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DAVID NICHOLLS
Hai til:
rise
the
Duvalierism
and
f a
of
Referring to the period between the death of Pope Leo XIII and the
election of his successor, the Irish Jesuit George Tyrrell wrote to a
friend, 'The ten days interim, when there was no infallible authority on
earth, were the happiest of my life'. 1Haitians are today enjoying one of
those rare springtimes of freedom between the departure of one
president and the election of another. After almost thirty years of
ruthless repression in this country of roughly six million people, all things
seem possible. New parties are forming, newspapers of all kinds are
appearing and the situation is highly volatile. In this article I wish to
consider why the Duvalier dynasty rose and fell, then to look at some of
the forces now at work in the republic. I shall suggest that the main
reason for the political demise of Jean-Claude ('Baby Doc') Duvalier
was a shift in the basis of his support from one class to another. This
made him susceptible to pressure from several directions: from
movements of mass protest, from the church, and finally from the US
Embassy and the army.
1239
coincidence between colour and class, so that most of the rich are
mulatto and most of the poor are black. There has hardly been an
important issue in Haiti where colour has not played a part; it is never
the sole factor, and is not always the dominant factor, but colour is
rarely absent.2
Having temporarily reassured the US and the bishops that he was
sympathetic to their interests, Franqois Duvalier ruthlessly repressed all
attempts by his opponents to challenge his position and skilfully
eliminated the most dangerous elements in the army. In the course of
the following years he dealt severe blows to all potential centres of
political opposition, including the intellectuals (school teachers,
students, professors and journalists), the church hierarchy, the US
Embassy, critics within his own party and trade union leaders. By 1964
he was able to have himself declared President-for-Life, to write a new
autocratic Constitution and to change the Haitian flag to black and red
(a symbolic aim he had cherished for many years). This flag-the flag of
Dessalines and Christophe-was said to reflect a new 'equilibrium' in
which the blacks would control power in a country where a light-skinned
elite had generally been dominant. This was the so-called 'Duvalierist
revolution'.
From the mid-1960s onwards, however, the dictator reached an
accommodation with the business community, with the US (after the
death of Kennedy) and with the church hierarchy. Businessmen were
assured by the government that they could continue to make money, so
long as they refrained from direct political action; US aid was resumed
and new-indigenous and docile-bishops were appointed. Papa Doc
was nevertheless careful to keep close contact with those middle-class
blacks who had originally supported him, many of whom were
houngans (Voodoo priests) and local leaders of his civilian militia, the
tontons macoutes. Despite occasional attempts by exiles to invade and
sporadic outbursts of popular discontent-particularly among peasants
of the Artibonite valley-Duvalier was firmly in control of the country
and was able in 1971, just before his death, to hand over power to his
teenaged son.
Overseas observers were surprised that a peaceful succession was
achieved. There are a number of reasons for this. In the first place they
failed to recognise that Papa Doc-by a combination of terror, populist
rhetoric and the adroit distribution of the small amounts of patronage
2
See David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979, and Haiti in Caribbean Context, London: Macmillan 1985, chapters 1, 3 and 12.
1240
Jean-Claudisme (1971-85)
With the help of his mother the new President was able to maintain
power and to accelerate the policies of accommodation adopted by his
father. Some of the more scandalous activities of the macoutes were
curbed and gestures were made in the direction of a liberalisation.
'Jean-Claudisme' was widely portrayed as aiming to achieve an
economic revolution, by a process of modernisation. Washington was
generally favourable to the new regime and encouraged private
investment in the growing sector of light industry and assembly plants.
The early 1970s was a period of relative economic prosperity.
Agricultural production grew, tourism revived and investment
increased. Real growth in the economy reached 5 per cent per annum
and the US Embassy confidently pronounced that the Haitian economy
'is in the process of recovery:3
Jean-Claude Duvalier had lived most of his life in the presidential
palace and lacked his father's intimate knowledge of the country. The
regime gradually lost support from many of the black middle classes and
came increasingly to depend on the support of the business community.
Demands for improvements in the economy and the need for foreign aid
meant that new technologically oriented men, who could speak the
language of the World Bank, like Henri Bayard and Marc Bazin, were
brought into the government. These men were, however, unhappy
about working with the old guard Duvalierists and macoutes. For years
the President attempted to retain support of both groups, but by the
early 1980s many of the black middle-class supporters of Francois
Duvalier had come to the conclusion that there was nothing for them in
the regime of Jean-Claude.4
While it would be wrong to attribute all the problems of Baby Doc to
Trends: Haiti, US Embassy, Port-au-Prince, 1973.
William Paley, 'Power shift imperils Haiti's frail stability', The Guardian (London) 13 January
1982.
3Economic
4
1241
his marriage, and to blame Michele Bennett for his political demise, the
president's growing dependence upon a corrupt clique headed by
Ernest Bennett, was viewed with alarm by different sectors of the
population. Well-established and influential members of the business
community disliked the privileges accorded to this arriviste-as they saw
him. The old guard of black Duvalierists saw the situation in terms of a
revival in mulatto influence. Undisguised profiteering by the DuvalierBennett entourage, with hundreds of millions of dollars leaving the
country into private bank accounts and an extravagant life-style at
home, disgusted all sectors of the population. The bourgeoisie, upon
whom the regime had come increasingly to depend, began to look
around for alternatives.
Some degree of what might be called corruption, sufficient to enable
an ex-President to spend his declining years in reasonable comfort
abroad, is an accepted part of Haitian public life. Jean-Claude Duvalier
and the Bennetts, however, overstepped the limit, and efforts are now
being made by the authorities to track down the embezzled money and
to reclaim it. Duvalier and his cronies were given temporary asylum in
France and initially stayed in a luxury hotel on Lake Annecy, not too far
from the prison where Toussaint Louverture, the black leader of slave
liberation, died in 1803. The French Government has tried to remove
Duvalier, but their own laws are making this difficult. He has since
moved to a house in the Riviera.
In the late 1970s, President Carter had put considerable pressure on
Haiti to liberalise its political system and opposition groups began to
organise, openly voicing cautious criticisms of the administration.
Although a number of independent journals appeared, influencing
opinion among students and intellectuals in the larger cities, the major
role was played by various radio commentators, whose caustic
observations on government corruption and inefficiency were listened
to by illiterate (though by no means unintelligent) peasants throughout
the countryside. With the election of Ronald Reagan, Jean-Claude felt
he could safely repress these opposition movements, but the spell had
been broken. Opposition continued to be manifested from such men
as Sylvio Claude, Gregoire Eugene, Gerard Gourge and Gerard
Duclerville. Many of these men were arrested and tortured but bravely
refused to leave the country.
1242
Popular protest
One of the significant features of the movement which eventually led to
the downfall of Duvalierism was that it had its base not in the capital but
in provincial towns like Gonaives, Petit Goave and Jeremie. For the
first time since the United States occupation of Haiti, which ended in
1934, a major political movement has begun outside Port-au-Prince.
Throughout the nineteenth century many governments had been
toppled as a result of ruralguerrilla activity by the cacos orpiquets, as they
were called.5 Armed resistance to the US occupation was also based in
the countryside.6 One of the consequences of the occupation was to
disarm the peasants and to centre economic, political and cultural life in
the capital. While Francois Duvalier (as we have seen) and his mentor
President Dumarsais Estime (1946-50) derived much of their support
from the provinces and rural areas, life continued to be centred in 'the
republic of Port-au-Prince'. Yet in a curious way the organisation of
tontons macoutes, by recruiting many thousands of rural Haitians,
incorporated them-at least symbolically-into the civic life of the
nation. The rhetoric of Duvalier continually proclaimed that the
peasants were the real and important element in the country. Nothing
was further from his intention than to allow them any material influence
in national affairs, yet-as I observed in 1979-'If people are told often
enough that they are important, they may begin to believe it.'7
Popular protests against particularly ruthless and corrupt macoute
leaders go back to the late 1960s, but became increasingly significant
under Jean-Claude Duvalier. Efforts to re-establish the reputation of
the government in the rural areas failed. Popular discontent increased
in the 1980s because of the decline in agricultural production, food
shortages due to drought, and the end of the migration of 'boat people'
to the US.
Added to this was the plague of swine fever and the compulsory
slaughter of the pig population, supervised by the Organisation of
American States, which was believed by many peasants to be part of a
conspiracy. The hardy black pigs fed largely on garbage, were a basic
5
See Alain Turnier, Avec Merisier Jeannis: une tranche de vie jacmelienne et nationale,
Port-au-Prince: published by author, 1982; Andre Georges Adam, Une Crise haitienne,
1867-1869: Sylvain Salnave, Port-au-Prince: Deschamps, 1982; and David Nicholls, 'Rural
Protest and Peasant Revolt, 1804-1869', in Haiti in Caribbean Context, op. cit., pp 167ff.
See Roger Gaillard's seven volumes Les blancs debarquent, Port-au-Prince: published by
author, 1972 onwards; and Kethly Millet, Les paysans haitiens, et l'occupation americaine,
1915-1930, LaSalle, Quebec: LaSalle Collectif Paroles, 1978.
David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, op. cit., p 237.
1243
feature of country life. The new pink pigs were officially distributed
only to those who could guarantee imported pig food and sties with
concrete floors.
Food riots occurred in various parts of the country. In November
1985, high school students took to the streets in Gonaives. Troops
panicked, opened fire, and a number of students were killed. This was
the match which ignited protests throughout the provinces. The
demonstrations became explicitly political and called for the downfall of
Duvalier, urging the army to take over; banners proclaimed 'Vive
l'arme'e'.
L Agel au Ministre, 2 juin 1921, Archives du Ministere des Affairs Etrangeres (Paris), Amerique,
1918-1940, Haiti 15.
9 Key figures in the ethnological movement were J C Dorsainvil, Jean Price
Mars, Arthur Holly,
Jacques Roumain and Carl Brouard. The literary aspects of the movement are discussed by L
Kesteloot, in Les ecrivains noirs de langue franaise, Brussels: Institut de Sociologie de
l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1965; N M Garret, The Renaissance of Haitian Poetry, Paris:
Presence Africaine, 1963; R Depestre, Bonjour et adieu ti la negritude, Paris: Laffont 1980; and
J M Dash, Literature and Ideology in Haiti, 1915-1961, London: Macmillan, 1981. See also
David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, op. cit., chapters 5-6. Duvalier's contributions are
to be found in his Oeuvres essentielles, Volume 1 (3rd edition) Port-au-Prince: published by
author, 1968.
1244
H Courlander and R Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, Washington DC: Institute for CrossCultural Research, 1966; David Nicholls, 'Politics and religion in Haiti', Canadian Journal of
Political Science 3(3) 1970, pp 40f and G R Smucker, 'The social character of religion in rural
Haiti', in C R Foster and A Valdman (eds), Haiti-Today and Tomorrow, Lanham, Maryland:
University Press of America, 1984, pp 35 onwards.
1245
See for example J-M Pare, 'Dimension politique de fait religieux en Haiti', Nouvelle Optique
(6-7) 1972, pp 5f. But, as I remarked in 1979, 'Although the explicit political intention of the
sponsoring agency has normally been conservative the unintended effects of these projects may
turn out to be more radical than their patrons have calculated'. From Dessalines to Duvalier, op.
cit., p 246.
1246
The army
In the crisis which culminated in the flight of Baby Doc in February 1986
the army was manifestly the only body which could assume the
government of the country, yet the unwillingness of the army to take
such action is a notable feature of the situation. Under Franqois
Duvalier the military had been brought firmly under civilian control and
army officers with political ambition were swiftly removed. In this way
he attempted to reverse a tradition which goes back to the foundation of
the state in 1804. Independence had been achieved by military struggle
and it was the generals who succeeded to political power. For over one
hundred years Haiti's head of state was invariably an army officer.
Militarism pervaded the whole administrative structure of the country
and this ethos was reflected in the Voodoo religion, where many of the
Iwa (spirits) were portrayed in the uniform of French eighteenthcentury officers.
Despite attempts by the US occupation to form a professional and
depoliticised army, it was not long before threats of a military coup
again became real. In 1946, 1950 and 1956-7 the army played a key
political role in the termination of one regime and the initiation of
another. While both mulattoes and blacks were to found among the
officer corps, the mass of the army was, of course, black. Throughout
the nineteenth century the army was one of the few institutions in Haiti
which facilitated the rise of poor non-elite blacks to positions of power
and ultimately to the presidency. Consequently, militarism was the
1247
Foreign relations
The United Statesplayedan importantpartin maintainingJean-Claude
Duvalier in power and it was not until the final days that Washington
decided to cut its losses and use its influenceto secure the departureof
the President. Even then US opinion was divided and it is widely
believed that the advice being given by former Ambassador Ernest
Preeg was that Washingtonshould persuade Duvalier to remain and
help shore up the regime.
Ever since Haiti's independence,foreign powers have taken a close
interestin the affairsof the republic.In the earlyyearsFrancehoped to
regain its wayward colony and it was only in 1825 that Haitian
independence was recognised by the former metropolis. The United
States and Britain were keen to trade with Haiti, and during the
Napoleonic period the latter encouragedthe Haitiansto resist French
overtures. Throughoutthe nineteenth centurythe US was, however,
eager to minimiseEuropeaninvolvementin Haiti and at times soughtto
establish a naval base at the Mole St Nicolas. In the years prior to
World War I, the US became particularlyworried about German
activities in Haiti. The overseas commerce of the country was
dominatedby Germanfirmsand shippinglines; the Germancolony in
Haiti was becomingincreasinglyinvolvedin the internalpolitics of the
country, by backing particularcandidates for office in exchange for
commercialfavours. This, together with a general desire for strategic
control of the region and the wish to find a safe field for foreign
investment, resulted in the US decision to invade and occupy Haiti in
1915.
Ernest H Preeg, Haiti and the CBI: a Time of Change and Opportunity, Miami: University of
Miami, 1985.
13 Christian Girault, Le commerce du cafe en Haiti, Paris: Paris CNRS, 1981.
1250
soap, flour, cement, essential oils and other domestic goods have
existed for many years and more recently, as we have noted, foreignowned assembly plants and industries have arrived, mostly in the
capital. These produce electronic goods, garments and such things as
children's toys, baseballs and brassieres. 14 Until recent months these
latter employed roughly 60,000 people, the majority being women.
Other exports include sugar, sisal, cocoa and (in 1984-5) mangoes.
Local commerce is mostly controlled by businessmen of Levantine
origin and by mulatto families.
The disturbances which began in November 1985 have led to
something of an economic crisis. About forty US firms have withdrawn
from Haiti leading to a loss of 12,000 jobs. This is partly due to political
uncertainty, as well as to the possibility of demands for higher wages
which might result from the creation of free trade unions; also new US
restrictions on the importing of textiles have contributed. Again US
health regulations have led to a decline in the importing of Haitian
mangoes. Tourism, which might have begun to recover in 1986 from
the AIDS scare has declined even further, with many hotels totally
desolate.
Since the fall of Duvalier many exiles have returned home to set up
political movements, including former Duvalierists Marc Bazin and
Leslie Manigat-both favoured by the US-and Rene Theodore, who
leads the Haitian Communist Party and appears to be receiving money
from the French Communist Party. Political leaders who remained in
the country include Sylvio Claude and Gregoire Eugene, with their rival
Christian Democratic parties and Hubert de Ronceray, a former
Cabinet minister under Duvalier. Serge Gilles, formerly living in Paris,
heads a party with links to the Socialist International. Two trade union
groups have been formed, one associated with the International
Federation of Free Trade Unions (and thus with the American
AFL/CIO), the other is politically more left-wing.
The junta headed by General Henri Namphy has generally restricted
itself to maintaining some degree of order rather than embarking on
major political changes. Namphy himself is widely believed to be an
honest man without political ambitions, who wishes to allow a
maximum of freedom for different voices to be heard. Pushed by public
opinion, manifested in public demonstrations and strikes, the junta
14
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