Govt of
Cabanatuan. She was detailed with the MTC upon the incessant request of its presiding
judge Petitioner Esteban (JORAM ni, sure jud ko). She applied for bookbinder but petitioner
did not act on her application. Consequently, she went to the petitioners chambers to follow
up her application. Esteban told her, Ano naman ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito?
Mula ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito sa opisina ko, at araw-araw,
isang halik. (mao na na!!! Joram gyud ni.)

Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly

kissed her on her left cheek. She was shocked and left the chambers, swearing never to
return or talk to petitioner.
One morning, the court interpreter told Ana May that the Judge Esteban wanted to see
her in his chambers regarding the payroll. As a subordinate, she complied. Once inside,
petitioner asked her if she has been receiving her salary as a bookbinder. When she
answered in the affirmative, he said, Matagal na pala eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa
kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?
Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and that he is a
married man with two sons.
Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, Hindi pwede yan, mahal
kita. (I cant allow that for I love you.) He embraced her, kissing her all over her face and
touching her right breast.
Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the payroll on
the table of her co-employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed something was
wrong and accompanied Ana May to the restroom. There she told Elizabeth what happened.
On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan criminal
charges.
Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in
relation to his office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official is not an essential
element of the crimes charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the criminal cases or
petitioner judge committed the offense in relation to his office.

Ruling:
Yes.

[10]

Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,
reads in part:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
In People v. Montejo, we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if the offense is intimately connected with the office of the

offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This
intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information. Hence, where the information is wanting in specific factual averments to show
the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. The Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations
showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his
official function.

C. Three-fold liability rule

San Luis v CA, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989
Facts:
Pvt respondent is the quarry superintendent in Laguna. He denounced graft and
corrupt practices by the employees of the Provincial Govt.
Petitioner Governor transferred pct respondent Berroya to the office of the Provincial
Engr through an Order. Respondent challenged the transfer which the CSC ruled as violative
of RA 22600 and the same ordered respondents reversion to his original position. Governor
did not follow the order of CSC but instead suspended respondent for alleged gross
discourtesy, inefficiency and insubordination. CSC reiterated to revert respondent to his
original position and declared the suspension as illegal. Governor appealed to the Office of
the President from the CSC rulings alluded to. OP reversed the CSC rulings. Respondent
moved for recon, the OP reversed its first decision and held the suspension improper.
In the interim, governor issued an Order dismissing respondent for alleged neglect of
duty, frequent unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and
abandonment of office. CSC declared the dismissal unjustified.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner governor is criminally, civilly, and administratively liable.
Ruling:
Where, as in this case, the provincial governor obstinately refused to reinstate the
petitioner, in defiance of the orders of the Office of the President and the Ministry of Local
Government and in palpable disregard of the opinion of the Civil Service Commission, the
appellate court's finding of bad faith cannot be faulted and accordingly, will not be disturbed
by this Tribunal Enciso v. Remo, G.R. No. L-23670, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580.] This
is in line with our previous ruling in Remo v. Palacio [107 Phil. 803 (1960)] that
xxx xxx xxx
(i)t having been clearly shown by evidence, that respondent, Deogracias Remo, in his
capacity as Mayor of Goa, refused to reinstate the petitioner to his former position in the
police force of Goa, despite the orders of Malacanang to do so (Exhs. G and I), and inspite of
the opinion of the Secretary of Finance (Exh. H), the respondent Mayor of Goa, willfully
acted in bad faith, and therefore, he, as Mayor of Goa, should pay for damages caused to
the petitioner, Angel Enciso. [At pp. 807-808.]

It is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty, particularly
when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable
for his acts like any private individual [Palma v. Graciano, 99 Phil. 72 (1956)].
Thus, in Mendoza v. De Leon [33 Phil. 508 (1916)], it was held:
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental
duties which are in their nature legislative or quasi-judicial liable for the consequences of
their official acts, unless it be shown that they act wilfully and maliciously and with the
express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff [at 513; Emphasis supplied].
Accordingly, applying the principle that a public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not
immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith
[Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16290, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 413; Correa v.
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, G. R. No. L-46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312], the Court
holds that petitioner Felicisimo T. San Luis, the Provincial Governor of Laguna who has been
sued both in his official and private capacities, must be held personally liable to Berroya for
the consequences of his illegal and wrongful acts.
In this regard, the Court sustains the appellate court's finding that petitioner San Luis must
be held liable to Berroya for moral damages since justice demands that the latter be
recompensed for the mental suffering and hardship he went through in order to vindicate his
right, apart from the back salaries legally due him [Rama v. Court of Appeals, supra at p.
5061]. The appellate court was clearly warranted in awarding moral damages in favor of
respondent Berroya because of the obstinacy of petitioner Governor who arbitrarily and
without legal justification refused Berroya's reinstatement in defiance of directives of the
administrative agencies with final authority on the matter. We agree with the appellate court
that the sum of P 50,000.00 for moral damages is a reasonable award considering the
mental anguish and serious anxiety suffered by Berroya as a result of the wrongful acts of
petitioner Governor in refusing to reinstate him.
Finally, as correctly adjudged by respondent court, petitioner San Luis must likewise answer
to Berroya for attorney's fees plus costs and expenses of suit, which have been fixed by said
court at P 20,000.00, in view of the wrongful refusal of petitioner provincial governor to
afford Berroya his plainly valid and just claim for reinstatement and back salaries.
Chavez v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 91391, Jan. 24, 1991
Facts:
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and
accounting, restitution and damages.
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the
petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment
suit" against him.
All the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity
from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the
petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It may be noted that the private respondent Enrile did not limit himself to general
averments of malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG

Chairman Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the
allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed the complaint.
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against
him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic.
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising
his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases
pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the
same case.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner, in his capacity as Sol-GEn is immune from suit.

Ruling:
Yes.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general
immunity arising solely from occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held
liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of
the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA
408 [1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the
Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also
because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of
Civil Service to reinstate.
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held
personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service
eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative
investigation.
In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16
1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial
auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and
severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the
province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations.
(Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor
grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or,
as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG
commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless
suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can
be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in
government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions
governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken
against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile
to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that action must
be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Domingo v Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008
Facts:

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III
at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary
Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. Secretary Laguesma
submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP issued AO 119, disagreeing with the recommendation that
respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
considering the circumstances of the case because of the nature of the position of Reyala as
occupying the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. Long digest by Ernani
Tadili.It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from service for being found guilty of grave
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of
suspension of service for the maximum period of one (1) year.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not
guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or
request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion.
According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was
merely Domingos perception of malice in his alleged acts a "product of her own
imagination"25 that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a particular person, not
against society as a whole.
Issue:

Whether or not Rayala is liable for sexual harassment .

Ruling:
Yes.
CA and OP were unanimous in holding that RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment.
They only differ in the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment
is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by
substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are
accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates
that such findings should bind us.40
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because
Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement
of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a
higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. 43 This
rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof
defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,

supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or
training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way
would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing
labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful
act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or
Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related,
educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of
acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office
shall:
Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly
approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases
and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for
unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include,
among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training
institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment.
The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees to
increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or
post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely
on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense,
not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along
with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence
to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA
7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a
"demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written
statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding
and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear,
having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses

with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for
a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or
requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher
position. It is enough that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating
and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the
Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to
another unit.
Office of the President. v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445,
September 14, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Cataquiz, then General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, was being ousted in a petition by a majority of the members of the Management
Committee and the rank and file employees of the LLDA, on the grounds of corrupt and
unprofessional behavior and management incompetence. In an investigation into the
allegations against Cataquiz ordered by Secretary Gozun of the DENR, it was determined
that respondent may be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
government and for violations of several pertinent laws and regulations. It was
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. Later, a
duly organized employees union of the LLDA, CELLDA, filed a complaint before the PAGC
charging Cataquiz with violations of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), The
Administrative Code and The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The Office of the President adopted the findings and recommendations of PAGC,
and dismissed the respondent from service. The decision was amended by the OP imposing
the penalties of disqualification from re-employment and forfeiture of retirement benefits
because the penalty of dismissal was no longer available to him because of his replacement
as General Manager of LLDA. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Meanwhile, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the charges against respondent for
violation of RA No. 3019.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the charges against respondent by the Ombudsman
serves as a bar to the finding of administrative liability.
Ruling:
No.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability: The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other
can be attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence required
and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle
that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or
that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.
D. Liability of Superior Officers for Acts of Subordinates
Cesa v Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166658, April 30, 2008
Facts:

On March 5, 1998, government auditors conducted a surprise audit at the Cash

Division of Cebu City Hall. Getting wind of the surprise audit, paymaster Rosalina
G.Badana hurriedly left her office and, since then, never returned. From September 20,
1995 to March 5, 1998, Badana had cash advances of more than P216 million fraudulently
incurred by presenting cash items such as payrolls and vouchers already previously credited
to her account to cover the balance or shortage during cash counts. Her unliquidated cash
advances were more than P18 million. The government auditors discovered that Badana had
an average monthly cash advance of P7.6 million in excess of her monthly payroll of P5.7
million, and was granted more advances without liquidating previous advances.
On April 3, 1998, the Ombudsman impleaded Cesa and other city officials.
[5]
Affirming the audit teams report, graft investigators concluded that the city officials
failure to observe relevant laws[6] and rules[7] governing the grant, utilization and liquidation
of cash advances facilitated, promoted, and encouraged the defalcation of public funds. The
irregularities could not have happened without the officials acts and omissions, as they
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent losses of funds and
efficiently supervise the paymasters.
Cesa argued before the Ombudsman that he could not grant cash advances as the
authority belongs to a higher officer and that he signed the cash advance vouchers not as
approving officer but because his signature was required therein. He further argued
that Badanas cash advances were legal and necessary for city workers salaries and that the
matter could be resolved by the city accountant. He also emphasized that since he had under
him five department heads, he was not expected to review the work of some 370 workers under
them, by virtue of division of labor and delegation of functions.
Ombudsman found Cesa and the other city officials guilty of neglect of duty and
meted to them the penalty of six months suspension without pay.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Cesas gripe that there was lack of due process as
the Ombudsman can undertake criminal or administrative investigations sans any
complaint. It found Cesa negligent for tolerating the illegal practices on cash advances
because he approved the paymasters requests for cash advances based on pieces of paper
without any particulars and without diligent supervision over them. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the Arias ruling[13] where this Court held that heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates, is inapplicable to this case for it had not been
alleged that Cesa conspired with Badana. What was proven was that his negligence in
carrying out his duties as city treasurer contributed to giving Badana the opportunity
to malverse more than P18 million in public funds.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine that a head of office has the right to rely on his
subordinates and to presume regularity in the subordinates performance of official functions
applies only in criminal cases.
Ruling:
No.
That a public officials foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an
irregularity constitutes an added reason to exercise a greater degree of circumspection
before signing and issuing public documents. [24] By failing to prevent the irregularity that
Cesa had reason to suspect all along or to take immediate steps to rectify, Cesa had
tolerated the same and allowed it to wreak havoc on the coffers of the city.
Arias v Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309
Facts:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry

of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands for the
right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan,
Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of
the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as assistant of
accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz,
then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works, who was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer
of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accusedClaudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District
Engineer's Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents
pertaining to private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project;
and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro
Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of
lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and
official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C.
Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel
of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with
evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C.
Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the discharge of their official public and/or
administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue
injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by
causing, allowing and/or approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of
public funds in favor of and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of
P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated
September 14, 1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and
certified xerox copies of Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of
Benjamin P. Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by
the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting
papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004
square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated
land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square meter
only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of
spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and
refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were
committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual pace of the 19,004
square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the
Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the right of
way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00
only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused misappropriated,
converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual value of the above-mentioned
land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses and benefits, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount of P1,428,300.00.
Ruling:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common
problems-dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions,
or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did
not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception,
and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his
signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the
negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of

being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the land
reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in
the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the
Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected
documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a
fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his
signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important
visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the
bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the
correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement
voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he
should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are
hundreds of document, letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands.
The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.

Part IV
Termination of Relations

A. Modes of termination
End of term
Fernandez v Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, 3-30-63
Facts:
Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan City on January 7,
1954, took his oath of office on the same date, and his appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on April 21, 1954. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia,
in an administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been found guilty
of gross negligence, violation of law, and dereliction of duty.
Fernandez was later charged before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City with two
offenses, one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer (Criminal Case No. 368) and
another for oral defamation (Criminal Case No. 438), for which he was suspended from office
by the then Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. He asked that his order of suspension be
lifted but it was denied. After the prosecution had rested its cases and without requiring the
accused to submit his defense, the latter was acquitted in the two criminal cases
abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal
administrative charge were instituted against him, or any administrative investigation
conducted of said charges. On April 28, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo
wrote Fernandez informing him that the President has terminated his services as chief of
police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio Ledesma in his place requesting him at the
same time to turn over his office to Ledesma. The nomination of Ledesma having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of
police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959. Whereupon, Fernandez instituted an action for quo
warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City
seeking his reinstatement on the ground that his removal from office without cause as

provided by law was in violation of our Constitution.

Issue:
WON, the removal of Fernandez from office by the President was valid in accordance with
Section 17, RA 288 Charter of the City of Basilan.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is clear that the President in the exercise of his discretion has put an end to the
services of appellant as chief of police of Basilan City on April 28, 1959, and this he did
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as
the Charter of the City of Basilan, which reads as follows:
SEC. 17. Appointment and removal of officers and employees Compensation.
The President shall appoint with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
municipal judge and auxiliary municipal judge, the city engineer, the city treasurerassessor, the city attorney, the chief of police and the other chiefs of departments of
the city which may be created from time to time, and the President may remove at
his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal
judge, who may be removed only according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
As may be noted, under the aforesaid section, the President is vested with the authority to
appoint, with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, among others, the chief of
police, and in connection with such power the same section says "the President may remove
at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge,
who may be removed only according to law." Verily, the President interpreted said removal
clause as meaning that he may terminate the services of any officer he may appoint under
the charter at his discretion or pleasure with the exception of the municipal judge who may
be removed only according to law, and in the exercise of such power he terminated the
services of appellant as chief of police.
We agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law says that the President may
remove at his discretion any of the appointive officers of the city with the exception of the
municipal judge who may be removed only according to law, it is evident that the legislative
intent is to make the continuance in office of any of said appointive officers dependent upon
the pleasure of the President. If such were not the case, it would not have made a distinction
in point of removal between appointive officers in general and the municipal judge. This
distinction verily is predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic Act No. 288 is there
any mention that the term of office of the chief of police, and for that matter of any
appointive officer, with the exception of the municipal judge, should be for a fixed period.
The fact no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of an intention to make it
dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power. And Congress is not
wanting in power to do so for, as it was aptly said: "A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign function of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public" (7 Mechem, Public Officers, Section 1; See also 42 Am. Jur., 944-955; Emphasis
supplied). And in Alba v. Alajar, 53 O.G. No. 5, p. 1452, this Court also said: "Congress can
legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure
of the President."
Appellant, however, does not agree with the foregoing view for he contends that the act of
the President in appointing Cecilio Ledesma to the position of chief of police of Basilan City
in his place is tantamount to his removal without cause from office in violation of Section 4,
Article XII, of our Constitution, invoking in support thereof our ruling in the cases of De los
Santos v. Mallare, 48 O.G., 1791 and Lacson v. Roque, 49 O.G., 93. But this contention
cannot be sustained considering that the position of the chief of police does not have a fixed
term. As already said, it was made dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the
President, whereas the cases invoked by appellant relate to positions for which the law fixes
a definite term of office. What is in point here is the case of Alba v. Alajar, supra, wherein
this Court made the following pronouncement:
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the

President in designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent Alajar as one of removal.
The replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of his tenure , which
is one the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. On this score, section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code which was declared inoperative in the Santos vs. Mallare case,
is different from section 8 of Republic Act No. 603. Section 2546 refers to removal at
pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 refers to holding office at the pleasure of
the President.
Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether legal cause should
precede or not that removal. What is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure
of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the
President.
The cases relied upon by respondents are, therefore, inopposite to the instant proceedings.
For all of them relate to removal of officials in violation of laws which prescribe fixity of term.
"'Even assuming for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act
itself is valid and lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has
been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with
the policy laid down by Congress therein.
Hernandez v Villegas, G.R. No. L-17287, 6-30-65
Facts:
Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of
the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at P6,000, effective November 1, 1955. In 1956,
he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices
under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the
International Cooperation Administration.
Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily
detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was
designated Acting Director for Security. While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent,
however, Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security and, when the
salary was increased from P6,600 to P7,017.60, he also received the corresponding salary
adjustment.
On January 9, 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the
President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his
letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status
from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a
classified position." A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of
Director for Security was likewise proposed.
On January 14, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo advised Secretary Hernandez that the
President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and Keefe. Accordingly,
Villegas and Keefe's appointments, effective January 1, 1958, were prepared and later
signed by Secretary Hernandez. As the Court of Appeals observed in its decision, "In one of
the appointments, defendant Keefe was promoted to the position of Director for Security ...
and in the other plaintiff was demoted to the rank of arrastre superintendent." (Emphasis
supplied)
It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28,
1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security
and, on further inquiry, found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent. On
March 3, 1958, therefore, he served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas
that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. He also
wrote the Auditor General, Secretary Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget
Commissioner, and the Civil Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the
promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of Director for Security.
Villegas resorted for quo warranto and the judgment was on his favor.
Issue/s:
1) WON, the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of Customs, is a primarily

confidential position
Held/Ratio:
Not necessarily, SC said that, we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is
primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject
to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec. 4) Villanuevas' removal,
is, therefore, concededly without cause. Thus, only recently, this Court reiterated in Corpus
v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965, the view that :
[T]he Constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily
confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit a fitness as
determined from competitive examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra, 49 O.G.
[No. 7] 2755), but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the
operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enumerated in section 4 of
Article XII that
No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.
and which recognizes no exception.
This view finds confirmation in sections 3 and 5 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act No.
2260).
The statement in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, to the effect that appointment to any of
the three classes of positions is terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be
deemed a mere obiter. It has been correctly criticized as misleading. For if these three
special positions do not really belong to the Civil Service, the Constitution would not have
specifically named them as an exception to the general rule that all appointments must be
made on the basis of merit and fitness to be determined by competitive examinations.
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law 411 [11th ed. 1962]) Indeed, in the Corpus case, this
statement was held as not controlling, the ruling in the De los Santos case, where the
statement appears, being that a city engineer who belongs to the unclassified service is
protected by the security of tenure provisions of the Constitution.
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential
positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers. (See, e.g., Corpus v. Cuaderno, supra; Alba vs. Evangelista, 53 O.G. 1452;
Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18879, March 30, 1963. Contra Hojilla v. Marino, G.R. No.
L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965.) But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures and
it has been shown that it has been lost in this case the incumbent is entitled to continue
in office.
We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without
cause and is therefore illegal.
Retirement
Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
Facts:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of
Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the
effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the
service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and
void.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as
and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had
occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS

during all times required by law.

In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well
as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to
1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also
indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the
GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor
General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900.
According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner
discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in
1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he
was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being
able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of
age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had
been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in
September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and
Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board
and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service
Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was
endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil
Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22,
1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of
Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence
to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the
Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as
January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal
Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to
the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable
recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum
dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his
initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of
petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of
Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. As emphasized by
petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has
been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the
2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to
petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957,
corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the
basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on
October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as
January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due
to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more
specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to
the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of
petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine
National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since
January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank
notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last
January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the government
service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961."
Issue/s:

WON, the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by
General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all
circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches,
estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it acted within its powers. It is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General
Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must
be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by
the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following
powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of
the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the
functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager,
who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and
social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the System, one or
more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an
actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the
approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they
may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their
compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall
have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications
to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees:
Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages
the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the
exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and
the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to
act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of
authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much
less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to
manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter
affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the
General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities,
the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases
and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General
Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which
flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the
System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this
principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of
the management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its
administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and
workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the
government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the
saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if
the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its
controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. We hold that any authority
conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said
Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the
actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the
authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not
constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality
is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is

not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the
System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law
clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief
executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard
regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General
Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually
boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this
clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There
must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which
another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and
that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral
and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent,
upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610,
614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government
officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the
age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the
government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the
opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate
perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a
comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting
demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the
public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the
duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the
Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General
Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence
before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be
disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.
For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material
government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his
date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to
January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise,
and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was
duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the
Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. It is to be noted
that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent
System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to
take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal
Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the
General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations
are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes
an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the
constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature
and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance
policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his
retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake
in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.
Abolition of office

Busacay v Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 1033

Facts:
The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan.
His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. On
October 18, 1945, after liberation, he was reappointed to that position with compensation at
the rate of P720 per annum. On March 21, 1946, he resigned but on April 16 he was
reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947, when the bridge was
destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laid off.
Previously, from July 17 to September 10, 1946, the bridge had been temporarily closed to
traffic due to minor repairs and during that period he and his fellow toll collectors had not
been paid salaries because they had not rendered any service, but upon the reopening of
the bridge to traffic after the repairs, he and his companions resumed work without new
appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947.
When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about the end of November,
1950, the plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness
to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint
him. Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in
February, 1951, and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since. The position
now carries a salary of P1,440 a year. The Bued toll bridge is a portion of a national road and
is a national toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid
from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation was set aside for these
salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 15, 1950, the board on toll
bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees
thereon, and prescribed corresponding rules and regulations.
Issue/s:
WON, by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors provided
therefor were abolished.
Held/Ratio:
No. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it
wholly and permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought,
avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. Rather the contrary was
taken for granted, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in northern Luzon
and to Baguio.
This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not, in our opinion, work to destroy but only to
suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation
as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.
This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is coextensive with that of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by
statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the
power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
The fact that the destruction of the bridge in question was total, and not partial as in 1945,
the length of time it took to reconstruct it, and the hypothetical supposition that the new

structure could have been built across another part of the river, are mere matters of detail
and do not alter the proposition that the positions of toll collector were not eliminated. We
believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments were not
considered forfeited notwithstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines
and who were allowed to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new
appointments are pertinent authority for the views here expressed
Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to the position he held before
the destruction of the Bued river bridge.
The claim for back salary and/or damages may not be granted, however. Without deciding
the merit of this claim, it is our opinion that the respondent Provincial Treasurer is not
personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without proper
authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to the suit.

Manalang v Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954

Facts:
Petitioner Luis Manalang contests, by quo warranto proceedings, the title of the incumbent
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, and seeks to take possession of said
office as the person allegedly entitled thereto.
The original respondent was Aurelio Quitoriano, who, at the time of the filing of the petition
(August 4, 1953), held said office, which he assumed on July 1, 1953, by virtue of a
designation made, in his favor, as Acting Commissioner of the National Employment Service,
by the Office of the President of the Philippines. Subsequently, or on October 22, 1953,
petitioner included, as respondents, Emiliano Morabe, who, on September 11, 1953, was
designated Acting commissioner of National Employment Service, and Zosimo G. Linato, the
Collecting, Disbursing and Property Officer of said National Employment Service
hereinafter referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Service in order to restrain him from
paying, to respondent Morabe, the salary of the Commissioner of said Service. Still later, or
on January 21, 1954, Mohamad de Venancio, who was designated Acting Commissioner of
said Service, and assumed said office, on January 11 and 13, respectively, of the same year,
was included as respondent.
Petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the Placement Bureau, an office created by
Executive Order No. 392, dated December 31, 1950 (46 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 5913, 59205921), avowedly pursuant to the powers vested in the President by Republic Act No. 422. On
June 20, 1952, Republic Act No. 761, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Organization of a
National Employment Service," was approved and became effective. Section 1 thereof partly
provides:
. . . In order to ensure the best possible organization of the employment market as an
integral part of the national program for the achievement and maintenance of
maximum employment and the development and use of productive resources there
is hereby established a national system of free public employment offices to be
known as the National Employment Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service.
the Service shall be under the executive supervision and control of the Department of
Labor, and shall have a chief who shall be known as the Commissioner of the
National employment Service hereinafter referred to as Commissioner. Said
Commissioner shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments and shall receive compensation at the rate of
nine thousand pesos per annum. A Deputy Commissioner shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and
shall receive compensation at the rate of seven thousand two hundred pesos per
annum.

On June 1, 1953, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose Figueras, recommended the appointment
of petitioner Luis Manalang as Commissioner of the Service. On June 29, 1953, respondent
Aurelio Quitoriano, then Acting Secretary of Labor, made a similar recommendation in favor
of Manalang, upon the ground that "he is best qualified" and "loyal to service and
administration." Said Acting Secretary of Labor even informed Manalang that he would
probably be appointed to the office in question. However, on July 1, 1953, Quitoriano was
the one designated, and sworn in, as Acting Commissioner of the Service. Such designation
of Quitoriano like the subsequent designation, first, of Emiliano Morabe, and the, of
Mohamad de Venancio is now assailed by Manalang as "illegal" and equivalent to removal
of the petitioner from office without cause.
Issue/s:
WON, Manalang was illegally removed from office without cause.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was not. Petitioner Manalang has never been Commissioner of the National
Employment Service and, hence, he could not have been, and has not been removed
therefrom. Secondly, to remove an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration of
his term. As removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. Such is not the case of
petitioner herein, for Republic Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement Bureau, and,
by implication, the office of director thereof, which, obviously, cannot exist without said
Bureau. By the abolition of the latter and of said office, the right thereto of its incumbent,
petitioner herein, was necessarily extinguished thereby. Accordingly, the constitutional
mandate to the effect that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Phil. Const.), is not in point,
for there has been neither a removal nor a suspension of petitioner Manalang, but an
abolition of his former office of Director of the Placement Bureau, which, admittedly, is
within the power of Congress to undertake by legislation.
It is argued, however, in petitioner's memorandum, that
. . . there is no abolition but only fading away of the title Placement Bureau and all its
functions are continued by the National Employment Service because the two titles
cannot co-exist. The seemingly additional duties were only brought about by the
additional facilities like the district offices. Employment Service Advisory Councils,
etc.
The question whether or not Republic Act No. 761 abolished the Placement Bureau is one of
legislative intent, about which there can be no controversy whatsoever, in view of the
explicit declaration in the second paragraph of section 1 of said Act reading:
Upon the organization of the Service, the existing Placement Bureau and the existing
Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare shall be abolished, and all the
files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel and unexpended balances of
appropriations of said Bureau and Commission pertaining to said bureau or office
shall thereupon be transferred to the Service. (Emphasis supplied.)
Incidentally, this transfer connotes that the National Employment Service is different and
distinct from the Placement Bureau, for a thing may be transferred only from one place to
another, not to the same place. Had Congress intended the National Employment Service to
be a mere amplification or enlargement of the Placement Bureau, Republic Act No. 761
would have directed the retention of the "qualified personnel" of the latter, not their transfer
to the former. Indeed, the Service includes, not only the functions pertaining to the former
Placement Bureau, but also, those of the former Employment Office in the Commission of
Social Welfare, apart from other powers, not pertaining to either office, enumerated in
section 4 of Republic Act No. 761.
It is next urged in petitioner's memorandum "that the item of National Employment Service
Commissioner is not new and is occupied by the petitioner" and that the petitioner is
entitled to said office "automatically by operation of law," in view of the above quoted
provision of section 1 of Republic Act No. 761, relative to the transfer to the service of the
"qualified personnel" of the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare.

This contention is inconsistent with the very allegations of petitioner's pleadings. Thus, in
paragraph 11 of his petition, it is alleged "that increasing the item and elaborating the title
of a civil servant, although necessitating a new appointment, does not mean the ousting of
the incumbent or declaring the item vacant." In paragraph 12 of the same pleading,
petitioner averred that "on or about June 25, 1953, two days before the departure of
President Quirino to Baltimore, petitioner wrote a confidential memorandum to His
Excellency reminding him of the necessity of appointing anew the petitioner as head of the
National Employment Service."
Having thus admitted and correctly that he needed a new appointment as
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, it follows that petitioner does not hold
or, in his own words, occupy the latter's item, inasmuch as the right thereto may be
acquired only by appointment. What is more, Republic Act No. 761 requires specifically that
said appointment be made by the President of the Philippines 'with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments." How could the President and the Commission on
Appointments perform these acts if the Director of the Placement Bureau automatically
became Commissioner of the National Employment Service?
Neither may petitioner profit by the provision of the second paragraph of section 1 of
Republic Act No. 761, concerning the transfer to the Service of the "qualified personnel" of
the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare,
because:
1. Said transfer shall be affected only "upon the organization" of the National Employment
Service, which does not take place until after the appointment of, at least, the commissioner
thereof. If the Director of the Placement Bureau were included in the phrase "qualified
personnel" and, as a consequence, he automatically became Commissioner of the Service,
the latter would have become organized simultaneously with the approval of Republic Act
No. 761, and the same would not have conditioned the aforementioned transfer "upon the
organization of the Service," which connotes that the new office would be established at
some future time. Indeed, in common parlance, the word "personnel" is used generally to
refer to the subordinate officials or clerical employees of an office or enterprise, not to the
managers directors or heads thereof.
2. If "qualified personnel" included the heads of the offices affected by the establishment of
the Service, then it would, also, include the chief of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare, who, following petitioner's line of argument, would, like
petitioner herein, be, also, a Commissioner of the National Employment Service. The result
would be that we would have either two commissioners of said Service or a Commission
thereof consisting of two persons instead of a Commissioner and neither alternative is
countenanced by Republic Act No. 761.
3. Congress can not either appoint the Commissioner of the Service, or impose upon the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to said office. The appointing power is
the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to
prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.
Facundo v Pablan, G.R. No. L-17746, January 31, 1962
Facts:
On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a petition for mandamus (docketed as Special Civil Case No. T-669)
against respondents Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan, Pangasinan), Layos, Domingo,
Lopez, de los Trinos, Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Perez (municipal treasurer)
alleging, as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed
Local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held
said position and received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because
he is a non-civil service eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service
examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260,

known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; that on June 24, 1960, respondents municipal
councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his position and, on the same day, approved
Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions of policemen; and that four days later, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his services as Local Civil Registry
clerk.
As second cause of action, the petition alleged that the other petitioner Facundo, a third
grade civil service eligible was appointed as Market Collector in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Asingan, on October 15, 1958, and has continuously held and performed the
duties of said position and received the emoluments therefor since his appointment; that in
said Resolution No. 67, his position was abolished; and that on June 28, 1960, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote him a letter terminating his services as Market Collector.
The petition further alleged that by the approval and adoption of said resolution and the
termination of their services, petitioners have been unlawfully excluded from their positions;
that in approving and adopting said resolution and in terminating their services, respondents
were impelled by revenge and ulterior motives; that respondents' acts are oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the specific provisions of the cited Republic Act No. 2260.
Petitioners, therefore, prayed that a preliminary mandatory order 1 be issued directing
respondent mayor Carbonell to reinstate them to their positions; and that judgment be
rendered declaring respondents to have acted illegally in passing said resolution, and in
terminating petitioners' services, declaring void said resolution for being oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260
To this petition, respondents timely filed their answer alleging, among others, that the
positions abolished under the resolution in question "were unnecessary and useless and
carrying duties which could be efficiently performed by other employees in the office of the
Municipal Treasurer"; that the appropriation for said positions, "could be applied for more
important and useful undertakings of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation
and pursuance of its inherent duty, which is the present administration's avowed policy of
maintaining peace and order which have been unduly neglected in the past"; and that said
resolution "is valid and lawful, enacted and resolved with a view of bringing about a better
and more efficient administration and in consonance with the promise and avowed policy of
the present administration of maintaining peace and order" for which it received the
confidence of the people of Asingan in the last local elections. Respondents prayed that the
petition be dismiss with costs.
The lower court ruled that the abolition of the position of Ulep was valid, being not civil
service legible while the abolition of the position of Facundo is not valid as he was entitled to
permanency being civil service legible.
To this, Ulep appealed while the respondents appealed out of the reglementary period. The
counsel for Facundo moved for execution of the judgment, to which the Judge Pabalan
denied, alleging that since Ulep appealed, then the SC may declare valid or invalid in parts
or in whole the Resolution 67 which can still affect Facundo. Facundo filed for mandamus
against Judge Pabalan.
Issue/s:
1) WON, mandamus can be granted against Judge Pabalan.
2) WON, the municipal council validly abolished the position of Ulep.
Held/Ratio:
1) Yes, Facundo's petition for certiorari with mandamus is meritorious. The records disclose
that respondents' appeal was filed out of time and was disallowed by the trial court in its
order of November 3, 1960. Consequently, the decision in favor of petitioner Facundo
became final and executory (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court), and he (Facundo) became
entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution. It, therefore, became respondent Judge's
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus, to issue the writ of execution sought by
Facundo.
The fact that there is only one decision and only one resolution involved, does not make the
right of one of the petitioners dependent upon the right of the other. The provisions of
Resolution No. 67 are severable, each petitioner occupying a different position and having

different qualifications, Facundo being a civil service eligible and Ulep, not. The decision too,
although only one, contains separate findings for each of the parties and makes distinct and
independent rulings for each of them. The appeal, therefore, of Ulep which has no bearing to
the ordered reinstatement of Facundo cannot be an obstacle to the execution of said
decision insofar as Facundo is concerned.
2) There is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the positions it
has created, but the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power
to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly
providing otherwise (Castillo v. Pajo, et al., G. R. No. L-11262, prom. April 28, 1958, citing
Brillo v. Enage, 50 O. G. 3102 and 67 C.J.S. 121). However, the office must be abolished in
good faith; and if immediately after the office is abolished, another office is created with
substantially the same duties, and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise
appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons, the courts will
intervene (Gacho, et al. v. Osmena, et al., G. R. No. L-10989, prom. May 28, 1959, citing 37
Am. Jur. 858).
In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in adopting.
Resolution No. 67 dated June 24, 1960, abolishing the position of appellant are stated
therein, to wit: there is "an excess of personnel" in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Asingan; the position of appellant "could be undertaken by the internal revenue clerk" in
said office; and if abolished, the remaining positions in said office "will be sufficient to
warrant the sound operation of said office". In respondents' answer, it is also stated that the
appropriation for said position "could be applied for more important and useful undertakings
of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation and pursuance of its inherent duty,
which is the present administration's avowed policy of maintaining peace and order, which
have been unduly neglected in the past." Observe too, that the new positions created (in
Resolution No. 70 of the same date as No. 67) are those of policemen, the duties of which,
are entirely different from those of appellant. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to
declare that the action of the municipal council of Asingan was an abuse of the power and
discretion lodged in it by existing law (Rodriguez v. Montinola, G.R. No. L-5689, prom. May
14, 1954).
Appellant contends that his removal from his position was illegal because having taken the
civil service examination required under Section 23 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the
Civil Service Act of 1959, he could not be replaced or removed from office, unless the results
of said examination shows he failed therein. He also argues that his removal was illegal, as it
was not for cause as provided by Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution. But, appellant can
not successfully invoke said provisions in his favor, because there has been no removal of
petitioner, but in abolition of his position, which was within the power of the municipal
council of Asingan to do.
Cruz v Primicias, 23 SCRA 998
Facts:
Direct petition for Mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by certain employees of the
Province of Pangasinan, to declare Resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Board and Executive
Order No. 2 of the Provincial Governor null and void; to have the abolition of petitioners'
positions declared illegal, and compel their immediate reinstatement; to restrain
respondents from excluding petitioners from the enjoyment of their rights as civil service
employees, and to recover attorneys' fees and costs.
It is not disputed that upon election and assumption of office in 1967 of the respondents
Provincial Governor and Members of the Provincial Board, the latter adopted on January 1,
1968, Resolution No. 5 providing as follows:

Resolution No. 5
RESOLVED by the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, that for the purpose of promoting
simplicity, economy and efficiency in the operation of the Provincial Government and
for the purpose of providing the necessary expanded services on agricultural
extension, rural health, provincial public works and legal services, etc., the Provincial
Governor is hereby authorized to effect by executive orders from time to time for a
period not exceeding six (6) months from the date of approval of this resolution, such
reforms and changes in the different offices and branches of the Provincial
Government as may be necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish
those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer
functions, appropriations, equipments, properties, records and personnel from one
office or branch to another; eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not
provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries and do
whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency of the
government service and provide necessary services for the promotion of the general
social welfare.
That any action taken by the Provincial Governor pursuant to this resolution shall be
immediately reported to the Provincial Board and shall be valid and subsisting until
the Provincial Board shall provide otherwise.1vvphi1.nt
Acting pursuant to this Resolution, the Governor issued his Executive Order No. 2 on January
2, 1968, reorganizing the office of the Governor and that of the Provincial Board. The order
expressly abolished the divisions provided for in the Annual Budget for the fiscal year ending
on June 30, 1968
1.
Executive
2.
Socio-Economic
Program
Implementation
3.
Political
Affairs
and
Placement
4.
Public
Information
5. Legal Division

Division
Division
Division
Division

as well as "all the positions listed in the current plantilla of personnel of said offices," with
certain exceptions. At the same time, the Executive Order (pars. d-f) provided:
(d) That there is hereby created, effective January 1, 1968, a private and confidential
staff of the Governor under his immediate control and supervision with such duties
and functions as may be assigned and prescribed by him from time to time in the
interest of the service.
(e) That as authorized by the Decentralization Law, there is hereby created, effective
January 1, 1968, One Provincial Attorney under the Governor with an annual salary of
P8,400.
(f) That there is hereby created a Personnel Division under the Office of the Governor
with such duties and functions as prescribed under Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules
in relation to Section 21 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
Petitioners are Provincial Clerk eligibles, except Bancod, who is a general clerk eligible. On or
about January 11 to 15, 1968, they were individually served notices of termination of their
services and coincidentally, the equipment used by said petitioners was taken, transferred

and redistributed to other retained offices.

In their answer filed on February 12, 1968, respondents pleaded that the reorganization of
the offices of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board had been made within the powers
of the Provincial government, in order to effect economy in view of the province's deficit of
P3.714 million pesos; to promote simplicity and efficiency, and to provide for more essential
services and activities; that the Governor's Executive Order No. 2 had been approved and
ratified by the Provincial Board on January 5, 1968, by its Resolution No. 8, while the
supplemental budget to provide for the newly created positions was ratified by the Board's
Resolution No. 50, of January 26, 1968; that the actions thus taken were immediately
effective, without need of the approval of the Secretary of Finance; and that the abolition
and creation of new positions were made in good faith, the selection of retained employees
had been made on the basis of seniority and fitness as required by the Civil Service law,
those retained having been appointed earlier than the petitioners. The answer also urged
that the petitioners should have exhausted their administrative remedies, by appealing to
the Commissioner of Civil Service.
After this case was argued in open court, one of the petitioners, Myrna Sison, formerly
occupying the position of correspondence clerk, manifested in writing that she was no longer
interested in the case and prayed that she be excluded therefrom.
Issue/s:
WON, the abolition of the offices held by petitioners is valid and legal.
Held/Ratio:
No, the abolition was not valid and legal. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue
that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903;
Rodriguez vs. Montemayor, 94 Phil. 964; Castillo vs. Pajo, 103 Phil. 515). And, of course, if
the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees, it is null and void.
A review of the record herein satisfies us that the justifications advanced for the abolition of
petitioners' offices (economy and efficiency) are but subterfuges resorted to for disguising
an illegal removal of permanent civil service employees, in violation of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The claim of economy effectuated through the reorganization is belied by the fact that while
72 positions were abolished, 50 of these were actually vacant. Only 22 stations were
occupied at the time of the reorganization, carrying total emoluments of P25,538.71 per
semester, of which P6,120.00 per semester corresponds to the five remaining petitioners
(Answer, Exh. 3-C). As against these 22 positions suppressed by the reorganization
(Executive Order No. 2), 28 new positions were simultaneously created, with a compensation
of P87,600.00 per annum, P43,800.00 per semester, for confidential personnel in the office

of the Governor (Exh. Order No. 2, par. d). In addition, a Provincial Attorney and his staff (p.
2), and a Personnel Division of five members, importing P13,380.00 per semester were set
up. Thus, against the suppressed items of P25,538.71, new items carrying a total
appropriation of P57,180.00 per semester (or P114,360.00 annually) were created, in
addition to P8,000.00 for casual laborers at the discretion of the Governor. Where the
economy lies is difficult to see. Significantly, this "economy" was the same excuse advanced
by the preceding administration when it attempted to eliminate civil service eligibles upon
its coming into power (Ocampo, et al. vs. Duque, supra).
As to the alleged need for greater efficiency, it is well to observe that no charge of
inefficiency is lodged against petitioners herein. Their efficiency is attested by their
promotional appointments in 1967. What can not be glossed over is that respondent's
reorganization replaced 22 civil service eligibles with 23 confidential employees. No further
elaboration is required to show that in truth and in fact, what respondents sought to achieve
was to supplant civil service eligibles with men of their choice, whose tenure would be
totally dependent upon respondents' pleasure and discretion. Thus the spirit of the Civil
Service law and of the Constitution are being purposely circumvented.
The motives behind these wholesale replacements are made manifest in paragraph 10 of
respondents' own Answer, where it is averred, in an attempt to justify the new positions
created, that:
... These positions are indispensable to the respondent Governor, he being the
elected Chief Executive of the Province and it could not be denied that his position is
more political in nature and as such, it is humbly submitted, that he is entitled to a
flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants in whom he has complete trust
and confidence not only in their capacity for work but also in their personal fitness
and loyalty. This should be so because his executive position is a political one and as
elected Governor, he is also the Chairman of the Provincial Committee of the
Nacionalista Party to which he belongs. In this situation, it could not be helped that
his Office should deal with his own party men on party matters. Not only that, as the
Chief Executive of the Province, his office has to keep and take up official secrets of
the government which should not be put in danger of being leaked out to third
parties, and it is for this reason, among others, that the respondent Governor should
have a flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants.
Here is proof that the true motivation for reorganizing out the petitioners was "not only (in)
their capacity for work but also (in) their personal fitness and loyalty". Political loyalty or
disloyalty are not statutory nor constitutional preconditions for appointment or grounds for
separation of eligibles in the Civil Service.
As a consequence of this pronouncement, it is likewise held, that respondents have
unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the enjoyment of an office to which they are
entitled; and that in failing or refusing to include in the 1968-1969 budget items required to
cover appropriations for salaries of petitioners, respondents have unlawfully failed or
neglected the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office.

Reorganization
Dario v Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989

Facts:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING
A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING
THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other
things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people
to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to
measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and
corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of
the organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws
then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all
government offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is
abolished or reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties
shall be transferred to the office or body to which its powers, functions and
responsibilities substantially pertain.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the
President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their
courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the
1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives
reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected
local officials, has been challenged in this Court, and two of which, with respect to appointed
functionaries, have likewise been questioned herein.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and

demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of
personnel,"
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and
the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the
Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or
c) informed of their termination.
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged
with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga
Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R.
Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz,
Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay
Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto
Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,,
Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279
individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He further
states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56
which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so
declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that
retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the
position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally
separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on
holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that
case supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force
and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17,
which was meant to implement the Provisional Constitution, had ceased to have force and

effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39,
the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations now under question
were "not for cause" and were a result of government reorganize organization decreed by
Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the
constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security
of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.
Issue/s:
WON, Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason (WON, the
removals conducted by Commissioner Mison in light of the reorganization as he claimed was
valid NO).
Held/Ratio:
No, reorganization must be in good faith. There is no question that the administration may
validly carry out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional
Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive
in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government.
It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit
implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to
certain conditions.
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive"
reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy"
following the people power revolution of 1986;

60
61

2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the
President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under
the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on
mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We
quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but
as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be
entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing
to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or

agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their

subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered
in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision
in so far as it mentions removals not for cause that would arguably support the
challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization
after the ratification of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much
later, on June 10, 1988.
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the
past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the
Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article
XVI, of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all
officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall
vacate their respective office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of
the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by
the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are
by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. 67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there
is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free
from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office
(not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of
economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is
obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and
simply because the Constitution allows it.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for

"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts
had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to
continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in
the sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to
those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization the first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation
No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date
(February 2, 1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, it
should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of
reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization.
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service.
And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February
2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy
and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and
primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for
cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive,
must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution
ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only
mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present
Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not
be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the
Freedom Constitution the first stage. We are on the second stage that inferred from the
provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but
is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and
Palma-Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent
officials and employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like
the execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the
democratic character of the Charter itself.

What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary

powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from
Executive Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless
propensity that accompanies reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals
arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would
have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the
"unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank and file that
reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she
said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is
necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and
to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be
made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We
quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have
ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that
would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports,
it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his
"progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief
Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to
separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v.
Arroyo, clarified.
The transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization,
the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 which had already been
consummated the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory provisions
themselves which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after
the effectivity of the new Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the reorganization.
Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as
stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's
subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the
reorganization inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution
seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that

Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by

law" principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify
removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former
Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that
removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good
faith a test not obviously required under the revolutionary government formerly
prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this government under
a democratic Charter.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes
place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we
are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course
of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to
"grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from
the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof.
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack
of it.
Reorganization
of
Lack of Good Faith in.

the

Bureau

of

Customs,

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy except for the change of personnel has occurred, which would have justified
(an things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at
the Bureau (which would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the
same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when
Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted
There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the
Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt
further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should
observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is
not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59
thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394
removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin
with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order
No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all
Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President."
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential
appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to
our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In PalmaFernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on
30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a
hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any
of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity
was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when
the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B.
Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions

of the latter on security of tenure govern.

90

It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a
reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a
reorganization should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987
(De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a
basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra]
provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a
challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar
as it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs
counter to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated
without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing" is not contrary to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's
transitory provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must
nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about
automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that
the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it also acknowledges the
possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of
tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about
the Act.

Dela Llana v Alba, 112 SCRA 294

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo,
assailed its validity because, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges not the Congress.
Issue/s:

WON, BP 129 is constitutional.

Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is constitutional.
Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was
introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of
cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the
proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth
in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in
the proposed Bill." In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored
by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which
it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained
the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted
substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments
to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government,
to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of
1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and
the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill
upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government."
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in
the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated
to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and
hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the
minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to
its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such
a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that
its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence
of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for
the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at
rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to

be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." As with the offices in the other branches
of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in
good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa cannot be any clearer. This is a quo
warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled
to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a
Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch.
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then
National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result
reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude
any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of
tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an
entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and
constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in
the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in
these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies
of every sort.
It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the
same court is valid and constitutional. Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and
other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities,
and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of
such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems
that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy.
To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article
X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did
not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively
inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the

incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing
ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the
boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid
the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara
decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and
the other begins." It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even
more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers,
whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down
'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not
only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'"
There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of
a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is
that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to

alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole."The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as
1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" He warned against
a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."
Further on this point from the same opinion" Another objection based on the absence in the
statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of
merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall
submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order
to be issued by the President." Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished
and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear
need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and
clean record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation without any interruption
in the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of
lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the
new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive.
It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through
public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral
adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is
from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is
to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. The judges may be guaranteed
a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to

be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant
after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an
empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in
spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to
reorganize inferior courts." That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will
do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing
the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units
in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does
not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant
to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend
the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, a decision promulgated almost half a
century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Biraogo v Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, & 193036 December 7, 2010

Facts:
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive

Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Nature of the Truth Commission
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as
an ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created
as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context
of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys
past. They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics:
(1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a
period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish
their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;
and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. Commissions
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend
institutional reforms.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on
reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators.
Issue/s:
(a) WON, The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(b) WON, E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

Held/Ratio:
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency
or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
a) No, it cannot legitimize the creation of the PTC, however the President has the power to
create ad hoc committees such the PTC. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring
of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing
structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have
to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the
interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772,
became functus oficio upon the
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last
whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was
enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are
fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued.

Now would you agree with me that P.D.
1416 should not be considered effective
anymore
upon
the
promulgation,
adoption, ratification of the 1987
Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your

Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

The power of the President to reorganize

the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents

powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive
and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches
of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to
the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. In a
case,
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the
Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no
changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive

power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
b) No on the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is
well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as
a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of
graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise
of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be
clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a

court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.
However, PTC cannot be succesfully created for it violated equal protection clause
as it targeted only the past administration.

Abandonment
Summers v Ozaeta, G.R. No. L-1534, October 25, 1948
Facts:
Summers was a cadastral judge who received an adterim appointment for the position of
judge-at-large. He then assumed office as a judge-at-large. However, such appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. He wanted to go back being a cadastral
judge invoking section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution, that he is entitled to continue as
cadastral judge during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and
judge-at-large are not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter office
he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.
Issue/s:
WON, Summers can validly resumed as a cadastral judge.
Held/Ratio:
No. There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Supreme Court
and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. We believe,
that said right is waivable and should be construed without prejudice to the legal effects of
abandonment in proper cases.
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-atlarge consequent upon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a
waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and
guaranteed by the Constitution. But it is maintained that an ad interim appointment is
merely temporary and the petitioner cannot be said to have vacated the office of cadastral
judge in view of the rejection of said appointment by the Commission on Appointments. This
point has to be resolved adversely to the petitioner, if we are to be consistent with the
decision in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, wherein it was held that "when a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of

a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same
category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another
Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to
be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased
in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Moreover, an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,
Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an "acting" appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued. Thus, the decision in Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil. 1,
cannot be invoked by the petitioner because Santiago, while being a member of the
municipal board of Manila, was designated only "Acting Mayor" and this Court held that he
did not thereby vacate his first office. Indeed, the distinction between an acting designation
and a permanent appointment may be gathered from the following passage of the decision:
"Mr. Santiago took the oath of office and qualified for the position of Acting Mayor of the City
of Manila. He indicated to the Municipal Board his intention to fill the new office temporarily
and then return to his position as member of the Municipal Board. Mr. Santiago never took
the oath of office as Mayor of the City of Manila. He never qualified for the office of Mayor.
He never accepted the office of Mayor. He did not at any time disclose an intention to
abandon the office of member of the Municipal Board. There was no resignation, express or
implied, from the latter office.
In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of judge-at-large by
taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of an "acting" judge-at-large. He
cannot argue that said acceptance was conditioned upon the approval of the appointment
by the Commission on Appointments, for, as stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the
petitioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to
the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said
commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have been for him to
await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualifying for and assuming the
position of judge-at-large. A hasty acceptance on the part of an ad interim appointee, in the
anxiety to enjoy either the higher honor or better material advantages of a second office,
may lead to seemingly unfair consequences for which the appointing power should not be
blamed. While in the ordinary course of things, an appointee certainly has the right to rely
on his record and expect the approval of his appointment, it is nevertheless the better part
of wisdom for one always to adopt the surer method which will, furthermore, protect him
against any design, intentional or otherwise, to oust him from an office the tenure of which
is fixed by the Constitution.
Under the comparison presented by the petitioner, the situation before us is undoubtedly
not one wherein he may appropriately hold two compatible offices at one time such, for
instance, as the positions of town recorder and county and probate judge, but one wherein
he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of
judge of first instance. At least, the petitioner does not contend that he can simultaneously
occupy the position of cadastral judge and the office of judge-at-large, for this would of

course be clearly against public policy. The law has created a fixed number of cadastral
judges (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P8,400 per annum each), and a
fixed number of judge-at-large (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P9,000
per annum each), and considerations of public interest must have been the basis thereof. If
the petitioner can be a cadastral judge and a judge-at-large at the same time, the judicial
positions as specified and created by law will be diminished by one. Authority in support of
our proposition is not wanting. In State vs. Jones, 150 Wis., 572; 110 N. W., 431, it was held:
"That realtor in a contest by quo warranto for the office of police justice of the city of
Watertown was held to have no right to that office, because at the time he was holding the
office of justice of the peace in the same city. The court said: 'We consider that the two
offices are clearly incompatible with each other, and that one person cannot and should not
hold both of them at the same time. In the plainest terms the charter gives the city four
judicial officers of the grade of justice of the peace while, if the realtor could make good his
right to the office of police justice it would, in fact, have but three.' This is a strong and
authoritative declaration of public policy and it is said elsewhere that the incompatibility
'which shall operate to vacate the first office exists where the nature and duties of the two
offices are such as to render it improper from consideration of public policy for one person to
retain both.' (Mechem, Pub. Off., section 422 and cases.) Preliminary examinations in
criminal cases may be held before a justice of the peace, country judge or court
commissioner. Chapter 195, St. 1898. The consolidation in one person of the offices of
country judge and justice of the peace diminishes the number of examining magistrates by
one." And is State ex rel. Crawford vs. Anderson, 155 Iowa, 271, 136 N. W., 128, the same
rule was stressed: "It is apparent from these several provisions of the law that the
lawmaking power considered it for the public good and convenience to have three judicial
officers in every township containing within its geographical limits an incorporated city,
town, and that in criminal prosecutions under statute, these officers should have the same
jurisdiction. And if this be true, can this plain purpose be thwarted by permitting one man to
hold two of these offices? We think not, because the two offices are, in our judgment,
incompatible when viewed in the light of the public policy expressed in the statutes creating
them and defining their powers and duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain
instances, there should be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly
without force and effect.
Incompatible office
Resignation
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were
submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)

for proper investigation.

In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned

from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:

The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
Office of the Ombudsman v Andutan, G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011
Facts:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those
occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. On July 1, 1998,
pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF;
Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corporation (Steel Asia); Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Lorenzana, President and Chief
Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was
criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As
government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively
charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to
submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the
Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all
leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
Issue/s:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutans resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
Held/Ratio:

I. No, provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not
prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was
committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been
settled by jurisprudence. In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court, speaking
through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public
officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the
object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in
nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a
statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while
the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year
from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In
fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis
supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a
general rule the word "may" is directory, the negative phrase "may not" is
mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word
"not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in
character, is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on
statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged
act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one
(1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to
conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the
issue of the Ombudsmans authority to institute an administrative complaint against a
government employee who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutans favor.
II. Yes, Andutans resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an
administrative complaint against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against
Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an

administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,
we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July
2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case
against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a
public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation neither warrants
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while
he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot
and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case
[Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondents resignation
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he shall still be answerable.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the
above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the administrative
cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the
imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against
him by resigning, since he knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of
the State would eventually reach him] is unfounded. First, Andutans resignation was
neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned
from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to
find reason in the Ombudsmans sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before
the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to
accept the Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him,
his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the
administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to
the provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the
Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while
the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is
not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If we agree with
this interpretation, any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long
time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.
We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law

which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence in the
government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned. Likewise, if the act
committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal
mechanisms are available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsmans
lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutans removal from the service is
moot, there is an irresistible justification to determine whether or not there remains
penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of
benefits. Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be imposed against
Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the
inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an
administrative case moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed,
this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9
May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite the petitioners separation from government service. Even if the
most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses
charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. Our position that accessory penalties are still
imposable thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint merely
flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case
against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have
justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if Paganos filing of
candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano
confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was
already notified by the Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no
administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash
shortage of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already
filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative
proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was
considered separated from service through her precipitate filing of
her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest
when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were
being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in
laying the foundation for an administrative case. (emphasis and

underscoring supplied)
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case
notwithstanding Paganos resignation was her bad faith in filing the certificate of
candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office x x x is
a question of transcendental [importance] and that preserving the inviolability of public
office compels the state to prevent the re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x
x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office. However, the State must
perform this task within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier
stated, under the Ombudsmans theory, the administrative authorities may exercise
administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has
validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an administrative
complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who
committed violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under
the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an
administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the
Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged
transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for
Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.
CONCLUSION
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this
statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public
institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsmans resolve in pursuing the present case for
violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and
dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper
subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsmans
factual findings.

Removal
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were

submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
for proper investigation.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.

The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of

Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771
Facts:
An indorsement letter from Mr. Gonzalez forwarding to Mr. Fernan a letter-complaint with
enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the SC. Mr. Fernan brought this indorsement to the
attention of the Court en banc because of its important implications of policy raised by said
1st indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by
"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from
Mr. Cuenco addressed to Hon. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently
filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in
the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to
comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's
intervention.
Issue/s:
Can a disbarment be made against Mr. Fernan, a member of the SC?
Held/Ratio:
No. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle
may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case
No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of
the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint
for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of

the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the

Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a
majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1]
in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit
who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom
are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with
jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed
by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other
high crimes, or graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be
charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New
Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited
to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in
accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found
in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the
above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be
proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law.
There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope
of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)."
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding
shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the
official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance
with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should
the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then
be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation
of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the
protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons
might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and
motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a
person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Recall
Prescription
Unabia v City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253
Facts:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at
P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place
was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the
Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health
Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be
reinstated but his petition was not headed by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a
person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670,
Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of
section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
The court further held that the notation at the bottom of Petitioners appointment to the
effect that his appointment is temporary pending report from the Government Service
Insurance System as to the appointees physical and medical examination did not make his
appointment merely temporary.
Issue/s:
WON, petitioner could be allowed to claim the remedy as he being considered as having
abandoned his office.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was deemed to have abandoned his office for his inaction. There is no reason for
excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging
to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service hence,
the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified
service are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject
to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This cannot be
a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which

he was removed.
If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce
therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as
having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated. These defenses are
valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of
Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with
approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained:
A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to
take steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce
to the order of removal and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case
of unreasonable delay he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to
recover its emoluments. (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which
may be deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case
decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States, 11 months was considered an
unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office and of the right to recover its
emoluments. However, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office,
the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the
island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of
the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a
period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly retarded; delays in the
statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to
employees in the civil service:
Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer
for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of
justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to
public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples interest requires
that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.
Gaz., [8], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to
be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it,
so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for
one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the
policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for
quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service
should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the
objection as to the delay in filing the action is raised for the first time in this Court, not
having been raised in the court below. The above circumstance (belated objection) would
bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we consider it to be essential to
the Petitioners right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal.
The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is

essential to Petitioners cause of action and may be considered even at this stage of the
action.
We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to
the existence of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one
year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to
dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a causes of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a
defense (section 10, Rule 9).

Failure to assume office

Section 11, Omnibus Election Code:
Failure to assume office. - The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take
his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant,
unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

Part IV
Termination of Relations

A. Modes of termination
End of term
Fernandez v Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, 3-30-63
Facts:
Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan City on January 7,
1954, took his oath of office on the same date, and his appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on April 21, 1954. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia,
in an administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been found guilty
of gross negligence, violation of law, and dereliction of duty.
Fernandez was later charged before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City with two
offenses, one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer (Criminal Case No. 368) and
another for oral defamation (Criminal Case No. 438), for which he was suspended from office
by the then Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. He asked that his order of suspension be
lifted but it was denied. After the prosecution had rested its cases and without requiring the
accused to submit his defense, the latter was acquitted in the two criminal cases
abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal
administrative charge were instituted against him, or any administrative investigation
conducted of said charges. On April 28, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo
wrote Fernandez informing him that the President has terminated his services as chief of
police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio Ledesma in his place requesting him at the
same time to turn over his office to Ledesma. The nomination of Ledesma having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of
police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959. Whereupon, Fernandez instituted an action for quo
warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City
seeking his reinstatement on the ground that his removal from office without cause as
provided by law was in violation of our Constitution.

Issue:
WON, the removal of Fernandez from office by the President was valid in accordance with
Section 17, RA 288 Charter of the City of Basilan.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is clear that the President in the exercise of his discretion has put an end to the
services of appellant as chief of police of Basilan City on April 28, 1959, and this he did
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as
the Charter of the City of Basilan, which reads as follows:
SEC. 17. Appointment and removal of officers and employees Compensation.
The President shall appoint with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
municipal judge and auxiliary municipal judge, the city engineer, the city treasurerassessor, the city attorney, the chief of police and the other chiefs of departments of
the city which may be created from time to time, and the President may remove at
his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal
judge, who may be removed only according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
As may be noted, under the aforesaid section, the President is vested with the authority to
appoint, with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, among others, the chief of
police, and in connection with such power the same section says "the President may remove
at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge,
who may be removed only according to law." Verily, the President interpreted said removal
clause as meaning that he may terminate the services of any officer he may appoint under
the charter at his discretion or pleasure with the exception of the municipal judge who may
be removed only according to law, and in the exercise of such power he terminated the
services of appellant as chief of police.
We agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law says that the President may
remove at his discretion any of the appointive officers of the city with the exception of the
municipal judge who may be removed only according to law, it is evident that the legislative
intent is to make the continuance in office of any of said appointive officers dependent upon
the pleasure of the President. If such were not the case, it would not have made a distinction
in point of removal between appointive officers in general and the municipal judge. This
distinction verily is predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic Act No. 288 is there
any mention that the term of office of the chief of police, and for that matter of any
appointive officer, with the exception of the municipal judge, should be for a fixed period.
The fact no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of an intention to make it
dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power. And Congress is not
wanting in power to do so for, as it was aptly said: "A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign function of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public" (7 Mechem, Public Officers, Section 1; See also 42 Am. Jur., 944-955; Emphasis
supplied). And in Alba v. Alajar, 53 O.G. No. 5, p. 1452, this Court also said: "Congress can
legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure
of the President."
Appellant, however, does not agree with the foregoing view for he contends that the act of
the President in appointing Cecilio Ledesma to the position of chief of police of Basilan City
in his place is tantamount to his removal without cause from office in violation of Section 4,
Article XII, of our Constitution, invoking in support thereof our ruling in the cases of De los
Santos v. Mallare, 48 O.G., 1791 and Lacson v. Roque, 49 O.G., 93. But this contention
cannot be sustained considering that the position of the chief of police does not have a fixed
term. As already said, it was made dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the
President, whereas the cases invoked by appellant relate to positions for which the law fixes
a definite term of office. What is in point here is the case of Alba v. Alajar, supra, wherein
this Court made the following pronouncement:
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the
President in designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent Alajar as one of removal.

The replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of his tenure , which
is one the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. On this score, section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code which was declared inoperative in the Santos vs. Mallare case,
is different from section 8 of Republic Act No. 603. Section 2546 refers to removal at
pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 refers to holding office at the pleasure of
the President.
Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether legal cause should
precede or not that removal. What is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure
of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the
President.
The cases relied upon by respondents are, therefore, inopposite to the instant proceedings.
For all of them relate to removal of officials in violation of laws which prescribe fixity of term.
"'Even assuming for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act
itself is valid and lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has
been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with
the policy laid down by Congress therein.
Hernandez v Villegas, G.R. No. L-17287, 6-30-65
Facts:
Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of
the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at P6,000, effective November 1, 1955. In 1956,
he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices
under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the
International Cooperation Administration.
Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily
detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was
designated Acting Director for Security. While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent,
however, Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security and, when the
salary was increased from P6,600 to P7,017.60, he also received the corresponding salary
adjustment.
On January 9, 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the
President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his
letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status
from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a
classified position." A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of
Director for Security was likewise proposed.
On January 14, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo advised Secretary Hernandez that the
President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and Keefe. Accordingly,
Villegas and Keefe's appointments, effective January 1, 1958, were prepared and later
signed by Secretary Hernandez. As the Court of Appeals observed in its decision, "In one of
the appointments, defendant Keefe was promoted to the position of Director for Security ...
and in the other plaintiff was demoted to the rank of arrastre superintendent." (Emphasis
supplied)
It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28,
1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security
and, on further inquiry, found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent. On
March 3, 1958, therefore, he served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas
that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. He also
wrote the Auditor General, Secretary Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget
Commissioner, and the Civil Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the
promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of Director for Security.
Villegas resorted for quo warranto and the judgment was on his favor.
Issue/s:
1) WON, the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of Customs, is a primarily
confidential position

Held/Ratio:
Not necessarily, SC said that, we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is
primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject
to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec. 4) Villanuevas' removal,
is, therefore, concededly without cause. Thus, only recently, this Court reiterated in Corpus
v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965, the view that :
[T]he Constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily
confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit a fitness as
determined from competitive examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra, 49 O.G.
[No. 7] 2755), but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the
operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enumerated in section 4 of
Article XII that
No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.
and which recognizes no exception.
This view finds confirmation in sections 3 and 5 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act No.
2260).
The statement in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, to the effect that appointment to any of
the three classes of positions is terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be
deemed a mere obiter. It has been correctly criticized as misleading. For if these three
special positions do not really belong to the Civil Service, the Constitution would not have
specifically named them as an exception to the general rule that all appointments must be
made on the basis of merit and fitness to be determined by competitive examinations.
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law 411 [11th ed. 1962]) Indeed, in the Corpus case, this
statement was held as not controlling, the ruling in the De los Santos case, where the
statement appears, being that a city engineer who belongs to the unclassified service is
protected by the security of tenure provisions of the Constitution.
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential
positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers. (See, e.g., Corpus v. Cuaderno, supra; Alba vs. Evangelista, 53 O.G. 1452;
Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18879, March 30, 1963. Contra Hojilla v. Marino, G.R. No.
L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965.) But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures and
it has been shown that it has been lost in this case the incumbent is entitled to continue
in office.
We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without
cause and is therefore illegal.
Retirement
Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
Facts:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of
Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the
effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the
service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and
void.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as
and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had
occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS
during all times required by law.

In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well
as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to
1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also
indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the
GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor
General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900.
According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner
discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in
1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he
was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being
able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of
age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had
been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in
September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and
Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board
and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service
Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was
endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil
Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22,
1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of
Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence
to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the
Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as
January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal
Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to
the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable
recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum
dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his
initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of
petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of
Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. As emphasized by
petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has
been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the
2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to
petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957,
corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the
basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on
October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as
January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due
to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more
specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to
the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of
petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine
National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since
January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank
notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last
January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the government
service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961."
Issue/s:
WON, the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by

General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all
circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches,
estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, it acted within its powers. It is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General
Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must
be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by
the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following
powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of
the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the
functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager,
who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and
social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the System, one or
more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an
actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the
approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they
may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their
compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall
have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications
to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees:
Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages
the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the
exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and
the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to
act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of
authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much
less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to
manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter
affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the
General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities,
the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases
and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General
Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which
flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the
System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this
principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of
the management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its
administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and
workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the
government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the
saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if
the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its
controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. We hold that any authority
conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said
Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the
actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the
authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not
constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality
is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is
not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the

System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law
clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief
executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard
regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General
Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually
boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this
clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There
must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which
another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and
that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral
and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent,
upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610,
614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government
officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the
age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the
government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the
opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate
perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a
comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting
demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the
public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the
duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the
Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General
Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence
before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be
disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.
For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material
government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his
date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to
January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise,
and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was
duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the
Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. It is to be noted
that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent
System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to
take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal
Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the
General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations
are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes
an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the
constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature
and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance
policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his
retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake
in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.
Abolition of office
Busacay v Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 1033

Facts:
The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan.
His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. On
October 18, 1945, after liberation, he was reappointed to that position with compensation at
the rate of P720 per annum. On March 21, 1946, he resigned but on April 16 he was
reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947, when the bridge was
destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laid off.
Previously, from July 17 to September 10, 1946, the bridge had been temporarily closed to
traffic due to minor repairs and during that period he and his fellow toll collectors had not
been paid salaries because they had not rendered any service, but upon the reopening of
the bridge to traffic after the repairs, he and his companions resumed work without new
appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947.
When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about the end of November,
1950, the plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness
to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint
him. Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in
February, 1951, and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since. The position
now carries a salary of P1,440 a year. The Bued toll bridge is a portion of a national road and
is a national toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid
from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation was set aside for these
salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 15, 1950, the board on toll
bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees
thereon, and prescribed corresponding rules and regulations.
Issue/s:
WON, by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors provided
therefor were abolished.
Held/Ratio:
No. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it
wholly and permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought,
avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. Rather the contrary was
taken for granted, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in northern Luzon
and to Baguio.
This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not, in our opinion, work to destroy but only to
suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation
as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.
This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is coextensive with that of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by
statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the
power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
The fact that the destruction of the bridge in question was total, and not partial as in 1945,
the length of time it took to reconstruct it, and the hypothetical supposition that the new
structure could have been built across another part of the river, are mere matters of detail

and do not alter the proposition that the positions of toll collector were not eliminated. We
believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments were not
considered forfeited notwithstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines
and who were allowed to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new
appointments are pertinent authority for the views here expressed
Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to the position he held before
the destruction of the Bued river bridge.
The claim for back salary and/or damages may not be granted, however. Without deciding
the merit of this claim, it is our opinion that the respondent Provincial Treasurer is not
personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without proper
authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to the suit.

Manalang v Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954

Facts:
Petitioner Luis Manalang contests, by quo warranto proceedings, the title of the incumbent
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, and seeks to take possession of said
office as the person allegedly entitled thereto.
The original respondent was Aurelio Quitoriano, who, at the time of the filing of the petition
(August 4, 1953), held said office, which he assumed on July 1, 1953, by virtue of a
designation made, in his favor, as Acting Commissioner of the National Employment Service,
by the Office of the President of the Philippines. Subsequently, or on October 22, 1953,
petitioner included, as respondents, Emiliano Morabe, who, on September 11, 1953, was
designated Acting commissioner of National Employment Service, and Zosimo G. Linato, the
Collecting, Disbursing and Property Officer of said National Employment Service
hereinafter referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Service in order to restrain him from
paying, to respondent Morabe, the salary of the Commissioner of said Service. Still later, or
on January 21, 1954, Mohamad de Venancio, who was designated Acting Commissioner of
said Service, and assumed said office, on January 11 and 13, respectively, of the same year,
was included as respondent.
Petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the Placement Bureau, an office created by
Executive Order No. 392, dated December 31, 1950 (46 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 5913, 59205921), avowedly pursuant to the powers vested in the President by Republic Act No. 422. On
June 20, 1952, Republic Act No. 761, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Organization of a
National Employment Service," was approved and became effective. Section 1 thereof partly
provides:
. . . In order to ensure the best possible organization of the employment market as an
integral part of the national program for the achievement and maintenance of
maximum employment and the development and use of productive resources there
is hereby established a national system of free public employment offices to be
known as the National Employment Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service.
the Service shall be under the executive supervision and control of the Department of
Labor, and shall have a chief who shall be known as the Commissioner of the
National employment Service hereinafter referred to as Commissioner. Said
Commissioner shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments and shall receive compensation at the rate of
nine thousand pesos per annum. A Deputy Commissioner shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and
shall receive compensation at the rate of seven thousand two hundred pesos per
annum.
On June 1, 1953, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose Figueras, recommended the appointment

of petitioner Luis Manalang as Commissioner of the Service. On June 29, 1953, respondent
Aurelio Quitoriano, then Acting Secretary of Labor, made a similar recommendation in favor
of Manalang, upon the ground that "he is best qualified" and "loyal to service and
administration." Said Acting Secretary of Labor even informed Manalang that he would
probably be appointed to the office in question. However, on July 1, 1953, Quitoriano was
the one designated, and sworn in, as Acting Commissioner of the Service. Such designation
of Quitoriano like the subsequent designation, first, of Emiliano Morabe, and the, of
Mohamad de Venancio is now assailed by Manalang as "illegal" and equivalent to removal
of the petitioner from office without cause.
Issue/s:
WON, Manalang was illegally removed from office without cause.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was not. Petitioner Manalang has never been Commissioner of the National
Employment Service and, hence, he could not have been, and has not been removed
therefrom. Secondly, to remove an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration of
his term. As removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. Such is not the case of
petitioner herein, for Republic Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement Bureau, and,
by implication, the office of director thereof, which, obviously, cannot exist without said
Bureau. By the abolition of the latter and of said office, the right thereto of its incumbent,
petitioner herein, was necessarily extinguished thereby. Accordingly, the constitutional
mandate to the effect that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Phil. Const.), is not in point,
for there has been neither a removal nor a suspension of petitioner Manalang, but an
abolition of his former office of Director of the Placement Bureau, which, admittedly, is
within the power of Congress to undertake by legislation.
It is argued, however, in petitioner's memorandum, that
. . . there is no abolition but only fading away of the title Placement Bureau and all its
functions are continued by the National Employment Service because the two titles
cannot co-exist. The seemingly additional duties were only brought about by the
additional facilities like the district offices. Employment Service Advisory Councils,
etc.
The question whether or not Republic Act No. 761 abolished the Placement Bureau is one of
legislative intent, about which there can be no controversy whatsoever, in view of the
explicit declaration in the second paragraph of section 1 of said Act reading:
Upon the organization of the Service, the existing Placement Bureau and the existing
Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare shall be abolished, and all the
files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel and unexpended balances of
appropriations of said Bureau and Commission pertaining to said bureau or office
shall thereupon be transferred to the Service. (Emphasis supplied.)
Incidentally, this transfer connotes that the National Employment Service is different and
distinct from the Placement Bureau, for a thing may be transferred only from one place to
another, not to the same place. Had Congress intended the National Employment Service to
be a mere amplification or enlargement of the Placement Bureau, Republic Act No. 761
would have directed the retention of the "qualified personnel" of the latter, not their transfer
to the former. Indeed, the Service includes, not only the functions pertaining to the former
Placement Bureau, but also, those of the former Employment Office in the Commission of
Social Welfare, apart from other powers, not pertaining to either office, enumerated in
section 4 of Republic Act No. 761.
It is next urged in petitioner's memorandum "that the item of National Employment Service
Commissioner is not new and is occupied by the petitioner" and that the petitioner is
entitled to said office "automatically by operation of law," in view of the above quoted
provision of section 1 of Republic Act No. 761, relative to the transfer to the service of the
"qualified personnel" of the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare.
This contention is inconsistent with the very allegations of petitioner's pleadings. Thus, in

paragraph 11 of his petition, it is alleged "that increasing the item and elaborating the title
of a civil servant, although necessitating a new appointment, does not mean the ousting of
the incumbent or declaring the item vacant." In paragraph 12 of the same pleading,
petitioner averred that "on or about June 25, 1953, two days before the departure of
President Quirino to Baltimore, petitioner wrote a confidential memorandum to His
Excellency reminding him of the necessity of appointing anew the petitioner as head of the
National Employment Service."
Having thus admitted and correctly that he needed a new appointment as
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, it follows that petitioner does not hold
or, in his own words, occupy the latter's item, inasmuch as the right thereto may be
acquired only by appointment. What is more, Republic Act No. 761 requires specifically that
said appointment be made by the President of the Philippines 'with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments." How could the President and the Commission on
Appointments perform these acts if the Director of the Placement Bureau automatically
became Commissioner of the National Employment Service?
Neither may petitioner profit by the provision of the second paragraph of section 1 of
Republic Act No. 761, concerning the transfer to the Service of the "qualified personnel" of
the Placement Bureau and of the Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare,
because:
1. Said transfer shall be affected only "upon the organization" of the National Employment
Service, which does not take place until after the appointment of, at least, the commissioner
thereof. If the Director of the Placement Bureau were included in the phrase "qualified
personnel" and, as a consequence, he automatically became Commissioner of the Service,
the latter would have become organized simultaneously with the approval of Republic Act
No. 761, and the same would not have conditioned the aforementioned transfer "upon the
organization of the Service," which connotes that the new office would be established at
some future time. Indeed, in common parlance, the word "personnel" is used generally to
refer to the subordinate officials or clerical employees of an office or enterprise, not to the
managers directors or heads thereof.
2. If "qualified personnel" included the heads of the offices affected by the establishment of
the Service, then it would, also, include the chief of the Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare, who, following petitioner's line of argument, would, like
petitioner herein, be, also, a Commissioner of the National Employment Service. The result
would be that we would have either two commissioners of said Service or a Commission
thereof consisting of two persons instead of a Commissioner and neither alternative is
countenanced by Republic Act No. 761.
3. Congress can not either appoint the Commissioner of the Service, or impose upon the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to said office. The appointing power is
the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to
prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.
Facundo v Pablan, G.R. No. L-17746, January 31, 1962
Facts:
On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a petition for mandamus (docketed as Special Civil Case No. T-669)
against respondents Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan, Pangasinan), Layos, Domingo,
Lopez, de los Trinos, Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Perez (municipal treasurer)
alleging, as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed
Local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held
said position and received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because
he is a non-civil service eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service
examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260,
known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; that on June 24, 1960, respondents municipal

councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his position and, on the same day, approved
Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions of policemen; and that four days later, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his services as Local Civil Registry
clerk.
As second cause of action, the petition alleged that the other petitioner Facundo, a third
grade civil service eligible was appointed as Market Collector in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Asingan, on October 15, 1958, and has continuously held and performed the
duties of said position and received the emoluments therefor since his appointment; that in
said Resolution No. 67, his position was abolished; and that on June 28, 1960, respondent
mayor Carbonell wrote him a letter terminating his services as Market Collector.
The petition further alleged that by the approval and adoption of said resolution and the
termination of their services, petitioners have been unlawfully excluded from their positions;
that in approving and adopting said resolution and in terminating their services, respondents
were impelled by revenge and ulterior motives; that respondents' acts are oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the specific provisions of the cited Republic Act No. 2260.
Petitioners, therefore, prayed that a preliminary mandatory order 1 be issued directing
respondent mayor Carbonell to reinstate them to their positions; and that judgment be
rendered declaring respondents to have acted illegally in passing said resolution, and in
terminating petitioners' services, declaring void said resolution for being oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260
To this petition, respondents timely filed their answer alleging, among others, that the
positions abolished under the resolution in question "were unnecessary and useless and
carrying duties which could be efficiently performed by other employees in the office of the
Municipal Treasurer"; that the appropriation for said positions, "could be applied for more
important and useful undertakings of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation
and pursuance of its inherent duty, which is the present administration's avowed policy of
maintaining peace and order which have been unduly neglected in the past"; and that said
resolution "is valid and lawful, enacted and resolved with a view of bringing about a better
and more efficient administration and in consonance with the promise and avowed policy of
the present administration of maintaining peace and order" for which it received the
confidence of the people of Asingan in the last local elections. Respondents prayed that the
petition be dismiss with costs.
The lower court ruled that the abolition of the position of Ulep was valid, being not civil
service legible while the abolition of the position of Facundo is not valid as he was entitled to
permanency being civil service legible.
To this, Ulep appealed while the respondents appealed out of the reglementary period. The
counsel for Facundo moved for execution of the judgment, to which the Judge Pabalan
denied, alleging that since Ulep appealed, then the SC may declare valid or invalid in parts
or in whole the Resolution 67 which can still affect Facundo. Facundo filed for mandamus
against Judge Pabalan.
Issue/s:
1) WON, mandamus can be granted against Judge Pabalan.
2) WON, the municipal council validly abolished the position of Ulep.
Held/Ratio:
1) Yes, Facundo's petition for certiorari with mandamus is meritorious. The records disclose
that respondents' appeal was filed out of time and was disallowed by the trial court in its
order of November 3, 1960. Consequently, the decision in favor of petitioner Facundo
became final and executory (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court), and he (Facundo) became
entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution. It, therefore, became respondent Judge's
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus, to issue the writ of execution sought by
Facundo.
The fact that there is only one decision and only one resolution involved, does not make the
right of one of the petitioners dependent upon the right of the other. The provisions of
Resolution No. 67 are severable, each petitioner occupying a different position and having
different qualifications, Facundo being a civil service eligible and Ulep, not. The decision too,

although only one, contains separate findings for each of the parties and makes distinct and
independent rulings for each of them. The appeal, therefore, of Ulep which has no bearing to
the ordered reinstatement of Facundo cannot be an obstacle to the execution of said
decision insofar as Facundo is concerned.
2) There is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the positions it
has created, but the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power
to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly
providing otherwise (Castillo v. Pajo, et al., G. R. No. L-11262, prom. April 28, 1958, citing
Brillo v. Enage, 50 O. G. 3102 and 67 C.J.S. 121). However, the office must be abolished in
good faith; and if immediately after the office is abolished, another office is created with
substantially the same duties, and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise
appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons, the courts will
intervene (Gacho, et al. v. Osmena, et al., G. R. No. L-10989, prom. May 28, 1959, citing 37
Am. Jur. 858).
In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in adopting.
Resolution No. 67 dated June 24, 1960, abolishing the position of appellant are stated
therein, to wit: there is "an excess of personnel" in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Asingan; the position of appellant "could be undertaken by the internal revenue clerk" in
said office; and if abolished, the remaining positions in said office "will be sufficient to
warrant the sound operation of said office". In respondents' answer, it is also stated that the
appropriation for said position "could be applied for more important and useful undertakings
of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation and pursuance of its inherent duty,
which is the present administration's avowed policy of maintaining peace and order, which
have been unduly neglected in the past." Observe too, that the new positions created (in
Resolution No. 70 of the same date as No. 67) are those of policemen, the duties of which,
are entirely different from those of appellant. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to
declare that the action of the municipal council of Asingan was an abuse of the power and
discretion lodged in it by existing law (Rodriguez v. Montinola, G.R. No. L-5689, prom. May
14, 1954).
Appellant contends that his removal from his position was illegal because having taken the
civil service examination required under Section 23 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the
Civil Service Act of 1959, he could not be replaced or removed from office, unless the results
of said examination shows he failed therein. He also argues that his removal was illegal, as it
was not for cause as provided by Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution. But, appellant can
not successfully invoke said provisions in his favor, because there has been no removal of
petitioner, but in abolition of his position, which was within the power of the municipal
council of Asingan to do.
Cruz v Primicias, 23 SCRA 998
Facts:
Direct petition for Mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by certain employees of the
Province of Pangasinan, to declare Resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Board and Executive
Order No. 2 of the Provincial Governor null and void; to have the abolition of petitioners'
positions declared illegal, and compel their immediate reinstatement; to restrain
respondents from excluding petitioners from the enjoyment of their rights as civil service
employees, and to recover attorneys' fees and costs.
It is not disputed that upon election and assumption of office in 1967 of the respondents
Provincial Governor and Members of the Provincial Board, the latter adopted on January 1,
1968, Resolution No. 5 providing as follows:

Resolution No. 5
RESOLVED by the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, that for the purpose of promoting
simplicity, economy and efficiency in the operation of the Provincial Government and
for the purpose of providing the necessary expanded services on agricultural
extension, rural health, provincial public works and legal services, etc., the Provincial
Governor is hereby authorized to effect by executive orders from time to time for a
period not exceeding six (6) months from the date of approval of this resolution, such
reforms and changes in the different offices and branches of the Provincial
Government as may be necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish
those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer
functions, appropriations, equipments, properties, records and personnel from one
office or branch to another; eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not
provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries and do
whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency of the
government service and provide necessary services for the promotion of the general
social welfare.
That any action taken by the Provincial Governor pursuant to this resolution shall be
immediately reported to the Provincial Board and shall be valid and subsisting until
the Provincial Board shall provide otherwise.1vvphi1.nt
Acting pursuant to this Resolution, the Governor issued his Executive Order No. 2 on January
2, 1968, reorganizing the office of the Governor and that of the Provincial Board. The order
expressly abolished the divisions provided for in the Annual Budget for the fiscal year ending
on June 30, 1968
1.
Executive
2.
Socio-Economic
Program
Implementation
3.
Political
Affairs
and
Placement
4.
Public
Information
5. Legal Division

Division
Division
Division
Division

as well as "all the positions listed in the current plantilla of personnel of said offices," with
certain exceptions. At the same time, the Executive Order (pars. d-f) provided:
(d) That there is hereby created, effective January 1, 1968, a private and confidential
staff of the Governor under his immediate control and supervision with such duties
and functions as may be assigned and prescribed by him from time to time in the
interest of the service.
(e) That as authorized by the Decentralization Law, there is hereby created, effective
January 1, 1968, One Provincial Attorney under the Governor with an annual salary of
P8,400.
(f) That there is hereby created a Personnel Division under the Office of the Governor
with such duties and functions as prescribed under Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules
in relation to Section 21 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
Petitioners are Provincial Clerk eligibles, except Bancod, who is a general clerk eligible. On or
about January 11 to 15, 1968, they were individually served notices of termination of their
services and coincidentally, the equipment used by said petitioners was taken, transferred

and redistributed to other retained offices.

In their answer filed on February 12, 1968, respondents pleaded that the reorganization of
the offices of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board had been made within the powers
of the Provincial government, in order to effect economy in view of the province's deficit of
P3.714 million pesos; to promote simplicity and efficiency, and to provide for more essential
services and activities; that the Governor's Executive Order No. 2 had been approved and
ratified by the Provincial Board on January 5, 1968, by its Resolution No. 8, while the
supplemental budget to provide for the newly created positions was ratified by the Board's
Resolution No. 50, of January 26, 1968; that the actions thus taken were immediately
effective, without need of the approval of the Secretary of Finance; and that the abolition
and creation of new positions were made in good faith, the selection of retained employees
had been made on the basis of seniority and fitness as required by the Civil Service law,
those retained having been appointed earlier than the petitioners. The answer also urged
that the petitioners should have exhausted their administrative remedies, by appealing to
the Commissioner of Civil Service.
After this case was argued in open court, one of the petitioners, Myrna Sison, formerly
occupying the position of correspondence clerk, manifested in writing that she was no longer
interested in the case and prayed that she be excluded therefrom.
Issue/s:
WON, the abolition of the offices held by petitioners is valid and legal.
Held/Ratio:
No, the abolition was not valid and legal. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue
that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903;
Rodriguez vs. Montemayor, 94 Phil. 964; Castillo vs. Pajo, 103 Phil. 515). And, of course, if
the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees, it is null and void.
A review of the record herein satisfies us that the justifications advanced for the abolition of
petitioners' offices (economy and efficiency) are but subterfuges resorted to for disguising
an illegal removal of permanent civil service employees, in violation of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The claim of economy effectuated through the reorganization is belied by the fact that while
72 positions were abolished, 50 of these were actually vacant. Only 22 stations were
occupied at the time of the reorganization, carrying total emoluments of P25,538.71 per
semester, of which P6,120.00 per semester corresponds to the five remaining petitioners
(Answer, Exh. 3-C). As against these 22 positions suppressed by the reorganization
(Executive Order No. 2), 28 new positions were simultaneously created, with a compensation
of P87,600.00 per annum, P43,800.00 per semester, for confidential personnel in the office

of the Governor (Exh. Order No. 2, par. d). In addition, a Provincial Attorney and his staff (p.
2), and a Personnel Division of five members, importing P13,380.00 per semester were set
up. Thus, against the suppressed items of P25,538.71, new items carrying a total
appropriation of P57,180.00 per semester (or P114,360.00 annually) were created, in
addition to P8,000.00 for casual laborers at the discretion of the Governor. Where the
economy lies is difficult to see. Significantly, this "economy" was the same excuse advanced
by the preceding administration when it attempted to eliminate civil service eligibles upon
its coming into power (Ocampo, et al. vs. Duque, supra).
As to the alleged need for greater efficiency, it is well to observe that no charge of
inefficiency is lodged against petitioners herein. Their efficiency is attested by their
promotional appointments in 1967. What can not be glossed over is that respondent's
reorganization replaced 22 civil service eligibles with 23 confidential employees. No further
elaboration is required to show that in truth and in fact, what respondents sought to achieve
was to supplant civil service eligibles with men of their choice, whose tenure would be
totally dependent upon respondents' pleasure and discretion. Thus the spirit of the Civil
Service law and of the Constitution are being purposely circumvented.
The motives behind these wholesale replacements are made manifest in paragraph 10 of
respondents' own Answer, where it is averred, in an attempt to justify the new positions
created, that:
... These positions are indispensable to the respondent Governor, he being the
elected Chief Executive of the Province and it could not be denied that his position is
more political in nature and as such, it is humbly submitted, that he is entitled to a
flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants in whom he has complete trust
and confidence not only in their capacity for work but also in their personal fitness
and loyalty. This should be so because his executive position is a political one and as
elected Governor, he is also the Chairman of the Provincial Committee of the
Nacionalista Party to which he belongs. In this situation, it could not be helped that
his Office should deal with his own party men on party matters. Not only that, as the
Chief Executive of the Province, his office has to keep and take up official secrets of
the government which should not be put in danger of being leaked out to third
parties, and it is for this reason, among others, that the respondent Governor should
have a flexible compact staff of highly confidential assistants.
Here is proof that the true motivation for reorganizing out the petitioners was "not only (in)
their capacity for work but also (in) their personal fitness and loyalty". Political loyalty or
disloyalty are not statutory nor constitutional preconditions for appointment or grounds for
separation of eligibles in the Civil Service.
As a consequence of this pronouncement, it is likewise held, that respondents have
unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the enjoyment of an office to which they are
entitled; and that in failing or refusing to include in the 1968-1969 budget items required to
cover appropriations for salaries of petitioners, respondents have unlawfully failed or
neglected the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office.

Reorganization
Dario v Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989

Facts:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING
A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING
THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other
things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people
to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to
measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and
corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of
the organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws
then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all
government offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is
abolished or reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties
shall be transferred to the office or body to which its powers, functions and
responsibilities substantially pertain.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the
President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their
courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the
1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives
reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected
local officials, has been challenged in this Court, and two of which, with respect to appointed
functionaries, have likewise been questioned herein.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and

demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of
personnel,"
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and
the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the
Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or
c) informed of their termination.
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged
with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga
Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R.
Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz,
Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay
Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto
Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,,
Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279
individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He further
states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56
which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so
declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that
retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the
position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally
separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on
holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that
case supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force
and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17,
which was meant to implement the Provisional Constitution, had ceased to have force and

effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39,
the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations now under question
were "not for cause" and were a result of government reorganize organization decreed by
Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the
constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security
of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.
Issue/s:
WON, Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason (WON, the
removals conducted by Commissioner Mison in light of the reorganization as he claimed was
valid NO).
Held/Ratio:
No, reorganization must be in good faith. There is no question that the administration may
validly carry out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional
Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive
in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government.
It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit
implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to
certain conditions.
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive"
reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy"
following the people power revolution of 1986;

60
61

2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the
President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under
the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on
mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We
quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but
as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be
entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing
to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or

agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their

subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered
in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision
in so far as it mentions removals not for cause that would arguably support the
challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization
after the ratification of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much
later, on June 10, 1988.
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the
past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the
Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article
XVI, of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all
officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall
vacate their respective office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of
the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by
the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are
by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. 67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there
is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free
from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office
(not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of
economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is
obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and
simply because the Constitution allows it.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for

"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts
had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to
continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in
the sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to
those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization the first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation
No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date
(February 2, 1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, it
should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of
reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization.
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service.
And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February
2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy
and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and
primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for
cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive,
must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution
ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only
mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present
Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not
be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the
Freedom Constitution the first stage. We are on the second stage that inferred from the
provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but
is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and
Palma-Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent
officials and employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like
the execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the
democratic character of the Charter itself.

What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary

powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from
Executive Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless
propensity that accompanies reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals
arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would
have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the
"unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank and file that
reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she
said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is
necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and
to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be
made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We
quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have
ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that
would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports,
it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his
"progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief
Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to
separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v.
Arroyo, clarified.
The transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization,
the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 which had already been
consummated the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory provisions
themselves which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after
the effectivity of the new Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the reorganization.
Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as
stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's
subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the
reorganization inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution
seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that

Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by

law" principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify
removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former
Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that
removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good
faith a test not obviously required under the revolutionary government formerly
prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this government under
a democratic Charter.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes
place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we
are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course
of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to
"grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from
the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof.
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack
of it.
Reorganization
of
Lack of Good Faith in.

the

Bureau

of

Customs,

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy except for the change of personnel has occurred, which would have justified
(an things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at
the Bureau (which would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the
same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when
Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted
There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the
Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt
further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should
observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is
not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59
thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394
removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin
with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order
No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all
Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President."
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential
appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to
our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In PalmaFernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on
30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a
hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any
of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity
was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when
the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B.
Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions

of the latter on security of tenure govern.

90

It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a
reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a
reorganization should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987
(De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a
basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra]
provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a
challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar
as it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs
counter to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated
without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing" is not contrary to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's
transitory provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must
nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about
automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that
the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it also acknowledges the
possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of
tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about
the Act.

Dela Llana v Alba, 112 SCRA 294

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo,
assailed its validity because, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges not the Congress.
Issue/s:

WON, BP 129 is constitutional.

Held/Ratio:
Yes, it is constitutional.
Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was
introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of
cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the
proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth
in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in
the proposed Bill." In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored
by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which
it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained
the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted
substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments
to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government,
to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of
1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and
the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill
upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government."
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in
the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated
to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and
hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the
minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to
its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such
a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that
its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence
of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for
the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at
rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to

be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." As with the offices in the other branches
of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in
good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa cannot be any clearer. This is a quo
warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled
to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a
Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch.
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then
National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result
reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude
any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of
tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an
entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and
constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in
the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in
these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies
of every sort.
It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the
same court is valid and constitutional. Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and
other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities,
and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of
such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems
that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy.
To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article
X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did
not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively
inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the

incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing
ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the
boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid
the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara
decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and
the other begins." It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even
more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers,
whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down
'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not
only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'"
There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of
a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is
that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to

alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole."The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as
1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" He warned against
a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."
Further on this point from the same opinion" Another objection based on the absence in the
statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of
merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall
submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order
to be issued by the President." Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished
and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear
need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and
clean record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation without any interruption
in the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of
lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the
new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive.
It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through
public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral
adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is
from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is
to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. The judges may be guaranteed
a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to

be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant
after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an
empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in
spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to
reorganize inferior courts." That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will
do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing
the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units
in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does
not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant
to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend
the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, a decision promulgated almost half a
century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Biraogo v Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, & 193036 December 7, 2010

Facts:
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive

Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Nature of the Truth Commission
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as
an ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created
as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context
of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys
past. They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics:
(1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a
period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish
their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;
and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. Commissions
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend
institutional reforms.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on
reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators.
Issue/s:
(a) WON, The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(b) WON, E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

Held/Ratio:
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency
or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
a) No, it cannot legitimize the creation of the PTC, however the President has the power to
create ad hoc committees such the PTC. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring
of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing
structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have
to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the
interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772,
became functus oficio upon the
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last
whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was
enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are
fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued.

Now would you agree with me that P.D.
1416 should not be considered effective
anymore
upon
the
promulgation,
adoption, ratification of the 1987
Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your

Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

The power of the President to reorganize

the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents

powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive
and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches
of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to
the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. In a
case,
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the
Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no
changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive

power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
b) No on the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is
well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as
a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of
graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise
of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be
clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a

court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.
However, PTC cannot be succesfully created for it violated equal protection clause
as it targeted only the past administration.

Abandonment
Summers v Ozaeta, G.R. No. L-1534, October 25, 1948
Facts:
Summers was a cadastral judge who received an adterim appointment for the position of
judge-at-large. He then assumed office as a judge-at-large. However, such appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. He wanted to go back being a cadastral
judge invoking section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution, that he is entitled to continue as
cadastral judge during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and
judge-at-large are not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter office
he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.
Issue/s:
WON, Summers can validly resumed as a cadastral judge.
Held/Ratio:
No. There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Supreme Court
and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. We believe,
that said right is waivable and should be construed without prejudice to the legal effects of
abandonment in proper cases.
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-atlarge consequent upon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a
waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and
guaranteed by the Constitution. But it is maintained that an ad interim appointment is
merely temporary and the petitioner cannot be said to have vacated the office of cadastral
judge in view of the rejection of said appointment by the Commission on Appointments. This
point has to be resolved adversely to the petitioner, if we are to be consistent with the
decision in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, wherein it was held that "when a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of

a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same
category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another
Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to
be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased
in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Moreover, an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,
Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an "acting" appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued. Thus, the decision in Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil. 1,
cannot be invoked by the petitioner because Santiago, while being a member of the
municipal board of Manila, was designated only "Acting Mayor" and this Court held that he
did not thereby vacate his first office. Indeed, the distinction between an acting designation
and a permanent appointment may be gathered from the following passage of the decision:
"Mr. Santiago took the oath of office and qualified for the position of Acting Mayor of the City
of Manila. He indicated to the Municipal Board his intention to fill the new office temporarily
and then return to his position as member of the Municipal Board. Mr. Santiago never took
the oath of office as Mayor of the City of Manila. He never qualified for the office of Mayor.
He never accepted the office of Mayor. He did not at any time disclose an intention to
abandon the office of member of the Municipal Board. There was no resignation, express or
implied, from the latter office.
In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of judge-at-large by
taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of an "acting" judge-at-large. He
cannot argue that said acceptance was conditioned upon the approval of the appointment
by the Commission on Appointments, for, as stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the
petitioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to
the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said
commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have been for him to
await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualifying for and assuming the
position of judge-at-large. A hasty acceptance on the part of an ad interim appointee, in the
anxiety to enjoy either the higher honor or better material advantages of a second office,
may lead to seemingly unfair consequences for which the appointing power should not be
blamed. While in the ordinary course of things, an appointee certainly has the right to rely
on his record and expect the approval of his appointment, it is nevertheless the better part
of wisdom for one always to adopt the surer method which will, furthermore, protect him
against any design, intentional or otherwise, to oust him from an office the tenure of which
is fixed by the Constitution.
Under the comparison presented by the petitioner, the situation before us is undoubtedly
not one wherein he may appropriately hold two compatible offices at one time such, for
instance, as the positions of town recorder and county and probate judge, but one wherein
he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of
judge of first instance. At least, the petitioner does not contend that he can simultaneously
occupy the position of cadastral judge and the office of judge-at-large, for this would of

course be clearly against public policy. The law has created a fixed number of cadastral
judges (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P8,400 per annum each), and a
fixed number of judge-at-large (Republic Act No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P9,000
per annum each), and considerations of public interest must have been the basis thereof. If
the petitioner can be a cadastral judge and a judge-at-large at the same time, the judicial
positions as specified and created by law will be diminished by one. Authority in support of
our proposition is not wanting. In State vs. Jones, 150 Wis., 572; 110 N. W., 431, it was held:
"That realtor in a contest by quo warranto for the office of police justice of the city of
Watertown was held to have no right to that office, because at the time he was holding the
office of justice of the peace in the same city. The court said: 'We consider that the two
offices are clearly incompatible with each other, and that one person cannot and should not
hold both of them at the same time. In the plainest terms the charter gives the city four
judicial officers of the grade of justice of the peace while, if the realtor could make good his
right to the office of police justice it would, in fact, have but three.' This is a strong and
authoritative declaration of public policy and it is said elsewhere that the incompatibility
'which shall operate to vacate the first office exists where the nature and duties of the two
offices are such as to render it improper from consideration of public policy for one person to
retain both.' (Mechem, Pub. Off., section 422 and cases.) Preliminary examinations in
criminal cases may be held before a justice of the peace, country judge or court
commissioner. Chapter 195, St. 1898. The consolidation in one person of the offices of
country judge and justice of the peace diminishes the number of examining magistrates by
one." And is State ex rel. Crawford vs. Anderson, 155 Iowa, 271, 136 N. W., 128, the same
rule was stressed: "It is apparent from these several provisions of the law that the
lawmaking power considered it for the public good and convenience to have three judicial
officers in every township containing within its geographical limits an incorporated city,
town, and that in criminal prosecutions under statute, these officers should have the same
jurisdiction. And if this be true, can this plain purpose be thwarted by permitting one man to
hold two of these offices? We think not, because the two offices are, in our judgment,
incompatible when viewed in the light of the public policy expressed in the statutes creating
them and defining their powers and duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain
instances, there should be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly
without force and effect.
Incompatible office
Resignation
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were
submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)

for proper investigation.

In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned

from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:

The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
Office of the Ombudsman v Andutan, G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011
Facts:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those
occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. On July 1, 1998,
pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF;
Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corporation (Steel Asia); Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Lorenzana, President and Chief
Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was
criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As
government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively
charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to
submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the
Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all
leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
Issue/s:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutans resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
Held/Ratio:

I. No, provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not
prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was
committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been
settled by jurisprudence. In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court, speaking
through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public
officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the
object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in
nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a
statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while
the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year
from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In
fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis
supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a
general rule the word "may" is directory, the negative phrase "may not" is
mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word
"not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in
character, is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on
statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged
act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one
(1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to
conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the
issue of the Ombudsmans authority to institute an administrative complaint against a
government employee who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutans favor.
II. Yes, Andutans resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an
administrative complaint against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against
Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an

administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,
we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July
2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case
against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a
public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation neither warrants
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while
he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot
and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case
[Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondents resignation
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he shall still be answerable.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the
above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the administrative
cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the
imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against
him by resigning, since he knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of
the State would eventually reach him] is unfounded. First, Andutans resignation was
neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned
from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to
find reason in the Ombudsmans sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before
the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to
accept the Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him,
his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the
administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to
the provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the
Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while
the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is
not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If we agree with
this interpretation, any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long
time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.
We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law

which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence in the
government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned. Likewise, if the act
committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal
mechanisms are available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsmans
lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutans removal from the service is
moot, there is an irresistible justification to determine whether or not there remains
penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of
benefits. Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be imposed against
Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the
inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an
administrative case moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed,
this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9
May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite the petitioners separation from government service. Even if the
most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses
charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. Our position that accessory penalties are still
imposable thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint merely
flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case
against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have
justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if Paganos filing of
candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano
confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was
already notified by the Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no
administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash
shortage of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already
filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative
proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was
considered separated from service through her precipitate filing of
her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest
when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were
being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in
laying the foundation for an administrative case. (emphasis and

underscoring supplied)
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case
notwithstanding Paganos resignation was her bad faith in filing the certificate of
candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office x x x is
a question of transcendental [importance] and that preserving the inviolability of public
office compels the state to prevent the re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x
x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office. However, the State must
perform this task within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier
stated, under the Ombudsmans theory, the administrative authorities may exercise
administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has
validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an administrative
complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who
committed violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under
the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an
administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the
Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged
transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for
Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.
CONCLUSION
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this
statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public
institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsmans resolve in pursuing the present case for
violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and
dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper
subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsmans
factual findings.

Removal
Office of the President v Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rankand-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior
and management incompetence.
In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were

submitted in a Report dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may
be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations
of several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team
recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
for proper investigation.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that
there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be
used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that
respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz
be relieved from his position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
On June 6, 2003, in a letter to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo),
the Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly
organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint dated September 5, 2003 before
PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
(corrupt practices: directly transacted with fishpen operators and authorized payment of
fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA, condoned/granted reductions of
fines and penalties and the like)
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for reemployment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of
the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President
Arroyo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz
serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(2) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC
and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
Held/Ratio:
1) The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability.
Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes
the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition
before this Court.

The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative
and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed;
and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from
further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public
service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
2) Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite
his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts
committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the
charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding
accessory penalties is valid.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the Presidents power to
remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the
President to order the respondents dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal,
he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of

Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. where the Court held that:
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can
still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.
In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771
Facts:
An indorsement letter from Mr. Gonzalez forwarding to Mr. Fernan a letter-complaint with
enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the SC. Mr. Fernan brought this indorsement to the
attention of the Court en banc because of its important implications of policy raised by said
1st indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by
"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from
Mr. Cuenco addressed to Hon. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently
filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in
the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to
comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's
intervention.
Issue/s:
Can a disbarment be made against Mr. Fernan, a member of the SC?
Held/Ratio:
No. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle
may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case
No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of
the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint
for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of

the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the

Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a
majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1]
in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit
who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom
are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with
jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed
by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other
high crimes, or graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be
charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New
Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited
to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in
accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found
in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the
above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be
proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law.
There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope
of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)."
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding
shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the
official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance
with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should
the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then
be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation
of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the
protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons
might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and
motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a
person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Recall
Prescription
Unabia v City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253
Facts:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at
P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place
was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the
Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health
Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be
reinstated but his petition was not headed by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a
person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670,
Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of
section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
The court further held that the notation at the bottom of Petitioners appointment to the
effect that his appointment is temporary pending report from the Government Service
Insurance System as to the appointees physical and medical examination did not make his
appointment merely temporary.
Issue/s:
WON, petitioner could be allowed to claim the remedy as he being considered as having
abandoned his office.
Held/Ratio:
No, he was deemed to have abandoned his office for his inaction. There is no reason for
excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging
to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service hence,
the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified
service are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject
to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This cannot be
a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which

he was removed.
If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce
therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as
having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated. These defenses are
valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of
Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with
approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained:
A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to
take steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce
to the order of removal and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case
of unreasonable delay he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to
recover its emoluments. (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which
may be deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case
decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States, 11 months was considered an
unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office and of the right to recover its
emoluments. However, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office,
the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the
island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of
the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a
period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly retarded; delays in the
statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to
employees in the civil service:
Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer
for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of
justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to
public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples interest requires
that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.
Gaz., [8], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to
be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it,
so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for
one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the
policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for
quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service
should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the
objection as to the delay in filing the action is raised for the first time in this Court, not
having been raised in the court below. The above circumstance (belated objection) would
bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we consider it to be essential to
the Petitioners right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal.
The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is

essential to Petitioners cause of action and may be considered even at this stage of the
action.
We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to
the existence of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one
year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to
dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a causes of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a
defense (section 10, Rule 9).

Failure to assume office

Section 11, Omnibus Election Code:
Failure to assume office. - The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take
his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant,
unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.